28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 requires a federal question on the face of the original plaintiff’s complaint; federal counterclaims do not establish federal-question jurisdiction for removal.

Hughes v. Midland Mortgage · filed 2025-08-20

Moreover, although Hughes asserts federal claims in her Complaint, those claims amount to federal counterclaims, which do not provide a basis for removal of this action under federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires a federal question in the plaintiff’s claim; a defendant’s federal counterclaim does not establish original jurisdiction.

Starnes · filed 2025-10-20

But even if Defendant is asserting a counterclaim against Plaintiff for a violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that still would not give this Court original jurisdiction over the pending state court child custody matter. The focus is not on the counterclaims asserted but on whether the district court would have original jurisdiction over the civil action pending in state court.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction cannot rest on a federal counterclaim in a removed state-court action.

Robinson · filed 2025-10-22

For these reasons, Robinson’s counterclaims provide no basis for original jurisdiction in this Court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state foreclosure action based on a defendant’s federal counterclaim.

Newrez LLC v. Lee · filed 2025-10-22

Because Defendants cannot remove this case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction or use a federal counterclaim to satisfy the original jurisdiction requirement for removal, jurisdiction over this case depends upon 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) as Defendants argue.

Section 1331 requires a federal question to appear on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; a defendant’s federal counterclaim cannot create jurisdiction.

Mercer · filed 2025-11-10

That said, a defendant’s counterclaim that asserts a federal claim cannot serve as the basis for creating “arising under” or “federal question” jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires the plaintiff’s own claim to raise a federal question; a federal counterclaim does not establish jurisdiction.

Westby Co-Op Credit Union v. Trails End Motel · filed 2026-02-06

Even if I considered those claims as proposed counterclaims, that wouldn’t affect the jurisdictional analysis. A complaint raises a federal question “only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon federal law. . . . Federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense, or rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.”

Section 1331 jurisdiction cannot rest on a defendant’s federal counterclaims when the plaintiff’s complaint asserts only a state-law claim.

City of Houston v. Jackson Jr. · filed 2026-04-20

The Court concludes that Jackson’s counterclaims do not create federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides no independent federal-question jurisdiction over a counterclaim that rests solely on state law.

Leatherwood v. Universal Business Service Co. · filed 1987-02-27

In contrast, the counterclaim for the underlying debt rests solely on state law grounds. Moreover, because the parties are not diverse and less than $10,000 is in controversy, no independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

Section 1331 does not permit federal-question jurisdiction based on a counterclaim when the plaintiff’s complaint raises no federal question.

Buttars · filed 2025-12-04

The Court thus grants the joint motion and remands the action back to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County Magistrate Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing the federal courts with jurisdiction over claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); see also Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 831 (“It follows that a counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff's complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”).

Section 1331 provides independent federal-question jurisdiction over a counterclaim that alleges a federal constitutional violation on its face.

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ferre · filed 1985-08-15

Count II alleges on its face a violation of FERRE’s constitutional right to privacy arising under the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments, and thus, it presents a federal question within this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A case does not arise under federal law for Section 1331 when the constitutional issue appears only as a defense or anticipated defense rather than as an integral part of the plaintiff's claim.

Barnett v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. · filed 1980-04-18

Consequently, we have no Federal question jurisdiction here since the constitutional element arises only by way of defense.

Section 1331(a) does not support removal when the complaint’s state-law insurance claim does not arise under ERISA.

Lederman v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1980-08-12(a)

This action was filed in the Califorhia Superior Court and removed here by the defendant citing the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and § 1441(a). The plaintiff moves for remand to the state court. For reasons herein set forth, such motion will be granted.

Section 1331 supports removal only when a federal controversy essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action appears on the complaint’s face.

Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. Hellmers · filed 1980-10-28

To warrant removal of an action from a state to a federal court on the ground that there exists a federal question, a controversy with respect to a federal question must be essential to plaintiff’s cause of action and must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint.

Section 1331(a) does not support removal when a federal question appears only in the defendant’s counterclaim rather than on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Border City Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. · filed 1981-09-14(a)

In short, a federal question alleged in a counterclaim ... does not, in and of itself, confer jurisdiction upon a federal court. It is no substitute for the requirement that in order for a case to be a proper subject for removal, the federal question must be disclosed on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction supporting removal when the case clearly arises under the federal internal-revenue laws.

Chandler v. Perini Power Constructors, Inc. · filed 1981-08-31

The case has been properly removed to this court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1340, as the case is clearly one within the Internal Revenue laws of the United States, and the motion to remand must be and it is herewith denied.

Section 1331(a) federal-question jurisdiction supporting removal must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and cannot be established from other pleadings or the removal petition.

Johnny's Pizza House, Inc. v. G & H Properties, Inc. · filed 1981-10-05(a)

Our reading of the State court petition reveals no federal question. Johnny’s chose to fashion its right of action under State law. A long established rule requires that the federal question utilized as the basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. ... We may not refer to other pleadings or to the removal petition to determine the propriety of removal.

Section 1331(a) requires the federal question to appear on the face of the complaint, and anticipated federal defenses raised in a complaint or answer do not support federal-question jurisdiction.

Anziulewicz v. Bluefield Community Hospital, Inc. · filed 1981-12-18(a)

The meaning of the “arising under” language of.the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), is critical to resolution of the issue here. ... the doctrine requires that the federal question be disclosed upon the face of the complaint. Furthermore, anticipated federal defenses raised in a complaint or by answer will not serve as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. ... In applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court perceives no federal question stated upon the face of plaintiff’s complaint. ... The “well-pleaded complaint” rule controls in this case and requires the Court to remand this action to the court from which it was improperly removed.

A complaint need not expressly cite federal law to establish Section 1331 jurisdiction when its allegations necessarily bring federal law into play.

South Dakota ex rel. Meierhenry v. Rippling Water Ranch, Inc. · filed 1982-01-19

The fact a complaint may not explicitly state that there is a federal question present does not defeat federal jurisdiction, however. A court may “take judicial notice of any federal. laws necessarily brought into play by the allegations of the complaint; and it is immaterial that specific reference to such laws may be omitted in the pleading.”

Section 1331 supports removal only when a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint; a defendant's federal-law defense does not create federal-question jurisdiction.

People of Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. · filed 1982-05-04

... First among these principles is that the existence of a federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 1003, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974); Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936); Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 460, 14 S.Ct. 654, 656, 38 L.Ed. 511 (1894); Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1981). Thus a defendant's assertion of an issue of federal law in the pleadings or in the petition for removal does not create a federal question.

Section 1331 does not confer arising-under jurisdiction when the complaint's federal allegations merely anticipate or reply to a probable federal-law defense.

Esther Lee Begay, Etc. v. The Kerr-Mcgee Corporation · filed 1982-06-11

We next address the issue of federal question jurisdiction. The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to hear all cases and controversies, regardless of amount in controversy, arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case does not arise under federal law within the meaning of section 1331 if the complaint merely anticipates or replies to a probable defense which would be based on federal law.

Section 1331(a) requires a federal question to appear affirmatively and distinctly on the face of the plaintiff's complaint; a federal defense cannot create federal-question or removal jurisdiction.

