20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(a)(1) treats a source’s statement as a medical opinion only if it outlines the claimant’s impairments and limitations.

Underhill v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-12-07(a)(1)

The ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Rezvani did not provide a medical opinion outlining Underhill’s impairments and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) requires a medical opinion to describe what a claimant can still do despite the claimant's impairments, specifically in relation to work activities.

Luksic v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-22(a)(1)

Moreover, the treatment note did not include any statement or description as to what Via could still do despite his impairments, specifically in relation to work activities – a requirement under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1); Mohssen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action No. 12-14501, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165782, at *25-26 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013) (“[C]ourts have specifically drawn a distinction between a doctor’s notes for purposes of treatment and a doctor’s ultimate opinion on an individual’s ability to work.” (citing Brownawell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2008)); cf. Link v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-01175, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139658, at *31-32 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 2023) (finding that statements from a doctor in a disability benefits questionnaire that “work requiring heavy lifting and forceful repetitive back motions would not be recommended” and “work requiring prolonged standing and walking would not be recommended” qualified as “medical opinions”). Under the regulations, Dr. Weaver’s treatment note does not qualify as a “medical opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as a statement from an acceptable medical source reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments and limitations.

Vigil v. Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-06(a)(1)

According to the regulations, a medical opinion is a “statement[] from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite your impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A report is not a medical opinion under § 404.1527(a)(2) when it merely references medical records without offering judgments about the cited evidence or meaningful insight into the claimant’s functional limitations.

Monet-Moyano v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-30(a)(2)

DE Cotto’s report does not qualify as a medical opinion. The Social Security regulations define medical opinions as “statements from physicians . . . or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite your impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added). ... The report is bare bones and simply references record copies, including Plaintiff’s various hospitalizations, a report by a consultative examiner, Plaintiff’s medication and dosage history, and her symptoms, without discussing or providing judgments about the cited evidence. ... Not only is DE Cotto’s note that Plaintiff “should not attend public” vague, it provides barely any guidance as to what Plaintiff can still do in the workplace and offers little insight, if any, into Plaintiff’s functional limitations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) requires a medical opinion to state concrete judgments about what a claimant can still do despite impairments; vague, equivocal statements do not qualify.

Baumgardner v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-11-20(a)(2)

Dr. Seidman’s opinion contains no information regarding what plaintiff “can still do despite [his] impairments,” including only vague language such as “likely” rather than concrete limitations. Tr. 1259-60; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2); 416.927(a)(1); see also see also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that equivocal language is inadequate in determining specific limitations). According to the regulations, Dr. Seidman’s opinion did not qualify as a medical opinion and, as such, the ALJ was under no obligation to evaluate it as such.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as a judgment about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, including what the claimant can still do and the claimant’s restrictions; statements that a claimant is disabled, unable to return to prior work, or totally incapacitated do not qualify.

Villarruel v. Dudek · filed 2025-04-03(a)(1)

In 2016, Dr. Greenwald opined that Villarruel was “permanently or at least partially disabled” and could not return to “his previous work status.” Months later, Dr. Greenwald indicated that Villarruel was “Totally Incapacitated.” None of these statements qualifies as a medical opinion, which is defined in the governing regulation as a “judgment[] about the nature and severity of” a claimant’s impairments, including symptoms, diagnoses, and prognoses, and “what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). The ALJ reasonably found that Dr. Greenwald’s opinions were on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as a statement from an acceptable medical source reflecting judgments about a claimant’s impairments, remaining abilities, or restrictions.

Madkins v. Bisignano · filed 2025-09-03(a)(2)

Here, neither party disputes that Dr. Prosser’s assessment constitutes a medical opinion. We agree that it so qualifies because it is a statement from a psychologist about Madkins’s mental impairments, what she can still do despite those impairments, and her mental restrictions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as a medical source’s judgment about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, including what the claimant can still do and the claimant’s restrictions.

Bonney v. Bisignano · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

Dr. Slutsky’s report is not a “medical opinion” as defined by regulation, because it did not provide any judgment “about the nature and severity of [Plaintiff’s] impairment(s), including . . . what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (defining “medical opinions”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) does not treat a doctor’s bare prediction about returning to work as a medical opinion when it gives no judgment about the claimant’s limitations or remaining abilities.

Cowan v. Astrue · filed 2008-12-24(a)(2)

First, Dr. Gietzen’s brief statement on the medical form was not a true medical opinion. It did not contain Dr. Gietzen’s judgment about the nature and severity of Mr. Cowan’s physical limitations, or any information about what activities Mr. Co-wan could still perform.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A physician’s opinion about a claimant’s ability to work is a medical opinion even when it addresses disability, an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Fuller v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-21(a)(2)

An opinion that Plaintiff cannot work a 40-hour workweek with the usual expectations and demands, and that he is “totally and permanently disabled” reflects judgments about the severity of Plaintiffs impairments, about the prognosis for his condition, and about what Plaintiff can still do despite his impairments. Moreover, Dr. Pro is a physician, a psychiatrist, and an acceptable medical source. Therefore, his opinion regarding disability and ability to work a 40-hour week is, by definition, a medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record.

Roldan-Colon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-09(c)(2)(i), (c)(4), (d)(2), and (e)(2)(i)

For this reason, the ALJ will give controlling weight to the opinions of treating physicians if they are well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a well-supported and consistent treating physician’s opinion controlling weight under the treating physician rule.

Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-02-28(c)(2)

In assessing a disability claim, an ALJ must consider and weigh the various medical opinions of record. Because Plaintiff’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, the ALJ was required to apply the treating physician rule, under which a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to “controlling weight” when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight on the nature and severity of an impairment when it is well supported by medically acceptable techniques and is not inconsistent with the substantial evidence of record.

Juarez v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-25(d)(2)

Under the treating physician rule, the ALJ must give “controlling weight” to the opinion of a claimant's treating physician as to the nature and severity of the impairment as long as it “‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight only when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.

New v. O'Malley · filed 2024-03-26(c)(2)

“According to this rule, the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician as to the nature and severity of the impairment is given controlling weight so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires controlling weight for a treating physician’s opinion about the nature and severity of an impairment when the opinion is well supported by acceptable medical evidence and is not inconsistent with other substantial record evidence.

Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-05-23(c)(2)

The treating physician rule requires that “the opinion of a [plaintiff’s] treating physician as to the nature and severity of the impairment is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (regulations for evaluating opinion evidence for claims filed before March 27, 2017). ... Accordingly, I find that the ALJ applied the correct standard in analyzing Dr. Awwa’s opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic testing and is not inconsistent with the other substantial record evidence.

Blanford v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-06-07(d)(2)

Under the rule, ALJs must give a treating physician’s opinion about an impairment “‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic testing and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally favors medical opinions from treating sources, limits medical opinions and treating-source status to acceptable medical sources, and reserves whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner.

Smart v. Berryhill · filed 2019-12-30(a)(1)–(2), (c)(2), (d)

The regulations provide that more weight will generally be given to “medical opinions” from “treating sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). “Medical opinions” are defined as “statements from acceptable medical sources,” and “treating source” is defined as an “acceptable medical source” with whom the claimant has or has had an ongoing treatment relationship. Id. § 404.1527(a)(1)–(2). A therapist such as Harshaw is not an “acceptable medical source.” Id. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a). Thus, Harshaw is not a treating source whose medical opinions are generally entitled to greater weight—in fact, Harshaw cannot even render a medical opinion. ... The ALJ properly assigned minimal weight to Burns’s opinion that Plaintiff “had a strong enough case to submit a disability claim,” (Tr. 555), because the issues of whether Plaintiff is disabled and unable to work are reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); Pascoe v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-226, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114178, at *9 (W.D.N.C. July 22, 2012).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) does not treat a medical source who examined a claimant on only one occasion as a treating source because there is no ongoing treatment relationship.

