20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d)(1) generally gives examining medical sources more weight than nonexamining sources; an ALJ must explain a decision to give greater weight to a conflicting nonexamining opinion.

Maynard v. Barnhart · filed 2007-02-16(d)(1)

The ALJ specifically acknowledged the latter statement in his decision, see id. at 26, yet he failed to explain why he did not give it greater weight than the opinion of the nonexamining state-agency consultants that M r. M aynard could sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1) (providing that more weight generally is given to examining sources than nonexamining sources).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An ALJ must determine whether a medical opinion comes from a treating physician before assigning it relative weight.

Tracy v. Astrue · filed 2007-09-05(d)(2)

Thus, the ALJ could not ascertain whether this unnamed physician who filled out the medical source statement was a treating physician,, a consultative physician, or a physician who merely reviewed the medical record but never saw the plaintiff. As the above case law makes clear, absent this information, it is impossible for the ALJ to determine the relative weight that should be accorded to this opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions in light of the source’s treating or examining relationship and the evidence available to that source.

White v. Astrue · filed 2009-07-23(d)

Essentially, the ALJ rejected the opinions of Dr. Hasan, a treating physician, and Ms. Bell, an examining source, for the opinions of two nonexamining sources who did not have the benefit of the evidence of record from Dr. Hasan, a treating source. Such findings are not supported by substantial evidence and do not comply with the 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an examiner’s opinion to receive limited weight when the examining relationship consists of a single referral.

Oliver v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2011-03-17(d)(2)(i)-(ii)

As the ALJ pointed out, Oliver’s relationship with Dr. King was extremely limited in nature, stemming from a single, post-litigation referral, and this brief relationship militates in favor of granting Dr. King’s opinion limited weight, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii); see also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2010).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors when deciding how much weight to give a medical opinion that does not receive controlling weight.

Brent v. Astrue · filed 2012-07-17(c)

Given the multiple factual errors in the ALJ’s various evaluations and the failure of the ALJ to consider the factors contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) to determine how much weight to afford non-controlling medical opinions, the Court finds the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions erroneous.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 allows an ALJ to weigh a physician’s treatment relationship and relevant specialization when choosing between conflicting medical opinions.

Beegle v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2012-07-23(c)(2), (c)(5)

Furthermore, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the opinion of Dr. Gordon Hardy over that of Dr. Jin to the extent that they conflicted because Dr. Hardy treated Beegle’s knee problems, and Dr. Jin was not an orthopedist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), (5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires consideration of the listed factors when weighing medical opinions; an ALJ may discount opinions that rely heavily on a claimant’s subjective reports.

Lewis v. Astrue · filed 2013-03-29(d)

Every medical opinion received by the ALJ must be considered in accordance with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) (2010). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ properly discounted the opinions based on the providers’ heavy reliance on Claimant’s subjective symptoms and limitations and that, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) requires an ALJ to consider the treatment relationship, medical support, and consistency with the record when weighing a treating physician’s opinion.

Ghanim v. Colvin · filed 2014-08-18(c)(2)–(6)

Even if a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted, the ALJ may not simply disregard it. The ALJ is required to consider the factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) in determining how much weight to afford the treating physician’s medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives an examining physician’s opinion more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion.

Himes v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2014-09-26(c)(1)

An examining physician’s opinion is generally given more weight than that of a source who has not examined the claimant. ... Moreover, the ALJ’s error in only assigning weight to Dr. Levassur’s opinion is compounded because he was a nonexamining physician, as opposed to Dr. Brown and Dr. DiGeronimo, who were examining physicians.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Medical opinions receive controlling weight only when they are well supported by acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques and consistent with other substantial evidence.

DIXON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-02-20(c)(2)

Medical opinions need be credited by the ALJ only if they are well- supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) permits an ALJ to give less weight to medical opinions that lack supporting evidence and explanation.

Schmid v. SSA · filed 2020-03-12(c)(3)

Because the opinions of the three examining physicians do not provide medical evidence on Schmid’s ability to adapt to changes in her environment, and because the opinions summarily decide she cannot work in any capacity, the ALJ was not required to give their opinions any additional weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions and explain the reasons for crediting them; a treating source is not automatically entitled to greater weight than a non-examining consultant.

EASTMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-04-23

I note that a treating source is not automatically entitled to greater weight over that of a non-examining consultant. Rather, in accordance with the Regulations, the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of weighing all of the medical opinion evidence in determining whom to credit and he must explain his rationale for doing so. See, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits little weight for a medical opinion on a check-box form when objective evidence does not support it.

Howard v. Saul · filed 2020-05-06

Check-box or fill-in-the-blank forms are entitled to little weight because they are not supported by objective evidence in the record as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) permits an ALJ to give greater weight to a medical opinion that is consistent with the record as a whole.

HORVATH v. SAUL · filed 2020-05-07(c)(4)

The ALJ explained that she gave Ostrich’s opinion great weight because it is supported by the record. This is an appropriate and valid reason for crediting evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 416.927. Further, substantial evidence supports her finding in this regard.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An ALJ must resolve uncertainty about who authored an assessment before giving it substantial weight as a medical opinion.