New England Explosives Corp. v. Maine Ledge Blasting Specialist, Inc. · filed 1982-07-09(a)

Federal question jurisdiction extends to eases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). The federal question must be disclosed on the face of the complaint, affirmatively and distinctly. ... Federal statutes asserted by way of defense do not confer federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the complaint states only a state common-law claim and no federal right or immunity is an essential element.

Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v. Fleer Corp. · filed 1982-09-02

In the present case, Topps’ Complaint does not state a claim of which a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States is an essential element. Rather, Topps has cast its action as one for restitution under the common law of the State of Delaware and filed it in the appropriate forum. No federal claim is stated. This is not a case over which this Court has original jurisdiction and thus there is no proper basis for its removal from the state court.

Under Section 1331(a), federal-question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.

City of Fresno v. Frampton · filed 1983-03-28(a)

Federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) is measured not by the end result of the action but by “whether a federal question appears on the face of a well pleaded complaint.”

Section 1331(a) requires the federal issue to arise from the plaintiff’s own claim for relief, not from an anticipated defense or reply.

Dorn v. Dorn's Transportation, Inc. · filed 1983-04-27(a)

The federal issue must be raised by the plaintiff’s own claim for relief; it is not sufficient that a federal question appears in the complaint as an anticipation of or reply to a probable defense.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction must arise from the plaintiff’s pleaded claim and is not created by a defendant’s assertion of a federal issue when the complaint seeks only state-law relief.

Eby v. ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP., SOUTH BEND STAMPING · filed 1983-05-17

In this case, defendants’ argument in support of their petition for removal makes clear that the jurisdiction of this' court over this claim, if such be found to exist, must lie in federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) and ultimately, therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... While defendants may be correct in their assertion that this case ultimately revolves around issues which could, in the ... alternative, have been pleaded under federal law, plaintiff’s complaint sets forth no such theories. ... This complaint clearly seeks relief arising under state law.

Section 1331 does not cover state-law actions that merely anticipate a federal defense or a federal response to a defense, but does cover a complaint whose asserted right succeeds or fails based on federal law's construction.

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Brown · filed 1983-06-20

A case does not present a federal question of the sort necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to these statutes where it merely anticipates a federal question defense which the defendant might raise; nor does a case present such a federal question where it anticipates a federal question response to a non-federal defense which the defendants might raise. ... Where the rights which plaintiff asserts would be supported if a federal statute or regulation is given one construction and defeated if given another, federal question jurisdiction exists.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction requires a substantial federal issue on the face of the plaintiff’s claim and cannot rest on federal preemption asserted only as a defense to state-law claims.

Martin v. WILKES-BARRE PUB. CO. · filed 1983-07-01

In sum, the Court finds that the first ground relied upon by the Defendants to remove this action does not raise a “substantial” federal question and, therefore, is an insufficient basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. ... Moreover, contrary to the Defendants' assertions, we find that the issue of federal preemption is merely an affirmative defense to the Plaintiff's state law claims and, as such, is an insufficient predicate for removal. ... Therefore, we conclude that the second ground asserted by the Defendants, the defense of federal preemption, also cannot serve as a basis for removal of the Plaintiff's Complaint to federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a state-law contract claim merely because the defendant is expected to raise a federal defense; the plaintiff’s own cause of action must arise under federal law.

Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago · filed 1983-08-11

In simple terms, the Complaint assails Board for a contract breach that raises no federal question at all. CTU cannot escape that fact by arguing it expects Board to raise a “federal defense” based on its obligations under the Plan: Under the long-established “well-pleaded complaint” rule, a “plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action” ... must be based on federal law, without reference to anticipated federal defenses.

A state-law contract claim does not arise under Section 1331 merely because the plaintiff anticipates a defense and alleges that defense is unconstitutional.

City of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie Cablevision, Inc. · filed 1983-10-04

The elementary requirement that must be met before federal jurisdiction may be invoked is that the federal question in the complaint must be well pleaded. ... It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. ... In sum, the plaintiff has failed to assert a claim arising under the Constitution or federal laws.

Under § 1331, a removable federal question must be determined from the complaint itself, without reference to the removal petition or answer.

James v. Bellotti · filed 1984-05-10

The existence of a federal question must be determined from the allegations in the complaint, without reference to other documents such as the petition for removal or the answer.

Under § 1331's well-pleaded complaint rule, federal-question jurisdiction must appear from the plaintiff's complaint, and federal preemption raised solely as a defense does not support removal.

Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-05-30

Where federal preemption is presented solely in the posture of a defense to state law claims a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the case cannot be properly removed from state to federal court.

Section 1331 jurisdiction requires a federal claim on the face of the well-pleaded complaint and a federal issue essential to relief; a federal-preemption defense alone is insufficient.

Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1984-06-15

As the cases, in our opinion, make clear, where no Federal claim can be found on the face of plaintiffs’ complaint and Federal law is not an essential element in establishing its right to relief, a defense of Federal preemption cannot serve as a basis for Federal jurisdiction. Here, a Federal claim cannot be found on the face of the plaintiffs’ complaints, and Federal Law is certainly not an essential element in establishing their right to relief.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction requires the federal question to appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.

Heidt v. Mid-State Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1984-10-05

The well-established rule that the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint applies in removal cases.

Section 1331 arising-under jurisdiction requires a federal question on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; a federal preemption defense cannot supply original or removal jurisdiction.

Hunter v. United Van Lines · filed 1984-11-05

We begin our analysis with a well-settled, elementary principle of “arising under” jurisdiction: a case “arises under” federal law within the meaning of the general federal question statute only if the federal question appears on the face of plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; if not, original jurisdiction is lacking even if the defense is based on federal law.

Section 1331 does not cover state tort and contract claims merely because a federal statute may affect defenses, indemnity, or liability; federal law must be an essential element of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded cause of action.

Stibitz v. General Public Utilities Corp. · filed 1984-11-19

Counsel's reliance on the interplay between the Price-Anderson Act and the state law claims in this case must fail as a basis for "arising under" jurisdiction, since none of the Price-Anderson elements are essential to plaintiffs' case under state tort and contract law. Whether defendants' liability will be limited or indemnified under the Price-Anderson Act, or whether defendants will be required to waive certain defenses they might otherwise have under state law, has no bearing on the matter of federal jurisdiction. Although such issues may well arise in the course of the litigation, "they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff[s'] original cause of action, arises under" the laws of the United States. ... Rather, under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," they form no basis for federal jurisdiction. ... We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs' state law claims do not arise under the Price-Anderson Act.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a state-law claim merely because the defendant raises a federal defense.

Hunter v. United Van Lines · filed 1985-01-29

A defendant thus cannot remove a state-law claim from state to federal court even if his defense is based entirely on federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer federal jurisdiction merely because a defense to an impending state-law action raises a federal issue.

Greenfield and Montague Transportation Area v. Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary, Dept. Of Labor · filed 1985-03-29

It is true that the defensive issue plaintiffs raise — the alleged lack of authority by the Department of Labor to assume the role created for it in the contract — is a federal law question. But that will always be true of a “federal” defense to impending or threatened state proceedings. The state courts are empowered to decide federal statutory issues where appropriate.

