28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over claims by a nondiverse plaintiff joined under Rule 20 in a diversity action.

Sunpoint Securities, Inc. v. Porta · filed 2000-03-31(b)

Supplemental jurisdiction is not precluded over claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 20.

Section 1367(b) does not allow supplemental jurisdiction over a diversity plaintiff’s claim against a defendant joined under Rule 20 when the claim does not satisfy the diversity jurisdiction requirements.

American Standard Insurance of Wisconsin v. Rogers · filed 2000-12-05(b)

While Roberts may be joined in American Standard’s action against Rogers under Rule 20, § 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over American Standard’s claims against Roberts in federal court.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over defendants’ counterclaims against nondiverse parties in a diversity action.

SR International Business Insurance Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties · filed 2003-09-26

We also agree with the Silverstein Parties that supplemental jurisdiction provides jurisdiction over the Silverstein Parties' counterclaims against the other insurers even though some of these insurers may be non-diverse.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as a substantial federal claim even when the federal and state claims are asserted against different parties.

Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. v. Do · filed 2003-10-07(a)

Section 1367(a) affords jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the viable federal and state claims are asserted against different parties.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a newly joined nondiverse defendant when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Wayman v. Accor North America, Inc. · filed 2007-05-15(b)

Judge Sebelius properly found that lacking diversity jurisdiction, this Court did not have supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), because the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim is based solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

When original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a realigned plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse party joined under Rule 14 or 19.

Hamlin Group, L.L.C. v. Third Generation Investments, Inc. · filed 2009-05-05(b)

However, subject matter jurisdiction over the third-party complaint would, be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (limitations on supplemental jurisdiction), and would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 (“required joinder” of a party must not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction), because Third Generation and Clocktower Development are both Iowa citizens, so no diversity of citizenship exists as to a claim between those parties.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant joined under Rule 20 in an action founded solely on diversity jurisdiction, even if the claim is related to one within original jurisdiction.

Barrett v. Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 2009-06-17(b)

Accordingly, § 1367(b) forbids the extension of this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over Barrett’s claim against Cotton, a non-diverse Rule 20 defendant.

Section 1367(b) cannot preserve jurisdiction in a diversity-only action if joining a nondiverse defendant would defeat complete diversity.

Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. · filed 2009-06-09(b)

What’s more, the court’s supplemental jurisdiction would not save the day if Bailey were joined.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined under Rule 20 when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

PHL Variable Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company · filed 2020-03-18(b)

The Lloyd’s Defendants are permissively joined parties per Rule 20, and the 14 Court’s original jurisdiction over the action stems from diversity, therefore the Court cannot have 15 supplemental jurisdiction over the Lloyd’s claims.

In actions based solely on diversity jurisdiction, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against a defendant joined under Rule 20.

MAIER SOLAR ENGINEERING, LLC v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY · filed 2022-03-25(b)

Because Plaintiff joined Cooper pursuant to Rule 20, the Court does not possess supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant joined under Rule 20 when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Lyons v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2022-11-10(b)

Based on § 1367(b), the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the wrongful termination claim against USAA Employer.

Section 1367(b) excludes supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against parties joined under Rule 20 when the case rests solely on diversity jurisdiction.

Thornton v. Selma Health and Rehab, LLC · filed 2024-01-12(b)

In civil cases arising solely under diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction like this one, supplemental jurisdiction does not extend to claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rule 20.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant joined under Rule 20 when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

ALLEN v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE · filed 2025-01-15(b)

The claims against both parties would involve common questions of law or fact such that Stifel would be joined as a Rule 20 defendant. As such, the Court must determine whether it can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against Stifel under § 1367(b) and § 1332. Based on an analysis of the facts and the law, the Court finds that it cannot.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a defendant joined under Rule 20 when the claim does not satisfy § 1332’s jurisdictional requirements.

Pizziconi · filed 2025-12-08(b)

Thus, because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against her under § 1332, the Court is prohibited from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against L. Gray under § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined under Rule 20 unless each claim independently satisfies the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.

Keith · filed 2026-03-31(b)

Accordingly, this court may exercise jurisdiction over Mitchell’s claims against each defendant only to the extent that each claim independently satisfies § 1332’s requirement of complete diversity and the amount-in-controversy threshold.

Section 1367 permits remand of a supplemental claim when its state-law question predominates over the remaining claims.

Clark v. Town of Kersey · filed 1997-08-08(c)(2)

Remand is also proper in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the question of whether the governmental entity acted in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity predominates over the remaining federal and state claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state labor class claim that materially replicates the federal FLSA claims despite a disparity in the number of claimants.

Hawkins v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. · filed 2011-11-16(c)(2)

Although Plaintiffs respond that diversity jurisdiction lies over the IMWL claim pursuant the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), it is unnecessary to reach the CAFA issue because supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... Whether the state law claims “substantially predominate” turns not on “[a] simple disparity in numbers,” but on “the type of claim,” meaning that if “the state law claims essentially replicate the FLSA claims[,] they plainly do not predominate.” ... That is precisely the situation presented here, where Plaintiffs’ individual FLSA claims are, as a substantive matter, materially identical to the IMWL claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction merely because a state-law class is much larger than a substantial federal FLSA collective when the claims raise the same issues.

DiSalvo, Zachary v. CRM US, Inc. · filed 2020-06-08(c)(2)

But in a case like this one, in which there is a federal collective of a substantial size, the fact that the potential size of the state-law class is significantly larger isn’t enough to justify applying § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits remand of supplemental state law claims when state law issues substantially predominate over the federal claims.

Karma Ventures v. Chelan County · filed 2021-02-11(c)(2)

Even if the LUPA petition were to resolve such novel and complex issues, the state law issues nonetheless predominate over the federal claims to warrant remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) does not require declining jurisdiction over state wage class claims solely because the class is larger when those claims closely mirror the federal claims.

Mongue v. The Wheatleigh Corporation · filed 2021-09-29(c)(2)

Despite these differences, the state claims are very similar to the federal claims and the difference in numbers is not a decisive factor according to Wang, Ervin, and Shahriar, the reasoning of which the court finds persuasive Thus, the court will not decline jurisdiction on predominance grounds.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law indemnity claim when its central factual issues overlap with the federal claims and it does not substantially predominate.