Hatala v. Saul · filed 2020-05-26

Here, the ALJ made little to no inquiry before deciding that Dr. Harding authored the January 22, 2016 MRFC, despite someone else’s name appearing on the document. The ALJ’s error is heightened due to the “substantial weight” that she assigned to that MRFC as compared to the other medical opinions in the record, and the resulting impact on the disability determination. Therefore, this court finds that remand is necessary to adequately resolve this ambiguity.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh and discuss medical opinions, and failing to address an opinion with potentially material limitations requires remand.

Manuel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-26(c)

Because the ALJ did not weigh and discuss the limitations assessed by Dr. Reynolds, the Court is unable to evaluate whether the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, remand is required.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) weighs medical opinions by the doctor’s relationship with the claimant, the evidence supporting the opinion, and its consistency with the record.

Walker v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2020-12-01(c)

Here, the ALJ provided specific reasoning for disregarding the opinions of Dr. Iyer and Dr. Haas, which are not entitled to deference because neither doctor is a treating physician, and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) generally gives an examining physician’s opinion greater weight than a non-examining physician’s opinion based only on written reports.

Ratto v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1993-08-13(d)(1)

For instance, the opinion of a doctor who has examined the patient will ordinarily be entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician whose only knowledge of the patient is obtained from written reports. 20 C.F.R. § 404-1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives more weight to medical opinions supported by more relevant evidence, particularly signs and laboratory findings.

Patricia GREENSPAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defend · filed 1994-12-30(d)(3)

Based upon the minimal nature of testing done by these physicians, the ALJ’s determination that their opinion on Greenspan’s disability was conclusory is supported by the record. ... 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion, generally give more weight to treating sources, and explain the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating source's opinion.

Sapier v. HHS · filed 1995-05-11(d)(2)

Social Security regulations reguire the Secretary to evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (1994). Said regulations also generally reguire the Secretary to give more weight to a claimant's treating sources ... Further, the Secretary will give a treating source's opinion controlling weight if his or her "opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic technigues and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record . . . ." Id. The regulations also provide that the Secretary "will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give our treating source's opinion."4 Id. ... Because the medical evidence obtained from Dr. Rush includes evidence that could support a finding that Sapier meets or eguals the section 9.08 listing for diabetes mellitus, the court finds that the ALJ's failure to consider Dr. Rush's medical findings reguires the court to reverse the ALJ's findings and remand this case for further review.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) governs how medical opinions are evaluated and weighed, including the decision whether to give a consulting psychiatrist's opinion great weight.

Spencer v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1996-01-31(d)

The ALJ's decision not to accord great weight to the opinion of Appellant's consulting psychiatrist is supported by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844). The 2012 rule moved the former treating-source provisions from § 404.1527(d) to (c) (77 FR 10651).

Section 404.1527(d)(2) permits an ALJ to give less weight to a one-time consulting physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a treating physician.

Prak v. Chater · filed 1995-07-05(d)(2)

In the present case, ALJ Dougherty could conclude that Dr. Rowe’s evaluation, the product of a one-time consultation arranged in connection with the hearing, was not as credible as that of Dr. Ky, Mr. Prak’s regular treating physician.

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527 governs the weight given to conflicting medical-source opinions, and a supervised nurse practitioner’s opinion may be considered as part of the supervising physician’s opinion.

Gomez v. Chater · filed 1996-01-26

Her opinion was properly considered as part of the opinion of Dr. Kincade, an acceptable medical source. Thus, the ALJ did accord it appropriate weight and consideration under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927, as against the opinion of Dr. Aho, an examining, nontreating source.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(5) gives greater weight to a specialist's opinion on medical issues related to the specialist's area of specialization than to a nonspecialist's opinion.

Catherine A. SMOLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHATER · filed 1996-03-29(d)(5)

Similarly, the opinions of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialization are given more weight than the opinions of a nonspecialist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Specialists’ opinions receive greater weight in their areas of specialty, but the ultimate determination of disability remains reserved to the Secretary.

Dickerson v. Chater · filed 1996-08-23

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Muckula’s opinion concerning Ms. Dickerson’s back problems as inconsistent with subsequent x-rays and with Dr. Dandridge’s evaluation of the severity of her complaints. Dr. Dandridge, the ALJ noted, is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, while Dr. Muckula is a family practitioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) (greater weight given to specialist’s opinion in area of his or her specialty). The ALJ permissibly rejected Dr. Muckula’s opinion. ... The ALJ could properly reject consultant Dr. Cooper’s statement in reaching his ultimate conclusion that Ms. Dickerson is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (ultimate responsibility for determining disability reserved to Secretary).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) provides that the weight given to a doctor's opinion generally depends on how well it is supported by clinical findings.

Stanfield v. Chater · filed 1997-04-11(d)(2)

The weight accorded to a doctor's opinion generally depends on the extent to which it is supported by clinical findings. See Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Dr. Glenn's report is unsupported by his own clinical findings and contains inconsistencies.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) gives more weight to the opinion of a physician who examined the claimant than to the opinion of a physician who did not examine the claimant.

