28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331's historical amount requirement is not met when the discounted value of limited future public-assistance payments and indirect property losses does not exceed $10,000.

Baxter v. Minter · filed 1974-07-19

... the court cannot find that the present discounted value of future payments and indirect loss of property rights exceeds $10,000.

Section 1331's historical amount-in-controversy requirement was not met when the controversy did not exceed $10,000.

Holley v. Lavine · filed 1976-02-03

As to the former, the district court held that the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000, a conclusion with which we agree.

Under Section 1331's former amount requirement, future monetary liability may count toward the jurisdictional amount when a right to future payments will be adjudicated in the suit.

Pharmacist Political Action Committee v. Harris · filed 1980-12-01

The court views the complaint as containing allegations of continuing damage, and monetary liability which will accrue in the future may properly be counted against the jurisdictional amount if “a right to future payments ... will be adjudged in the present suit.” ... If the plaintiffs were to prevail, such a right to future payments would exist, so the minimum amount in controversy requirement of § 1331 is satisfied.

Under the former version of § 1331(a), a claim arose under federal law when its outcome depended on interpreting federal law, and a prospective injunction worth more than $10,000 satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement.

County Department of Public Welfare v. Stanton · filed 1982-07-29(a)

At the time this action was initiated, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) granted original jurisdiction to district courts over matters arising under the laws of the United States where the value of the controversy exceeded $10,000.00. The test to determine if an action arises under the laws of the United States is whether the outcome of the controversy depends on an interpretation of a federal law. ... Since this action arises under federal law and has an amount in controversy exceeding $10,000.00, jurisdiction rests with this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Under Section 1331's former amount-in-controversy requirement, a claim alleging deprivation of constitutionally protected rights cannot be valued below the jurisdictional amount to a legal certainty.

Revis v. Laird · filed 1975-03-31

The question nevertheless arises with respect to the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In this regard, the court is in agreement with Judge Peckham in CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F.Supp. 644 (Cal. 1972). where it is indicated that where the claim is deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, it cannot be said with a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. ... Accordingly, this court concludes that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on causes of action to redress alleged deprivations of rights under the First and Fifth Amendments.

Under Section 1331(a)'s former amount-in-controversy requirement, a plaintiff whose allegation is controverted bears the burden of proving the amount, and constitutional rights are not automatically valued above $10,000.

Network Project v. Corporation for Public Broadcasting · filed 1975-07-23(a)

However, as plaintiffs recognize, § 1331(a) is not available to confer jurisdiction unless the plaintiffs can also meet the $10,000 requirement. But, it is well established, too, that a dismissal of the complaint for failure to meet the $10,000 requirement is inappropriate unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff could not recover that statutory amount. ... When, as here, the allegation of the jurisdictional amount is controverted, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that amount. ... Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff alleges the deprivation of some constitutional right, as here, does not translate to mean that the requisite jurisdictional amount need not be satisfied. ... Thus, it is clear that none of the plaintiff-viewers has satisfied the requisite jurisdictional amount, and the complaint must be dismissed as to them.

Under Section 1331's former amount requirement, custody and visitation rights are not reducible to pecuniary value and therefore cannot satisfy the $10,000 threshold.

Nouse v. Nouse · filed 1978-03-30

Finally, as noted by Judge Cooper below, it appears to be settled law that custody and visitation rights are incapable of being reduced to any pecuniary standard of value. Consequently, the action here does not meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount required by both 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1332.

A Bivens-type damages claim invoking Section 1331 must show that money damages are appropriate for the particular constitutional interest asserted.

Polakoff v. Henderson · filed 1973-08-03(a)

the Court held to be sufficient a complaint against federal officers alleging naked Fourth Amendment deprivations and relying on the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... He added, ‘[t]he same, of course, may not be true with respect to other types of constitutionally protected interests, and therefore the appropriateness of money damages may well vary with the nature of the personal interest asserted.’ ... The plaintiffs have not convinced the court of the appropriateness of money damages for the alleged deprivation of their rights.

Section 1331 permits a federal prisoner to seek damages for federal prison conduct that plausibly deprives the prisoner of constitutional rights.

Patmore v. Carlson · filed 1975-04-28

This Court now holds that such conduct in a federal prison raises a claim of deprivation of a federal right under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under the logic of ... plaintiff can sue for damages in federal court.

Section 1331 does not support extending a Bivens damages remedy for alleged interference with a speedy trial when constitutional defenses and judicial contempt powers already provide adequate protection.

Jones v. United States · filed 1975-08-27

... decision was premised on the recognition that unless a federal common law right to seek monetary damages exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 no remedy would be available to the aggrieved parties. ... Any violation of the plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial was adequately safeguarded by his constitutional defense to such deprivation. Furthermore, a federal judge’s contempt power is more than adequate to deter any intentional jury tampering activity on the part of federal officials. Therefore, I find that the ... doctrine should not be extended to grant jurisdiction in an action for damages from a federal officer’s alleged attempts to prevent ... an individual from receiving a just and speedy trial.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a Bivens claim alleging that governmental pressure caused an employer to retaliate against protected First Amendment speech.

Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Service · filed 1975-09-15

The District Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).

Bivens claims brought under Section 1331 are the federal counterpart to Section 1983 claims and are subject by analogy to the same requirement that civil-rights allegations be pleaded with specificity.

Rende v. Rizzo · filed 1976-07-13

Claims brought under Section 1331 and ... Bivens ... are the federal counterpart to Section 1983 civil rights complaints. As such, collateral issues developed under Section 1983 should apply to these claims by analogy. ... Common sense would require that the specificity requirement of the ... line of cases apply equally to Bivens-type claims under § 1331.

Section 1331(a)'s general jurisdictional grant empowers a federal court to award a traditional damages remedy for a constitutional violation when it may grant equitable relief for the same protected interest.

Hill v. McMartin · filed 1977-05-09(a)

Conversely, if a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress is thought adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subject-matter jurisdiction enumerated therein, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), then it seems to me that the same statute is sufficient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional remedy at law.

