28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over claims for refunds of Standard Flood Insurance Policy premiums.

Board of Directors of Rough Riders Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Signature Group, LLC · filed 2013-12-20

The Court agrees that federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 exists over plaintiffs’ claims for a refund of SFIP premiums.

Section 1331 grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits concerning policies issued under the National Flood Insurance Program.

M & K Restaurant LLC v. Farmers Insurance · filed 2014-07-08

The Court is thus satisfied that it has jurisdiction over the instant case concerning a policy issued under the NFIP pursuant to § 1331 and can proceed to the merits of the case.

Section 1331 confers federal-question jurisdiction over a claim for breach of a Standard Flood Insurance Policy against a Write Your Own insurer, but not over state-law claims against an insurance broker whose agreement is governed by state law.

Long Beach Road Holdings, LLC v. Foremost Insurance · filed 2015-02-11

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the Plaintiffs breach of contract claim as against Foremost, the WYO insurer. However, the Plaintiffs claims against Fairmont, at issue in the present motion, do not raise a federal question because Fairmont is an insurance broker, not a WNO insurance carrier. Thus, the alleged broker agreement between Fairmont and the Plaintiff will not be governed by FEMA regulations or federal regulations. Rather, as described below, the broker agreement will be governed by New York law. Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges solely common law and New York state law claims against Fairmont.

Section 1331 confers federal-question jurisdiction over a suit alleging mishandling of a claim under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy.

Felix v. Service Insurance Company · filed 2020-08-28

Not only does this case raise a federal question because it involves the alleged mishandling of plaintiffs’ insurance claim under a SFIP, see Battle v. Seibels Bruce Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 596, 607–08 (4th Cir. 2002), but plaintiffs’ theory that they may assert a fraud claim under North Carolina law is expressly preempted. ... Plaintiffs’ argument is meritless, where subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 42 U.S.C. § 4072 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A petition for judicial review can qualify as an action under § 1331.

Credit Union Group Enterprises LLC v. Kansas Department of Credit Unions · filed 2006-09-27

The plaintiff unpersuasively argues that a petition for judicial review does not qualify as either an “action” under § 1331 or an “action, suit or proceeding” under § 1789(a)(2).

Section 1331 provides subject matter jurisdiction over APA actions seeking judicial review of agency action.

Shaaban v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services · filed 2022-01-27

But, as Shaaban argues, this has no impact on this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Shaaban’s claims, as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides for subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to the APA for judicial review of an agency’s action. See Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2014).

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over claims seeking judicial review of agency decisions under the APA.

Saltzman · filed 2026-03-26

Both this Court and the Ninth Circuit have expressly stated that a court has federal question jurisdiction over claims invoking judicial review via the APA. ... The Court thus finds Defendants’ argument is without merit and is satisfied it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim.

Federal-question jurisdiction does not arise merely because one party is a federally-chartered bank.

Jatoi v. Guaranty Federal · filed 2000-05-24

The parties are not diverse, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1348, and Jatoi’s complaint suggested he was seeking to invoke federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, federal-question jurisdiction is not triggered merely because one of the parties is a federally-chartered bank.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a defendant bank has a federal origin.

Hays v. First National Bank · filed 1984-03-26

Assuming the truth of those factual premises, I still deny the legal conclusion that this court has jurisdiction. The federal origin of a national bank is not a ground for asserting the right to sue in federal court.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of customary international law incorporated into federal common law.

Bodner v. Paribas · filed 2000-08-31

Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims involving violations of customary international law. ... Thus, the Court finds that federal question jurisdiction exists over the Bodner complaint.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over claims arising under customary international law when the presumption against extraterritoriality precludes jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.

Jovic v. L-3 Services, Inc. · filed 2014-09-24

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot assert jurisdiction under Section 1331 or CAFA for claims arising under customary international law, where the presumption against extraterritoriality precludes jurisdiction under the ATS.

Section 1331 does not supply original jurisdiction when a party merely removes a state administrative proceeding without filing a separate federal civil rights action.

Franklin v. State of Louisiana · filed 2001-01-09

Franklin also incorrectly asserts that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 provide the district court with original jurisdiction over his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that the district court “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” ... However, Franklin has not filed a separate federal civil rights claim; he has tried removed a state administrative proceeding.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction for removal of a state misdemeanor summons or ticket.

(PS) State of California v. El · filed 2019-09-27

The basic federal jurisdiction statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, which confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. ... Here, it appears that defendant is attempting to remove a “Summons/Ticket” related to a Sacramento County Superior Court misdemeanor case. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Such an action would not present a federal question.

Section 1331 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over federal-question civil actions and does not govern jurisdiction in state criminal proceedings.

Jersey: Osorio v. Gallo · filed 2020-03-31

In any event, subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s state criminal conviction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a claim that defendants lacked standing to commence a state foreclosure proceeding.

Smith v. US Bank National Association Mastr Asset Securities Trust 2006-WMC2 · filed 2022-07-11

Thus, the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over his claim that Defendants lacked standing to commence a foreclosure proceeding in state court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a claim that defendants lacked standing to begin a state-court foreclosure proceeding.

Smith v. US Bank National Association Mastr Asset Securities Trust 2006-WMC2 · filed 2022-07-22

Thus, the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over his claim that Defendants lacked standing to commence a foreclosure proceeding in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not give a federal court jurisdiction to combine a federal civil action with a state criminal matter.

Watkins v. Cowlitz County Diking Service · filed 2024-06-28

This Court has no legal authority or jurisdiction to combine this civil action with a state criminal matter. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over federal claims without requiring a plaintiff to first satisfy a state medical-review-panel requirement.

Villegas v. Hancock Regional Hospital · filed 2024-10-23

Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendant under a federal law pursuant to this Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendant may not use the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to bar Plaintiff’s federal claims under federal law.

Section 1331 grants district courts original federal-question jurisdiction; the Rooker-Feldman limit on that jurisdiction requires at least one final state-court judgment before it bars federal review.

