28 U.S.C. § 1331

For suits brought by Indian tribes, § 1331 and § 1362 both require the action to arise under federal law.

Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. Unite Here Int'l Union · filed 2018-09-28

Thus, where a tribe is bringing suit, these provisions are duplicative-the existence of jurisdiction under both provisions depends on whether the action arises under federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when general maritime law is the sole substantive basis for the claim.

Ferreira v. KK · filed 1959-01-30

While it is true that the First Circuit, in Doucette v. Vincent, supra, held that a suit based upon the general maritime law necessarily “arises under the Constitution” within the meaning of section 1331 of title 28 U.S.Code, the rule in this Circuit is different. In Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 2 Cir., 221 F.2d 615, 619, it was held that, “cases * * * in which the general maritime law is the sole substantive basis for awarding the relief claimed in the complaint” were excluded from the scope of section 1331. ... There was therefore no jurisdiction over this action on the law side when the complaint was filed.

A claim under general maritime law arises under the Constitution for § 1331 purposes, so the district court has jurisdiction when the then-required amount is present even without diversity.

Doucette v. Vincent · filed 1952-02-05

We think it is an equally obvious consequence of the Jensen line of cases that a suit brought on the law side of the federal district court, on a claim under the general maritime law, is a “civil action” which “arises under the Constitution” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and that therefore, if the jurisdictional amount required by § 1331 is present, the district court has jurisdiction irrespective of diversity of citizenship.

A civil action on a maritime claim may be maintained on the law side of federal court without diversity because the maritime claim arises under the Constitution within § 1331.

Moore-Mccormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault · filed 1953-03-30

Indeed, as we fully explained in Doucette v. Vincent, 1 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 834, a civil action on a maritime claim might be maintained on the law side of a federal district court even in the absence of diversity of citizenship, since the maritime claim is one that “arises under the Constitution” within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. § 1331.

A claim arising only under unmodified general maritime law does not arise under federal law within section 1331 and cannot support civil-side jury jurisdiction without diversity.

Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha · filed 1954-03-31

Thus, plaintiff’s argument as •earlier set forth must fall. ... Uniform application of an admiralty right does not in and of itself • create ■civil jury jurisdiction, nor can the extension of remedies as in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099, and International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157, create such jurisdiction.

Section 1331 excludes cases in which general maritime law is the sole substantive basis for relief, absent a separate jurisdictional ground such as diversity.

Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha and Norton, Lilly & Company · filed 1955-04-05

In view of the persistence of this legislative attitude and in the absence of any indication that there are situations in which it has not prevailed, we are constrained to conclude that the Congress, in enacting Section 1331 and its predecessor provisions, intended to exclude from its scope, cases such as the one now before us, in which the general maritime law is the sole substantive basis for awarding the relief claimed in the complaint.

Claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance arising solely under maritime law do not arise under federal law within section 1331 and require admiralty or diversity jurisdiction.

Melleck v. Oliver J. Olson and Co. · filed 1957-03-13

(5) the claim for breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness asserted in the second cause of action at bar, and the claim for maintenance asserted in the third cause of action, both arise under maritime law; and so neither presents a case which “arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States”, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ... It is ordered therefore that the motion to dismiss is hereby denied, and the alternative- motion to transfer is hereby granted; and the claims asserted in the second and third causes of action of plaintiff’s complaint are ordered transferred to the admiralty docket of this Court, there to be filed and given a number without prepayment of fees, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1916.

A Jones Act claim arises under federal law for section 1331 purposes, but section 1331 alone does not give a jury right on a joined unseaworthiness claim.

Jenkins v. Roderick · filed 1957-11-05

Inasmuch as this count sets forth a “civil action” which “arises under the laws of the United States” the Rhode Island Court had, and this Court has, jurisdiction of count 1 by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... From the above discussion it follows that in the case at bar plaintiff is not entitled to go to the jury on his unseaworthiness count by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. He is, however, entitled to go to the jury on that count because it is pendent to a Jones Act count.

A common-law maritime tort does not arise under federal law within section 1331 and is not removable on that basis absent diversity.

Walls v. City of New York · filed 1957-11-15

The action does not arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1331), nor is it removable as a “civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction” (28 U.S.C. § 1333) in the absence of diversity of citizenship.

General maritime-law claims do not arise under federal law within section 1331, and the identical arising-under language in the removal statute covers the same class of cases.

Crawford v. East Asiatic Company · filed 1957-11-25

Again and again the Courts have held that no jurisdiction existed on the law side, ruling that an action arising under the maritime law is not one “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” ... In view of the fact that the “cases arising under” language found in § 1441(b) is identical with the original jurisdiction language found in § 1331, and the fact that § 1441 functions only with reference to the original jurisdiction sections, it is palpably clear that the “cases arising under” language in § 1441 (b) refers to the same class of cases covered by § 1331.

A claim under general maritime law does not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States for section 1331 jurisdiction on the law side of federal court.

Eriksen v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co. · filed 1958-01-13

The question whether a case under the general maritime law is one arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States so as to qualify for federal jurisdiction on the law side of the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was considered and answered in the negative ... The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah.

A complaint that fails to state a maritime claim cognizable in admiralty also fails to establish section 1331 jurisdiction when federal-question jurisdiction depends on that asserted maritime character.

Clinton v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots of America, Inc. · filed 1958-04-21

Our conclusion above that appellant failed to state a maritime claim cognizable in admiralty is dispositive of his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A maritime negligence and unseaworthiness action does not arise under federal law for section 1331 purposes and requires another basis for original federal jurisdiction.

Fred. Olsen & Co. v. Moore · filed 1958-05-07

Because of the maritime nature of the action, the Court did not have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1331.

A general maritime action was not an action arising under federal law for removal, and in any event failed § 1331's former $10,000 amount requirement when only $438.50 was sought.

Kemp v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1959-01-12

If this is an action arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, it may not be removed as the jurisdictional requirement of $10,-000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, is not present (see 28 U.S.C. § 1331). ... If the action is one in admiralty under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 it is not a case which “[arises] under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States” within the meaning of § 1441(b).

General maritime claims do not independently arise under § 1331, but a district court may exercise limited pendent jurisdiction over related maritime claims when the complaint properly alleges a Jones Act claim.

Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. · filed 1959-04-06

When we apply to the statute, and to the clause of Article III from which it is derived, commonsensical and lawyer-like modes of construction, and the evidence of history and logic, it becomes clear that the words of that statute do not extend, and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. ... Rejection of the proposed new reading of § 1331 does not preclude consideration of petitioner’s claims under the general maritime law. These claims cannot, we have seen, be justified under § 1331. However, the District Court may have jurisdiction of them “pendent” to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act.

An unseaworthiness claim lacks an independent basis under § 1331 but may be heard through pendent jurisdiction when joined with a substantial Jones Act claim arising from the same acts.

Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. · filed 1959-04-07

Therefore, no longer can it be asserted that there was an independent basis of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which would authorize the district court with jury to entertain a complaint based on unseaworthiness as provided in the general maritime law. ... However, as counsel for appellant has pointed out, the district court, despite the lack of diversity of citizenship, had jurisdiction of Count I, a substantial cause of action based upon the Jones Act, so that, pursuant to the actual holding in the Romero case, that court thereby acquired a “pendent” jurisdiction of the related claims under the general maritime law growing out of the same acts.

A tort claim arising solely under general maritime law is cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction, not section 1331, even when admiralty cannot furnish the equitable remedy requested.

Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' International Union, International Longshoremen's Association · filed 1960-05-04

In other words, a tort under the general maritime law is not cognizable by a federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but only under 28 U.S.C. § 1333; consequently, a plaintiff alleging only a claim for tort under the general maritime law may have from a federal court such remedies as admiralty can give and no others. ... But we find nothing in Romero to justify reading “under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to include the general maritime law in cases where admiralty is not competent to give the remedy the plaintiff seeks.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a Jones Act claim does not create a jury-trial right for a joined maritime maintenance-and-cure claim.

Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co. · filed 1962-06-29

In the light of the Romero decision, ruling out 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a statute of the United States which might afford a right of jury trial on a claim for maintenance and cure, the only statutes of the United States requiring consideration are the Jones Act and the saving clause. ... We likewise see no force in an argument that if the door to the “law side” of the Federal court is unlocked by a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, here the Jones Act, the “saving clause” takes over and gives a right to jury trial on any claim for a money judgment properly joined, despite its maritime nature, just as if the door had been unlocked by diversity, § 1332.

Claims based on general maritime law cannot be brought under § 1331 federal-question jurisdiction.

Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co. · filed 1963-06-10

Claims based upon general maritime law cannot be brought in federal courts under the federal question jurisdiction of 28 U. S. C. § 1331.

State wrongful-death and survival claims arising from maritime torts do not fall within § 1331 and cannot proceed on the civil side of federal court without an independent basis such as diversity.

Cunningham v. Bethlehem Steel Co. · filed 1964-07-28

Actions relying on state wrongful death and survival statutes are maritime torts not within the contemplation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and are not cognizable on the civil side of the court absent independent jurisdiction based on diversity. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Jurisdiction of such claims is lodged in admiralty and in the state courts.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over claims based on general maritime law because that body of law is not a law of the United States within the section’s meaning.

Karakatsanis v. Conquestador Cia. Nav., S.A. · filed 1965-02-15

The “general maritime law” is not a law of the United States within the meaning of this section, and an action based on general maritime law does not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Section 1331, therefore, does not give jurisdiction to this court over this action.

A Jones Act action at law does not have to satisfy Section 1331(a)'s former amount-in-controversy requirement.

Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. · filed 1968-05-24(a)

This court holds: 1) lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time; ... 2) for the reasons set forth below, an action under the Jones Act need not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of 1331(a).

A maritime matter does not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States for federal-question jurisdiction purposes merely because federal district courts have original admiralty jurisdiction.

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Manor Investment Co. · filed 1968-07-10

This is a maritime matter. In removing the case to this Court the petitioning defendants relied on the notion that a maritime matter bottoms federal question jurisdiction and further that such a matter is removable without regard to citizenship of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, the law is to the contrary; such a matter is not one arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States; it is one of which the district courts do have original jurisdiction but it is removable only if none of the defendants properly joined is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought.

Section 1331(a) does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a foreign seaman's United States-law claims for injuries aboard a foreign-flag vessel owned by a foreign citizen.

Trinanes v. Schulte · filed 1970-01-21(a)

Subject matter jurisdiction is not conferred upon this Court by 28 U. S.C. § 1331 where plaintiff, an alien seaman, seeks recovery under the laws of the United States for injuries sustained aboard a foreign flag vessel owned by a foreign citizen.

A maritime insurance claim does not present a federal question within Section 1331 merely because it falls within federal admiralty jurisdiction.

JJ Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Company · filed 1974-01-28

Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) of a civil action in the state court to the civil side of the federal district court could not be effected because a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is not involved and the requisite amount is lacking for a diversity of citizenship case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A party cannot obtain, via the removal vehicle, federal jurisdiction over a claim of which the district court could not have taken original jurisdiction.

A common-law maritime claim does not arise under federal law within Section 1331 merely because federal maritime law supplies the substantive rule.

Eastern Steel & Metal Co. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. · filed 1974-05-17

The only possible way a common law maritime action could be brought originally in the federal court is under the diversity jurisdiction, which is not present here, or under an interpretation of the federal question jurisdiction whereby a common law maritime action (involving federal substantive law) was deemed to arise under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That interpretation was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company, 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959).

A general maritime-law claim does not arise under federal law within Section 1331, and Section 1331 jurisdiction based on the Jones Act depends on that Act's applicability to the facts.

Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp. · filed 1975-10-31

Whether jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 depends on the applicability to the facts of the Jones Act. The plaintiff’s general maritime law claim included in the complaint does not raise a federal question under § 1331 and at all events would be subject to the same choice of law criteria as is the Jones Act.

Jones Act claims arise under federal law within Section 1331, so a district court with sufficient United States contacts may not decline jurisdiction for forum non conveniens, unlike an admiralty claim under the Death on the High Seas Act.

Ying Shiue Jyu Fen v. Sanko Kisen (USA) Corp. · filed 1977-09-27

Jones Act actions are “Cases, in Law ., arising under . . . the Laws of the United States,” U.S.Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and thus are placed in the “federal question” category of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Once sufficient United States contacts are shown, the district courts cannot decline to exercise jurisdiction regardless of inconvenience. ... By contrast, Death on the High Seas Act actions do not arise under the “laws” of the United States but are specifically within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.

A Jones Act claim presents a federal question under Section 1331 only if the defendant is an employer under the Act and United States law applies under the governing choice-of-law analysis.

Papaioannoiu v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. · filed 1983-08-24

Cases arising under the statute indicate that courts have conducted a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether a claim brought pursuant to the Jones Act presents a “federal question” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. First, the Court should determine whether the defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 688, ... If the defendant is found to be an employer subject to the Act, the Court must then make an inquiry as to the choice of law applicable in the case at bar. If United States law would not be applied to the action, then the Jones Act does not apply and there exists no federal question jurisdiction.

A Jones Act claim is a federal claim within § 1331’s original jurisdiction even though Congress has made it nonremovable from state court.

Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Company · filed 1984-05-16

The Jones Act claim, however, is not removable, ... even though it is a federal claim for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), ... because Congress has explicitly prohibited removal of Jones Act claims.

A Jones Act claim may proceed under Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction even when admiralty jurisdiction is unavailable, with a related unseaworthiness claim heard pendent to it.