Section 1331 permits a constitutional damages claim against officials acting under color of federal law, including a direct Fifth Amendment due-process claim under the Bivens doctrine.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1977-08-05

The rights protected by the Fifth Amendment due process clause are as fundamental as Fourth Amendment rights. ... By its allegation of jurisdiction under § 1331 it is clear that in addition to its § 1983 claim, the appellant is pursuing a separate claim which derives directly from the Constitution. Jurisdiction was properly asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).

Section 1331 supports a Bivens-type Fifth Amendment claim against officers acting under color of federal law, including officers of a congressionally approved interstate compact.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1977-12-21

The due process rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are as fundamental as those protected by the Fourth Amendment. Nothing in ... warrants limitation to Fourth Amendment claims; its rationale clearly supports extension to cases of this sort. … Having found jurisdiction under § 1331, we turn now to the immunity issue.

Section 1331 supports a Bivens action for a Fifth Amendment due-process violation by officials exercising federally derived authority under an interstate compact.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1978-01-30

This court thus has no jurisdiction under § 1343, but appellant also relied on federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, which provided the jurisdictional basis for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). ... Nothing in Bivens warrants limitation to Fourth Amendment claims; its rationale clearly supports extension to cases of this sort. ... Having found jurisdiction under § 1331, we turn now to the immunity issue.

Section 1331 permits a claim directly under the Eighth Amendment against federal officers when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and judicial relief is the only means of redress.

Botway v. Carlson · filed 1979-07-30

The first issue before this Court is whether the plaintiff may seek relief by invocation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In construing plaintiff’s complaint these requirements have been amply satisfied. Plaintiff here rests his claim directly on his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts defendants have denied him this right, and it is clear that his only means of redress is through petition to this Court. Plaintiff may therefore proceed to litigate his claim against these defendants under the general federal jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction for a Bivens action only when the alleged conduct rises to a constitutional violation; an actionable common-law or statutory tort alone is insufficient.

Hernandez v. C. Lattimore, Nathaniel Mitchell, Hugh Herbert, N. Avignone, and R. Brown, Correctional Officers, Me · filed 1979-12-06

This is so because ... requires that there have been a constitutional violation giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and we recognize ... that some common law torts and some statutory torts, although actionable in state forums, do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over common-law malicious-prosecution or abuse-of-process claims against a federal officer unless the conduct amounts to a constitutional deprivation.

Riggs v. Miller · filed 1979-12-11

In short, the Court does not perceive a constitutional deprivation and is therefore without jurisdiction to consider the malicious prosecution and malicious abuse claims under the Fifth Amendment. They will be dismissed.

A constitutional damages action brought under Section 1331 borrows the most appropriate state statute of limitations when no federal limitations period applies.

Brewster v. Secretary of the United States Army · filed 1980-04-16

Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute limiting the time to bring an action implied directly from the Constitution, the approved approach is to determine the limitation period by reference to the most appropriate State Statute.

Section 1331 does not support a constitutional reputation claim when the alleged government stigmatization does not amount to a deprivation of a protected liberty interest.

Metadure Corp. v. United States · filed 1980-06-11

Therefore, just as the claim in ... under section 1983 was held not to state a cause of action, so the claim in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is legally deficient.

Section 1331(a) permits individuals and corporations to bring direct Fifth Amendment damages claims against federal officials.

Marshall v. Kleppe · filed 1980-08-19(a)

Such claims may be brought in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... We think that a private cause of action under the Fifth Amendment for damages may also be asserted by DJM, even though it is a corporation.

A Bivens action within Section 1331 traditionally provides damages rather than injunctive relief, and no minimum damages threshold remains after the 1980 amendment.

Wheeler v. United States · filed 1981-04-03

... action, recognizable by the district courts under the jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, has traditionally provided a means of obtaining damages, not injunctions. Although petitioner no longer needs to fulfill a minimum damages requirement, see P.L. 96-486, 49 U.S.L.W. 1107, it is unlikely he would be able to name an appropriate defendant since trial judges have immunity except in extraordinary circumstances.

Section 1331(a) permits direct constitutional damages actions against federal officials, so the Federal Tort Claims Act's limitations period does not govern a claim brought against an official individually under Section 1331.

Marshall v. Kleppe · filed 1981-04-20(a)

Marshall predicated jurisdiction not on 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which permits FTCA suits against the United States, but on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), the general federal-question jurisdiction statute which, by Supreme Court holding, permits direct constitutional causes of action against federal officials. The statute of limitations provided in the FTCA is therefore inapplicable to Marshall's claim.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over Bivens-type constitutional claims against federal defendants who cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Crumpacker v. Civiletti · filed 1981-05-06

Section 1983, however, may not be asserted against the federal defendants. ... As against these defendants, the Court assumes that plaintiffs seek to allege a Bivens-type claim for relief, with jurisdiction arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A § 1331 damages claim against an IRS official individually requires personal jurisdiction, specific unconstitutional conduct, lack of good faith, and action beyond the official’s authority.

White v. Commissioner · filed 1982-04-13

In order to recover damages from an IRS official in his individual capacity under Section 1331(a) personal jurisdiction must be acquired through service of process under F.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1) or (7), the plaintiff must allege and prove specific allegations of unconstitutional conduct by the individual official she seeks to hold liable, and plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of good faith and actions beyond defendant’s authority.

Section 1331 authorizes federal courts both to determine whether a constitutional claim states a cause of action and to choose among available judicial remedies for vindicating constitutional rights.

Bush v. Lucas · filed 1983-06-13

This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff’s claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, ... but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.

Section 1331 empowers federal courts to grant damages for constitutional violations, but Congress may impliedly preclude a Bivens remedy through an alternative remedial scheme.

