28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367 does not supply the original jurisdiction required to remove an action under § 1441.

Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corporation · filed 2001-08-14

But § 1367 cannot provide the "original jurisdiction" that § 1441 demands for an action to be removable.

Section 1367 does not provide an independent basis for original jurisdiction or removal.

Riggs v. Plaid Pantries, Inc. · filed 2001-09-12

A party may not rely on supplemental jurisdiction as an independent basis for removal.

Section 1367 does not supply original subject matter jurisdiction for removal, even when the removed action relates to another case within the federal court’s jurisdiction.

Allred v. Bauhaus USA, Inc. · filed 2002-12-16

In addition, although this point was not explicitly raised by the Defendant, the court notes that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is not a source of-original subject matter jurisdiction, and a removal petition therefore may not base federal subject matter jurisdiction on the supplemental jurisdiction statute, even if the action which a defendant seeks to remove is related to another action over which the federal district court already has subject matter jurisdiction, and even if removal would be efficient.

Section 1367 does not provide a basis for removing a state court action to federal court.

Patel v. Del Taco, Inc. · filed 2006-05-01

Section 1367, which provides for supplemental jurisdiction, is not a basis for removal.

Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction cannot supply the original jurisdiction needed to remove a state court complaint, even when the complaint relates to an existing federal action.

Port Authority of Ny and Nj v. Allianz Ins. Company · filed 2006-08-03

In the present action, IRI has not alleged diversity, and, regardless of whether this court could resolve the coverage question posed by plaintiffs’ complaint through supplemental jurisdiction in the related action, supplemental jurisdiction cannot supply the original jurisdiction needed to remove a state court complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)— “even if the action which a defendant seeks to remove is related to another action over which the federal district court already has subject-matter jurisdiction, and even if removal would be efficient.”

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over related claims in an action with original jurisdiction, but does not independently authorize removal of a separate state-court action.

Vick v. Nash Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2010-10-26(a)

Simply put, the supplemental jurisdiction statute is not “an independent source of removal jurisdiction.”

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims but cannot itself supply a basis to remove a state court action.

Sovereign Bank, N.A. v. Lee · filed 2013-09-12

While the supplemental jurisdiction statute allows a district court to exercise jurisdiction over claims that are “so related” that they “form part of the same case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367, that statute cannot form the basis for removal.

Section 1367 generally does not provide an independent basis to remove a state court action for consolidation with a related federal case.

Scotiabank of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Castro · filed 2017-01-05

While it is true that this relationship might permit the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the consolidated actions, a minimal amount of research on Sanchez’s part would have revealed to him that supplemental jurisdiction generally does not constitute an independent grounds for removal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 limits supplemental jurisdiction to claims within an action over which the district court has original jurisdiction and does not authorize removal based on a related, separate federal action.

Howell v. Do · filed 2020-09-03(a)

Section 1367 does not provide for removal based on claims related to a separate action.

Section 1367(a) does not itself authorize removal of a case from state court.

Ozim v. The California Endowment · filed 2020-10-16(a)

The federal question and supplemental jurisdiction statutes do not, in themselves, provide for removal.

Section 1367 allows related state law claims to be joined with a claim within original federal jurisdiction, but does not independently authorize removal of a separate state law action.

Bridgeton Landfill, LLC v. Missouri Asphalt Products, LLC · filed 2021-02-19

To the extent Missouri Asphalt’s argument can be construed as one that a federal court’s ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction provides an independent basis for removal, it is foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Motion Control Corp. v. SICK, Inc., 354 F.3d 702, 705-06 (8th Cir. 2003). ... In reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit explained that “while [28 U.S.C. § 1367] does allow factually related state law claims to be joined with the claim over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, it plainly does not provide a separate basis for removal of independent state law actions.” /d. ... Therefore, that this case may be factually related to the pending CERCLA action does not create a basis for removal here.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when federal jurisdiction existed at removal, even after plaintiffs abandon the allegations supporting the federal defense.

Williams v. Lockheed Martin · filed 2021-03-09(a)

At the time the petition for removal was filed, subject-matter jurisdiction existed based on the federal contractor defense. Accordingly, the ...exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims was also proper.

Section 1367(a) does not confer original jurisdiction over a separate action and cannot itself support removal to federal court.

Malgesini v. Malley · filed 2021-04-08(a)

Section 1367(a) does not, however, provide the Court with original jurisdiction over an action and, thus, removal pursuant to it is improper.

Section 1367(a) does not provide original subject-matter jurisdiction for removal or authorize supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims removed in error.

Bolton v. Gallatin Center for Rehabilitation & Healing, LLC · filed 2021-04-21(a)

Curiously, Gallatin argues that the Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bolton’s state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because this case was removed (albeit improperly). (See Doc. No. 29 at 6–8). The Sixth Circuit has spoken directly on this issue, holding that “[t]he supplemental-jurisdiction statute is not a source of original subject-matter jurisdiction and a removal petition therefore may not base subject-matter jurisdiction on the supplemental- jurisdiction statute[.]” Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Given this binding and unambiguous precedent, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that were removed in error.

Section 1367 cannot supply original subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law claims removed without a valid basis for federal jurisdiction.

Greenbaum v. Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC · filed 2021-05-06

To the extent Defendants are arguing that the Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims simply because this case was removed (albeit improperly), that argument is foreclosed by binding Sixth Circuit case law. In Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, the Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he supplemental-jurisdiction statute is not a source of original subject-matter jurisdiction and a removal petition therefore may not base subject-matter jurisdiction on the supplemental-jurisdiction statute[.]” 100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims that were removed in error.

Section 1367 does not independently provide original jurisdiction and cannot support removal of a state-court action, even when that action is related to a pending federal case.

Ogaz v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. · filed 2021-07-07(a)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does not provide an independent source of original subject matter jurisdiction, and, thus, a removal petition alleging that a court has subject matter jurisdiction based on Section 1367 is improper, even if the removed action is related to another action over which the federal district court already has subject matter jurisdiction, and even if removal would be more efficient.

Section 1367 does not provide an independent basis to remove a case from state court.