Petersen v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. · filed 1986-02-21

A suit under the Jones Act may be brought as a federal question case under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... Thus, we conclude that in the instant case the district court had subject matter jurisdiction of both the Jones Act claim and the unseaworthiness claim.

Section 1331 does not make a general maritime claim filed in state court under the savings-to-suitors clause removable.

Coody v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1986-03-03

It is settled that if one brings a maritime claim pursuant to § 1333, a defendant may not remove the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the ground that such a maritime claim “is a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” and, therefore, is an action over which a district court would have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A claim under § 905(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not automatically create § 1331 jurisdiction; federal jurisdiction depends on the nature of the underlying claim.

Curtis Michael Richendollar, Cross-Appellant v. Diamond M Drilling Company, Inc., Cross-Appellee, and Baker Marine Corpo · filed 1986-03-05

Accordingly, the presentation of a claim under § 905(b) does not automatically raise a federal question cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The nature of the underlying claim must be considered, for that claim determines whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331's general federal-question jurisdiction does not supply a basis to remove an in personam maritime action brought in state court under the saving-to-suitors clause.

Leonard v. Kern · filed 1986-12-31

In order to remove a case brought in state court under the saving to suitor’s clause some jurisdictional basis, other than admiralty or general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, must be demonstrated.

Section 1331 does not independently preserve jurisdiction over pendent general-maritime claims when a plaintiff elects the law side of federal court, does not invoke admiralty jurisdiction, and the Jones Act claim supporting jurisdiction is dismissed.

Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-04-08

Because Trentacosta specifically elected to file his suit on the “law side” of the court with jurisdiction premised solely on the Jones Act, the district court did not err when, upon dismissing the Jones Act claim against all defendants except Aero, it dismissed all remaining claims against those defendants.

Section 1331 does not preclude joining a Jones Act claim with general-maritime claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure.

Pearson v. Rowan Companies, Inc. · filed 1987-12-09

It is well-settled that neither the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1331 preclude the joinder of a Jones Act claim with one for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure under the General Maritime Law.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction requires a federal question on the face of the well-pleaded complaint; federal defenses, preemption, and an underlying maritime issue do not suffice, because admiralty and federal-question jurisdiction are distinct grants.

Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v. the Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel · filed 1988-07-15

It is axiomatic that for federal question jurisdiction to exist, the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. ... federal jurisdiction may not be founded upon a defense based on federal law, ... or because the cause of action raised in the complaint is preempted by federal law. ... to the extent JWI may be implying that admiralty jurisdiction is a subset of federal question jurisdiction, and therefore removal is appropriate because subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to ... U.S.C. section 1331, the Supreme Court rejected that argument long ago in ... Romero, supra. ... Accordingly, JWI’s contention that federal question jurisdiction exists because of the underlying admiralty action must fail.

Section 1331 does not treat in personam maritime claims as arising under federal law, so a saving-to-suitors action filed in state court cannot be removed absent diversity or another independent federal jurisdictional basis.

Queen Victoria Corp. v. Insurance Specialists of Hawaii, Inc. · filed 1988-08-25

As a necessary corollary of the saving to suitors clause, an ... in personam ... maritime claim brought in state courts may not be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 absent diversity or a federal question. ... Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., ... established that admiralty cases do not “arise under” the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. Although ... Romero ... addressed 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdiction statute, ... Plaintiffs in this action exercised their choice to bring a civil action in Hawaii state court, and defendant may not undermine that choice by removing the suit to federal court as an action arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.

General maritime claims do not arise under Section 1331, but Jones Act claims do; a Rule 9(h) complaint must invoke Section 1331 over the Jones Act claim to elect a jury trial.

Kathriner v. Unisea, Inc. · filed 1990-06-18

Further, while causes of action based upon the general maritime law are not federal questions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ... statutory maritime causes do present federal questions for which Congress may by statute specifically provide a right to trial by jury. ... However, the court in this case finds that plaintiff’s complaint, designated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h), fails to make the requisite election because it does not invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over plaintiff’s Jones Act claim.

A Death on the High Seas Act claim does not fall within Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction and, absent diversity or another basis, can be brought in federal court only under admiralty jurisdiction.

Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Caltex Petroleum, Inc., Caltex Petroleum Corporation, and Caltex Oil Corporatio · filed 1991-06-17

We so conclude because in federal court (and absent diversity of citizenship), a DOHSA claim can be brought only on the admiralty “side” of the docket.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over general admiralty or maritime common-law claims.

Pittman v. Port Allen Marine Services · filed 1992-05-01

General admiralty or maritime claims do not arise under federal law although such claims are cognizable in federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a claim arising solely under general maritime law.

Lewis v. United States · filed 1993-01-20

Maritime actions arising under the general maritime law are not claims that arise under the “Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States” for purposes of invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331... Romero’s holding that maritime claims are not encompassed within the “arising under” clause of § 1331 is equally applicable to the “arising under” clause of § 1441(b), the federal removal statute.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a Jones Act claim, while general maritime claims do not themselves arise under federal law for this purpose.

Nielsen v. Weeks Marine, Inc. · filed 1995-12-15

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case not only because of diversity of citizenship, but also because it arises under the Jones Act, a law of the United States. ... Plaintiffs other claims are not separate and independent and in any event do not “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (maritime claims are not “arising under” eases).

Section 1331 does not directly cover general maritime law claims, but a court may hear them alongside a properly pleaded Jones Act claim.

Sango v. Plovba · filed 1997-06-04

Claims under the general maritime law may not be brought directly under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but may be addressed by a district court “pendant to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act” in cases such as this where “the complaint also properly alleges a claim under the Jones Act.”

A general maritime law claim filed in state court does not arise under § 1331 or itself support removal, though another basis for original federal jurisdiction may permit removal.

Fields v. Pool Offshore Inc · filed 1999-08-02

While Fields’ general maritime law claim, brought in state court under the savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), is not one which “arise[s] under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and does not of itself furnish a basis for removal even though it could have been filed originally in federal court, nevertheless this does not preclude removal when there is some basis for original federal jurisdiction other than admiralty, such as diversity of citizenship or a statute.

Section 1331 does not treat a general maritime law claim brought under the savings to suitors clause as arising under federal law, so that claim alone does not support removal.

Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., Pool Company, Incorrectly Sued as Pool Offshore, Inc. · filed 2000-02-22

While Fields' general maritime law claim, brought in state court under the savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), is not one which "arisefs] under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and does not of itself furnish a basis for removal even though it could have been filed originally in federal court, nevertheless this does not preclude removal when there is some basis for original federal jurisdiction other than admiralty, such as diversity of citizenship or a statute.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over general maritime claims solely because they arise under maritime law.

Thomas-Sea Boat Builders, Inc. v. Cross Offshore Corp. · filed 2000-05-02

General maritime claims do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States for purposes of removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide original federal-question jurisdiction over general maritime claims.