Atlantic Richfield Company v. NL Industries · filed 2026-02-26(c)(2)

Although there may be unique legal issues as to the 1940 Lease Agreement, the Court does not conclude that the indemnity claim will predominate over the CERCLA claims.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan · filed 1997-08-12(a)

Section 1367(a) does not apply to questions of personal jurisdiction, and the two cases cited by the district court are inapposite: Wiggins v. Philip Morris, Inc., 853 F.Supp. 458, 469 (D.D.C.1994), involved the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction, over supplemental claims, and Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F.Supp. 1094, 1116 (S.D.N.Y.), concerned the exercise of personal jurisdiction where subject matter jurisdiction was based on the FSIA, not diversity of citizenship.

Section 1367(a) permits pendent personal jurisdiction over related state law claims when the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant on a federal claim.

Starlight International, Inc. v. Herlihy · filed 1998-07-21(a)

Although this narrow interpretation of § 1367 has some appeal, every circuit court confronting the issue has rejected the commentators’ analysis and upheld the principle of pendent personal jurisdiction. ... Finding this reasoning persuasive, the court follows the holdings of the Second and Fourth Circuits and concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Verkrui-sen defendants is appropriate on plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental personal jurisdiction over defendants subject to federal claims for related state law claims.

Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1998-09-14(a)

The express terms of § 1367 do not clearly give or deny personal jurisdiction over these movants. Nevertheless, this Court finds that a broader interpretation is appropriate. With such a broader interpretation, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the domestic Rule 12(b)(2) movants for purposes of the remaining state claims in this litigation.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental personal jurisdiction over related state-law cross-claims against a defendant served under a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process.

Rubinbaum LLP v. Related Corporate Partners V · filed 2001-02-16(a)

Given the explicit statement of the Court of Appeals in IUE AFL-CIO that § 1367(a) does not alter the analysis of pendent personal jurisdiction, which the Court of Appeals found to exist in that case, it is plain that supplemental personal jurisdiction under § 1367(a) is an available basis of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has been properly served pursuant to nationwide service of process authorized by a federal statute.

Section 1367(a) supplies supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over related claims but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Hunter v. Mendoza · filed 2002-03-07(a)

Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction cannot be established pursuant to § 1367.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental subject matter and personal jurisdiction over related claims that form part of the same case or controversy.

Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc. And Brooks Strong · filed 2003-04-16(a)

This statute confers supplemental jurisdiction with respect to both subject matter and personal jurisdiction where the “same case or controversy” requirement is satisfied.

Section 1367 permits supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Baptichon v. Nevada State Bank · filed 2004-02-09

The existence of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims thus does not aid plaintiff in demonstrating personal jurisdiction over NSB.

Section 1367 permits factually related state-law claims to be joined with claims within original federal jurisdiction, but does not independently establish personal jurisdiction.

DakColl, Inc. v. Grand Central Graphics, Inc. · filed 2005-01-20

28 U.S.C. § 1367 merely allows factually related state law claims to be joined with claims over which the federal district court has original subject matter jurisdiction. ... It does not provide the Court with an independent basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 cannot support supplemental personal jurisdiction over related claims when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claim that would anchor them.

Spaceco Business Solutions, Inc. v. Mass Engineered Design, Inc. · filed 2013-04-29

Plaintiffs argue that if personal jurisdiction can be established as to the tort claims, then personal jurisdiction as to the patent claims exists pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1206 (Fed.Cir.2003). I do not disagree that this is the law. However, because the Court could not find a basis for personal jurisdiction of the tort claim, it follows that there is no basis for personal jurisdiction as to the patent claims either.

A court may decline to combine supplemental subject matter jurisdiction with pendent personal jurisdiction when no claim independently supports both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.

Magill v. Elysian Global Corporation · filed 2020-02-11(a)

Because the Court finds that there is no personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to the only claims over which it has original jurisdiction, Magill’s claims, the Court must dismiss these claims and the Blumsacks’ supplemental state law actions. “Insofar as the claims could arguably be maintained through a crisscrossing web of pendent subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise such discretion.”

Section 1367 provides supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction over claims but does not dispense with the requirement of personal jurisdiction over each defendant.

Selby v. Schroeder · filed 2020-02-18

Due process requires this court to have personal jurisdiction over every defendant before it, see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)), and Section 1367 is concerned with subject-matter jurisdiction for claims, not in personam jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over pendent claims, but a court must still have personal jurisdiction over each defendant.

Colson v. Samson Hair Restoration, LLC · filed 2011-11-28(a)

Although § 1367(a) permits a federal court to entertain pendent claims over which it would otherwise lack subject matter jurisdiction, federal due process still requires that a court have personal jurisdiction over each defendant.

Section 1367 provides subject matter jurisdiction over supplemental claims but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Powers-Barnhard v. Butler · filed 2020-08-21

Plaintiff’s argument as to Ms. Butler misses the mark. “Supplemental jurisdiction deals with subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction.”

Section 1367 governs supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not address supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction.

Moore v. Senate Majority PAC · filed 2020-09-18

A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, governs the exercise of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not address supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction. So the court does not apply it.

Section 1367 does not authorize pendent claim or pendent party personal jurisdiction.

Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc. · filed 2021-08-17

No less importantly, no federal statute or rule authorizes pendent claim or pendent party personal jurisdiction. ... No such law exists—not in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, not in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1367 permits supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over a claim but does not dispense with personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

D'Anzieri v. HHarrison Global LLC · filed 2022-12-02

Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for which it lacks original, or subject-matter, jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in addition to subject-matter or supplemental jurisdiction, unless the defendant waives personal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 governs supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not address supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction.

Carden v. Springfield Mortuary Service Inc · filed 2024-09-03

A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, governs the exercise of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not address supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not govern pendent personal jurisdiction.

WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited · filed 2020-07-16

The court uses the term “pendent personal jurisdiction” to distinguish the concept from the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims against nondiverse parties by the would-be plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, even when that party is formally the defendant.

The Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Adams · filed 1997-08-19(b)

The policies behind the supplemental jurisdiction statute can only be served by reading section 1367(b) to prohibit the assertion of claims against the agents.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a common law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction under Younger abstention.

