28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 supports removal when a state complaint alleges termination to prevent pension benefits from vesting because ERISA completely preempts that claim, even if the complaint does not cite ERISA.

Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc. · filed 1987-01-30

An asserted or anticipated defense predicated on federal preemption of state law is, in jurisdictional terms, a defense like any other, and will not serve to invoke federal jurisdiction. ... Even though plaintiffs did not refer to ERISA in their state petition, their claim that they were terminated by ... defendant in an attempt to deprive them of company retirement benefits is a claim preempted by ERISA, and removal is proper.

A state-law claim within ERISA Section 502(a)'s exclusive civil-enforcement scope is completely preempted, necessarily arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes, and is removable.

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Taylor · filed 1987-04-06

Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, “arise[s] under the . . . laws ... of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(b).

A state-law benefits claim within ERISA's civil-enforcement scheme is completely preempted, arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes, and is removable.

D'Onofrio v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1987-06-16

Necessarily this claim is within the scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and therefore is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. ... As such, this case is properly removable to federal court. ... Accordingly, the court finds that it has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b), and that the plaintiffs motion for remand should be, and is hereby denied.

Section 1331 does not support removal when federal preemption is only a defense and federal law has neither completely displaced state regulation nor supplied a corresponding federal remedy.

Crazy Eddie, Inc. v. Cotter · filed 1987-07-23

Because the EPCA does not exclude state regulation of energy efficiency standards, the preemption that Crazy Eddie argues is necessarily a defense to the state action and does not afford any basis for removal jurisdiction. ... In sum, Crazy Eddie has posited no substantial, disputed federal ingredient which would support removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction extends to state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA and redressable under ERISA Section 502(a), because Congress made those claims necessarily federal in character.

44 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1180, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,328, 2 indiv.empl.rts.cas. 1112 John J. Sorosky v. Corpo · filed 1987-08-25

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction because certain of Sorosky's state law claims were completely preempted by ERISA; the complaint therefore raised a claim under ERISA, and it could have been filed originally in the federal district court.

Section 1331 supports removal when ERISA completely preempts a state-law contract claim for employee-plan benefits.

Kanada v. Hartford Life Insurance · filed 1987-10-06

Therefore, the court finds that ERISA has pre-empted plaintiffs state law breach of contract claim. Thus, plaintiff has alleged a cause of action which necessarily “arises under” federal law. ... For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to remand is denied.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the complaint asserts no direct federal claim and merely seeks the value of benefits lost through an allegedly unlawful termination under state law.

Schultz v. National Coalition of Hispanic Mental Health & Human Services Organizations · filed 1988-02-11

It is also apparent that there is no direct claim under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and consequently no obvious federal question that would give this Court jurisdiction over the action. ... There is, in short, no basis for removal of this action to federal court.

Section 1331 supports removal when ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions both preempt and displace a nominally state-law claim, even though the complaint does not plead a federal question on its face.

Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New York · filed 1988-03-23

On the one hand, if ERISA preempts and displaces either statute, then this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the entire matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 by virtue of the holding in Taylor ... and may decide the merits of defendant’s motion. ... As explained below, the Court holds that ERISA preempts and displaces La.R.S. 22:657 and thus that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support removal when a state wrongful-discharge claim seeks damages that include lost retirement benefits but alleges neither an ERISA benefits claim nor termination intended to interfere with ERISA rights.

Rody v. Midland Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1988-05-06

Consequently, it is alleged that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. ... This relationship is too remote, tenuous and insubstantial to support jurisdiction for removal.

A state-law claim is removable under Section 1331 through complete preemption only when a federal statute supplies a comparable civil cause of action and Congress clearly intended removal; ordinary or forum preemption defenses alone do not create federal-question jurisdiction.

Railway Labor Executives Association v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co. · filed 1988-10-14

under the “well pleaded complaint” rule, there is no removal jurisdiction in this case and a remand is required unless it can be said that the RLA or the ICA “completely preempts” RLEA's state cause of action. ... The well pleaded complaint rule is alive and well and a plaintiff “may [in most instances] avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” ... If the federal statute creates no federal cause of action vindicating the same interest the plaintiff's state cause of action seeks to vindicate, ... recharacterization as a federal claim is not possible and there is no claim arising under federal law to be removed and litigated in the federal court. ... Because there is no RLA or ICA cause of action within the scope of which RLEA’s state claim falls and because we do not find the requisite Congressional intent, we hold that there is no removal jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 does not support removal of state wrongful-death claims under the complete-preemption doctrine when federal maritime law has not been shown to displace those claims completely.

Tomlin v. Carson Helicopters, Inc. · filed 1988-11-15

In sum, the defendants have failed to show adequate support, in the legislative history or in case law, for their claim that the complete preemption doctrine should be extended to provide federal question jurisdiction in this case. ... there is no federal question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the case must be remanded to State Court because this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 removal ordinarily requires a federal question on the face of the complaint, but a state-law claim completely preempted by federal law is federal from its inception.

Scherer v. LABORERS'INTERN. UNION OF N. AMERICA · filed 1988-12-19

Whether a federal question is presented must be determined by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule; that is, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.” ... However, where state law is completely pre-empted by federal law, then any claim allegedly based on pre-empted state law raises a federal question from its inception.

Section 1331 does not support removal or a federal declaratory-judgment action when federal preemption is only a defense and the federal statute does not completely preempt the state-law cause of action.

Cablevision of Boston Ltd. Partnership v. Flynn · filed 1989-03-30

The “well-pleaded complaint” rule teaches that where the federal question does not appear on the face of the complaint and is raised only by way of a federal defense, the jurisdictional statute does not authorize removal. ... Because this Court concludes that any implied federal cause of action that may exist under the Cable Act does not so pre-empt common law theories as to convert them into essentially federal claims, Cablevision’s pre-emption argument operates only as a possible defense in the courts of the Commonwealth to Boston’s common law claims and cannot serve as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction upon which to ground its federal declaratory judgment action.

Section 1331 does not permit removal of a state-law action merely because the Longshore Act supplies a federal defense; the Act lacks the special jurisdictional grant and congressional intent required for complete preemption.

Aaron v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 1989-06-26

On the contrary, federal question jurisdiction can only be obtained for claims regarding the LHWCA under the general federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). ... We apply the well-pleaded complaint rule to this action and find that removal was improper.

A state-law claim preempted by ERISA and outside ERISA's insurance savings clause arises under federal law and is properly removable under Section 1331.

Howard v. Gleason Corp. · filed 1989-07-19

Because the State law in this case is preempted by the ERISA and is not subject to exemption under the ERISA’s savings clause, removal of this case to this Court was proper. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to State court is denied.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction requires a federal claim on the well-pleaded complaint's face unless the state claim falls within a narrow area that Congress completely preempted; an ordinary federal preemption defense is insufficient.

Allstate Insurance Company v. The 65 Security Plan, Lindemuth, Michael · filed 1989-07-19

Thus, Allstate’s “well-pleaded complaint” does not, on its face, state a federal claim and the fact that the Plan may have a preemption defense does not alone permit removal. We must now consider if Allstate’s claims fall into one of those narrow areas that Congress has decided to completely preempt.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a state-law tort claim when the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act appears only as a federal defense and Congress did not manifest an intent to make such claims completely preempted and removable.