Simms v. Roclan Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2001-04-04

General maritime claims do not “arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States” for purposes of original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a claim under the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act; the Act reaches only admiralty jurisdiction under Section 1333(1).

Auerbach v. Tow Boat U.S. · filed 2004-01-14

LOVOLA, even if applicable, would not allow removal of the action because its jurisdictional reach extends to that of admiralty jurisdiction under Section 1333(1) only, not Section 1331.

Section 1331 does not make a maritime claim brought in state court under the saving-to-suitors clause removable merely because admiralty law governs it; removal requires an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Seeger v. Superior Diesel, Inc. · filed 2005-12-21

Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that a claim brought in state court pursuant to the “saving to suitors” clause should not be removable on the ground of general federal question jurisdiction. ... Thus, without some independent basis for federal jurisdiction, this admiralty case is not properly removable, and therefore, the court grants Plaintiffs Motion to Remand.

Section 1331 does not treat admiralty and maritime claims as arising under federal law solely because they fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction.

Rafter v. Stevenson · filed 2010-01-28

Admiralty and maritime cases fall within a federal court’s original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), but they do not "aris[e] under” the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

Section 1331 requires a discrete federal question in the plaintiff’s complaint; admiralty jurisdiction alone does not supply one when a maritime claimant elects common law remedies in state court.

Kiesgen v. St. Clair Marine Salvage, Inc. · filed 2010-07-12

However, federal courts have jurisdiction over actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and such a case may be removed by the defendant if the complaint is based on federal law. ... Once the election to proceed under the common law occurred, admiralty jurisdiction was not a proper basis for removal. Rather, the defendant was required to show another independent ground for federal jurisdiction, that is, either a discrete federal question or diversity of citizenship. The defendant has shown neither.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over claims merely because they arise under general maritime law.

Coronel v. AK Victory · filed 2014-02-28

The mere fact that these claims implicate general maritime law does not establish federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

General admiralty and maritime claims do not themselves arise under federal law for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Pierce v. Parker Towing Co. · filed 2014-06-09

Federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is also not at play because, as further discussed herein, admiralty and maritime claims do not "arise under” the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States for purposes of § 1331.

General maritime claims within admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333 do not arise under federal law within the meaning of § 1331.

Bartel ex rel. Estate of Bishop v. Alcoa Steamship Co. · filed 2014-12-04

Plaintiffs action does not assert a claim that arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that maritime claims, for which federal courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, do not “arise under” the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

General maritime claims within admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333 do not arise under federal law for purposes of § 1331.

Bartel ex rel. Estate of Dennis v. American Export Isbrandtsen · filed 2014-12-04

Plaintiffs action does not assert a claim that arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that maritime claims, for which federal courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, do not “arise under” the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is distinct from maritime jurisdiction and cannot be invoked merely by citing the saving to suitors clause.

A.E.A. ex rel. Angelopoulos v. Volvo Penta of Americas, LLC · filed 2015-01-09

Thus, the mere reference of the saving to suitors clause in itself cannot invoke federal question jurisdiction when the clause preserves a plaintiff’s right to pursue maritime claims in state court.

General maritime and admiralty claims do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States and therefore do not supply federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Mims v. Deepwater Corrosion Services, Inc. · filed 2015-03-16

While federal courts have original jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty claims, such claims do not present a federal question because they do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

General maritime and admiralty claims alone do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States and therefore do not establish federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Waddell v. Edison Chouest Offshore · filed 2015-03-20

While federal courts have original jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty claims, such claims do not present a federal question because they do not “arise under” the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state common-law action seeking common-law remedies solely because it has a general maritime nature.

J.P. v. Connell · filed 2015-03-26

A review of the Complaint reveals this is a Florida common law action. There is no law cited in the Complaint that creates a federal cause of action. Moreover, a case with a general maritime nature requesting common law remedies does not provide a ground for federal jurisdiction. ... In light of the narrowly construed construction of federal question jurisdiction, the Court finds general federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over common law maritime claims.

Mitev ex rel. Miteva v. Resort Sports Ltd. · filed 2015-09-23

Further, Plaintiffs common law maritime claims do not arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Section 1331 alone does not provide a basis to remove a maritime action from state court.

New York Marine and General Insurance Company v. AGCS Marine Insurance Co. · filed 2020-04-07

Indeed, it is well-settled that § 1331 does not, in itself, provide a basis to remove maritime actions.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over general maritime claims solely because they arise under maritime law.

White v. Viera · filed 2021-07-15

Even if it were, federal question jurisdiction1 would still be lacking because general maritime claims do not “arise under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.” Armstrong v. Alabama Power Co., 667 F.2d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”).

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a civil action asserting only maritime unseaworthiness; federal jurisdiction over that action requires diversity.

Walker v. Dravo Corp. · filed 1962-11-02

The precise point decided in Romero was that there is no jurisdiction of such a case on the law side of the Court under the “federal question” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In the case of a federal court, however, there is no common law remedy available to enforce the maritime cause of action except where diversity jurisdiction exists.

Section 1331 does not treat a maritime claim alone as arising under federal law.

Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp. · filed 1993-11-08

Rather, maritime claims do not qualify for federal question removal simply because they are not claims “arising under” the laws of the United States.

Section 1331 does not provide federal question jurisdiction over a maritime claim brought under the saving to suitors clause merely because the plaintiff could also have asserted an OCSLA claim.

Fogleman v. Tidewater Barges, Inc. · filed 1990-08-22

Therefore, we must hold that when a plaintiff elects to proceed under the saving to suitors clause and he is able to plead facts sufficient to meet the Executive Jet test for admiralty jurisdiction, the mere fact that he may also have asserted a claim under OCSLA will not vest the court with federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide a basis to remove a general maritime claim filed in state court under the saving to suitors clause, even if the Admiralty Extension Act applies.

Benjamin v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America · filed 1992-06-30

The Fifth Circuit has consistently applied the general rule that, when a plaintiff exercises the option to bring an action in state court under the saving to suitors clause, rather than under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, defendants cannot" remove the case by asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because the Plaintiffs in this case chose to file their claims in state court, and Brown & Root did not allege diversity of citizenship as grounds for removal, remand is appropriate.

Section 1331 grants subject-matter jurisdiction but does not itself create a private right of action.

Cytline, LLC v. Public Utility District No. 2 · filed 2021-03-11

Nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “independently grant[]” us jurisdiction. Cytline conflates a private right of action with subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support jurisdiction when the sole asserted federal statutory cause of action had been repealed before the conduct giving rise to the suit.

De Arellano v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1985-12-12

Section 1374(b) of Title 49 has definitely been eliminated as of January 1, 1983. ... Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or under § 1331.

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction to determine whether federal law creates a cause of action even when the existence of that cause is seriously disputed.

