28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c) allows a court to require a plaintiff to show why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Marquise Bailey v. Aldredge · filed 2022-08-05(c)

The Court therefore further ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) allows a court to weigh judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity at every stage when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Brooke v. Great Wall International LLC · filed 2022-08-05(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, faimess, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court therefore further ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Gonzalez v. 10905 Venice, LLC · filed 2022-08-09(c)

The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Brooke v. West Covina Convention Center Group LLC · filed 2022-08-09(c)

The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Garcia v. Talebi · filed 2022-08-09(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court therefore further ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) calls for weighing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim.

Weilch v. Madrigal · filed 2022-08-09(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’1 Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988)). The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even when supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Cauley v. Dacha Home, LLC · filed 2022-08-10(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even when supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Elliott v. Sankary · filed 2022-08-18(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even when supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Weilch v. Estabrook · filed 2022-08-18(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims even when supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Weilch v. Varela · filed 2022-08-18(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction even when it exists.

Weilch v. SCDC Properties, Inc. · filed 2022-08-23(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4) support requiring a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim should be retained in light of substantial predominance and circumvention of California’s pleading requirements.

Garcia v. Birrieria Gonzalez Lounge, Inc. · filed 2020-01-03(c)(2), (c)(4)

See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because (1) “Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim” and, (2) because “it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements.”). The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim for similar reasons.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and to decline jurisdiction if the response is inadequate.

Acevedo v. FM Restaurants El Torito Opco, LLC · filed 2020-01-03(c)

Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

An Unruh Act claim does not substantially predominate over an ADA claim when their proof is nearly identical, and avoidance of California’s heightened requirements for high-frequency litigants does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when fairness and efficiency outweigh comity concerns.

Whitaker v. Ohanessian · filed 2020-01-08(c)(2), (c)(4)

Similarly, here, the proof required for Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and ADA claims is nearly identical. Therefore, the Court finds that the Unruh Act claim does not predominate over the ADA claim. ... This Court finds persuasive the cases in the Northern District of California which have examined this issue and found that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting declination of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction even when it exists and to require a plaintiff to show why jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim should be retained.

Zarian v. Vassar Mark LLC · filed 2020-01-10(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) allows a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s measures against abusive disability-access litigation.

Fernandez v. Nordstrom, Inc. · filed 2020-01-10(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of any such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to justify retaining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and to decline jurisdiction if the response is inadequate.

Le v. Akosh Investments, LLC · filed 2020-01-17(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under § 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff seeking supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim to justify its exercise and submit sworn facts concerning high-frequency litigant status.

Garcia v. Lo · filed 2020-01-21(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Under § 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s efforts to curb abusive disability-access litigation.

Berry v. Han · filed 2020-01-21(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

In deciding whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim, a court may require the plaintiff to justify its exercise and submit sworn facts establishing whether the plaintiff and counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants.

Rutherford v. Supreme Bright, LLC · filed 2020-01-21(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim, a court may require the plaintiff to identify the statutory damages sought and provide sworn facts concerning high-frequency litigant status.

Langer v. Opt Beverly LLC · filed 2020-01-21(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Section 1367 permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when the damages claim substantially predominates over the federal ADA claim and retaining jurisdiction would allow a high-frequency litigant to evade California’s pleading requirements.

Langer v. 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC · filed 2020-01-21(c)(2), (c)(4)

The Court DECLINES to adopt jurisdiction pursuant to the second and fourth factors. ... Consequently, as has been the case with some of Mr. Langer’s prior ADA suits, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the Unruh claim because it substantially predominates over the ADA claim. ... Regardless, the Court finds that either arrangement, though somewhat duplicative, better accommodates the passage of California’s statute on high frequency litigants and appropriately discourages serial litigants from “us[ing] the federal court system as a loophole to evade California’s pleading requirements.”

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require justification for retaining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s restrictions on high-frequency accessibility litigants.

Rafael Arroyo, Jr. v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. · filed 2020-01-22(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim should be exercised, including information on statutory damages and high-frequency-litigant status.

Garcia v. Greenmeadow Enterprises · filed 2020-02-04(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Under § 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and provide facts bearing on high-frequency-litigant status.

Rutherford v. HF Investments, LLC · filed 2020-02-04(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Section 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4) permit a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim should not be declined for substantial predominance and avoidance of state pleading requirements.

