28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 does not supply arising-under jurisdiction for a creditor's claim against the FDIC acting as receiver when federal banking law deems that suit not to arise under federal law.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. La Rambla Shopping Center, Inc. · filed 1986-05-21

There is no “arising under” jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... specifically states that a suit like this one, between a creditor and the FDIC as a receiver, “shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.”

A federally chartered corporation’s power to sue or be sued in state or federal court does not by itself create Section 1331 original jurisdiction.

Walton v. Howard University T/A · filed 1987-11-06

It would be difficult to conclude from the remarks made during the hearing that the Committee intended to cause litigation involving the Red Cross to arise under the laws of the United States, and thereby to expand the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.

A federal corporation’s charter does not create Section 1331 jurisdiction merely by authorizing the corporation to sue and be sued in state or federal court unless the charter explicitly grants federal jurisdiction.

Griffith v. Columbus Area Chapter of the American Red Cross · filed 1988-02-01

In conclusion, the statutory language of the Red Cross Charter is not sufficiently explicit to create original federal jurisdiction over all suits, or to establish a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Finally, the Red Cross is not a corporation sufficiently under the control of the United States government so that it may invoke federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1349. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED.

Section 1331 jurisdiction covers suits involving the FDIC because 12 U.S.C. Section 1819 deems them to arise under federal law, except when the FDIC acts as receiver of a state bank.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. W.R. Grace & Co. And Grace Petroleum Corporation · filed 1989-09-11

The jurisdiction of suits by and against the FDIC is specified in section 1819 Fourth of the Banking Code, which provides that all suits to which the FDIC is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States (thus bringing section 1331, the federal-question statute, into play), unless the FDIC is a party “in its capacity as receiver of a State bank.” Since Continental is a national bank rather than a state bank, this exception to federal jurisdiction would not apply even if the FDIC had been suing as a receiver, which it was not; an assignee is not a receiver.

The Red Cross charter's sue-and-be-sued clause confers only capacity to litigate and does not create Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction.

Anonymous Blood Recipient v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 1989-09-22

Article III jurisdiction is broader than statutory jurisdiction, even though the language of § 1331 parallels that of Article III. ... this listing of courts only gives the general power to sue in any court. ... it does not mention jurisdiction. ... The context and legislative history of § 2 also indicate that the “sue and be sued” clause only refers to capacity to litigate. Accordingly, I GRANT plaintiffs’ motion to remand this case to Oakland County Circuit Court.

Section 1331 continues to provide jurisdiction over disputes concerning federally chartered savings institutions even after repeal of a specific jurisdictional provision that had made that federal character explicit.

Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ultimate Savings Bank, F.S.B. · filed 1990-05-18

However, the repeal of § 1730 does not appear to this court to divest it of jurisdiction. ... Thus even if the court no longer has jurisdiction under § 1730 it still has it under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits against the Red Cross because its federal charter's sue-and-be-sued provision confers original federal-question jurisdiction.

Doe v. American National Red Cross · filed 1992-07-10

Defendant also asserted that federal question jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it is organized under a federal charter pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 2. ... In light of this decision, the court now acknowledges that both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction exist in this case.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the plaintiff's state-law claim is not preempted by federal labor law.

Wheeler v. Furr's, Inc. · filed 1985-06-27

Given the court’s findings that plaintiff’s action is based on state law and is not pre-empted by federal labor law, it appears that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this lawsuit.

Section 1331 does not permit removal based only on a federal Section 301 preemption defense when the plaintiff does not seek to vindicate a right arising from a collective-bargaining agreement.

Austin v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1986-09-19

If the “federal question” in a case is raised only by way of a federal defense the jurisdictional statute does not authorize removal. ... A state law claim ought not be recharacterized as a § 301 suit for jurisdictional purposes simply because the plaintiff’s employment was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The jurisdictional inquiry more properly focuses on whether the plaintiff seeks to vindicate a right arising out of the collective agreement. If not, then there is no federal question jurisdiction and it is left to the state courts to determine whether the action is nonetheless within the scope of § 301 preemption.

Section 1331 supports removal when state-law tort claims are cognizable solely as federal breach-of-contract claims under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Gates v. Tenzer · filed 1986-12-29

The union removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on the basis that the action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, over which this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... After reviewing the case file and the applicable law, this Court concludes that plaintiff’s claims on both counts are cognizable solely as breach of contract claims arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction exists when a nominal state-law claim is completely preempted because its resolution necessarily depends on federal labor-law principles.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Association of Flight Attendants · filed 1987-06-29

Therefore, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 1331(a) supports removal when state employment claims are completely preempted by LMRA § 301.

Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. · filed 1987-09-30(a)

Thus, Childers’ claims for wrongful discharge, retaliatory discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA. Since defendants have properly removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), Childers’ motion to remand is denied.

Section 1331 does not support removal when state blacklisting claims are not completely preempted by LMRA § 301.

United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local Number 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp. · filed 1987-12-07

We hold that plaintiffs’ blacklisting claims are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.

A state-law claim completely preempted by federal labor law is treated from its inception as a federal claim arising under Section 1331 and is removable despite the well-pleaded-complaint rule.

Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association and Tanforan Racing Association Peter W. Tunney, Individually and as Vice · filed 1988-08-10

However, under the complete preemption doctrine, which is an independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, once an area of state law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law and is removable.

Section 1331 supports removal of claims completely preempted by federal labor law but not independent state tort claims.

Briggs v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1990-12-19

This case was removed on the strength of defendants’ preemption defense. I have determined that only the tortious interference claim is preempted, and that claim has been dismissed as untimely. The remain ... ing claims are not subject to a preemption defense and arise solely under state law.

Section 1331 covers a nominally state-law wrongful-discharge claim when LMRA Section 301 completely preempts the claim and therefore makes it arise under federal law.

Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, Inc. · filed 1991-04-26

At the outset, I agree that this case is properly before the Court under federal “arising under” jurisdiction. As defendant RCA argues, and as plaintiff concedes, a claim for wrongful discharge based on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, such as plaintiff asserts in Count I of his complaint, is completely preempted by the LMRA. ... However, an exception to this application of the well-pleaded complaint rule “is that Congress may so completely preempt a particular area, that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. For 20 years, this Court has singled out claims pre-empted by § 301 of LMRA for such special treatment.” ... This is because “§ 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’ Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.”

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because those claims arise under federal law.

Milne Employees Association v. Sun Carriers, Inc. · filed 1992-05-04

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). ... Thus, if a state law claim is completely preempted by a federal statute such as section 301, the state law cause of action necessarily becomes a federal one and can be removed. ... The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over MEA's claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with contractual relations, and interference with prospective economic advantage, as they were completely preempted under section 301.