Aaron v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg · filed 1989-08-15

We apply the well-pleaded complaint rule to this action and find that removal was improper. Therefore, we VACATE the judgment of the district court. We REMAND the case to the district court with the instruction that it remand to state court.

A state claim falling within ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions is completely preempted, arises under federal law within Section 1331, and is removable.

Fitzgerald v. Codex Corporation · filed 1989-08-17

Thus, this action is “necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, ‘arises under ... the laws ... of the United States,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).”

A state malpractice action is not removable under Section 1331 through ERISA complete preemption when the claim falls outside ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions.

Pfefferle v. Solomon · filed 1989-08-21

Abbott’s contention that Pfefferle’s suit alleges a claim falling within the scope of § 1132(a) of ERISA and is therefore removable to this Court is incorrect.

A state-law claim is completely preempted and removable under Section 1331 only if it falls within the federal statute's civil-enforcement provision and Congress clearly intended to permit removal despite the complaint's reliance on state law.

Matthew Krashna and Tamara D. Krashna, His Wife v. Oliver Realty, Inc., Grant Building Inc., A/K/A Grant Building and Su · filed 1990-02-02

We have recently identified two factors that are necessary for “a federal court in a case removed from a state court ... to recharacterize what purports to be a state law claim as a claim arising under a federal statute.” ... First, “the statute relied upon by the defendant as preemptive [must] contain[] civil enforcement provisions within the scope of which the plaintiffs state claim falls.” ... Second, there must be “a clear indication of a Congressional intention to permit removal despite the plaintiff's exclusive reliance on state law.”

Section 1331 does not support removal based on federal preemption when the plaintiff's state-law claim is not completely preempted by federal law.

City of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1990-10-10

In the instant case, diversity of citizenship does not exist, so subject matter jurisdiction, if it exists, must be predicated upon federal question jurisdiction under which district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... As concluded in the preceding discussion, the federal court should decline consideration of this case based upon the abstention doctrine, or, in the alternative, should remand the case to the state court based upon lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction to support removal because the substance of plaintiff’s claim has not been preempted by federal law.

Section 1331 removal requires a federal cause of action on the properly pleaded complaint.

Vail v. Pan Am Corp. · filed 1990-11-27

In the absence of diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction must be established in the manner required by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only if a federal cause of action is presented on the face of the properly pleaded complaint.

Section 1331 does not permit removal based on an ordinary federal-preemption defense; complete preemption requires clear congressional intent to make the state-law cause of action removable.

Amrhein v. Quaker Oats Co. · filed 1990-12-20

However, it is well settled that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law. ... Federal preemption is ordinarily raised as a defense. Because it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, it does not authorize removal to federal court. ... Congressional intent to preempt a field is not enough; Congress must intend to create removal jurisdiction. ... The question for this Court is whether Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make all causes of action relating to child restraints removable to federal court. The answer is simply no.

Section 1331 permits removal of an ERISA-related state-law claim under complete preemption only when the claim is cognizable under ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Bromenn Healthcare v. Northwestern National Life Insurance · filed 1992-11-13

Therefore, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over any state law claim cognizable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) pursuant to the doctrine of complete preemption. Beyond this limitation, the Seventh Circuit fails to acknowledge removal jurisdiction for ERISA actions removed under the general federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an airport terminal slip-and-fall negligence claim when the Federal Aviation Act does not completely preempt the claim.

Butcher v. City of Houston · filed 1993-01-29

If the state law claims are not preempted by § 1305(a)(1), then federal question jurisdiction is not present and Plaintiff’s motion to remand must be granted. ... The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s state law negligence action does not involve claims related to airline “services” within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1). ... The Court therefore concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that this action must be remanded to state court.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because a federal law may preempt them; removal under complete preemption requires congressional intent to make the claims removable.

In Re Air Disaster · filed 1993-05-07

If the complaint relies only on state law, the district court generally lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the action is not removable. That a defendant raises a federal defense to a state law claim, including a preemption defense, is immaterial for jurisdictional purposes. ... No analogous statutory provision nor any similar clearly stated legislative history exists with respect to the FAA or the ADA. Therefore, by application of the clear instructions of the Supreme Court in Taylor and the other authorities cited above, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand must be granted.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against crop insurance agents for their own errors or omissions because the Federal Crop Insurance Act does not completely preempt those claims.

Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency · filed 1993-05-24

In addition, a review of the FCIA and its legislative history uncovers no congressional intent that claims against insurance agents for the agents' own errors or omissions are to be deemed to create federal-question jurisdiction. ... We therefore find that the FCIA does not have the extraordinary preemptive force necessary for the application of the doctrine of complete preemption.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over an insured’s claim under an FCIC-reinsured crop insurance policy when the Federal Crop Insurance Act completely preempts the state-law claim.

Owen v. Crop Hail Management · filed 1994-01-18

Unless the Act completely preempts state law thereby meeting the corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court will not have federal question jurisdiction over this case and must remand it to the Associate Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Missouri. ... The Act completely preempts state law. Given the history and purpose of the Act, the congressional intent and the provision for civil enforcement, the Act so extensively regulates federal crop insurance that it does not leave any room for state law to supplement it thus, Crop Hail Management’s removal of the ease from state court was proper.

Section 1331 gives federal courts original jurisdiction over personal injury claims governed by the Warsaw Convention because those claims arise under federal law even when pleaded as state law claims.

Luna v. Compania Panamena De Aviacion, SA · filed 1994-03-30

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993). ... Plaintiffs' claims, which are covered by the Warsaw Convention, necessarily arise under federal law and were properly removed to federal court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the defendant raises a preemption defense; the federal statute must completely preempt those claims.

Adkins v. Excel College of Corbin, Inc., Doing Business as Excel College Robert Wiley, Huntington Federal Savings · filed 1994-04-11

The district court erred when it determined that a preemption defense, without more, was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 permits federal-question removal based on ERISA preemption only when the removing defendant alleges facts showing that an ERISA-qualified plan is involved.

Mitchell v. Investors Guaranty Life Insurance · filed 1994-08-30

This court is confronted with a motion to remand to the state court a case removed by defendants upon their allegation that the action is controlled by the Employees Retirement Income Security Act and thus presents a federal, question removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The central point of Judge Albritton’s opinion, and the point of this court’s earlier similar opinions, is that a reasonable degree of particularity is required of a removing defendant who wants to enjoy the concept of preemption or “super-preemption.” ... Not finding that these defendants have alleged the facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of an ERISA-qualified plan, plaintiffs’ motion to remand will be granted by separate order.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction when federal law completely preempts state-law claims, making them arise under federal law.

Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-09-14

In summary, while the Court acknowledges that a preemption defense is generally not sufficient to permit removal under the well-pleaded complaint rule, where the scheme of federal legislation and regulation is so comprehensive, such as the MDA, that federal law effectively, even if tacitly, displaces and subsumes all state-law claims, federal-question removal is allowed. ... Having first determined that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all state-law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a state law claim that presents a federal question because federal law completely preempts it.

Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-09-22

The state law claim contained in count I of the complaint relates to the safety or effectiveness of a medical device subject to regulation under the MDA. The claim is preempted by the MDA. As such, the claim presents a question of federal law, establishing federal court jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law FEHBA benefits claims merely because federal law may preempt them; removal requires complete preemption.

Goepel v. Nat'l Postal Mail Handlers Union · filed 1994-09-22

The Plan is free to raise preemption as a defense in state court, and our holding that FEHBA does not completely preempt the Goepels' state law claims so as to permit removal of this action does not prejudge the merits of such a claim.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that ERISA completely preempts because those claims arise under federal law.

Broadnax Mills, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia · filed 1994-11-08

Original jurisdiction exists where the plaintiffs cause of action arises under the Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Pursuant to this doctrine, a federal court will have jurisdiction, regardless of the complaint’s contents, where Congress has “so completely preempted] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” ... The record before the Court establishes that the plaintiffs claims are preempted by ERISA and fall within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. On this basis, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to remand this matter to state court will be denied.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law wrongful-death claims arising from international air travel when the Warsaw Convention does not completely preempt those claims.

Campos v. Sociedad Aeronautica De Medellin Consolidada, S.A. · filed 1994-12-30

Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule to this case, and in light of the Court’s determination that the Warsaw Convention is not an exclusive cause of action, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint “does not arise under federal law so as to confer re- ... moval jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.”

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim based solely on a federal pre-emption defense when federal law does not completely pre-empt the claim.

Autrey v. United Companies Lending Corp. · filed 1995-01-03

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions that arise under the laws of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“federal question jurisdiction”), as well as over civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. ... Because § 501 does not completely pre-empt Plaintiffs’ Mini Code claims, which this Court so finds since § 5-19-4(g) qualifies under DIDMCA’s (b)(4) override exception, remand is appropriate.

Section 1331 supports federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law benefits claim when ERISA completely preempts the claim and converts it into a federal claim.

David C. Roberts, Sri v. Motion Picture Pension Plan Blankenship Administrator · filed 1995-02-01

Federal question jurisdiction exists over actions "arising under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... The complete preemption doctrine, however, provides an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. ... Here, Roberts's state-law conversion action sought to establish his rights to certain benefits, which were due under the terms of an employee benefits plana and were allegedly converted by the Pension Plan when it honored the IRS's levy. Given these circumstances, removal was proper.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because an ERISA plan or statute may be involved when the claims are not completely preempted.

Barringer v. Parker Bros. Employee Retirement Fund · filed 1995-02-07

It is an elementary principle of law that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives District Courts jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... Given that there is not a single piece of evidence in this case that any Plaintiff is a beneficiary of an ERISA plan or that the transaction at stake here involves anything more than a third party, the Court finds absolutely no evidence that a federal question is raised in this case. As stated above, the mere fact that an ERISA statute may be involved in this case is obviously insufficient in itself to give this Court federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against private insurers on FCIC-reinsured crop insurance policies when the Federal Crop Insurance Act does not completely preempt those claims.

O'Neal v. Cigna Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1995-02-28

Examination of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint reveals that the alleged wrongs of which Plaintiff complains were actions of the insurance agency and the issuing provider in the handling of Plaintiff’s claim. In other words, they are claims against Defendants for their own errors and omissions. ... Based on the foregoing reasons and the cited authorities, the court concludes that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this action.

Section 1331 gives district courts original jurisdiction over state law claims that arise under federal law through complete preemption by the Copyright Act.

Patrick v. Francis · filed 1995-05-17

Removal of plaintiffs complaint was therefore proper since section 301(a) preempted four of plaintiffs state law claims, including the fourth cause of action for copyright violation. This Court has original jurisdiction over plaintiffs copyright violation claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because ERISA might preempt it; removal requires a federal question on the complaint’s face or a claim within ERISA’s complete-preemption doctrine.

DUKES v. U.S. HEALTHCARE · filed 1995-06-19

The HMOs removed these cases to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441, alleging that the district courts had original jurisdiction over the claims, because the claims "[arose] under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States." Sec. 1441(b); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... State law claims which fall outside of the scope of Sec. 502, even if preempted by Sec. 514(a), are still governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and, therefore, are not removable under the complete-preemption principles established in Metropolitan Life.

Federal-question jurisdiction on removal cannot rest on a preemption defense unless federal law completely preempts the state-law claim; federal railroad regulation does not completely preempt state-law property claims concerning railroad servitudes.

State of Louisiana v. Sprint Communications Co. · filed 1995-06-28

Generally, a suit may not be removed to a federal court on the basis of a federal defense including the defense of preemption; however, under the “complete preemption doctrine”, once an area of state law has been completely preempted, any claim based on that preempted state law is considered a federal claim and therefore arises under federal law. ... This court is not at all convinced that the Congress intended to preempt private state law regulating the rights of owners of immovable property in Louisiana by federal statutes which regulate railroads.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state securities-law claims merely because federal securities law may preempt some state law; federal securities law does not completely preempt the field.

Gilman v. Wheat, First Securities, Inc. · filed 1995-07-31

While defendant is correct that federal question jurisdiction exists when federal law completely preempts the area of state law set out in a complaint, see, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393-94, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430-31, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), federal law has not completely preempted the securities area. ... Thus, this court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over a removed benefits claim when ERISA governs the insurance plan and preempts the state-law claims.

McFarland v. Union Central Life Insurance · filed 1995-10-12

The court should consider first the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, because it goes to the court’s jurisdiction of this removed civil action. ... That this group insurance policy constitutes an employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA, and that ERISA (and specifically the remedial provision of ERISA codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)) preempts the plaintiffs State-law claims, are established by the statutory provisions reviewed above, and by ERISA law as announced in Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). ... For the reasons stated, the court will deny the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, read as a motion to remand this civil action, and will grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and dismiss this civil action.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when no federal issue appears on the complaint and the federal statute does not completely preempt those claims.

Horn v. Rural Community Insurance Services · filed 1995-11-02

As discussed below, the plaintiff raises no federal issues on the face of his complaint. Therefore, if this court has jurisdiction over this action, it is only pursuant to the doctrine of “complete” or “super” preemption. Having examined the submissions of the parties and the relevant case law, though, the court finds that Congress did not intend for the FCIA to completely preempt this area of the law. Accordingly, the court finds that the Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is due to be GRANTED.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state wage claims through complete preemption by the FLSA because Congress did not clearly intend to make those claims removable.

Morales v. Showell Farms, Inc. · filed 1995-12-11

In sum, even if Morales’ claims are pre-empted, the FLSA evidences no congressional intent to convert federal pre-emption from a defense into a grounds for jurisdiction. Because the pre-requisites are not present for jurisdiction under the complete pre-emption doctrine, Showell has not demonstrated that this court has federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits removal of a state-law claim on federal-question grounds when ERISA completely preempts the claim under § 502(a), but ordinary ERISA preemption under § 514(a) does not create federal jurisdiction.