Section 1331 is unavailable for a state-law contract claim when the federal question arises only from a potential defense.

Spaeth v. United States Secretary of Interior · filed 1985-03-15

The federal question only arises from the Danielsons’ potential defense of unmarketable title based on federal law.

Section 1331 does not permit removal when the federal question appears only in a defense to a well-pleaded state-law complaint.

Taylor v. General Motors Corporation, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 1985-07-25

The federal question relied on for removal is based upon Metropolitan’s defense. Although the issue is certainly not free from doubt, we are persuaded that plaintiff has confined his claim against Metropolitan to one based on state law, and the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes removal.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction when a declaratory complaint merely anticipates a federal defense or a federal response to a nonfederal defense.

Unifirst Bank for Savings, F.A. v. Broadmoor Apartments · filed 1985-08-20

Here, as in ... the plaintiffs complaint merely anticipates a federal question defense or a federal response to a non-federal defense. Accordingly, this court is of the opinion that it does not have federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the face of the state complaint alleges only a state contract claim and no federal statute or cognizable federal claim.

Biel v. Airline Pilots Ass'n · filed 1985-11-01

The face of plaintiffs State court motion for judgment does not implicate any federal statute or any cognizable federal claim. It appears to allege no more than a State contract claim. This Court therefore may not exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1337.

Section 1331 requires the federal question to be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim; the possibility that federal law may arise later does not confer jurisdiction.

Carpenter v. Leonard · filed 1986-04-15

The federal question must be an essential element of the plaintiffs' claim to confer jurisdiction. ... The possibility that an issue of federal law may emerge in the suit does not constitute a federal question.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a state-law contract dispute requires resolution of a dominant federal issue; the plaintiff must assert a right created by federal law.

Fred Oliver, Cross-Appellants v. Trunkline Gas Company, Cross-Appellee · filed 1986-05-12

But the presence of a federal issue, however much it may dominate the case, is insufficient to confer federal-question jurisdiction. On the contrary, such jurisdiction is conferred by statute only when the plaintiff is asserting a right created by federal law.

Section 1331 requires the federal question to play a significant role in resolving the action and to appear on the face of the complaint rather than in a defense.

Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Company · filed 1986-06-12

An action "arises under" federal law only if "resolution of the federal question must play a significant role in the proceedings." ... Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, the federal question must appear from the complaint and not from any defense the defendant might raise to defeat the cause of action.

Under Section 1331's well-pleaded-complaint rule, a state-law claim is outside federal-question jurisdiction unless the right to relief necessarily requires resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question.

Contemporary Electric, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1986-06-27

A review of the well-pleaded Motion for Modification of Arbitration Award of Contemporary clearly reveals that state law creates the cause of action (and, in fact, provides Contemporary with the only relief possible as a non-party to the arbitration) and that the right of Contemporary to the relief under state law does not require resolution of a substantial, disputed question of federal law. Consequently, the cause of action in the well-pleaded Motion for Modification of Arbitration Award of Contemporary does not “arise under” the laws of the United States and is not within the original “federal question” jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 1331 requires a nonfrivolous claim to a federal right or remedy and does not cover a locally governed contract claim merely because a tribal entity is a party.

Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, United States of America, and Department of Housing and Urba · filed 1986-07-29

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980). A non-frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. ... However, the fact that the Housing Authority is created by and operates on behalf of an Indian tribe is not alone sufficient to find the existence of a federal question. ... Because Weeks’ breach of contract claim does not require interpretation of the validity, construction or effect of federal law, no subject matter jurisdiction over the Housing Authority based on a federal question exists here.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when federal preemption and constitutional issues arise only as defenses to state-law claims.

Craig v. Congress Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1986-10-03

It should go without saying that defendants’ federal preemption and constitutional challenges to the Maine Severance Pay Act, raised as defenses in this action, do not confer federal question jurisdiction on this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 requires a federal question to appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint that identifies the federal provision invoked and alleges facts showing that the case arises under federal law.

Martinez v. United States Olympic Committee · filed 1986-10-06

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction must appear on the face of a plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. ... The complaint must identify the statutory or constitutional provision under which the claim arises, and allege sufficient facts to show that the case is one arising under federal law.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction cannot rest on anticipated federal defenses or on a federal issue that may arise later in litigation.

ANR Pipeline Co. v. Conoco, Inc. · filed 1986-10-22

Where state-law causes of action are alleged, federal defenses that the plaintiff anticipates defendant may assert are simply irrelevant to the determination of whether there is federal question jurisdiction. Similarly, it is also irrelevant that sometime during the course of litigation a federal question may arise.

Section 1331 jurisdiction exists only when a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint; a federal defense cannot create original or removal jurisdiction.

Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc. · filed 1987-04-01

A case “arises under” federal law within the meaning of section 1331 only if a federal question appears on the face of plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; original jurisdiction is lacking even if a defense is alleged to be based exclusively on federal law.

Section 1331 removal is unavailable for a well-pleaded state-law claim unless federal law preempts the state claim and supplies a federal cause of action; absent preemption, the plaintiff may remain in state court.

Amelia County School Board v. Virginia Board of Education · filed 1987-06-08

Because it is abundantly clear that Virginia does meet the minimum federal requirements, the preemption prong of the “artful pleading” doctrine has not been met, and the “well-pleaded complaint” rule governs. Consequently, plaintiffs are the masters of their claims, and can rightly pursue those claims in state court under state law.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams · filed 1987-06-09

The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when federal law neither creates the plaintiff's cause of action nor supplies a substantial federal issue on which the state-law right to relief necessarily depends.

Isaacs v. Group Health, Inc. · filed 1987-09-04

Moreover, even absent a finding that MESCO waived its right to remove, this Court would, nevertheless, remand the case to state court, as there is no basis for finding that federal law creates plaintiffs’ cause of action or that the plaintiffs’ right to relief necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal law.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the plaintiff's well-pleaded foreclosure complaint raises no federal issue, even if the defendant relies on federal regulations as a defense.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. LeCrone · filed 1989-02-23

FNMA’s complaint for foreclosure of LeCrone’s mortgage raises no federal issues and thus the suit between FNMA and LeCrone does not present a federal question for removal analysis, Mr. LeCrone’s reliance upon federal regulations in his defense notwithstanding.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a territorial land dispute pleaded under the Commonwealth constitution when the asserted federal Covenant and enabling statute are not substantive issues in the suit.

Mafnas v. Laureta · filed 1989-03-16

The only authority allowing removal then is 28 U.S.C. §1331, Federal Questions. ... Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction in the district courts "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." ... Defendants' reliance on the Covenant and 48 U.S.C. §1681 are also irrelevant. ... It is not a substantive issue in this suit which goes to the issue of whether supplying an indigenous person with the means to acquire land which will then be leased to a non-indigenous person violates Article XII.

Section 1331 follows the well-pleaded-complaint rule, so a federal tribal-immunity defense does not convert state tax claims into removable federal questions.

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham · filed 1989-03-29

The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. ... The possible existence of a tribal immunity defense, then, did not convert Oklahoma tax claims into federal questions, and there was no independent basis for original federal jurisdiction to support removal.

Sections 1331 and 1441 require a federal question on the complaint's face, and artful pleading does not support removal of state-law claims unless a final federal judgment wholly precludes them.