Section 1331 supplies federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Horne v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1992-06-23

Southern Bell removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446. ... Having found that Horne’s privacy claim arises under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and that such a claim is subject to federal preemption, the Court concludes that remand of this case would be inappropriate.

Section 1331 supports federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that arise under federal law through complete preemption by LMRA § 301.

Crawford v. TRW, INC. · filed 1993-02-26

If Congress intends that a federal statute completely preempt an area of state law, any complaint alleging claims under that area of state law is presumed to allege a claim arising under federal law. The complaint may, thus, be removed to federal court and will be treated as alleging a federal cause of action. ... In sum, because the Court finds that resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress will require interpretation of, and will depend upon analysis of, numerous provisions of the CBA as well as unwritten company/union practices, the Court determines that Defendants’ removal of this action to federal court on the basis of LMRA Section 301 preemption was proper.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction through Railway Labor Act complete preemption when the claims do not require interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Pratt, Bradford & Tobin, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1994-03-29

Thus, the Court must determine whether plaintiffs claims require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. ... These claims do not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, therefore the RLA does not preempt.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Furillo v. Dana Corp. Parish Division · filed 1994-10-21

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b). ... Because plaintiffs defamation claim is preempted by federal labor law, it was properly removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), and we therefore deny plaintiffs Motion to Remand.

Section 1331 does not confer federal question jurisdiction over state law defamation claims merely because federal labor law may supply a preemption defense; removal requires complete preemption that converts the claims into federal ones.

Box Tree South, Ltd. v. Bitterman · filed 1995-01-17

Moreover, even if the plaintiffs defamation claims were preempted by the NLRA, the Court would not have federal question removal jurisdiction over this action in the absence of complete preemption.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state workers’ compensation retaliation claim that can be resolved without interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, because LMRA § 301 does not preempt the claim.

Umphrey v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co. · filed 1995-03-27

The sole issue before this court is whether plaintiffs well pleaded complaint raises issues “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” that entitle the defendants to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). ... This court finds that no interpretation of the CBA is required to correctly determine the outcome of this case and that section 301 preemption does not apply.

Section 1331 gives a district court federal-question jurisdiction over a state contract claim that arises under the Railway Labor Act through complete preemption.

Sirois v. Business Express, Inc. · filed 1995-07-26

Accordingly, the court finds that it has federal guestion jurisdiction over Count I of plaintiff's complaint as it arises under the RLA and that removal, therefore, was appropriate.

Complete preemption under the Railway Labor Act can create federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 for removal even when mandatory arbitration prevents the federal court from adjudicating the dispute.

Burgos v. Executive Air, Inc. · filed 1996-02-12

This finding has the practical effect of: (1) conferring federal question jurisdiction upon the Court such that removal from the Commonwealth court is appropriate, due to the RLA’s complete preemption of state contract law in this matter; but also, (2) divesting the Court of subject matter jurisdiction on account of the RLA’s prescribed grievance mechanism for settlement of all “minor disputes.”

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law discrimination claim that is independent of a collective bargaining agreement and is not completely preempted by federal labor law.

Mitchell v. Village Super Market, Inc. · filed 1996-05-20

Thus, this court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs complaint which relies upon the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination for redress of the plaintiffs alleged wrongs.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by LMRA § 301 when resolving the claim requires interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, a Limited Partnership, D/B/A Tci of Michiana · filed 1996-11-26

Because the CBA must be interpreted, and because the claim of the local depends on the meaning of and is substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA, the claim, even though dressed in state-law clothing, is a federal § 301 claim. Federal question subject matter jurisdiction thus existed through the complete preemptive power of § 301, and removal was proper.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA when they substantially depend on interpreting a labor contract.

Crowne Investments, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local No. 1657 · filed 1997-03-27

Because all of Crowne’s state law claims are substantially dependent on an interpretation of a § 301 contract, there is complete preemption in this case. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction over Crowne’s claims so that removal to this court was proper and the Motion to Remand is due to be denied.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state defamation and outrage claims arising from a labor dispute merely because the NLRA may preempt them; that preemption is not complete.

Metheney v. Monarch Rubber Co. · filed 1999-04-15

The Court concludes there is no preemptive force so “ ‘extraordinary’ ” as to constitute complete preemption. Whatever preemption defenses exist, Defendants may raise before the state tribunal.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim based on § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act only if § 301 completely preempts the claim.

Howell v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. · filed 1999-05-03

Thus, only if plaintiffs claims are completely preempted by § 301 does the Court have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim that is independent of a collective bargaining agreement and is not completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

Kittle v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 2000-01-19

Thus, the LMRA does not completely preempt the state law claims under the well-pleaded complaint rule, and we shall remand this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over a labor-law claim completely preempted by LMRA § 301 even when the complaint pleads only state-law claims.

Kern v. Dannon Company Inc · filed 2003-06-13

These two come together in the “well pleaded complaint rule,” a Supreme Court interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 that holds that a non-diverse defendant cannot remove a case to federal court if the plaintiff declined to plead an issue of federal law on the face of his complaint. ... Plead it how he will, a plaintiff simply cannot avoid removal of a labor-law claim — even one premised on state law — to federal court.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that requires interpreting a collective bargaining agreement and is completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

Bolton v. McWane Cast Iron & Pipe Co. · filed 2004-07-21

McWane has correctly concluded that “under the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, claims that require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement for their resolution are treated as arising under federal law and thus may be removed to federal court.” ... Plaintiffs negligence claim is not sufficiently independent of the CBA.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction to remove a state-law claim on the ground of complete preemption by the Railway Labor Act, which lacks the necessary preemptive force.

Roddy v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad · filed 2005-01-14

We conclude that the RLA does not have the extraordinary preemptive force necessary to create federal removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law railroad employment claim based on a Railway Labor Act preemption defense, because that Act does not completely preempt such claims.

Rody v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Inc. · filed 2005-03-15

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In determining whether a complaint arises under federal law we apply the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. ... We conclude that the RLA does not have the extraordinary preemptive force necessary to create federal removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims asserted to be minor disputes under the Railway Labor Act, because that Act does not completely preempt those claims.

Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2005-09-13

Instead, we hold that even if state-law claims qualify as minor disputes under the RLA, the RLA does not completely preempt those claims and therefore does not provide federal courts with original jurisdiction over them.

Section 1331 allows federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when federal law completely preempts the claim, including when the requested relief requires interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Klepsky v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2007-06-12

An exception to this rule exists, however, where federal law completely preempts state law on the relevant subject matter, as the LMRA does in cases that require interpretation of a CBA. ... For this reason, we find that preemption exists under the LMRA, and that removal based on federal jurisdiction was proper here.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law tort claims that assert rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement and can be resolved without interpreting it.