Jefferson-11th Street, LLC v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-04-09(c)(3)

Because that action “dismisse[s] all claims over which [the Court] has original jurisdiction,” the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count III of the Complaint and grants the Tenants’ Motion to Dismiss. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Staying federal claims permits the court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining common-law claim.

Jefferson-11th Street, LLC v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-06-05

Because the Court will stay rather than dismiss a part of Count I and Count II, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining common-law claim contained in Count III. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits a court that dismisses a federal claim under Colorado River abstention to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Mazlin Trading Corp. v. WJ Holding LTD · filed 2021-03-26

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for confirmation of the arbitration awards is granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Petitioners’ cross-motion to confirm the arbitration awards is denied as moot, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Petitioners’ remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims raising novel or complex issues, including claims that underlie federal claims from which the court has abstained.

Bath Petroleum Storage, Inc. v. Sovas · filed 2001-03-21(c)(1)

Defendants argue, and this Court agrees, that because these claims raise novel or complex issues of state law, dismissal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits a court that abstains from federal question claims to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.

Harper v. Public Service Com'n of West Virginia · filed 2003-11-19

Because the court has determined that it should abstain from considering Plaintiffs’ federal question claims, the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims (to the extent such jurisdiction exists) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e).

Section 1367 permits a court that abstains from the federal claims to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the accompanying state law claims.

Virdis Development Corp. v. Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County · filed 2015-02-18

This Court' declines to exercise any pendent jurisdiction regarding the purely state law claims appearing in Count II. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when it abstains from the federal claim.

Davies v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n · filed 1997-03-20(c)(3)

Accordingly, the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over Count I of the complaint, which contains plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief under § 6972(a)(1)(B). The court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law damage claims set forth in Count II. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) makes pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim inappropriate when the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over the related federal claims.

Nichols v. Brown · filed 2013-03-03(c)(3)

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert such a claim, pendent jurisdiction is not appropriate once the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) does not permit a court to decline a state-law claim merely because it raises a novel or complex issue when independent diversity jurisdiction exists, absent an applicable exception.

Clark v. Matthews International Corp. · filed 2011-05-02(c)(1)

In that opinion, we declined, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Clark’s MHRA claim because it “raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” ... However, the Supreme Court has indicated that, as a general rule, the novelty or complexity of a state-law issue is not an appropriate basis upon which to remand a case when diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists.

Section 1367(c) does not authorize dismissal of common law claims supported by independent diversity jurisdiction after the federal claims are dismissed.

China Trust Bank of NY v. Standard Chartered Bank · filed 1997-10-22(c)

Because the complaint invokes diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court may not, on the facts alleged, dismiss the common law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction, but that discretion does not apply to claims independently within its diversity jurisdiction.

Glass v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2010-02-17(c)

The Airport Authority has confused this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction with the explicit constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction. ... Supplemental jurisdiction, however, is discretionary. ... Here, all of Glass’ causes of action are in federal court based on an independent, constitutionally conferred, and statutorily authorized source of jurisdiction: diversity.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit a court to decline jurisdiction over state-law claims that independently fall within its diversity jurisdiction, even if all federal claims are dismissed.

Price v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 2011-09-07(c)(3)

Defendants argue that if no federal claims survive summary judgment, then the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state and city-law claims as well, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... But as Price points out, this Court has jurisdiction over the state and city-law claims under its diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ... Thus, even if all the federal claims were dismissed, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state and city-law claims would be improper.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against an added nondiverse defendant when diversity is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction.

Brune v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2019-07-24(b)

3 Contrary to Plaintiff’s “belie[f] . . . that the Court would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any additional defendants added to this matter,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction is not available when the Court’s sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction is neither present nor needed when the complaint alleges no federal-law claims and diversity jurisdiction covers the state-law claims.

Rosa & Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development v. Target Corp. · filed 2015-02-09

However, § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction is neither present nor required because the Parks Institute does not allege any federal-law claims in its Amended Complaint, and the diversity of the parties is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the Parks Institute’s state-law claims.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over the specified joinder or intervention claims only when exercising it would violate § 1332’s diversity requirements.

Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant · filed 2006-05-01(b)

This final clause makes the diversity statute, § 1332, decisive. If that statute is not offended, the prohibition of § 1367(b) does not apply.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity action over a plaintiff’s state-law claims against a nondiverse party impleaded under Rule 14.

LLOYD NOLAND FOUNDATION v. HealthSouth Corp. · filed 2007-08-24(b)

Because § 1367(b) barred the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the Foundation's state-law claims against HealthSouth, the Foundation is correct in its assertion that it was prohibited from asserting its state-law claims against HealthSouth in the federal litigation.

Section 1367(b)'s exception to supplemental jurisdiction does not apply when original jurisdiction rests on an FTCA claim rather than diversity jurisdiction.

Lackro v. Kao · filed 2010-10-08(b)

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' associated state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and the exception to exercising jurisdiction under that statute does not apply.

Section 1367(c) does not provide a basis to decline state law claims supported by independent diversity jurisdiction, even when CAFA’s home state exception is invoked.

Martin v. Trott Law, P.C. · filed 2017-07-12(c)

Even if the home state exception applied, there would be no basis to dismiss the state law claims under section 1367(c), because that exception does not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit dismissal of state-law claims if independent diversity jurisdiction exists.

Stoller v. Walworth County, Wisconsin · filed 2019-05-30(c)(3)

The district court could not dismiss the claims under § 1367(c)(3) if federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship existed, and on remand the court should consider the possibility that diversity jurisdiction existed.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit a court to dismiss state-law claims by declining supplemental jurisdiction when the complaint independently establishes diversity jurisdiction over those claims.

Wang v. China Wok · filed 2020-09-18(c)(3)

Thus, the allegations of the complaint establish a basis for diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. Zheng and China Wok fail to show I have discretion to dismiss Wang’s state-law claims by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.

Section 1367(c) does not call for discretionary dismissal of state law claims when the court has independent diversity jurisdiction over them, even after the only federal claim is resolved.