Airco Industrial Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund · filed 1985-09-11

Although a serious question exists whether plaintiff has a cause of action under section 1103(c), this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for the purpose of determining whether plaintiffs cause of action exists.

Section 1331 does not support an Indian trust-responsibility claim without a particular, recognizable federal right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Donahue v. Butz · filed 1973-07-30

The only remaining source of District Court jurisdiction for the pending case is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, granting jurisdiction to District Courts in civil actions wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. ... In the pending case we find no comparable context of particular, recognizable rights of plaintiffs upon which to invoke the doctrine of trust responsibility.

Section 1331 covers Medicaid recipients' suit against state officials to enforce federally guaranteed access to fully paid medical services, even though the governing statute and regulation do not expressly create a civil remedy.

Yanez v. Jones · filed 1973-04-04

This is the evil which § 250.30(a)(6) was designed to avoid. Where this evil has allegedly occurred, a suit brought to enjoin its continuance is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. ... Inasmuch as jurisdiction is found to attach against the State under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it is not necessary to decide at this time whether jurisdiction also attaches under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1331 covers a claim for injuries caused by violating a duty imposed by the Federal Aviation Act, even when the Act does not expressly create the private remedy.

Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp. · filed 1972-10-12(a)

It is further concluded that a violation of a duty imposed by the Act creates a cause of action in favor of one who is injured or damaged by the death of a person resulting from such violation; and that this Court has jurisdiction of such actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

An alleged threat of environmental damage may satisfy Section 1331's jurisdictional requirements in a NEPA action.

Sierra Club v. Mason · filed 1972-10-31

The alleged threat of environmental damage would also seem sufficient to satisfy the- requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D.Conn. July 7, 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.Supp. 882 (W.D.Wis.1971).

A claim enforcing new federal substantive rights created by section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act arises under federal law for § 1331 purposes without requiring diversity.

Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, United Auto Workers, C.I.O. · filed 1952-03-17

Thus, a claim under Section 303 is plainly an action arising under the laws of the United States and cognizable in a Federal Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 without regard to diversity.

A complaint must affirmatively allege either a federal statute furnishing § 1331 jurisdiction or the facts necessary for diversity jurisdiction.

Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees · filed 1952-06-10

There being, then, no averment of jurisdiction with respect to defendant union, either on the basis of diversity or of a federal question, the complaint must be dismissed as to the union, unless there is an amendment correcting the defect.

A complaint challenging a collective-bargaining provision as unlawful under a federal statute presents federal jurisdiction to decide legality, unlike a complaint seeking only interpretation of the agreement.

Connors v. Boston & Maine Railroad · filed 1958-06-02

This is not like a case confessedly seeking a judgment declaring “the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement”. ... On the allegations of this complaint this Court must dismiss on the merits plaintiff’s prayer that this Court declare the invalidity of the contractual provision and of plaintiff’s discharge.

A wrongful-discharge claim for breach of a railway collective-bargaining agreement does not arise under § 1331 when no federal statute creates the cause of action or supplies the violated duty or right.

Duplisea v. Maine Central Railroad · filed 1958-10-31

Nor is there any allegation of a breach of a duty imposed or the violation of a right given by the Constitution, the Railway Labor Act, or any other federal statute. ... If such a federal cause of action had been created, presumably the federal district court would have had jurisdiction, either under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, or under the more general provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since more than $3,000 was involved. ... But counsel for appellant was unable to point to any provision of the Railway Labor Act creating such federal cause of action.

A railway employee's wrongful-discharge claim does not arise under § 1331 when the Railway Labor Act creates no judicial cause of action and relief, if any, must come from state law.

Bohannon v. Reading Company · filed 1958-12-18

As applied to the suit against Reading, the argument must fail. It seems well established that the Act does not provide an employee a right of action for wrongful discharge. ... In such circumstances recourse must be had to state law for possible relief; and in a proper case of diversity of citizenship, which is concededly lacking here, the Federal courts may take jurisdiction over such litigation.

Proceedings involving application of the Federal Arbitration Act do not independently furnish section 1331 jurisdiction.

Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co. · filed 1960-02-15

At the outset, it is settled in this Circuit that suits involving the application of the Arbitration Act do not furnish an independent basis of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A state wrongful-death claim does not arise under § 1331 merely because federal statutes and regulations supply standards that may need to be construed and applied in deciding the claim.

Moody v. McDaniel · filed 1960-12-12

Since these complaints do not present cases created by or arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the fact that federal law and regulations promulgated thereunder are plead by plaintiffs, and that it may be necessary to construe and apply those laws and regulations in the course of disposing of these cases on their merits, does not confer jurisdiction on this court to try these cases.

Sections 1331 and 1337 supply jurisdiction without diversity over a Railway Labor Act claim alleging that a bargaining representative discriminated against an employee.

Haley v. Childers · filed 1963-03-08

Like Cunningham, supra, 266 F.2d 411, 414, jurisdiction in such a discrimination action is based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, even without diversity.

Section 1331 supplies original jurisdiction over an action to determine arbitration obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement in an industry affecting commerce, making the action removable.

Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, United Steelworkers · filed 1964-04-24

since this is a civil action over which this Court would have had original jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331(a); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)), the action therefore was properly removed to this Court (28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b)); and ... Ordered that plaintiff’s motion to remand the action be, and the same hereby is, denied; and it is further ... Ordered that defendant Board’s motion to dismiss the action be, and the same hereby is, denied as moot.

Section 1331 supports jurisdiction over a ripe challenge to ongoing federal agency action when the claim requires interpretation and construction of a federal statute or alleges a fundamental denial of due process.

Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1964-09-02

Jurisdiction rests upon Section 10(e)-of the A.P.A. (5 U.S.C. § 1009), and the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337). ... Assuming that the denial of 6(b) reports was so violative of plaintiff’s rights as to constitute a fundamental denial of due process, the matter is presently ripe for judicial review. ... Clearly, the instant action falls within the ambit of both Leedom and Boire as one involving the interpretation and construction of a statute.

Section 1331(a) gives jurisdiction over a cause of action predicated on a federal statute, including a bank's challenge under the National Bank Act to the Comptroller's approval of a competing branch.

Bank of Sussex County v. Saxon · filed 1966-02-16(a)

This court has jurisdiction over the cause of action alleged in the complaint of Sussex Bank under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) because that cause of action is predicated upon the Federal Statute, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c).

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a claim that a union breached its federally imposed duty of fair representation through hostile discrimination.

Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1968-08-13

Here, the District Court, however, properly found that Mr. Brady had pleaded causes of action invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337. ... The jurisdiction of the District Court over the subject matter of this suit was well founded in view of the allegations in the complaint as amended of hostile discrimination and of violations of Mr. Brady’s rights under section 2 (Fourth) (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act.

Section 1331 may supply jurisdiction to grant relief for violations of federal constitutional and statutory provisions that contain no express civil remedy.