Medlen v. Estate of Meyers · filed 2008-04-09

Accordingly, because Medlen’s claims are grounded wholly in Ohio employer intentional tort law and not in the CBA, and because resolution of those claims will not necessitate an interpretation of the CBA, no federal question jurisdiction exists under the complete preemption doctrine or otherwise.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over a state wage claim merely because the Railway Labor Act supplies a complete federal defense; the RLA does not completely pre-empt the claim.

Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. · filed 2009-01-27

Even assuming that Alaska’s removal petition demonstrates that the RLA provides a complete federal defense to Moore-Thomas’s state wage and hour claim, because the RLA is subject to ordinary rather than complete pre-emption, her complaint does not arise under federal law and is not removable.

Section 1331 gives a federal court jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA when the claim seeks to enforce a collective bargaining agreement.

Mitchell v. GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO., INC. · filed 2009-03-13

In sum, this court retains jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim pursuant to the “complete preemption” corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule because Plaintiffs’ state-law claim in essence seeks enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, a task granted exclusively to the federal courts.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law wrongful-termination and fair-representation claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and are completely preempted by LMRA § 301.

McLeod v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2014-02-01

To resolve both of these claims will require the interpretation of the governing CBA. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Respondent that the Petitioner’s claims are completely preempted by federal law and finds that the Respondent’s removal of this action to this Court was proper.

Section 1331 confers federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Nelson ex rel. Estate of Boogaard v. National Hockey League · filed 2014-02-20

Because Counts III and IV are completely preempted, those claims are federal ... claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and thus were properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through LMRA complete preemption over state-law claims that rest on rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement and require no interpretation of that agreement.

Stellar v. Allied Signal, Inc. · filed 2015-04-15

Plaintiffs’ claims involve state law rights that exist independent of any collective bargaining agreement. The Court is not required to interpret any provision of the CBAs, nor do Plaintiffs’ claims raise “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted by § 301.

Section 1331’s general federal-question grant cannot restore jurisdiction to issue an injunction that the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly withdraws.

Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and the Texas Mexican Railway Company v. Broth · filed 1962-08-17

Thus, the appellants must not deal merely with the substantive law to be applied to a “labor dispute,” but they must find jurisdiction for a federal court to consider the problem. Clearly, no help is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional section under which this action was brought.

Section 1331 cannot support jurisdiction for injunctive relief that the federal Anti-Injunction Act bars.

Kadash v. City of Williamsport · filed 1973-06-29

Since the injunctive relief plaintiffs seek would fly in the face of § 2283’s bar against interference with state judicial proceedings, I conclude jurisdiction cannot be asserted under the Federal Question Statute.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over Medicare reimbursement cases; providers must use the judicial-review route in 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo.

Southeast Arkansas Hospice, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2011-03-24

Because federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not lie in Medicare reimbursement cases, see Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 10-20, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000), section 1395oo provides the sole means for a provider to obtain judicial review of the Secretary’s overpayment determination.

Section 1331 does not provide general federal question jurisdiction over Medicare reimbursement cases.

Lion Health Services, Inc. v. Sebelius · filed 2011-03-14

The Secretary correctly notes that there is no general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in Medicare reimbursement cases.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over Medicare payment claims arising under the Medicare Act when 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii and 405(h) bar direct federal-question review.

Auburn Regional Medical Center v. Leavitt · filed 2010-02-26

Accordingly, pursuant to § 1395ii and § 405(h), the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' claims for relief directly under § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a Medicare rule challenge when the administrative review process provides no opportunity to challenge the rule.

Bartlett Memorial Medical Center, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 2003-10-20

Thus, Plaintiffs effectively received "no review at all" on their challenge to Ruling 97-2 and should be permitted to bring their challenge before this court. Because of this unique situation, we conclude that we may exercise federal question jurisdiction over this case under Michigan Academy.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over Medicare Part B claims alleging that hearing officers misapplied valid fair-hearing rules and regulations.

Walsh v. McGee · filed 1995-10-11

Rather, these accusations challenge the manner in which hearing officers applied the rules and regulations to their cases. In fact, plaintiffs concede the validity of the Part B rules and regulations applicable to their cases by citing them as the standards by which this Court should evaluate defendants’ actions. Accordingly, this Court holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide direct federal-question jurisdiction over post-amendment Medicare Part B claims, including methodology challenges, that arise under the Medicare Act; judicial review requires compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Farkas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Of Michigan · filed 1994-05-24

We therefore will no longer apply the amount/methodology distinction to claims brought under Part B of the Medicare Act as a means of providing federal-question jurisdiction for such claims.

Section 405(h) bars § 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare reimbursement and related due-process claims until the provider obtains a final administrative decision.

Homewood Professional Care Center, Ltd. v. Heckler · filed 1985-06-12

Since the Board has made no final determination to date of any of the plaintiff’s procedural due process claims, we hold that the district court properly concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

Section 405(h) does not bar § 1331 jurisdiction over a direct constitutional challenge to the Medicare Act when the Secretary cannot grant the requested relief and administrative review would serve no purpose.

American Medical Ass'n v. Heckler · filed 1985-04-18

Administrative review of these claims could serve no purpose because the Secretary has no authority to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs, to-wit: a declaration that the fee freeze portions of the Medicare Act are unconstitutional. Under such circumstances, the jurisdiction of this matter properly lies with the District Court.

Section 1331 permits a non-benefit claimant to obtain judicial review of a Medicare regulation absent a clear and convincing showing that Congress intended to preclude review.

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan and Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of H · filed 1985-03-19

As we said in our earlier opinion herein, “Given the presumption favoring judicial review and absent a clear and convincing showing that Congress intended the contrary, we conclude that [federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” 728 F.2d at 331. We further conclude, as did Judge Kinneary in ... that the Supreme Court in ... did not proscribe judicial review to challenges to the Medicare Act where the challenge was made by a party other than a claimant for benefits.

Section 1331(a) does not provide jurisdiction to review Medicare reimbursement procedures when 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) is incorporated into the Medicare Act.

Alabama Hospital Ass'n v. Califano · filed 1979-01-12(a)

On the basis of ... this court concluded that the incorporation of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) into the Medicare Act through 42 U.S.C. § 1395U, eliminated subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) to review the validity of HEW’s reimbursement procedures.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare provider-reimbursement disputes is barred by Social Security Act § 205(h).