Avoyelles Pblsh Co v. Ieyoub · filed 2001-02-13

This doctrine also arises from the negative inference in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes that a district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993). ... Therefore, under this analysis, at a minimum there must be some state court final judgment before the Rooker-Feldman doctrine properly precludes federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not bar federal district court review of state administrative agency action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Southern California Edison Co. v. Lynch · filed 2002-09-23

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the actions of the Commission because it is a state administrative agency, not a court.

Section 1331’s grant of original jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when a district court reviews the action of a state administrative agency rather than a state court judgment.

Southern California Edison Company v. Lynch · filed 2002-09-23

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the actions of the Commission because it is a state administrative agency, not a court.

Section 1331 does not authorize federal district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments; the Rooker-Feldman bar requires a final state court judgment.

Farrell v. Decew (In Re Farrell) · filed 2003-04-17

It is well settled by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that the grant of original jurisdiction to district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and by extension to bankruptcy courts, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), “does not authorize district [or bankruptcy] courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over [final] state court judgments.” ... Thus, there is no final state court judgment, and Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable.

The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional limit associated with § 1331 does not prevent a district court from confirming an arbitration award when confirmation does not review or undermine a prior state court order.

G.C. And K.B. Investments, Inc., a Louisiana Corporation v. Stuart Wilson Irene Wilson · filed 2003-04-23

The doctrine is not constitutionally based, but “arises out of a pair of negative inferences drawn from two statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes the district court’s original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; and 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which allows Supreme Court review of final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” ... Rooker-Feldman does not apply here. ... There was no prohibited review of the Hawaii state court order and no collateral attack on any such judgment. The district court properly had jurisdiction to issue the order confirming the arbitration award.

Section 1331 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction over a suit seeking relief from an allegedly erroneous state-court judgment, but related litigation against an adverse party is not barred merely because it overlaps with a state-court suit.

Noel v. Brian C. Hall Sandra A. Hall, Fka Sandra Johnson, and Gabrielle S. Lennartz Herb Weisser Michelle A. Mercha · filed 2003-09-02

We believe that the following general formulation describes the distinctive role of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in our federal system: If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction, which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not withdraw for review of an unreviewed state administrative decision that is legislative rather than judicial.

Mitchell v. Fishbein · filed 2004-08-03

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that Congress's grant to federal district courts of jurisdiction to entertain suits raising federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to th[e United States Supreme] Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)." Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (" Verizon Maryland ") (emphasis added). ... In the present case, we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable both because the Screening Committee, in compiling a list of qualified attorneys, acts as an administrative body, rather than conducting proceedings that are judicial, and because its denial of Mitchell's application for recertification to the 18-B Panel was a decision that was not judicial but legislative.

Section 1331 permits federal district courts to review unreviewed state administrative decisions raising federal questions because the Rooker-Feldman limit applies to state-court judgments.

Mitchell v. Fishbein · filed 2004-08-03

While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that the federal district courts may not review decisions by a state’s courts, it does not preclude federal district court review of “executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.”

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over an independent federal claim based on an injury that existed before a state-court judgment; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar that claim.

McKithen v. Richard Brown, District Attorney, County of Queens, New York · filed 2007-03-13

But, given that McKithen in federal court seeks redress for an injury that existed in its exact form prior to the state-court judgment, he cannot be complaining of an injury “caused by” the state court.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction but does not authorize district courts to review and reverse state-court judgments.

Ajjahnon v. New Jersey · filed 2007-04-23

While a review of these state court decisions may possibly be had in the Supreme Court, review may not be had under the guise of a § 1983 complaint filed in federal district court. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n.3 (2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see [28 U.S.C.] § 1257(a).”); see also Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992).

Section 1331 permits an independent federal claim when the alleged injury was caused by defendants’ conduct rather than a state-court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar jurisdiction.

Ezagui v. City of New York · filed 2010-06-24

Here, Plaintiff does not complain of an injury caused by a state court judgment; instead, he complains of an injury caused by Defendants’ failure to give him notice of his due process rights related to the seizure and retention of his vehicle. ... Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not applicable and does not bar Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over independent federal claims for damages related to an earlier state-court judgment when those claims do not seek review or reversal of that judgment.

Miller v. Countrywide Home Loans · filed 2010-09-30

Rather, Plaintiff is seeking money damages, and although he may claim in part based on such errors and deficiencies in the state-court proceedings (which Rooker-Feldman renders beyond the jurisdiction of this Court), his Amended Complaint also makes related, but clearly separate, claims based on alleged violations of federal and state law over which this Court does have jurisdiction unaffected by the earlier foreclosure judgment in state court proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore does not operate to deprive this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 gives district courts original federal-question jurisdiction but does not authorize appellate review of state court judgments.

Gage v. Warren Township Committee & Planning Board Members · filed 2012-03-02

Parties who wish to challenge a state court judgment may ultimately seek relief from the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, but the original jurisdiction vested in the Federal district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not extend to appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over lawsuits seeking to reverse or modify final state-court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Arroyo v. FDIC · filed 2013-08-16

Subject-matter jurisdiction is properly-invoked when a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States is pled. ... Those determinations are prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which states that a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits that seek to reverse or modify state-court judgments.

Section 1331 ordinarily grants jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims, subject to the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch · filed 2013-09-19

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1331 usually vests federal courts with jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an exception that applies to preclude jurisdiction.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction but does not authorize federal district courts to review and reverse final state-court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Houston v. Queen · filed 2014-03-25

The Houston Brothers’ decision to frame their fraud claim as a civil rights action for injuries arising from a state court’s judgment does not confer this Court with the jurisdiction necessary to review and invalidate the Judgment of Possession.

Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal-question jurisdiction over a challenge to an interlocutory state-court decision when the state proceedings have not ended.

William Penn Apartments, L.P. v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals · filed 2014-04-14

Because state proceedings had not ended, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine presents no bar to WPA’s having filed suit.

Federal-question jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the plaintiff did not lose in state court.

Clavin v. County of Orange · filed 2014-08-04

Here, plaintiff did not lose in state court and, therefore, the first of the four requirements has not been met.

Federal-question jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the alleged injuries arise from a defendant’s independent actions rather than state-court judgments.