Doe v. P Trustees of Dartmouth College · filed 2024-04-17(c)

Although the court has found that Dartmouth is entitled to summary judgment on Doe’s only federal law claim, the court will not consider dismissing Doe’s breach of contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) given the existence of diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over petitions to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the dispute shares a common case or controversy with a pending federal claim.

Rocket Jewelry Box, Inc. v. Noble Gift Packaging, Inc. · filed 1997-11-20(a)

Accordingly, I conclude that supplemental jurisdiction constitutes an “independent basis of jurisdiction” under the FAA.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims seeking on-the-record review of state or local administrative decisions.

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons · filed 1997-12-15(a)

There is nothing in the text of § 1367(a) that indicates an exception to supplemental jurisdiction for claims that require on-the-record review of a state or local administrative determination. Instead, the statute generally confers supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims" in the same case or controversy as a federal question, without reference to the nature of review.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims, while allowing it to retain a claim whose dispositive issue it has already decided.

Bronson v. Ann & Robert H Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago · filed 2021-03-18(c)(3)

Since the Court has dismissed Bronson’s federal claims with prejudice, however, “the usual practice” would be to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and dismiss them without prejudice. ... Count III does not suffer from the same deficiency and, thus, it is dismissed without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over claims raising complex issues of state law while retaining jurisdiction over other supplemental claims.

Boody v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1997-12-18(c)(1)

Supplemental jurisdiction may be declined where the claim raises complex issues of state law, § 1367(c)(1), as in the present case regarding claims against the Camden Defendants, while, in contrast, the state claims against the Cherry Hill Defendants could all be resolved by applying well-settled principles of CEPA law to this case.

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of a supplemental state age discrimination claim when the corresponding federal claim fails, while other state claims may remain when a federal retaliation claim survives.

Delanoy v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2009-03-31

Delanoy invokes the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for his state law claims. Because Delanoy’s federal claim of age discrimination does not survive the motion for summary judgment, summary judgment as to plaintiffs state law claim based on age discrimination pursuant to Law 100 is GRANTED and said claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Because Delanoy’s federal claim of retaliation survives the motion for summary judgment, summary judgment as to Delanoy’s remaining state law claims is DENIED.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction when a Rule 19 party is aligned as an involuntary plaintiff and that party’s joinder destroys diversity.

Butcher v. Hildreth · filed 1998-02-11(b)

Based on this court’s finding that Mr. Bar-field is properly aligned as an involuntary plaintiff, under Rule 19, under this statute this court does not have jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse person’s claim when that person is proposed to be joined as a Rule 19 plaintiff in an action founded solely on diversity, even if another party proposes the joinder.

Central Synagogue v. Turner Construction Co. · filed 1999-09-16(b)

Thus, Central’s claim against Turner is a claim by a person proposed to be joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19 and therefore fits squarely within the language of 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 19 plaintiff’s claim in a diversity action when that claim fails the jurisdictional amount requirement.

Ricciardi v. Kone, Inc. · filed 2003-05-13(b)

However, Section 1367(b) creates an exceptions to that rule in diversity actions where plaintiffs are joined pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 19. ... Therefore, if Rule 19 applies to Vincent Ricciardi, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claim.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by nondiverse people proposed to join as plaintiffs under Rule 19 or intervene under Rule 24 when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Estate of McFarlin v. City of Storm Lake · filed 2011-09-07(b)

As I explained when I construed McFarlin’s improper Rule 19 motion to join as a Rule 24 motion to intervene, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear McFarlin’s claims because he is not diverse from all defendants and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) denies supplemental jurisdiction to non-diverse parties proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 or Rule 24.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims when a district court has original jurisdiction over at least one claim, including through diversity jurisdiction.

Darling's v. Chrysler Group, LLC · filed 2014-10-30(a)

If even one claim falls under a district court’s “original jurisdiction,” whether under the federal question jurisdiction statute generally or the diversity jurisdiction statute, the supplemental jurisdiction statute allows the district court to hear other claims that are part of the same “case or controversy.”

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by persons proposed to join as plaintiffs under Rule 19 in a diversity action.

CSNK Working Capital Finance Corp. v. Liquid Capital Exchange, Inc. · filed 2021-06-08(b)

And contrary to Bay View’s contentions, supplemental jurisdiction is not available over “persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19.”

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim by a party involuntarily joined as a counterclaim defendant, because that party is not a plaintiff under the subsection.

ADYB Engineered For Life, Inc. v. Edan Administration Services (Ireland) LTD. · filed 2022-07-20(b)

However, the Second Circuit has consistently held that “plaintiffs” in section 1367(b) “refers to the original plaintiff in the action, [] not to a defendant who brings a counterclaim or cross- claim, thereby becoming a third party plaintiff.” F5 Cap. v. Pappas, 856 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original); see Viacom, 212 F.3d at 726–27. “[T]hat reading serves Congress’s purpose because ‘defendants are involuntarily brought into court,’ whereas a plaintiff is ‘master of [his] complaint.’” F5 Cap., 856 F.3d at 79 (quoting Viacom, 212 F.3d at 727). H.Cohen is not an original plaintiff, nor was he joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 when those claims would defeat diversity jurisdiction.

Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A. · filed 1994-03-31(b)

Moreover, if Nike had filed this suit as the sole plaintiff, it could not have relied on the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction to add NIL and NIL’s claims. ... Supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used to create jurisdiction over an action that does not satisfy the requirements of the diversity statute.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against nondiverse defendants joined to an action founded solely on diversity jurisdiction.

Johnson v. WELSH EQUIPMENT, INC. · filed 2007-10-30(b)

However, there is a statutory restriction on the Court’s ability to exercise diversity jurisdiction over newly joined, nondiverse defendants: ... In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. ... Plaintiff admits, and the parties who briefed the issue agree, that three nondiverse parties were misjoined as direct Defendants in this action and, as a result, complete diversity no longer exists.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a defendant joined under Rule 20 when exercising it would conflict with diversity jurisdiction’s amount in controversy requirement.

LM Insurance Corp v. Spaulding Enterprise · filed 2008-07-08(b)

We also note that supplemental jurisdiction could not be exercised over LM’s claims against Rosetti, because doing so would require that she be joined as a defendant pursuant to ...FED. R. CIV. P. 20, something explicitly forbidden by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) when doing so “would be inconsistent with” the requirements for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which includes the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to reconsider a discretionary remand order even after the order has been mailed to state court.

Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp. · filed 1998-04-15(c)

Accordingly, we conclude that the mailing of a remand order does not divest a district court of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration following a remand order issued under S 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when a federal claim is restored on remand.

Armstrong v. City of Carlsbad · filed 2002-08-15

On remand the district court should grant Armstrong leave to amend his due process claim and should reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear Armstrong’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Remand orders under § 1367(c) are freely reviewable on appeal because the statute places no restriction on their appealability.

Pio v. GENERAL NUTRITION COMPANIES, INC. · filed 2007-03-02(c)

Unlike remands under § 1452(b), remands under § 1367(c) are freely reviewable because Congress placed no statutory restrictions on their appealability.

Section 1367(a) allows a district court to reconsider exercising supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after federal claims are reinstated on appeal.

Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio · filed 2017-11-01(a)

The district court should have the opportunity on remand to determine anew whether to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

A district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is discretionary rather than jurisdictional, so the court may reconsider its remand of the state law claims.

Masjid Malcom Shabazz House of Worship, Inc. v. Inkster, City of · filed 2022-03-23(c)

Under Hudson—the only case the Court found from this circuit that addresses a district court’s ability to reconsider its own order of remand under § 1367(c)—the Court is not precluded by § 1447(d) from reconsidering its August 12, 2021 Opinion and Order that granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as to Count III and remanded the case to state court.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against individual defendants when the federal claims against them are dismissed well before trial.

Rodriguez-Rivas v. POLICE DEPT. OF PUERTO RICO · filed 2007-02-08

The dismissal of the Title VII claim against the individual Defendants leaves only state claims against them that should be resolved in a state court. Since the federal claim against the individual defendants have been properly dismissed well before the .commencement of trial, this Court will exercise its discretion and decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims asserted against them in the present case.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against all defendants when federal claims remain pending against one defendant, even if federal claims against other defendants have been resolved.

Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc. · filed 1998-04-19

Although the court has granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Land O’ Lakes, FCS, and FCC on the only federal claims against them, the court nonetheless retains jurisdiction over the federal claims against defendant CSA and supplemental jurisdiction over Oeltjenbrun's state-law claims against all defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims against a defendant even when the federal claim against that defendant is dismissed, if federal claims against a co-defendant remain and all claims arise from a common nucleus of facts.

Jarzyna v. Home Properties, L.P. · filed 2011-02-04(a)

Even though the Court dismissed the one federal claim brought against Defendant L.P., the pendency of federal claims against co-defendant FCO permits jurisdiction. ... Additionally, as stated in the discussion of misjoinder, all claims arise out of the same common nucleus of facts. Consequently, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants whose federal claims were dismissed when federal claims against other defendants remain and the state claims share a common nucleus of operative fact.

Town of Islip v. Datre · filed 2017-03-28(c)(3)

As discussed above, the Church defendants are correct that the Complaint fails to state federal claims against them (as well as the arranger, and Atlas defendants), but the Court concludes that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate because the federal claims against the Datre and Grabe defendants remain, and the state law claims against the arranger, Atlas, and Church defendants “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,” namely, the dumping of the material at the Park.

Section 1367 permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants after dismissing all federal claims against them and remanding those state law claims to state court.

Reed v. Gautreaux · filed 2019-11-21

Having dismissed all federal claims asserted against the EMS/EMS employees, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Plaintiff’s state law claims against the EMS/EMS employees shall be remanded to state court.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims against defendants whose federal claims were dismissed when federal claims against other defendants remain.

Kiekisz v. Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners/Cuyahoga County · filed 2021-11-09(c)(3)

After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court will not exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims against Defendants Lagreca, Beawin-Monah, Zitiello, and Parnell. Although the federal claims against those individuals are dismissed, other federal claims remain against several other Defendants, including Dr. Tallman and Nurse Trovato. Further, the State claims involve the same set of facts and circumstances as the remaining federal claims such that there is one case or controversy between the parties.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to retain related state-law claims against a defendant after dismissing the federal claims against that defendant when federal claims against other defendants remain.

King v. Village of Brewster · filed 2023-03-29(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the Court has dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims against the Village, the Court has not dismissed all federal claims in this action. Federal claims remain against Officer Quinones and Don’s Automotive. Thus, because at this stage plaintiff asserts claims against the Village, Quinones, and Don’s Automotive, all arising from the same incidents, based on “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,” Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d at 122, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims against the Village.

Section 1367 cannot support claims against members of an unincorporated association when there is no independent claim against their representative to which those claims can be appended.

Indiana Gas Company, Inc. v. Home Insurance Company · filed 1998-05-13

Yet that could not be described as a use of the supplemental jurisdiction: the only claim would be a representative one, on which complete diversity could not be established. Just so with suits by and against unincorporated insurance syndicates. Indiana Gas does not have claims against the lead underwriters, to which claims against names might be appended using 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of putative class members when the court has original jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs’ federal claim.

Irwin v. Mascott · filed 1999-03-24(a)

In this action the court unquestionably has jurisdiction over named plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. Since putative class members’ claims are supplemental to the named plaintiffs’ claims, this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these claims is appropriate.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize a district court to freeze a defendant’s assets before judgment to secure payment of a possible judgment.

United States v. Arthur G. Cohen, and Steven M. Terk Marvin B. Tepper Lawrence M. Goodman Ilyne R. Mendelson · filed 1998-08-11(a)

But ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction confers no authority on a district court to enter a prejudgment order enjoining a defendant from disposing of his property which may be used to satisfy a judgment not yet obtained.

Section 1367(b) does not bar a diversity defendant from joining nondiverse parties as counterclaim defendants.

United Capitol Insurance Company v. Kapiloff · filed 1998-09-08(b)

It was the Kapiloffs, as the declaratory judgment defendants, who joined the nondiverse insurance brokers as additional parties, naming them counterclaim defendants. Because § 1367(b) does not limit this joinder, we are satisfied that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaimant’s claim against a nondiverse counterdefendant.

American Insurance v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. · filed 2009-01-07(b)

This limitation does not apply when a counterclaimant asserts a claim against a non-diverse counterdefendant.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim against a nondiverse additional party when the counterclaim forms part of the same case or controversy as the original claim.