Bolton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2018-04-11(a)(2)

Finally, Dr. Gilbert and Dr. Ganshirt were not treating sources, but rather referrals from Dr. Schack; each examined Bolton on a single occasion, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2); Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2015), and the ALJ properly evaluated their opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a treating source by an ongoing treatment relationship, while allowing infrequent evaluations to qualify when their nature and frequency are typical for the claimant's condition.

Malone v. Saul · filed 2019-06-14(a)(2)

A “treating source” must have an “ongoing treatment relationship,” meaning that Plaintiff must “see, or have seen, the source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [Plaintiff’s medical condition(s)].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). However, a medical source that has evaluated a patient “only a few times or only after long intervals (e.g., twice a year)” can be considered a treating source “if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical for [Plaintiff’s condition(s)].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a treating source by an ongoing treatment relationship, while allowing infrequent evaluations when their nature and frequency are typical for the claimant’s condition.

Malone v. Saul · filed 2019-11-22(a)(2)

A “treating source” must have an “ongoing treatment relationship,” meaning that Malone must “see, or have seen, the source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [Malone’s] medical condition(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). However, a medical source that has evaluated a patient “only a few times or only after long intervals (e.g., twice a year)” can be considered a treating source “if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical for [Malone’s] condition(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). ... This examination was the only time King assessed Malone, and therefore, the ALJ correctly did not consider King to be a treating physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives treating-source opinions more weight only when the source has an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant during the relevant period.

Ramsey v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-10-30(c)(2)

As an initial matter, we disagree that Dr. Lewis’s opinion was entitled to the level of deference provided to treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (explaining that more weight is given to the opinions of “treating sources”). Dr. Lewis saw Ramsey only once prior to the ALJ’s decision, and Ramsey eventually chose to pursue surgical treatment with Dr. Anthony Leone. Dr. Lewis did not have an “ongoing treatment relationship” with Ramsey during the relevant period. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that a doctor was not a treating physician because he did not have an “ongoing physician-treatment relationship” with the claimant during the period of alleged disability). Therefore, the Appeals Council did not need to engage in an explicit analysis of the factors we laid out in Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a medical source as a treating source when the claimant sees the source with a frequency consistent with accepted practice, including only a few times or at long intervals when typical for the condition.

Price v. Saul · filed 2021-01-28(a)(2)

A treating physician is one who has provided a plaintiff “with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with” that plaintiff. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(a)(2). ... While five visits is relatively few, the Court finds that it is sufficient to establish a treating physician relationship under the circumstances of this case. Specifically, Dr. Greenfield is a specialist, and recommended that plaintiff see him only every six months. ... The relationship can fairly be described as “ongoing.” ... Generally, we will consider that you have an ongoing treatment relationship with an acceptable medical source when the medical evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for your medical condition(s). We may consider an acceptable medical source who has treated or evaluated you only a few times or only after long intervals (e.g., twice a year) to be your treating source if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical for your condition(s).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For claims governed by the former treating-source rule, an ongoing treatment relationship is required for a medical source to qualify as a treating source and receive controlling-weight consideration.

Ball v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-15(c)(2)

The undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err when determining that Dr. Cass was not a treating source. “A physician qualifies as a treating source if there is an ‘ongoing treatment relationship’ such that the claimant sees the physician ‘with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [the] medical condition.’” Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). A Court must determine if an ongoing treatment relationship exists at the time the physician’s opinion is rendered. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 04-2171, 167 F. App’x 496, 506 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2006). In this case, the record does not reflect that the evaluators had an ongoing relationship with Plaintiff.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the prior medical-opinion regulations, a physician who evaluated a claimant only twice years apart, with no evidence of an ongoing treatment relationship, is not a treating source entitled to extra weight or review under the treating-source good-cause standard.

Chait v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-25(a)(2)

Under the regulations, a “treating source” provides the claimant “with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you,” seen “with a frequency.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Here, Dr. Allen, a psychiatrist with the David Lawrence Center, evaluated Chait twice—once in 2005 (years before the onset date), and once in 2012. (Tr. 870, 953.) Other than these two evaluations, there are no other records from Dr. Allen, or the David Lawrence Center, that would show an “ongoing treatment relationship” with Chait. Thus, the Court does not give Dr. Allen’s opinion any extra weight or evaluate it using the good cause standard.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) excludes a physician from treating-source status when the relationship was based solely on obtaining a report supporting a disability claim.

Goble McGuire, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-10-16(a)(2)

A treating physician is one who has (or had) “an ongoing treatment relationship” with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). If the claimant’s relationship with the physician at issue was based “solely on [the claimant’s] need to obtain a report in support of [the] claim for disability,” the physician is not a treating source. Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives special weight to a treating source opinion based on a treatment relationship that existed when the opinion was prepared; later visits do not confer that status retroactively.

Luttrell v. Astrue · filed 2011-12-23(d)(2)

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Tidwell did not qualify as a treating physician when he prepared his report. ... A treating source opinion is accorded special weight because that opinion is uniquely informed by an extant treating relationship; a later-arising relationship obviously has no value in that regard.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A physician who evaluates a claimant only once is not a treating source, so the physician’s report is not entitled to controlling weight.

Esparza v. Saul · filed 2023-03-31(a)(2), (c)(2)

The report Plaintiff relies on was a one-time evaluation. ... Therefore, the ALJ was not required to give Dr. Roeser’s report controlling weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) makes an ongoing treatment relationship relevant when evaluating the weight of a medical opinion.

Velez v. Commisioner of Social Security · filed 2020-11-20(a)(2)

And while Vélez argued that Dr. Carreras should have been allotted greater weight, I note that the treatment relationship with Dr. Santiago was more “ongoing” than the one with the consultative physician, Dr. Carreras. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) generally gives more weight to a specialist’s opinion on medical issues within the specialist’s area of expertise than to a nonspecialist’s opinion.

Wehner v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-06-07(c)(5)

An ALJ should “generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of expertise than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5), 416.927(c)(5). ... While Dr. Samagh could not opine as to plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis, i.e., the source of plaintiff’s fatigue, as a primary care physician who treated plaintiff for many years, she could provide an opinion about the extent of plaintiff’s fatigue based on her observations of plaintiff.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) and (c)(4) direct adjudicators to give more weight to medical opinions supported by relevant evidence and consistent with the record as a whole.

Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-02(c)(3), (c)(4)

As such, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Clark’s opinion was unsupported and inconsistent, and therefore entitled to little evidentiary weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion . . . the more weight we will give that opinion.”), (c)(4) (“The more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) generally gives more weight to a specialist’s opinion on issues related to the specialist’s field than to a non-specialist’s opinion.

Hinders v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-21(c)(5)

The ALJ also did not err by relying on Dr. Mubarak’s lack of specialization in the area of mental health to give his opinion less weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) (“We generally give more weight to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the medical opinion of a source who is not a specialist.”) ... But the fact that Dr. Mubarak treats mental health issues as part of his family practice does not make him a specialist in that area. Absent evidence that Dr. Mubarak is a mental health specialist (aside from addiction)—and there is no such evidence in the record—the ALJ’s conclusion complies with the applicable regulation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5)) and is supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion supported by relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

Goffron v. Berryhill · filed 2018-05-24(c)(3)

The regulations provide that “[t]he more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [an ALJ should] give that medical opinion.” ... Accordingly, Dr. Freeman’s reliance on laboratory findings should lend his opinion more, not less, weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion supported by relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

Farley v. Berryhill · filed 2018-05-30(c)(3)

The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion ... the more weight we will give that opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)(i) generally calls for giving more weight to a treating source's medical opinion when the treatment relationship is longer and the claimant has been seen more often.

Johnson v. Saul · filed 2019-09-25(c)(2)(i)

The MSS is the only opinion evidence from medical providers that had a longitudinal relationship with Plaintiff and regularly met with her. See SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight be will give to the source’s medical opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires the weight given to a nonexamining source’s opinion to depend on its supporting explanation and consideration of pertinent evidence, including treating and examining opinions.