Howe v. Litwack · filed 2014-08-26

Here, even assuming that Howe “lost” in state court, it appears that the injuries she complains of were not caused by state-court judgments but, rather, by Litwack’s independent actions, which – to the extent they allegedly went beyond the scope of his authority – were not compelled by any state-court judgment. Therefore, the District Court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over an independent federal claim challenging executive action despite prior state-court decisions on related questions, because Rooker-Feldman bars review of state-court judgments.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-09-12

Put another way, the “doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see [28 U.S.C.] § 1257(a).” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). ... As in Exxon and Skinner, Singletary’s suit does not seek to “review” or “undo” any D.C.-court decision. Rather, his § 1983 claim seeks review of a decision made by the Board of Parole—“an executive entity,” not a court. Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 92. Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.” Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 644 n.3. The fact that the D.C. courts have ruled on habeas petitions related to (but ultimately different than) Singletary’s current § 1983 claim is of no consequence for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 1331’s Rooker-Feldman limitation does not bar a diversity action involving no federal question within the scope of § 1257(a).

Darling's v. Chrysler Group, LLC · filed 2014-10-30

Accordingly, the federal question statute should not be read to allow federal district courts to review “final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings” which could instead proceed through the state appellate courts and then be brought to the United States Supreme Court. ... Among other distinctions, Case 208 involves no federal question within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore has no logical application here.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over claims seeking damages for injuries caused by a state-court judgment when resolving them would require reviewing and rejecting that judgment.

Alroy v. City of New York Law Department · filed 2014-11-24

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that Congress did “not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments” when it defined the district courts’ original subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... As explained above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the State Court’s decision under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Section 1331 grants district courts original jurisdiction and generally excludes appellate review of state-court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Crossdale v. Crossdale · filed 2015-02-03

Section 1331 provides that district courts are courts of “original jurisdiction.” They thus generally lack appellate jurisdiction, including appellate jurisdiction over state courts.

Federal-question jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when claims challenge the fraudulent conduct used to obtain state-court judgments and are independent of those judgments rather than seeking to overturn them.

Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Associates LLC · filed 2015-02-10

The district court concluded, at the motion to dismiss stage, that “plaintiffs assert claims independent of the state-court judgments and do not seek to overturn them.” Sykes I, 757 F.Supp.2d at 429. We agree.

Section 1331 does not permit review and reversal of a final state-court judgment under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine merely because the claims allege fraud or due-process violations.

Houston v. Venneta Queen · filed 2015-03-12

Although they assert claims of harm ostensibly separate from the judgment of possession—e.g., fraud and violation of due process—they seek only declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the state-court judgment, not damages from these purportedly independent wrongs. ... Absent an exception, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies to deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is barred by Rooker-Feldman when the claimed injuries arise from state court judgments allegedly procured by fraud and the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise their claims in state court.

Sanders v. JGWPT Holdings, Inc. · filed 2015-03-05

There is no “extra-judicial” injury or “pre-litigation fraud”: the fraud was the judicial transaction itself. For this Court to make a finding on that fraud would undermine the state court judgments approving the transfers. ... Therefore this Court will follow its fellow district court judges in finding that Rooker-Feldman prohibits its review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district court appellate review of state-court judgments but does not bar judicial review of state agency decisions.

Wong v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2016-04-19

We also reject the Department of Human Services’s argument that the district court lacked authority to exercise jurisdiction because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred review of the state agency decision. See D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). As the Court explained in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see § 1257(a). The doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency. 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the doctrine does not apply.

Section 1331 gives district courts original federal-question jurisdiction but does not authorize appellate review of state court judgments; the Rooker-Feldman limit does not bar claims for injuries caused by a defendant rather than by a state court judgment.

Lannan v. Levy & White · filed 2016-05-11

That doctrine recognizes that federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction and precludes a United States District court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, which Congress has reserved to the Supreme Court. ... Again, Plaintiffs allege an injury that White caused through his deceptive debt collection acts; they do not seek to attack or vacate the small claims court judgments.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction but does not permit a federal district court to review and reject a state-court judgment.

Tabia v. Dekeon · filed 2019-06-24

“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over ... state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see § 1257(a).” ... Here, Tabia explicitly asks this Court to review and reject the judgments of the state court. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks jurisdiction to do so.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is limited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when a federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state-court judgment.

Greenlee v. Rettich · filed 2020-03-23

An important limitation on jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and indeed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdiction statute, is the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine, when a claim asserted in a federal proceeding is inextricably intertwined with a judgment entered in a state court, the district courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter; it must be brought into the federal system by petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1331 does not give a federal district court jurisdiction to review final state court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Hines v. Wilmington Saving Fund Society FSB · filed 2020-05-20

Plaintiffs are thus barred from trying to appeal the Foreclosure Action by pursuing these claims before this Court.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction but does not authorize district courts to review and reject state-court judgments.

Gribbin v. N.Y. State Unified Court Sys. · filed 2021-03-09

“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments,” a power reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court. ... There is no way to grant Gribbin’s reasonable accommodation request without reviewing and rejecting the divorce judgment, and the District Court did not have power to do so.

Section 1331 permits original jurisdiction over an independent federal claim arising from conduct during execution of a state-court judgment, even when the state court denied a remedy for the same alleged injury.

Tang v. Grossman · filed 2021-03-22

While Rooker-Feldman precludes review of state-court judgments themselves, it does not preclude independent review of an alleged violation for which the state court denied a remedy. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the present action presents an independent federal claim against Defendant Grossman that averts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.

Section 1331 grants district courts original jurisdiction but does not authorize appellate review of state-court judgments.

Strauss v. Dwyer · filed 2021-08-17

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, a role which Congress has reserved to [the Supreme Court].” ... Here, because, as stated above, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint challenges the Oneida County Court’s decision on plaintiffs N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 440.10 motion, his claims are precluded by the limitation on this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction but does not authorize district courts to review state-court judgments as appellate courts.

Barlow v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2022-03-30

The doctrine “recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments,” with such jurisdiction reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court. ... Because the four Rooker-Feldman factors are met in this case, the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction over federal questions; it does not authorize district courts to review state-court judgments, but independent federal claims may proceed.