Garcia v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC · filed 2020-02-05(c)(2), (c)(4)

See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because (1) “Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim” and, (2) because “it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements.”). The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim for similar reasons.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (4) permit a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act and other state-law claims should be retained in light of state-law predominance and circumvention of California pleading requirements.

Yiun v. Garden Fresh Restaurants LLC · filed 2020-02-05(c)(2), (c)(4)

A number of federal district courts across California have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims brought alongside ADA claims, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2) & (c)(4). See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because (1) “Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim” and, (2) because “it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements.”). The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim and other state law claims for similar reasons.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (4) allow a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim should not be declined for predominance or circumvention of California pleading requirements.

Whitaker v. Bedjakian Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2020-02-07(c)(2), (c)(4)

Several federal district courts across California have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims brought alongside ADA claims, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2) & (c)(4). ... The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim for similar reasons.

Under section 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and may decline jurisdiction if the plaintiff fails to respond timely or adequately.

Garcia v. EK Lynwood, LLC · filed 2020-02-18(c)

Plaintiff shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by February 24, 2020. Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of any such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and provide sworn facts about high-frequency-litigant status when fairness and comity concerns arise from California’s disability-access litigation restrictions.

Whitaker v. WHB Biltmore LLC · filed 2020-02-18(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

In considering whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim, a court may require information about statutory damages and high-frequency-litigant status to assess fairness and comity.

Garcia v. Jovensons LLC · filed 2020-02-18(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Section 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4) support requiring a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim should not be declined for state-law predominance and circumvention of California’s pleading requirements.

Garcia v. Krystal Enterprises LLC · filed 2020-02-20(c)(2), (c)(4)

See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because (1) “Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim” and, (2) because “it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements.”). The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim for similar reasons.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s measures against abusive disability-access litigation.

Bouyer v. Benny Aliav and Aliza Aliav · filed 2020-02-24(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when the plaintiff fails to timely or adequately respond to an order to show cause concerning its exercise.

Estrada v. Gonzalez · filed 2020-02-24(c)

Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of any such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act and other state-law claims where federal filing evades California’s restrictions on accessibility litigation.

Lee v. Solorzano · filed 2020-02-25(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and other state-law claims, and the dismissal of those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s restrictions on high-frequency disability-access litigation.

Rutherford v. Big Dog Enterprises · filed 2020-03-02(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim, a court may require the plaintiff to justify exercising jurisdiction and disclose the statutory damages sought and facts bearing on high-frequency-litigant status.

Perri v. Merona Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2020-03-02(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Under Section 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and may decline jurisdiction if the response is untimely or inadequate.

Berry v. Jimenez · filed 2020-03-02(c)

Plaintiff shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by March 12, 2020. Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of any such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and to decline jurisdiction if the response is untimely or inadequate.

Whitaker v. Street Retail, Inc. · filed 2020-03-02(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of any such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim that substantially predominates over an ADA claim when comity and discouraging forum shopping also constitute exceptional circumstances.

Langer v. Stromesa Court LLC · filed 2020-03-02(c)(2), (c)(4)

In addition, the important interest of comity supports declining jurisdiction.

In considering whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify exercising jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s efforts to curb abusive disability-access litigation.

Bouyer v. Suchite · filed 2020-03-09(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and to decline jurisdiction if the response is inadequate.

Williams v. Frizzell · filed 2020-03-09(c)

Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under § 1367(c), a district court may require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act and other state-law claims should be retained and decline jurisdiction upon an inadequate response.

Dunn v. The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated · filed 2020-03-09(c)

Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and other state law claims, and the dismissal of those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show why supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s safeguards against abusive disability-access litigation.

Zarian v. Public Storage · filed 2020-03-30(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under § 1367(c), a court may order a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised over an Unruh Act claim.

Marsh v. AP Palmdale II LLC · filed 2020-04-10(c)

The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4) permit a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim should not be declined because of substantial predominance and circumvention of California’s pleading requirements.

Langer v. Cavi Investments, LLC · filed 2020-04-10(c)(2), (c)(4)

See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because (1) “Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim” and, (2) because “it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements.”). The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim for similar reasons.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s measures against abusive disability-access litigation.

Bouyer v. FAF Investment Company · filed 2020-04-13(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under § 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff seeking supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim to show cause and disclose the statutory damages sought and facts bearing on high-frequency-litigant status.

