28 U.S.C. § 1331

When a specific jurisdictional provision governs judicial review of agency action, it takes priority over Section 1331's generalized federal-question grant.

Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld · filed 1976-03-03

This is the type of situation in which review under the APA is allowable, and a specific statutory provision regarding procedures and jurisdictional basis should and must be given priority over the generalized federal question section, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not support a contractual interpleader action that presents no federal question and fails the jurisdictional requirements of the governing interpleader statute or rule.

St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Stone · filed 1977-03-16

Plaintiff claims this Court’s jurisdiction over the interpleader action is based on 26 U.S.C. § 7426, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 2201, and 2202. However, its reliance upon these sections is misplaced. Both the title and substance of the complaint clearly show that it is an action for interpleader, and, as such, is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1335 or F.R.Civ.P. 22. ... Additionally, plaintiff cannot base jurisdiction over this inter-pleader action on F.R.Civ.P. 22 because of the lack of either diversity or a federal question.

A specific statutory jurisdictional provision takes priority over Section 1331's generalized federal-question grant when reviewing federal agency action.

Parkridge Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee · filed 1977-04-15

A specific statutory provision regarding jurisdiction should be given priority over the generalized federal question statute.

Section 1331 cannot support a damages judgment exceeding $10,000 against the United States when the Tucker Act gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction.

Polos v. United States of America · filed 1977-06-16

Polos advances several alternate bases for jurisdiction: the mandamus statute (28 U.S.C. § 1361); the federal question statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331); the insurance statutes (5 U.S.C. § 8715); and the Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. § 459(d)) [now 38 U.S.C. § 2022]. There are serious problems with each of these as a source of jurisdiction to enter the judgment below. It is sufficient for our purposes that use of any of these statutes to entertain a claim and to grant a judgment for damages greater than $10,000 would infringe on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

Section 1331 district-court review is unavailable when a specialized federal statute gives a court of appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over the challenged agency regulation.

The Lubrizol Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1977-08-12

Although petitioner understandably felt compelled to file initially with this court under Section 307(b)(1) in order to meet that provision’s 30-day filing period, it consistently has argued that original jurisdiction to review the particular regulation at issue here, dealing solely with the registration and reporting requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of 211, lies with the federal district courts under Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). ... In sum, petitioner has failed to persuade us that we should not accept Judge Celebrezze’s analysis ... concluding that the District of Columbia Circuit is the appropriate forum for reviewing EPA’s regulation that includes motor oil additives within its definition of “fuel and fuel additives.”

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a federal contract claim committed by the Tucker Act to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, because the specific grant controls the general statute.

Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. Harris · filed 1977-08-30

Since this Act is a specific grant of jurisdiction, it takes precedence over general jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1337. ... We conclude that this case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

When a customs dispute may fall within the Customs Court's exclusive jurisdiction, a district court invoking Section 1331 may retain the action only while the specialized court determines whether it can provide an adequate remedy.

Sybron Corp. v. Carter · filed 1977-10-13

Nevertheless, since the question remains whether the Customs Court can provide an adequate remedy, I will retain jurisdiction in this court pending a ruling by the Customs Court as to its jurisdiction. ... If that court accepts jurisdiction, the action here will be dismissed.

Section 1331’s historical amount requirement does not apply to a Federal Tort Claims Act case because the FTCA provides an independent jurisdictional basis with no minimum amount.

Caidin v. United States · filed 1977-11-03

However, the suggestion in the district court’s order that the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must also be satisfied in the instant case is erroneous. The FTCA provides an independent basis for jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), for which there is no minimum jurisdictional amount.

Section 1331(a) provides district-court jurisdiction over an immigration claim that does not challenge a final deportation order and therefore falls outside the statute granting courts of appeals exclusive deportation review.

Nasan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1978-03-24(a)

The broad grant of jurisdiction contained in this section is not otherwise circumscribed by Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), the provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction over deportation matters in courts of appeal. Thus, this court concludes that it has jurisdiction over this cause under Section 279 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 1331 is surplusage when a federal statute supplies its own jurisdictional grant and the complaint asserts no federal rights outside that statute.

Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corp. · filed 1978-08-08

Therefore, plaintiffs’ reliance upon § 1331 is mere surplusage since no federal rights other than those covered in DCPA are involved.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over disputes arising from a railroad collective-bargaining agreement when Congress placed them within the exclusive jurisdiction of a railroad adjustment board.

Sorensen v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. · filed 1979-06-08

The matters about which the plaintiffs complain do not spring directly from the merger order or any order of the ICC, but rather from the collective bargaining agreements of December 19, 1968, placing the matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National' Railroad Adjustment Board or a Board established by agreement between the parties.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction for agency-action review authorized by the APA, but it cannot circumvent a federal statute’s exclusive administrative and appellate review procedure.

Ceta Workers' Organizing Committee v. City Of New York · filed 1980-03-05

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction for agency action review authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. ... Since the grievance and judicial review procedures outlined in §§ 106 and 107 seem expressly designed to deal with complaints such as those made by appellants, and since any other interpretation would permit “unnecessary duplication and conflicting litigation,” Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, supra, 379 U.S. at 422, 85 S.Ct. at 558, we are impelled to the conclusion that Congress intended the review procedure set forth in § 107 to be exclusive as to claims grounded upon a prime sponsor's or subrecipient's inadequate or illegal actions.

Sections 1331 and 1337 confer federal-question jurisdiction over disputes concerning contract enforceability and injunctive relief that arise under the Railway Labor Act, even though the Norris-LaGuardia Act may bar the requested injunction.

Trans International Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1980-02-14

Although we ultimately hold that the NorrisLaGuardia Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the primary strike in this case, federal question jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. ... since the enforceability of the contract clauses at issue and the propriety of granting injunctive relief arise under the various sections of RLA ... et seq.

An amendment expanding Section 1331 jurisdiction does not repeal or modify a specific statutory restriction on injunctive review absent evidence that Congress intended that result.

Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce · filed 1980-06-04

These arguments are of no avail. The limi/ tation of Section 305(d) is explicit. Th’e Court cannot lightly assume its repeal , or modification.

Sections 1331 and 1337 confer jurisdiction over Railway Labor Act contract-enforceability and injunction questions even when the Norris-LaGuardia Act limits relief.

Trans International Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1980-06-27

federal question jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. ... since the enforceability of the contract clauses at issue and the propriety of granting injunctive relief arise under the various sections of RLA ... et seq.

The McCarran Amendment does not withdraw Section 1331 jurisdiction over federal water-rights suits or make the state forum exclusive.

United States v. California · filed 1980-10-07

The District Court also would have had jurisdiction of this suit under the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [28 U.S.C.S. § 1331]. For the same reasons, the McCarran Amendment did not affect jurisdiction under § 1331 either.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act requires a nonjury trial in an action against a covered foreign state even when the action also presents federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui" · filed 1981-01-15

Under § 1330 the district courts have jurisdiction of all actions against commercial corporations owned by foreign states as defined in § 1603. All that is prohibited is jury trial. Our conclusion with respect to § 1331 jurisdiction is reinforced by § 1441(d), see note 7 supra. Clearly if a foreign state, as defined in § 1603(a), were to base removal on the existence of a federal question, § 1441(d) would bar a jury trial.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over suits against the United States arising under federal law, though a narrower, directly applicable jurisdictional statute may be the preferred ground.