FEDCorp, Inc. v. Salamone · filed 2021-07-21

Similarly, Defendant’s supplemental jurisdiction argument also fails because a defendant may not base a § 1441(a) removal on the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 does not independently authorize removal of a state-court action that lacks a basis for removal under original jurisdiction.

Lucky U, LLC v. S&F Investments LLC · filed 2021-08-18

Further, Lucky U’s argument that the Court should retain jurisdiction over this matter through supplemental jurisdiction is unavailing.

Section 1367(a) does not supply original jurisdiction to remove a state-court action, even when a related action is pending in federal court.

Shaw v. Daifuku North America Holding Co. · filed 2021-11-30(a)

In moving to remand this case, plaintiff argues that supplemental jurisdiction alone cannot serve as the basis for removal, even if the two cases are nearly identical. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 8.) ... The court finds plaintiff’s arguments to be persuasive. ... This parallel litigation is nothing new and does not warrant this court’s creation of a novel rule that would undermine the clear understanding of original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion to remand.

Section 1367(a) does not provide a basis for removing a state court action to federal court.

Malgesini v. Malley · filed 2022-03-24(a)

He argues that under 28 U.S.C. 1367, Plaintiff’s action was removeable because, when related with the Malley Action, this Court had supplement jurisdiction over this action. “This contention is frivolous. Section 1367, which provides for supplemental jurisdiction, is not a basis for removal.”

Section 1367(a) does not authorize removal of a separate state-court action for consolidation with a related federal action.

Sparks v. Anderson · filed 2022-04-12(a)

Fourth, to the extent that Defendant attempts to invoke supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mrs. Sparks’s action in order to consolidate it with another case in this court.

Section 1367 does not provide original subject-matter jurisdiction for removal of a separate case, even when its claims arise from the same controversy as a case already within federal jurisdiction.

Williams v. Shamburger · filed 2022-08-29

In contravention to Defendants’ argument, the Sixth Circuit has held that a removal petition cannot base subject-matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because the supplemental jurisdiction statute is not a source of original subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) extends jurisdiction to related claims within an action that has original jurisdiction; it does not provide an independent ground to remove a separate case.

The County Commission of Fayette County, West Virginia v. Gadsden, Gaillard, and West LLC · filed 2022-12-09(a)

When read in combination, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) make clear that supplemental jurisdiction is not an appropriate ground for removal.

Section 1367(a) does not confer original jurisdiction and cannot independently support removal of a state-court action.

Malgesini v. Malley · filed 2023-01-31(a)

Section 1367, however, does not provide a district court with original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has original jurisdiction over related federal claims at removal; later abandonment of the federal claims does not divest that jurisdiction.

McGarrity v. Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. · filed 2023-05-23(a)

At the time Plaintiff’s case was removed, this Court had original jurisdiction over the federal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, see id. § 1367(a). See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Because the Court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal, any subsequent abandonment by Plaintiff of her federal claims does not divest the Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over her state law claims.

Section 1367 does not provide removal jurisdiction or allow a separate state court action to be consolidated with a related federal action.

JALON v. BANK OF AMERICA · filed 2023-09-29(a)

Because the State Foreclosure action is separate from the RICO action, the Jalons may not rely on § 1367 to consolidate the two cases. Nor may they look to that statute as a basis for removal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not independently permit removal of a state action based on a related federal case.

J.M. v. Comal Independent School District · filed 2024-08-15(a)

First, removal here was improper as removal cannot rest solely on purported supplemental jurisdiction premised on J.M. b/n/f J.M. & S.M.. v. Comal Independent School District, Case No. 5:23-cv-1547-XR.

Section 1367 does not provide an independent basis for removing a case to federal court, even when the case is related to a pending federal action.

Institute for Legislative Analysis v. Schlapp · filed 2025-04-11(a)

Here, there is no independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction cannot fill the void because it cannot be used to remove this case to federal court.

Section 1367 does not provide original jurisdiction to remove a state action merely because it is related to a separate federal action.

Andy Investments LLC v. Potter · filed 2025-04-21

The Potters fail to acknowledge or engage with the substantial authority holding that “[t]he supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does not provide an independent source of original subject matter jurisdiction, and, thus, a removal petition alleging that a court has subject matter jurisdiction based on Section 1367 is improper, even if the removed action is related to another action over which the federal district court already has subject matter jurisdiction, and even if removal would be more efficient.” Ogaz v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV21740JFWKKX, 2021 WL 2822400, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2021).

Section 1367 does not permit a court to retain claims in an action improperly removed because a properly joined defendant is a citizen of the forum state.

Turnage v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2003-04-21

Finally, the defendants, citing Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996), briefly argue that because diversity jurisdiction exists over the claims of those plaintiffs who do not have claims against a non-diverse dealer defendant, this court could, and should, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of those plaintiffs who do have claims against non-diverse dealer-defendants. This argument presupposes that it was appropriate to remove these cases in the first place. It was not. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), absent a federal question, an action may not be removed if any properly joined and served defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action was filed. As we have determined, the dealer-defendants, most if not all of whom are citizens of Mississippi, were properly joined in these cases; accordingly, removal was improper.

Section 1367 does not permit removal based on claims related to a separate federal action.

Howell v. Do · filed 2020-10-01(a)

Section 1367 does not provide for removal based on claims ... related to a separate action.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when another federal statute assigns exclusive jurisdiction over that claim to state courts.

United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2000-08-17(a)

Thus, by the express terms of section 1367(a), which allows supplemental jurisdiction only as long as another statute does not provide otherwise, and by the logic prohibiting federal question jurisdiction over United Artists’ claim, supplemental jurisdiction is unavailable.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over interference proceedings involving solely pending patent applications because federal patent law grants the USPTO exclusive jurisdiction over those proceedings.

Airport Surface Technologies, L.L.C. v. FieldTurf, Inc. · filed 2003-06-23(a)

35 U.S.C. § 135 expressly provides that the USPTO has exclusive jurisdiction over interference proceedings involving solely pending patent applications. ... The court will not usurp the exclusive power of an administrative agency once Congress has spoken on the issue. As such, § 1367(a) is not applicable to Plaintiffs’ Count VII.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over claims when another federal statute expressly assigns their review to a different forum, even if the claims arise from the same case or controversy.