California v. Chevron Corp. · filed 1989-04-17

Normally a suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441; ... Normally a plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. ... To allow this type of removal except where a final federal judgment wholly precludes the state court suit would violate “the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule — that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.”

Section 1331 does not support removal when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint asserts only state-law claims and FEGLIA neither governs the dispute nor completely preempts those claims.

Mall v. Atlantic Financial Federal · filed 1989-06-23

Moreover, for both removal and original jurisdiction, the federal question must appear on the face of the complaint unaided by the answer, counterclaim or petition for removal. ... It neither expressly advanced nor impliedly suggested a federal cause of action nor are these claims preempted by federal law. Accordingly, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction to entertain the claim and this case will be remanded to state court.

Sections 1331 and 1441 require a federal question on the complaint's face, and artful pleading does not support removal of state-law claims unless a final federal judgment wholly precludes them.

People of the State of California v. Chevron Corporation · filed 1989-07-07

Normally a suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1441; ... Normally a plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. ... To allow this type of removal except where a final federal judgment wholly precludes the state court suit would violate "the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule--that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court."

A state-law employment claim does not arise under Section 1331 merely because its terms mirror a collective-bargaining agreement, but a plaintiff’s voluntary post-removal amendment adding a federal claim supplies jurisdiction and waives the removal objection.

Kidd v. Southwest Airlines, Co. · filed 1990-01-04

The incorporation of some collective bargaining standards into an otherwise independent agreement does not alter the nature of the underlying agreement. Federal question jurisdiction does not exist on this ground. ... Thus, the face of Kidd’s well-placed complaint in Texas state court does not allege a claim arising under federal labor laws. The district court did not have federal question jurisdiction upon removal from state court. ... Thus, where, after objecting to removal, the plaintiff voluntarily amends the original complaint to allege a federal cause of action, the plaintiff will have waived the ability to challenge removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support removal when every claim has an alternative state-law theory that does not require resolving federal law, and a prior federal judgment based only on state law cannot recharacterize later state claims as federal under the artful-pleading doctrine.

Ultramar America Ltd. v. Dwelle · filed 1990-04-16

Construing Ultramar’s well-pleaded complaint, this court cannot say that Ultra-mar’s right to relief ... necessarily ... depends upon construction of a substantial question of any federal environmental law. ... The fact that an alternative theory of relief exists for each claim alleged in the complaint, one not dependent upon federal law, is itself grounds to defeat federal question jurisdiction. ... We hold that when the prior federal judgment was grounded in state law, the state claims contained in a subsequent action filed in state court cannot be rechar-acterized as federal for purposes of removal.

A state-law claim that is both preempted by ERISA and within ERISA’s exclusive civil-remedy provision may be recharacterized as arising under federal law for federal-question removal jurisdiction.

Davis v. John Alden Life Insurance · filed 1990-08-29

Having already determined that the plaintiffs’ cause of action is both within the preemptive sweep of ERISA and within the general scope provision of ERISA, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ cause of action may be recharacterized to state a claim arising under federal law, specifically under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Consequently, the “complete preemption” doctrine is applicable to this ease, and this court has proper removal jurisdiction.

ERISA preemption of a state-law claim concerning conflicting employee-benefit coordination provisions supports original federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 426 Health & Welfare Fund v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1990-10-05

Defendants removed to this court, claiming that ERISA preempts Plaintiffs’ claim, and this court thus has original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction because ERISA does not preempt the Michigan Act. The Court finds that ERISA does preempt and subject matter jurisdiction is properly vested here.

Wholly state-law claims against a bankruptcy trustee do not arise under Section 1331 merely because federal bankruptcy preemption is asserted as a defense, unless Congress intended the claims to be completely preempted.

Robinson v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. · filed 1990-11-01

As discussed above, the claims contained within the plaintiffs’ complaint in this action are each based wholly on state law. Because claims against bankruptcy trustees do not fall within an area completely preempted by the force of federal law, this case could not have been commenced in federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A due-process allegation raised defensively to anticipated res judicata does not create Section 1331 removal jurisdiction when it is not an essential element appearing on the face of the original well-pleaded state-law complaint.

Martin v. Drummond Coal Co., Inc. · filed 1991-02-06

In either event, the “due process” issue is made necessary by defendant’s position and did not appear on the face of the original, well-pleaded complaint. The “well-pleaded complaint rule” is so ingrained in federal question removal jurisprudence that it needs no citation of authority. ... In the procedural posture of this case, plaintiff argues that his defensive allegation of a “due process” violation is not an essential element of his claim and does not create a plaintiff-created ground for removal. ... If this court were inclined to do so, it could distinguish both of these cases from the instant case, but the principle there enunciated is certainly applicable here.

Section 1331 removal requires a substantial federal claim essential to the well-pleaded complaint; neither a wholly frivolous constitutional claim nor a federal defense supplies jurisdiction.

Bahr v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. · filed 1991-05-02

Consequently, a district court must dismiss for want of jurisdiction if the asserted federal claim, that is the basis of jurisdiction, is obviously without merit or is wholly frivolous. ... It is obvious, therefore, that the federal claim set forth in the Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint is not “substantial” and falls within that small category of purported federal question cases to which other courts have held to be obviously without merit or wholly frivolous. ... Consequently, the NASD’s removal of the above styled action on this basis is inappropriate. ... Under the present statutory scheme, a Defendant may not remove a proceeding to federal court unless the Plaintiff’s “well pleaded complaint” establishes that the case “arises under” federal law and the right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States is an element, and an essential one, of the Plaintiff’s cause of action. ... As such, the second ground asserted by the Defendant also cannot serve as a basis for removal of the Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this cause.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state-law securities claims that are viable under both state and federal law merely because plaintiffs previously filed a federal suit before refiling in state court.

Howard v. Hibbard Brown & Co. · filed 1993-10-21

At issue in plaintiffs’ motion is whether this case was properly removed to this court based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims in the present ease are viable under both state law and federal law, the court cannot say that the claims are “essentially” federal in nature. ... The court concludes that the procedural maneuvering by the plaintiffs is not enough reason to place this case into the realm of the artful pleading doctrine. ... This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over federal claims, supporting denial of remand of an action asserting those claims.

Erickson v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc · filed 2013-10-04

The district court properly denied Erickson’s motion to remand because the district court had federal question jurisdiction over Erickson’s federal claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims that were part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction when the pleadings present no viable federal question.

Leech Lake Citizens Committee v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians · filed 1973-03-28

There is no federal question which would confer jurisdiction on this Court.

A substantial federal claim supplies § 1331 jurisdiction even if the court ultimately determines that the claim lacks merit.

Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co. · filed 1951-05-07

If the complaint raises a federal question, the mere claim confers power to decide that it has no merit, as well as to decide that it has.

A complaint must allege facts establishing a substantial federal claim; merely pleading the ultimate legal conclusion that equal protection was denied does not establish § 1331 jurisdiction.

Everlasting Development Corp. v. Sol Luis Descartes · filed 1951-11-30

However, something more than the mere pleading of such an ultimate conclusion of law is necessary to bring the complaint within 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A claim asserting a federal statutory right creates § 1331 jurisdiction whether or not the claimant ultimately proves the claim, and diversity is unnecessary.