Bank of Hemet v. United States · filed 1981-04-24

This case falls within the jurisdictional grants under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1340 as argued by appellant. Section 1331 grants to the district courts jurisdiction over suits against the United States arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. ... We rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) because it is the narrowest and most directly applicable ground of jurisdiction covering the instant case.

A specific congressional prohibition on district-court jurisdiction displaces jurisdiction that Section 1331 would otherwise confer.

City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission · filed 1981-04-27

Since Congress could confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), and 1337, it can limit jurisdiction under 16 U.S.C. § 2633(a). For these reasons, the Complaint in the instant case must be dismissed.

Section 1331 grants jurisdiction only to district courts and does not expand the Court of Claims' Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Thompson Tower Ltd. Dividend Housing v. United States · filed 1981-07-10

Plaintiffs assert that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,1494, and 2201. The first two of these statutes clearly pertain only to the district courts. Section 1494 is not applicable in this case, and section 2201 does not confer jurisdiction on this court.

Section 1331 is not an alternative jurisdictional basis for actions against foreign states, which Congress intended to be brought under Section 1330(a) and tried without a jury.

Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S. A. · filed 1981-09-17

Although Congress did not explicitly alter § 1331, that does not end the inquiry. ... We conclude, therefore, that Congress intended all actions against foreign states to be tried without a jury, and to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).

Section 1331 is not an alternative jurisdictional basis for actions against foreign states, which Congress intended to be brought under Section 1330(a) and tried without a jury.

Rex v. De Vapores · filed 1981-10-22

Although Congress did not explicitly alter § 1331, that does not end the inquiry. ... We conclude, therefore, that Congress intended all actions against foreign states to be tried without a jury, and to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).

Section 1331 grants jurisdiction only to district courts and cannot provide jurisdiction to the Court of Claims.

Costner v. United States · filed 1981-11-18

Plaintiffs petition, however, invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 5 U.S.C. § 702 (judicial review of administrative action). Neither of these provides jurisdiction for this court: § 1331 is limited by its terms to the district courts, and § 702 does not provide an independent source of jurisdiction for any court.

Section 1331(a) supplies subject-matter jurisdiction over claims challenging current IRS practices and procedures, distinct from tax-refund claims governed by separate jurisdictional requirements.

Oldland v. Kurtz · filed 1981-11-25(a)

, Defendants moved to dismiss, under F.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear these complaints. ... I conclude that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all of these claims, except for the refund claims, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). I will consider subject-matter jurisdiction over the refund claims separately.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is unavailable when Congress has supplanted nonstatutory review with an exclusive court-of-appeals review scheme.

Compensation Department of District Five v. Marshall · filed 1981-12-09

District Five had asserted other bases for jurisdiction, but the district court correctly found all avenues of nonstatutory review precluded or otherwise unavailable. Jurisdiction was not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) because it was “supplanted by the provisions for exclusive Court of Appeals review.”

Section 1331 jurisdiction to review agency action remains subject to statutes in which Congress precludes judicial review.

Labash v. United States Department of Army · filed 1982-01-13

There also is no basis for federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court in Califano v. Sanders noted that jurisdiction conferred on federal courts to review agency action by § 1331 is subject to any “preclusion of review statutes created or retained by Congress.” ... § 2735 is just such a statute.

Section 1331 does not provide an alternative jurisdictional route around the requirements of the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision.

Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co. · filed 1982-02-11

Although the complaint alleges federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we conclude that the requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 must be met and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not give the plaintiff an alternative procedure for conferring jurisdiction.

A special statutory grant of jurisdiction may restrict the general jurisdiction conferred by § 1331.

MGPC, Inc. v. Department of Energy · filed 1982-02-17

Does the special grant of jurisdiction in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note section 211(d)(1) and (2) contain restrictions that limit the general grant of jurisdiction in such statutes as 28 U.S.C. § 1331? ... We answer both questions in the affirmative and find that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

Section 1331's district-court jurisdiction is displaced when a later statute grants a special court original and exclusive jurisdiction notwithstanding any other law.

United Transp. Union v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1982-03-31

The failure of Congress to make specific mention of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the "notwithstanding" provision of § 1152(a) could well have been due to the fact that it wished as well to exclude the application of other laws, e.g., the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 vesting the district courts with jurisdiction over cases arising under laws of the United States. Its omission of express reference is no reason for failing to read its general words as meaning what they unmistakably say.

Section 1331 gives original jurisdiction over federal securities-law claims, but an express statutory nonremoval provision can still require remand.

Abing v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis · filed 1982-05-19

In this case, Count Six of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which is based on the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, plainly arises under the laws of the United States. Therefore, the federal courts would have original jurisdiction over this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... This express prohibition of removal of actions brought under the Securities Act of 1933 clearly prevents removal of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) by virtue of the opening clause of section 1441(a).

Section 1331 cannot bypass Section 1337(a)'s specific $10,000-per-bill-of-lading jurisdictional requirement for Carmack Amendment claims because Section 1337(a) is an exception to Section 1331's general grant.

Pillsbury Company v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company · filed 1982-07-14

Pillsbury’s argument that this court has jurisdiction under Section 1331, irrespective of Section 1337(a), is without merit. Applying Pillsbury’s argument, any claim, however small, could still be brought in federal court if it involved the Interstate Commerce Act because the amount in controversy requirement has been removed from Section 1331. ... For Section 1337(a) to have any effect, it must be viewed as a specific exception, similar to Section 1340, to the broad grant of jurisdiction in Section 1331.

A corporation excluded from FECA's expedited-review procedure may still challenge the Act under § 1331 if it satisfies the usual standing requirements.

Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Commission · filed 1982-10-22

Athens, however, may challenge section 441b of the FECA under the federal question jurisdiction granted federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 so long as the company satisfies the “usual” standing requirements.

Section 1331 does not independently confer jurisdiction over proceedings arising under the bankruptcy laws because the Bankruptcy Reform Act made Section 1471 the exclusive and comprehensive jurisdictional grant for bankruptcy matters.

Gillman v. Preston Family Investment Co. (In Re Richardson) · filed 1983-02-07

Section 1331, however, does not vest jurisdiction of this action in the district court. ... For these reasons, neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor any of its statutory ancestors was intended to grant subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under the bankruptcy laws of the United States and correct construction of Section 1331 requires its elimination from the possible sources of subject matter jurisdiction over this action. ... With respect to bankruptcy matters, Section 1331 grants no jurisdiction not granted by Section 1471. ... In summary, even if under former law Section 1331 granted jurisdiction of bankruptcy civil proceedings, the continued existence of that jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

A corporation ineligible for the Federal Election Campaign Act's special expedited-review procedure may still challenge the Act under Section 1331 if it satisfies ordinary standing requirements.

Athens Lumber Company, Incorporated v. Federal Election Commission · filed 1983-02-07

As a corporation, Athens is unable to certify its constitutional challenges pursuant to the statute. Athens, however, may challenge section 441b of the FECA under the federal question jurisdiction granted federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 so long as the company satisfies the "usual" standing requirements.