William T. WINFREY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-08-07(d)(1)

First, because Dr. Goodman did not examine plaintiff, his opinion was not entitled to as much weight as that of Dr. Spray.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires medical opinions to be weighed using specified factors, while an opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not entitled to particular significance because the Commissioner decides disability based on the record.

Marcotte v. Callahan · filed 1997-09-30(d), (e)

A psychologist’s professional opinion is weighed based on the type of evaluation, the treatment relationship, evidentiary support for the opinion, the opinion’s consistency with the record, and his specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Because the Commissioner is responsible for making the decision as to whether a claimant is disabled based on the evidence in the record, an opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work or that his impairments meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment is not entitled to any particular significance. § 404.1527(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Specialist opinions on medical issues related to their specialties generally receive more weight than nonspecialist opinions, and opinions consistent with the record as a whole receive more weight.

Loftis v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1998-01-15(d)(5), (d)(4)

Second, the Commissioner properly discounted Dr. Ellis' testimony because it conflicted with that of an orthopedic specialist who examined Loftis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) (noting that generally more weight is given to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her areas of specialty than to the opinion of a nonspecialist). Third, Dr. Ellis' opinion was inconsistent with the medical record as a whole. See, e.g., Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043 (upholding ALJ's rejection of treating physician's opinion where it was contradicted by nontreating physicians); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(4) (providing that the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight it is accorded). Accordingly, the Commissioner did not improperly reject the opinion of Loftis's treating physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 governs how an ALJ evaluates and weighs a medical source’s opinion, including based on the nature of the physician-patient relationship.

Smith v. Chater · filed 1998-03-11

On remand, the ALJ should determine the nature of the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Hinkle and Mr. Smith, and accord the doctor’s opinions concerning the disabling nature of the claimant’s pain their appropriate weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to give substantial weight to submitted medical evidence and opinions unless specific, legitimate reasons constituting good cause justify rejecting them.

Neslund v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 1998-08-17(c)-(d)

But under the regulations accompanying the Social Security Act, not cited by Neslund in his brief, this is exactly what the ALJ must do--give substantial weight to the medical evidence and opinions submitted, unless specific, legitimate reasons constituting good cause are shown for rejecting it. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)-(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to weigh a non-treating physician's opinion using specified factors, including support, consistency, and specialization, and give a good reason for the weight assigned.

Craft v. Apfel, Commissioner · filed 1998-10-06(d)

However, the ALJ must decide what weight to assign to a non-treating physician's opinion, based on several listed factors (including (i) the existence, nature, and extent of any treatment or examining relationship; (ii) the extent to which the opinion is supported by medical evidence and is consistent with the record as a whole; and (iii) whether the opinion is rendered in an area of specialty). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (1996). An ALJ's determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion will generally not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up "specious inconsistencies," Scivally v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 1992), or has not given good reason for the weight afforded a particular opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) makes a doctor's determination that a claimant is disabled nonbinding on the Commissioner, while § 404.1527(d)(3) supports giving less weight to an unsupported medical opinion.

Martin v. SSA · filed 1998-10-28(e), (d)(3)

A doctor’s determination of disability is not binding on the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (1996). In addition, the AFDC form dated January 2 9 , 1987, finding a temporary disability for one year, was not supported by contemporaneous medical records or treatment notes or with any detailed comments or explanation, making it entitled to less weight than if it had been properly supported. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (1996).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a statement as a medical opinion only when it reflects judgments about the nature and severity of an impairment and the limitations it causes, not merely a diagnosis or symptom history.

Briody v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-30(a)(2)

Therefore, because it does not “reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the] impairment(s), including ... symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,” and what limitations a patient faces, Dr. Boro’s statement is not a medical opinion. See Bailey, 2017 WL 1102671, at *2 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2); 416.927(a)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(6) makes a medical source's familiarity with the claimant's case record relevant when determining the weight of the source's medical opinion.

Reyes-Munguia v. Saul · filed 2019-10-07(c)(6)

The extent to which a medical source is “familiar with the other information in [the claimant’s] case record” is relevant in assessing the weight of that source’s medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a) treats a statement about an impairment’s nature, severity, symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, restrictions, or residual functional capacity as a medical opinion; a treatment-services score without specific functional findings is not one.

Martin v. Saul · filed 2019-11-19(a)

The Social Security Administration defines medical opinions as ‘“‘statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity’ of a claimant’s impairments, including the claimant’s symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, physical and mental restrictions, and residual functional capacity.” Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a). Setting aside the question of whether a case manager or other non-physician at HRDI would qualify as an “acceptable medical source,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a), the LOCUS score alone does not satisfy the definition of medical opinion in any event. The LOCUS assessment was used to make treatment recommendations for Plaintiff, but was not accompanied by findings of his specific functional limitations. (R. 574-77). The LOCUS score in and of itself does not articulate particular mental restrictions resulting from Plaintiff’s impairments or his specific residual functional capacity.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) generally gives treating physicians’ opinions more weight than examining physicians’ opinions, and examining physicians’ opinions more weight than nonexamining physicians’ opinions when weighing medical evidence.