Constantine v. Minis · filed 1995-12-21

Section 1441(b) permits removal of an action without regard to diversity of citizenship where federal-question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Defendants’ assertion of preemption under § 514(a) of ERISA does not, therefore, support removal of this action from state court. ... Because plaintiffs claims do not fall within the scope of § 502(a)’s “complete preemption”, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this action and does not reach the question of preemption under § 514(a).

Section 1331 gives a district court federal-question jurisdiction to decide whether a state-law claim apparent on the face of the complaint is completely preempted by federal law.

MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc. · filed 1996-01-22

The major issue in this case is whether state malicious prosecution actions for events taking place within the bankruptcy court proceedings are completely preempted by federal law. If they are, it is clear that there is a federal question involved in this action, and that will establish the jurisdiction of the district court to rule upon the issue.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a state-law claim merely because a federal statute may preempt it; complete preemption requires clear congressional intent to make the claim removable.

Esquivel v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-01-30

Defendant cites to no clear manifest congressional intent to make causes of action under the Communications Act removable to federal court in the same manner as those filed under the LMRA or ERISA.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when complete preemption makes the claim federal from its inception.

Simmons v. United Parcel Service · filed 1996-02-12

Under the “complete pre-emption doctrine,” once an area of state law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. ... Therefore, the “complete pre-emption” doctrine applies and UPS’s removal on that basis was proper.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when federal law completely preempts that claim.

Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co. · filed 1996-03-22

One exception to this general rule applies to areas of federal law that completely preempt state law, such as controversies involving an interpretation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on complete preemption when the federal statute provides plaintiffs no cause of action and the regulated devices are subject to minimal federal regulation.

Collins v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 1996-04-23

Although defendants may be correct that the “interests” plaintiffs assert concerning safety of the medical device are addressed by the MDA, we will not find federal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state claims where the federal statute provides no cause of action whatsoever to the plaintiffs, and the devices at issue are subject to minimal regulations by the federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when the invoked federal statute cannot completely preempt those claims because it provides no comparable federal cause of action.

Kozar v. AT & T · filed 1996-04-25

With these principles in mind, since Section 11(c) of OSHA cannot “completely preempt” Plaintiffs state law claims because it does not provide the Plaintiff with a comparable federal cause of action which Plaintiff could have originally prosecuted in this Court, I find that Plaintiffs claims do not “arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal statute does not completely preempt them.

Castellanos v. U.S. Long Distance Corp. · filed 1996-06-17

Because this court does not agree that the Federal Communications Act governs exclusively in this area, the court holds that complete preemption does not apply and remands this ease to the state court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when federal law supplies only a preemption defense and no substitute federal cause of action.

Pena v. Downey Savings & Loan, Ass'n · filed 1996-06-25

Neither HOLA nor OTS regulations creates a federal cause of action with respect to employment contracts that would replace applicable state causes of action. Accordingly, it is the Court’s conclusion that preemption is not “complete” and removal jurisdiction is not available.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over state law claims that federal law completely preempts, despite the absence of a federal claim on the face of the complaint.

Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. · filed 1996-07-08

We conclude that Jass’ state law negligence claim against Margulis and her vicarious liability claim against PruCare for Mar-gulis’ alleged negligence are within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA and therefore completely preempted. Because complete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the district court had jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that federal law completely preempts, even when the complaint states no federal basis for jurisdiction.

Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan · filed 1996-07-08

Thus, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists if the complaint concerns an area of law "completely preempted" by federal law, even if the complaint does not mention a federal basis of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a federal statute completely preempts that claim; the Communications Act does not completely preempt state-law claims over cellular billing practices.

DeCastro v. AWACS, Inc. · filed 1996-08-02

This court concludes that the Communications Act does not provide an enforcement mechanism for Counts I and II, and, consequently, they are not independently removable to this court on the basis of the complete pre-emption doctrine.

Section 1331 supplies arising-under jurisdiction over state-law claims within ERISA's civil enforcement provisions because complete preemption makes those claims federal in character, even when preemption is not obvious when suit is filed.

Board of Trustees of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local 25 and Employers' Health and Welfare Fund v. The Madison H · filed 1996-10-15

Under the principle expressed in Metropolitan Life, sometimes referred to as “superpreemption,” ERISA-related state law causes of action are by statute necessarily federal in character, so as to fall under the “arising under” jurisdiction of federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, regardless of whether preemption is obvious at the time the suit is filed.

Complete federal preemption makes a state-law claim a federal question within original jurisdiction when the federal statute wholly displaces that claim.

Woods v. Unigroup, Inc. · filed 1996-11-04

The question for this Court thus becomes whether any federal statute so preempts Plaintiffs' state-law negligence claim. ... Therefore, because the Carmack Amendment preempts Plaintiffs' state law negligence cause of action, the claim was properly removed for this Court's exercise of original jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state surety claim on an ERISA complete-preemption theory when the claim falls outside ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.

International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Seaboard Surety Co. · filed 1996-11-25

Plaintiffs’ state law surety claim would not meet the second prong of this test because of the Court’s conclusion that a claim against Seaboard is not within ERISA’s enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that are completely preempted by federal law because those claims arise under federal law.

Ferraro v. Bell Atlantic Co., Inc. · filed 1997-02-20

In conclusion, this court finds that plaintiffs claims are preempted by the LMRA and ERISA and, therefore, “arise[] under the ... laws ... of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs motion to remand is denied, as this case was properly removed to federal court by the defendants.

Section 1331 allows federal-question jurisdiction when complete preemption converts state-law claims into federal claims; ordinary preemption does not suffice.

Sanderson, Thompson, Ratledge & Zimny v. AWACS, Inc. · filed 1997-03-25

Comcast’s arguments confuse the distinction between complete preemption, which is an appropriate basis for federal question jurisdiction, and ordinary preemption, which is not. ... This Court therefore does not have federal question jurisdiction over Sanderson’s claim by virtue of the doctrine of complete preemption.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law ERISA claim through complete preemption only if ERISA both preempts the claim and displaces it with a civil enforcement remedy.

Jack B. Buster, A. Lee Petersen v. Ronald E. Greisen Henry P. Head and David L. Ratchye · filed 1997-03-26

ERISA “completely preempts” a state law claim only when it both preempts the claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) and displaces the claim with its civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). ... The Trustees’ complete preemption argument fails because section 1132(a) does not displace Buster’s claim.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction on removal when ERISA completely preempts a state-law claim challenging an administrative denial of plan benefits.

Lancaster Ex Rel. Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. · filed 1997-04-10

For the foregoing reasons, the direct negligence claim of Count III and the fraud claim of Count V, insofar as it pertains to Kaiser, fall within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) and, thus, provide the basis for complete preemption in the circumstances. Because removal jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs’ claims in this action is proper on the basis of portions of Counts III and V, it is unnecessary to examine the applicability of complete preemption to the direct negligence claim of Count IV and the remaining fraud claims of Count V.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law fraud claim when the insurance at issue is not an ERISA employee benefit plan and ERISA does not preempt the claim.

Levett v. American Heritage Life Insurance · filed 1997-06-18

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs claim for fraudulent inducement is not preempted by ERISA and that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this ease pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions and is completely preempted.