Section 1331 does not independently resolve jurisdiction over a foreign state when sovereign immunity is asserted; jurisdiction instead turns on immunity and the exceptions specified by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States · filed 1983-04-20

The Court finds that the question of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 is a non-issue. For if Mexico is immune under the FSIA, it is, as plaintiff concedes, “of no consequence whether Sec. 1331 jurisdiction exists as well.” ... The existence of subject matter jurisdiction turns on whether Mexico’s acts or omissions fall within the general rule of immunity, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1604, or are excepted from jurisdiction immunity under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605(a)(4) or (5).

Section 1331 does not confer district-court jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters because bankruptcy jurisdiction requires a specific statutory grant.

Matter of Seven Springs Apartments, Phase II · filed 1983-06-14

Proponents of District Court bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 misread the federal question statute. It was not intended to include a grant of jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. Subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts exists only by express statutory grant.

Section 1331 cannot circumvent a federal statute that vests exclusive review of agency decisions in the courts of appeals.

Steamboaters v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · filed 1983-06-24

This suit claims jurisdiction on the bases of: a) Federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; b) Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; and c) Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. ... However, I do not have the authority to review agency decisions under the Federal Power Act. The Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, 16 U.S.C. § 8257(b). Therefore, Steamboaters’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied and the case will be dismissed.

Section 1331 does not grant district courts bankruptcy jurisdiction because Congress intended Section 1471 to be the sole source of bankruptcy jurisdiction.

In Re South Portland Shipyard · filed 1983-06-29

Furthermore, as noted above, district court jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to section 1331 would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 be the sole source of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and thus such jurisdiction would not survive the enactment of the Reform Act.

A bankruptcy-related plenary action against third parties requires an independent Section 1331 federal question or Section 1332 diversity basis; a state-law controversy without a federal question may rely only on diversity.

Foreman Industries, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1983-10-14

The alternative bases for jurisdiction of such suits, once labeled “plenary proceedings”, ... must be found in either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) or § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). ... As the nature of the present controversy does not fall within the old classification of a “summary” proceeding, the only ... valid alternative on the facts presented, upon which to base this court’s jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship.

Section 1331 provides an additional, independent basis for district-court jurisdiction over traditional bankruptcy matters arising under valid federal bankruptcy law, and specific bankruptcy grants supplement rather than supplant it.

Seven Springs Apartments, Phase II v. Calmare Assets (In Re Seven Springs Apartments, Phase II) · filed 1983-11-15

The only question is whether there is a federal forum to vindicate that right. This court has concluded there is, ... and holds that section 1331 provides an additional, independent basis for this jurisdiction. ... Thus, this court concludes that the jurisdictional grants in the various bankruptcy statutes did not supplant section 1331; they merely supplemented it.

Section 1331 general federal-question jurisdiction is insufficient by itself to authorize a specially constituted three-judge district court when a specific statute limits that court’s jurisdiction.

Democratic Party of United States v. National Conservative Political Action Committee · filed 1983-12-12

The Democrats also claim that federal courts have statutory subject matter jurisdiction of this case under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp V. 1981). While we assume this assertion to be correct, ... general federal question jurisdiction is insufficient to permit this three-judge district court to decide the case.

Sections 1331 and 1337 do not confer jurisdiction over NLRA unfair-labor-practice claims that Congress committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.

Greater New Orleans Stage, Motion Picture v. W.H. Bower Spangenberg, Inc. · filed 1984-05-21

The lack of a jurisdictional statute conferring jurisdiction in the federal courts over § 157 and § 158 actions divests this Court of original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the broad “arising under” sections of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1337.

Section 1331's general jurisdictional grant cannot circumvent the specific statutory exception denying federal jurisdiction over state-law disputes involving the FDIC as receiver of a state bank.

Gross v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. · filed 1985-05-29

It follows that the limitation on federal jurisdiction stated in the proviso cannot be evaded by predicating jurisdiction on some general jurisdictional grant. ... We agree fully with the analysis underlying the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion, and must therefore conclude that FDIC cannot establish this court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this complaint.

A claimant cannot avoid the Tucker Act’s jurisdictional restrictions by labeling a money-damages suit as arising under § 1331.

Williams v. Secretary of the Navy · filed 1986-03-18

It is well-settled that “a plaintiff .., should not be allowed to avoid the jurisdictional (and hence remedial) restrictions of the ... Tucker Act by casting its pleadings in terms that would enable a district court to exercise jurisdiction under a separate statute.” ... And yet, that is precisely what Williams has attempted to do by labeling his suit as filed exclusively under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361.

Section 1331 supports district-court jurisdiction over a trademark-related customs challenge that does not fall within the Court of International Trade’s exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581.

Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States of America · filed 1986-05-06

In sum, we conclude that this action does not fall within any of the specific provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1581. We find nothing in the purpose or legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 justifying a departure from its literal terms. Congress’ overriding purpose was to consolidate jurisdiction over certain matters involving international trade in a single specialized court, bringing uniformity and expertise to the area. But those ends would not be served in this case. Regardless of which court takes jurisdiction over actions commenced against the Government, the district courts would still have jurisdiction over actions under Section 526(c) against private parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 being no bar, we hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 1121.

Section 1331 cannot be used to bypass the Quiet Title Act, which is the exclusive means for an adverse claimant to challenge the United States' title to real property.

Fadem v. United States · filed 1986-08-12

They assert that the district court had jurisdiction under the Bona Fide Rights Act, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 772 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. The district court dismissed, holding that appellants' exclusive remedy for settlement of such boundary disputes was provided under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a. We affirm.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction on the Special Court created for railroad-reorganization disputes; only 45 U.S.C. § 1105 pertains to that court's jurisdiction.

Masy v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. · filed 1986-09-16

In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that jurisdiction is grounded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343; 45 U.S.C. § 1105; and Fed. R.Civ.P. 23. Only Section 1105 of Title 45 pertains to the jurisdiction of the Special Court.

The Court of International Trade's exclusive jurisdiction is an exception to § 1331's general federal-question jurisdiction in the district courts.

R.J.F. Fabrics, Inc. v. United States · filed 1986-12-01

The jurisdiction granted to the U.S. Customs Court, predecessor to the Court of International Trade, has long been recognized as an exception to the jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, i.e., federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331’s general federal-question grant does not override Congress’s assignment of exclusive customs jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade.

Haddad Manufacturing Co. v. Gucci, Inc. · filed 1987-01-21

The court’s point is well-taken; to recognize federal district court jurisdiction in the case at bar would, in effect, render meaningless Congress’ designation of CIT jurisdiction as “exclusive.”

Section 1331 cannot circumvent the Quiet Title Act's exclusive procedure for challenging the United States' title to real property.

Navajo Tribe of Indians v. State of New Mexico · filed 1987-02-25

Because the QTA is “the exclusive means by which adverse claimants [may] challenge title to real property,” ... the Tribe’s recitation of other statutes that purport to grant jurisdiction is irrelevant.

Section 1331(a) does not provide treaty-based jurisdiction over a Warsaw Convention claim when the Convention’s own jurisdictional requirements are not met.

Chagnon v. Japan Air Lines · filed 1987-03-31(a)

Because treaty jurisdiction over this action in the United States does not lie, there is no basis to claim that this action “arises under” a treaty of the United States, there is no federal jurisdiction over this action, and therefore the petition for removal was improper.