Hospital San Jorge, Inc. v. United States Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1979-05-17(a)

The Hospital argues that federal question jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... federal question jurisdiction over Medicare provider reimbursement disputes is barred by § 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which is expressly made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395Ü.

Section 1331 does not authorize review of the amount of an alleged Medicare Part B overpayment.

United States v. Lapin · filed 1979-08-08

Mr. Justice Rehnquist held that section 405(h) of the Social Security Act “prevents] review of decisions of the Secretary save as provided in the Act, which provision is made in § 405(g)” (at 757) and that “the District Court did not have jurisdiction . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 1331” (at 753, 95 S.Ct. at 2461). ... Surely, circumvention would so result because this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the hearing officer’s determination as to amount and thus need not and may not apply a substantial evidence test on review.

Section 1331 does not authorize district-court review of Medicare benefit-payment determinations when Section 405(h), incorporated into the Medicare Act, precludes federal-question review.

Stanley L. Drennan, M.D. v. Patricia Harris (Successor to F. David Mathews), Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1979-09-04

Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide subject matter jurisdiction in the district court to review the determination regarding Drennan’s claims for payment.

Medicare's bar on Section 1331 review does not reach claims based on independent federal statutes and constitutional provisions that challenge agency conduct outside the Medicare Act.

Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1979-10-22(a)

The substantive claims and issues which plaintiffs raise, to protect and enforce their privacy interest, stem from federal statutes and constitutional provisions, and are therefore independent of the Medicare Act. It is over those claims and issues that 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) supplies federal question subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, bars Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over factual determinations in Medicare provider-reimbursement disputes.

United States v. Bellevue Hospital, Inc. · filed 1979-11-05(a)

As to federal question jurisdiction, this Circuit has conclusively determined that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) over factual determinations in Medicare provider reimbursement disputes is barred by § 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which is expressly made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, expressly forecloses general federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331 for claims arising under the Act.

Himmler v. Califano · filed 1979-12-11

Section 405(h) expressly forecloses the exercise of jurisdiction on two of the bases asserted by the plaintiffs' complaint, general federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, dealing generally with civil suits against the United States.

Section 405(h)’s bar on actions brought under Section 1331 against the United States does not preclude review in a Medicare recoupment action brought by the United States.

United States v. James v. Aquavella and Salmon C. Harvey · filed 1980-03-17

It is clear that no portion of § 405(h) specifically divests the district courts of jurisdiction in actions such as this one. ... Finally, the third sentence relates to actions brought “against the United States” and certain federal officials, not to actions brought by the United States.

Social Security Act Section 205(h), as incorporated into Medicare, bars Section 1331 review of both a beneficiary's constitutional claims and challenges to the merits of the agency's benefits determination.

Fox v. Harris · filed 1980-04-25

Moreover, the Act incorporates section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), ... precluding judicial review of such decisions under the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Section 205(h) establishes a jurisdictional bar to a beneficiary’s constitutional claims as well as his challenge to the merits of the agency’s determination.

Although Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 review of Medicare reimbursement amounts owed by the federal government, Section 1331 remains available for constitutional claims when Medicare provides no specific avenue of judicial review.

Chelsea Community Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross Association · filed 1980-09-25

The present jurisdictional question, therefore, is solely whether the district court had "federal-question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Appellants' constitutional claims, however, are cognizable by the district court; here § 1331 provides jurisdiction where no specific statutory avenue to judicial review is open.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction to review a pre-1973 Medicare provider-overpayment decision because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) does not bar review of those claims.

United States v. Fairlane Memorial Convalescent Homes, Inc. · filed 1980-10-22

Following ... this Court holds that, inasmuch as § 405(h) does not apply to pre-1973 provider overpayment actions, it has subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over a Medicaid claim against a state official is not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) when the plaintiff asserts no Medicare claim, attacks no regulations specifically incorporated into Medicaid, and cannot use Medicare administrative review.

Friendship Villa-Clinton, Inc. v. Buck · filed 1981-03-31(a)

In the within case, plaintiff is not suing any federal official, is making no claims under the Medicare statute, and, unlike plaintiffs in ... and in ... is not attacking Medicare regulations specifically incorporated into Medicaid by the Medicaid statute. For those reasons, this Court concludes that section 405(h) does not bar this action and that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over a Medicare provider’s challenge to termination procedures, requiring use of the Social Security Act’s own review provision.

Northlake Community Hospital v. United States · filed 1981-07-21(a)

Although Northlake’s claim in the instant case involves the procedures for terminating a provider agreement rather than the procedures for obtaining reimbursement pursuant to such an agreement, the result with respect to these two procedures should be the same. Under ... North-lake’s allegation of federal question jurisdiction is defective.

Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act precludes Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over Medicare provider-agreement termination claims just as it does over provider reimbursement disputes.

Northlake Community Hospital v. United States · filed 1981-09-29(a)

In Trinity Memorial Hospital of Cudahy, Inc. v. Associated Hospital Services, 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977), this court agreed that Salfi "precludes the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis" for Medicare provider reimbursement disputes. Although Northlake's claim in the instant case involves the procedures for terminating a provider agreement rather than the procedures for obtaining reimbursement pursuant to such an agreement, the result with respect to these two procedures should be the same. Under Salfi and Trinity, Northlake's allegation of federal question jurisdiction is defective.

Section 205(h) bars Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over Medicare provider-reimbursement claims and requires use of the Medicare Act's administrative and judicial review procedures first.

Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Schweiker · filed 1981-11-30(a)

Because we agree that, by virtue of section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, no subject matter jurisdiction attaches to suits arising under the Medicare Act and that Hopewell was required to resort to the administrative review process of that Act before bringing its cause before the courts, we find it unnecessary to reach the merits of this controversy. ... Federal jurisdiction over provider reimbursement disputes is limited to that specifically supplied by the Medicare Act itself, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo, and, absent resort to the Act's procedures, the providers cannot seek to have their claims resolved by the district court.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare Part B reimbursement determinations because Congress intended the program’s limited review remedies to be exclusive.

United States v. Morton Sanet, M.D. · filed 1982-02-01

Congress intentionally provided for no judicial review of Part B reimbursement determinations. ... By a divided court sitting en banc, we answered the question in the affirmative, at least in an action with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the basis for jurisdiction.

Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act, as incorporated into Medicare, bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over actions seeking review of the amount of benefits payable under Medicare Part B.

Herzog v. Secretary of Health, Education, & Welfare · filed 1982-07-09

The third sentence of section 205(h) also precludes federal question jurisdiction in this case. The plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to recover benefits under Part B of the Medicare Act. The same considerations which persuaded Congress to limit federal question jurisdiction under the Social Security Act apply to the Medicare Act. ... Consequently, the present action to determine the amount of benefits payable under Part B is barred absolutely by section 205(h).