Reed v. Berryhill · filed 2020-02-04(c)(3)

Plaintiff contends that that Dr. Heldman’s opinion should not have been given more weight than that of Ms. Parrot because Dr. Heldman failed to provide adequate support for her medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“because nonexamining sources have no examining or treating relationship with you, the weight we will give their medical opinions will depend on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their medical opinions. We will evaluate the degree to which these medical opinions consider all of the pertinent evidence in your claim, including medical opinions of treating and other examining sources.”). The Court agrees.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) directs that the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight it receives.

Mills v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-23(c)(4)

The Social Security Act’s implementing regulations distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant but who review the claimant’s file (non-examining physicians). Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(2). ... Generally speaking, these are both legitimate reasons for discounting medical providers’ opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (inconsistencies between physician’s opinion and claimant’s daily activities is legitimate reason to discount that opinion); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-02 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) supports giving less weight to an opinion about mental work-related abilities when the medical source is not a mental-health professional.

Large v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-24(c)(5)

Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Kumar’s opinions regarding Large’s mental work-related abilities “little weight” because he was not a mental health professional was appropriate and supported by the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) (2019).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) requires an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion from a specialist, but does not permit categorical rejection of an opinion merely because its author is not a specialist.

Norris v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2020-04-02(c)(5)

Additionally, although 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) provides than an ALJ shall “give more weight” to the opinion of a specialist, it doesn’t say that an ALJ may categorically reject the opinion of a doctor who isn’t a specialist.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) permits an adjudicator to discount a medical opinion based on the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship.

Jones v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-08-13(c)(2)

A doctor’s opinion may be discounted based on the length and frequency of the treatment relationship and the nature and extent of the treatment relationship. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A physician who saw the claimant on a single occasion is not considered a treating physician, and his opinion is not entitled to great weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) gives greater weight to a medical opinion when its source provides a better explanation and sufficient supporting clinical findings.

(SS) Bogart v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-15(c)(3)

An ALJ can properly reject opinions that do not contain sufficient rationales for their conclusions, such as insufficiently explained check-off reports. ... “The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.” ... Here, the ALJ properly noted the lack of sufficient clinical findings, diagnosis, or examinations to corroborate Dr. Lau’s disability determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs the ALJ to give more weight to medical opinions supported by relevant evidence and well explained, but it does not require an opinion to state how long a limitation will last.

Pasquini v. Saul · filed 2021-01-20(c)(3)

Section 404.1527(c)(3) and 416.927(c)(3) of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations provide that: The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that medical opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion. Furthermore, because nonexamining sources have no examining or treating relationship with you, the weight we will give their medical opinions will depend on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their medical opinions. We will evaluate the degree to which these medical opinions consider all of the pertinent evidence in your claim, including medical opinions of treating and other examining sources. ... Third, although it is helpful, nothing in the relevant statute, regulations, or caselaw requires that a medical opinion address the duration a limitation could be expected to persist. ... On these facts, I find that it is not proper under the regulations to discount an opinion for what it doesn’t say, while ignoring what it does when the administrative record includes treatment notes which may, or may not, provide insight as to the duration of a “flare” of Plaintiff’s skin disorder.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs adjudicators to give greater weight to medical opinions supported by more relevant evidence.

Navarro v. Saul · filed 2021-10-21(c)(3)

First, it is true that a normal mental status examination is not necessarily dispositive of whether an individual suffers from moderate limitations in work-related functioning. But the lack of any abnormal findings on the mental status examination is certainly relevant to assessing the weight to give to Dr. Martin’s assessed limitations, since it means that the mental status examination does not provide any support for those limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion . . . the more weight we will give that medical opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs adjudicators to give more weight to medical opinions supported by relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

SOTO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-10-04(c)(3)

However, as it pertains to Plaintiff’s absenteeism, concentration deficits, unscheduled breaks, and off-task time, the ALJ accorded little weight to those portions of Dr. Rosenblum’s opinion. She reasonably explained that, in connection with these findings, Dr. Rosenblum merely ...; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (stating that more weight will be given to opinions that are supported with relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings). ... Based on these reasons, I find the ALJ appropriately considered all medical evidence in connection with her evaluation of Dr. Rosenblum’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ weighing a medical opinion to consider how much relevant medical evidence, especially medical signs and laboratory findings, the source provided to support it.

Bender v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-15(c)(2)

To be sure, in assessing medical opinion evidence the ALJ must consider the amount of objective medical evidence supporting the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Here however, the ALJ improperly relied on isolated notations provided by sources who treated Plaintiff for physical, not mental, impairments to discount opinion evidence. The purported inconsistencies cited by the ALJ do not withstand scrutiny.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines medical opinions as statements from acceptable medical sources expressing judgments about an impairment's nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, and remaining abilities and restrictions.

Torres-Rosario v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-13(a)(1)

However, most of the evidence cited by Plaintiff are not medical opinions as she claims, but her own subjective reports of her symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(A)(1) (medical opinions are “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s) and your physical or mental restrictions.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) distinguishes medical-source opinions that must be weighed from treatment-note observations that merely record findings and do not express judgments about an impairment.

Hawkins v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2019-09-12(c)

Nor, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, was the ALJ required to "weigh" these mental status examination findings in the manner medical source opinions must be weighed. ... The mere observations contained in plaintiff's treatment notes reflect no such judgments, and thus are not medical opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats conclusory statements that a claimant is disabled as not medical opinions, so they receive no special or controlling weight; a treating-source statement receives controlling weight only if it qualifies as a medical opinion.

Lugo v. Saul · filed 2019-09-12(a)(1), (c)(2), (d)(1), and (d)(3)

However, the “opinions” of Dr. Thomas and Dr. Mandelbaum are merely conclusory reports to the Workers’ Compensation Board that Plaintiff was temporarily disabled and could not return to work, which are not “medical opinions” as defined by the regulations. ... Thus, these “opinions” are not entitled to any special weight. ... Indeed, none of Plaintiff’s other treating physicians offered a medical opinion as defined by the regulations, so there was no opinion entitled to “controlling weight.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source’s judgment about an impairment’s nature or severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, or physical or mental restrictions.

Sinbaldi v. SSA · filed 2017-06-12(a)(2)

The regulations also explain that [m]edical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairments(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite [her] impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as a statement that both evaluates the claimant’s symptoms, diagnosis, or prognosis and expresses judgment about what the claimant can still do and the claimant’s physical or mental restrictions.

Winston v. Nancy Berryhill, Acting Cmsnr · filed 2018-12-04(a)(2)

Because the definition of a “medical opinion” requires both an evaluation of symptoms and an expression of judgment regarding a claimant’s capabilities and restrictions, Dr. Davis’s report is not a medical opinion within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (using “and” to connect the definitional phrases). Therefore, the ALJ did not violate any legal standards specific to medical opinions when she assessed and incorporated the observations noted in Dr. Davis’s evaluation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under § 404.1527(a)(1), a statement about a claimant’s impairment-related judgment and ability to work can be a medical opinion requiring the ALJ to discuss and explain its treatment.

Delaney v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2019-11-22(a)(1)

The Court finds that Dr. Simmons’ statement that Plaintiff “continues to … engage in questionable judgment which will likely influence his mental health and his ability to be a consistent employee” is a “medical opinion” as that term is defined. ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1); 416.927(a)(1). To this end, the ALJ had a duty to discuss the opinion and explain his treatment of the same. ... He failed to do so, and the error warrants remand.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about an impairment’s nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Ward Benjamin Tate v. Berryhill · filed 2019-11-25(a)(1)

What the ALJ describes as a “reliable medical source statement” is simply a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (defining “medical opinion” as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [claimant’s] impairment(s), including [his] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental restrictions”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines medical opinions as statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgment about an impairment's nature and severity, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Weeks v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-12-04(a)(1)

But, not all medical records and treating notes are medical opinions. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). Instead, “[m]edical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgment about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restriction.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines medical opinions as judgments from acceptable medical sources about an impairment’s nature, severity, diagnosis, prognosis, functional capacity, or restrictions.