Thompson · filed 2025-10-21(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal courts are granted jurisdiction to hear claims related to civil actions over which they already have jurisdiction, so long as the claims “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” That section begins with a caveat; it reads: “Except . . . as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute . . . .” Id. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). In this case, 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)-(d) expressly provides otherwise.

Section 1367(a)’s express federal statute exception does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over opt-out state wage claims merely because they accompany an FLSA collective action.

Salazar v. Agriprocessors, Inc. · filed 2007-10-22(a)

The federal statute at issue here — the FLSA, specifically § 216(b) — neither expressly prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims of opt-out class members nor mentions supplemental jurisdiction. ... Therefore, the court finds that § 1367(a)’s “or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute” exception is not applicable here.

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim when another federal statute expressly requires a final agency decision before judicial review.

ABC Home Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1995-03-07(a)

Furthermore, the plain language of § 1367(a) prevents the application of supplemental jurisdiction in this case. That section provides that a district court will have supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims unless “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Here, Congress has “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.” Id. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over ABC’s request for reaudits unless ABC obtains a “final decision of the Secretary” and commences a civil action within the statutorily mandated time. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over ABC’s request for reaudits.

Section 1367(a) does not require supplemental jurisdiction over claims whose removal another federal statute expressly forbids.

California v. PG & E Corp. (In Re Pacific Gas & Electric Co.) · filed 2002-06-14(a)

In this case, supplemental jurisdiction is not required under Section 1367(a) because Section 1452(a) “expressly provide[s] otherwise” by preventing removal of the First Priority Claims.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction when another federal statute expressly provides otherwise; the CAFA mass action provision supplies such an exception.

Lowery v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2007-04-11(a)

This argument is unavailing. Section 1367 does not apply where “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Regardless of whether the final clause of § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) serves as a threshold requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction or an exception to that jurisdiction, it is clearly, by its own terms, the very sort of explicit statutory exception from supplemental jurisdiction that § 1367(a) contemplates.

Section 1367(a) excludes claims over which another federal statute denies jurisdiction, including infringement claims involving unregistered copyrights barred by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).

In Re: Literary Works in Elec. Databases Litig. · filed 2007-11-29(a)

Section 1367(a) 14 excepts from its reach those cases in which another federal statute denies jurisdiction. ... For these reasons, we conclude that § 1367(a) did not provide the District Court with 10 jurisdiction over the claims arising from the alleged infringement of unregistered copyrights.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when another federal statute expressly bars federal jurisdiction over it.

Granato v. Apple Inc. · filed 2023-07-19(a)

Supplemental jurisdiction would also be unavailable here for the separate reason that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 contains an express exception to supplemental jurisdiction if another federal statute “expressly provide[s] otherwise.”

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse defendant-intervenor’s claims in a diversity action when intervention is as of right.

Langone v. Flint Ink North America Corp. · filed 2005-07-05(b)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, makes different provisions for plaintiff-intervenors and for defendant-interve-nors, and the weight of authority permits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over defendant-intervenors, even where diversity is lacking.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an intervening defendant’s counterclaim or cross-claim even when the intervenor shares citizenship with an original party.

Development Finance Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc. · filed 1995-04-26(b)

We conclude that §1367(b) does not deprive the district court of supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim or cross-claim raised by an intervening defendant, even where the intervenor shares citizenship with an original party.

Section 1367(b) limits plaintiffs’ efforts to join nondiverse parties, but does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a diversity defendant’s counterclaims against nondiverse parties joined under Rule 13(h).

United Capitol Insurance v. Kapiloff · filed 1998-09-08(b)

Thus, the limitation of § 1367(b) applies only to plaintiffs' efforts to join nondiverse parties. ... Because § 1367(b) does not limit this joinder, we are satisfied that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's Rule 24 intervention claim in a diversity action when exercising it would be inconsistent with § 1332's requirements.

TIG Insur Co v. Reliable Research · filed 2003-06-30(b)

That language is as clear as it could be, and it means that Security Union cannot rely on supplemental jurisdic- tion to support its Rule 24 claim in intervention against TIG, because the exercise of such jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the requirements of § 1332.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse cross-claim by a plaintiff who intervenes under Rule 24 in a diversity action unless the claim has an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Maricco v. Meco Corp. · filed 2004-05-03(b)

Yet, because BCBSM has intervened in this action as a plaintiff under Rule 24, its cross-claim against the original Plaintiffs seemingly runs afoul of the exclusionary language of § 1367(b), which mandates that claims asserted by an intervening plaintiff in a diversity suit must independently satisfy the requirements for federal court jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse permissive intervenor’s claim as a plaintiff when the original action rests solely on diversity jurisdiction.

Contimortgage Corp v. Anglezis, Demetris · filed 2006-03-23(b)

Because Mr. Byrne is a non-diverse party and intervened as a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) in a case in which the only basis for jurisdiction was diversity, his action must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b); TIG Ins., 334 F.3d at 634.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse intervenor’s affirmative claims against an original plaintiff in a diversity action when the intervenor is properly aligned as a plaintiff.

Siteworks Contracting Corp. v. Western Surety Co. · filed 2006-11-14(b)

A review of the record and the relevant case law, however, leads me to conclude that Defendant Marx is better classified as an intervening plaintiff rather than an intervening defendant, and thus is barred from asserting its state law claims against the non-diverse Plaintiff under § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) does not bar a defendant’s claim against a nondiverse joined party because a defendant asserting a counterclaim is not a “plaintiff” under that subsection.

Legion Insurance v. Family Service, Inc. · filed 2008-06-12(b)

In this case, since Family Service is not a “plaintiff,” Section 1367(b) is inapplicable and the only remaining question in determining whether this Court has supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(a) is whether Family Service’s claim against the Fund is sufficiently related to Family Service’s counterclaims against Legion that it constitutes “part of the same case or controversy.”

Section 1367(b) does not strip supplemental jurisdiction over state counterclaims brought by parties who intervened as defendants.

Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas · filed 2010-07-28(b)

Because Bondholders intervened as defendants, their state counterclaims are outside of the supplemental jurisdiction stripping provision of section 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over claims by defendants who assert compulsory counterclaims, even when diversity jurisdiction supplies the original basis for jurisdiction.

Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge · filed 2011-01-14(b)

Yet in the case that is actually before the Court, Roberts and Springline have not been made parties under any of the Rules subject to § 1367(b)‘s jurisdiction-stripping provision10; rather, they are defendants and Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaimants.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff-intervenor’s claim against a nondiverse party when that claim would violate the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

Well-Come Holdings, LLC v. American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. · filed 2013-02-26(b)

Well-Come’s claims against Flintlock LLC cannot be maintained under supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Although Well-Come has an independent basis for jurisdiction against ASRRG and ASIS under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because Well-Come is diverse from them, that basis for jurisdiction cannot support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Well-Come’s claims against Flintlock LLC.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by nondiverse parties intervening as plaintiffs in diversity cases, but does not bar claims by intervening defendants.

Deluxe Building Systems, Inc. v. Constructamax, Inc. · filed 2013-04-19(b)

Supplemental jurisdiction is thus asymmetrical; it may be granted to a party aligned as a defendant, but denied to the party if aligned as plaintiff.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an intervening plaintiff’s claim in an action founded solely on diversity jurisdiction when that claim would violate § 1332’s jurisdictional requirements.

Hedge Capital Investments Limited v. Sustainable Growth Group Holdings LLC · filed 2014-12-04(b)

The Receiver also asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) allows the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the intervening complaint. But that argument is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute, which states that: ... We must therefore remand with directions that the district court dismiss the intervenor-complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 24 intervenor aligned as a plaintiff when the intervenor’s claim does not meet the diversity requirements of § 1332(a).

Samuels v. Dr. Miracle's, L.L.C. · filed 2015-05-18(b)

We conclude that Griffin decides this appeal. As in Griffin and as Murphy concedes, Murphy is aligned with the plaintiff and, thus, is “seeking to intervene as [a] plaintiff[] under Rule 24.” § 1367(b). Thus, Murphy must meet both of § 1332(a)’s requirements.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a claim by a person seeking to intervene as a plaintiff under Rule 24 when hearing the claim would conflict with the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.

Parker v. John Moriarty & Associates · filed 2016-12-02(b)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by persons seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24, “when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”

Section 1367(b)'s restriction on claims by plaintiffs applies to the original plaintiff, not to a defendant asserting a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.

State National Insurance v. Yates · filed 2004-11-12(b)

Although we have not directly addressed this issue in the past, today we hold that “plaintiff” in § 1367(b) refers to the original plaintiff in the action – not to a defendant that happens also to be a counter-plaintiff, cross-plaintiff, or third-party-plaintiff.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims by a nondiverse, dispensable defendant intervenor that are part of the same case or controversy, whether intervention is as of right or permissive.

Pennsylvania National MutuaL Casualty Insurance v. Perlberg · filed 2010-07-19(b)

Accordingly, the court finds that supplemental jurisdiction is not precluded by § 1367(b) where the claims of a nondiverse, but not indispensable, defendant-intervenor are part of the same case or controversy, regardless of whether intervention is as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), or permissive pursuant to Rule 24(b).

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over an intervenor opposing the plaintiff’s claim rather than seeking to intervene as a plaintiff.

Karsner v. Lothian · filed 2008-07-15(b)

Because the Commissioner is not seeking to intervene as a plaintiff (or petitioner)—she is instead opposing Karsner’s petition to expunge—section 1367(b) does not bar the Commissioner’s intervention as of right.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims by defendant intervenors in diversity cases.

Chambers Medical Foundation v. Chambers · filed 2006-04-04(b)

However, § 1367(b) is silent as to would-be intervenor-defendants in a diversity case. This silence has led courts to conclude that we may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over intervenor-defendants. ... However, as set forth above, if the Estate is permitted to join as a defendant, then we can exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought by original defendants rather than original plaintiffs.

Underwriters at Lloyd's Subscribing to Cover Note B1526MACAR1800089 v. TCSL, Inc. · filed 2020-09-30(b)

Accordingly, because defendants Abaxis and Zoetis are not the original plaintiffs, section 1367(b) does not defeat supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse intervening defendant who only opposes the plaintiff’s requested relief.

Gerschel v. Bank of America , N.A. · filed 2021-04-26(b)

The limitations to the court’s supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(b) do not prevent an intervening defendant from bringing counterclaims against plaintiffs, and courts routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. ... Likewise, courts retain jurisdiction where, as is the case here, intervening defendants do not raise affirmative counterclaims but seek to oppose the relief sought by plaintiffs.

Section 1367(b) requires a court with jurisdiction based solely on diversity to determine whether exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff-intervenor’s claim would conflict with the requirements of § 1332.

Johnson v. Agility Fuel Systems, Inc · filed 2021-06-28(b)

Accordingly, the Court must determine whether an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over BFI’s claims in intervention “would be inconsistent” with the exercise of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive intervenor’s claim against a nondiverse party in a diversity action when the intervenor is substantively a plaintiff despite nominally intervening as a defendant.

Cross Sound Cable Company, LLC v. Long Island Lighting Company · filed 2022-01-27(b)

Because Mr. Cook should be considered a plaintiff for purposes of Section 1367(b), and because Mr. Cook and Defendant LIPA are both citizens of New York, the court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over any claim by Mr. Cook seeking to invalidate the FTCPA, even if such a claim arose from a common nucleus of operative fact.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff-intervenor’s claim in a diversity case when that claim itself does not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of Section 1332.

Caldwell v. Latham Pool Products Inc · filed 2022-03-31(b)

The amount in controversy element for the intervention may not be met by pointing to the main dispute. The element must be satisfied with respect to the claim set forth in the proposed complaint in intervention.

Section 1367(b) requires a proposed intervening plaintiff in a diversity action to satisfy diversity jurisdiction requirements; a partial subrogee must disclose the citizenship of its insured.