John P. Heaney, M.D. v. United States Veterans Administration · filed 1985-04-11

The federal courts have power to grant relief, including damages, for violations of constitutional rights under the general statutory grant of authority to decide all cases “arispng] under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ... Because Congress has not expressly removed the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts to award damages in cases covered by DMS regulations, the question before us is whether the regulatory scheme constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation in authorizing such a remedy. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the enactment of the DMS scheme presents a special factor counseling hesitation; accordingly, no private damage action may be allowed in this case.

Section 1331 is the statutory jurisdictional basis for a Bivens damages action alleging constitutional violations by federal agents or private parties acting as federal actors.

Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp. · filed 1987-07-30

The statutory basis for ... jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 authorizes federal courts not only to decide whether a constitutional claim states a cause of action but also to select an available judicial remedy to vindicate the constitutional right.

Walker v. Jones · filed 1987-12-15

The jurisdictional grant provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 authorizes the courts to not only decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff’s claim that he or she has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, “but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.”

Section 1331 gives federal courts power to award damages for constitutional violations even when no statute or common-law cause of action supplies the remedy, subject to congressional alternatives and special factors.

Bothke v. Fluor Engineers & Constructors, Inc., and W.J. Terry · filed 1987-12-16

The federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation.

Section 1331 does not support a new Bivens damages remedy for constitutional claims arising from federal employment when a comprehensive federal personnel scheme and meaningful statutory remedies counsel against supplementing Congress’s remedial framework.

Washington v. Secretary of Health & Human Services · filed 1988-07-11

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the Constitution supports a private cause of action for damages against a federal official under the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, for violation of constitutional rights. ... The court finds that both exceptions are applicable to the instant case. This case involves a “federal personnel matter.” ... Thus, a direct constitutional challenge is precluded since Ms. Washington clearly has other effective means of redress and has had an opportunity to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the federal courts for protection of her justiciable constitutional rights.

Section 1331 does not support a Bivens damages action for allegedly unconstitutional Medicare-program suspension procedures when Congress has supplied an adequate comprehensive remedial framework.

Hilst v. Bowen · filed 1989-05-04

In this case, a comprehensive remedy is provided to physicians when their right to participate in the Medicare program is suspended. ... We believe that the reasoning of Chilicky is applicable here and precludes Hilst from pursuing a Bivens action.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction does not itself necessarily authorize an award of damages.

JACKSON v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS · filed 2021-08-24

While federal statute provides that district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" 28 U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction does not necessarily create the authority to award damages.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction does not itself necessarily authorize an award of damages.

DANCY v. WATSON · filed 2020-03-09

Congress has provided that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But jurisdiction does not necessarily create the authority to award damages.

Section 1331(a) is a jurisdictional grant and does not itself create a direct Fourteenth Amendment damages action against municipal entities or officers.

Santora v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1977-04-04(a)

Plaintiffs also seek to imply a cause of action against the City of New York directly from the fourteenth amendment with jurisdiction predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... But it is this court’s considered opinion that no such cause of action may be stated. ... Similarly unexplained is why an essentially jurisdictional enactment should be taken as an expansion of carefully delimited statutory rights.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction under Grable when the federal issues appear only as defenses and are absent from the face of the well-pleaded complaint.

Mitchell v. Advanced HCS · filed 2022-03-10

Thus, these federal issues are neither raised nor disputed on the face of the complaint, and Grable does not apply.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the plaintiff anticipates a federal defense.

Urdinaran v. Aarons · filed 2000-09-26

Additionally, Plaintiffs anticipation that Defendants will raise a federal defense to his state claims— namely immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11101, et seq. — is insufficient to establish this Court’s original jurisdiction over his state tort and contract claims.

Section 1331 requires a federal claim on the face of the complaint; a federal defense to a state-law claim does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Civil City of South Bend, Ind. v. Conrail · filed 1995-02-14

That the defendant railroads rely on federal law as a basis for disregarding the ordinances does not make the cities’ claim arise under federal law. The federal claim must appear on the face of the complaint, and the availability of a federal defense to a state law claim does not provide a federal court with subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A claim does not arise under § 1331 merely because a federally governed lease appears in the case or a probable defense will require federal law.

Superior Oil Co. v. Merritt · filed 1985-09-16

The defendants may wish to challenge the validity of the leases as part of their defense, but merely because a complaint anticipates or replies to a probable defense that would be based on federal law does not mean it arises under federal law within the meaning of section 1331.

A plaintiff cannot create § 1331 jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim by anticipating and attacking a federal defense in the complaint.

Daniel Hale Williams Memorial Health Foundation v. City of Chicago · filed 1976-02-05

But it has long been established that a person may not convert a non-federal claim into a federal claim by anticipating a federal defense and attacking that defense in the initial complaint.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a challenge to a state statute based solely on alleged violations of state law.

National Market Reports, Inc. v. Brown · filed 1978-01-18

We are unaware of any federal statute which empowers, much less obligates, a federal district court to hear plaintiff’s state law complaints. Standing alone, an attack upon a state statute on the sole ground that it violates state law is clearly not contemplated by the Congressional grant of either “federal question” jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or “civil rights” jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A substantial Section 1331 claim gives a federal court power to hear factually related state-law claims under pendent jurisdiction.

Campito v. McManus, Longe, Brockwehl, Inc. · filed 1979-04-20

Inasmuch as plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges a claim under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder with jurisdiction founded on 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has the judicial power to entertain related non-federal claims.

A federal defense to a nonfederal claim does not satisfy Section 1331’s arising-under requirement; a federal right must be an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim.

Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co. · filed 1980-04-22

It is well settled that the existence of a federal defense to a nonfederal claim is insufficient to satisfy the “arising under” requirement. ... For an action to arise under federal law a right under federal law must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs' claim.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a declaratory action whose real controversy arises under state law and in which federal preemption appears only as a defense.