Joyce v. Rjr Nabisco Holdings Corp. Rjr Nabisco, Inc. Nabisco Brands, Inc. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co · filed 1997-09-16

The district court concluded that federal jurisdiction was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal question jurisdiction, because the complaint arose under ERISA. ... If this doctrine applies, the district court has removal jurisdiction, even if the well-pleaded complaint rule is not satisfied. ... Joyce’s allegations that RJR knew he was eligible for benefits but failed to so inform him, come squarely within § 502(a)(3). We accordingly affirm the district court’s conclusion that it had removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against private FCIC-reinsured insurers because the FCIA does not completely preempt those claims.

Bullard v. Southwest Crop Ins. Agency, Inc. · filed 1997-12-01

In short, this court holds that the FCIA fails to express the clear manifestation of congressional intent necessary for a finding of complete preemption. Neither the legislative history of the FCIA nor its express provisions clearly establish Congress’ intent to create a federal cause of action against private insurance companies, or to grant federal jurisdiction over such suits. Without clear congressional intent to establish these provisions, the court holds as a matter of law that the FCIA does not meet the standards set forth by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit for completely preempting all state common law claims asserted against reinsured entities.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a claim pleaded under state law when the complaint, viewed in context, raises a colorable federal question in a field completely preempted by federal law.

Biw Deceived v. Local S6, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Iamaw District Lodge 4 · filed 1997-12-30

Although our research has not revealed any ready-made solution to this dilemma, we conclude that the artful pleading doctrine permits a district court to recharacterize a putative state-law claim as a federal claim when a review of the complaint, taken in context, reveals a colorable federal question within a field in which state law is completely preempted.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over an ERISA-related state-law claim only if the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Toumajian v. Frailey · filed 1998-01-29

If both conditions are not met, however, the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the matter should be remanded. Only if the complaint asserts a state law claim that can be reasonably characterized as a claim under any of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions can the action be properly removed.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over an ERISA-related state-law claim removed to federal court only when the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme; an ERISA preemption defense alone does not confer jurisdiction.

Toumajian v. Frailey · filed 1998-01-29

Accordingly, even if the district court found that the Complaint contained a state law claim that "relates to" an ERISA plan, and is thus preempted by § 1144(a), the complaint is not removable to the federal court unless it is also encompassed within ERISA's civil enforcement scheme.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law insurance contract claim when no federal law completely preempts that claim.

HHC v. York Insurance · filed 1998-02-18

York has pointed to no federal statute or federal regulatory scheme that could possibly justify this Court’s exercising its federal question jurisdiction over this matter based on federal pre-emption. Furthermore, the Court holds that Virginia law creates HHC’s cause of action and Virginia law provides the remedy requested. Because this is a state law contracts action in an area where Congress has not exercised federal pre-emption, the Court holds that the pre-emption doctrine cannot support exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over state-law claims that federal law completely preempts because those claims arise under federal law.

Person v. Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. · filed 1998-02-26

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... However, once an area of state law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered a federal claim, and thus arises under federal law. ... Accordingly, this court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs action.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim through complete preemption only if the claim falls within a federal cause of action.

Cyr v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas · filed 1998-07-16

A conclusion that necessarily follows from the foregoing is that for defendants to succeed in their contention that there has been a complete preemption that causes this court to have removal jurisdiction over the instant action they would have to satisfy their burden to demonstrate that at least one of the causes of action alleged by plaintiffs comes within the scope of a federal cause of action.

Federal-question jurisdiction based on ERISA complete preemption must exist when the case is removed; later adoption of a retroactive plan cannot create jurisdiction that was absent then.

Whitt v. Sherman International · filed 1998-07-30

Because the 1992 LTIP had not been enacted as of the time of removal, for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction, no ERISA “plan” existed when Sherman removed the case, and, consequently, no federal question jurisdiction existed, either.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law wage deduction claim that can be resolved without interpreting an ERISA plan and is not completely preempted.

Nagel v. Chukerman Packaging, Ltd. · filed 1998-08-19

In this case, removal is proper if there is a federal question, ie., if the case arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Otherwise, the case should be remanded. ... In summary, since this case can be resolved without interpreting the MERP, the plaintiffs’ IWCPA claims are not completely preempted under ERISA and the case is remanded to state court.

Federal-question jurisdiction based on ERISA complete preemption requires a state-law claim within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions; ordinary ERISA preemption alone does not suffice.

McClelland v. Gronwaldt · filed 1998-09-10

Thus, although the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief may "relate to" an ERISA plan, thereby triggering ordinary preemption, we can find no basis for holding that the motion asserted a claim falling within the scope of section 502(a). We therefore hold that the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs’ motion asserted a claim "arising under" federal law, so as to provide the basis for original jurisdiction necessary to support removal.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that are completely preempted by federal law.

Stoudemire v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. · filed 1998-09-24

For the reasons discussed above, Stoude-mire’s state law claims are completely preempted by federal law, giving this court federal question subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that are completely preempted by federal law governing foreign trade.

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. · filed 1998-11-16

Consequently, the Court finds that the plaintiff may not avail itself of the well-pleaded complaint rule insofar as the field of foreign trade is subject to total and complete federal preemption.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when complete preemption applies or resolving the claim necessarily requires construing federal law.

Kight v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. · filed 1999-01-22

There are two exceptions to the general rule: 1) where the “complete preemption doctrine” applies; and 2) where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts a vicarious-liability claim against a plan insurer for its agent’s misrepresentation of plan terms.

Mahon v. Cyganiak Planning, Inc. · filed 1999-01-24

Under the facts of this case, the court finds that complete preemption, and thus federal removal jurisdiction, is appropriate. ... To be clear, the court holds that ERISA completely preempts claims of vicarious liability brought against an ERISA-plan insurer for a misrepresentation by its agent regarding the terms of a plan.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on a FIFRA preemption defense because FIFRA does not completely preempt state law.

Ell v. S.E.T. Landscape Design, Inc. · filed 1999-01-25

Consequently, because the Supreme Court requires an explicit statement from Congress in order for the courts to find complete preemption, we are unable to conclude that FIFRA completely preempts state law and creates federal question jurisdiction in this Court.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a federal statute completely preempts that claim.

Carter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. · filed 1999-03-08

Because the complete preemption doctrine applies to plaintiffs breach of contract claim the claim creates a federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim through ERISA complete preemption when the claim concerns the quality of medical advice rather than plan benefits and can be resolved without interpreting the plan.

Crum Ex Rel. Estate of Crum v. Health Alliance-Midwest, Inc. · filed 1999-05-06

Whether removal was proper in this case depends upon whether this court has “federal question” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal courts original jurisdiction over cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... This court finds that Plaintiffs claim that Defendant is liable for the alleged wrongful conduct of the advisory nurse or nurses does not rest upon the terms of the plan and can be resolved without interpreting an ERISA plan. ... (2) Because this court lacks jurisdiction over Counts I through III of Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand the Amended Complaint (# 6) is GRANTED.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim through complete preemption only when Congress intended to convert that claim into a federal one.

Blab T v. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. · filed 1999-07-30

The complete preemption analysis thus focuses primarily upon evaluating Congress's intent, which is the "touchstone" of federal court removal jurisdiction. ... Given these circumstances, we conclude that section 612 of the Cable Act and its legislative history fail to demonstrate the requisite congressional intent to convert Bay TV's state law claims into claims arising under federal law and to permit removal jurisdiction under § 1441(a).