Mallonee v. Kijakazi · filed 2019-11-21(c)

Three types of physicians may offer opinions in Social Security cases: those who treated the plaintiff, those who examined but did not treat the plaintiff, and those who did neither. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). A treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, which is generally entitled to more weight than a nonexamining physician’s.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) makes a medical source’s familiarity with the claimant’s case record and the consistency of the source’s opinion with the record relevant considerations in assigning weight to the opinion.

Rivard v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-11-27(c)(4), (c)(6)

Moreover, the extent to which a medical source is “familiar with the other information in [the claimant’s] case record” is relevant in assessing the weight of that source’s medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(6), 416.927(c)(6). An ALJ may choose to give more weight to an opinion that is more consistent with the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the weight given to a non-treating medical opinion to reflect its consideration and explanation of pertinent evidence, including treating-source opinions.

DUFFY v. BERRYHILL · filed 2019-12-03(d)(2)

Therefore, remand is warranted so that, consistent with the applicable regulations, “if the Commissioner is to give significant weight to the opinion of one or more non-treating physicians, the Commissioner must be assured that such non-treating physicians considered, and explained the value of, the treating physicians’ opinions.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) gives more weight to medical opinions supported by better explanations.

Norman v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2019-12-09(c)(3)

An “ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (“The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.”). Here, the ALJ highlighted that Dr. Groenhout’s treatment notes “lack[ed] findings to support his opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation generally gives more weight to treating-source opinions than examining or reviewing opinions and more weight to examining opinions than reviewing opinions.

Clark v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2019-12-23(c)(1), (c)(2)

Generally, a treating doctor’s opinion is entitled to more weight than an examining doctor’s opinion and a reviewing doctor’s opinion. ... This is because “these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... Generally, an examining doctor’s opinion is entitled to more weight than a reviewing doctor’s opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. This is because 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1) expressly provides for it.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

Otanez v. Berryhill · filed 2020-01-07(d)(2)

In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating physician’s opinion because a treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). If a treating source’s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under § 404.1527(a)(2), a GAF score is not a medical opinion, so the ALJ need not defer to it.

Harrell v. SSA, Commissioner of · filed 2020-01-28(a)(2)

To the extent that the Commissioner’s guess is correct – that Harrell’s argument refers to Dr. Bhavsar’s GAF assessment – the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s decision. GAF scores do not constitute medical opinions. ... Thus, the ALJ was not required to defer to the GAF scores provided by Dr. Bhavsar. For this reason, the undersigned finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s assessment of the GAF score in this case.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion using the listed factors when no opinion receives controlling weight.

FLORES v. SAUL · filed 2019-12-16(c)

The weight an ALJ gives to medical opinions is guided by the factors described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). If the ALJ determines that no medical opinion in the record deserves controlling weight, as happened in this case, the ALJ must consider every opinion in the record according to those factors, which include whether the physician: examined the claimant; treated the claimant frequently or for an extended period of time; specialized in treating the claimant’s condition; performed appropriate diagnostic tests; or offered opinions consistent with the objective medical evidence and the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats statements reflecting a medical source's judgment about an impairment, its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, or restrictions as medical opinions; observations and treatment records alone do not qualify.

Flinders v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-11(a)(2)

The Regulations define medical opinions as “statements from medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [a claimant’ symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [a claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). ... However, the records cited by plaintiff do not contain statements from Drs. Simons, Abou-Elsaad, and Heind] reflecting their judgment about plaintiff's functional limitations or her work-related abilities despite her impairments so as to constitute an “opinion” under the Regulations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) generally requires an ALJ to give more weight to an examining source's medical opinion than to a nonexamining source's opinion.

Phillips v. Berryhill · filed 2020-02-12(c)(1)

In general, an ALJ must accord more weight to the medical opinion of an examining soutce than to that of a nonexamining soutce. Testamark v. Berryhill, 736 Fed. Appx. 395, 387 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1) and Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 268 (4th Cir. 2017)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) permits an ALJ to give greater weight to medical opinions that are more consistent with the record as a whole.

(SS) Bitler v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-26(c)(4)

An ALJ may choose to give more weight to opinions that are more consistent with the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1)–(5) permits an ALJ to discount a medical opinion for reasons including its lack of supporting evidence, failure to explain work-related limitations, the physician's lack of relevant specialization, and inconsistency with other medical evidence.

Sauer v. Saul · filed 2020-03-04(c)(1)–(5)

The ALJ gave both opinions little weight, noting that they provided no relevant evidence to support such a conclusory disability determination. The ALJ noted that Dr. Zug failed to specify any impairments or diagnosis, other than “chronic medical conditions,” and failed to identify how these unidentified conditions limited Plaintiff’s ability to work. R. 25. The ALJ reiterated that Dr. Zug’s treatment notes and examinations do not shed any light on these opinions. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Zug was a family practitioner that did not specialize in mental health or CFS. Furthermore, the record reveled that two other doctors questioned Dr. Zug’s diagnosis of CFS. These are all valid reasons for the ALJ to discount Dr. Zug’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation treats residual functional capacity as not a medical opinion and directs the ALJ to give more weight to opinions that are more consistent with the record as a whole.