Michigan Savings & Loan League v. Francis · filed 1980-05-08

The actual controversy involved here is the application of a state statute and state regulations to the plaintiff associations. ... This is the real controversy, and it does not contain the essential element of a federal question. ... The mere fact that a federal defense may be “lurking in the background” of plaintiffs’ complaint is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires a federal right or immunity to be an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim and does not permit a state-court defendant to recast a federal defense as a federal declaratory claim.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. The Division Of Industrial Safety · filed 1980-12-02

Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires that a right or immunity created by the Constitution or the laws of the United States be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. ... In the instant case, United is a defendant in the state court action to enforce citations issued by the Division, and has stated that it has asserted and will continue to assert jurisdictional defenses in that action. Therefore, United's allegations of federal question jurisdiction in this appeal remain defensive in nature, and it cannot assert its jurisdictional objections to the state court action as a basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts.

Section 1331 requires a federal right or immunity to be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim; a federal issue that is only defensive, including a preemption objection to state enforcement, cannot establish federal-question jurisdiction.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Division of Industrial Safety of Department of Industrial Relations · filed 1980-12-02

Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires that a right or immunity created by the Constitution or the laws of the United States be an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. ... It is not enough that a federal question appears in the complaint as an anticipation of or reply to a probable defense. ... Therefore, United’s allegations of federal question jurisdiction in this appeal remain defensive in nature, and it cannot assert its jurisdictional objections to the state court action as a basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts.

Section 1331 requires federal law to be a direct element of the plaintiff’s own claim and does not support jurisdiction when the only federal issue is a defendant’s preemption defense to local-law enforcement.

Township of Greenwich v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1981-01-14

In the instant case, however, federal law is not a direct element of plaintiff’s claim, as required by § 1331. ... Since the only conceivable federal question to be found in plaintiff’s complaint arises in anticipation of Mobil’s preemption defense, we find that the complaint constitutes an insufficient basis on which to ground federal question jurisdiction. We must, therefore, agree with the defendant United States that this court lacks jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 jurisdiction cannot rest on a federal sovereign-immunity defense that must be raised affirmatively rather than appearing in the well-pleaded complaint.

Verlinden B. v. V. Central Bank of Nigeria · filed 1981-04-16

Defenses that have to be ... raised affirmatively, no matter how urgent their federal nature, do not confer jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a claim based solely on state law that alleges no violation of a federal statute or rule.

Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman · filed 1982-03-26

Although the cross-claim purports to base federal jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, and on section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, a general conferral of federal jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal securities laws, these statutes are not pertinent to Cenco’s cross-claim since Cenco does not allege any violation of a federal statute or rule.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over claims arising under federal laws, including RICO and the federal securities laws.

Gunther v. Dinger · filed 1982-04-30

First, defendants contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. The argument is frivolous. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides for the jurisdiction of this Court over claims arising under the laws of the United States. RICO and the federal securities laws are laws of the United States, and thus this Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims thereunder.

Section 1331 reaches a state-created cause of action when federal law is an essential, pivotal part of the claim and the right to relief depends on construing that federal law.

State of Ny by Abrams v. Citibank, Na · filed 1982-05-03

... While Executive Law § 63(12) provides the “cause of action,” it is used in three of the four causes of action alleged as little or nothing more than the statutory basis for the Attorney General to bring the suit in a representative capacity. The substance of the alleged violations in the three causes of action incorporating EFTA all involve and require determinations of whether Citibank has violated federal law. If no violation is found, then no violation of state law could be found to have occurred. Construction of EFTA is necessary to resolution of the claims.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a cross-claim that alleges no violation of a federal statute or rule, even when the principal action involved federal securities claims.

Cenco Incorporated v. Seidman & Seidman · filed 1982-10-04

Although the cross-claim purports to base federal jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, and on section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, a general conferral of federal jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal securities laws, these statutes are not pertinent to Cenco's cross-claim since Cenco does not allege any violation of a federal statute or rule.

Section 1331's requirements are satisfied by a complaint alleging violations of the United States Constitution and federal statutes.

Tufts v. Bishop · filed 1982-12-06

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of the United States Constitution as well as federal statutes, and consequently the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are sufficed.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over a claim arising solely under state law when federal questions enter only as elements of a defense.

Cavanagh v. Brock · filed 1983-09-22

Original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not lie here, because plaintiffs advance solely a state constitutional claim; any federal questions put in issue are raised as elements of the defense.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a state-law claim when the federal issue appears only as a defense or as the plaintiff’s rebuttal to that defense.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1984-06-29

But a federal court does not have federal question jurisdiction over a case in which the plaintiff is suing on a state law cause of action and the federal question only arises by way of the defendant’s defense or by the plaintiff’s rebuttal to the defendant’s defense.

Section 1331 does not independently confer jurisdiction over a state-law consortium claim that alleges no deprivation of a federal right.

Fritts v. Niehouse · filed 1984-09-17

Thus, the consortium claim is not directly cognizable under the federal question jurisdictional statute nor under the civil rights jurisdictional statute because Joyce Fritts has not alleged any deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over claims based entirely on state law when no federal issue is presented.

Johnson v. Miller · filed 1984-10-12

I do not retain jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or ancillary to jurisdiction in other courts.

A state-law claim arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes when federal issues pervade and are integral to determining the plaintiff’s right to relief.

Agosto v. Barcelo · filed 1984-09-27

Because issues of federal law so pervade and are integral to the determination of the plaintiff's right to the relief he seeks, the case “arises under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.

Section 1331 does not independently authorize jurisdiction over state-law claims; those claims require a valid exercise of pendent jurisdiction.

Icahn v. Blunt · filed 1985-06-24

Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of H.B. No. 117 under the Missouri Constitution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (jurisdiction over civil rights claims). Neither statute authorizes this Court to exercise jurisdiction over state claims. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Icahn’s claims that H.B. No. 117 is invalid under the Missouri Constitution only if the exercise of pendant jurisdiction is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1331 does not provide subject-matter jurisdiction over remaining causes of action that assert only state-law claims after the federal agency and federal claims are dismissed.

In Re Moses · filed 1985-12-16

After HUD is dismissed from this action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1332, 1346 because the remaining causes of action assert only state law claims.