Smith v. Saul · filed 2019-12-13(a)(2)

Treatment notes, in general, do not constitute medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”). ... Here, the treatment notes, findings, and observations of Dr. Tick, Dr. Anderson, and Ms. Gallegos concern only medical diagnoses and do not address any functional limitations or opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work. ... Therefore, the ALJ did not need to provide reasons to reject the findings of these providers, and did not err in weighing the opinion evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical source opinion as an acceptable medical source's judgment about the nature and severity of a patient's impairment, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Fenwick v. Berryhill · filed 2019-12-27(a)(1)

A “medical source opinion” is a statement from an acceptable medical source that reflects a judgment about the nature and severity of a patient’s impairment(s), including a patient’s symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what a patient can still do despite those impairments, and a patient’s physical and mental restrictions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as a statement about what a claimant can still do despite impairments and about the claimant's physical or mental restrictions.

Thrasher v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2020-02-07(a)(1)

This excerpt, however, arguably lacks the specificity necessary to constitute a “medical opinion” for purposes of weight allocation, as such an opinion requires a statement regarding “what [the claimant] can still do despite [his] impairment(s)[] and [his] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as a statement from a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of an impairment.

Sou v. Saul · filed 2020-04-06(a)(2)

SSR 96-9p does not define “medical documentation,” but a medical opinion is a “statement[] from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect[s] judgments about the nature and severity of . . . impairment(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (2012) (emphases added).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source’s statement reflecting judgments about an impairment’s nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, capabilities, and restrictions.

James v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-20(a)(2)

The relevant regulation defines “medical opinions” as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source's statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of an impairment, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Vasquez v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-05-19(a)(2)

But Plaintiff does not identify any specific “statements from [treating] physicians . . . that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [his] impairment(s), including [his] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental restrictions” that Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have credited over Dr. Henderson’s medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2) (defining a medical opinion).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source’s judgment about the nature and severity of an impairment, including the claimant’s symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and restrictions; only such opinions must be evaluated under section 404.1527(c).

Andraka v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-15(a)(1)

The ALJ is required to evaluate medical opinions in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The regulations define a medical opinion as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (a)(1); see also Carrie Lynette M. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 2250641, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2019) (describing medical opinion as “a statement that reflects a physician’s judgment about what a claimant remains able to do despite his impairments.”). Plaintiff cites to two statements in the medical treatment notes of Dr. Wiese that the ALJ failed to weigh. Tr. at pp. 414 (Plaintiff “fatigues after he has been on his feet for 2 hours or so”) & 417 (Plaintiff “states he can be on his feet for about an hour and then will get very tired”). These statements, however, are clearly subjective reports from Plaintiff, not medical opinions from Dr. Wiese. They reflect no medical judgment about Plaintiff's condition and offer no opinion about Plaintiff's functional abilities. “There was therefore no medical opinion that the ALJ was required to weigh.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source’s statement reflecting a judgment about an impairment’s nature and severity, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, capabilities, and restrictions.

DENNIS-ORSHAK v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-07-30(a)(1)

This is consistent with the regulations, which define a medical opinion as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in giving no weight to Dr. Cohen’s causation opinion because it is neither a medical opinion nor is it relevant to the present issue.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines an opinion as a physician’s statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments.

Casiano v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-14(a)(2)

Generally, whenever a physician offers a statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, the statement is an opinion requiring the ALJ to state with particularity the weight given to it and the reasons therefor. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178–79 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as a judgment about an impairment’s nature and severity, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, what the person can still do, and physical or mental restrictions.

Lay v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-09-24(a)(1)

Such statement is a subjective symptom, rather than a medical opinion, and the ALJ properly concluded that the claimant’s subjective symptoms were not fully supported by the evidence (Tr. 25-35). Likewise, the claimant’s MOCA score is also not a medical opinion, and because Dr. Ward did not indicate what, if any, functional limitations resulted from the claimant’s below average score, the ALJ was not required to specifically discuss it. See, e. g., Moua v. Colvin, 541 Fed. Appx. 794, 797-98 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Dr. Bhakta’s treatment notes do not offer any medical opinions concerning [the claimant’s] abilities or limitations. . . Thus, there was no pertinent medical opinion for the ALJ to weigh.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (defining medical opinions as “judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including his symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what he can still do despite impairment(s), and his physical or mental restrictions”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source’s judgment about an impairment’s nature, severity, prognosis, functional capacity, or physical or mental restrictions.

Chase v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-30(a)(1)

In this case, however, neither Dr. Ranjbara-Jahromi nor Dr. Schug offered “medical opinions,” as that term is defined by the applicable regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”); they provided medical evidence, on which the ALJ recounted and relied, (see R.21 (referring to Dr. Ranjbara-Jahromi’s physical examinations and testing in connection with cardiac condition and Dr. Schug’s examination of Plaintiff’s feet and findings of “absent sensation” in feet)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source's judgment about an impairment's nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Christiansen v. Saul · filed 2020-10-09(a)(1)

The applicable SSA regulations define medical opinions as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a) defines a medical opinion as a statement from an acceptable medical source reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of an impairment, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, what the claimant can still do, and physical or mental restrictions.

MC KEE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-10-06(a)

Although the opinions of treating physicians are entitled to great weight if they are consistent with the record, see Nazario v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2019); Hubert v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 746 F. App’x 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2018), it does not appear that observation constitutes a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a) (“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”), 416.927(a) (same); cf. Paczkoski v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-01775, 2014 WL 4384684, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014) (affirming denial of benefits where the ALJ afforded little weight to treating doctor’s assessments where the doctor “did not opine that [the claimant] had any specific functional limitations or that he was disabled. . . . Thus, there was no opinion of functionality by [the treating doctor] that the ALJ could weigh”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a) treats statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of impairments as medical opinions, so an MRI report without such a judgment need not be weighed as a medical opinion.

Dunn v. Berryhill · filed 2019-01-09(a)

Further, there was no “medical opinion” evidence contained in the MRI results. So, the ALJ was not required to assess or weigh any “medical opinions.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a) (defining medical opinions as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairments”). Instead, in this case, it appears that the ALJ took the MRI for what it was, properly noted the results of the MRI, and nothing more is required.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 distinguishes medical opinions about an impairment’s nature, severity, symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, functional abilities, and restrictions from the ALJ’s administrative role of determining RFC and disability.

Adamczyk v. Berryhill · filed 2019-02-12(a)(1), (d)

Medical opinions are statements that “reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s),” including the claimant’s “symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,” what the claimant “can still do despite impairment(s),” and the claimant’s “physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1), 416.927(a)(1). ... Instead, it is the role of the ALJ to determine the individual’s RFC and, in light of that RFC, to determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). ... Instead, the ALJ used the records to make an administrative assessment, which the ALJ is allowed to do. See SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (explaining the difference between administrative findings and medical opinions).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) assigns ultimate disability and residual functional capacity determinations to the ALJ, rather than treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants.

DUVA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2019-06-27(e)(1)

“The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e}(1), 404.1546(c)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) leaves ultimate responsibility for determining disability and residual functional capacity with the ALJ, so a treating physician’s opinion does not control those determinations.

MILLER v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2020-06-29(d)(1)

However, this does not completely prevent an ALJ from discounting the opinion of a treating physician because the disability and RFC determinations are ultimately the ALJ’s sole responsibility.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) reserves the ultimate disability and residual functional capacity determinations to the ALJ rather than treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants.

DANIELS v. BERRYHILL · filed 2021-03-01(e)(1)

In explaining his support for the ALJ’s RFC determination, the Magistrate Judge agreed with the Commissioner’s reliance on the regulatory provision that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c)” (Mag.’s R&R at 8). ... Because the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform the standing and walking required of medium work was supported by substantial evidence, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) leaves the ultimate disability and residual-functional-capacity determinations to the ALJ rather than to treating, examining, or state-agency medical sources.