(SS) Medina Venegas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-05(c)(4), (d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining residual functional capacity). ... An ALJ may choose to give more weight to opinions that are more consistent with the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating-source medical opinion controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; opinions not entitled to controlling weight are evaluated using specified factors.

Norris v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-06(c)(2)

Pursuant to Agency regulations, a medical opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is from a treating source and is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit has held that treating physicians’ opinions “are only accorded great weight when they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and are consistent with the evidence.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3rd 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In determining the weight of medical source opinions not entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ will evaluate the following factors: the length, nature, and extent of treatment relationship; evidence in support of the opinion; consistency with the record as a whole; and the physician’s specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2010).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(4) gives greater weight to a medical opinion that is more consistent with the record as a whole and permits an opinion to be rejected when it is inconsistent with that record.

Yates v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-12(d)(4)

An ALJ may properly reject a physician’s opinion which is inconsistent with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(4), 416.927(d)(4) (the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight it will be given); see also Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1999) (a medical report’s inconsistency with the overall record constitutes a legitimate reason for discounting the opinion). Yet the ALJ must provide his interpretations of the evidence and explain why those interpretations, rather than the physician’s interpretations, are correct.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) generally gives treating physicians’ opinions greater weight than examining physicians’ opinions, and examining sources greater weight than non-examining sources, subject to discounting contradicted opinions for specific and legitimate reasons.

Kautzman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-18(c)

The general rule is that the opinions of treating physicians are owed greater weight than those of examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Similarly, examining sources generally are owed greater weight than non-examining sources. Id. However, when a treating physician’s or an examining physician’s opinion is contradicted, the ALJ may discount that opinion if the ALJ lays out specific and legitimate reasons for doing so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ to explain the weight assigned to opinions from consultative examiners and state-agency reviewers, but it does not require a “good reasons” explanation for that weight.

Mayle v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-19(f)

Although the ALJ must provide some explanation of the weight given to the opinions of consultative examiners and state-agency reviewers, see 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(f), he was not obligated to give “good reasons” for the weight he assigned.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) allows the ALJ to assign different weight to medical-source opinions based on their support in the evidence when determining a claimant’s disability.

Porras v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-19(f)(1)

Because the disability determination falls within the purview of the ALJ, she could give some weight to the opinions of Drs. Gonzales, Gilbert, and Saunders, and give greater weight to the opinions of SAMCs Drs. Reid and Post than that of SAMC Dr. Cremona, if she found them to be better supported by the evidence. See Frank, 326 F.3d at 620; see also Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion, first deciding whether a treating source's opinion receives controlling weight and otherwise weighing the opinions using the listed factors.

Robinson v. Commissioner · filed 2020-03-23(c)

The regulations require Administrative Law Judges to evaluate every medical opinion in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ ... 404.1527(c); 416,927(c). The process of assigning weight to medical opinions in the record begins with a determination whether to assign controlling weight to the medical opinion of the treating source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 416,927(c). If controlling weight is not assigned to the treating source’s opinion, the Administrative Law Judge must consider the factors in paragraphs (c)(1)-(6) of this section in deciding how much weight to accord each of the medical opinions in the record, including the medical opinion from the treating source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an administrative law judge evaluating a medical opinion to consider the doctor’s examination and relationship with the claimant, supporting medical evidence, consistency with the record, and specialization.

Gullett v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-24(c)

“When weighing each medical opinion, the ALJ must consider whether the doctor has examined the claimant; the doctor’s relationship with the claimant; the medical evidence supporting the doctor’s opinion; how consistent the doctor’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and the doctor’s specialization.” ... Based on its review of the ALJ’s decision and the record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly applied the appropriate standard in evaluating the weight to be accorded these medical opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires every medical opinion to be evaluated, generally gives greater weight to treating-source opinions, and requires a well-supported, consistent treating-source opinion to receive controlling weight; other opinions are weighed using six listed factors.

Weinberg v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-25(c)(2), (c)(1)–(6)

Every medical opinion is evaluated regardless of its source, but the Commissioner generally gives greater weight to opinions from a treating source. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treating source is a claimant’s “physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source” who provides or has provided a claimant with medical treatment or evaluation, and who has or has had an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant. Id. § 404.1502. When “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence,” the Commissioner must give such an opinion controlling weight. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). If controlling weight is not given to a treating source’s opinion, the Commissioner considers six factors in deciding the weight given to each medical opinion: (1) whether the source examined the claimant or not; (2) whether the source treated the claimant; (3) the medical signs and laboratory findings that support the given opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) whether the opinion is made by a specialist or non-specialist; and (6) any other factor which “tend[s] to support or contradict the opinion.” See id. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) generally favors medical opinions from sources who examined the claimant but permits an ALJ to give greater weight to a nonexamining source in appropriate circumstances.