Place v. Anderson · filed 2022-05-10

Put simply, the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to [the Supreme] Court.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). ... Here, Plaintiffs do not seek review and rejection of the state juvenile court’s order transferring Angel to White and Bond nor do they assert that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment. ... We accordingly reject Defendants’ assertion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits the claims in this case and proceed to the merits.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a § 925A claim that does not seek to undo a state court judgment; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar that jurisdiction.

Brush v. United States · filed 2023-01-24

The Court confirms its ruling of October 26, 2022, that the principle of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine does not apply to limit this Court’s federal question subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331. This is because Congress specifically granted this Court authority in 18 U.S.C. § 925A to consider plaintiff’s claim and because this Court’s judgment on the matter will not in any way affect the existence of plaintiff’s state court conviction judgment.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction to review state-court judgments or claims inextricably intertwined with them.

Bank of America National Association v. Giehl · filed 2023-02-23

The Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over these inextricably intertwined claims.

Section 1331 does not authorize district courts to hear appeals from state-court judgments; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar an independent claim that does not seek review of such a judgment.

Herskovic v. Verizon Wireless · filed 2023-04-03

The Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine recognizes that Congress did “not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments” when it defined the district courts’ original subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... As discussed previously, see supra section I, the instant action concerns Defendant’s attempt to collect the termination fee pursuant to the Customer Agreement—it is not a review of the judgment Plaintiff obtained in small claims court. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction but does not permit a district court to review and overturn a final state-court judgment.

Almanzar v. ZAM Realty Management Co., LLC · filed 2023-12-05

To the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn such a final order or judgment issued by the Appellate Division in 2009, just as determined by Judge Cote in Almanzar I, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires the dismissal of those claims. Under this doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment where a litigant seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn such a final state court order or judgment.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction and helps bar lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

James Olivette Ezell · filed 2024-04-01

The doctrine has two statutory bases: (1) 28 U.S.C. §1257, which limits federal review of state court proceedings to the United States Supreme Court, and (2) 28 U.S.C. §1331, which provides that federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction. ... As the Superior Court has already held that PennyMac’s mortgage is valid, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to re-adjudicate matters related to Ezell’s contest of PennyMac’s mortgage.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction but does not permit a district court to review and nullify state-court judgments.

DEECK v. SINGER · filed 2024-08-20

Nor is this the proper court to seek to nullify the outcome of the New Jersey Superior Court’s foreclosure action. For those reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and this Court must dismiss this case in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction, but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits that jurisdiction when a plaintiff seeks review of a state-court judgment.

COUNTS v. STATE OF MAINE · filed 2025-03-11

While Mr. Counts is correct that federal question jurisdiction can provide a federal court with subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute, he misunderstands that this jurisdiction is not limitless, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is one such limit.

Section 1331 grants original federal-question jurisdiction; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a claim that seeks no redress for a legal wrong committed by a state court.

Al-Farouk v. Nelson · filed 2025-04-17

Therefore, because Al-Farouk is not seeking redress for a “legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court” as to this remaining issue, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to review a state court’s decision for alleged constitutional error.

WILSON v. WILSON · filed 2025-04-23

First, Defendant asserts the Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But, as this Court previously explained to Defendant in another case,3 the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars the Court from considering Defendant’s action. ... Defendant’s suit falls within the latter category, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Superior Court’s decision or instruct it to take action.

Section 1331’s grant of original federal-question jurisdiction does not permit a federal court to review a state-court judgment under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Rinegard-Guirma v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2023-03-01

This action therefore is within this court’s jurisdiction—but only to the extent that it’s based on 524. All of Guirma’s arguments that the judgment was improper under state law are barred by Rooker-Feldman.

Section 1331 does not give district courts appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, except for habeas corpus petitions.

Horvath v. Bourne · filed 2005-11-07

we affirm because Horvath’s claims were barred either by the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1523, 1526 & n.8 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not allow district courts appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments), or by res judicata, see id. at 1527 (federal court has to give same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give); Wells v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 616 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Ark. 1981) (elements of res judicata).

Section 1331 grants district courts original jurisdiction but does not authorize them to review state court judgments on appeal.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation · filed 2025-06-04

Instead, the combination of Section 1257(a) and Congress’s failure to give lower federal courts any appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments means that no federal court has jurisdiction to review such decisions. See Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 644 n.3 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to [the Supreme] Court.”).

Section 1331 gives district courts original jurisdiction over federal questions but does not authorize them to review state-court judgments.

Dubuc v. Googasian · filed 2003-09-03

The district court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “probably” bars this lawsuit. We disagree. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.”

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a challenge to a state administrative agency’s decision because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar that review.

Harper v. Public Service Com'n of West Virginia · filed 2003-11-19

Thus, the court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in the instant matter as a means of precluding subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court does have jurisdiction because the action presents a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction over federal questions; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a district court from reviewing state administrative action.

Holy Ghost Revival Ministries v. City of Marysville · filed 2015-04-07

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to [the Supreme] Court,' see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).” Verizon Maryland, 535 U.S.' at 644, 122 S.Ct. 1753. These concerns are not implicated by judicial review of state administrative actions. See id. As such, the doctrine has no applicability here.

Section 1331 grants district courts original jurisdiction; a separate grant of habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 is unaffected by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Gouveia v. Espinda · filed 2019-06-12

In sum, the additional jurisdictional grant provided by § 2241—separate and apart from the jurisdiction conferred under § 1331—means that Rooker-Feldman is not pertinent.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from a final state-court judgment under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Reyna v. PNC Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-05-08

Plaintiff is thus barred from seeking a direct appeal to this Court on these claims.

Section 1331 permits federal court review of state law issues arising from a state commission’s interconnection agreement decision because 47 U.S.C. § 252 does not preclude that jurisdiction.

Verizon Northwest Inc. v. Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2003-04-07

In light of the Court’s interpretation of § 252, we conclude that our review of state law issues under § 1331 is not precluded.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction to decide Telecommunications Act interconnection agreement disputes before a state public service commission determines the issue.