Snyder v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-23(e)(1)

The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) leaves the ultimate disability and residual-functional-capacity determinations to the ALJ rather than treating or examining physicians or state-agency consultants.

GRIFFIN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-07-31(d)(2)

The ALJ was tasked with analyzing a variety of opinions, including those of the state agency psychological consultants in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC. “The ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ weighing medical opinions to consider the length, frequency, nature, and extent of each source’s treatment relationship, and permits greater weight for a non-acceptable medical source who saw the claimant more often.

Peterson v. Bisignano · filed 2025-12-17(c)(2), (f)(1)

The ALJ also erred by discounting Briggs’ and Hardison’s opinions without addressing the length of their treatment history. When determining how much weight to afford a medical opinion, ALJs are “required to consider” the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination” and the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... In discounting Briggs’ and Hardison’s opinions, the ALJ failed to acknowledge that they had longer, more frequent, and more extensive treatment relationships with Peterson than Dr. Drenguis or ARNP Sigler. The ALJ’s failure to address these factors “alone constitutes reversible legal error.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1) (“[I]t may be appropriate to give more weight to the opinion of a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source if he or she has seen the individual more often . . . .”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) identifies the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination as factors in weighing a medical opinion.

Bolding v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-07-18(c)(2)

“Length of treatment relationship and the frequency of examination” are a factor in weighing medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Pl.'s Br. 16 (ECF No. 13). Accordingly, it is proper for the ALJ to consider the one-time examination as a factor in giving little weight to Dr. Ellison's opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)(i) requires an ALJ to consider the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination when evaluating a medical opinion.

Miracola v. Saul · filed 2020-07-29(c)(2)(i)

The SSA’s regulations, however, require ALJs to consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination in evaluating medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i), 416.927(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions, including state-agency consultant findings, using factors such as supportability and consistency, and permits but does not require obtaining medical-expert opinions.

Chuderski v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-07-23(c)(3), (c)(4), (e)(2)(ii), (e)(2)(iii)

The regulations clearly permit the opinions of nonexamining agency medical consultants to override those of treating medical sources, when the former are more consistent with the record evidence than the latter. ... See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4) (“in deciding the weight [to] give to any medical opinion,” ALJ considers several factors including “[s]upportability” and “[c]onsistency”); id. at (e)(2)(ii) (“When an [ALJ] considers findings of a State agency medical . . . consultant . . . , the [ALJ] will evaluate the findings using the relevant factors in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section, such as . . . the supporting evidence in the case record”). ... An ALJ may “ask for and consider opinions from medical experts on the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) and on whether [the claimant’s] impairment(s) equals the requirements of any [listed] impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(iii). ... Applied here, the ALJ had no obligation to call a medical expert to testify about Plaintiff’s thoracic spine abnormality.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to review every medical opinion.

Kathriner v. Saul · filed 2019-07-25(c)

An ALJ must review every medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the regulatory factors when weighing a medical opinion, but the ALJ need not expressly discuss each factor if the decision clearly states the weight assigned and the reasons for it.

Golden-Schubert v. Commissioner, SSA · filed 2019-07-30(c)

An ALJ is not required to expressly discuss each factor in deciding what weight to give a medical opinion. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Suddath was a treating psychiatrist and expressly gave Dr. Suddath’s opinion little weight due to the inconsistencies described above. This, along with the ALJ’s citation to the inconsistent evidence, “satisfies the requirement that the ALJ’s decision be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ thus applied the correct legal standard in weighing Dr. Suddath’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) requires an ALJ to evaluate an opinion from a medical source who is not acceptable using the same factors used for acceptable sources, including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Kephart v. Kijakazi · filed 2019-07-31(f)(1), (c)(2)-(6)

An ALJ must also evaluate such opinions using “[t]he same factors used to evaluate the opinions of medical providers who are acceptable medical sources,” such as “the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record and specialization of the doctor.” Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires every medical opinion to be evaluated and permits consideration of an acceptable source’s knowledge of Social Security disability programs and evidentiary requirements.

Berry v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-07-31(c), (c)(6)

The regulations provide that the amount of an acceptable source’s knowledge of Social Security disability programs and their evidentiary requirements may be considered in evaluating an opinion, regardless of the source of that understanding. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(6), 416.927(c)(6). The regulations also require that every medical opinion will be evaluated, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion and, when determining the weight of a treating physician’s opinion, consider factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Emmitt v. Berryhill · filed 2019-08-01(c)

The Social Security regulations require the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion it receives, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). ... In such a situation, the ALJ must assess what weight the opinion should be given based on factors enumerated in 20 C.E.R. § 404.1527(c). Those factors include: (1) the physician’s length of treatment of the claimant; (2) the physician’s frequency of examination; (3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) the support of the physician’s opinion afforded by the medical evidence of record; (5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (6) the specialization of the treating physician; and, (7) any other considerations. Jd.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors when weighing medical opinions, but does not require explicit discussion of each factor if the ALJ considers them.

Murphy v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-01(c)

In the absence of an opinion from a treating source that is entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must consider several factors in determining the weight to give to the various medical opinions, including the examining or treatment relationship a medical source has with the claimant, how well the opinion is supported by evidence, and the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, as long as the ALJ considers the factors set forth in the regulations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1)-(2) directs that treating-source opinions generally receive more weight than opinions from physicians who do not treat the claimant, and examining-source opinions receive more weight than nonexamining-source opinions.

Nove v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2019-07-28(c)(1)-(2)

Generally, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating physician than to the opinion of those who do not actually treat the claimant. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2). More weight is also given to an examining physician than to a nonexamining physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) treats a nurse practitioner as an other source rather than an acceptable medical source, so an ALJ may disregard the nurse practitioner's opinion only for germane reasons.

Jaff v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-07(f)

Under the regulations applicable to plaintiff’s claim,3 a nurse practitioner is not an “acceptable medical source[ ]” but an “other source.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 06-03p. An ALJ may disregard an opinion from an “other source” if the ALJ provides germane reasons.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider a nurse practitioner’s opinion under the regulatory factors and generally explain the weight assigned, but it does not require good reasons for discounting such an other-source opinion.

Peterson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-10-11(c), (f)(1)

The ALJ is not required to give “good reasons” for discounting “other source” opinions, Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 2031115, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 6, 2012), but is still required, to consider the opinion using the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.§1527(c), though not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). ... Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ evaluation of Ms. Sefsick’s opinions complied with agency regulations and controlling law.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and consider factors including the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors when assigning weight.

Manley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-04-13(c), (c)(1), (c)(2)(ii), (c)(4), (c)(5)

The regulations also state “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). In evaluating any medical opinion, an ALJ must consider the examining relationship, treatment relationship, length of the treatment relationship, relationship and frequency of examination, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors. Id. An ALJ’s failure to weigh medical opinion evidence pursuant to these factors mandates remand.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs an ALJ to give more weight to an opinion supported by evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-04-14(c)(3)

The ALJ also explained that he gave Dr. Fabiano’s opinion some weight because the opinion was supported by his examination findings. Tr. 27. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (“[t]he more a medical source presents evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [the ALJ] will give that opinion”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider and explain the weight given to each medical opinion, including factors such as the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Lydon v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-04-15(c)

When making a disability determination, an ALJ shall consider and explain the weight afforded to every medical opinion in the record. ... see also CFR § 404.1527(c) (when weighing a medical opinion, the ALJ must consider factors such as the treatment relationship, including length and frequency of examination and nature and extent of relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1)–(6) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider the listed factors when deciding what weight to give it.

Clemente v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-04-20(c)(1)–(6)

If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the relevant factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6) and determine the appropriate weight to give the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) makes consistency with the record as a whole a relevant factor when an ALJ evaluates a medical opinion.