Edmonds v. 4051 Ardmore LLC · filed 2020-04-13(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and her counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised over an Unruh Act claim in light of fairness and comity concerns.

Villegas v. Attina Company · filed 2020-04-13(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under Section 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim and dismiss that claim if the response is inadequate.

Rutherford v. PS Business Parks, L.P. · filed 2020-04-13(c)

Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim should be retained and to decline jurisdiction if the response is inadequate.

Rutherford v. Marvin L.S. House · filed 2020-04-14(c)

Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to justify supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim in light of California’s litigation restrictions and to decline jurisdiction if the response is inadequate.

Zarian v. ATA Investments, LLC · filed 2020-04-14(c)

Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction, including over an Unruh Act claim when a plaintiff inadequately responds to an order to show cause.

Langer v. Oberst · filed 2020-04-14(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim even when supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Williams v. Ostriker · filed 2020-04-16(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and the dismissal of that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Under § 1367(c), a court may require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act and other state-law claims.

Cho v. Trojon 1970, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17(c)

The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to show cause why supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim should be retained in light of California’s restrictions on accessibility litigation.

Langer v. 201 Main, LLC · filed 2020-04-20(c)

Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim after considering fairness and comity.

Bouyer v. Haroutunian · filed 2020-06-02(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim to require the plaintiff to explain why jurisdiction should be exercised and provide facts about damages and high-frequency-litigant status.

Garcia v. Cho · filed 2020-09-23(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover. Plaintiff and his counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by California Civil Procedure Code sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim.

Whitaker v. Jagtoria Properties, LLC · filed 2020-11-19(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims providing original jurisdiction.

Giordano v. The School Board of Lee County, Florida · filed 2020-01-02(c)(3)

Even assuming these are properly pled, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court exercises its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

Section 1367 permits remand of remaining state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed when fairness and comity outweigh judicial economy and convenience.

Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys' Haven, Inc. · filed 2020-01-03(c)(3)

Although judicial economy and convenience may weigh toward retaining jurisdiction over this case, fairness and comity weigh more heavily toward remanding it. This consideration, coupled with the presumption of remand in this situation, indicate that remand of this case to the Jefferson Circuit Court is the best course of action.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims are dismissed before trial, with an early procedural stage and pending related state actions weighing against retaining jurisdiction.

Harrison v. Crick · filed 2020-01-06(c)(3)

However, where a federal court exercises jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the court will generally decline to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.

After all federal claims are dismissed, Section 1367 permits discretionary retention of the remaining state-law claims and requires balancing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Apotex Corp. v. Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited · filed 2020-01-06(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, and must balance the “traditional ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’” to determine whether to do so. Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissal of all federal claims, while allowing retention of those claims pending an opportunity to amend the federal claims.

Calloway-Armstrong v. Clarksville Police Department · filed 2020-01-06(c)(3)

However, because the court is permitting the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint, the court will not dismiss the plaintiffs’ state law claims at this time. Should the plaintiffs fail to file the optional amendments, or should the amendments to the complaint fail to state Section 1983 claims upon which relief can be granted, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Dickerson v. Duncan · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Dickerson’s remaining claims, having concluded that his federal claims are meritless. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims when the relevant considerations weigh against retaining jurisdiction.

Bogan v. Berrien County Sheriffs Department · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all claims within its original jurisdiction are dismissed before trial.

Barta v. Yeomans · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

However, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case because all federal claims alleged by Barta will be dismissed preservice without leave to amend.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Warfield v. Washburn · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

Because the plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state law claims after resolving the only federal claim on summary judgment when judicial economy and comity do not favor retention.

Haley v. Clark Construction Group-California, Inc. · filed 2020-01-13(c)(3)

Having considered the relevant factors, the Court in its discretion declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ... Judicial economy and comity are not served by retention of the state law claims. The remaining claims are therefore REMANDED to the Superior Court for San Francisco County.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after resolving all claims supporting original jurisdiction, considering economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Bank Of New York Mellon v. Blackhorse Homeowners Association · filed 2020-01-13(c)(3)

I have resolved all of the claims that supported original jurisdiction in this court. The remaining claims raise only Nevada state law issues that should be resolved in Nevada state court. Although the overall case has proceeded to summary judgment, Blackhorse and NAS have not pursued their claims against each other in this court, so concerns about economy or convenience are not implicated. I therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when no viable federal claims remain.