Calvelage v. OnTime Express, LLC · filed 2023-10-23(b)

Here, given that GWCC paid St. Mary’s “the sum of $111,473.67 minus their $5,000 deductible” (ECF 4 (emphasis added); see also ECF 4-1 ¶¶ 13, 14), GWCC needs to also inform the Court of St. Mary’s citizenship(s) for purposes of determining whether the complaint in intervention is consistent with the requirements for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) permits a diverse intervening plaintiff to bring a related crossclaim against a nondiverse coplaintiff when the intervention does not circumvent diversity requirements.

Neal v. Neal · filed 2023-10-30(b)

Section 1367(b) excludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims by an intervenor seeking to intervene as a plaintiff where such jurisdiction “would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” § 1367(b). ... Although Linda has intervened under Rule 24, her intervention is not inconsistent with § 1332 because she is not joining for the exclusive purpose of suing the plaintiff as a nondiverse party and thus not attempting to circumvent the requirements of diversity. ... intervening plaintiff, Linda is diverse from all defendants. In turn, she is also pursuing a crossclaim against the plaintiff, Jeffrey.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse intervening defendant who is dispensable under Rule 19(b).

City National Bank of Florida v. Louisiana Apple, LLC · filed 2024-09-17

Since none of the Rule 19(b) factors “favor[s] the conclusion” that the SBG Entities are an indispensable party, we’ll exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over them.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse intervening defendant’s claims in a diversity action.

PMC Casualty Corp v. Virginia Surety Company Inc. · filed 2025-06-19(b)

Yet the text of section 1367(b) bars jurisdiction over claims that fail to meet section 1332's requirements only by those "seeking to intervene as plaintiffs."

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an intervening plaintiff’s claims in a diversity-only case when those claims would violate the diversity requirements.

Barbosa · filed 2025-11-13(b)

As a result, under the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Accident Fund’s claims.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an intervening plaintiff’s claims when exercising it would conflict with diversity jurisdiction requirements.

Hensley v. Westin Hotel · filed 2024-09-04(b)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), the district court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hartford’s claims against Merritt because “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction . . . over claims by persons . . . seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of [28 U.S.C. §] 1332.”

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an intervening plaintiff’s affirmative claims in a diversity action when those claims do not satisfy diversity requirements.

Hallco Manufacturing Co. v. Quaeck · filed 1995-04-28(b)

From Foster’s proposed complaint in intervention, it is clear that Foster seeks to intervene in order to allege affirmative claims against all of the parties and is therefore intervening as a plaintiff. The court does not have supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Foster’s proposed complaint in intervention.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over garnishment against a nonparty employer to collect a fee award entered in the original case.

Vukadinovich v. Mccarthy · filed 1995-07-05

It is whether the district court's ancillary jurisdiction (now a part of its statutory "supplemental jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367) extends to a garnishment proceeding directed against a nonparty to the original proceeding, namely Vukadinovich's employer. ... Garnishment is a standard, often essential, step in the collection of a judgment, and the party holding the judgment (here, unusually, the defendant) ought to be able to take this step without having to start a new lawsuit in a different court system.

Section 1367 preserves supplemental jurisdiction over a creditor’s bill against a nondiverse third party to enforce a judgment when the claim raises no significant legal issues outside the operative facts that produced the judgment.

Kelley v. Michaels · filed 1995-07-10

Based on the specific facts before us, we agree with the district court that this is a simple garnishment raising no significant legal issues outside the operative facts that produced the original judgment — hence within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction — unless statutory changes in 1990 require a different result. ... Section 1367 intended to supplant the related and somewhat overlapping concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, principally reinstating pre-Finley case law with some additional clarification. ... Our research has turned up no evidence that Congress intended to eliminate the creditor’s bill we recognized in Sandlin as well-settled law.

Section 1367(a) permits a closely related state law claim against additional parties to secure payment of a potential federal judgment before judgment is entered.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. JRG Fox Valley, Inc. · filed 1997-09-23(a)

Based on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Wilson, this court finds plaintiff does not need to obtain a judgment against JRG before joining the Grassfields as defendants.

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction after judgment to a new claim against another party that rests on facts distinct from those underlying the judgment and has no independent jurisdictional basis.

McCrohan v. Uxbridge Police Ass'n Local 123 · filed 2017-05-26(a)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), this Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over McCrohan’s state law claims against Local 123 because her original Complaint included a federal claim for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. Upon the entry of judgment, that subject matter jurisdiction “vanished.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 862. McCrohan’s alternative enforcement theories are not “a mere continuation” of the underlying claims because they depend on the relationship and control between MCOP and Local 123—facts that differ significantly from those underlying the judgment against Local 123 for defamation and infliction of emotional distress. As these enforcement theories raise no federal question, and the parties are not diverse, this court lacks subject jurisdiction over these proposed proceedings.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims seeking judicial review of state administrative decisions when they form part of the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission · filed 2019-11-15(a)

Nevertheless, these claims are part of the “same case or controversy” as the Wests’ constitutional claims. All claims challenge the stewards’ decision to disqualify Maximum Security. Thus, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims for judicial review. The Supreme Court has made clear that a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims seeking judicial review of a local agency action pursuant to a state statute, just the same as a federal court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over more typical state-law claims like breach of contract or negligence.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after granting summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Woods v. Lemonds · filed 1992-09-28(c)(3)

Based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to plaintiff’s state claim of battery because defendant shall be granted summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s claims that this Court has original jurisdiction over.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it grants summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Flegel v. Northeast-Northwest · filed 1992-10-26(c)(3)

Based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to plaintiff's state claims because defendants shall be granted summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs' claims in which this court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after granting summary judgment on federal claims.

Puricelli v. Borough of Morrisville · filed 1993-04-19(c)(3)

To the extent that Puricelli pleads any state law claims, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and dismiss them without prejudice to his right to re-file in state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims within its original jurisdiction.

Fiscus v. City of Roswell · filed 1993-09-21(c)

Since summary judgment has been granted as to the § 1983 claims over which this Court had original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction because what remains are claims based solely upon Georgia law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

Wiselman v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. · filed 1993-10-27(c)(3)

Since the Court, is granting summary judgment on behalf of Defendants as to the only claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over either of the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of a supplemental state-law claim after the federal claim is resolved by summary judgment.