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim through complete preemption only when federal law converts the claim into one arising under federal law; the cited HIPAA provisions do not do so.

Cowan v. Combined Insurance Co. of America · filed 1999-08-05

This exception is known as the “complete pre-emption” doctrine and operates to convert any claim purportedly based on state law into a federal claim which arises under federal law. ... Applying such reasoning in the instant case, the court likewise finds that the first and second provisions of HIPAA do not call for application of the complete preemption doctrine.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption of state-law claims only when a federal statute supplies the preemptive basis; constitutional provisions alone do not suffice.

Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc. · filed 1999-08-20

Complete preemption requires a statutory basis, but the Defendants have not identified a federal statute that completely, or even partially, preempts the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Therefore, the ease does not present a federal question.

Section 1331 supplies federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim displaced by ERISA through complete preemption.

Hull v. Fallon · filed 1999-08-23

Thus, federal question jurisdiction exists–and the case may be removed to federal court–if Hull's state law claims arise in an area that has been displaced by ERISA.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when complete preemption makes the claim federal in character.

Heimann v. National Elevator Industry Pension Fund · filed 1999-08-30

Because we conclude, for the reasons hereinafter assigned, that under the two-step analysis the Heimanns’ causes of action fall within the scope of §§ 514 and 502(a), removal was proper under the “complete preemption” corollary to the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Hence, we are satisfied that the district court had jurisdiction of this case and that this court does as well.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on a federal preemption defense unless federal law completely preempts those claims.

Shaw v. TCI/TKR of Northern Kentucky, Inc. · filed 1999-09-24

Because Congress did not intend to completely preempt Plaintiffs’ state law claims, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of Defendants' preemption defense.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that federal law completely preempts.

Rievley Ex Rel. Rievley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee · filed 1999-09-29

The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because Rievley’s claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith are covered by OPM’s mechanism for the civil enforcement of the terms of FEHBA plans, all three claims are completely preempted. Accordingly, under the doctrine of complete federal preemption, BCBS-TN and PCS properly removed these claims to this Court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption based solely on constitutional provisions without a showing of congressional intent.

Archer v. Arms Technology, Inc. · filed 1999-10-14

Without some showing of Congress’ intent, this Court declines Defendants’ invitation to find complete preemption based only on federal Constitutional provisions. ... The state law claims for relief that Defendants removed to this Court are not preempted by federal law and are not within this Court’s original jurisdiction.

Federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption requires an act of Congress that displaces the state-law claim; general constitutional principles do not suffice.

McNamara v. Arms Technology, Inc. · filed 1999-10-18

First, the complete preemption doctrine only applies when an act of Congress is involved. In reading the Defendants’ briefs, the Court looked for, but did not find, reference to any federal statute that completely or partially preempts the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Instead, it appears that the Defendants have relied solely on general “principles of constitutional law” to support their arguments.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by federal law, including federal common law governing passport control.

Varela-Fernandez v. Burgos · filed 1999-12-15

However, one exception to the “artful pleading doctrine” is the doctrine of complete preemption. ... This Court holds that passport control must be governed solely by federal law, and has been effectively pre-empted, if not specifically by statute, by federal common law. ... Thus, to the extent that petitioner intends to use a verified birth certificate for international purposes, this Court has jurisdiction, and enters declaratory judgment that the Secretary may not verify petitioner’s birth certificate for international purposes.

Complete preemption makes a state-law claim arise under federal law for purposes of § 1331 when it substitutes a federal cause of action for the state claim.

Miller v. Carelink Health Plans, Inc. · filed 2000-01-21

Complete preemption substitutes a federal cause of action for the state claim, making it one which arises under federal law, and conferring removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because federal preemption may be a defense; the federal law must completely preempt the claim.

Nelson v. Associates Financial Services Co. of Indiana, Inc. · filed 2000-01-25

Accordingly, this Court concludes that § 1735f-7a does not completely preempt the Plaintiffs state law claims. Defendant’s preemption argument may be a defense to Plaintiffs complaint, but it is not sufficient to give this Court federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs complaint.

Section 1331 allows federal jurisdiction over a state claim completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a), regardless of the relief the plaintiff requests.

Wood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 2000-03-28

Since ERISA Section 502(a) completely preempts a state claim, removal of Wood’s state claim to federal jurisdiction is proper. ... The relief Wood seeks is irrelevant to a determination of complete preemption.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction when complete preemption makes a state-law claim arise under federal law.

Vorhees v. NAPER AERO CLUB, INC. · filed 2000-05-16

If the present claims are completely preempted, then plaintiffs current state-law claim is properly characterized as one that arises under federal law, thus creating federal question jurisdiction and making removal proper. ... Thus, plaintiffs claim is preempted by the FAA. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs motion to remand.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim merely because a federal statute supplies a preemption defense; the statute must completely preempt the claim.

Johnson v. Baylor University · filed 2000-06-22

Thus, § 44936’s preemption provision and resulting affirmative defense are insufficient, without more, to create federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 recognizes complete preemption as a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for federal-question jurisdiction.

Brown v. Washington/Baltimore Cellular, Inc. · filed 2000-07-20

Federal question jurisdiction is ordinarily determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that the federal question must be “presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint” to establish jurisdiction. ... One narrow exception to this rule is the doctrine of complete preemption.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when ERISA completely preempts and recharacterizes it as a federal benefits claim.

Moran, Debra C. v. Rush Prudential HMO · filed 2000-10-19

Thus, Ms. Moran’s claims properly are recharacterized as claims for benefits under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, sec. 502(a)(1)(B), and removal was proper.

Section 1331 allows federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts a state-law claim and recharacterizes it as a federal claim.

Debra C. Moran, and State of Illinois, Intervenor-Appellant v. Rush Prudential Hmo, Incorporated · filed 2000-10-19

Even though a complaint may not mention a federal basis of jurisdiction, the complete preemption doctrine “permits ‘recharacter-ization’ of a plaintiffs state law claim as a federal claim so that removal is proper.” ... Thus, Ms. Moran’s claims properly are recharacterized as claims for benefits under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), and removal was proper.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when ERISA does not completely preempt them.

Benton v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2000-10-24

Because the court finds that the plaintiff has not asserted a claim under § 1132, there is no complete preemption of his state law claims. As a result, removal of this case to the federal court was improper.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that ERISA completely preempts.

Love v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co. · filed 2000-11-07

Because Love has asserted state law claims for denial of benefits which are completely preempted by ERISA, this court has federal question jurisdiction over Love’s claims.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption over state-law claims seeking monetary relief for deceptive advertising of long distance telephone rates under the FCA.

Minnesota Ex Rel. Hatch v. Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2000-12-27

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Congress did not intend, in enacting the FCA, to completely preempt state law claims seeking monetary relief for the false or deceptive advertising of long distance telephone rates. “Complete preemption” does not provide this Court with federal question jurisdiction over the State’s restitution claim.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law complaint when federal law completely preempts the claims it presents.