Johnson v. Wilcher · filed 2020-01-16(c)(3)

Since the Court determines that no viable federal claims exist in this case, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims which could arguably remain.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when removal was recent and no substantive action has occurred in federal court.

Amark Logistics, Inc. v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc. · filed 2020-01-16(c)(3)

And, once the only claim over which the court has original jurisdiction is dismissed, the court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). Because the case has only recently been removed and no substantive actions have been taken in this court, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Amark’s state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanding remaining state claims when federal claims are withdrawn early and judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity favor remand.

Westmark Emerald Pointe LLC v. City of Burien · filed 2020-01-17(c)(3)

Here, judicial economy favors remand. ... This action is still in its initial stages, and the Court has not expended significant resources addressing parties’ claims. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Westmark’s state law claims and allowing remand.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims arising under federal law.

Molchan v. Delmar Fire Department, Inc. · filed 2020-01-17(c)(3)

As to supplemental jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s claims arising under federal law will be dismissed, and the Court thus declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

JACKSON v. VALERIO · filed 2020-01-17(c)(3)

Because the Court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, “it ha[s] the authority to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

MALDONADO v. CITY OF PASSAIC BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-01-21(c)(3)

Because the Court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, “it ha[s] the authority to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claim. See Petrossian v. Cole, 613 F. App’x 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Obuskovic v. Wood, 761 F. App’x 144, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2019) (“A District Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). Here, in its discretion, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1). See, e.g., Mathis v. Phil. Elec. Co., 644 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, Count II of the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

United States v. Hardin House, Inc. · filed 2020-01-22(c)(3)

Without federal claims pending, I decline to exercise jurisdiction over relators’ remaining state law claims.

After dismissing all federal claims before trial, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when the balance of relevant considerations weighs against retaining them.

Hieshetter v. Amann · filed 2020-01-22(c)(3)

Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

After all federal claims are dismissed before trial, comity supports declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where no federal interests, extraordinary inconvenience, or inequity warrant retaining them.

Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local No. 38 Vacation Fund v. Novak Francella LLC · filed 2020-01-22(c)(3)

The value of comity alone tips the balance in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law attorney’s lien dispute after all federal claims have been dismissed, where the state court is better positioned to determine the fees.

Mayall v. Randall Firm, The · filed 2020-01-23(c)(2)

But even when supplemental jurisdiction exists, the court can decline jurisdiction when “the [supplemental] claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Here, the court had original jurisdiction over Mr. Mayall’s federal law claims, but those claims have all been dismissed. The only remaining issue is Mr. Ady’s lien for attorney’s fees. ... For these reasons, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Mayall’s motion to set aside attorney’s lien. Relief should instead be sought in the state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Adkisson v. Eubanks · filed 2020-01-23(c)(3)

Therefore, the Court will dismiss the federal claims against the defendants based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over A.A.’s state law claims.

After dismissal of the sole federal claim, supplemental jurisdiction should be declined over a state claim presenting unresolved state-law questions that is not inextricably intertwined with the federal claim.

Lambert v. Fiorentini · filed 2020-01-24(c)

That dispute appears to raise questions of state law, which would be "best resolved in state court." Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672. ... Finally, the certiorari claim is not so "inextricably intertwined" with the procedural due process claim under § 1983 that exercising supplemental jurisdiction would be appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice when the related federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Chamberlain v. Vinci · filed 2020-01-24(c)(3)

To the extent that Chamberlain accuses Capt. Webb or Lt. Cutter of state common law violations, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “When, as here, the federal claim is dismissed early in the case, the federal courts are inclined to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice rather than retain supplemental jurisdiction.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)). Any such claims are dismissed without prejudice so that Chamberlain may pursue file suit in state court, should he choose.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

MCLEOD v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-01-24(c)(3)

To the extent the Complaint raises claims under New Jersey state law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Burley v. Humphries-Dixon · filed 2020-01-24(c)(3)

Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claim because his Section 1983 claims arise under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the Court declines to do so. The Court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if ‘[it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction... .’” Brown v. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio, 517 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367). That is the case here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after properly dismissing the federal claims.

McMillan v. Chaker · filed 2020-01-27(c)(3)

As for Nicole Chaker’s cross-appeal, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim after properly dismissing the RICO claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Ove, 264 F.3d at 826.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when transfer of the federal claim leaves no federal-law question.