Branhaven, LLC v. BeefTek, Inc. · filed 2013-08-15(a)

Given the identical issues of facts and law and the logical relationship between the claims, the counterclaim is compulsory, and the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim against Scidera.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s compulsory counterclaims against nondiverse additional parties.

Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Crocker · filed 2016-03-25(b)

Lastly, the limitations under § 1367(b) do not apply here as the Plaintiffs did not' seek to join additional parties nor did they seek to assert claims against any additional parties.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant joined under Rule 20 when the action rests solely on diversity jurisdiction.

Echols v. Courier Express One, Inc. · filed 2021-12-20(b)

However, Phillips is a non-diverse party, and Section 1367(b) states that in civil actions proceeding in federal court based solely on diversity jurisdiction under Section 1332, the district court “shall not have supplemental jurisdiction” over “claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule…19, 20” or “over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19,” if “exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, Phillips falls within the jurisdictional exclusions in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and may not be joined to a federal action.

Section 1367 limits supplemental jurisdiction to civil actions and does not supply jurisdiction over contract claims raised in a criminal proceeding.

United States v. Polishan · filed 1998-09-10(a)

There is no mention of the application of supplemental jurisdiction to a criminal case. Given the specific statutory-language, Polishan cannot argue that supplemental jurisdiction exists under § 1367 in relation to the alleged breach of Reliance’s duty under its insurance policy with Leslie Fay to advance his defense costs.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions and does not provide jurisdiction over pending state criminal proceedings.

Weinert v. Pushmataha County Municipal District · filed 2025-03-24

28 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 1369 and 1631 only apply to civil actions.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against an additional defendant when that claim would defeat the diversity required for jurisdiction.

Dobrovich v. Hamel · filed 1998-10-20(b)

Pursuant to our earlier decision in Hotchkiss, and our granting of leave to amend the Hamel complaint, diversity would be the only basis for jurisdiction over Hamel, and the presence of Hotchkiss would destroy diversity as the basis for jurisdiction. Thus, section 1367(b) forbids our exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the Hotchkiss defendants.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction to join a foreign defendant to a diversity suit between a U.S. citizen and foreign plaintiffs when the joinder would defeat diversity jurisdiction.

EXTRA EQUIPAMENTOS E EXPORTAÇÃO LTDA. v. CASE CORPORATION · filed 2004-03-15(b)

The diversity jurisdiction does not extend to a suit in which there is a U.S. citizen on only one side of the suit and foréign parties on both sides, ... as there would be if Case Brasil became a defendant. And the federal courts’ supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used to leap this jurisdictional hurdle. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court weighs judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity at every stage of the litigation.

Raglin v. Cruz · filed 2022-06-29(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, faimess, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

Section 1367(c) permits district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims based on the circumstances of the case, the nature of those claims, the governing state law, and their relationship to federal claims.

Weilch v. Singh · filed 2022-06-20(c)

Depending on a host of factors, then -- including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims - - district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.

Section 1367(c) allows district courts to consider the circumstances of the case, the state-law claims, and their relationship to the federal claims when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Raglin v. Teng · filed 2022-06-22(c)

Depending on a host of factors, then -- including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims - - district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when fairness and comity raise concerns.

Benford v. Lenz · filed 2022-06-23(c)

In light of the foregoing, the court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to show why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when fairness and comity concerns arise.

Mister Bailey v. Dragonis Investments, LLC · filed 2022-06-27(c)

In light of the foregoing, the court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) calls for a court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to weigh judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity at every stage of the case.

Cauley v. Smoky Hollow Industries, LLC · filed 2022-06-27(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”

Section 1367(c) calls for a court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to weigh judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Bryant v. Sonny Shami Noori · filed 2022-06-06(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) need not state its reasons for doing so.

San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-11-06(c)(2)

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide stated reasons for its dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state takings claim when hearing it would allow an unripe federal takings claim to ripen in the same action.

National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Town of Wales · filed 2012-10-23(c)(4)

Moreover, it would be a strange scenario indeed if a federal takings claim could withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to utilize state remedies, then ripen through the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, and finally be adjudicated under the court's original jurisdiction. This Court has no trouble concluding that this is not what Supreme Court envisioned in crafting this rule. Therefore, even if it this Court could exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanding bifurcated state claims when separate juries considering distinct legal theories will avoid prejudice and promote fair and efficient adjudication.

Penaloza v. City of Rialto · filed 2020-03-10(c)(4)

The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1376 because “there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” ... Here, there is a substantial judicial interest in remanding the claims, as the separate juries will be able to independently consider the distinct legal theories which underly each of the causes of action. This will avoid prejudice to either party and allow for both parties to receive a prompt and efficient adjudication on the entirety of the complaint.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when the court has already resolved the parallel ADA claim and liability under the Unruh Act follows automatically.

Lammey v. Plaza Segundo, LLC · filed 2022-06-14(c)(4)

Under our recent decision in Arroyo, however, the district court abused its discretion in determining that “compelling reasons” existed for declining supplemental jurisdiction under the specific circumstances of this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after all claims within its original jurisdiction are dismissed, without expressly stating that reason when the basis is clear.

Dirauf v. Berger · filed 2022-12-28(c)(3)

The District Court did not err by failing to explain why it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the Remand Order.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when compelling reasons include broader state-law issues and a more advanced parallel state action.

Lawson · filed 2026-05-31(c)(4)

After careful consideration, pursuant to Section 1367(c)(4), this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because of the nature of the state law claims, the relationship between the state and federal claims of the parties, the more advanced stage of litigation of Nelson’s counterclaims in the 2025 State Court Action, and the far broader nature of the factual issues involved in Nelson’s counterclaims than the circumstances of Lawson’s claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) requires a district court to articulate compelling reasons when it declines supplemental jurisdiction.

Okwedy v. Molinari · filed 2003-06-25(c)(4)

On remand, “[t]he district court may either exercise jurisdiction over those claims under [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(a) or articulate ‘compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.’”

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction if it articulates compelling reasons for doing so.