Garley v. Sandia Corp. · filed 2001-01-03

Under the “complete preemption doctrine,” federal courts may exercise federal question jurisdiction over complaints that, although not presenting federal questions on their face, nonetheless present state law claims that are preempted by federal law.

Section 1331 supplies federal question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts state law claims.

Dickerson v. Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2001-01-30

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA, giving this court federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when complete federal preemption makes the claim necessarily federal in character.

Namovicz v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2001-02-26

The general rule for determining the existence of federal question jurisdiction is whether or not a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. ... The effect of sections 30118-30120 is to completely preempt the area of vehicle and equipment recalls. ... As jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, i.e., federal question jurisdiction, the issues raised by the parties regarding diversity jurisdiction need not be addressed.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims alleging misrepresentations about compliance with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act because that Act does not completely preempt state law governing informal warranty dispute mechanisms.

McIntire v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2001-03-06

This Court, therefore, likewise concludes that the MMWA does not completely preempt the field of informal settlement mechanisms for warranty disputes. ... Accordingly, the doctrine of complete preemption does not provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when there is no ERISA plan to support complete preemption.

Oskars, Inc. v. Bennett & Co., Inc. · filed 2001-03-09

Because there is no ERISA plan, the Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded Complaint asserting only state law claims is not completely preempted. Accordingly, since the Complaint brings only state law claims, this court lacks federal question jurisdiction and the Motion to Remand is due to be GRANTED.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the Federal Communications Act supplies an ordinary preemption defense; the Act must completely preempt those claims.

Braco v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc. · filed 2001-04-03

What Defendant describes is “defensive” or “ordinary” preemption, of the sort which may afford an affirmative defense in state court. This is not alone sufficient to confer removal jurisdiction, absent an expression by Congress of an intent for the statute to have this effect. There is no such clear expression of intent in either the FCA or its legislative history.

Section 1331 supports federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim for ERISA plan benefits when ERISA completely preempts the claim; a federal preemption defense alone does not confer jurisdiction.

Dunson-Taylor v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2001-04-24

If the plaintiffs claim arises under state law, the mere assertion of federal preemption as a defensive argument will not confer federal question subject matter jurisdiction. ... Consequently, Plaintiffs claims, although couched in terms of state law, are claims for benefits under Mr. Taylor’s life insurance policy. Accordingly, they fall within the scope of § 1132(a)(1)(B), and are completely preempted by ERISA.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a facially state-law claim when federal law completely preempts the claim and makes it a federal cause of action.

Galveston Linehandlers, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · filed 2001-05-15

For instance, under the complete preemption doctrine, federal law can so thoroughly preempt a field of state law that the plaintiffs complaint must be characterized as stating a federal cause of action, even if the complaint, on its face, contains only state law causes of action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims on a theory of conflict preemption alone; complete preemption is required.

Binion v. Franklin Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2001-06-12

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that even assuming conflict preemption applies to plaintiffs state law claims, this court lacks jurisdiction since there is no arguable basis for concluding that the FDCPA completely preempts plaintiffs state law negligence claim.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim based on preemption only when federal law completely preempts the claim; ordinary conflict preemption does not suffice.

Virgil v. Reorganized MW Co., Inc. · filed 2001-06-22

However, under the “artfully-pleaded complaint” exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, removal may be proper where the defendant can show that Congress has legislated so as to completely preempt any state law claims in the relevant field of law. ... This Court declines to find that the FDCPA completely preempts state causes of action in the absence of an express Congressional intention to do so. ... Neither diversity nor a federal question exists to permit removal to this Court.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts a state-law claim seeking relief akin to recovery of benefits due under an ERISA plan.

Krasny v. Waser · filed 2001-06-25

Such claims are completely preempted, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that are completely preempted by ERISA.

Hooper v. Albany International Corp. · filed 2001-07-25

Because Plaintiff has asserted state law claims for denial of benefits which are completely preempted by ERISA, this court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over state-law claims governed by a self-executing treaty when the treaty completely preempts those claims.

Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc. · filed 2001-07-30

The Court concludes that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not preclude federal jurisdiction in this case, because the CISG preempts state law causes of action falling within the scope of the CISG.

Section 1331 treats state-law claims completely preempted by the Copyright Act as arising under federal law for federal-question jurisdiction.

Firoozye v. Earthlink Network · filed 2001-07-31

Thus, this Court concludes that the Copyright Act completely preempts state-law claims within the scope of section 301. Accordingly, if any of the plaintiffs claims are preempted under the Copyright Act, those preempted claims must be viewed as involving federal questions for the purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over removed state-law claims that ERISA completely preempts.

Daughtry v. Birdsong Peanuts · filed 2001-09-07

Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA, and the court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption when the federal statute asserted as preemptive provides no private right of enforcement.

Burgo v. Volkswagen of America · filed 2001-10-17

Absent a private right of enforcement, the MVSA cannot completely preempt state law, and thus cannot provide jurisdiction for removal.

Section 1331 does not give federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the Warsaw Convention may preempt them; complete preemption requires congressional intent to transfer jurisdiction to federal court.

Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2001-10-29

The complete preemption doctrine applies only when Congress intends not merely to preempt a field in state law, but also intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to federal courts. ... The Court thus concludes that removal was improper, since it has not found such intent manifested with respect to the Warsaw Convention.

An ERISA defense does not establish federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims unless ERISA completely preempts those claims.

Rogers v. Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc. · filed 2001-11-20

Whether this Court has jurisdiction over this cause and, thus, whether removal was proper depends on whether Plaintiffs’ state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Unless ERISA completely preempts the state law claims, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the well-pleaded complaint rule.

Section 1331 does not provide federal question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim that is not subject to ordinary ERISA preemption and therefore cannot be completely preempted.

Tower Loan of Mississippi v. Hospital Benefits, Inc. · filed 2001-12-05

For these reasons, the court is of the opinion that Tower’s claim is not subject to ordinary preemption under ERISA. There thus can be no complete preemption, and hence no removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction based on a federal preemption defense only when the federal statute completely preempts the state-law claim; FEHBA does not completely preempt medical-malpractice claims.

Haller v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest · filed 2001-12-13

Only “complete preemption” statutes provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction when pled as a defense; ordinary preemption statutes do not. ... I find more persuasive those authorities which conclude that medical malpractice claims are not completely preempted by the FEHBA. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and the action must be remanded.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal law completely preempts those claims.

St. Mary's Hospital v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. · filed 2002-03-01

Having found that Plaintiffs state law claims involving the 7 SBP enrollees are completely preempted by FEHBA, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to reach the merits of Defendant’s request for summary judgment.

Federal-question jurisdiction cannot rest on a federal preemption defense to a state-law claim; removal requires a federal question on the face of the complaint or complete preemption.

National Management Ass'n v. Transamerica Financial Resources, Inc. · filed 2002-03-18

If the plaintiffs claim arises under state law, the mere assertion of federal preemption as a defensive argument, i.e., a conflict preemption situation, will not confer federal question subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts a state law claim involving an employee benefit plan’s reimbursement rights.