Caraboolad v. Sun Tan City, LLC · filed 2020-01-27(c)(3)

There no longer being a question of federal law, the Court declines to accept supplemental jurisdiction over the SCTPPA claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's SCTPPA claim will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim and dismiss it without prejudice after dismissing all federal claims.

Scott v. Mcclung · filed 2020-01-28(c)(3)

To the extent that the complaint adequately states a claim under Virginia law, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that state-law claim and it will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Meadows v. Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-01-29(c)(3)

Further, because the court will dismiss Meadows’ remaining claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and II and remands Counts I and II to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Wilson v. Carlson · filed 2020-01-29(c)(3)

Having dismissed the only federal claims in this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Perez v. State of California · filed 2020-01-31(c)(3)

In the absence of a federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed.

Holliday v. Newington Police Department · filed 2020-01-31(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if all federal claims have been dismissed).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims when the balance of relevant considerations weighs against retaining jurisdiction.

Hill 699324 v. Matthews · filed 2020-01-31(c)

Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claims when litigation is at an early stage and state courts are best positioned to resolve them.

Notz v. Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities · filed 2020-02-07(c)(3)

Because it is early in this litigation and because the state courts of Connecticut are best positioned to address ... Notz’s claims of improper conduct by a state agency, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims at the initial motion-to-dismiss stage, when it has developed no familiarity with the remaining issues.

Henson v. Howard University · filed 2020-02-10(c)(3)

As this case has not progressed past the initial Motion to Dismiss and the Court has developed no familiarity with the issues presented, it will decline to retain jurisdiction and will instead remand the matter to the Superior Court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Sloan v. Pennsylvania Department of Cor · filed 2020-02-10(c)(3)

A District Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the District Court properly dismissed Sloan’s claims under federal law, it plainly acted within its discretion in declining to hear his claims under state law.

Section 1367 permits a district court, in its discretion, to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed.

Willis v. District of Columbia Public Schools · filed 2020-02-18(c)(3)

“A district court may choose to retain jurisd iction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after federal claims are dismissed.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Intern., 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This Court has, in its “sound discretion[,]” elected ... to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Willis’ common law claims.

After all federal claims are dismissed, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state-law claims when related claims are already pending in state court and retaining jurisdiction would waste judicial and party resources.

Fressadi v. Glover · filed 2020-02-18(c)(3)

The federal claims that vested this Court with jurisdiction over Case 2 have been dismissed. ... Retaining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining three state law claims against Glover will not promote judicial economy or convenience. ... The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s amended Case 2 state law claims against Glover.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after disposing of all federal claims before trial.

Turyants v. City of New York · filed 2020-02-18(c)(3)

Having disposed of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims arising under New York state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Jordan v. Howard · filed 2020-02-18(c)(3)

Although Plaintiff’s state law claims were properly asserted in this Court by means of the supplemental jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a court may decline such supplemental jurisdiction where the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor resolving the remaining state-law claims in state court.

Apotex Corp. v. Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited · filed 2020-02-19(c)(3)

The Court “may” decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it has dismissed “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Here, the balance weighs in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

In re Cedar Shake & Shingle Antitrust Litigation · filed 2020-02-20(c)(3)

As a result of the ruling on Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims, the Court intends to exercise its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, as § 1367(c)(3) clearly permits.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed or the remaining claims raise novel or complex issues of state law.

Gavaldon v. Standard Chartered Bank International (Americas) Ltd. · filed 2020-02-20(c)(1), (c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims if all claims the Court had original jurisdiction over have been dismissed, or the remaining claims raise novel or complex issues of state law. ... Both of these apply here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Williams v. Garber · filed 2020-02-21(c)(3)

The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. ... Because the Court is dismissing Mr. Williams’ claims that gave it original jurisdiction, we will likewise decline to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after dismissing the federal claim.

Reynolds v. Adams · filed 2020-02-27(c)

To the extent that Reynolds may have some claim against the defendants under state law, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such state-law claims and will dismiss them without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed at the pleading stage and no considerations favor retaining jurisdiction.

Wilson v. Mount Diablo Unified School District/Special Education Local Plan Area · filed 2020-02-27(c)(3)

In this instance, as the case remains at the pleading stage, and there are no apparent considerations weighing in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss remaining state-law claims without prejudice when all federal claims have been dismissed before trial.