Volk v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-04-20(c)(4)

When determining how much weight to give a medical opinion, the ALJ should consider the nature and extent of the physician’s examining or treating relationship with the claimant, supportability of the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, the specialization of the physician, and other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Consistency with the record as a whole is a relevant consideration when evaluating medical opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) requires an ALJ to consider the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization when weighing a medical opinion.

Jaber v. Social Security Administration · filed 2021-04-06(c)(2)-(6)

These factors include the examining relationship, treatment relationship, length and frequency of examinations, the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence, the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole, and whether the opinion is that of a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) and 416.927(c)(2)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives a well-supported treating-source opinion controlling weight, requires other treating opinions to be weighed under specified factors, and requires consideration but not wholesale adoption of state-agency findings.

Windsor v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-27(c)(2)-(6), (e)(2)(i)-(ii)

A treating source opinion must be given "controlling weight" if such opinion (1) "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." ... Indeed, "[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 416.927." ... In formulating the RFC, ALJs “are not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or psychological consultants, or other program physicians or psychologists.” 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i)6. Nonetheless, because “State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified physicians, psychologists,” ALJs must consider their findings and opinions. Id. ... Thus, although the ALJ assigned “partial weight” to Dr. Kukor’s conclusions, he was not required to include all of the limitations in the RFC or “explain why [she] did not adopt all of [the] limitations.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider medical-opinion evidence with other relevant evidence and weigh medical opinions using factors including examination, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other factors that support or contradict the opinion.

Doshie v. Saul · filed 2019-08-28(b), (a)(2), and (c)

In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ is required to consider the medical opinion evidence of record together with the other relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). “Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, and what the claimant can still do despite her impairments and her physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). All medical opinions, whether by treating or consultative examiners, are weighed based on (1) whether the provider examine the claimant; (2) whether the provider is a treating source; (3) length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination, including nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) supportability of opinion with medical signs, laboratory findings, and explanations; (5) consistency with the record as a whole; (6) specialization; and (7) other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider medical opinions and determine their weight using factors including supporting evidence and consistency, while giving controlling weight to a qualifying treating-source opinion.

Reed v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2019-08-30(b), (c)(2), (c)(4)

An ALJ “must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F. 3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)). ... The ALJ accords “controlling weight” to a treating doctor’s opinion where medically-approved, diagnostic techniques support the opinion and the opinion is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F. 3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). ... “Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give that opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3)-(4) directs an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion that is supported by medical signs and consistent with the overall record.

Locatelli v. Saul · filed 2020-05-18(c)(3)-(4)

The ALJ properly adopted Dr. Sklaroff’s opinion because it was supported by and consistent with the record evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(4) (the more a medical source presents medical signs to support her opinion, or the more consistent her opinion is with the overall record, the more weight the ALJ will give to that opinion); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (opinions of non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider the treatment relationship, supportability, and consistency of medical opinions, but need not mechanically discuss every factor when adherence to the regulation is clear.

Hart v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-18(c)(1)-(4)

Despite’s plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ is not required to mechanically review every factor so long as the Commissioner’s adherence to the regulations is clear. See Crowell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2017); Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s statement shows consideration of the treatment relationship and implicate factors of supportability and consistency. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1-4) (considering the examining and treatment relationship and the fact that the more medical source opinion evidence is supported by, and consistent with, the evidence of record, the more weight is given the opinion).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consult the listed factors when deciding how much weight to give a treating physician’s opinion.

Trank v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-20(c)

In sum, the ALJ violated the treating physician rule by failing to provide good reasons for assigning Dr. Nelson’s opinion partial weight and by not consulting the factors in 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) in deciding what weight to give the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) identifies six factors for weighing a medical source opinion, and a detailed analysis is required when the rejected opinion is the sole relevant medical opinion before the ALJ.

Keel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-20(c)

The Regulations provide six factors for an ALJ to consider in determining the degree of weight to afford a medical source opinion. ... The factors are: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of the opinion by medical signs and laboratory findings; (4) the consistency of the medical opinion with the record; (5) whether the medical opinion is one of a specialist or not; and (6) any other factors the claimant or others bring to the Commissioner’s attention. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c), 404.1527(c).3 Generally, the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but where the ALJ rejects the sole relevant medical opinion before it, it must engage in a detailed analysis of the relevant factors. ... Moreover, the Court concludes that the ALJ was not required to engage in an analysis of the regulatory factors with respect to the portion of the record at issue because, to the extent it was a medical source statement, it was not the sole medical source statement in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) makes a medical opinion’s consistency with the record a relevant weighting factor, but a claimant’s failure to pursue treatment is not directly relevant to the opinion’s weight.

Call v. Saul · filed 2020-05-22(c)

However, while the consistency of a medical opinion with the record as a whole is a relevant factor in evaluating a medical opinion, Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007); Orn, 495 F.3d at 631, the fact that a claimant fails to pursue treatment is not directly relevant to the weight of a medical provider’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1)-(2) generally gives greater weight to treating-source opinions than to examining-source opinions, and greater weight to examining-source opinions than to reviewing-source opinions.

Arteaga v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-22(c)(1)-(2)

In evaluating medical opinions, the regulations distinguish among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; and (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), (e), 416.926(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician’s.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to weigh a treating physician’s opinion that lacks controlling weight using factors including the treatment relationship, frequency of evaluations, support and consistency, and specialization.

Richmond v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-26(c)(2)

Should the ALJ decide not to give a treating or examining physician’s medical opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must weigh it according to factors such as the nature, extent, and length of the physician-patient relationship, the frequency of evaluations, whether the physician’s opinion is supported by and consistent with the record, and the specialization of the physician. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). ... The Court therefore finds the ALJ properly considered Dr. Levitt’s opinion, and provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for giving it little weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(b) requires an ALJ to consider all medical opinions in the record, although the ALJ need not expressly explain how every factor was considered.

Mercado v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-26(b)

An ALJ must consider all medical opinions in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b); 416.927(b). The regulations, however, “do not require an ALJ to expressly state how each factor was considered . . .” Bourinot v. Colvin, 95 F. Supp. 3d 161, 177 (D. Mass. 2015) (Hillman, J.). This Court finds, nonetheless, that the ALJ’s failure to weigh the opinion of Dr. Dewolfe constituted prejudicial error.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a) treats a statement as a medical opinion when it reflects an acceptable medical source’s judgment about the nature or severity of an impairment, including the claimant’s remaining abilities and physical or mental restrictions.

ANDRESS v. SAUL · filed 2020-05-28(a)

Dr. Gedeon, who managed Plaintiff’s pain care, and Dr. McConnell, who gave Plaintiff a second opinion regarding the availability of any further surgical options, did not make any judgment about “what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s)” and the “physical or mental restrictions” to which the claimant is subject. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a) (defining “medical opinions”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs that a medical opinion supported by a better explanation receives more weight.

Gutierrez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-29(c)(3)

Based on the current record, the Commissioner is correct that this was a proper basis for discounting Dr. Byrd’s and Dr. Norris’s opinions as they related to Plaintiff’s capacity for work—neither of them gave a substantive explanation for their opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (“The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)–(c)(6) requires an ALJ to consider the treatment relationship, examination frequency, supportability, consistency with the record, and the provider’s specialization when weighing a medical opinion.

Morefield v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-29(c)(2)–(c)(6)

Additionally, an ALJ must consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the opinion’s supportability, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and whether the provider is a specialist. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)–(c)(6), 416.927(c)(2)–(c)(6). ... Moreover, the ALJ’s decision does not describe that, when evaluating Dr. Hlavinka’s opinion, the ALJ considered the required factors set forth in Social Security regulations, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination. ... But that orphaned boilerplate statement, appearing several pages prior to the discussion of Dr. Hlavinka’s opinion, lacks any detail or explanation of the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Hlavinka’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and, when no opinion is entitled to controlling weight, consider treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors in assigning weight; treating-source opinions generally receive more weight.