Nerney v. Valente & Sons Repair Shop, a Partnership, Joseph A. Valente and Mary Ann Valente, D/B/A Valente & · filed 1995-09-13(c)(4)

The district court may either exercise jurisdiction over those claims under § 1367(a) or articulate “eompel-ling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

A party may forfeit an objection to a district court retaining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims fall out before trial.

Sullivan v. James P. Conway and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1998-11-16(c)(3)

'No one complains of his doing so, however, and discretionary components of the supplemental jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may be forfeited, just like any other nonjunsdictional grounds in civil litigation.

An objection to a district court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is waived if it is not raised in the district court.

Leslie Kohler,plaintiff-Appellant v. Inter-Tel Technologies,defendant-Appellee · filed 2001-04-11(c)

Kohler has waived her objection to the district court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by failing to raise it in the district court. ... The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is therefore treated differently from Article III jurisdiction, which must be examined even when no party has raised it or even if raised for the first time on appeal.

A party who opposes dismissal of remaining state law claims under § 1367(c) waives an objection to the district court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Carter v. Family and Child Treatment of Southern Nevada · filed 2011-11-23(c)

Before the district court, Carter “oppose[d] the dismissal without prejudice of his remaining state law claims” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and so “waived [his] objection to the district court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.” Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).

A party waives an argument that the district court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) by failing to raise it in the district court.

Greenway v. Southern Health Partners, Inc. · filed 2020-09-15(c)

Kenneth, however, never raised the supplemental jurisdiction issue to the district court and has therefore waived it. ... For those reasons, we will not “overlook [Kenneth’s] failure to present [his section] 1367(c) arguments to the district court.” See id.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain related state claims after dismissing all federal claims, and a party can waive an objection to that discretionary choice by failing to develop the objection before the district court.

Rubinstein v. Yehuba · filed 2022-06-29(c)(3)

With that standard in mind, we conclude that waiver occurred here. The Yehudas cited § 1367(c) only a single time in their mo- tion to dismiss reply, and they did not develop any argument under that subsection.

An objection to a district court’s discretionary decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is waived unless raised in the district court.

Ash v. Flowers Foods · filed 2024-03-28(c)

Finally—and most importantly—Plaintiffs failed to request a remand from the district court in the event that it ruled for Flowers on the federal claim. That failure renders Plaintiffs’ instant challenge waived.

A party forfeits an objection to a district court’s retention of supplemental jurisdiction by failing to raise it in the district court.

Innova Investment Group, LLC v. Village of Key Biscayne · filed 2024-05-29(c)

But Innova never asked the district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim if the federal claims were dismissed. Because a district court’s de- cision to retain supplemental jurisdiction “may not be raised at any time [like] a jurisdictional defect,” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009) (citation omitted), Innova forfeited its supplemental jurisdiction argument by not raising it below, see Rubinstein v. Yehuda, 38 F.4th 982, 995–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (conclud- ing that an objection to the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction raised for the first time on appeal was waived); cf. Acri ... v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[O]nce [a district court] is satisfied that the power to resolve state law claims exists, the court is not required to make a [sec- tion] 1367(c) analysis unless asked to do so by a party.”).

Section 1367(c)(3) does not authorize dismissal of remaining diversity claims after one aggregated claim is dismissed, because the aggregated claims all fall within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Community Services, Inc. · filed 1999-01-22(c)(3)

This can have no bearing on aggregated claims, because (for one thing) the dismissal of an individual claim that was aggregated to create original jurisdiction, is emphatically not the dismissal of “all claims over which [the court] has original jurisdiction,” so long as it can be said that the court had on the filing-date original jurisdiction over the dismissed claim and the disaggregated claims that remain.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit a court to decline jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim that formed part of aggregated claims establishing original diversity jurisdiction, even after other claims are dismissed.

Barefield v. HSBC Holdings PLC · filed 2018-12-07(c)(3)

The Court finds this reasoning persuasive and holds that the Court cannot decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's sole remaining claim because the claim, as part of the bundle of claims that put more than the jurisdictional amount at issue and established original jurisdiction, was not supplemental at all.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as a federal claim, even when the state claims involve additional parties.

Alger v. Ganick, O'Brien & Sarin · filed 1999-02-09(a)

Without question, the state law claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. All of the claims involve Alger’s dispute over the amount and the means used to collect his two student loans. Under the mandatory language of section 1367(a), this court therefore has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Such jurisdiction exists notwithstanding the presence of additional parties such as MHEAC.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims against additional parties when the action includes claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Hudson County Carpenters Local Union No. 6 v. V.S.R. Construction Corp. · filed 2000-12-29(a)

The individual defendants are however, subject to the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. ... Unlike Peacock, where there was no original jurisdiction to supplement, in this case there is a present case or controversy under both ERISA and § 301 of the LMRA. ... Thus, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction with respect to each of the defendants.

Section 1367(a) authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties when those claims form part of the same constitutional case as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co. · filed 2002-09-03(a)

In 1990, Congress enacted § 1367 to provide such an express grant. ... We therefore decline Selective Employment’s invitation to impose a per se constitutional bar on supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties.

Section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties when those claims form part of the same constitutional case as claims within original jurisdiction; the district court retains discretion whether to exercise that jurisdiction.

Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co. · filed 2002-09-03(a)

In 1990, Congress enacted § 1367 to provide such an express grant. ... Thus, to avoid dismissal for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the employees must show that the state conspiracy claims against Selective Employment constitute part of the same constitutional case as the federal RICO claims against the growers. Assuming that the claims meet the Gibbs standard, the district court has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The decision to exercise that jurisdiction remains discretionary with the district court.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant facing no federal claims when those claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with federal claims against another defendant.

Mondschein v. NY 101, INC. · filed 2020-03-17(a)

Exercising jurisdiction over the state law claims against Gross is proper, even though there are no federal claims against him.

Section 1367(a) expressly provides supplemental jurisdiction over related claims involving additional parties.

In Re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994 · filed 1995-11-17(a)

Thus, insofar as § 1367 now expressly provides for “pendent party jurisdiction,” the analysis driven by Finley is unwarranted.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law tax claims when deciding them would conflict with the federalism principles embodied in the Tax Injunction Act.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Board of Revision of Taxes · filed 1999-04-08(c)(4)

Assuming we could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims despite the Tax Injunction Act, we elect not to do so. Section 1367(c)(4) gives the court discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction “in exceptional circumstances” when “there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” We believe it would be contrary to the principles of federalism embodied in the Tax Injunction Act if we were to become involved in deciding whether a local tax is lawful under state law.