FORD v. BASS AND ASSOCIATES · filed 2020-02-27(c)(3)

In keeping with the standard established by Gibbs and maintained by the Eleventh Circuit, this Court acknowledges that in the instant case, since all federal claims have indeed been dismissed before trial, Eleventh Circuit precedent sets “a very strong argument” and “strong[] encouragement” for dismissal of the state law claim. ... Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s case without prejudice “so that the [Plaintiff] may pursue the claim in state court” should she so choose, and thereby upholding the precedent that the state should be “the final arbiters of state law.”

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims.

Otworth v. Moulatsiotis · filed 2020-02-27(c)(3)

Otworth’s state law claims against Swanson are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Courts generally should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims are resolved before trial, subject to an exception when a state-law claim might be time-barred.

Leiser, Jeffrey v. Hannula, Joan · filed 2020-02-28(c)(3)

The general rule is that federal courts should relinquish jurisdiction over state law claims if all federal claims are resolved before trial. ... An exception to this general rule arises in circumstances in which a state law claim might be time barred.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Buller v. Woodrow · filed 2020-03-02(c)(3)

Having now granted summary judgment on all the federal claims alleged ... against Defendants, the Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Buller’s remaining ... state law claims. ... Accordingly, Buller’s state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Jones v. Jinparn · filed 2020-03-02(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Here, having dismissed the claims against Officer Jinparn, the only claims that remain arise under California state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal-law claims.

Crandell v. Department of Corrections and Community Supervison · filed 2020-03-02(c)(3)

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal-law claims as frivolous, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from that relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), and the Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s state-law claims, see § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Bobiles v. Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. · filed 2020-03-04(c)(3)

The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if, among other reasons, it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... So, I decline to exercise my discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over them, do not reach the defendants’ arguments for dismissing these claims, and remand Bobiles’s state-law claims back to the state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Tibbs v. Bryan · filed 2020-03-04(c)(3)

While the Court has the discretion to assert supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, Bailey v. U.S.F. Holland, Inc., 2015 WL 2125137 at *10 (M.D.Tenn. May 6, 2015) (Trauger, J.), Section 1367, nonetheless, specifically provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses all federal claims.

Jordan v. Flippin · filed 2020-03-06(c)(3)

While I could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, I decline to do so because I am dismissing all of his federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Maraglino v. Espinosa · filed 2020-03-06(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maraglino’s state law claims because the court ... dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law declaratory counterclaims that would substantially predominate over the claims within original jurisdiction when judicial economy favors resolving the issues in a pending state-court action.

Miller v. Canadian National Railroad Company · filed 2020-03-06(c)(2), (c)(4)

However, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims I & II because these requests for declaratory judgment would substantially predominate the other claims, over which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and because judicial economy favors declining to adjudicate these issues currently pending before an Illinois state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when continued adjudication would not serve judicial efficiency or economy.

Nevarez v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2020-03-09(c)(3)

Because continued adjudication of the PAGA claims would not serve judicial efficiency or economy, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of each of the non-PAGA claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all claims supporting original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Lister v. Allen Oakwood Correctional Institution · filed 2020-03-09(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the claims supporting original jurisdiction are dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim with prejudice.

Menges v. Johnson Mark LLC · filed 2020-03-10(c)(3)

That is, the Court would dismiss Menges’ FDCPA claim with prejudice and would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.7 That is the same relief Menges seeks in his Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the Court need not reach Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

After dismissing the federal claims, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when no compelling reason supports retaining them.

North Mill Street, LLC v. City of Aspen · filed 2020-03-10(c)(3)

The Court need not determine to what extent plaintiff’s claims are premised upon state laws, however, because with the federal questions dismissed the Court sees no compelling reason to exercise whatever supplemental jurisdiction it might be able to exercise.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Smith v. Kim · filed 2020-03-10(c)(3)

To the extent that Plaintiff may be asserting ... state law claims against Defendants, having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and they are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of potential state law claims after judgment is entered for the defendants on the federal claim.

Roberts v. Corizon Health Services · filed 2020-03-11(c)(3)

By separate order, the Court will enter judgment for the defendants on that claim. The Court also adopts the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the Court dismiss any potential state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Dawson v. Doe · filed 2020-03-12(c)(3)

Because the Court has granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Dawson’s constitutional claims over which the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction, the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Cotz v. Gutierrez-Scaccetti · filed 2020-03-18(c)(3)

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims arising under federal law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state- law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (stating a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims concerning domestic relations after dismissing all federal claims, leaving the state claims dismissed without prejudice.