Shelton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-12(c)(1)

SSA regulations provide that the agency will “[g]enerally[ ] . . . give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to a medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined [the claimant].” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1). This general principle, however, is subject to exception, and, in some cases, an ALJ may properly afford greater weight to a nonexamining source. See Miller, 811 F.3d at 834 (“[U]nder certain circumstances, an ALJ may assign greater weight to a [nonexamining] state agency consultant’s opinion than to that of a treating or examining source.” (citing SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2, 1996)); Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409 (same).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors when determining how much weight to give a treating therapist’s opinion, even though the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.

Taylor v. Saul · filed 2020-04-22(c)

As a therapist Roehl is not an “acceptable medical source.” SSR 06-3p. Having said that, although Roehl’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ is still required to consider the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) factors in determining how much weight to give her opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives more weight to opinions from examining physicians than to opinions from non-examining physicians.

Vaughn v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-04-24

What is more, the ALJ rejected the opinion of an examining physician who evaluated Plaintiff once in favor of a non-examining physician who never evaluated Plaintiff at all. The ALJ’s proffered reasons for doing so—that Dr. Jahnke was familiar with the standard for assessing disability, that she had reviewed the medical record, and that she clearly explained her opinions—did not justify inverting the long-settled hierarchy of physician opinions set out both in the Commissioner’s regulations and in this circuit’s precedents. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are afforded more weight than those of non-examining physicians.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The weight given to a nonexamining medical opinion depends on the degree of supporting explanation and its consistency with the record as a whole.

Jordan v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-05-22(c)(3),(4)

While not itself dispositive of anything, Dr. Sturgis’s reliance on certain records to the exclusion of others—particularly records suggesting a deterioration in Ms. Jordan’s functioning—without supporting explanation tends to lessen the weight that should have been accorded to his opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1) (providing that assessing claimant’s degree of functional limitation “requires us to consider multiple issues and all relevant evidence to obtain a longitudinal picture of your overall degree of functional limitation” (emphasis added)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3),(4) (providing that “because nonexamining sources have no examining or treating relationship with you, the weight we will give to their medical opinions will depend on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their medical opinions” and that “the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion” (emphasis added)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) identifies consistency with the record as a whole as a factor in assigning weight to a medical opinion, generally favoring more consistent opinions.

VARGAS v. BERRYHILL · filed 2020-06-18(c)(4)

The regulations make clear that consistency with “the record as a whole” is a factor considered by the ALJ in assigning weight to a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.”)

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating source’s opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence, while allowing consideration of the treatment relationship, supportability, and consistency.

LINDEMEYER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-06-19(c)(2)

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), a treating source’s opinion will be given controlling weight if the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record. Several factors may also be used to determine the weight given to a medical opinion including: the length of the treatment relationship; the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; supportability by the medical evidence; and consistency with the record as a whole. Id. If a treating source’s opinion conflicts with that of other medical sources, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reasons. ... Here, the ALJ complied with the regulations in assigning “limited” or “partial” weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctor.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to opinions from examining sources and controlling weight to treating-source opinions, while permitting consideration of factors such as specialization and familiarity with Social Security programs.

Thompson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-22(c)(1)-(6)

Social security regulations generally provide for an order of hierarchy in the evaluation of medical opinion evidence, with the opinions of treating physicians to be given the most weight, and the opinions of examining consultants to be given greater weight than the opinions of non-examining consultants. For claims filed before March 27, 2017, the regulations specify that “[g]enerally,” an ALJ is required to “give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you,” with the most weight, or “controlling weight” to be given to treating physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1) and (2). ... The evaluation of medical opinions includes consideration of many factors, including a physician’s specialization. However, an ALJ is not required to perform an exhaustive, step-by-step analysis of each factor in weighing medical source opinions. ... Included among the relevant factors to be considered is familiarity with SSA programs. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). Here, the fact that Dr. Bolz had specialized orthopedic training does not diminish the fact that under SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306 at *3 (March 27, 2017), he was a state agency consultant.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to treating-source opinions than to opinions from sources who do not treat the claimant, and gives greater weight to examining-source opinions than to nonexamining-source opinions.

Osier v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-07-08(c)(1)-(2)

Generally, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating physician than to the opinion of those who do not actually treat the claimant. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2). More weight is also given to an examining physician than to a nonexamining physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) generally gives more weight to opinions from examining, treating, and specialist physicians than to opinions from non-examining, non-treating, and nonspecialist physicians.

Roberts v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-15(c)

The method for weighing medical opinions under the Social Security Act is found in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Relevant here, the opinions of examining physicians are generally given more weight than non-examining physicians, treating more than non-treating physicians, and specialists more than non-specialist physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1-5). ... To begin, as a one-time consultative examiner, Dr. Dodsworth’s opinion was not entitled to any special consideration by the ALJ. In other words, the ALJ did not need to articulate good cause for rejecting Dr. Dodsworth’s findings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires a treating-source opinion to receive controlling weight when it is well-supported and consistent with substantial evidence, while permitting reduced weight for opinions inconsistent with the objective medical record.