Section 1331 does not override a statute that expressly withdraws federal jurisdiction to restrain or review an authorized federal tax-refund reduction when another adequate forum remains available.

Richardson v. Baker · filed 1987-06-22

Because the Court has no jurisdiction over a claim against federal defendant Baker under the tax intercept program, Baker’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 1331 does not override the exclusive statutory forum for claims arising directly from an ICC-exempted railroad lease transaction.

RY. LABOR EXECUTIVES v. Guilford Transp. Indus. · filed 1987-07-27

Consequently, in accordance with the ruling of the First Circuit, the Court finds that it is without jurisdiction to consider claims ordinarily cognizable by this Court under the RLA where the alleged claims arise directly out of a lease transaction granted a statutory exemption by the ICC under the controlling statute.

Section 1331 cannot bypass the Little Tucker Act's jurisdictional limit assigning monetary claims exceeding $10,000 to the Claims Court rather than a district court.

Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States · filed 1987-12-02

A claim such as we have here under the LTA for more than $10,000 brought in district court fails to accord the district court jurisdiction because it contravenes the express language of the statute.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over monetary claims exceeding $10,000 that fall within the Claims Court's exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Divine Farms, Inc. v. Block · filed 1988-01-04

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction in suits that must be brought exclusively in the U.S. Claims Court.

Sections 1331 and 1338 give district courts original jurisdiction over federal trademark disputes that do not fall within the Court of International Trade's specialized customs jurisdiction.

International Maven, Inc. v. McCauley · filed 1988-01-20

The underlying dispute in this action would require a determination on the substantive law covering trademark and counterfeit goods. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338, the district courts have original jurisdiction over actions based on federal statutes relating to trademarks.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's $50,000 amount requirement bars independent federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331 for a smaller claim but does not bar pendent jurisdiction supported by diversity claims.

Wetzel v. American Motors Corp. · filed 1988-05-05

We hold that the MMWA limitation on the amount in controversy precludes a federal cause of action where jurisdiction is predicated only on federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337), but does not preclude federal jurisdiction where there are state claims to which the MMWA claim is pendent and the parties are of diverse citizenship.

Section 1331 remains available for Medicare reimbursement claims when the statute's ordinarily exclusive administrative-review route is not genuinely available to provide redress.

Beverly Hospital v. Bowen · filed 1989-04-14

The 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395oo route is indeed exclusive when it is genuinely available to provide redress; when that is not the case, however, parties may invoke general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982), as was done in this case and in Burlington Memorial Hospital.

Section 1331's broad grant is cut off when a special statutory review provision vests exclusive jurisdiction in a court of appeals, including for related constitutional claims.

Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1989-04-17

Although broad, our section 1331 jurisdiction may be narrowed if a special statute gives another court jurisdiction over a particular subject. ... Generally, section 1331 gives district courts the jurisdiction to consider claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Nonetheless, it is “well settled,” even in the District of Columbia Circuit, that a statute which vests special jurisdiction in a court of appeals cuts off jurisdiction in the district court over related statutory claims, that is, cuts off jurisdiction over claims arising under the “laws” of the United States. ... We therefore conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over Waste Management’s challenges, constitutional or otherwise.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over a facial constitutional challenge filed before agency action, but a special review statute reserves challenges to final ICC orders and rules to the courts of appeals.

Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad · filed 1989-07-05

Because no administrative action had been taken at the time plaintiffs' complaint had been removed and filed in federal district court, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1337, to decide plaintiffs' facial challenge to the constitutionality of Sec. 1247(d). ... We also agree that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' challenge to the ICC's decision to grant the CITU and to the ICC's final rules implementing Sec. 1247(d). Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2342, the federal circuit courts of appeal, and not the federal district courts, have exclusive jurisdiction to "determine the validity of ... all rules, regulations, or final orders of the [ICC] made reviewable by [28 U.S.C. Sec. 2321]."

Section 1331 and the FLSA do not independently confer jurisdiction over federal employees' FLSA compensation claims because the Tucker Act is the exclusive jurisdictional basis.

Parker v. King · filed 1991-07-12

Today we consider the Little Tucker Act in tandem with the FLSA and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, the "federal question" statute, in order to resolve whether the latter provisions suffice by themselves to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. ... Despite this language, we conclude that Bowen does not overturn previous authority establishing the Tucker Act as the exclusive jurisdictional basis for FLSA claims against the government.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a Fifth Amendment just-compensation claim exceeding $10,000 against the United States because the Tucker Act's specific jurisdictional scheme controls.

Broughton Lumber Company v. Yeutter · filed 1991-07-12

We reject Broughton's section 1331 argument, and conclude that Broughton may not rely on section 1331 to confer jurisdiction in Oregon district court over its claim for just compensation under the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Invoking section 1331 cannot circumvent the Contract Disputes Act or supply district-court jurisdiction over a contract claim against the United States when sovereign immunity has not been waived.

Murphy Timber Co., Inc. v. Turner · filed 1991-07-29

Murphy, however, attempts to plead to avoid the CD A, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) and jurisdiction with the Claims Court by alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Framing the complaint in this manner, however, does not vest jurisdiction with the district court.

Section 1331 may support district-court jurisdiction over claims against federal agencies seeking solely equitable relief when the Tucker Act does not place the action within the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

United Liberty Life Insurance v. Ryan · filed 1991-08-02

Plaintiff maintains that this Court has federal question jurisdiction over its claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and that the federal government waives sovereign immunity under § 1331 in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702. ... Because United Liberty seeks solely equitable remedies against OTS, RTC and FDIC, the Claims Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this action. This Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims against these defendants is proper.

Section 1331 grants general federal-question jurisdiction unless a more specific statute assigns jurisdiction elsewhere.

Intl Science & Tech v. Inacom Communication · filed 1997-02-11

It is clear, however, that § 1331 is a general federal-question statute, which gives the district courts original juris- diction unless a specific statute assigns jurisdiction elsewhere.

Section 1331 does not give district courts original jurisdiction over LHWCA benefit claims, even though they arise under federal law.

In re: CSX Transportation v. · filed 1998-07-28

While Shives' LHWCA claim arises under the laws of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it is not an action over which the district courts have original jurisdiction. An LHWCA claim must be filed with the Department of Labor where it is assigned to an adminis- trative law judge whose decision is reviewed by the Benefits Review Board. 33 U.S.C. §§ 910(a), 921(b). Review by the courts is autho- rized through a petition for review, which may be filed only in the courts of appeals, not in the district court. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).

Section 1331 does not provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction when Congress has supplied a tailored means of reviewing state commission determinations under the Telecommunications Act.

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin · filed 1999-07-12

In their pleadings, some of the local carriers contend that alternative bases for jurisdiction may be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (general- federal question), § 1337 (general federal commerce) and the declaratory judgment statutes, §§ 2201-02. ... Respect for congressional intent means that generalized statutes cannot be used in place of the tailored ones Congress has created.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim when that statute imposes its own more restrictive jurisdictional requirements.