Golden v. Hendricks County Sheriff's Department and Sheriff Thomas Underwood, in His Official and Individual Cap · filed 1994-02-14(c)(3)

Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Furthermore, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Golden's pendent state claim alleging that he was demoted without just cause, see IND.CODE ANN. Sec. 36-8-3-4, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment.

Congdon v. Strine · filed 1994-05-24(c)(3)

Because our subject matter jurisdiction rests exclusively on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have found that plaintiffs’ federal claims do not survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and therefore will dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Blevens v. Town of Bow · filed 1994-10-12(c)(3)

Having granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declines supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss remaining state law claims without prejudice after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims.

Maynard v. Greater Hoyt School District No. 61-4 · filed 1995-02-21(c)(3)

Having determined that the federal claims are subject to summary judgment for the defendants, the remaining claims will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Hastings v. Lamy · filed 1995-04-28(c)(3)

Having granted the remaining state defendants' unopposed motion for summary judgment, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state defamation claim against his brother, Laurence Hastings, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and hereby dismisses that claim without prejudice, and without comment as to its merit under applicable state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant after granting summary judgment on the only federal claims against that defendant.

Scales v. Sonic Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-01(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on the only federal jurisdiction claims asserted against Sonic, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims asserted by plaintiffs against Sonic and finds that such claims should be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss a supplemental state law claim after granting summary judgment on the claim supporting original jurisdiction.

Moran v. Marker · filed 1995-05-02(c)(3)

Because the court will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the claim upon which the court’s original jurisdiction is based, the court will dismiss the supplemental malicious prosecution claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Johnson v. Automotive Ventures, Inc. · filed 1995-06-21(c)(3)

Since the court will grant summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs federal claims, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Cole v. Sharp · filed 1995-08-11(c)(3)

With the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs’ claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, the court shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after disposing of all federal claims on summary judgment.

Fry v. UAL Corp. · filed 1995-08-11(c)(3)

Having determined that UAL is entitled to summary judgment on both of plaintiffs’ federal claims, thus disposing of the federal bases of jurisdiction in this case, the Court shall decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after disposing of all federal matters, despite substantial discovery and pending summary judgment motions.

Basile v. H & R BLOCK, INC. · filed 1995-08-01

By order of July 24, 1995 summary judgment was granted as to the federal question claims and issues; supplemental jurisdiction was relinquished, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e); and the action remanded, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). ... Defendants object to remand of the case on the ground that removal occurred over two years ago, followed by considerable discovery and the pendency of the present motions. However, there is no compelling reason why federal jurisdiction should be retained, and the discovery is readily available for use in state proceedings.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims when it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, including on summary judgment.

Jones v. Ziegler · filed 1995-08-03(c)(3)

A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if all claims over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Since summary judgment has been granted as to plaintiffs federal claims against these remaining defendants and since there are no exceptional circumstances here, this Court will not exercise pendent jurisdiction in this case over plaintiffs remaining claims of battery and negligent retention.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on the only federal claim.

Muller v. Automobile Club of Southern California · filed 1995-09-15(c)(3)

This Court has ruled that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs only federal claim — Plaintiffs first cause of action for “violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.” As a result, this Court now declines to exercise its discretionary authority to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs causes of action based on state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it grants summary judgment on the only federal claims.

Leach v. Quality Health Services, Inc. · filed 1995-10-03(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on the only federal claims in this action, we turn to the state law claims. We do not find that those claims should remain in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). For this reason, we dismiss the remaining counts, Counts Four through Nine.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it has resolved all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ruggles v. Keebler Co. · filed 2002-10-15(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are resolved on a pretrial motion.

Martin v. Mendoza · filed 2002-11-12(c)(3)

It is the general rule in this circuit that once federal claims have been finally resolved on pre-trial motion, the exercise of jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims should be declined.

Section 1367(c)(2)-(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after all federal claims are dismissed before trial when judicial economy, fairness, and comity favor dismissal, despite completed discovery and a pending summary judgment motion.

Morris v. Kernan · filed 2019-11-22(c)(2)-(3)

Here the Court was faced with both of those situations when Morris’s § 1983 claim was dismissed: all federal claims had been dismissed before trial, and as a result the remaining state law claims inescapably and substantially predominated over any federal law claims, of which there were none. Therefore, the Court was authorized by Congress to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over Morris’s state law claims. ... But on the other hand, judicial economy, fairness, and comity weighed in favor of this Court relinquishing its supplemental jurisdiction. ... Additionally, the fact that Sutton’s summary judgment motion was pending when the Court dismissed this federal lawsuit does not demonstrate unfairness towards Sutton. ... Additionally, the fact that Sutton may have to engage in some redundant discovery in a state court lawsuit does not demonstrate unfairness towards Sutton.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims before trial.

Sudarsky v. City of New York · filed 1991-11-22(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of plaintiffs’ federal claims, dismissal of the pendent claims is appropriate as well.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when dismissal occurs before trial and extensive discovery.

Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Young · filed 1992-11-12(c)(3)

In the case at bar, through this Memorandum-Decision and order, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim has been dismissed well before trial and well before extensive discovery has been conducted. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state claims and said claims are hereby dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after it dismisses or resolves all federal claims before trial.

Julio A. Mercado-Garcia, Maria Del Carmen Avila Mugica, and Their Marital Conjugalship v. Ponce Federal Bank · filed 1992-11-19(c)(3)

Once the court dismissed some of the federal claims and resolved the others before trial by summary judgment, it had the discretion also to dismiss the pendent state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Mercado’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state claims when it dismisses the federal claims before trial.

Blankman v. County of Nassau · filed 1993-04-21(c)(3)

In cases involving federal claims and appended state claims “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” ... In light of the deficiencies in plaintiffs’ federal claims, the pendent state claims are also dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when it dismisses all federal claims before trial.

Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co. · filed 1993-04-30(c)(3)

Because plaintiffs’ federal claims will be dismissed before trial, this court declines to exercise jurisdiction over those supplemental state claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claim is dismissed before trial, absent extraordinary circumstances favoring retention.

Loutfy v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co. · filed 1993-05-20(c)(3)

In the instant ease substantive resources have not been expended thus far in this litigation; neither do we find available to the defendant a defense to the state-law claim which invokes issues of federal law. Thus, in the absence of these mentioned circumstances, we find it inadvisable to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing all federal claims before trial.

Fittanto v. Children's Advocacy Center · filed 1993-09-24(c)(3)

Since all of plaintiffs’ federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, this court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state claims for malicious prosecution and will dismiss them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) gives courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Escobar v. Landwehr · filed 1993-11-09(c)

When federal claims are dismissed before trial, the decision to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims is a matter of discretion for the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after resolving the federal claim before trial.

Adrian Waldera Trucking, Inc. v. Quality Liquid Feeds, Inc. · filed 1994-03-03(c)(3)

The Court concludes that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the federal tariff undercharge claim and that continuing supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised over the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally calls for dismissal of pendent state claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Acker v. Vermeer · filed 1994-06-30(c)(3)

Generally, dismissal of federal claims before trial dictates that the pendent state claims should also be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3); Schultz, 759 F.2d at 718.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss pendent state-law claims without prejudice when it dismisses the claims within its original jurisdiction before trial.

Independent Entertainment Group, Inc. v. National Basketball Ass'n · filed 1994-05-20(c)(3)

Because the claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction are being dismissed before trial, the Court also dismisses the pendent state-law claims without prejudice in order to avoid making needless decisions of state law.

When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, a district court generally should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Wright v. Associated Insurance Companies Incorporated · filed 1994-07-21(c)(3)

Hence the general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits.

When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, § 1367(c)(3) generally calls for leaving supplemental state claims to state courts, subject to recognized exceptions.

Wright v. Associated Insurance Companies Inc. · filed 1994-07-21(c)(3)

Thus, the general rule is that, when all federal-law claims are dismissed before trial, the pendent claims should be left to the state courts. But there are three well-recognized exceptions to this general rule.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state claims without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims before trial.

Malmin v. Board of Com'rs of Idaho State Bar · filed 1994-08-02(c)(3)

Because the district court dismissed the federal claims before trial, it did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Malmin's supplemental state claims without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3) (1990).

Section 1367(c) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Reed v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-10-27(c)

The dismissal of Plaintiffs § 1983 claims disposes of all federal claims before this Court and the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after all federal claims drop out before trial, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Nlfc, Incorporated v. Devcom Mid-America, Incorporated · filed 1995-01-19(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), district courts are granted supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims. If all federal law claims drop out before trial, however, district courts may dismiss such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e). We will reverse a district court’s dismissal of pendant state claims only upon a showing that the district court abused its discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; dismissal of the federal claim well before trial supports that choice.

Frost v. Fox · filed 1995-04-26(c)(3)

Section 1367(c) of 28 U.S.C. provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim in four circumstances, one of which is when the district court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Because the district court dismissed Frost's only federal claim well before trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims before trial.

PaineWebber Income Properties Three Ltd. Partnership Ex Rel. Third Income Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1995-06-23(c)

As jurisdiction in this case is based on a federal issue, RCRA and the dismissal of Count I disposes of all federal claims before the Court, this Court no longer has original jurisdiction over this action and may decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Therefore, the supplemental state claims are hereby dismissed.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim before trial, especially when difficult state-law questions remain.

24 Hour Fuel Oil Corp. v. Long Island Rail Road · filed 1995-10-24

Thus, were it clear that LIRR violated state law in its action here, the court would be inclined to proceed on the merits pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... How to weigh these interests in this case is a question best determined by the state courts and not by a federal judge guessing how a state court would resolve this question of state law in a case where no federal question remains. Thus, supplemental jurisdiction is denied as well.

Section 1367 generally favors relinquishing a supplemental state claim when the federal claim is dismissed before trial, unless the state claim is plainly meritless.

Van Harken v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-01-06(c)(3)

The general rule is that when as here the federal claim drops out before trial (here way before trial), the federal district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental claim. ... If, however, an interpretation of state law that knocks out the plaintiffs- state claim is obviously correct, the federal judge should put the plaintiff out of his misery then and there, rather than burdening the state courts with a frivolous case.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims on the ground that federal claims have failed when those federal claims remain viable.

Pittiglio v. Michigan National Corp. · filed 1995-11-30(c)(3)

Defendants first argue that the state law claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(e)(2) and (3). However, as Plaintiffs’ federal claims are viable, the state law claims may not be dismissed in this manner.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Mowat-Chesney v. Children's Hospital · filed 1996-03-05(c)(3)

ORDERED that the remainder of the action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit declining supplemental jurisdiction based on dismissal of federal claims against one defendant when claims within original jurisdiction remain against another defendant.

Nelson v. Temple University · filed 1996-02-14(c)(3)

Because claims over which the court has original jurisdiction — Title IX and Title VII— remain in the case, however, the court will retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs related state law claims against Downing.

Section 1367(c) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after the federal claim fails.

Mobley v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia · filed 1996-04-01(c)

Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, and these state law claims are all that remain in this action. This Court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as to whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over issues dealing solely with state law. Since this case involves parties who are all from the State of Georgia and most of whom reside in the Augusta area, resolution of this lawsuit is more appropriate at the state level. Accordingly, I see no need to keep these state claims at the federal level, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs state law claims is hereby GRANTED.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss remaining state law claims after resolving all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Imes v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1996-04-30(c)(3)

Finally, the Court concludes that even if it were to deem Plaintiffs’ non-constitutional claims to have been asserted only pursuant to state law, the Court is convinced it would exercise its discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3) and dismiss any such remaining state law claims given its resolution of all claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal-law claims.

Pena v. Edward Mattox, Charles Bretz, Patricia Schneider, and Others Unknown · filed 1996-05-21(c)(3)

The district judge properly relinquished jurisdiction over these claims when he dismissed the plaintiff’s federal-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses the federal claim, and to dismiss the state claims without prejudice.

Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1996-06-10(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to assert supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims raised under the Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act, KRS 207.130 et seq., and the common law of Kentucky. These claims, therefore, are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed early, before trial.

Hidalgo v. Overseas-Condado Insurance Agencies, Inc. · filed 1996-06-20(c)(3)

This Court declines to exercise such pendent jurisdiction. “As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiffs federal claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after it dismisses all claims that conferred federal jurisdiction.

Urvashi B. Patel, an Individual v. Scotland Memorial Hospital, a North Carolina Corporation W. Harley Davidson Gregory C · filed 1996-07-10(c)(3)

Where the district court has dismissed all claims that conferred federal jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after dismissal of all federal claims, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Ruby Castaneda v. City of Tempe Tempe Police Dept. Officer, Larry Wylie, in His Individual and Official Capacity · filed 1996-07-15(c)(3)

As to the dismissal of all federal law claims with prejudice, we affirm for the reasons articulated by the district court. Moreover, there is no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Castaneda's supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

J.S. Service Center Corp. v. General Electric Technical Services Co. · filed 1996-07-17(c)(3)

Because we dismiss both federal claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State University · filed 1996-07-26(c)(3)

Consequently, defendants’ motion to dismiss the VAWA claims with prejudice is granted. I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss these without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that would substantially predominate over a claim within its original jurisdiction, including in time and forms of proof.

Corrigan v. Harvey · filed 1996-09-16(c)(2)

Additionally, this court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the claim substantially predominates over the claim over which this court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(2). Although this court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs maintenance and cure claim, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs other claims. While Plaintiffs tort claims do arise out of the same occurrence as his maintenance and cure claim, the questions of law and allegations of fact to be decided are not parallel. Plaintiffs tort claims would predominate both in time and forms of proof over his maintenance and cure claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Whitcraft v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1996-09-30(c)(3)

There is no remaining federal question, and plaintiff has proposed no sufficient reason for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the face of § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when no viable federal claim remains.

James H. Higgason, Jr. v. Barnes · filed 1996-10-15(c)(3)

Without a valid due process claim or any other viable federal claim, the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort law complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state claims when all federal claims have been dismissed before trial.

Kasemeier v. Indiana University · filed 1996-10-16(c)(3)

Finally, with all the federal claims having been dismissed before trial, the district court acted within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Wright v. Associated Insurance Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (1994).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Thompson v. McFatter · filed 1996-11-27(c)(3)

Based upon its dismissal of the federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 leaves the decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissal of all federal claims to the district court’s discretion, reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Stehney v. Perry · filed 1996-12-03(c)(3)

After dismissing counts 1 through 5, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This decision is committed to the discretion of the district court. Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (3d Cir. 1993). Because all federal claims were correctly dismissed and the district court found that dismissal of the remaining state claim would not be unfair to the litigants or result in waste of judicial resources, we see no abuse of discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Shepherd v. Boysen · filed 1996-12-03(c)(3)

Section 1367 explicitly provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's pendent state-law claim if it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority · filed 1997-01-09(c)(3)

And, having granted summary judgment to the defendants on that Count, the Court declines under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to exercise jurisdiction over Laughlin’s state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Hence, Count II of Laughlin’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim that would substantially predominate over the claim within its original jurisdiction.

Denno Ex Rel. Denno v. School Board of Volusia County · filed 1997-02-03(c)(2)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claim because the claims will “substantially predominate over the claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction” for several reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

KPMG Peat Marwick v. Texas Commerce Bank · filed 1997-02-12(c)(3)

Because this Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and they are remanded to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, with comity, fairness, and economy informing that choice.

Express Car Wash Corp. v. Irinaga Bros., Inc. · filed 1997-06-04(c)(3)

Under federal statute, this court may decline to hear supplemental state-law claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Therefore, under principles of comity, fairness, and economy, it would be more appropriate for the Oregon courts to determine how — if at all — Meghrig will influence their interpretation of these defendants’ liability under Oregon statutes. ... Therefore, I DISMISS plaintiffs remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Fouquet v. Canulette · filed 1997-07-03(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without prejudice the state law claims after granting summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after remanding the federal claim that supplied original jurisdiction.

Lemay v. Budget Rent a Car Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-07-09(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state FCRA claim. Section 1367(c)(3) states that “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It is early in the ease and the federal ADEA claim has been remanded to state court. The Court does not have original jurisdiction over the state FCRA claim. Therefore, the FCRA claim is also remanded to state court.

Section 1367 permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc. · filed 1997-07-11(c)(3)

The Court FINDS that it had and continues to have supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction is one of discretion. ... In exercising this discretion, the district court should consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. ... The usual rule in the Fifth Circuit is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed. ... This Court FINDS that the balance of these factors in the present case militate in favor of dismissing the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction; that choice is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Jordahl v. Democratic Party VA · filed 1997-07-28(c)(3)

Although the district court did not cite to § 1367(c)(3), it is clear from its opinion, that the district court exercised its discretion not to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... In the instant case, no evidence of abuse of discretion by the dis- trict court exists in its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Cacy v. Chickasha City · filed 1997-09-02(c)(3)

In any event, once the district court dismissed Mr. Cacy’s federal claims, it was authorized to dismiss the supplemental state claims as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to dismiss a supplemental state-law claim after the federal claims are resolved on summary judgment.

Williamson v. Bernalillo County · filed 1997-09-17(c)

In the absence of an anchoring federal cause of action, the district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ supplemental replevin claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see, e.g., Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 577 (10th Cir. 1994).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Fox v. Van Oosterum · filed 1997-11-26(c)(3)

Having dismissed plaintiffs federal claims, only plaintiffs state tort claims remain. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction^]” ... The Court, therefore, in its discretion, dismisses plaintiffs state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Medina v. City of Osawatomie · filed 1998-01-27(c)(3)

The district court is expressly authorized to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The court finds no compelling reason to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and determines in the interest of comity and federalism that plaintiffs remaining state law claim be heard in state court.