The Social Security Act’s § 405(h), as incorporated into Medicare, precludes § 1331 jurisdiction over a Medicare provider-reimbursement dispute.

Indiana Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Schweiker · filed 1982-08-12

The Seventh Circuit has held that ... ‘precludes the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis’ for Medicare provider reimbursement disputes. ... Because of § 405(h), this Court has no jurisdiction under § 1331 to entertain the Hospital Association suit.

Section 405(h) bars Medicare providers from using § 1331 to challenge the validity of a Medicare reimbursement regulation.

Hadley Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker · filed 1982-09-13

Therefore we conclude that § 405(h) bars plaintiffs, as Medicare providers, from obtaining § 1331 jurisdiction to challenge the validity of the Malpractice Rule.

Section 1331 did not warrant district-court adjudication of constitutional claims concerning Medicare provider-agreement nonrenewal when an administrative hearing and Court of Claims review remained available.

Group Health Inc. v. Schweiker · filed 1982-09-23

Pursuant to the inherent power of the Federal Courts to hear constitutional claims, ... and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the plaintiffs assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims. ... Therefore, since the plaintiffs have been offered a hearing, and all avenues of review have not been precluded in that the Court of Claims is an Article III Court empowered to entertain constitutional claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a Medicare statutory-authority challenge is not displaced by § 405(h) when preclusion would eliminate judicial review of the issue.

Riverside General Hospital v. Schweiker · filed 1982-10-07

In addition, this Court holds that § 405(h) cannot be given preclusive effect over plaintiff’s substantive claim as to the statutory authority of the Secretary because to do so would eliminate judicial review of this important statutory issue.

Section 405(h) does not bar Section 1331 jurisdiction over a Medicare challenge seeking prospective lawful agency conduct rather than recovery of benefits.

Starnes v. Schweiker · filed 1983-08-16

These cases limit the bar of § 405(h) to claims brought to recover benefits and permit the exercise of § 1331 jurisdiction to adjudicate any other right for which no alternative form of judicial relief is available. ... But we do not perceive the suit essentially one to recover benefits; it is a suit to enforce lawful conduct on the part of the Secretary. ... We hold therefore that federal question jurisdiction existed in the district court.

Section 1331 permits review of a constitutional Medicare claim when applying Section 405(h) would otherwise leave no avenue for judicial consideration of the constitutional challenge.

BARTLETT ON BEHALF OF NEUMAN v. Heckler · filed 1983-09-23

Alternatively, and for the reasons discussed above, in particular the ... decision, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 405(h) applies to a Medicare reimbursement case whose district-court jurisdiction is founded on Section 1331.

V.N.A. Of Greater Tift County, Inc., a Georgia Non-Profit Corporation v. Margaret M. Heckler and Blue Cross and Blue Shi · filed 1983-10-07

There can be no question that § 405(h) fully applies to the present case, because the district court’s jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits review of a Medicare Part B regulation governing reimbursement methodology when Congress provided no alternative review mechanism and did not clearly and convincingly preclude judicial review.

Michigan Academy Of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross And Blue Shield Of Michigan · filed 1984-02-23

Given the presumption favoring judicial review and absent a clear and convincing showing that Congress intended the contrary, 3 we conclude that the district court correctly found federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 to render a decision in this case.

Section 405(h) does not bar Section 1331 jurisdiction over a nonconstitutional challenge to Medicare agency action that does not seek benefits or reimbursement and for which no alternative statutory review procedure exists.

Abrams v. Heckler · filed 1984-03-14

A number of cases have reasoned persuasively that § 405(h) does not bar federal question jurisdiction where, as here, the plaintiff does not seek Medicare benefits or a money judgment based on a claim for reimbursement for services rendered, but rather, review of agency action unrelated to such disputes. ... With these considerations in mind, the Court holds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 jurisdiction remains available for a constitutional challenge to Medicare procedures when the claimant has no other avenue of judicial review, notwithstanding Section 405(h)'s general bar.

Krebsbach v. Heckler · filed 1985-08-26

the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395Ü, precludes section 1331 jurisdiction over all claims arising under the Medicare Act. ... does not bar federal question jurisdiction over constitutional questions where there exists no other avenue of review. ... In the instant case there is no review available of defendants’ refusal to provide plaintiff with a hearing regarding the suspension of reimbursements. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether this refusal violates plaintiff’s due process rights.

Section 405(h) does not preclude Section 1331 review of a Medicare-related claim that is not cognizable administratively, is not intertwined with a benefits claim, and otherwise would have no judicial-review route.

Samaritan Health Center v. Heckler · filed 1985-08-29

Because this claim is not cognizable by the PRRB as a challenge to reimbursement or prepayment rates, the plaintiffs have no access to judicial review other than through this action. ... Our Court of Appeals has held that section 405(h) does not “preclude judicial review of claims for which no alternative form of judicial review [is] available,” ... and this action may therefore be considered under the Court’s general federal question jurisdiction.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 review when a purported Medicare procedural challenge arises under the Medicare Act and is inextricably intertwined with claims for Part B benefits.

Hatcher v. Heckler · filed 1985-10-14

Thus, we are forced to the conclusion that under Salfi and Ringer the claims of the appellants before us arose under the Medicare Act and, hence, were precluded from further judicial review under section 1331 by section 405(h).

Section 1331 is precluded for Medicare Part A reimbursement claims arising under the Medicare Act when the Prospective Reimbursement Review Board provides an avenue to judicial review.

Good Samaritan Medical Center v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1985-11-07

We hold that such an implied exception is not applicable in this case, because plaintiffs have an avenue for judicial review of Medicare Part A claims: presentation of their claims to the Prospective Reimbursement Review Board. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims arising under Medicare Part A, including claims effectively seeking higher reimbursement through regulatory action.

Ohio Hospital Ass'n v. Heckler · filed 1986-02-20

In actions arising under Part A of the Act — as both the instant case and ... Good Samaritan ... do — § 1331 jurisdiction is barred.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into Medicare Part B, does not foreclose Section 1331 review of challenges to the validity of the Secretary's instructions and regulations, as opposed to benefit-amount determinations.

Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians · filed 1986-06-09

By the same token, matters which Congress did ... not ... delegate to private carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Secretary’s instructions and regulations, are cognizable in courts of law.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to review claims arising under the Medicare Act because § 405(g) is the exclusive basis for judicial review.

Arcadia Valley Hosp. v. Bowen · filed 1986-06-16

The Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), is the sole basis for judicial review of claims arising under the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 permits review of Medicare Part B regulations alleged to conflict with the Medicare Act even though individual Part B benefit determinations are insulated from judicial review.