Willis v. Saul · filed 2020-08-24(c)

A treating source’s opinion must be given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. ... The ALJ properly assigned Dr. Monteiro’s opinions partial weight as only portions were consistent with the objective medical records.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) supports giving greater weight to a medical opinion from a specialist about the specialist’s area of expertise.

Moody v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-08-26(c)(5)

These were discussed, but the ALJ properly gave Dr. Irwin’s opinion more weight as a specialist. (R. at 659); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(3) generally bases the weight of medical opinions on the examining or treating relationship and permits rejection of a contradicted treating or examining opinion only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

(SS) Gonzales v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-03(d)(1)-(3)

“Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are afforded more weight than those of non-examining physicians, and the opinions of examining non-treating physicians are afforded less weight than those of treating physicians. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2)). “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ weighing medical opinions to account for examining status, the length of the treatment relationship, and the medical source's specialty, and it does not permit an unexplained preference for a one-time examiner or non-examining consultants over treating physicians.

Estes v. Saul · filed 2020-09-08(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(5)

It was appropriate for the ALJ to consider the doctors’ specialties in weighing their opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5). But it was not appropriate for the ALJ to reject the opinions of plaintiff’s treating doctors, one of whom is a spine specialist, in favor of the opinions of non-examining consultants who do not specialize in spines. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1) (“[W]e give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who has examined you than to the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined you.”); ... Similarly, it was proper for the ALJ to consider the length of each treater’s relationship with plaintiff, but she did not explain why the opinion of the IME, who examined plaintiff once, was entitled to more weight than those of the doctors who treated him for months or years. (R. 342-46); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will give to the source's medical opinion. When the treating source has seen you a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture of your impairment, we will give the medical source’s medical opinion more weight than we would give it if it were from a nontreating source.”). ... In short, the ALJ’s rejection of the treaters’ opinions is not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, this case must be remanded for a reassessment of the medical opinion evidence.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to opinions from acceptable medical sources and does not give controlling weight to opinions from sources who are not acceptable medical sources.

Kane v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-14(c)(2)

In particular, the relevant regulations differentiate between evidence from “acceptable medical sources” and medical sources who are not “acceptable” as well as nonmedical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 (providing that generally opinion evidence from acceptable medical sources are entitled to greater weight than opinion evidence from other sources). Significantly, neither NP Kane nor LMSW Roberson are “acceptable medical sources” as defined in the relevant regulations and thus their opinions are not entitled to controlling weight as provided for by § 404.1527(c)(2) and § 416.927(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) provides that opinions from sources who are not acceptable medical sources do not receive controlling or significant weight.

Patterson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-22(c)

Specifically, as the ALJ found, AR at 48, not only is the December 1, 2017 Mental Impairment Questionnaire dated almost one year after Plaintiff’s last date insured of December 31, 2016, 20 C.F.R. § 404.315(a); Reynolds v. Colvin, 570 Fed.Appx. 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2014) (treating retrospective opinion not probative where it is not supported by contemporaneous treatment records) (quoting Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir.1996) (“A treating physician's retrospective medical assessment of a patient may be probative when based upon clinically acceptable diagnostic techniques.”)), but neither LMSW Kuhl nor NP Flynn-Aikins qualifies under the relevant regulations as an acceptable medical source whose opinion is entitled to controlling or significant weight, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), nor does the Plaintiff point to the use of clinically acceptable diagnostic techniques. Although “the ALJ is certainly free to consider the opinion of [other medical sources] in making his overall assessment of a claimant’s impairments and residual abilities, those opinions do not demand the same deference as those of a treating physician.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires medical opinions to be weighed based on the source’s examining and treating relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and specialty, while opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not medical opinions and cannot be determinative.

Abrams v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-09-29(c), (d)

The weight afforded to a medical opinion regarding the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments depends upon the examining and treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant, the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... The regulations and case law establish a general preference for assigning greater weight to the opinions of treating medical sources than the opinions of non-treating medical sources, and greater weight to the opinions of non-treating medical sources than the opinions of non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2); Ryan v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 939, 942 (11th Cir. 1985). ... Additionally, applicable regulations provide that physicians’ opinions on issues such as whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The court focuses on the doctors’ evaluations of the claimant’s “condition and the medical consequences thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) directs an ALJ weighing a medical opinion to consider factors such as the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization, giving more weight to well-supported and consistent opinions.

Buchanon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-29(c)

The Social Security regulations provide guidelines for the ALJ to employ when evaluating medical opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. In determining the weight to afford a medical opinion, the ALJ considers a variety of factors including but not limited to the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, whether an opinion is well-supported, whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and the area of the doctor’s specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). For instance, the more a medical source presents evidence to support an opinion, such as medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight that medical opinion will receive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3). Further, the more consistent the medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight that opinion will receive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence, and that a specialist's opinion is entitled to more weight than a nonspecialist's.

Floyd v. Apfel · filed 1999-06-24(d)(2), (d)(5)

The ALJ properly rejected Dr. Collins’ opinion that Mr. Floyd was totally disabled. Dr. Collins’ opinion is not “well–supported by medically acceptable clinical . . . diagnostic techniques and is . . . inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in” the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1029. Thus, it was not entitled to controlling weight. ... A specialist’s opinion is entitled to more weight than that of a nonspecialist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the weight given to a medical opinion to depend primarily on factors including the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency with the record as a whole, and specialization.