In the Matter of Complaint and Suit of Samuel Cunningham v. Erie Railroad Company and United Railroad Workers of America · filed 1959-05-04

Whether he is right or wrong, there is jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, even without diversity.

Absent diversity, section 1331 jurisdiction requires a substantial federal question, though a federal court may abstain while state courts determine a predicate issue of state property law.

Williams v. City Of Wichita · filed 1960-05-23

There is no diversity of citizenship. Jurisdiction depends on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires a substantial federal question. ... These reasons are sufficient under Martin, Successor to Lawler, etc. v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224, 79 S.Ct. 1034, 3 L.Ed.2d 1186, and cases there cited, to support the lower court in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction in this declaratory judgment suit between citizens of the same state.

A private plaintiff invoking § 1331 must show that the defendant’s conduct invaded the plaintiff’s private legal rights and presents a substantial federal question.

Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency · filed 1962-11-28

We think it is well settled that in a private suit in a federal court, where it is claimed that a substantial federal question is involved, it must clearly appear that defendant’s acts constituted the invasion of plaintiffs’ private legal rights.

A bare allegation that a claim arises under federal law does not establish section 1331 jurisdiction; the complaint must disclose a genuine and substantial federal controversy controlling the result.

Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Puckkee · filed 1963-08-07

Federal jurisdiction of the claim cannot be sustained under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on the bare allegation that it “ * * * arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” ... A genuine and substantial Federal Question must be stated, and the Court will look beyond the naked allegations of the complaint, to determine whether the asserted claim is controlled or conditioned by Federal law.

Section 1331 requires the plaintiff’s asserted right to depend on the construction and effect of federal law, but jurisdiction depends on a substantial, noncolorable federal basis rather than whether the plaintiff will prevail.

Midwestern Developments, Inc. v. The City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1964-08-19

The asserted right must depend upon the operative effect of federal law, i. e., the result of the suit must depend upon the construction and effect of such law. ... But, jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the lawsuit does not depend upon whether the suitor is entitled to prevail. The court does not judge the merits of the lawsuit to determine jurisdiction. It will examine the plaintiff’s pleadings to determine only whether the asserted claim has a substantial basis in federal law and is not merely a colorable statement that the claim does so arise.

Section 1331(a) does not confer jurisdiction over a claim that presents no substantial federal question and essentially seeks federal review of state-court judgments construing state law.

Tkaczyk v. Gallagher · filed 1966-09-12(a)

Viewing plaintiffs’ claim in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as reflected in their complaint, briefs, statements of counsel in open court and all other papers and proceedings before the Court, there is no substantial federal question presented (Cranney v. Trustees of Boston University, 139 F.Supp. 130, 133 (D.Mass.1956)); ... (1) The action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with costs to defendants.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to review an urban-renewal hearing when no federal statute creates a private right of review and the due-process claim presents no substantial federal question.

Green Street Association v. Daley · filed 1967-01-25

For jurisdictional purposes, they rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009. … We held there that neither section 105(d) of the Housing Act nor section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides the basis for a federal right to judicial review of an urban renewal plan. We see no reason to reexamine our position in that case. Moreover, no substantial federal question of due process is raised. … The district court properly dismissed Count II.

Absent diversity, Section 1331 requires dismissal of a complaint that fails to present a substantial federal question.

New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller · filed 1967-01-31(a)

Accordingly, where, as here, there is no diversity of citizenship among the parties, a complaint which fails to present a substantial federal question must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

A federal question must be substantial and integral to the complaint for jurisdiction to attach under § 1331(a); an incidental or collateral federal issue is insufficient.

Jemzura v. Belden · filed 1968-02-16(a)

Where jurisdiction is asserted to exist on the basis of a federal question, that question must be a substantial one and must form an integral part of the complaint. A mere incidental or collateral federal question may appear, or may lurk in the background of the record, but this is not a sufficient or adequate basis upon which federal jurisdiction may attach.

Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over a sufficiently alleged federal controversy is distinct from whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted.

Yelinek v. Worley · filed 1968-05-06(a)

The doctrine of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), establishes a distinction between the question of federal jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the complaint to show a cause of action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. … Treating the complaint as sufficiently alleging a controversy which “arises under” the laws of the United States, and thereby giving the Court jurisdiction, the complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed.

Meeting Section 1331's former monetary threshold was not enough; the action also had to present a substantial federal question arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

National Cold Storage Co. v. Port of New York Authority · filed 1968-07-12

The court finds that the monetary requirement of Section 1331 is met. The satisfaction of the monetary requirement does not of itself vest federal jurisdiction for the action must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, the so-called federal question provision. It is not enough, however, that there be any federal question at issue but that there be a federal question which is not unsubstantial.

Section 1331 requires facts establishing a federal-rights violation; conclusory or anticipatory allegations made solely to obtain jurisdiction do not suffice.

Oliver v. Donovan · filed 1968-11-26

The plaintiffs cannot make out a case for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction under the various statutes cited in paragraph “12” of their complaint as the claimed basis of jurisdiction herein, unless they allege in their complaint facts establishing a violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. … It appears to this Court that even if it could be said that the claim herein is not unsubstantial nor frivolous it is made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, especially since no act has been shown to be violative of the 13th and 14th Amendments, no Amendment bars specifically any of the acts alleged, and no federal statute is claimed to have been violated. Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as a basis for jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiffs’ cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable defense.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction when a case presents a substantial federal question.

P. B. I. C., Inc. v. Byrne · filed 1970-05-06

that we have jurisdiction because of the substantial federal question here presented. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3).

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over property-deprivation claims based only on state officials' alleged violations of state law.

Flood v. Margis · filed 1971-01-15

In my opinion, the plaintiff’s claims that the defendants’ violations of state law have resulted in the deprivation of property without due process of law do not state a substantial federal question so as to give this court jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a municipal taxpayer's claim that local officials mismanaged public property when no federal right is infringed.

Booth v. Lemont Mfg. Corp. · filed 1971-03-29(a)

There is no jurisdiction under the federal constitution or the federal statutes to entertain appellant's suit herein, even if it were to be considered a taxpayer's suit for the benefit of the municipality.

Section 1331 requires a substantial claim founded directly on federal law, and no federal jurisdiction exists when local law can resolve the controversy without interpreting federal law.

Cabana Management, Inc. v. Hyatt Corporation · filed 1971-05-11

To confer original jurisdiction on the federal courts under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (general federal question) there must be a substantial claim founded directly upon federal law. ... A corollary of this doctrine is that when the controversy between the parties may be decided under local law without the necessity of interpreting a federal statute, there is no federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331(a) requires a substantial federal question to be directly in issue when diversity is absent.

Kheel v. Port of New York Authority · filed 1971-07-28(a)

Diversity of citizenship being absent, plaintiffs must show that a substantial federal question is directly in issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 1331 requires a real and substantial federal question that is an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, not one merely lurking in the background.

Essling v. Brubacker · filed 1971-11-12

In order for jurisdiction to be properly based on the existence of a “federal question” that question must constitute an essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action and form an integral part of his case. ... The question must be real and substantial and not conjectural. ... It is not enough that the question of federal law be merely lurking in the background.