Sincavage v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-29(c)

In deciding what weight to accord competing medical opinions and evidence, the ALJ is guided by factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). “The regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *2. Treating sources have the closest ties to the claimant, and therefore their opinions generally entitled to more weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources...”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating source). Under some circumstances, the medical opinion of a treating source may even be entitled to controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (explaining that controlling weight may be given to a treating source’s medical opinion only where it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record). Where no medical source opinion is entitled to controlling weight, the Commissioner’s regulations direct the ALJ to consider the following factors, where applicable, in deciding the weight given to any non-controlling medical opinions: length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the extent to which the source presented relevant evidence to support his or her medical opinion, and the extent to which the basis for the source’s conclusions were explained; the extent to which the source’s opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; whether the source is a specialist; and, any other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) directs an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion that is more consistent with the record as a whole.

Compton v. Commissioner · filed 2020-06-01(c)(4)

The ALJ’s explanation makes clear that he gave little weight to Dr. Williams’s opinion because there was other evidence in the record that weighed against his finding that Plaintiff's diabetes and A1C levels would have imposed such a limitation on her. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2)(i) requires an ALJ to consider state-agency consultants’ findings as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate disability determination, and explain the weight given to a state-agency psychological consultant’s opinion unless a treating source receives controlling weight.

Bolin v. Saul · filed 2020-05-29(e)(2)(i)

“Therefore, administrative law judges must consider findings and other opinions of State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination about whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. Unless the claimant’s treating source is given controlling weight, the administrative law judge must explain the weight given to the opinions of a state agency psychological consultant. Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) directs that medical opinions receive greater weight when supported by relevant evidence, especially medical signs and laboratory findings, and when the source provides a better explanation.

Hall v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2020-06-01(c)(3)

“[t]he more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that medical opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to meaningfully evaluate a non-treating medical opinion, but the opinion is not entitled to particular deference and the ALJ need not provide an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis.

Boykin-Sullivan v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2020-06-02(c)

In her opinion, the Magistrate Judge properly notes that while medical opinions of non-treating consultative examiners like Dr. Madden must be meaningfully evaluated, they are not entitled to any particular deference and an ALJ need not give “an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis” of their opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions using factors including the treatment relationship, examination, supportability, consistency, and specialization, while § 404.1527(c)(2) generally gives controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion unless it lacks evidentiary support, conflicts with substantial evidence, or is overly conclusory.

Schmedeke v. Commissioner Of Social Security · filed 2020-06-04(c), (c)(2)

The weight given to a medical opinion depends on if it comes from the treating physician, an examining physician, the longevity of the treatment relationship, the thoroughness of the examination, supportability of the decision, consistency with the record, and the physician’s expertise or specialization in the subject matter. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Generally, the heaviest weight is given to treating physicians, since the longevity of their relationship with the claimant gives them the fullest picture of the claimant’s health and capabilities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Treating physicians’ medical opinion is given controlling weight unless it lacks evidentiary support, is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, or is overly conclusory. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... The ALJ’s decision does not analyze the section 404.1527(c) factors or explain why he gives greater weight to the treating physician’s brief medical opinion over the more specialized, thorough, functional, and specific opinions of Drs. Geary, Meyer, and Formby. Such a conclusion may be warranted, but a court cannot review the decision without its rationale or explanation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) governs the evaluation of medical-opinion evidence, and an ALJ complies when the decision assigns weights to treating and consultative opinions and explains the reasons.

Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-04(d)

First, as discussed supra, the ALJ discussed the opinion evidence in the record, assigned weights to the opinions of the treating and consultative physicians in the record, and provided his reasoning for doing so. Plaintiff has pointed to no internal inconsistencies in the opinions of the treating sources, no inconsistencies between their opinions and the medical evidence, or to any specific objections to the ALJ’s apportionment of weight. Accordingly, there is no indication in the record, or in Plaintiff’s brief, that the ALJ failed to comply with 20 CFR § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires the ALJ to weigh medical opinions using the listed factors and gives a well-supported, consistent treating physician’s opinion controlling weight.

Pyeatt v. Saul · filed 2020-06-05(c)

All medical opinions, whether by treating or consultative examiners, are weighed based on (1) whether the provider examined the claimant; (2) whether the provider is a treating source; (3) length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination, including nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) supportability of opinion with medical signs, laboratory findings, and explanation; (5) consistency with the record as a whole; (6) specialization; and (7) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... A treating physician’s opinion will be given controlling weight if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see also Hacker, 459 F.3d at 937.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(2) requires an ALJ to articulate reasons for the weight assigned to opinions from sources who are not acceptable medical sources.

Grega v. Saul · filed 2020-06-08(f)(2)

Nor are we persuaded by Grega’s contention that the ALJ improperly gave partial and limited weight to the opinions of Brenda Hammett, a nurse practitioner who treated him, and Susan Petrillo, a licensed clinical social worker who also treated him. Neither provider qualifies as an “acceptable medical source” to whom the treating physician rule would apply, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), (d)–(e), 416.902(a), (i)–(j), and the ALJ articulated reasons for the weight accorded to their opinions, see id. §§ 404.1527(f)(2), 416.927(f)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(6) makes a medical source's familiarity with the other information in the claimant's case record relevant when weighing that source's medical opinion.

Patterson v. Saul · filed 2020-06-10(c)(6)

The extent to which a medical source is “familiar with the other information in [the claimant’s] case record” is relevant in assessing that source’s medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion, explain the weight assigned, and consider the listed regulatory factors.

Hartman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-10(c)(1)–(6)

The ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinions of the state agency consultants under the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ simply provided the state agency consultants great weight, followed by a listing of the ‘B’ Criteria. Without a discussion and fully analysis of the opinions of the state agency consultants, the Court cannot be sure the ALJ properly considered the opinions. This error, in combination with the other errors committed by the ALJ, requires remand.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to state the weight given to medical opinions, while that requirement does not extend to other forms of medical evidence.

RAFINE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-06-10(c)

An ALJ is required to state what weight he or she ascribes to a medical opinion, but not to other forms of medical evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider a nonexamining source’s opinion and its consistency with the record, and permits giving more weight to an opinion that is more consistent with the record.

Boleyn v. Saul · filed 2020-06-11(b), (c)(1), (c)(4)

As Dr. Haynes is a nonexamining source, the ALJ must consider the opinion and whether it was consistent with other independent evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b),(c)(1), 416.927(b),(c)(1); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. ... An ALJ may choose to give more weight to an opinion that is more consistent with the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (“[T]he more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”); Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and consider specified factors when assigning weight, generally favor treating sources, and reserve controlling weight for qualifying treating-source opinions.

Kshir v. Saul · filed 2020-06-11(c)

The Commissioner’s regulations also set standards for the evaluation of medical evidence, and define medical opinions as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [a claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do despite impairments(s), and [a claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(a)(2). Regardless of its source, the ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... In deciding what weight to accord competing medical opinions and evidence, the ALJ is guided by factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Treating sources have the closest ties to the claimant, and therefore their opinions generally entitled to more weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources . . . .”); ... Under some circumstances, the medical opinion of a treating source may even be entitled to controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to consider medical opinions with the other relevant evidence and weigh them under the regulatory factors, including giving a well-supported and consistent treating-source opinion controlling weight.

Crowley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-12(b), (c), (c)(2)

When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers “medical opinions . . . together with the rest of the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). ... “An ALJ must give ‘controlling weight’ to a treating physician’s opinion if it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.’” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1132 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848-49 (8th Cir. 2007)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... The ALJ properly considered the state agency consultants’ opinions. The ALJ also gave good reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for giving less weight to Dr. Mathew’s treating-source opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) directs ALJs generally to give more weight to a specialist’s opinion on medical issues within the specialist’s area than to a non-specialist’s opinion.