Section 1331 does not provide subject-matter jurisdiction over remaining causes of action that assert only state-law claims after the federal agency and federal claims are dismissed.

Moses v. Banco Mortgage Co. · filed 1985-12-16

After HUD is dismissed from this action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1346 because the remaining causes of action assert only state law claims.

Section 1331 does not create federal-question jurisdiction when federal law appears only as a defense to a threatened state or local action.

Lawrence v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals · filed 1986-02-28

Section 1331 provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Plaintiff claims that this action involves the interpretation and application of a federal statute, Title VII, and a federal rule of procedure, Rule 11, and thus that it arises under the laws of the United States. It is well established, however, that defenses to a claim do not create federal jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.

A plaintiff cannot create Section 1331 jurisdiction by adding a request for injunctive relief that federal law forbids to a complaint that otherwise states only an anticipatory federal defense to a state-court action.

Hickey v. Duffy · filed 1987-08-24

A party should not be able to obtain federal jurisdiction by adding, to a complaint that does not establish such jurisdiction, a request for a remedy the court is forbidden to give.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when the asserted federal right is merely an anticipatory defense to a pending or threatened state-court enforcement action.

Northeast Federal Credit Union v. Neves · filed 1988-01-25

In the instant case, NEFCU’s newly-emergent claim of federal right is nothing more than an anticipatory defense to Maine’s state court action to enforce the levies. And it is settled beyond peradventure that federal question jurisdiction will not lie if the asserted federal right “is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened [state court] action.”

A federal issue raised only as a potential defense to state-law claims does not create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

640 Broadway Renaissance Co. v. Cuomo · filed 1989-07-24

And use of federal claims as a potential ... defense ... does not confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Limitation of Liability Act does not independently create Section 1331 jurisdiction.

The Complaint of Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts · filed 1990-12-21

Likewise, we conclude that the Act does not create independent jurisdiction in the federal courts by “arising under” federal law under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) or § 1337 (commerce, et al.) (1988).

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a state freedom-of-information claim merely because the plaintiff anticipates a FERPA defense or argues that applying FERPA as a defense would violate equal protection.

Norwood v. Slammons · filed 1991-05-08

This discussion indicates that even if it is plaintiffs position that the equal protection clause (or component of the Fifth Amendment) prohibits the defendants from relying upon FERPA as a defense to plaintiffs FOI claim, this nonetheless does not state a federal claim regardless of the merits. ... Therefore, even if Judge Clark is correct that FERPA could be construed in a manner violative of equal protection, ... this does not necessarily confer jurisdiction on a federal court to decide the claim.

Section 1331 does not independently give a federal court jurisdiction over claims that county zoning ordinances violate state statutes; hearing those claims requires pendent jurisdiction.

First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County · filed 1991-10-04

Plaintiffs’ only remaining claims are that the zoning ordinances are void for failure to comply with Florida Statutes §§ 125.66 and 125.68. That issue is beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court absent the exercise of pendant jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.

Section 1331 does not confer federal question jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s claim alleging only violations of state-promulgated prison classification rules.

Cugini v. Ventetuolo · filed 1992-01-02

Unlike many, inmates, Cugini chose not to bring a § 1983 action alleging civil rights violations. If he had brought such an action, this Court would certainly have federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the case would arise under the laws of the United States. ... Therefore, if the Morris rules are state-made rules, not meant to be enforced in federal court, this case, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ... This Court concludes, therefore, that state prisoner actions alleging violations of the Morris rules or seeking enforcement of those rules properly belong in state court because the rules were promulgated under state law and were meant to be dealt with by state machinery.

Section 1331 may provide jurisdiction over a state-law claim that necessarily turns on a sufficiently substantial federal issue, even when the federal statute supplies no private right of action.

Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research · filed 1992-03-04

Thus, even where no private right of action exists for the underlying federal issue, if the nature of the federal issue is sufficiently substantial, subject matter jurisdiction may still exist.

Section 1331 does not confer federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim whose only federal issue is an alleged violation of a federal statute for which Congress provided no private federal remedy.

Smith v. Industrial Valley Title Insurance · filed 1992-02-24

The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ removed claims because they are not federal causes of action, and the only issue of federal law presented is whether there have been violations of a federal statute for which Congress did not provide a private federal remedy.

Section 1331 gives a federal court original jurisdiction over a state-law dispute only when a well-pleaded claim necessarily requires resolution of a substantial, disputed question of federal law.

Ippolito v. State of Fla. · filed 1993-06-14

A federal court does not have original jurisdiction over a dispute involving state law matters unless the claim for relief requires resolution of a "substantial, disputed question of federal law” which is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state law claims.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state retaliatory-discharge claim based on rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement and ERISA.

Dean v. Texas Steel Co. · filed 1993-09-30

Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs state 8307c claim is preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and ERISA. The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments. Plaintiff has sued the defendant for wrongful discharge under Texas law. If Plaintiffs factual assertions are true, he will have advanced a valid claim regardless of the terms of the alleged collective bargaining agreement (which, Defendant contends, invokes federal LMRA jurisdiction). Similarly, Plaintiffs claim does not seek to enforce rights provided by ERISA; he seeks to enforce his right to not be retaliated against for asserting a negligence claim against his employer, which is a right provided by the State of Texas. Thus, Plaintiffs action does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law personal-injury claims that invoke CERCLA or RCRA violations when those statutes provide no personal-injury remedy and the federal violations are only one theory of recovery.

Polcha v. AT & T Nassau Metals Corp. · filed 1993-10-18

Based upon all of the foregoing, we conclude that this court would not have original jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, so that removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law securities fraud claims merely because federal claims were available, even if the plaintiffs previously filed and dismissed a federal suit.

Widmer v. Hibbard Brown & Co. · filed 1993-10-21

At issue in plaintiffs’ motion is whether this case was properly removed to this court based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims in the present case are viable under both state law and federal law, the court cannot say that the claims are “essentially” federal in nature. ... The court concludes that the procedural maneuvering by the plaintiffs is not enough reason to place this case into the realm of the artful pleading doctrine. ... This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over a claim alleging a violation of the Clean Water Act because the claim arises under federal law.

Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. · filed 1993-12-08

Sierra Club additionally invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which vests the district courts with original jurisdiction “over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... Clearly, the first cause of action raises a federal question by alleging a violation of the Clean Water Act, a law of the United States.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state malicious prosecution claim merely because the plaintiff must show that an underlying federal action was legally untenable.

Berg v. Hayden Leason Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe Paul Alexander · filed 1994-09-07

Accordingly, we hold that Berg’s malicious prosecution action does not “arise under” federal law simply because one element requires proof that the underlying federal action was legally untenable. As there is no original federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, removal jurisdiction was improperly exercised and the action must be remanded to state court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because federal violations are alleged as predicate acts when those violations are not a sufficiently substantial element of the claim.

Meinders v. Refco Securities, Inc. · filed 1994-10-11

Given the limited purpose for which violations of federal law are asserted in this case, the presence of the claimed violation of federal law as an element of the COCCA claim is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when relief does not necessarily require resolving a substantial question of federal law.

Handyman Network, Inc. v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. · filed 1994-11-07

Examination of Plaintiffs Complaint also underscores the conclusion that Plaintiffs right to relief does not necessarily depend on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Plaintiffs second cause of action for quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment, is pled to entitle Plaintiff to recover in the event a determination is made that no contract exists. If, indeed, no contract was ever formed by the parties, and therefore, Defendant cannot have breached any of the federal laws sought to be incorporated, a jury may nevertheless award damages based on Plaintiffs South Carolina common law remedy for restitution. The jury would not have to resolve any questions of federal law to award recovery to Plaintiff. That analysis applies equally well to Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and Unfair Trade Practices Act claims, neither of which will require any resolution of federal law. Accordingly, the court finds an absence of federal question subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim only when the claim presents a substantial question of federal law; the availability of a separate federal claim alone does not suffice.

Cook v. Chrysler Credit Corp. · filed 1994-11-09

Under the reasoning of Hill, the mere fact that the plaintiffs may have brought the action under 16 C.F.R. § 433.2, standing alone, does not support removal jurisdiction. Even though it is not essential to bring a claim under a federal statute to create federal question jurisdiction, there must be a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law freight undercharge claim for intrastate shipments outside the ICC’s jurisdiction.

North Penn Transfer, Inc. v. ATD-American Co. · filed 1994-11-16

To the degree that a state undercharge claim exists outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction, this Court does not have jurisdiction over that claim under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1337, the jurisdictional grounds originally asserted by plaintiff.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a complaint asserting only state-law claims whose resolution does not depend on federal law.

Price v. Alfa Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-02-06

Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege any violation(s) of a federal statutory or constitutional provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, the court may not assert jurisdiction over the original action.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA because their resolution requires interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Agee v. Huggins · filed 1995-05-09

In summary, all Counts of Plaintiffs Complaint are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, and thus this action is properly before the Court as one arising under federal law. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Remand [4r-l].

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because a complaint mentions federal law when relief does not necessarily depend on resolving a substantial federal question.

Anderson v. Household Finance Corp. of Alabama · filed 1995-08-14

The court does not believe that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on a resolution of a substantial question of federal law, in that federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. The court finds that the mere mention of the words “federal laws” does not confer the court with federal-question jurisdiction, particularly when a commonsense reading of the complaint and amended complaint reflects the pleading of state law claims. The causes of action are supported by alternative theories of state law, and the TILA is not essential to any of those theories.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law surety-bond claim merely because proving default requires construing a collective bargaining agreement rather than federal law.

Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp. · filed 1995-10-13

Here, the Board’s state law claim on the surety bond does not present a substantial federal question. It is true that the Board had to prove as an element of its claim on the bond that Delta had defaulted on its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement. But the nature and extent of Delta’s obligations and whether default occurred are resolved by construing the collective bargaining agreement, not federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims merely because a federal defense may apply or federal law may need to be construed.

Heichman v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1995-12-26

Whether some defense grounded in federal law might apply to bar recovery or some provision of federal law might need to be construed in evaluating plaintiffs case are separate questions irrelevant to the existence of removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over claims alleging only state-law violations merely because a federal preemption defense is anticipated.

Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. Town of Avoca Planning Board · filed 1996-03-21

Because plaintiffs complaint alleges only violations of state law, it does not arise under federal law, and jurisdiction therefore cannot be premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action that asserts only a federal defense to a state-law claim.

Gaar v. Quirk · filed 1996-06-27

Because Quirk's malpractice complaint is founded solely in state law, the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain Gaar's petition, which is merely a defense to Quirk's claim.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the litigation may require resolving questions of federal statutory law.

State of Maryland v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1996-08-01

That questions of federal statutory law may need to be resolved in the course of the litigation is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction on this court.

Ordinary state law claims asserted alone do not establish federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Gaia Technologies, Inc. v. Reconversion Technologies, Inc. · filed 1996-08-19

Although assertion of these claims alone cannot confer federal question subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such state claims if joined with related federal claims: Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over a property dispute when deciding the claim necessarily requires determining whether a railroad right-of-way was abandoned under federal law.

Grantwood Village v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1996-09-09

Because the ICC has exclusive and plenary authority to determine whether a rail line has been abandoned, see, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1132, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981), the question of whether MoPac abandoned the right-of-way necessarily involves federal law. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, federal jurisdiction is proper and the district court did not err in refusing to remand this case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because it could adversely affect a federal consent decree.

In re County Collector of the County of Winnebago · filed 1996-09-16

Contrary to the school district’s position, a state law claim does not present a federal question merely because it adversely impacts the terms of a federal consent decree.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because the claim could adversely affect a federal consent decree.

In re County Collector of the County of Winnebago, Illinois · filed 1996-10-22

Contrary to the school district's position, a state law claim does not present a federal question merely because it adversely impacts the terms of a federal consent decree.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that necessarily depends on a substantial federal issue when the federal statute provides a private cause of action.