Feller v. Feller · filed 2020-03-20(c)(3)

Here, the Court has dismissed all of Mr. Feller’s federal claims, and where the remaining claims relate to matters of domestic relations, this Court has no compelling interest in their resolution. ... The Court thus declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Feller’s state torts. Those claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when the sole federal claim is dismissed at the pleading stage and the case is in its infancy.

Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation · filed 2020-03-20(c)(3)

Because there is no viable federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... Because this case is in its infancy, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims is inappropriate.

After dismissing all federal claims, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand a local negligence claim when comity and fairness favor adjudication in local courts.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-03-23(c)(3)

Here, the balance of factors points towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the negligence claim. ... That may be so, but other factors—especially comity and fairness—point towards remand. ... With her federal claims both dismissed, remand to D.C. Superior Court is a more appropriate outcome.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when it dismisses all federal claims at an early stage of litigation.

HARROLD v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY · filed 2020-03-24(c)(3)

Here, at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, the Court is dismissing Plaintiff's federal claims, which provided the Court with federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court uses its discretion pursuant to § 1367(c) and declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law CEPA claim. Therefore, Count One is dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Saunders v. Amplus Air Conditioning Contractor, Inc. · filed 2020-03-25(c)(3)

Under these circumstances, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss Counts III and IV without prejudice.

After all federal claims are dismissed, § 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Horst v. Abused Adult Resource Center · filed 2020-03-26(c)(3)

In considering whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, the Court must consider the provisions of Section 1367(c) and the factors the United States Supreme Court outlined in Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350-51, and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). These factors include judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350. In the instant action, the balance of factors weighs in favor of dismissal of Horst’s state law claims without prejudice. Consequently, the court in its discretion can and should dismiss Horst’s state law claims.

After all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed, supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims may be declined when limitations are tolled, few judicial resources have been spent on those claims, and their resolution is not obvious.

CIESNIEWSKI v. ARIES CAPITAL · filed 2020-03-27(c)(3), (d)

Here, none of these factors warrant retaining jurisdiction over the state- law claims. First, Mr. Ciesniewski may refile the claims in state court because the statute of limitations is tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for at least 30 days after dismissal. 28 U.S.C § 1367(d). Second, the state law claims have not been substantively addressed in any prior order or hearing, so few court resources have been expended in their adjudication. Finally, the parties’ briefing on the state-law issues demonstrates that it is not obvious how they should be decided. Because the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). These claims are DISMISSED without prejudice so Mr. Ciesniewski can refile them in state court.

When all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed before trial, supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims must be declined unless judicial economy, convenience, and fairness affirmatively justify retaining them.

Simonson v. Borough of Taylor · filed 2020-03-30(c)(3)

Finally, since the court is granting defendants summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s federal claims, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims, Counts V and VI, and these claims will be dismissed without prejudice. “A district court may refuse to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction where, as in the instant case, ‘the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kocher, 926 F.Supp.2d at 613 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3)). “In fact, ‘where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal law claims.

Trapp v. Chrysalis Center · filed 2020-04-13(c)(3)

Accordingly, I will dismiss Trapp’s federal law claims with prejudice in light of the opportunity he has previously had to file an amended complaint. As to Trapp’s state law claims, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and Trapp may separately pursue any such state law claims to the extent that relief may be available by filing a separate action in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to leave state-law claims dismissed when reconsideration does not revive the dismissed federal claims.

IPPOLITO v. CARPENITO · filed 2020-04-13(c)(3)

However, because Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration fails as tothe CVRA, the Court denies Plaintiff’s requestto reinstate the state-law counts.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage.

Helfrich v. City of Pataskala · filed 2020-04-13(c)(3)

Although the Court has discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, doing so here would not be a prudent exercise of this discretion. ... This case is in its early stages, and all federal claims have been dismissed upon initial judicial presentation.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Stemler v. Borough of Parryville · filed 2020-04-13(c)(3)

Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). ... Because this court will dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims over which it has original jurisdiction, only the state law claims remain. This court will exercise its discretion and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law third-party claims after dismissal of the original claims when the record is undeveloped and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity do not favor retention, despite years of pendency.