Flood v. Kuhn · filed 1970-03-04

Although none of these statutes expressly provide for a civil remedy, jurisdiction to grant relief for a violation of such provisions may be found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

Section 1331 grants subject-matter jurisdiction but does not itself create a cause of action.

Sullens v. Carroll · filed 1970-01-21

Sections 1331 and 1343 of Title 28, United States Code, are sections vesting the district court with original jurisdiction; provided, that a cause of action is stated by looking either to the Constitution of the United States or to other federal statutes. In other words, Sections 1331 and 1343 grant jurisdiction but do not establish a cause of action.

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over a constitutional involuntary-servitude claim even when the constitutional provision and its implementing statute do not expressly create a civil remedy.

Flood v. Kuhn · filed 1970-08-12

Although neither expressly provides for a civil remedy, jurisdiction to grant relief for a violation of such provision may be found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a claim that alleges no substantive right under federal law.

Moses v. Burgin · filed 1970-08-27

Insofar as plaintiff alleges that she was injured by a violation of fiduciary duties traced to the preamble of the Act, that is section 1 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 80a-l, she does not assert a substantive claim under the Act or under any of the laws of the United States. ... That aspect of her claims fails both on the merits and for want of jurisdiction under 15 U.S. C. sec. 80a-43, or 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331, or otherwise.

Section 1331 gives a court jurisdiction to decide a constitutional claim even when the complaint ultimately fails to state a cause of action under the Constitution.

City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority · filed 1971-01-19

While this court does have jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it alleges an action which arises under the Constitution, the complaint does not indeed state a cause of action under the Constitution.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when alleged post-purchase nondelivery of securities states only a state-law contract claim and no claim under federal securities law.

Fuller v. F. I. duPont, Glore, Forgan & Co. · filed 1971-06-28(a)

But plaintiff does not state any claim under the laws of the United States. ... The only claim that is stated by the original complaint is the claim of failure to deliver a security under § 400.8-314 RSMo, V.A. M.S., under Missouri state law; but no diversity of citizenship is stated to show federal diversity jurisdiction of this claim for relief based on state law. ... The plaintiff may sue for breach of contract under state law, but the same principles show no jurisdiction in the federal court.

Section 1331 requires an alleged violation of a federal right and does not confer jurisdiction over a state-law trust claim merely because determining that claim may require construing federal tax law.

Barlow v. Marriott Corp. · filed 1971-06-30(a)

But even assuming that determination in plaintiffs’ favor, plaintiffs cannot successfully assert federal jurisdiction under § 1331 or § 1340 without establishing a federal right which is alleged to have been violated— and no such right exists in plaintiffs’ favor in this case.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction when a primary issue in the case requires interpreting Acts of Congress.

Joseph M. Burke, as Stockholder of the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, Etc. v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Comp · filed 1972-09-12

Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the federal question statute). Since the primary issue, standing at the very inception of the alleged title to the strips of land in question, involves an interpretation of two Acts of Congress, both passed over a hundred years ago, we are of the opinion that the District Court did have jurisdiction, see 324 F.Supp. at 1128.

Section 1331(a) supplied jurisdiction over a claim under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act even without diversity or a related federal infringement claim.

Norman M. Morris Corporation v. Hyman Weinstein, D/B/A Bright Star Enterprise · filed 1972-08-14(a)

The intent of Congress in enacting § 1125(a), supra, dealing with false descriptions or representations of articles in commerce was clearly to fashion a new federal remedy against a particular kind of unfair competition that the common law had effectively protected, and under § 1125(a), supra, federal jurisdiction attached against any defendant who had allegedly, by word or deed, falsely represented his commodity (watches in the instant case) and had caused it to enter commerce and be transported in interstate commerce, even in the absence of diversity of citizenship ... or a related federal claim of infringement. ... We conclude the court had jurisdiction of the action under the provisions of § 1125(a), supra, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.

A claim arises under federal law for § 1331 when it seeks a remedy allegedly granted by federal law, and a court does not decide at the jurisdictional stage whether that asserted federal right exists.

Comprehensive Group Health Services Board Directors v. Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1973-08-08

We find that the Court is vested with jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The first requirement of that section is that the case “arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... It is clear beyond cavil that plaintiffs’ complaint seeks a remedy the source of which is the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964; hence the claim arises under federal law. Jurisdiction is conferred where plaintiffs allege a claim based on a right allegedly given by federal law. We cannot look to the merits of the existence of that right in deciding the jurisdictional issue.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over an OSHA damages claim when Congress did not create a private civil remedy under OSHA.

Russell v. Bartley · filed 1974-03-27

With respect to Bartley and Barton, there is no legislative history or case law to support appellant’s proposition that OSHA created a private civil remedy and the clear language of § 653(b)(4) of the Act specifically evidences a congressional intention to the contrary. Therefore, the District Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was eminently correct.

A plaintiff cannot invoke Section 1331(a) for an Indian Civil Rights Act equal-protection claim unless the asserted injury falls within the Act's protection.

Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota · filed 1974-08-08(a)

The plaintiffs in their complaint contend that the District Court has jurisdiction to determine their claims under 28 U.S. C. § 1343(4) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). However, before the plaintiffs may take advantage of either jurisdictional statute, it must be determined whether the equal protection clause in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) extends to the type of injury alleged by the plaintiffs. ... For the reasons given above this Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction of this action, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.

Section 1331 cannot bootstrap jurisdiction over a school district when every requested remedy depends on civil-rights statutes that provide no remedy against the district.

Weathers v. West Yuma County School District R-J-1 · filed 1974-12-12

Finally, plaintiff asks us to “bootstrap” our jurisdiction over the school district by application of the “federal question” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... remedy exists against the school district under these provisions, our assertion of federal question jurisdiction would be, at best, meaningless.

Section 1331(a) does not provide jurisdiction over a private damages action based on federal safety standards when the governing federal statute creates no implied private remedy.

Doak v. City of Claxton, Georgia · filed 1975-01-14(a)

The motion of the City of Claxton to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction over the subject matter is sustained and the municipality is ■ dismissed as a defendant in the three actions. ... If the Pipeline Safety Act does not permit a private remedy by implication in the instance of the City of Claxton, which owned and operated the local distribution system, it is even clearer that no federal jurisdiction under § 1331(a) exists as to co-defendants that manufactured the safety regulating device and regulator or installed the same.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over an action arising under the Railway Labor Act.

Japan Air Lines Co. v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers · filed 1975-02-19

This action arises under RLA § 2, First, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First. ... Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337.

Section 1331(a) supplies jurisdiction over a private federal cause of action when a federal right is an essential element, including an implied private action under the Rivers and Harbors Act.