Jairath v. Dyer · filed 1996-12-16

Plaintiffs state cause of action necessitates the interpretation of a substantial federal issue for which Congress clearly provided a private federal cause of action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when the federal interest implicated by the claim does not warrant it.

Ernzen v. Ernzen · filed 1997-01-09

The nature of the federal interest at issue here does not warrant the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when a state-law claim invokes a federal statute that provides no private federal cause of action and the federal interest does not warrant a federal forum.

Ernzen v. Ernzen · filed 1997-01-09

In particular, "a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation does not state a claim 'arising under' the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. at 817. Appellants' complaint makes precisely such an allegation and, consequently, does not arise under federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law Medicaid overpayment claims when state law supplies the grounds for liability and resolving the claims requires no analysis of federal law.

State of NY v. Lutheran Center for the Aging, Inc. · filed 1997-02-21

All of these state law obligations, enabling the plaintiff to recover overpayments of Medicaid disbursements, exist without requiring an analysis of federal law. The fact that they are generally derived from a federal program, or the result of a contract mandated by federal law will not alter this result.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law petition that contains no federal claim or substantial federal question.

George v. Borden Chemicals & Plastics Operating Ltd. Partnership · filed 1997-03-31

If, however, the state law creates the cause of action, the court must determine whether the plaintiff’s demand “necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” ... Because the defendants have failed to find a federal claim in the state court petition itself and because defendants’ removal petition may not base subject matter jurisdiction on the supplemental jurisdiction statute, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against a telecommunications carrier when the claims do not implicate federally governed service or require interpreting the Communications Act.

Lipcon v. Sprint Corp. · filed 1997-04-14

Even under Ivy, this Court finds no federal claim because it cannot be said that, in the instant case, “the complaint discloses a need for the interpretation of an act of Congress.”

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim for libel or slander.

Moore v. University of Notre Dame · filed 1997-07-01

Of course, it is understood and elementary that the federal question jurisdiction which is invoked in this case cannot be the jurisdictional foundation for a claim for libel and slander.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because it invokes the False Claims Act as a source of public policy, absent a sufficiently substantial, disputed question of federal law.

Campbell v. The Aerospace Corporation Arthur J. Schiewe · filed 1997-09-03

We therefore hold that Campbell’s incorporation of the FCA as the source of public policy violated did not raise a sufficiently substantial, disputed question of federal law so as to confer federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state RICO claim merely because alleged federal mail and wire fraud violations are predicate acts.

Patterman v. Travelers, Inc. · filed 1997-10-07

The complaint alleges no claims “arising under” federal law and, thus, removal was improper.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over a claim pleaded under state law when the claim is really one of federal law and cannot be decided without resolving a federal issue.

Atlantic Coast Demo. and Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic Cty. · filed 1997-12-18

Federal question jurisdiction can exist over a state law claim if it is really one of federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when all claims in the complaint arise under state law.

Barrows v. Robson · filed 1997-12-23

As all of the plaintiff’s claims are made under state law, no federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (granting federal courts jurisdiction for “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”) Plaintiff’s complaint (Docket No. 1) asserts that this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties in this case.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because a prior federal diversity judgment may support a res judicata defense.

Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 1997-12-31

Because there is no diversity of citizenship alleged, the propriety of removal depends on whether this case falls within the original jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a civil action “arising under” the laws of the United States. ... Semtek, unlike the' plaintiffs in Moitie who first alleged violations of federal antitrust law, has never alleged anything remotely resembling a federal claim, for both its California and Maryland complaints alleged only state law business torts.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that necessarily require reconsideration of a settlement approved by the federal court.

Chance v. Sullivan · filed 1998-02-05

Consequently, this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and therefore has discretion to hear all claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1367.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a claim framed as state-law breach of warranty when the claim is based on an FCC-filed tariff and necessarily raises a substantial federal question.

Marcus v. AT&T Corp. · filed 1998-02-24

Therefore, the breach of warranty claim necessarily raises a substantial federal question over which federal courts may properly exercise jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not extend federal-question jurisdiction to state-law claims.

Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co. · filed 1998-06-04

It is undisputed -- and, of course, indisputable -- that neither 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) nor 28 U.S.C. § 1331 extends federal jurisdiction to state-law claims.

Section 1331 does not give federal courts jurisdiction over a claim for benefits under state statutes when the complaint alleges no constitutional violation or other federal basis.

Crites v. Div. of Family Serv. · filed 1998-08-28

Plaintiffs, however, did not allege a constitutional violation or any other basis for federal jurisdiction over a claim for benefits under Missouri statutes.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a Georgia RICO claim merely because it alleges violations of federal criminal law as predicate acts.

Graham Commercial Realty, Inc. v. Shamsi · filed 1998-09-02

After careful consideration, this court finds that asserting violations of federal criminal law as predicate acts to Georgia’s RICO act is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction.

Federal-question jurisdiction does not extend to a state damages claim based on an ADA duty when Congress withheld a private damages remedy and the plaintiff cannot pursue the ADA’s available injunctive remedy.

Jairath v. Dyer · filed 1998-09-16

We conclude that the congressional intent not to provide a private damages remedy for this kind of ADA violation is, in the instant case, just as it was in Merrell Dow, "tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction."

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a claim that an agency violated its own rules only if the rules allegedly violated are federal law.

Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp. · filed 1998-11-20

Jurisdiction to exercise judicial review of an agency’s violation of law depends upon the law alleged to have been violated.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because it involves a collateral federal issue.

McNeill v. Franke · filed 1999-03-08

When, as here, the rights involved are rooted in state law, the presence of a collateral federal issue does not transform the action into a federal case.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because they involve a federal issue when the implicated federal statutes provide no private right of action.