Linoz v. Heckler · filed 1986-09-23

Thus, the Court held that federal question jurisdiction was available to review Part B regulations asserted to be inconsistent with the Act. ... Having determined that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we need not reach the separate question whether jurisdiction lay under the mandamus statute.

Section 1331 review jurisdiction may be available for Medicare claims outside a carrier hearing officer’s statutory jurisdiction.

Medical Fund-Philadelphia Geriatric Center v. Heckler · filed 1986-10-24

Thus to the extent the plaintiff’s claims involve matters not within the statutory jurisdiction of the hearing officer, review jurisdiction may be available under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction for challenges to Medicare Part A regulations, which must proceed under the Medicare Act’s jurisdictional grants.

Frankford Hospital v. Davis · filed 1986-11-18

This Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since as heretofore pointed out, challenges to the regulations under Part A must be brought under the jurisdictional grants provided for in the Medicare Act.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare reimbursement claims.

Hospital Ass'n v. Secretary of Health & Human Services · filed 1987-06-08

Federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982), is barred by section 205 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(h) (Supp. III 1985), which is made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395ii (Supp. III 1985).

Section 1331 does not permit a Medicare provider to bypass the statutory administrative-review process for a regulatory-interpretation dispute when the circumstances do not justify waiving exhaustion.

Oulton v. Bowen · filed 1988-02-18

Because I believe that Congress did not intend this result, I find that, under the present set of facts, this court must decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. ... I concur with defendants that this court has no jurisdiction over the instant dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 2201, or 2202.

Sections 1331 and 2201 cannot be used to obtain an abstract ruling on a Medicare issue and thereby bypass the judicial-review prerequisites that would govern a concrete claim.

National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, Department of Health & Human Servic · filed 1988-03-01

We hold that plaintiffs have presented no “case of actual controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 2201, properly cognizable under the general federal question jurisdiction of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs may not invoke 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201 for the adjudication of an “issue” and thereby circumvent the prerequisites to judicial review which would attend presentation of that issue in the context of a concrete claim.

Section 1331 permits federal review of statutory and constitutional challenges to Medicare Part B agency procedures even though benefit-amount determinations themselves are insulated from review.

Quality Care Medical Equipment Co. v. Bowen (In Re Quality Care Medical Equipment Co.) · filed 1988-11-16

Congress has not precluded judicial review to ensure that such mandate is met. Challenges to the agency’s process based on the statute and the constitution are thus within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. ... Whether such challenges present cognizable claims upon which relief can be granted is a separate question which the federal courts are not jurisdictionally precluded from deciding.

Section 1331 does not independently authorize review of Medicare claims beyond the review expressly provided by the Medicare Act.

Minnesota Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen · filed 1988-12-29

It is well settled that this court’s “jurisdiction to review claims arising under the Medicare Act exists only as expressly specified in the Act itself.” ... Since no timely requests for expedited review were filed, the court has no jurisdiction to hear the claims of the 1985-A “single filing” hospitals, and those claims should be dismissed.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to review the amount of a Medicare Part B benefits determination.

Anderson v. Bowen · filed 1989-07-28

Finding a challenge to the amount of Medicare Part B benefits awarded at the heart of this controversy, we agree with the district court that it has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 to review the Part B benefit determination.

Section 1331 does not furnish jurisdiction over a claim arising under Medicare because Section 405(h), as incorporated into Medicare, requires such claims to proceed exclusively through Section 405(g).

Wilkins v. Sullivan · filed 1989-11-14

Wilkins relies upon 28 U.S.C. section 1361, 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and 42 U.S.C.A. section 1395ff to vest the district court with jurisdiction to review the denial of Medicare benefits. However, 42 U.S.C. section 405(h) (as applied to Medicare by 42 U.S.C.A. section 1395ii) provides that any "claim arising under" the Medicare program must be brought exclusively under section 405(g).

Section 1331 permits judicial review of a Medicare Part B challenge to the validity of agency rules or claim-determination methods, though it does not permit review of an individualized application of valid rules.

American Ambulance Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1990-08-14

met, conferring jurisdiction on the district court. We will therefore reverse and remand for consideration of the merits.

Section 1331 cannot bypass the Social Security Act’s exclusive Medicare review process, and a provider must exhaust that administrative process before a federal court may adjudicate payment disputes.

Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Tampa Bay v. Sullivan (In Re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Tampa Bay) · filed 1990-10-30

The Supreme Court has characterized it as “sweeping and direct” to such an extent to bar Court jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 except as authorized by the Social Security Act. ... The Provider has not exhausted all the administrative remedies before coming to this Court. This Court has no greater jurisdiction under these circumstances.

Section 1331 does not permit judicial review of a Medicare exclusion before the Secretary issues a final decision under the Social Security Act, absent an applicable exhaustion exception.

Hussain v. Secretary of Health & Human Resources · filed 1990-10-23

Jurisdiction in this matter must be granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which provides: “[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... Under the statutory scheme created by the Social Security Act, this court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action ... only after ... the Secretary renders a final decision in the administrative action. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over Medicare claims because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), incorporated into the Medicare Act by § 1395ii, expressly bars that jurisdictional route.

Westchester Management Corp. v. United States Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1991-01-29

Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) via 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii specifically denies federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1346 for claims arising under the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 cannot provide jurisdiction over an individual Medicare benefits claim because 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) supplies the exclusive judicial-review route and requires administrative exhaustion.

Cervoni v. Sullivan · filed 1991-05-03

Jurisdiction through § 405(g) is the only possible jurisdictional basis, to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, for all “claim[s] arising under” the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 is unavailable for claims arising under the Medicare Act because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), incorporated by § 1395ii, requires use of the Act’s own review provisions.

Livingston Care Center, Incorporated v. United States · filed 1991-05-31

The plain language of 405(h), as incorporated by 1395ii, precludes the federal courts from entertaining claims based on the jurisdictional provisions of the Torts Claims Act, Sec. 1346 of Title 28, or the statutory grant of jurisdiction over federal questions, Sec. 1331 of Title 28, if the claims "arise under" the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 cannot support a Medicare-provider claim when the Medicare Act supplies both its standing and substantive basis, because Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, channels such claims through the Act’s own review provisions.

Livingston Care Center, Inc. v. United States · filed 1991-05-31

Under the plain language of 405(h), plaintiffs’ claims, based on § 1331 and § 1346 of Title 28, should be precluded as “arising under” the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare provider reimbursement dispute before the provider completes the Medicare Act’s administrative review process.