Marx v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-15(c)(5)

First, the ALJ discounted Dr. Mayers’ opinion because she opined to physical limitations, which were “beyond the scope of her examination.” AR 768. As a Clinical Psychologist, Dr. Mayers’ examination was limited to the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of Plaintiff’s mental disorders. Thus, the ALJ could discount Dr. Mayers’ limitations regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations for this reason. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) (“[w]e generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist”). However, as Dr. Mayers is a Clinical Psychologist, the ALJ could not discount her opinion regarding Plaintiff’s psychological conditions merely because she inappropriately opined to physical limitations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions using the listed factors, but does not require an explicit factor-by-factor discussion for a non-treating source.

Cook v. SSA · filed 2020-06-17(c)

Instead, such an examiner’s opinion should be weighed considering the factors laid out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Nothing in the regulations requires an ALJ to subject a non-treating source’s opinion to an explicit, factor-by-factor analysis when determining the amount of weight it should be given. ... Further, an ALJ’s “failure to discuss the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) factors is ‘no reason to speculate that the ALJ did not . . . consider them.’”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ weighing a treating physician’s opinion to consider the treatment relationship, supporting medical and laboratory findings, consistency with the record, specialization, and other relevant factors.

Holmes v. Berryhill · filed 2020-06-17(c)(1)–(6)

In making such a determination with regard to Dr. Nelson’s opinion, the ALJ was required to consider a number of factors such as: (1) the length of Plaintiff’s treatment relationship with Dr. Nelson and the frequency of Dr. Nelson’s examinations of her; (2) the nature and extent of their treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which Dr. Nelson’s opinion was supported by medical and laboratory findings; (4) the consistency of Dr. Nelson’s opinions with the record as a whole; and (5) whether Dr. Nelson was a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6); see also Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives treating-source opinions greatest deference, requires controlling weight when they are well-supported and consistent with the record, and requires consideration of specified factors otherwise.

Zerkel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-18(c)

Under these regulations, the opinions of treaters are entitled to the greatest deference because they “are likely to be . . . most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treater’s opinion must be given “controlling weight” if “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” ... Even if a treater’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinions, consistency of the opinions with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider whether a medical source is a specialist when weighing that source’s opinion, but that factor alone is not a specific and legitimate reason to reject the opinion.

Schuur v. O'Malley · filed 2020-06-22(c)

The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Dr. Daniel’s opinion, that he is not a specialist, is not specific and legitimate. Whether or not a provider is a specialist is one of the factors an ALJ is to consider when weighing opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). However, it does not rise to the level of specific and legitimate when rejecting an opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions based on the physician’s relationship with the claimant, the opinion’s support and consistency, the physician’s relevant expertise, and other relevant factors, and permits separate statements from one source to be weighed independently.

Brooks v. US Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-06-23(a), (c)(2)-(6)

The opinion of a reviewing agency physician must be assessed in light of the absence of a treating or examining relationship between the physician and the claimant, the support given for the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the reviewer’s relevant expertise. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). Each statement by a medical source reflecting that source’s judgment regarding a claimant’s impairments constitutes a medical opinion that may properly be weighed independently of the source’s other such statements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a), (c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions using the listed factors, but does not require an express, factor-by-factor discussion when the decision clearly explains the weight assigned and the reasons for it.

Balata v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-06-26(c)

Mr. Balata argues that the ALJ failed to consider the § 404.1527(c) factors in evaluating Dr. King’s opinion. Doc. 19 at 22. The Court disagrees. The ALJ is not required to “apply expressly each of the six relevant factors in deciding what weight to give a medical opinion.” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). Rather, the decision need only be “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider every medical opinion and, when a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, weigh it using factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors.

(SS) Valerie Ann Patterson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-23(b), (c)(2)–(6)

The ALJ must consider and evaluate every medical opinion of record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) and (c) (applying to claims filed before March 27, 2017); Mora v. Berryhill, No. 1:16–cv–01279–SKO, 2018 WL 636923, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018). In doing so, the ALJ “cannot reject [medical] evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.” Mora, 2018 WL 636923, at *10. ... “If a treating physician’s opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ because it is not ‘well-supported’ or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the [Commissioner] considers specified factors in determining the weight it will be given.” Id. at 631. These factors include (1) the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination;” (2) the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship;” (3) the “[s]upportability” of the opinion;” (4) the “[c]onsistency” of the opinion “with the record as a whole;” (5) whether the opinion is from “a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty;” and (6) “any other factors [the claimant] or others bring to [the ALJ’s] attention, or of which [the ALJ is] aware, which tend to support or contradict the opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ weighing a medical opinion to consider the applicable regulatory factors and give specific, legitimate reasons for assigning it little weight.

Florez v. Social Security Adminstration · filed 2020-07-02(c)

To support according “little weight” to Dr. Padilla’s opinions, the ALJ was required to (1) demonstrate consideration of all of the applicable regulatory factors for weighing medical opinions, and (2) provide “specific, legitimate reasons” for rejecting Dr. Padilla’s opinions.8 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Chapo, 682 F.3d at 1291 (explaining that dismissal or discounting of an examining source’s opinions must be “based on an evaluation of all of the factors set out in [20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)] and the ALJ must provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting [such opinions]” (quotation marks omitted)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Sections 404.1527(c)(3) and (c)(4) support giving more weight to a medical opinion when its explanation is better and when it is more consistent with the record as a whole.

Blair v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-07(c)(3), (c)(4)

The ALJ assigned great weight to the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Thukral, which was supported with an explanation and consistent with the medical evidence of record. (Tr. 16; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“[t]he better an explanation a source provides for the opinion, the more weight [the ALJ] will give that opinion”).) ... In addition, the ALJ found that Dr. Thukral’s opinion was consistent with the other evidence from the record. (Tr. 16; 167 (treatment records stating that plaintiff’s “pain comes and goes,” x-ray of left foot showed bone structures were intact, mild soft tissue swelling, and heel spurs).) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“[g]enerally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as a statement from an acceptable medical source reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, and such an opinion must be weighed.

Fortini v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-09(a)(2)

Regardless of whether the opinion is a pre-drafted statement available for selection by Dr. Jelinek, it relates to the “nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment(s),” and, thus, is a medical opinion that requires weighing.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) generally requires greater weight for a medical opinion from a source who examined the claimant than for one from a source who did not.

Kande v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-09(c)(1)

“Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive. “Generally, we give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who has examined you than to the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined you.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 defines medical opinions and directs adjudicators to give greater weight to opinions from examining, treating, and specialist physicians than to those from non-examining, non-treating, and nonspecialist physicians.

Brancazio v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-10(a)(2), (c)(1)-(5)

Medical opinions are “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” ... Specifically, the opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than non-examining physicians, treating more than non-treating physicians, and specialists more than non-specialist physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1-5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and ordinarily weigh it using factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other considerations.

Harrison v. Saul · filed 2020-07-13(c)

The Social Security regulations require the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion it receives, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... In such a situation, the ALJ must assess what weight the opinion should be given based on factors enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Those factors include: (1) the physician's length of treatment of the claimant; (2) the physician’s frequency of examination; (3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) the support of the physician’s opinion afforded by the medical evidence of record; (5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (6) the specialization of the treating physician; and, (7) any other considerations. Id. ... Here, the thoroughness of the ALJ’s decision shows that he carefully considered the medical records and testimony, and that his determination reflects those findings accurately. The Court concludes that the diagnosis and expert opinion factor also supports the ALJ’s decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(6) makes a medical source’s familiarity with the other information in the claimant’s case record relevant when determining the weight given to that source’s opinion.

Cardenas v. Saul · filed 2020-07-13(c)(6)

That Dr. Jahnke was more familiar with Plaintiff’s longitudinal case record was a legitimate and specific reason to give more weight to Dr. Jahnke’s opinion than the opinions of Dr. Early and Dr. Kahirimbanyi. ... See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6) (specifying that the extent to which a medical source is “familiar with the other information in [the claimant’s] case record” is relevant in assessing the weight to give that opinion); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1042 (recognizing that the ALJ is to consider the consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole and assess the amount of relevant evidence that supports the opinion); Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041 (same).