Kuns v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2013-02-21

The general federal jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not provide the Court with jurisdiction to decide a claim arising under a federal statute that has its own specific' — and more restrictive — jurisdictional requirements.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction to review a PTO attorney suspension when 35 U.S.C. § 32 provides a more specific jurisdictional basis.

Chaganti v. Lee · filed 2016-05-11

Although petitioner cites 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the source of federal jurisdiction in the present case, the basis for federal jurisdiction over this matter is 35 U.S.C. § 32, a more specific statutory basis for federal jurisdiction,- because it is well-settled “that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”

Special statutory review provisions for FCC decisions narrow Section 1331 and defeat residual federal-question jurisdiction even for alleged patent abuse of authority or infringement of a substantive right.

Bywater Neighborhood Association v. Tricarico · filed 1989-08-08

Bywater would also have us premise jurisdiction upon the old workhorse, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. But Congress may, as 47 U.S.C. Sec. 402(a) and (b) indicate, narrow that jurisdiction; to the extent that Bywater argues that the district court could retain "residual federal question jurisdiction" on the ground that the agency's violation might be found a patent abuse of its authority or a manifest infringement of a substantive right, we must reject that jurisdictional basis also. Nothing precludes Bywater from obtaining immediate remedies from the District of Columbia Circuit.

Section 1331 cannot provide pre-enforcement review of Clean Water Act agency action when Congress has specifically precluded judicial review at that stage.

Hoffman Group, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1990-05-14

On August 4, 1988, the Hoffman Group, Inc. (“Hoffman”) filed a complaint in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 that sought review of an EPA order requiring Hoffman to stop filling its wetlands and to restore areas it had already filled. In dismissing the suit, the district court held that Hoffman was seeking impermissible pre-enforcement review of agency action taken under the Act. We affirm.

Section 1331 does not permit pre-enforcement review of a Clean Water Act compliance order when Congress impliedly precluded judicial review until an enforcement proceeding.

Southern Pines Associates v. United States · filed 1990-08-30

On July 19, 1989, Southern Pines and VICO filed a complaint and a petition for a temporary restraining order predicating jurisdiction on the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2201 and 2202, and federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... Because we find that Congress intended to preclude, prior to enforcement action or imposition of penalties, judicial review of compliance orders issued under the Clean Water Act, we affirm the district court order dismissing this action.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over structural constitutional challenges to SEC and FTC proceedings because those agencies’ statutory review schemes do not displace jurisdiction over those claims.

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC · filed 2023-04-14

We now conclude that the review schemes set out in the Exchange Act and the FTC Act do not displace district court jurisdiction over Axon's and Cochran's far-reaching constitutional claims.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over structural constitutional challenges to SEC and FTC proceedings when the Acts’ agency review schemes do not cover those claims.

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC · filed 2023-04-14

District courts may ordinarily hear those challenges by way of 28 U. S. C. §1331’s grant of jurisdiction for claims “arising under” federal law. ... Our conclusion follows: The claims are not “of the type” the statutory review schemes reach. Id., at 212. A district court can therefore review them.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over federal-question claims, but Congress can channel challenges to agency action through a separate statutory review scheme.

NCRNC, LLC v. Kennedy · filed 2025-05-30

28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers district court's with original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution and federal laws. Although the default rule generally authorizes federal district courts to consider challenges to the lawfulness of administrative proceedings, Congress can "preclude district courts from exercising jurisdiction over challenges to federal agency action" by substituting "an alternative scheme of review." ... The Court is convinced that the "statutory review scheme . . . reaches the claim in question," Axon Enter., 598 U.S. at 185, and that Congress intended to leave challenges, like the one Plaintiff asserts, to the prescribed statutory review procedure. ... Under these circumstances, the Court is without statutory jurisdiction (and, although the Court need not reach the question, see U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1999), might also lack Article III jurisdiction).

Section 1331 ordinarily gives district courts jurisdiction over challenges to federal agency action arising under federal law, but a statutory agency review scheme can displace that jurisdiction.

Frank Harmon Black and Southeast Investments, N.C., Inc. v. Securities · filed 2026-03-24

District courts ordinarily have jurisdiction to hear challenges to federal agency action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal court jurisdiction over actions “arising under” federal laws. ... However, as explained below, Axon presents a narrow exception that the Court determines does not apply to the claims at issue due to the near completion of the agency proceedings at the time of this Court’s review, which distinguishes the present case from the here-and-now injury in Axon.

Section 1331 does not permit removal of a state workers' compensation action on an unsupported ERISA-preemption theory when Section 1445(c) makes the action nonremovable.

Watson v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1989-05-30

The Defendant’s claim of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is based upon the theory that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act has been preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ... Significantly, no authority is cited in support of this novel proposition. On the contrary, this case comes within a category of cases specifically made nonre-movable by Congress. ... In the instant case, Section 1445(c) bars its removal to this Court.

Section 1331 gives a federal court jurisdiction when a plaintiff sufficiently identifies a right arising under federal law, even if the federal claim fails on the merits.

Thrailkill v. Champion Ford, Inc. · filed 1991-10-08

The Court finds the plaintiff has sufficiently identified a right arising under federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, such that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to the case against defendant Ford Motor Company. Therefore, Ford Motor Company’s Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction will be denied. However, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted on grounds that the plaintiffs fail to state a RICO claim against Ford Motor Company for which relief can be granted.

Section 1331 does not allow a plaintiff challenging an Endangered Species Act listing to bypass the Act’s citizen-suit requirements by invoking federal-question jurisdiction and the Administrative Procedure Act.

Building Industry Ass'n of Southern California, Inc. v. Lujan · filed 1992-02-27

Plaintiff alleges that it claims jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, not the ESA. ... The APA, however, does not provide an independent source of jurisdiction. ... Therefore, to claim federal question jurisdiction in this Court, plaintiff must sue under the citizen suit provisions of the ESA and hence must meet the ESA’s requirements.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a claim based on a federal statute such as RICO.

Baker, Deborah v. IBP, Incorporated · filed 2004-02-04

RICO is a federal statute, and a claim based on it therefore arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1331.

Even when Section 1331 and a constitutional utility-rate claim are adequately pleaded, the Johnson Act removes federal jurisdiction when all of its statutory conditions are met.

South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission · filed 1976-09-24

We have no difficulty with plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations. The appropriate jurisdictional statutes (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1343), as well as the bases for plaintiff’s cause of action (the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and the amount in controversy are all adequately pled. Moreover, plaintiff’s claim that the Commission’s reduction in its proposed rates deprives it of property without due process of law is a constitutional issue normally cognizable in the federal courts. ... All the conditions of 28 U.S.C. § 1342 are met and this Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s case.

Invoking Section 1331 does not permit a district court to enjoin a state public-utility rate order when all requirements of the Johnson Act’s jurisdictional bar are satisfied.

Kalinsky v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1980-02-11

Plaintiff invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and-1343. ... For these reasons we hold plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Johnson Act.

The Johnson Act does not withdraw Section 1331 jurisdiction over a state utility-rate order when jurisdiction rests partly on interpretation of federal labor law rather than solely on constitutional repugnance.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 1245 v. Public Service Commission · filed 1980-02-21

It does not so rest in this case; 'it also rests in part upon a proper interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act and the jurisdiction therein provided as well as on general federal question jurisdiction, the jurisdictional amount having been met. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 and other general jurisdictional grants do not provide jurisdiction for alimony or child-support claims governed by the specific federal statutory scheme in 42 U.S.C. §§ 652–660.