Potomac River Ass'n v. Lundeberg Maryland Seamanship School, Inc. · filed 1975-04-11(a)

... U.S.C. § 1331(a) requires that a cause of action must be raised which “arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... Because, as found below, the Rivers and Harbors Act does support a cause of action by one private party against another under limited circumstances, jurisdiction exists under section 1331(a) whether the cause of action is regarded as having a general federal source, or whether an implied cause of action arises from the Rivers and Harbors Act.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a claim resting on a federal statute that merely waives sovereign immunity without creating the substantive right asserted.

Morrison v. Morrison · filed 1976-02-13

Consequently, this court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to section 1331 because 42 U.S.C. § 659 only removes the government’s immunity and does not create a right to garnishment under federal law.

A breach of a private association's rules does not arise under federal law for Section 1331 merely because the association is closely related to a federal agency.

Lange v. H. Hentz & Co. · filed 1976-09-09

I hold that a breach of NASD rules is simply a breach of a private association’s rules, although that association is one which is closely related to the SEC. This case, therefore, does not present a question which arises under the laws of the United States. Construing Section 1331 narrowly as I must, I find no remedy expressly granted by Congress for a breach of NASD rules, no claim which is based upon a direct construction of the SEA and no distinct policy of the SEA which requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim. I find instead a simple claim for the breach of a private association’s rules of fair trade.

Section 1331 does not confer arising-under jurisdiction when the federal statute invoked expressly creates no rights or liabilities for the plaintiff to enforce.

Boston v. United States · filed 1976-10-28

As stated above in reference to plaintiffs' claim of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since the Act in question denies plaintiffs any rights under the Act, this suit can not be one arising under the Act. ... Accordingly, the Court must conclude that jurisdiction is lacking over plaintiffs' claims of denials of property acquisition rights as enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 4651.

Section 1331(a) does not supply original or removal jurisdiction over a state-created garnishment claim when the federal statute invoked only waives sovereign immunity and creates no substantive right.

Williams v. Williams · filed 1976-12-27(a)

However, original jurisdiction does not exist, and therefore removal jurisdiction does not exist .under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) taken in combination with either § 1331(a) or § 1346(a)(2), because this case does not “arise under” 42 U.S.C. § 659 or any other provision of federal law, within the meaning of section 1331(a) and also is not “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department” as required by § 1346(a)(2).

Section 1331(a) does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when the federal statutes invoked create no federal right for the plaintiff.

Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. · filed 1977-06-08(a)

Since plaintiff’s complaint does not show that she has a federal right under § 793 or § 794, neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), (federal question) nor § 1343(4) (federal civil right) confers federal court jurisdiction.

Section 1331(a) requires a federal right or immunity to be an essential element of the claim and does not confer jurisdiction when the invoked federal statute creates no right or remedy for the plaintiff.

Newton v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. · filed 1977-08-18(a)

A right or immunity created by Federal law must be an essential element of the claim in order to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite under this section. ... As hereinabove stated, federal question jurisdiction may not be exercised where no remedy exists under the statute forming the basis of the claim.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction to interpret the Northwest Ordinance because its reenactment by the First Congress made it federal statutory law.

Swimming Turtle v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS. OF MIAMI CTY. · filed 1977-08-25

Neither is this Court bound by the interpretation of Article III placed on it by the Appellate Court of Indiana in 1901 since there is an independent basis for this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C., Sections 1331, 1337, 1343, 1353, and 25 U.S.C. § 345. The Northwest Ordinance is a part of the basic organic law of The United States of America enacted by a national legislative body before the existence of The Constitution of the United States. The Northwest Ordinance was reenacted by the First Congress of the United States and is therefore a part of the federal statutory law which this Court has jurisdiction to interpret.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction to interpret the Northwest Ordinance because Congress reenacted it and thereby made it part of federal statutory law.

Swimming Turtle v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1977-08-25

Neither is this Court bound by the interpretation of Article III placed on it by the Appellate Court of Indiana in 1901 since there is an independent basis for this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C., Sections 1331, 1337, 1343, 1353, and 25 U.S.C. § 345. ... The Northwest Ordinance was reenacted by the First Congress of the United States and is therefore a part of the federal statutory law which this Court has jurisdiction to interpret.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction for a Longshoremen’s Act theory when the invoked provision merely preserves an action against a vessel and creates no independent cause of action.

Heim v. City of New York · filed 1977-12-02

Plaintiff also contends that he has a claim under § 905(b) of the Federal Longshoremen’s Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 ff, and that there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, giving jurisdiction where the matter arises under the “laws” of the United States. But ... § 905(b) is of no aid to plaintiff. It simply makes clear that the Compensation Act does not bar an action against a “vessel” which “caused” the injury. It does not create any independent cause of action.

Section 1331 provides an independent basis for jurisdiction over a federal agency's crossclaim arising under the Home Owners' Loan Act.

Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Associations v. Stein · filed 1979-11-02

This Court has both ancillary and independent jurisdiction over the Cross-claim herein under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, 28 U.S.C. Section 1337 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1345. The Bank Board is authorized to prosecute its Cross-claim herein under Section 5(d)(1) of HOLA.

Section 1331(a) provides jurisdiction over a civil damages action implied from federal criminal statutes protecting airline passengers from assault.

Chumney v. Nixon · filed 1980-01-24(a)

Are plaintiffs entitled to a civil cause of action for damages against defendants which is derived from the federal criminal statutes described above and over which the federal courts would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)? ... Although it is certainly a close question, we disagree. ... It seems to this court to be an appropriate step under the legal doctrines which we have outlined above to approve a civil cause of action for damages derived from criminal statutes which plaintiffs alleged were violated in this case.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a federal civil-rights action enforcing tenants’ rights under federal public-housing law.

Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1990-12-03

This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Federal Question jurisdiction. ... This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief because Plaintiffs have an enforceable right, under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(i)(l), to require the RRHA to “utilize leases which do not contain unreasonable terms.”

When a claim rests on a federal statute, § 1331 jurisdiction requires that statute to supply a right of action in federal court.

Williams v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2007-08-31

However, this general federal-question jurisdiction statute is applicable only when the plaintiff sues under a federal statute that creates a right of action in federal court.

Section 1331 does not create an independent right of action.

McGrady v. United States Postal Service · filed 2008-08-14

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the district court’s jurisdiction can be upheld ... question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, neither of those statutes creates an independent right of action that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a claim based on a criminal statute that provides no private right of action.

Zaza v. OK Bureau of VA · filed 2023-01-26

Thus, the criminal statute does not confer federal-question jurisdiction for this lawsuit.

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction when a complaint asserts a cause of action under federal law; whether that law provides a private right of action is a separate question.

Saul v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2024-05-31

As to the first issue -- jurisdiction -- the Court concludes that the Sauls properly have invoked the Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action under federal law, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. ... Whether this statute contains a private right of action is not a jurisdictional question.

Federal-question jurisdiction may rest on a federal criminal statute that provides a private right of action; citing one without such a right generally does not suffice.