Section 1367(a) governs supplemental jurisdiction in civil actions and does not eliminate ancillary jurisdiction in criminal cases.

Rene Garcia and Carmen Vazquez Alvarez v. Jane S. Teitler as Personal Representative of Stanley A. Teitler, Deceased, 1 · filed 2006-03-22(a)

Although § 1367 says nothing of criminal matters, it does not follow that a court may not exercise ancillary jurisdiction in a criminal case.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are factually interdependent with the original suit.

Cincinnati Insurance Company v. McLean (PLR2) · filed 2019-09-27

The former has been codified by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, while the latter, known as “ancillary enforcement jurisdic- tion,” continues as a creature of case law and necessity. ... First, these claims are factually interdepend- ent with the suit as it originated, which sought to clarify the relationship of the parties.

Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction is unnecessary when § 1334 supplies related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction and cannot bypass the jurisdictional provisions of §§ 1334 and 157.

Ruby Evans by and through her Successor in Interest v. Windsor Vallejo Care Center, LLC · filed 2025-02-20(a)

Such “supplemental jurisdiction” is not necessary in light of Congress expressly providing for related to jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334. To the extent that such supplemental jurisdiction exists, the facts, claims, pleadings, and factors weigh heavily for remand of the State Court Action to the State Court (and supplemental jurisdiction does not provide a "work-around" of the jurisdictional provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 enacted by Congress).

Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction is distinct from equitable ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes related to a court’s prior decrees.

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. · filed 1999-04-08

We also reject Churchill County's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the State Engineer cannot satisfy the test for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 is distinct from the equitable doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, which allows a court to adjudicate related claims “to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The latter is aL work here.

Section 1367 does not confer ancillary jurisdiction over a judgment enforcement proceeding that raises a new theory of liability against a nonparty to the original action.

IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard International Partners, LLC · filed 2005-02-10

This issue in turn raises an entirely new and original legal proceeding, over which this court cannot rightfully extend ancillary subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not displace a federal court’s common law ancillary jurisdiction over proceedings to enforce its judgments.

National City Mortgage Co. v. Stephen · filed 2011-07-22

Ancillary jurisdiction is a common law doctrine that survived the codification of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 does not govern ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over separate proceedings, which survives independently under the courts’ common law powers.

Shenecqua Butt v. United Brotherhood · filed 2021-06-08

Although not mentioned in § 1367, this common-law doctrine has survived the codification of supplemental jurisdiction and remains independent of the statute.

Section 1367 does not govern uncodified ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over a receiver’s suit to carry out a receivership.

Crawford v. Bleeden · filed 2022-05-12

“ʻThis form of jurisdiction developed in case law as “ancillary” or “ancillary enforcement” jurisdiction. It seems clear that § 1367 does not apply to this form of jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3523.2 (3d ed. 2002)). Proceedings in this action brought by the Receiver are supported by uncodified ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not govern ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, which arises under federal common law.

Atlas Biologicals v. Biowest · filed 2022-10-11

Not governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is a creature of the common law and thus is governed by caselaw.

Section 1367 permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, including a claim whose scope and damages remain unsettled under state law.

Carpenter v. Refrigeration Sales Corp. · filed 1999-05-05(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this claim and Carpenter’s motion for summary judgment is, thus, denied with respect to this claim. ... The Court is particularly disinclined to exercise jurisdiction over Carpenter's public policy claim. While it is clear that such a claim does exist under Ohio law, the nature and scope of any such claim is less clear. This is particularly so when one tries to determine the measure of damages available under such a claim. Where state law remains in the developmental stages, that development is best left to the state courts.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to dismiss state-law claims without prejudice when it leaves unresolved questions of state law to state courts.

Brady v. Dill · filed 1999-07-22(c)(1)

Those questions are for the Commonwealth's courts to answer. Hence, we direct the district court to dismiss Brady's state-law claims without prejudice for want of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims are allowed to proceed.

Shipp v. McMahon · filed 2000-01-07

Because we are of the view that Shipp’s Equal Protection claims should be allowed to proceed, we affirm the district court’s decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Shipp’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims raise novel and complex issues of state law.

Cooper v. Parrish · filed 2000-02-09(c)(1)

However, there may be certain nuances in the Tennessee common law immunity doctrine that Tennessee courts have yet to address. Thus, we suggest that on remand the district court consider whether it should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this' case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state-law claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law.

Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc. · filed 2000-03-14(c)(1)

Because of the novel and complex nature of the claims in Count III, this court agrees that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of permitting the state to interpret its own laws.

Section 1367(c) calls for the district court to determine whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are resolved.

Wilson v. Russo · filed 2000-05-19(c)

Therefore, although we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on the federal claims, we will remand to the District Court so that it may evaluate the state claims and determine whether or not to retain jurisdiction of them under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a court to retain jurisdiction over related state law claims when the federal claims survive and no other reason to decline jurisdiction is shown.

Fac, Inc. v. Cooperativa De Seguros De Vida · filed 2000-06-28(a)

This Court has not dismissed Plaintiffs federal claims, however, and Defendants have not advanced any other argument to convince the Court that it should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs related state law claims. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ request for dismissal of Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(a) can give a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims in a removed action that includes federal claims.

Fountain v. Bd Trst Biloxi Muni · filed 2000-07-14(a)

The district court also had supplemental jurisdiction over Fountain’s state-law claims at the time of removal.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain jurisdiction over a surviving state-law claim in the interest of judicial economy.

Kelly v. City of Meriden · filed 2000-09-27(c)

In the interest of judicial economy, the court shall retain jurisdiction over the common law cause of action concerning defamation.

Section 1367 permits a federal court to retain related state law claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as claims within its original jurisdiction in the interests of judicial economy.

Miner v. Town of Cheshire · filed 2000-09-29

Because the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Title VII claims, and because the surviving state law claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts, the court, in its discretion, will retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in the interests of judicial economy.