Kelley v. Kelley · filed 1977-01-17

the traditional means of obtaining Federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal questions), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (original jurisdiction of Federal Courts), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (actions generally removable); and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (removal of suits against federal officers or agencies) are unavailing to plaintiffs suing under 42 U.S.C. §§ 652-660.

Title VII's exclusive federal-employment discrimination remedy preempts a constitutional cause of action that would otherwise invoke Section 1331.

Beeman v. Middendorf · filed 1977-01-18

... U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute which would be invoked by a litigant attempting to establish jurisdiction for a constitutional cause of action. ... This Court can only conclude, therefore, that when the Court found that Title VII pre-empts all other remedies for ... federal employment discrimination, it meant to include the constitutional cause of action within the scope of those supplanted remedies.

Section 1331 does not permit a federal employee to bypass Title VII's exclusive remedy for federal-employment discrimination by recasting the action under other federal statutes or the Constitution.

Davis v. Reed · filed 1977-04-20

Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(4). ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in Federal employment. ... Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction of this action insofar as it is against the United States and is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Thirteenth Amendment, and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375.

Section 1331(a) does not furnish a direct Fourteenth Amendment remedy for municipal employment discrimination when Title VII comprehensively supplies the governing remedy.

Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee · filed 1977-07-18(a)

Count II invokes “federal question” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and alleges the amount in controversy to exceed $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. ... In the present case, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to imply a cause of action for injunctive or monetary relief based on the Fourteenth Amendment. As Congress has so recently and comprehensively addressed the precise issue of municipal liability for sex-based employment discrimination through the passage of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, the “precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”

Section 1331 cannot supply a separate Fifth Amendment remedy for federal age discrimination because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for such claims.

Paterson v. Weinberger · filed 1981-05-08

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 2201 and 2202. ... The district court was correct in dismissing the appellant's fifth amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court was of the opinion that after the May 1, 1974, effective date of 29 U.S.C. § 633a, the ADEA became the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in federal employment. ... We agree with this analysis.

Section 1331 continues to provide jurisdiction over federal-employee strike injunctions based on federal criminal and civil statutes despite the Civil Service Reform Act’s allocation of unfair-labor-practice jurisdiction.

Air Transport Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization · filed 1981-06-18

There are other statutes, both criminal and civil, cited above, which coupled with the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 continue to supply a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 cannot bypass Title VII's exclusive administrative and judicial scheme for federal-employment discrimination claims.

Caton v. Canal Zone Government · filed 1981-10-01

assert that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of their suit on multiple grounds, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, & 2201; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; the 1955 Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation entered into between the U.S. and Panama; and the 1955 Treaty’s attached Memorandum of Understandings Reached. ... none of these statutes provides a basis for this Court to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit, except in strict accord with the requirements of Title VII, made applicable to governmental employees by its 1972 amendments.

Section 1331 does not cover claims arising under a federal-sector collective-bargaining agreement or arbitral award, and a federal employee cannot evade the Civil Service Reform Act’s exclusive remedial framework through general federal-question jurisdiction.

Walsh v. United States · filed 1983-12-16

Neither a collective bargaining agreement nor an arbitral award is a Constitution, law, or treaty of the United States, and claims arising under either source are plainly outside the embrace of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In sum, Congress has, in Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, established a comprehensive system for the resolution of labor-management disputes in the public sector. ... Walsh “cannot totally avoid this framework by invocation of the general federal question jurisdiction statute.”

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a federal employee's handicap-discrimination claim against a federal agency or official when the claim is predicated on Section 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fallett v. United States Postal Service · filed 1986-08-25

Because that claim has been dismissed, however, the question is whether a claim is stated under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1343. ... The court concludes that it has no jurisdiction over a claim of discrimination, based on a handicap, against a federal agency or official predicated upon § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1331 does not independently confer jurisdiction over federal-employment discrimination claims when a more specific statutory scheme denies jurisdiction because the claimant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Vinieratos v. United States · filed 1991-07-23

Finally, we hold that there is no independent ground for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... Indeed, the administrative exhaustion requirements in Title VII and the Civil Service Reform Act would have no effect if a claimant could be heard in federal court under section 1331 directly.

Section 1331 does not independently confer jurisdiction over federal-employment discrimination claims when a more specific statutory scheme denies jurisdiction because the claimant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Vinieratos v. United States, Department of the Air Force ex rel. Aldridge · filed 1991-07-23

Finally, we hold that there is no independent ground for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Indeed, the administrative exhaustion requirements in Title VII and the Civil Service Reform Act would have no effect if a claimant could be heard in federal court under section 1331 directly.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction merely because a case involves rights under the United States Arbitration Act.

In Re the Arbitration Between Victorias Milling Co. & Hugo Neu Corp. · filed 1961-07-13

The Lawrence Court specifically stated “that though new substantive federal rights were created, suits involving the application of the Arbitration Act do not furnish an independent basis of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” 271 F.2d at page 408. ... Victorias is thus thrown back on the underlying subject matter jurisdiction, which in this ease is maritime.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement when the underlying divorce and support dispute raises no federal question.

Hirsch v. Kairey · filed 2023-08-01

Plaintiff fails to allege jurisdiction under Section 1331. Here, the underlying controversy — relating to the parties’ divorce, including alimony, child custody, and child support — is not a type of subject matter over which this Court would have federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 supplies no federal-question jurisdiction over a petition concerning arbitration when the underlying demand raises no federal-law claim.

Perini Management Services, Inc. v. Kildare Construction Consultants, LLC · filed 2021-10-01

The Court therefore looks through Perini’s complaint to the underlying demand for arbitration to determine whether Kildare raises any claims that provide federal-question jurisdiction. ... Perini identifies three aspects of Kildare’s demand that, Perini claims, raise a federal question. The Court concludes that none are adequate.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an FAA § 10 petition to vacate an arbitration award merely because § 10 is federal.

Tex. Health Mgmt. LLC v. Healthspring Life & Health Ins. Co. · filed 2019-03-29

Looking to the face of THM's well-pleaded petition to vacate, THM does not allege a federally created cause of action establishing federal jurisdiction (Dkt. #1). ... Therefore, THM does not allege a federal cause of action sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction on the face of its well-pleaded complaint.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10 merely because the petition invokes the Federal Arbitration Act.

Crews v. S & S Service Center Inc. · filed 2012-01-26

Thus, this Court finds that the 9 U.S.C. § 10 petition does not provide § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over an action to enjoin arbitration when the underlying dispute arises under federal law.

Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Shadburn · filed 2011-11-03

The court agrees that § 1331 provides an independent jurisdictional basis for subject matter jurisdiction. ... Although Vaden addressed a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration, district courts have applied Vaden’s precepts when the motion is instead one to enjoin an arbitration proceeding, and the court agrees with the reasoning of these courts.

Section 1331 gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over federal law claims even when the parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes.

D'ANTUONO v. Service Road Corp. · filed 2011-05-25

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal law claims in that Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claims in that Complaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Defendants have provided no authority to support the proposition that a valid arbitration agreement divests a federal court of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires an independent federal question to hear a petition to confirm or vacate an arbitration award; the Federal Arbitration Act alone does not supply one.