Contact Communications v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2003-02-28

A. The TCA Strips Federal District Courts of Federal Question Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Regarding Claims That Have Not Been Presented to a PSC. ... It is clear to this Court that absent a prior determination of the issue by the state PSC, no federal court jurisdiction exists.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over a challenge to a state commission decision implicating federal law when the decision is not an interlocutory order from a § 252 proceeding.

Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. ICG Telecom Group, Inc. · filed 2001-03-30

Clearly, the instant action is not the product of an interlocutory order from a § 252 proceeding. Thus, in light of the implication of federal law in the state commission’s decisions, jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims would also be appropriate under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal jurisdiction to interpret or enforce approved telecommunications interconnection agreements when Congress limited federal review to the grant in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).

Bell Atlantic v. MCI · filed 2002-05-29

Accordingly, we conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide federal jurisdiction over Bell Atlantic's claims in the circumstances of this case where Congress intended that federal jurisdiction be lim- ited to the grant in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction to review state telecommunications commission orders for compliance with federal law, whether the orders concern existing interconnection agreements or arbitration of new ones.

Pacific Bell v. Telecomm · filed 2003-04-07

Thus, Verizon Maryland authorizes our exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 over both the challenges to the CPUC's generic orders, which target existing interconnection agreements, and the Pac-West Order, which deals with arbitration of a new agreement.

Section 1331 permits federal courts to review claims that state commission orders violate federal law when the orders arise from independent state law proceedings, unless the challenged action is an interlocutory order arising from § 252 proceedings.

GTE North Inc v. Strand · filed 2000-04-20

We therefore hold that federal review is available under § 1331 to determine whether state commission orders violate federal law except in cases in which the challenged regulatory action is clearly an interlocutory order arising out of § 252 proceedings.

Section 1331 does not provide an alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state when the FSIA governs the action.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic · filed 2012-09-11

Continental incorrectly argues that 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(b), read in conjunction with the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides an alternate source of subject matter jurisdiction. This argument fails because, as noted supra, § 1650a is not a grant of jurisdiction, but merely a mandate that jurisdiction, if it exists, may be exercised solely in the federal courts. Because Continental incorrectly relied on § 1331 in its pleading, it was granted leave to amend its pleading orally to add reliance on § 1330.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction merely because an action is against a foreign state; the FSIA supplies the jurisdictional basis for such actions.

Martinez v. Republic of Cuba · filed 2010-04-28

If, as the Garnishees argue, the mere fact that an action is against a foreign state supports federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there would be no need for § 1441(d) because removal would always be available under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b). The Court cannot interpret § 1441(d) as mere surplusage. ... Further support for this construction comes from the fact that the FSIA is the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over cases against foreign states.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign after the FSIA; § 1330 is the exclusive jurisdictional route.

Abrams v. Société Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Français · filed 2001-11-05

However, the jurisdiction provision does not alter anything. It simply replaces § 1331 and § 1332 as the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.

Section 1331 does not independently establish subject matter jurisdiction over foreign states; jurisdiction must be proper under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Freund v. Republic of France · filed 2008-12-19

Plaintiffs also allege that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Compl. V 56), ... These allegations are insufficient to establish jurisdiction. The FSIA is the “sole basis” for asserting subject matter jurisdiction over “foreign states,” a phrase that includes the sovereign's political subdivisions, agents, and instrumentalities.

Section 1331 does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign because the FSIA supplies the sole jurisdictional basis.

Iskandar v. Embassy of the State of Kuwait · filed 2015-05-28

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332, as the grounds for subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Compl. ¶ 3. However, the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign nation in the United States.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a longshoreman’s federal negligence claim against a foreign-state-owned corporation despite the FSIA’s separate jurisdictional provision.

Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A. · filed 1980-06-24(a)

There was no expression of an intent to limit federal question jurisdiction. ... I reject defendant’s construction of § 1330 and find at least two jurisdictional bases for granting a jury trial in the instant case—28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a contract dispute merely because it involves an SEC-adopted securities arbitration form.

Credit Suisse First Boston LLC v. Chai · filed 2004-04-29

Thus, it necessarily follows from Barbara that the role of Form U-4 in this litigation cannot furnish the court with federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a motor carrier’s claim for unpaid freight charges arising solely from its shipping contract.

Transit Homes of America v. Homes of Legend, Inc. · filed 2001-11-14

The Court simply answers that in this case it must be the former because there is no diversity jurisdiction and the Court concludes that Morgan’s contract claim for unpaid freight charges does not "arise under” federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1337.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment seeking only interpretation of an interconnection agreement under state contract law, without a substantial federal question.

Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Services, Inc. · filed 2002-01-10

As we have noted, adjudication of the dispute between BellSouth and the CLEC defendants does not require “resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” but merely interpretation under Georgia law of the term, “local traffic,” as it is used in the interconnection agreements between the two parties. ... In summary, the district court had no justification for exercising its federal jurisdiction to interpret the agreements between BellSouth and the CLEC defendants and therefore cannot do so -- even in the context of a declaratory judgment action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a trademark ownership dispute controlled by state contract law when the trademark claims are entirely derivative of the contract issues.

International Armor & Limousine Company v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., Third-Party v. Earle F. Moloney, Third-Party · filed 2001-12-18

Because in this case the only serious dispute is how the contracts of 1986 and 1990 allocate ownership rights in the Moloney name and business history (as applied to stretch limousines), the same principle leads to the conclusion that there is no federal jurisdiction. The dispute arises under the law of contracts; any trademark claims are entirely derivative of the contract issues.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an ordinary insurance coverage contract dispute involving an Indian tribe.

Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Tribal Court of the Spirit Lake Indian Reservation · filed 2007-08-01

Federal question jurisdiction is not implicated at this time. Auto Owners’s declaratory judgment action sounds in contract law raising a state-law question regarding the existence of coverage under the policies issued to Tate Topa.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an ordinary insurance-contract coverage dispute involving an Indian tribe.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tate Topa Tribal · filed 2007-08-01

Federal question jurisdiction is not implicated at this time. Auto Owners's declaratory judgment action sounds in contract law raising a state-law question regarding the existence of coverage under the policies issued to Tate Topa. Both parties acknowledge that the underlying Lohnes action in tribal court invokes the FTCA. But this separate declaratory judgment action in federal court does not involve the FTCA. Ordinary contract principles apply to the claim. As noted in Weeks and Gaming World, an ordinary contract dispute involving an Indian tribe does not raise a federal question.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a contract action when resolving the claim necessarily requires deciding questions under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sokaogon Chippewa Community · filed 2011-04-15

Wells Fargo’s action on the Indenture and Bonds necessarily raise federal questions concerning whether the Indenture is a management contract within the meaning of the IGRA and, if so, whether the Tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity is valid. Wells Fargo’s complaint therefore invokes federal jurisdiction, and the Court will proceed to the grounds asserted in the defendants’ motion.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction for a claim based on the District of Columbia’s alleged breach of contract.

Gill v. Drug Enforcement Agency · filed 2011-12-13

This action predicated on the District’s alleged contract breach does not present a federal question under § 1331, and “the District, like the fifty states, is not subject to [the] diversity jurisdiction . . . of the federal courts” under § 1332.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract claim that presents no federal question.

Graham v. Otey · filed 2014-07-25

Federal district courts have jurisdiction in civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties Of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Plaintiff‘s breach of contract claim presents no federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over independent contract claims against a health insurer when resolving them does not require interpreting an ERISA plan.

Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Aetna Health Inc. · filed 2016-02-09

Where a plaintiff seeks relief to enforce rights under an independent agreement with a defendant, federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a contract claim merely because a declaratory-judgment request invokes patent exhaustion when patent law is not a necessary element of relief.

Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Nokia Corporation · filed 2021-11-15

As discussed below, Nokia has not shown that Continental’s request for a declaratory judgment regarding patent exhaustion created federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim that does not arise under federal law.

Ramani v. TuneCore Inc. · filed 2022-07-05

The plaintiff appears to allege a breach of contract claim against the defendant, which does not arise under federal law.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract claim that alleges no federal basis.

Bell v. Iozzo · filed 2023-02-23

Plaintiff does not invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, and his allegations for breach of contract do not suggest any basis for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when a breach of contract claim does not arise under the Constitution or federal law.

Nova El v. Foursight Capital · filed 2023-04-25

Plaintiff’s claim, which can broadly be construed as a breach of contract claim, does not arise under the Constitution or any federal laws.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim.

Alexander v. Lemonade Inc. · filed 2023-04-26

But a breach of contract claim is not a federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract claim between nondiverse parties when no federal basis for the claim is identified.

Cohan v. Carmel Management Group LLC · filed 2024-05-06

Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to bring the breach of contract claim in via federal question jurisdiction—however, Plaintiff cites no provision of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that allow for a breach of contract claim between two non-diverse parties to be heard in federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim that does not arise under federal law.

DKSJ, LLC v. Cohen · filed 2025-02-26

First, the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim does not arise under federal law.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a contract claim merely because the underlying grant came from a federal agency.

SUTTON · filed 2025-10-17

While the factual contentions involve a federal grant that was issued by FEMA, and wherein Plaintiff received Veteran Preference under the VPA during the grant selection process, the claims, while not plainly stated, can be construed to be questions of contract law that, in this case, do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over contract claims that allege no violation of federal law.

Dunlap · filed 2025-10-20

Although Plaintiff used the form for filing a civil rights case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, he has alleged contract claims and has not alleged the violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim based on a contract rather than the Constitution or federal law.

Smith v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2001-09-14

In this case, to the extent Smith had any third party beneficiary interest at stake, he relied on a contract rather than the Constitution or any federal law, and therefore no federal question was presented under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over an essentially contractual claim against the United States merely because the contractor alleges violations of federal procurement regulations.

Management Science America, Inc. v. Pierce · filed 1984-11-27(a)

This court’s jurisdiction over those claims therefore turns on whether Plaintiff’s action is essentially contractual or statutory in nature. ... The court finds that Plaintiff’s action is essentially contractual.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a claim that state or local legislation impaired a contract in violation of the Contract Clause.

Baker v. Baltimore County, Md. · filed 1980-03-26(a)

Thus, in this case, plaintiffs have alleged a breach of the Contract Clause of the Constitution and have stated a cause of action arising under federal law so as to meet the jurisdictional requirements of section 1331.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a government contract claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. United States · filed 1980-08-08

I agree with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Lee v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1979), and the Second Circuit in Watson, that the terms of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491 preclude district court jurisdiction under § 1331, regardless of the APA amendment’s effect on the defense of sovereign immunity under § 1331.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over claims arising under the IDEA because the IDEA is a federal statute.

Thomas Ullmo, Jacqueline Ullmo, and Jason Ullmo, by and Through His Parents and Legal Guardians, Thomas and Jacqueline U · filed 2001-12-07

The IDEA is a federal statute. Any claim arising under the IDEA is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

Garnishment proceedings do not arise under federal law within Section 1331’s federal-question jurisdiction.

Farm & City Insurance v. Johnson · filed 2002-02-14

It does not appear to the court that garnishment proceedings arise under federal law within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or are founded upon the Constitution or any act of Congress, within the meaning of § 1346(a)(2).

Section 1331 supplies federal jurisdiction over a suit seeking declaratory relief against state agency regulations alleged to violate federal law.

IL Assoc Mortgage B v. Office of Banks & Re · filed 2002-10-21

It is not necessary for us to determine whether the 1982 Act is such a statute, cf. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002), because federal jurisdiction is supplied by 28 U.S.C. §1331 in any event. For the reasons given in Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1982), that statute supplies jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief against regulation by a state agency and contends that the agency has violated federal law by adopting particular regulations.

Section 1331 requires a federal question in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; a third-party complaint does not create jurisdiction over the original action.

Billy E. Adkins, Administrator of the Estate of Helena R. Adkins v. Illinois Central Railroad Company · filed 2003-03-06

Nevertheless, we must consider whether the existence of a third-party complaint affects the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the original action. We conclude that it does not. ... If the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint is not based on a federal question, there is no § 1331 jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not give a federal court jurisdiction over an original action lacking a federal question merely because a third-party complaint raises one.