Section 1331 does not support jurisdiction when the complaint fails to raise a substantial federal question.

Colon v. State of New York, Division of Human Rights · filed 1973-01-05

Since plaintiff fails to raise a substantial federal question, his complaint is dismissed.

Section 1331 requires a substantial claim founded directly on federal law.

Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corporation · filed 1973-08-24

To bring a case within section 1331 a plaintiff must have a substantial claim founded directly upon federal law.

A federal claim can be sufficiently substantial for Section 1331 jurisdiction even when the court ultimately decides it against the plaintiff.

Hendrickson v. Wilson · filed 1973-08-30

The court finds here that the federal question asserted by plaintiffs, though decided adversely to them, was nevertheless of sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.

A claim that a registered federal judgment violated § 1963 presented a substantial federal question under § 1331(a), permitting the registering court to decide closely related nonfederal claims.

Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co. v. Vincent Lirocchi, D/B/A Cable Climber Sales Co. · filed 1974-01-03(a)

Thereafter appellant abandoned its allegation that jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship and instead asserted jurisdiction on the basis that a federal question existed. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... Applying these principles to the present case, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the registering court under § 1963 to take the remedial steps indicated above, where a foreign judgment has been registered in clear violation of the statute, presents a substantial federal question which it has the power to decide along with a closely related non-federal claim.

Section 1331 requires a substantial claim founded directly on federal law rather than a state-law dispute linked only indirectly to federal law.

Schantz v. White Lightning · filed 1973-10-29

From a simple application of the language of 28 U. S.C. § 1331, I feel that the requirement of a “claim arising under the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States” has not been met. Wright’s discussion of a federal question [Wright Law of Federal Courts, 2d Ed., Chapter 3, § 17], points up both that the statute, to be usable, must have a common sense application, citing Judge Cardozo, and that a workable rule is to require a substantial claim founded directly upon Federal law, citing Professor Mishkin.

Section 1331 cannot sustain federal-question jurisdiction when the substantive federal statutes invoked do not confer subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Andrew J. Smith, Etc. v. United Mine Workers of America, an Unincorporated Association, and Louis Kosec · filed 1974-04-01

The trial court also found federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments). We have held that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction under either LMRA or LMRDA. It follows that there is no federal question which would sustain federal question jurisdiction under the mentioned sections.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction to enforce a System Board of Adjustment award when the complaint presents a substantial claim arising under the Railway Labor Act.

Adamszewski v. Local Lodge 1487, International Association of MacHinists and Aerospaceworkers, Afl-Cio · filed 1974-06-05

In such a case jurisdiction would exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1337 provided that the complaint presented a substantial claim arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188.

Section 1331 requires a federal right or immunity to be an essential element of the cause of action; a mere suggestion of a federal issue does not convert a state-law tort into a federal question.

Schantz v. Ada White Lightning and Leroy White Lightning, Jack F. Schaff v. Ada White Lightning and Leroy White Li · filed 1974-08-28(a)

“A mere ‘suggestion’ of a federal question is not sufficient.” Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124, 127 (8th Cir. 1968). The only action, to be litigated under the facts of the case before us are those which may arise under the state law of North Dakota. Accordingly, the District Court has no jurisdiction under § 1331(a) to entertain this lawsuit.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a claim involving no federally created right or immunity that depends on judicial construction.

Buda v. Saxbe · filed 1975-01-06

Likewise, there is no right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States involved, which depends upon judicial construction, so that this Court lacks jurisdiction of the state’s counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction when good-faith allegations present issues arising under federal statutes and the Constitution.

CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. Simon · filed 1975-11-18

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the plaintiff’s good faith allegations predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and issues arising under 27 U.S.C. § 205, 5 U.S.C. § 701, and the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 1331 covers substantial, justiciable due-process claims challenging congressional action.

Weeks v. United States · filed 1975-12-18

We are persuaded that the Kansas Delawares present substantial constitutional claims under the Due Process Clause — claims deserving consideration on their merits. And since we are also convinced that the claims are justiciable, as explained below, we feel the case is properly here under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.

A claim does not present a substantial federal question under Section 1331 merely because it invokes federal statutes when its validity turns only on factual application rather than construction of those statutes.

Harris v. Commonwealth of Pa. · filed 1976-07-21

While plaintiff’s claims rely on rights founded upon federal statutes, we do not believe that the validity of her claims depend in any sense on the construction which we give such statutes as would create a substantial federal question within the ambit of § 1331. ... Thus plaintiff’s assertion of this court’s jurisdiction over the named defendants based on the existence of a federal question within the meaning of § 1331 must be denied.

Section 1331 requires allegations distinctly presenting a real and substantial federal question and cannot be invoked by formal jurisdictional statements when the federal statute creates neither the asserted duty nor an express remedy.

Girardier v. Webster College · filed 1976-11-15

It is a well settled rule of law that federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 cannot be invoked by formal statements alone. Plaintiffs' allegations must distinctly disclose a real and substantial question of a federal nature. ... The plaintiffs here fail to cite a duty or invoke an express remedy created by the Bankruptcy Act.

A sham Fourteenth Amendment claim cannot support Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over a municipality.

McCoy v. Thorn · filed 1978-06-01(a)

The inclusion of an action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a mere sham, insufficient to support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). As there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, there is no pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims against the City.

A Bivens claim cannot invoke Section 1331 when its jurisdictional assertion is without color of merit and no alleged facts could entitle the plaintiff to relief.

Fennell v. Carlson · filed 1978-11-09

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff’s assertion that this Court has jurisdiction herein under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is without color of merit.

Section 1331 supports jurisdiction when a complaint raises substantial federal questions.

Metcalf v. Trainor · filed 1979-05-07

The court finds that the consolidated complaint raises substantial federal questions providing sufficient grounds for the assertion of federal jurisdiction.

A federally derived right does not arise under federal law for Section 1331 purposes unless the suit substantially disputes the validity, construction, or effect of federal law and the result depends on that dispute.

Tulsa County Public Health Nursing Service, Inc. v. Tulsa City-County Health Department · filed 1979-08-30

There is no federal question here. The Court is not asked to interpret a vague or puzzling section or phrase of the Medicare Act, or of any of the H.E.W. regulations. They are all clear, and have been applied by the proper agencies to determine that the “certified provider” here is the combined agency of both Plaintiff and Defendant Health Department. “A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends.”

Section 1331 requires a substantial claim founded directly on federal law and does not confer jurisdiction when the alleged federal question is conclusory and without merit.

Lake Lansing Special Assessment Protest Ass'n v. Ingham County Board of Commissioners · filed 1980-04-16

To bring a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 a Plaintiff must have a substantial claim founded directly upon federal law. ... The Court finds that such a federal question, as contemplated by Section 1331, if one exists, is without merit and thus subject matter jurisdiction is not conferred upon this Court by virtue of alleging that a federal question arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to enforce an IRS regulation that imposes no mandatory duty on the agency.

Continental Electric Co. v. Kurtz · filed 1980-06-04

The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... we find no mandatory duty imposed by the regulation or basis for jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for dismissal.