Med-Tel International Corp. v. Loulakis · filed 2005-12-07

Therefore, even though it would appear that respondents’ and petitioners’ causes of action are created by §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA respectively, this alone cannot satisfy the requirements for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal question jurisdiction over a motion to vacate an arbitration award based on alleged arbitrator misconduct when the motion does not require resolution of a substantial federal question.

Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Felizardo · filed 2003-08-12

Choice’s motion to vacate is premised on the alleged misconduct of the arbitrator and does not depend on the “resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” ... Federal question jurisdiction is therefore also not present.

Section 1331 does not give a federal court jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award when the asserted grounds do not require resolution of a substantial question of federal law.

Smith v. RUSH RETAIL CENTERS, INC. · filed 2003-07-01

After due consideration, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that, because the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to section 10 of the FAA only when diversity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction exists, because plaintiff has not alleged diversity jurisdiction, and because plaintiff has not alleged that his grounds for vacating the arbitration award require the resolution of a substantial question of federal law sufficient to accord federal question jurisdiction, the Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint.

Section 1331 does not itself provide jurisdiction over suits to compel arbitration or enforce arbitration awards.

Stone, Avery J. v. Doerge, David J. · filed 2003-05-02

If this were so, however, then any demand for arbitration would arise under federal law, supporting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331; yet it is settled that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits seeking to compel arbitration (or enforce awards) only if the parties are of diverse citizenship, or some grant of jurisdiction other than §1331 applies.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award merely because the underlying arbitration involved federal-law questions.

Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co. · filed 2001-02-12

The mere presence of federal law questions in an underlying arbitration is insufficient to supply an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction over the petition to vacate that arbitration award.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a dispute merely because NASD rules governed its arbitration and were subject to SEC review.

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,321 Timothy L. Ford v. Hamilton Investments, Inc. · filed 1994-07-15

Notwithstanding that the Securities and Exchange Commission had an opportunity to review the NASD rule that prescribes arbitration as a means of resolving disputes such as this one, the mere fact that the arbitration was conducted before the NASD as required by the association’s rules does not make the case one that arises out of the federal securities laws.

The Federal Arbitration Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction, so Section 1331 jurisdiction over an arbitration dispute must arise under some federal statute other than that Act.

Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission · filed 1974-05-15

In respect to subject matter jurisdiction, it is clear that the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., does not provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction. ... Subject matter jurisdiction must exist either as a result of diversity of citizenship between the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), or as a result of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), arising under a statute other that the United States Arbitration Act.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over an arbitration dispute must arise from the Constitution or a federal statute other than the Federal Arbitration Act, which is not itself a source of federal jurisdiction.

S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n · filed 1978-06-12

As discussed above, however, the federal arbitration act cannot be looked to as a source of jurisdiction; federal question jurisdiction must arise from a constitutional provision or a federal statute other than the federal arbitration act.

The Federal Arbitration Act creates substantive federal law but does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. · filed 1983-02-23

It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise.

The Federal Arbitration Act creates substantive federal law but does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Southland Corp. v. Keating · filed 1984-01-23

While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or otherwise.

The Federal Arbitration Act does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331, so a federal court needs another subject-matter jurisdiction basis to entertain an action under the Act.

Enserch International Exploration, Inc. v. Attock Oil Co. · filed 1987-03-31

It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise.

The Federal Arbitration Act does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331; the underlying dispute must have another federal jurisdictional basis.

Ness v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. · filed 1987-11-24

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-14, however, clearly does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 must independently support federal jurisdiction over Federal Arbitration Act rights because the FAA itself does not confer federal jurisdiction.

Bock v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. · filed 1989-04-13

Federal and State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the FAA. Absent Federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1331, a State court is the only forum in which to assert rights arising under the act because the FAA itself does not confer Federal jurisdiction.

The Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law but does not itself create Section 1331 jurisdiction; an FAA claimant needs diversity or another independent jurisdictional basis.

Klein v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. · filed 1990-04-18

Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs’ cause of action “arises under” the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) ... the FAA does not confer federal question jurisdiction. ... Although the FAA establishes federal substantive law requiring parties to honor arbitration agreements, the FAA does not create independent federal question jurisdiction.

The Federal Arbitration Act creates substantive federal law but does not independently create Section 1331 jurisdiction; a federal court may compel arbitration only when diversity or another independent jurisdictional basis covers the underlying dispute.

JDC (America) Corp. v. Amerifirst Florida Trust Co. · filed 1990-05-16

The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec.1331 (1976 ed, Supp V) [28 U.S.C.S. sec.1331] or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.

The Federal Arbitration Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction, so jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement must come from Section 1331, Section 1332, or another independent source.

Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mutual Insurance · filed 1990-10-11

The FAA is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction. “Under the FAA, federal jurisdiction is available only if otherwise available through some independent source such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332.”

The Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law but does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Lorentzen v. Levolor Corp. · filed 1990-12-27

We note that — contrary to the assertions of plaintiff — the fact that plaintiff’s claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause arises under the Federal Arbitration Act, does not, in and of itself, confer a preference for federal court adjudication. ... “While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not' create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.”

The Federal Arbitration Act does not independently create federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331, so a party seeking to enforce or vacate an arbitration award must plead diversity or another independent federal jurisdictional basis.

Galuska v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1991-03-29

As Merrill Lynch notes, the consensus on the issue is that the Arbitration Act "does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 or otherwise. ... [T]here must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction ... [for] enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the state courts".

Section 1331 does not confer original jurisdiction based solely on the Federal Arbitration Act.

Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. v. Jc Penney Cas. Ins. · filed 1991-12-04

At the outset, the court notes, and the parties agree, that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, does not confer original jurisdiction on a district court within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award merely because the underlying claims could have been brought as federal claims.

Giangrande v. Shearson Lehman/E.F. Hutton · filed 1992-09-15

In the circumstances, this court concludes that, even assuming that plaintiff might have brought these claims directly in federal court as Rule 10b-5 claims, invoking federal question jurisdiction, ... that fact does not support subject matter jurisdiction of this claim which seeks but one remedy— ... vacation of the arbitration award.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state contract claim for accrued sick leave when ERISA does not preempt the claim.

McGraw v. FD Services, Inc. · filed 1993-01-28

Defendant asserts that this court has original jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiffs fourth cause of action implicates a federal statute. ... Therefore, ERISA does not preempt a state law contract cause of action to recover these funds. Thus, there is no federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide independent federal-question jurisdiction merely because the Federal Arbitration Act applies to a dispute.

First Commercial Financial Group, Inc. v. Baghdoian · filed 1993-01-26

... the Arbitration Act does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law enforcement claim when ERISA preemption is only a defense and ERISA provides no alternative cause of action.

Minnesota Ex Rel. Ulland v. International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of America · filed 1994-07-12

It is undisputed that none of the six provisions in section 1132(a), nor any other provision in ERISA, provides the Commissioner with an alternative cause of action to enforce the Amended Order. Therefore, the State’s cause of action under Minn.Stat. § 45.027, subd. 5 to enjoin the Trust from violating the Amended Order does not “arise under” federal law and does not come under this Court’s removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a lawsuit involves federal funds.