Adkins, Billy E. v. IL Central RR Co · filed 2003-03-06

If the plaintiff’s well-pleaded com- plaint is not based on a federal question, there is no § 1331 jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a third-party beneficiary claim involving a federal prison contractor agreement may be premature to decide without the complete contract.

Phillips v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2003-04-29

The BOP has moved to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because this breach of contract claim does not constitute a “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The Court does not have the complete contract before it and finds that it would be premature to determine its jurisdiction in this regard.

Section 1331 cannot provide federal-question jurisdiction over a third-party complaint that alleges no federal claim.

Eastgate Investments I, LLC v. MW Builders, Inc. · filed 2020-03-20

As MW Builders alleges no federal claim in its Third-Party Complaint, it must rely on diversity of citizenship under § 1332 or supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction cannot rest on a defendant’s anticipated counterclaim or third-party claim.

NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL v. GROSSBERGER · filed 2025-04-30

But federal question jurisdiction cannot rest on an anticipated counterclaim or a third-party claim.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over tribal affairs only when federal law determines the issues involved.

Sac & Fox Tribe v. Bureau of Indian Affairs · filed 2006-03-03

In cases involving tribal affairs, we exercise section 1331 jurisdiction only when federal law is determinative of the issues involved.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an intra-tribal leadership dispute merely because it affects compliance with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa v. Bear · filed 2003-04-15

The Court does not find that IGRA provides an appropriate basis for federal question jurisdiction because, despite plaintiffs’ efforts to characterize this action as one based on federal question jurisdiction, the Court finds that the Tribe’s leadership dispute raises intra-tribal issues. This Court is without jurisdiction to resolve intra-tribal disputes.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over tribal affairs only when federal law determines the issues in dispute.

Sac & Fox Tribe Of The Mississippi In Iowa v. Bureau Of Indian Affairs · filed 2006-03-03

In cases involving tribal affairs, we exercise section 1331 jurisdiction only when federal law is determinative of the issues involved.

Section 1331 does not give a federal court authority to resolve an internal tribal-law dispute over whether a tribe authorized a lawsuit.

The QUAPAW TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA v. Blue Tee Corp. · filed 2009-09-02

Even if the Tribe was not authorized to file this lawsuit as a matter of Tribal law, BNSF must ask the Tribal courts to construe Tribal law and determine if the lawsuit was authorized by the appropriate Tribal governmental body.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a tribe’s RICO claims when a suggested intra-tribal dispute does not present a genuine, nonfrivolous question of tribal law.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Cypress · filed 2015-12-23

In the absence of a wholly non-justiciable issue, federal question jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1362, and the Tribe has met its burden of establishing jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an internal tribal election dispute that presents no federal question.

Whalen v. Oglala Sioux Tribe Executive Officers · filed 2021-09-20

Ms. Whalen’s complaint challenging the procedures and outcome of the 2020 OST election is a tribal election dispute that is an entirely intra-tribal matter. Ms. Whalen presents no federal question, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of the case.

Section 1331 allows federal question jurisdiction over a dispute involving a tribe when federal law determines the issues and the dispute does not concern internal tribal affairs.

Bird Industries, Inc. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation · filed 2022-07-11

The RICO statute provides that the district courts of the United States shall have federal question jurisdiction over civil actions to prevent and restrain prohibited racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, this case turns on the application of federal law. The case does not involve any of the internal tribal affairs such as tribal membership, politics, or domestic relations to which the intra-tribal dispute doctrine typically applies. Thus, the intra-tribal dispute doctrine does not apply.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over a claim that a state utility commission misinterpreted an interconnection agreement provision implementing an essential duty under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global Naps, Inc. · filed 2004-08-02

As a result, when there is a claim that a state utility commission has misin- terpreted an interconnection agreement provision that implements a duty imposed by the Act, review should be available under § 1331 in district court. We are not saying that every dispute about a term in an interconnection agreement belongs in federal court, but when the con- tractual dispute (like the one here) involves one of the 1996 Act’s essential duties, there is a federal question.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over disputes requiring interpretation of telecommunications interconnection agreements governed by the Telecommunications Act.

ICG Telecom Group, Inc. v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2005-06-30

I find that reasoning persuasive. I find and conclude that the TCA provides federal question jurisdiction in this case because resolution would have required interpretation of Section (A)3.17 of the Agreement, subject to the TCA.

Section 1331 grants jurisdiction to review state utility commission decisions involving federal telecommunications regulation, and general concerns of comity or federalism do not override that grant.

Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. AT & T COMMUNICATIONS OF DELAWARE, LLC · filed 2004-07-16

General principles of comity or federalism do not override that express statement of Congressional intent, just as they do not override the general grant of jurisdiction' provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review precisely the type of question involved in this case.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over disputes concerning the interpretation or enforcement of interconnection agreements under the Telecommunications Act.

Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Michigan, Inc. · filed 2003-05-20

Through its decision in Verizon Maryland, the Supreme Court has now definitively answered these jurisdictional challenges for us. In that analogous appeal, the Court concluded, as had this circuit previously in GTE North, Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909 (6th Cir.2000), that the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 conferred upon district courts the power to resolve these disputes.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction to resolve disputes over a state commission’s interpretation or enforcement of telecommunications interconnection agreements.

Michigan Bell Telephone Company v. Mfs Intelenet Of Michigan, Inc. · filed 2003-08-14

Through its decision in Verizon Maryland, the Supreme Court has now definitively answered these jurisdictional challenges for us. In that analogous appeal, the Court concluded, as had this circuit previously in GTE North, Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909 (6th Cir.2000), that the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 conferred upon district courts the power to resolve these disputes.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction for Helms-Burton Act suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities without requiring an FSIA exception.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) · filed 2026-06-23

By making suits under the Helms-Burton Act subject to §1331 rather than §1330, Congress made clear that actions under the Helms-Burton Act are not actions under the FSIA.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a claim that a state utility commission misinterpreted an interconnection agreement when the disputed provisions incorporate federal law and implement a duty imposed by federal law.