LeMaster v. Powell · filed 2020-04-15(c)(3)

The interests of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” do not support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under the circumstances. See Musson Theatrical, 89 F.3d at 1254. Though LeMaster’s third-party claims have been pending in this Court for more than two years, the record pertaining to these claims is relatively undeveloped. No party filed a timely dispositive motion. The third-party claims were effectively dormant throughout the litigation, with the Powells first seeking dismissal after the summary judgment period. As a result, the Court has expended few resources regarding these claims, and any delay that results from dismissal at this stage is attributable to the parties’ conduct, strategic choices, or lack of attention. Accordingly, retaining the case at this point would not further judicial economy. In its discretion, the Court elects to dismiss the remaining third-party claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claims asserted to support original jurisdiction.

Mays v. Combs · filed 2020-04-15(c)(3)

Furthermore, having dismissed the claims over which Mays alleged that this court had original jurisdiction, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims, particularly when the remaining state claims raise novel issues of state law.

Karp v. SI Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2020-04-16(c)(1), (c)(3)

Having dismissed the Plaintiff’s federal claims, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state claims if, among other circumstances, “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... I see no reason to depart from this practice here, particularly in light of the fact that the Plaintiff’s state-law claims appear to implicate novel issues of Maryland law. See ECF No. 61 at 2-3 (indicating that Maryland courts have not decided the potentially dispositive issue of whether standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of an acquired company is lost upon the consummation of a merger); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (whether a claim “raises a novel or complex issue of State law” is a factor that may lead a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when the sole federal claim is dismissed and no unusual circumstances warrant retaining jurisdiction.

Focused Impressions, Inc. v. The Sourcing Group, LLC · filed 2020-04-16(c)(3)

FII has not argued that this is an unusual case and, as to the state law claims alleged against Smith, the Court does not find unusual circumstances that would counsel against declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. As a matter of judicial efficiency, the Court therefore dismisses FII’s remaining state law claims against Smith.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Anchor Health Systems Inc v. Radowski · filed 2020-04-22(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims brought against the Defendants City of Hammond, Professional Claims Management, Inc., and Dennis Radowski.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after all federal claims are resolved, with remand appropriate in a removed case.

Neri v. Albuquerque Public Schools · filed 2020-04-22(c)(3)

Nonetheless, the Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, I recommend declining supplemental jurisdiction over the claims arising under state law and remanding them to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state and local claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dominguez v. Banana Republic, LLC · filed 2020-04-23(c)(3)

Alternatively, after dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claims for lack of standing this Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims when comity and the state legislature’s preference for state courts outweigh judicial efficiencies, especially after dismissal of the federal claims.

Eldridge v. Shelby County, Tennessee · filed 2020-04-23(c)(3), (c)(4)

The exclusivity provision of the TGTLA constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” justifying a court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over TGTLA claims. ... The interests of comity outweigh any efficiencies to be gained by allowing Plaintiffs’ TGTLA claims to proceed, especially given that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.

A state claim whose limitations period expired before the federal action was filed does not qualify for the limitations exception to relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of all federal claims.

Evans v. Lambert · filed 2020-04-24(c)(3)

In this case, however, it appears that the statute of limitations had run prior to Plaintiff filing his complaint in federal court. ... As result, Plaintiff’s claims do not come under an exception to the general rule that federal courts are to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims. ... The Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law medical malpractice claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor declining jurisdiction.

Scottsdale Insurance Company v. All Citizens Transportation, LLC · filed 2020-04-24(c)(3)

Because no claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction remains in the case and the common-law factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Rosenow v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2020-04-27(c)(3)

Rosenow’s federal claims have been dismissed. The Court declines to exercise ... supplemental jurisdiction over Rosenow’s state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when the proceedings remain at an early stage and judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor dismissal of the remaining state-law claims without prejudice.

Johnston v. Prairie View, Inc. · filed 2020-04-27(c)(3)

Here, the proceedings are at an early stage (despite pending for a lengthy amount of time) and the remaining causes of action— following dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims—are purely state-law claims. Considering the various factors, therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. These claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

A court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims when the claims arise from the same facts and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor doing so.

Ragin v. Riverbay Corporation · filed 2020-06-22(a)

The Court finds that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims is warranted given that the federal and state claims arise under an identical set of facts and the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of jurisdiction.