Highland Hills Hospital v. Louisiana · filed 1996-03-06

But the mere presence of federal funds is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction over this lawsuit.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction solely because a party seeks a remedy under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Amalgamated Local Union Number 55, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of · filed 1997-09-08

Nor is any remedy available under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., for the FAA provides no independent basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an FAA petition merely because it invokes the FAA; the petition must present a substantial federal question.

Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp. · filed 1997-11-25

The Baltins' motion did not raise a federal question. First, even though sections 10 and 11 of the FAA appear to "create[ ] ... cause[s] of action," see Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28, 103 S.Ct. at 2856, the Supreme Court has held that a suit brought pursuant to the FAA is not intrinsically a case presenting a federal question.

Section 1331 requires an independent federal question apparent on the face of the complaint; the Federal Arbitration Act does not itself supply federal-question jurisdiction.

DPCC, Inc. v. Cedar Fair, L.P. · filed 1998-06-19

The Act, however, does not supply an independent basis of jurisdiction, but only supplies governing law for cases otherwise properly in federal court. ... Federal jurisdiction must not only exist independently from the Arbitration Act, the independent basis must appear on the face of the complaint.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction merely because a claim invokes the Federal Arbitration Act.

M.C. Construction Corp. v. Gray Co. · filed 1998-07-30

It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement, to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. ... The defendant is therefore in error to the extent it asserts that subject matter jurisdiction for its notice of removal and counterclaim is based on the FAA.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an application to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act merely because the underlying arbitration involved federal law.

Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc. · filed 1999-02-12

Nevertheless, we agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that s 10 does not create federal question jurisdiction, even when the underlying arbi- tration involves federal law, essentially because of the Su- preme Court's general pronouncements concerning the limits of federal district court jurisdiction over the Federal Arbitra- tion Act.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a dispute concerns a contract or an agreement to arbitrate.

Tamiami Partners, Ltd. Ex Rel. Tamiami Development Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians · filed 1999-06-07

In addition, the mere fact that a dispute concerns a contract or an agreement to arbitrate, without more, does not raise a federal question.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction solely because a party seeks to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4; an independent basis for federal jurisdiction is required.

Caudle v. American Arbitration Association · filed 2000-10-17

As Caudle sees matters, the federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, applies because he wants to compel the AAA to arbitrate his dispute under 9 U.S.C. § 4. But § 4 is neither a grant of jurisdiction nor the source of an independent claim arising under federal law.

Section 1331 generally does not confer federal-question jurisdiction based on a federal preemption defense, because that defense does not appear on the face of the complaint.

Broadbent v. Allison · filed 2001-08-17

Because federal preemption is a defense to an action, it does not appear on the face of the complaint and therefore generally does not authorize removal to federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a Federal Arbitration Act petition without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

CIGNA HealthCare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser · filed 2002-01-16

The FAA does not create independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A federal district court has jurisdiction over a petition filed under the FAA only when the plaintiffs establish an independent basis of jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a petition under the Federal Arbitration Act; the petition needs an independent jurisdictional basis.

Circuit City Stores, Inc., a Virginia Corporation v. Najd · filed 2002-06-24

The FAA does not confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction merely because a claim is subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Trawick v. Asbury MS Gray-Daniels, LLC · filed 2003-02-12

However, the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter “FAA”) does not create an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires an independent federal-question basis for jurisdiction over an application under the Federal Arbitration Act, which does not itself create federal-question jurisdiction.

Smittle v. Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC · filed 2003-07-16

As the district court correctly noted, because the Federal Arbitration Act “does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction,” the party seeking confirmation must demonstrate a jurisdictional basis under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) or § 1332 (diversity).

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction merely because a case arises under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Richard C. Young & Co., Ltd. v. Leventhal · filed 2003-12-03

Defendants correctly contend that the Federal Arbitration Act does not create a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim only when resolving the claim necessarily requires resolving a substantial question of federal law.

Metheny v. Becker · filed 2003-12-12

But removal on the basis of this claim fails because it does not appear that resolution of the claim "necessarily" requires resolution of the federal issue (which we shall assume dubitante to be "substantial").

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because a federal issue may arise later; the claim must necessarily present a substantial federal question.

Alshrafi v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2004-06-08

Overall, even if Alshrafi’s claims raise federal issues somewhere down the road, this Court cannot, at this juncture, rule those federal issues sufficiently important to confer federal ingredient jurisdiction on this Court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a Federal Arbitration Act claim unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Stafford v. Discover Bank · filed 2004-12-17

While state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to resolve claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the FAA does not provide an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction in federal court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because federal substantive arbitration law applies.

Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. · filed 2005-06-27

Defendants’ suggestion that the mere applicability of the 'federal substantive law of arbitration would be sufficient to provide federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is incorrect, however.

Section 1331 requires an independent federal question to confer jurisdiction over an action to vacate an arbitration award; the Federal Arbitration Act alone does not supply one.

Qwest Dex, Inc. v. HEARTHSIDE RESTAURANT, INC. · filed 2005-07-12

The only federal law mentioned in plaintiffs’ complaint is the FAA. Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the United States Supreme Court has long held that the FAA “does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”

Section 1331 requires an independent ground for federal-question jurisdiction over a motion to vacate an arbitration award; the Federal Arbitration Act alone does not supply one.

Cole v. Long John Silver's Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2005-09-15

Accordingly, the Court adopts the view that the FAA does not support federal question jurisdiction and finds that, here, Respondents’ motion must be supported by some independent ground of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award when the asserted federal basis is the Federal Arbitration Act and the underlying dispute concerns whether an arbitration contract exists under state law.

Fisher v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. · filed 2006-03-27

Fisher’s jurisdictional arguments are grounded solely on several provisions of the FAA. Also, unlike Wilko, the underlying dispute in this case rests on the existence of a contract under state law. ... Even when construing the material allegations of the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court can find no grounds on which to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 requires a substantial federal question; a claim to vacate or modify an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act does not establish federal-question jurisdiction without an independent jurisdictional basis.

Madeoy v. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N · filed 2008-02-21

The Madeoys present no independent basis upon which to establish federal question jurisdiction. The Madeoys’ claims arise from a construction dispute between an individual homeowner and their contractor in Montgomery County, Maryland and do not present any substantial federal question. This Court therefore lacks the requisite jurisdiction and must dismiss plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and any and all claims asserted against all defendants.

The Federal Arbitration Act alone does not create federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331; a petition under the Act requires an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont · filed 2009-05-06

Although the district court’s Confirmation Order in the present case described this action as raising a federal question under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., that Act in fact does not independently confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a party raises a federal statute as a defense to an anticipated state-law claim.

Debartolo v. Healthsouth Corporation · filed 2009-06-26

After all, a federal defense does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award solely because it arises under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Technologists, Inc. v. Mir's Limited · filed 2010-07-27

Although the FAA explicitly allows a party to file an action in federal court to vacate an arbitration award, see 9 U.S.C. § 10, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA “is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.” ... Thus, Technologists’ argument that the FAA confers federal question jurisdiction over its Petition to Vacate is foreclosed by binding precedent.