Romanov v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2025-05-21

The citation of a law that criminalizes certain behavior without also providing for a private right of action against the perpetrator of the crime generally does not suffice to establish jurisdiction in a federal civil action. ... Accordingly, for purposes of this preliminary jurisdictional analysis, the court finds that federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is properly invoked.

Section 1331 requires a plaintiff to plead a basis for a private federal action to establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Boone v. Dixon · filed 2025-10-09

Mr. Boone offers no statutory basis for pursing a private right of action in federal court against the defendants, as required for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not establish federal-question jurisdiction when a complaint identifies no statutory basis for a private right of action.

Boone v. Close Circuit Television · filed 2025-10-09

Mr. Boone offers no statutory basis for pursing a private right of action in federal court against the defendants, as required for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 requires the plaintiff to identify a basis for a private federal right of action to establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Boone v. General Mills · filed 2025-10-09

Mr. Boone offers no statutory basis for pursing a private right of action in federal court against the defendants, as required for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 requires a complaint to present a federal question; allegations without a statutory basis for a federal claim do not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Boone v. Amazon · filed 2025-10-10

Mr. Boone offers no statutory basis for pursuing a private right of action in federal court against the defendants, as required for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the cited federal criminal statute creates no private right of action.

Skipwith · filed 2026-01-14

The criminal statute cited here does not create a private right of action. ... As such, the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 1331 gives a court original jurisdiction over a claim alleging a violation of federal law even if the claim later fails because that law provides no private cause of action.

D'Amico · filed 2026-04-10

Therefore, Count II raises a federal question, giving the Court original jurisdiction over it. ... As explained therein, neither § 873 nor § 1951 provide a private cause of action for a private individual to recover civil damages.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a claim for relief from concrete and immediate governmental action that arguably interferes with federal rights.

Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans · filed 1984-10-04

Because Cox sought relief from concrete and immediate governmental action which arguably interfered with its federal rights in No. 84-3743, this Court has jurisdiction over that action.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction to decide whether a federal statute creates a private right of action; the absence of that right supports dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Chenkin v. 808 Columbus LLC · filed 2010-03-02

Although the district court, concluding that the Housing Act of 1949 does not provide a private right of action, dismissed the complaint both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, we affirm on the latter ground. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1946) (where the complaint “is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States,” the district court must entertain the suit unless the federal claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous”); Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (the question of whether a private right of action can be implied from a federal statute is itself a sufficient federal question to meet the modest requirements for subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Schwartz v. Gordon, 761 F.2d 864, 867 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissal for inapplicability of federal statute to the facts alleged is more aptly termed one for failure to state a claim than one for lack of jurisdiction if question presented was nonfrivolous).

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction to determine whether a federal statute implies a private cause of action even when the statute contains no express jurisdictional grant.

Award Service, Inc. v. Northern California Retail Clerks Unions and Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, a Trust Fun · filed 1985-06-19

Having concluded that there is jurisdiction under either 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we must next decide whether a right of action exists under section 403(c)(2)(A) of ERISA in favor of an employer for the return of contributions mistakenly paid to Pension Trust.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim when the underlying statute creates no cause of action for the relief sought.

Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Service, Inc. · filed 1973-09-11

The plaintiff relies for jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337. She relies on 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) as the basis of her action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives the United States District Court jurisdiction over matters arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 gives jurisdiction over matters arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce. But the fact remains that the statute which the plaintiff in this case relies on for her cause of action simply gives this Court no jurisdiction over such a claim.

A claim arises under federal law for Section 1331 when it depends on the construction of a federal statute, even if that statute does not expressly provide a private right of action.

National Ass'n for Community Development v. Hodgson · filed 1973-03-30

The principle seems well established that a district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (1970), where plaintiffs’ claims will be sustained if a statute of the United States is given one construction, and the claim defeated if it is given another construction. ... The only exception to this rule is the instance where the claims alleged under federal law are frivolous or immaterial, asserted solely for the purpose of gaining jurisdiction. ... Thus, suits brought to enforce federal statutory rights do “arise under” federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction even though the federal statute at issue may not explicitly provide a private right of action.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a passenger’s Safety Appliance Acts injury claim when federal law creates no private damages action and any liability instead arises under state law.

Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. · filed 1953-07-14

This all goes to reinforce our conclusion that the subject matter of the cause of action stated in the amended complaint was not within the jurisdiction of the court below under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It was not a civil action arising “under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”

A contract claim does not arise under federal law for § 1331 merely because federal policy informs the agreement when Congress created no private federal remedy.

Mcfaddin Express, Incorporated v. The Adley Corporation · filed 1966-10-17

Although, as recognized in our prior opinion, there is doubtless a federal policy “that a carrier authorized to exercise temporary control will use this permission in accordance with its agreement, so as to enable the controlled carrier to resume independent operation if approval under § 5 is ultimately denied,” 346 F.2d at 426, the infusing of the agreement with this policy is not enough, standing alone, to cause an action for breach of the contract to constitute a federal claim.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction for a damages claim when the federal statute invoked creates no private damages action.

Huftstetler v. Davies · filed 1970-01-23

It is also clear that jurisdiction cannot exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... it does not create a private cause of action for damages from one who has violated the Act.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a claim alleging violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act even though the claim fails on the merits because that Act creates no private right of action.

Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co. · filed 1971-01-29

The sixth claim avers that defendants, by conduct substantially as charged in the first five claims, have engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45). There appears to be federal question jurisdiction of this claim (28 U.S.C. § 1331). ... This claim is plainly without merit because there is no private action for damages under the “antitrust laws” for violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. ... There is no private right of action under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

A federal statute that creates no private right of action provides no basis for federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

State of Florida Ex Rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 1971-04-29

Since there is no private right of action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Florida’s First Amended Complaint furnished no basis for the exercise of this Court’s federal question jurisdiction under either Section 1331 or 1337.

A complaint alleging violation of a federal statute may invoke Section 1331 jurisdiction even though the claim is later dismissed on the merits because that statute creates no private civil action.

Oldham v. Oldham · filed 1972-02-08

Plaintiff’s Complaint is sufficient to invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Thus, it is the view of the court that if a private civil cause of action were intended for Subchapter II, Congress would have made a specific provision therefor. ... Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

An executive order issued without statutory lawmaking authority and contemplating only administrative enforcement does not create a private right enforceable under § 1331(a).

Stevens v. Carey · filed 1973-08-08(a)

Thus, the very documents that granted plaintiff her union rights, irrespective of their status as “laws of the United States,” did not suggest that union members might vindicate those rights by private suits in the federal courts. To the contrary, they contemplated an administrative remedy, withdrawal of recognition. ... Congress has not granted the federal courts jurisdiction over such matters, ánd we have no authority to fashion our own subject matter jurisdiction here.