Section 1331 reaches a student-voter-registration challenge that presents a substantial Fourteenth Amendment question.

Auerbach v. Kinley · filed 1980-10-09

This Court is persuaded that neither ... nor the other cases relied upon by defendants here satisfy the test set forth in ... and that plaintiffs’ challenge to the student voter registration scheme raises a substantial federal question.

Section 1331 supplies subject-matter jurisdiction when an environmental challenge presents a substantial federal question.

CITIZENS AGAINST 2, 4-D v. Watt · filed 1981-08-11

The Court finds and concludes that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, by reason of a substantial federal question being present.

Section 1331 does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff cannot show that a federal right is implicated.

The Genesee Brewing Company, Inc. v. Village of Sodus Point, New York · filed 1984-05-01

Since Genesee failed to show a basis for subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the defendant’s contention that no federal jurisdiction existed was correct.

Section 1331 supplies subject-matter jurisdiction when federal questions remain in the litigation.

Oklahoma Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc. · filed 1985-01-07

Since federal questions do exist, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is determined from the complaint's allegations and exists only when they disclose a real and substantial federal question.

Roberts v. Clark · filed 1985-08-29

When jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is challenged, the issue must be determined by considering the allegations of the complaint. If the allegations disclose a real, substantial federal question, there is jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not itself establish jurisdiction; the party invoking it must plead facts supporting a substantial federal question, and jurisdiction is presumed absent until demonstrated.

Terpstra v. Farmers and Merchants Bank · filed 1985-10-07

This section, by itself, does not confer jurisdiction. ... The complaint must set forth facts which provide a sufficient basis to establish a substantial federal question. ... The limited jurisdiction of federal courts places the onus of establishing proper jurisdiction on the party seeking it. There is a presumption of lack of jurisdiction until it is demonstrated that such jurisdiction exists.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction when the complaint fails to allege a viable cause of action arising under the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties.

Lundt v. Hodges · filed 1985-12-31

The plaintiff alleges in ¶ 8 of his complaint that this Court’s jurisdiction is based, in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, the plaintiff has failed to allege a variable cause of action which arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. ... Finding that the Court does not have jurisdiction under either of the above statutes, it is unnecessary for the Court to review plaintiffs remaining allegations.

Section 1331 requires an alleged violation of the Constitution or a federal statute and does not sustain jurisdiction when the plaintiff demonstrates neither.

Goulding v. Irving Feinglass and Irwin Solomon, Randall S. Goulding v. Thomas Dietz · filed 1987-03-13

A prerequisite in maintaining an action in federal court under ... is that the plaintiff must allege a violation of the United States Constitution or a federal statute. ... We hold that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was proper because there was a lack of federal jurisdiction since the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either a violation of the United States Constitution or a federal statute.

A state-law claim presents a substantial federal question under Section 1331 when construing federal law is decisive to rights and relationships created by federal law, even if the federal statute supplies no private right of action.

West 14th Street Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners Corp. · filed 1987-03-18

Nonetheless, assuming that plaintiffs have no private right of action under § 3607, we conclude that the federal element in plaintiffs’ state cause of action would still be sufficiently substantial to confer arising under jurisdiction. ... In light of this qualitative difference, the federal ingredient in plaintiffs’ complaint in this case is sufficiently substantial to confer the arising under jurisdiction. Having found federal jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits.

A state-law claim incorporating duties from a federal executive order can support Section 1331 removal only if the order provides a private federal cause of action.

Milton UTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VARIAN ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-04-07

Only if the executive order provides Utley with a private right of action against Varian in federal court might his complaint raise a “substantial” federal question permitting removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide arising-under jurisdiction when a state-law claim uses a federal statutory violation as an element but Congress created no express or implied federal cause of action for that violation.

Hedges v. Legal Services Corp. · filed 1987-04-14

Thus, since Congress does not expressly or implicitly provide a federal cause of action for § 2996d(b)(2) violations, this court has no jurisdiction over plaintiff’s suit.

Federal-question jurisdiction over a Rule 22 interpleader exists when at least one threatened action fairly alleged in the complaint arises under federal law, but state claims do not qualify merely because federally funded coupons or federally mandated contract terms are involved.

De Ponce v. Hinsdale Supermarket Corp. · filed 1987-06-26

This court therefore holds that federal question jurisdiction exists if at least one of the threatened actions fairly alleged in the interpleader complaint arises under federal law. ... For the foregoing reasons this court concludes that none of the alleged state causes of action include as a necessary element a substantial issue of federal law sufficient to give this court jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support removal of state-law escrow claims when the invoked federal statute creates no private remedy and therefore presents no substantial federal question.

Bergkamp v. New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. · filed 1987-08-27

The Court finds persuasive the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, and concludes that no private remedy was intended under Section 10 of RESPA. Without a private right of action, there can be no “substantial” question of federal law and no basis for removal jurisdiction under the federal question statute.

A state-law cause of action arises under Section 1331 when it embodies a substantial federal question, including duties created by a federal housing program and its regulations.

City of New York v. Rapgal Associates · filed 1989-01-10

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction lies in the federal courts for civil actions “arising under” federal law. ... It is unnecessary to determine whether the City based its suit on a federal or state cause of action. Instead, it is sufficient for this Court to find that a substantial federal question exists in this case. Federal law created HUD’s NSA program and delineated the City’s ministerial role.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a state-law challenge to an execution sale when the claim presents no substantial federal question.

Bernard Sephus and George Lafleche v. Peter Gozelski, Elijah Hunter, Defendants-Third Party Robert M. Hustead, Third Par · filed 1989-02-06

The federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all civil actions where the matter in controversy arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331. ... Because the Hunters claim involves no substantial federal question, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with direction to DISMISS based on lack of jurisdiction.

A state-law claim does not arise under Section 1331 merely because it involves the receipt or expenditure of federal funds; resolving federal law must be a real, substantial, and essential element of the claim.

Gingerich v. White Pigeon Community Schools · filed 1990-04-13

Defendants mistakenly assume that the receipt and use of federal funds is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. To invoke federal question jurisdiction, the claim must “arise under” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... A state-created claim can only be said to “arise under” federal law if the dispute turns upon the “validity, construction, or effect of federal law” where the federal question is a real and substantial issue whose resolution is an ... essential element of the case. ... No “real and substantial issue” of federal law exists here, and therefore Count Y will be remanded together with the other state-law claims.

Section 1331 jurisdiction requires more than merely stating a federal cause of action; a facially insubstantial federal claim does not suffice.

Cushing v. Moore · filed 1992-01-29

Plaintiffs’ mere statement of a federal cause of action is not necessarily enough to invoke this court’s jurisdiction through § 1331.

Section 1331 does not itself create a cause of action; federal-question jurisdiction requires a claim under federal law or the Constitution.

Peabody v. State of Arizona · filed 1992-08-26

Peabody correctly identifies the statutes that would have vested the district court with jurisdiction to hear his claim: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. But these statutes do not, by themselves, create a cause of action: ... To establish federal question jurisdiction, Peabody must state a claim under a federal statute or under the Constitution. He hasn't.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction for a federal securities claim, but that basis cannot be maintained after the claim fails.