Thomas v. Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2002-04-16

Since the Plaintiffs state law claim is completely preempted by ERISA, the preemption provides this Court federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA completely preempts a state-law claim and transforms it into a federal claim.

Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Incorporated Core, Incorporated · filed 2002-05-28

Darcangelo’s fifth claim, for breach of contract, is completely preempted and is transformed into a federal claim under ERISA § 502. The contract claim, then, gives rise to federal question jurisdiction, and the removal to federal court was proper.

Section 1331 treats state-law claims completely preempted by a federal cause of action as arising under federal law.

Hoover v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. · filed 2002-05-31

Based on this fact, and the Court’s findings that the negligence and breach of contract claims in plaintiffs’ original petition are preempted under an ordinary preemption analysis and that the Carmack Amendment provides plaintiffs a federal cause of action, the Court finds that the negligence and breach of contract claims in plaintiffs’ original petition are completely preempted under the Carmack Amendment. Plaintiffs’ claims therefore arise under federal law.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when complete preemption makes them federal claims from their inception.

Kimmel v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co. · filed 2002-06-12

Under the “complete” preemption doctrine, once an area of law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. ... Therefore, the complete preemption doctrine applies and removal on that basis was proper.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that federal law completely preempts, treating them as federal claims.

Howell v. Lab One, Inc. · filed 2002-07-03

The court finds the preemptive force of the federal statutory scheme involved in this area to be so complete that it transformed the plaintiffs state and common law petition into one stating a federal claim.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state tort claims arising from the administration of Medicare benefits because Medicare does not completely preempt those claims.

Hofler v. Aetna US Healthcare of California, Inc. · filed 2002-07-10

Federal question jurisdiction lies for causes of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because Congress did not clearly manifest any intention to convert all state tort claims arising from the administration of Medicare benefits into federal questions, we hold that the Medicare program does not completely preempt state tort law claims.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that ERISA completely preempts and converts into federal claims.

Arnold v. CSX Hotels, Inc. · filed 2002-07-30

In conclusion, the court holds that plaintiffs’ action is one to recover a benefit under ERISA. As such, the exclusive enforcement provisions of ERISA provide plaintiffs’ sole remedy completely preempting their state law claims. Once their claim is transmogrified into one under ERISA, federal question jurisdiction is present.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because a federal preemption defense is anticipated; complete preemption can supply jurisdiction when federal law displaces the state-law claim.

Wisconsin v. AT&T CORP. · filed 2002-07-31

A complaint states a federal claim within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 only when a claim for relief depends on federal law. Anticipated federal defenses, including a preemption defense, will not convert a state claim into a federal question, even though the federal defense may be the predominant issue in the case. ... Accordingly, there is not complete preemption by the FCA which would warrant the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal question jurisdiction over state law claims when the invoked federal statute does not completely preempt them.

Wells v. Shelter General Insurance · filed 2002-08-02

The Court, therefore, finds that the artful pleading doctrine has not been implicated, and that exercising removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is not warranted.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against a wireless carrier when the Federal Communications Act does not completely preempt those claims.

Threadgill v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C. · filed 2002-08-05

Even if Threadgill’s Original Petition were controlling, federal question jurisdiction would not exist because the claims stated in that petition were not completely preempted.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims for unauthorized switching of long-distance service when the Federal Communications Act does not completely preempt those claims.

Sapp v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2002-08-15

Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs claims are not completely preempted, and therefore the court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal law completely preempts them.

Marshall v. Ormet Corp. · filed 2002-08-19

Under this principle, a plaintiff may elect to assert valid state claims while foregoing any possible federal claims and thereby defeat the federal question jurisdiction of the United States District Court. A well-established exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule occurs when federal law has created “complete preemption.” ... In light of the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiffs Complaint, while couched solely in terms of state law, raises issues which are completely preempted by federal law.

Section 1331 permits removal based on ERISA federal-question jurisdiction only when ERISA completely preempts the state-law claims.

Blaylock v. Mutual of New York Life Insurance · filed 2002-08-30

Having concluded that the policy sold by MLOA constitutes an ERISA plan, the question then becomes whether the plaintiffs’ claims in this case are completely preempted by ERISA, for removal jurisdiction on the basis of ERISA exists only if that is the case.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law common fund fee claim that falls outside ERISA’s complete-preemption doctrine.

Alleman v. BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF ILLINOIS · filed 2002-10-03

Section 1331 confers upon federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under” the laws of the United States. ... The claim in this case, like the claim in Blackburn, is outside the scope of § 502(a). ... Therefore, for all the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that there is no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court will grant the plaintiffs motion to remand.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA’s civil enforcement and whistleblower provisions.

McSharry v. UnumProvident Corp. · filed 2002-12-04

In sum, McSharry’s claims arise under the laws of the United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and his complaint is removable because his claims are completely preempted by ERISA under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a) and 1140.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over claims pleaded solely under state law when Title VII does not completely preempt those claims.

Allred v. Bauhaus USA, Inc. · filed 2002-12-16

Accordingly, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s explanation of the limited role of the artful pleading doctrine in federal question jurisdiction analysis, and the express recognition of the Plaintiffs right — as master of her complaint — to avoid federal jurisdiction by electing to proceed solely under state law in her state court action, the court concludes that none of the Plaintiffs claims arise under federal law.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption when the federal standard at issue lacks the preemptive scope and force needed to convert state-law claims into federal claims.

Fullen v. Philips Electronics North America Corp. · filed 2002-12-18

Defendant’s Notice of Removal is defective, as the United States Supreme Court’s “complete preemption” doctrine is not applicable to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, and thus does not create federal question jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when ERISA completely preempts the claim and the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Lechleiter v. Clairol Inc. · filed 2003-02-03

More specifically, “ERISA preemption provides a valid basis for removal jurisdiction only if (1) the state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA, and (2) that cause of action is “within the scope’ of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).” ... Resultingly, because Plaintiff seeks the very relief ERISA provides, his claims fall within the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA and the second prong of Plumbing Industry Board is satisfied.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state consumer fraud claims challenging deceptive wireless-service advertising and invoicing when the Federal Communications Act does not completely preempt the claims and the federal issue is only a preemption defense.

STATE EX RE. NIXON v. Nextel West Corp. · filed 2003-02-04

For these reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief based on alleged violations of state consume protection law with respect to fraud and false advertising.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims on a complete-preemption theory when the removing party fails to establish that an applicable federal statute completely preempts those claims.

Selim v. Pan American Airways Corp. · filed 2003-03-25

Defendant has presented no authority binding on this Court concluding that the ADA or any other federal statute applicable to this action completely preempts state law claims to support removal jurisdiction, nor has Defendant presented arguments sufficient to counter the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent discussed above.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim invoking ERISA complete preemption only if the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Atlantis Health Plan, Inc. v. Local 713, I.B.O.T.U. · filed 2003-04-16

Therefore, since the parties are not diverse, for original jurisdiction to exist in this Court, the complete preemption doctrine must apply. ... For, the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over this case because the second prong of the complete preemption doctrine is clearly not satisfied.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when complete preemption is not established.

Batton v. Gulf · filed 2003-05-06

Therefore, this court has no original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and removal based on federal question jurisdiction is unavailable.