Verizon Maryland, Incorporated v. Global Naps · filed 2004-08-02

In sum, because (1) Verizon's complaint alleges that the PSC misinterpreted interconnection agreement provisions that incorporate federal law, (2) the agreement interpreted is federally mandated, (3) the contractual duty at issue is imposed by federal law, and (4) the purpose of the 1996 Act is best served by allowing review of the PSC's order in the district court, we hold that Verizon's contract claim in Count I raises a substantial question of federal law. The claim therefore arises under federal law, conferring jurisdiction in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over federal-question suits involving a state even when the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.

Lieberman v. State of DE · filed 2003-07-14

In fact, ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has assumed that the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court could be made concurrent with the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. We maintain the unremarkable position that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 properly provides the District Court with jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts federal-question jurisdiction but does not establish jurisdiction for state courts.

Thomas G. Brown D/B/A/ B & B Construction Company v. First State Bank of Texas · filed 2019-11-05

This is what is called “federal question” jurisdiction, the authority for which resides in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and it is the basis for jurisdiction in federal, not state, district court.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction to district courts, not to the Court of Federal Claims.

Houston v. United States · filed 2004-04-29

However, as that statute is limited to district courts, it does not apply to this case.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction to United States district courts, not the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Fry v. United States · filed 2006-08-11

The United States Court of Federal Claims is not a “district court,” within the meaning of either 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 or 26 U.S.C. §§ 6330, 7429.

Section 1331 concerns the jurisdiction of federal district courts, not the Court of Federal Claims.

Allen v. United States · filed 2022-01-20

The federal question and di- versity jurisdiction statutes that Mr. Allen cites, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, concern the jurisdiction of the district courts, not the Court of Federal Claims.

Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction to district courts but does not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Anderson v. Hutson · filed 2024-08-26

The Sheriff asserts a third basis for appellate jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As Plaintiffs explain, Section 1331 speaks only to the “original jurisdiction” of the “district courts,” not to our appellate authority.

Section 1331 does not itself create rights or establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Bey v. Greenfield MHP Holdings LLC · filed 2025-01-07

Section 1331 is not a source of rights and does not create federal question jurisdiction itself.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction but does not create substantive rights.

Noe v. United States Government · filed 2023-12-22

Noe’s appellate argument fails because §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202 do not create any substantive rights, see Hanson v. Wyatt, 552 F.3d 1148, 1157 (10th Cir. 2008), and citing them would not have remedied the deficiencies that led to dismissal of claims one or three.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law but does not itself create constitutional or statutory rights.

Basey v. Reardon · filed 2023-11-28

As an initial matter, Section 1331 does not confer constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 1331 does not itself provide a claim for relief.

Moss v. Clark County Title · filed 2023-11-08

Moreover, HUD and Mr. Sautter’s argument, that the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not state a cognizable claim for relief, also has merit.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction but does not itself provide a claim for relief.

Kiewel v. Hickok · filed 2021-09-28

The first two statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, are merely jurisdictional.

Section 1331 does not provide an independent ground for relief against a state actor.

Simpson v. Thompson · filed 2020-02-27

Also invoked by Simpson, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide an independent ground for relief, as Simpson has not asserted any claims against a federal actor.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction to district courts but creates no substantive right to money damages against the United States.

Jordan v. United States · filed 2016-08-26

This statute is "jurisdictional," and therefore "‘do[es] not cr ate any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages."’

Section 1331 confers federal-question jurisdiction but does not create a cause of action for violations of international law.

Bancoult v. McNamara · filed 2004-12-21

Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot bring suit for a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this statute confers only federal question jurisdiction, not a cause of action for violations of international law.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over substantial federal questions but does not itself create a cause of action.

Somerville v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-09-26

Somerville’s original petition characterized his claim as one seeking a declaration of rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The former provision grants subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts in matters presenting a substantial question of federal law; the latter provision authorizes relief in the form of a declaration of rights. Neither provision itself creates a cause of action: one merely provides a forum for asserting federal claims, the other permits a declaration of rights as a form of relief if a cause of action is successfully asserted.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law but creates no substantive rights.

Sosa v. Lantz · filed 2009-09-02

As to other sections of title 28, Plaintiff cites two statutes that confer subject-matter jurisdiction on federal district courts— § 1331 provides district courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, and § 1343 provides district courts with “original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person” seeking vindication of federal civil rights or voting rights — but provide no substantive rights.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction but creates no substantive rights enforceable against the United States.

Nyanjega v. Douglas · filed 2019-03-13

While Plaintiffs point to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this statute is merely a jurisdictional one that “does not create any substantive rights that may be enforced against the United States . . . .” Hagemeier v. Block, 806 F.2d 197, 203 (8th Cir. 1986).

Section 1331 jurisdiction is unaffected by whether the APA provides a cause of action for the claim.

Sheikhi v. Trump · filed 2020-11-24

Whether a claim is reviewable under the APA implicates a plaintiff’s cause of action but does not affect the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction but does not create a cause of action.

Dinkins v. Moon · filed 2022-04-27

Mr. Dinkins mentions some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, e.g., Doc. 3 at ¶¶ 20–21, 50, and the jurisdictional provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 46. As he has been informed before, those rules and statutes do not create any cause of action.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction but does not itself provide a cause of action.

Heath v. Spencer · filed 2022-09-19

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is simply the statute which provides this Court with federal-question jurisdiction in general.

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction but does not itself create a cause of action; a claim must arise under a separate federal law.

Williams v. Long Beach Mortgage Company · filed 2022-11-14

Section 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 are general jurisdictional statutes that do not create a cause of action, but “rather depend[ ] upon an action arising under a separate federal law before a district court’s jurisdiction is proper.”

Section 1331 grants federal-question jurisdiction but does not create substantive rights or an independent claim for relief.

Perales v. Daniels · filed 2023-04-24

Taking these in reverse order, section 1331 simply establishes the district courts’ federal-question jurisdiction; it does not itself create substantive rights.