ESTATE OF AYERS EX REL. STRUGNELL v. Beaver · filed 1999-05-19

Congress did not intend to provide a private right of action under the Medicare or Medicaid Acts and the mere presence of a federal issue, in this case, will not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because they involve a federal issue under the Medicare or Medicaid Acts, which provide no private right of action.

Estate of Ayres ex rel. Strugnell v. Beaver · filed 1999-05-19

Congress did not intend to provide a private right of action under the Medicare or Medicaid Acts and the mere presence of a federal issue, in this case, will not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 covers nonmaritime OCSLA claims governed by state law that OCSLA makes applicable federal law.

Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc. · filed 1999-07-26

Furthermore, Hufnagel has alleged against Kerr-McGee a non- maritime claim under and governed by Louisiana law, made applicable federal law by OCSLA, and his claim is thus one arising under OCSLA for purposes of sections 1331 and 1441(b), and is hence removable without regard to the citizenship of any of the parties.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim unless federal law creates the cause of action or the right to relief necessarily depends on resolving a substantial federal question.

Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation v. Deana Drain · filed 1999-09-08

Accordingly, because federal law does not create appellee’s cause of action and because “vindication of its rights under state law” does not “turn[ ] on some construction of federal law,” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, general federal-question jurisdiction under section 1331 will not lie.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over claims that sound exclusively in state law and raise no federal question on their face.

Holland v. Pinkerton Security · filed 1999-09-23

To the extent that Holland does state such causes of action, they sound exclusively in state law, and raise no federal questions on their face. The Court thus lacks original jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law Y2K claim when the Y2K Act creates no federal cause of action.

Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-10-12

What the Y2K act does not create, however, is a federal cause of action. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs complaint does not present a claim “arising under” federal law, and that federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not exist over the present action.

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over a state-law claim involving federal law only when resolution of a substantial federal issue is necessary to the claim.

Abarca v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1999-10-27

Thus, if a federal law is not necessary to the resolution of a state cause of action — that is, the claim will not win or lose strictly depending on the interpretation of federal law — then it is not substantial.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state RICO claim merely because the claim uses violations of federal law as predicate acts.

Horowitz v. Marlton Oncology, P.C. · filed 1999-11-17

That New Jersey borrowed a federal definition for an element of this state law cause of action cannot operate to confer jurisdiction upon the federal court.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over state law claims when the plaintiff fails to establish a federal claim.

Randolph v. Maryland · filed 1999-11-18

Randolph has failed to establish a federal claim and this Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to entertain his state law claims, including his Motion for Default Judgment against Lowery.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a local-law claim merely because the local ordinance is construed in accordance with federal law.

Pendergraph v. Crown Honda-Volvo, LLC · filed 1999-11-22

However, the mere fact that a local ordinance is construed in accordance with a federal statute does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 can cover a state-law claim without a federal cause of action, but a federal issue does not support jurisdiction when the claim also rests on an alternative state-law ground.

Long v. Bando Manufacturing of America, Inc. · filed 2000-01-13

We therefore hold that, although federal question jurisdiction may exist even where the plaintiff has not stated a federal cause of action, Long’s complaint did not invoke the federal courts’ “arising under” jurisdiction, because it put forth alternate state and federal policies to support his state-law wrongful discharge claim.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because the complaint mentions federal securities violations that are not essential to those claims.

Environmental Remediation Holding Corp. v. Talisman Capital Opportunity Fund, L.P. · filed 2000-04-13

I do not find that the several statements by plaintiff of alleged violations of federal securities law “seek a remedy expressly granted by a federal law,” require a “construction of a federal statute,” or require a determination of a claim in light of some “distinctive policy of a federal statute.”

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that do not arise under federal law.

ARCO Environmental Remediation, L.L.C. v. Department of Health & Environmental Quality · filed 2000-05-24

Because ARCO’s claims do not arise under any federal law, this case does not fall within either the federal courts’ federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or the federal courts’ exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies arising under CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b).

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when a necessary and substantial federal issue is decisive of the claims and appears in the well-pleaded complaint.

Drawhorn v. Qwest Communications International, Inc. · filed 2000-05-30

The federal issues must be a necessary and substantial part of the plaintiffs’ “well-pleaded complaint” as they are here. The federal issues in this case are not defenses. Rather, they are decisive issues to many of the potential class members claims thus giving this court federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction when a complaint asserts a claim arising under federal law, including a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Leach v. Manning · filed 2000-06-02

For example, Count One of the Complaint expressly asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights through their enforcement of certain Pontiac ordinances against the Plaintiffs and their property. This assertion of claims arising under federal law is sufficient to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over a complaint that pleads federal-law violations alongside state-law violations.

Country Club Estates, L.L.C. v. Town of Loma Linda · filed 2000-06-14

A complaint that pleads violations of both state and federal law is within the original jurisdiction of a federal district court.

Section 1331 gives district courts original jurisdiction when a complaint pleads a federal-law claim alongside state-law claims.

Country Club Estates, L.L.C. v. The Town of Loma Linda · filed 2000-06-14

A complaint that pleads violations of both state and federal law is within the original jurisdiction of a federal district court.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when an essential element requires proving federally actionable crimes and doing so raises a substantial federal question.

Ayres v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2000-11-29

We find federal question jurisdiction in this case because the case involves both (1) the necessity for Plaintiffs to prove, as an essential element of their state law cause of action, the existence of federal mail and wire fraud crimes as predicate acts, which crimes would be enforceable in a federal civil RICO cause of action; and (2) the fact that proof of the alleged federal mail and wire fraud crimes involves a very substantial federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when all claims arise under state law.

Worrall v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise · filed 2001-02-02

As all the claims involved arise under state law, there also can be no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over a civil claim arising under a federal statute such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp. · filed 2001-03-15

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since Plaintiffs’ civil action arises under the laws of the United States— specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when a federal regulatory issue is not an essential element of those claims.

Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation · filed 2001-04-02

Accordingly, because MESC’s status as a D/MBE under the federal regulations is not an essential element of CDOT’s state law claims, ECI and MESC have failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that this court has jurisdiction over the pending action.