K & W ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Appolito · filed 1992-11-06

Because Plaintiffs’ securities fraud claim is not viable, there is no basis upon which federal question jurisdiction may be maintained.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a federal claim that is neither immaterial to the dispute nor wholly insubstantial and frivolous, even when its merits are doubtful.

Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Young · filed 1992-11-12

A careful review of plaintiffs’ complaint leads the court to conclude that the § 1983 claim is not “immaterial to the true thrust of the complaint” nor “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” ... Consequently, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim on the ground of insubstantiality is denied.

Section 1331 permits dismissal of an asserted federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only when the claim was made solely to obtain jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.

Young v. Francis · filed 1993-05-04

An action based upon the alleged existence of a federal question may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if the allegation is “ ‘made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction,’ ” or is “ ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ ”

Section 1331 provides no federal-question jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the only federal claim is dismissed.

Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transportation Co. · filed 1994-02-18

Because this court lacks federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the supplemental state claims must be dismissed unless the plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a federal claim that is not wholly insubstantial and frivolous, even if the claim ultimately fails.

Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life · filed 1994-09-02

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... As did the Supreme Court in Bray, we hold that while PFWHC's Sec. 1985(3) claim fails, it was not, prior to the Court's holding in Bray, " 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous'... so to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction."

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over a federal claim that fails on the merits if the claim was not wholly insubstantial and frivolous.

Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc. · filed 1994-09-02

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Appellants contend that because Bray held the first clause of § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of aetion against anti-abortion activists seeking to block health clinics which perform abortions, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the state claims in this case. As did the Supreme Court in Bray, we hold that while PFWHC’s § 1985(3) claim fails, it was not, prior to the Court’s holding in Bray, “ “wholly insubstantial and frivolous’... so to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction.”

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law conversion claim when a substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of the claim.

Schulze v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. · filed 1994-09-14

Although the complete preemption doctrine is inapplicable, removal is appropriate if “it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of [that] state claim[ ]”—namely, the existence or absence of lawful justification for Legg Mason’s actions. ... Whether Legg Mason’s actions were justified requires an interpretation of Section 6332(a), namely whether Legg Mason was “in possession of’ or “obligated with respect to” any property of Kenneth Schulze. Accordingly, the conversion claim is removable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when the complaint’s only federal claim seeks a remedy unavailable under the federal statute it invokes.

McMurray v. Harwood · filed 1994-12-14

Because 35 U.S.C. § 256 plainly does not permit the remedy plaintiff seeks, the complaint fails to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, and the first claim for relief must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1331 requires an alleged federal source for a claimed immunity from state prosecution; immunity arising from state law presents no federal question even when tied to compliance with federal regulations.

Conkey v. Reno · filed 1995-05-04

However, plaintiffs never identify the source of that immunity. If it arises from federal law, there might be jurisdiction. However, it is equally possible the claimed immunity or bar arises from state law; i.e. Nevada could exempt the prohibitions of certain state laws on the basis of a person’s compliance with corollary federal regulations. If such is the case, the existence of the asserted immunity or bar presents no federal question under § 1331 nor any jurisdiction arising under § 1337(a) nor any jurisdiction arising under § 1343(a)(3).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when the alleged federal claim is insubstantial.

Patterson v. Hamrick · filed 1995-06-27

Because plaintiffs’ federal claim is not substantial, this Court correctly found that there was no federal question jurisdiction upon which removal was proper and correctly remanded the case to state court.

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim when the asserted implied cause of action is nonfrivolous, even if the claim ultimately fails on the merits.

Herrmann v. Meridian Mortgage Corp. · filed 1995-09-12

Since the argument is non-frivolous, this court has jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs first cause of action — and, via this court’s supplemental jurisdiction, the balance of plaintiffs claims.

Section 1331 jurisdiction persists when a federal claim later fails if the claim was not wholly insubstantial and frivolous before the controlling ruling.

PORTLAND FEMINIST WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER v. ADVOCATES FOR LIFE · filed 1995-10-18

Appellants contend that because Bray held the first clause of Sec. 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action against anti-abortion activists seeking to block health clinics which perform abortions, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the state claims in this case. As did the Supreme Court in Bray, we hold that while PFWHC's Sec. 1985(3) claim fails, it was not, prior to the Court's holding in Bray, " 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous' ... so to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction."

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim even if the claim later fails on the merits.

National Trust v. Ecm Motor Co. · filed 1996-02-05

Given the generosity of this standard, it is obviously possible that a plaintiff may successfully invoke federal jurisdiction, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and yet may lose on some other ground, such as a failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), or failure to prove the merits after a full trial.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a separate veil-piercing suit that alleges no underlying violation of federal law.

Peacock v. Thomas · filed 1996-02-21

Because Thomas alleged no “underlying” violation of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan, neither ERISA’s jurisdictional provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U. S. C. § 1331 supplied the District Court with subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit.

Section 1331 gives a court federal-question jurisdiction over a facially substantial claim seeking recovery under federal law, even if the claim fails on the merits.

Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund · filed 1996-04-15

That is, in cases where the asserted basis for subject matter jurisdiction is also an element of the plaintiffs allegedly federal cause of action, we ask only whether — on its face — the complaint is drawn so as to seek recovery under federal law or the Constitution. If so, then we assume or find a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, and reserve further scrutiny for an inquiry on the merits.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over a state malpractice claim merely because it involves federal law issues that are insufficiently substantial.

Custer v. Sweeney · filed 1996-07-22

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Custer's legal mal- practice claim after dismissing his ERISA claim because Custer's legal malpractice claim is not completely preempted by ERISA and does not incorporate federal law issues substantial enough to create federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 requires a question of federal law; a claim that alleges no federal basis against a defendant does not establish federal-question jurisdiction over that claim.

Moses v. Bond · filed 1996-08-22

Generally, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only if a case involves parties with diverse citizenship in an action for at least $50,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or if the case involves a question of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Plaintiff also has failed to allege a federal claim against the defendant physicians.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a Title VII claim unless the claim is wholly insubstantial; whether the defendant qualifies as a Title VII employer goes to the merits.

Smith v. Norwest Financial Wyoming, Inc. · filed 1996-10-15

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 unless Smith’s claim for relief is “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” ... Thus, the definition of employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) is important only on substantive, rather than jurisdictional grounds.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a claim without a federal cause of action when its resolution requires deciding a substantial federal issue that implicates an important federal interest.

Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co. · filed 1996-10-23

Because adjudication of Ormet’s claim implicates a substantial federal interest, we hold that this action arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a claim arising under federal law when the claim is substantial enough to present a federal controversy, even if it may ultimately fail on the merits.

Leclaire Courts Resident Management Corp. v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1996-10-28

As the Court finds that it will have to interpret § 1437r to determine whether RMC has a cause of action under that statute, or under § 1983 based on a right conferred by § 1437r, the Court cannot find the assertion of a private right of action to enforce § 1437r is so insubstantial, implausible, or completely devoid of merit so as to not involve a federal controversy within the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court. ... Therefore, the Court finds that under the substantiality test of jurisdiction the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter under § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction when a complaint asserts a federal claim, even if the claim is likely to fail on the merits.

McCreary v. Wilt · filed 1998-07-28

Generally, the reference to a federal question in the complaint precludes dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.