Total Care, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1991-12-31

The Social Security Act provides at 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) that "[n]o action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that § 405(h), as quoted above, bars federal question jurisdiction over suits for recovery of Social Security Benefits. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1974); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984). This Circuit, following the Supreme Court, has held that § 405(h) limits "[f]ederal jurisdiction over provider reimbursement disputes ... to that specifically supplied by the Medicare Act itself, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo," which requires a final decision by the PRRB before judicial review is available. Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Schweiker, 666 F.2d 34, 38 (4th Cir.1981) (hereinafter "Hopewell I "). By initiating this suit before the PRRB had heard or decided its EJR request, Total Care failed to comply with the full procedures for administrative and judicial review under the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over challenges to Medicare Part B regulations prescribing how benefits are calculated without requiring exhaustion of the administrative process for benefit-amount determinations.

Abbott Radiology Associates v. Sullivan · filed 1992-07-24

Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' First, Third and Fifth Causes of Action are properly characterized as challenges to the Secretary's regulations, cognizable in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and are not challenges to the amount of a Part B determination subject to the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust the administrative procedure set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over Medicare Part B disputes after the 1986 amendments; the Medicare Act is the exclusive source of federal court jurisdiction.

Abbey v. Sullivan · filed 1992-09-28

In sum, we hold that the 1986 Amendments to the Medicare Act require that Part B claims be reviewed in the same manner as Part A claims. Thus, the Medicare Act, to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is the sole source of federal court jurisdiction over Part B disputes.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a challenge to the validity of an alleged Medicare sanction policy, rather than an individual sanction determination, despite the limits of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

Stewart v. Sullivan · filed 1992-10-26

Recognizing general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to address such a challenge to a policy of the Secretary does not frustrate the meaning and purpose of § 405(h).

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction subject to statutes that preclude judicial review, including the Military Claims Act’s finality provision.

Fumi Hata, Personal Representative of the Estate of Arnold S. Hata v. United States · filed 1994-04-26

Hata alleged jurisdiction generally under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 gives district courts original jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, "subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 984, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) (emphasis added). As discussed below, the MCA is such a statute.

Section 1331 does not provide federal question jurisdiction over a challenge to a Medicare Part B local medical review policy before presentment to and a final decision by the Secretary.

American Society of Dermatology v. United States Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1997-01-30

The question, then, is whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. I have concluded, for the reasons stated in the thorough and well reasoned opinion of the Sixth Circuit in ... that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over limited relief for a Medicare provider despite § 405(h) when denying jurisdiction would be the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review.

Pathfinder Healthcare, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 2001-11-21

The Court answers in the affirmative the threshold issue of whether this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant relies principally on the recent Supreme Court case of Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000)(“Illinois Council”) for the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). In the vast majority of cases, that would be true. In this case, however, the Court is convinced that denying Pathfinder this limited relief would amount to the “‘practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review.’ ”

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction may be precluded when Congress intends to bar judicial review.

Bredesen v. Rumsfeld · filed 2007-06-26

There are certain cases where federal question jurisdiction may be precluded by Congress.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare Act claim when the claim can be heard through administrative channels and receive judicial review afterward.

Colorado Heart Institute, LLC v. Levitt · filed 2009-04-20

Because Plaintiffs could get their claim heard administratively and could get judicial review after administrative channeling, the Court has no Section 1331 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a nursing home’s declaratory challenge to Medicare survey findings against a state agency conducting surveys on behalf of the federal agency; the Medicare review channel applies.

Outagamie County v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services · filed 2013-06-04

But this raises a more fundamental question: does federal question jurisdiction under section 1331 extend to such a claim? ... If nursing homes may not bring actions for declaratory relief against DHHS directly, it makes no sense to permit them to bring such actions against the state agencies charged with conducting the surveys on DHHS’s behalf. ... Accordingly and for the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the County’s action.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is displaced when an agency review scheme shows Congress intended the claim to proceed through that scheme.

Bennett v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission · filed 2015-12-17

But, a statute providing for agency review will divest the federal district courts of jurisdiction if “the ‘statutory scheme’ displays ¿ ‘fairly discernible’ intent to limit jurisdiction, and the claims at issue ‘are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[é] statutory structure.’”

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare claim before administrative review is complete when that process still affords an opportunity for review.

D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell · filed 2016-01-12

(1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not grant the Court subject matter jurisdiction in this case because channeling Plaintiffs claims through the administrative appeals process would not mean the claims received “no review at all.”

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is impliedly precluded for challenges to SEC administrative proceedings that the Exchange Act channels through agency review and then to a court of appeals.

Bennett v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission · filed 2016-12-16

Federal district courts generally have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also id. § 2201. However, Congress may expressly divest the district courts of jurisdiction over certain claims. See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 5 (2000). Congress can also impliedly preclude jurisdiction by creating a statutory scheme of administrative adjudication and delayed judicial review in a particular court. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994). ... We conclude that Congress’s intent to preclude district- court jurisdiction is “fairly discernible” from the statutory scheme here.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction for a Medicare claim when an aligned Medicare beneficiary can pursue the claim through the Act’s administrative review process.

Henry v. Azar · filed 2021-02-08

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Illinois Council exception does not apply to Alcresta and, therefore, Alcresta may not assert its Medicare claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide parallel federal-question jurisdiction over due process claims seeking review of a naturalization denial when § 1421(c) governs judicial review of that denial.

Adi v. Wolf · filed 2022-01-28

Congress’s limited grant of jurisdiction to district courts in section 1421(c), however, precludes federal question jurisdiction here.

Section 1331 does not authorize a district court to issue mandamus compelling a state judge to act, regardless of whether the plaintiff labels the requested relief an injunction.

Biggs v. Ward · filed 1954-05-21

Furthermore the court was without jurisdiction for the further reason that in its essence, plaintiff’s suit asked the District Court for a writ of mandamus to compel action by defendant. Though he did not term the relief sought as mandamus but asked an injunction, the writ prayed was mandatory in character. If the relief prayed had been granted it would have resulted in an order of the District Court commanding defendant to do as plaintiff wished. This, in its essence, is a petition for writ of mandamus, which is not within the District Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1331 alone does not supply jurisdiction to compel a federal official to perform a statutory ministerial duty when the plaintiff asserts no cause of action apart from mandamus.

Lovitky v. Trump · filed 2020-02-11

Next, Lovitky has offered no support for his bare assertion that the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides for jurisdiction for the court to hear his lawsuit. ... Therefore, neither can the federal question statute alone serve as the source of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer action when no federal question appears on the face of the complaint.

Pannu v. Martir · filed 2020-03-11

Here, the Court’s review of the Notice of Removal and attached Complaint makes clear that this Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over the instant matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. First, there is no federal question apparent from the face of the Complaint, which appears to allege only a simple unlawful detainer cause of action.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an electronic-signature dispute merely because it invokes the E-SIGN Act, which supplies no private cause of action.

Yoshimura v. Takahashi · filed 2020-03-11

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because neither the E-SIGN Act nor DJA confer federal question jurisdiction.

Federal-question jurisdiction is absent when the complaint asserts only a state-law malicious-prosecution claim and no constitutional violation.

Vinson v. Davidson · filed 2020-03-11

Removal was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441—federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on February 27, 2020 clarifying the “complaint is based solely on a cause of action for malicious prosecution that arises under State law.” (Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff also requested attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendants responded consenting to remand because Plaintiff had confirmed “he does not allege any violation of his constitutional rights.” (Dkt. No. 8). Defendants did not address Plaintiff's request for attorney fees. Under these circumstances, it appears the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the case should be remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint alleges only state-law negligence and no deprivation of a federal right.

Kelly v. Albany Police Department · filed 2020-03-12

Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate federal question jurisdiction as he has not demonstrated that his claims arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and resolvable in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance.

Langford v. Richardson · filed 2020-03-13

“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”

Section 1331 gives district courts federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law complaint when the claim depends on what federal law requires.

Peck v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services · filed 2020-03-16

And, while Plaintiff cites to Illinois’ Health Care Services Lien Act and asserts a nominal claim for the unauthorized practice of law, the crux of his claim is that federal law requires Defendants to seek reimbursement from Medicare, in the amount it dictates, prior to or in lieu of filing a lien in a civil lawsuit. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint raises a federal question and this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint does not plausibly allege facts establishing a federal claim.

Howland v. Kelly · filed 2020-03-16

Second, nothing in the complaint plausibly suggests that Ms. Howland’s factual allegations, if true, would adequately raise a federal question. ... Therefore, the Court finds that there is no statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, either.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over tort claims that do not arise under the federal laws invoked.

Osei v. Standard Chartered Bank · filed 2020-03-17

Such claims do not implicate either the INA or the Refugee Act of 1980, because neither law provides a cause of action for torts. Thus, despite Osei’s claims that he has been granted asylum pursuant to these laws, Osei’s contentions against Standard Chartered Bank do not “arise under” these federal laws and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under them.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over a complaint that pleads only state-law FCRA claims.

Jackman v. 20th Judicial Circuit Court Administration · filed 2020-03-17

Here, there is no federal question on the face of the Complaint. Jackman specifically pleads three state-law claims.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an ordinary personal-injury claim when the complaint alleges no discernible federal claim.

WHITE v. WISHARD HOSPITAL · filed 2020-03-19

Nor can the Court discern any federal claims in the complaint. Ms. White alleges a personal-injury claim, which is ordinarily a state-law claim. So the Court cannot exercise federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when a Section 1983 complaint fails to identify a constitutional or federal law violation.

Harrington v. City of Shiner, Texas · filed 2020-03-20

Harrington’s complaint fails to establish federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint asserts no federal claim and its state-law claims do not depend on resolving a federal-law question.

Riley v. C R Bard Incorporated · filed 2020-03-20

No federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the master complaint asserts no federal claim and the state law claims alleged in the complaint do not depend on the resolution of a federal law question.

Section 1331 requires a federal law claim to support federal question jurisdiction; merely invoking federal jurisdiction is insufficient.

Mercer v. Poland Springs · filed 2020-03-20

To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiffs claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when a complaint makes no federal claims.

Swain v. Sanford · filed 2020-03-23

Because Swain provided insufficient information for the Court to determine his domicile, and thus to determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists, and because he has not made federal claims, his Complaint must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 18 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1331 requires a federal claim apparent from the complaint; an unsupported assertion of a federal claim does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

BEY v. BERGMAN · filed 2020-03-23

Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court to exercise federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that neither fall under the Price-Anderson Act nor raise an actually disputed and substantial issue under CERCLA.

Dailey v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC · filed 2020-03-23

I do not have federal-question jurisdiction over this action under either the PAA or CERCLA.

A citation to a federal provision that creates no cause of action is insufficient to establish original federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

UNITED SERVICES, INC. v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2020-03-23

Neither citation is to federal law that creates a cause of action sufficient to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).

Section 1331 requires facts supporting a federal claim; merely invoking a federal statute on a complaint form does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Poole v. NYCHA · filed 2020-03-23

Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. ... Plaintiff asserts his claims using a federal court form that invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the complaint does not plead facts that give rise to a federal claim.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when a complaint invokes “Thou shall not kill” as its asserted federal basis.

Gosnell v. Loomis · filed 2020-03-24

“Thou shall not kill” is simply not a basis for federal question jurisdiction. Thus, federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes, the Constitution, or treaties of the United States.

Bush v. Tony's Crew, Inc. · filed 2020-03-24

Subject-matter jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 when a plaintiff asserts a claim arising under a federal statute, the Constitution, or treaties of the United States, commonly referred to as “federal-question” jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides no federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint identifies no federal question and none is discernible from its allegations.

Turner v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 3) nor can the Court discern from Turner’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint identifies no federal basis and its allegations reveal no federal question.

Jackson v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Jackson does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 3) nor can the Court discern from Jackson’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 supplies no federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint identifies no federal basis and its allegations reveal no federal question.

Long v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Long does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 2) nor can the Court discern from Long’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 requires a federal question identifiable from the complaint or its allegations to support federal-question jurisdiction.

Laston v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Laston does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 3) nor can the Court discern from Laston’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 requires a discernible federal question in the plaintiff’s allegations to support federal-question jurisdiction.

Turman v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Turman does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction ... pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 3) nor can the Court discern from Turman’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint identifies no federal question and its allegations reveal none.

Wilson v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Wilson does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 2) nor can the Court discern from Wilson’s allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint identifies no federal basis and its allegations reveal no federal question.

Davis v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Davis does not identify any basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to ... 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 2) nor can the Court discern from Davis’ allegations a federal question at issue in this case.

Section 1331 requires a federal question to appear in the plaintiff’s original complaint to establish ordinary federal-question jurisdiction.

LIFEBRITE HOSPITAL GROUP OF STOKES, LLC v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA · filed 2020-03-30

Therefore, for this court to properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the case must implicate a question of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because Plaintiff does not explicitly rely on any federal law in its original complaint, this court appears to lack subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over Title VII claims because Title VII is federal law.

Hardmon v. Coleman · filed 2020-03-31

Because Title VII is federal law, the Court may exercise federal question jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to § 1331.