Runyon v. Apfel · filed 1999-08-24

Rather, the weight of the opinion must depend primarily on the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, including (1) examining relationship; (2) treatment relationship, (3) supportability; (4) consistency with the record as a whole; and (5) specialization.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) directs the ALJ to give controlling weight to a supported, consistent treating-physician opinion and, otherwise, to weigh it using specified relationship, evidentiary, consistency, specialization, and other factors.

Smith v. Apfel · filed 1999-11-02(d)

In deciding whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the medical opinions along with the rest of the relevant evidence. Generally, the ALJ will give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion that is consistent with other evidence if the opinion is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic tests. If the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ will consider the following factors when determining the weight to give: 1) the length of the relationship and frequency of examination, 2) the nature and extent of relationship, 3) whether the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, 4) whether the opinion is consistent with the records as a whole, 5) specialization of the physician, and 6) other. factors that may be brought to the court’s attention. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). ... The Court finds that the ALJ used the correct legal standard set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) when he gave more weight to the assessment of the state agency physician, and discounted the assessment of Smith’s treating physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) requires the Social Security Administration to give greater weight to a medical opinion when the source provides more relevant supporting evidence, especially medical signs and laboratory findings.

Martin v. Apfel · filed 2000-08-30(d)(3)

The ALJ never commented upon this difference and thereby implicitly viewed the doctors’ opinions of equal probative force. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (2000), however, understandably states that the more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support- an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight the Social Security Administration will give that opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) permits an ALJ to give a physician’s opinion little weight when it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.

Belanger v. Apfel · filed 2000-09-20(d)(2)

Regulations provide that an ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician if it is “inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the] case record ...” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives less weight to a nonexamining source's opinion when it lacks supporting explanations, particularly specific medical findings.

Lauer v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2001-04-04(d)(3)

Although Dr. Larson indicated that Mr. Lauer had only minimal work-related limitations resulting from depression, the weight given the opinions of "nonexamining sources" such as Dr. Larson "depend[s] on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations," see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(3), and Dr. Larson provided no specific medical findings to support his mental RFC assessment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) gives greater weight to treating than examining or reviewing opinions, favors explained specialist opinions, and gives controlling weight to a supported treating opinion not inconsistent with substantial evidence.

Holohan v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissionerof Ssa · filed 2001-04-17(d), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(5)

Title II's implementing regulations distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant[but who review the claimant's file] (nonexamining [or reviewing] physicians)." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d). Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician's. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d). In addition, the regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not, see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(3), and to the opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over that of nonspecialists, see id. 404.1527(d)(5). 15 In disability benefits cases, physicians typically provide two types of opinions: medical opinions that speak to the nature and extent of a claimant's limitations, and opinions concerning the ultimate issue of disability, i.e., opinions about whether a claimant is capable of any work, given her or his limitations. Under the regulations, if a treating physician's medical opinion is supported by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2); see also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-2p.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) directs an ALJ to give greater weight to a medical opinion when the source presents more relevant supporting evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

Foster v. Halter · filed 2002-01-18(d)(3)

These findings, however, were neither explained nor supported by medical or clinical findings. Moreover, these findings were inconsistent with Dr. Tanley’s narrative report. The ALJ was therefore entitled to conclude that the findings listed in the questionnaire were not entitled to significant weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives more weight to opinions from examining and treating sources, and controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion when it is well-supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence.

Shontos v. Barnhart · filed 2003-03-07(a)(2), (d)(1), (d)(2)(i), (d)(2)

At the very least, Dr. Burn had what the regulations describe as an examining relationship, and accordingly, his opinion would be given more weight than a source who had not examined Ms. Shontos. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(1). ... The ALJ erred in determining that Ms. Flaherty was not an acceptable medical source. Medical equivalence is determined by considering medical evidence and other evidence of impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. “Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added). “In addition to evidence from the acceptable medical sources listed . . . we may also use evidence from other sources to show the severity of your impairment(s) and how it affects your ability to work. Other sources include, but are not limited to- - (1) Medical sources not listed . . . nurse-practitioners . . . and therapists.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1) (emphasis added). The regulations read together, indicate that nurse practitioners and therapists are “other medical sources” whose opinions are considered medical opinions. Id. Accordingly, Ms. Flaherty and Ms. Bookmeyer are acceptable medical sources. ... We further find the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Ms. Shontos’ treating mental health providers. The amount of weight given to a medical opinion is to be governed by a number of factors including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, consistency, specialization, and other factors. Generally, more weight is given to opinions of sources who have treated a claimant, and to those who are treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The regulations provide that the longer and more frequent the contact between the treating source, the greater the weight will be given the opinion: “When the treating source has seen you a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture of your impairment, we will give the source’s opinion more weight than we would give it if it were from a nontreating source.” Id. at (d)(2)(i). A treating source’s opinion is to be given controlling weight where it is supported by acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and where it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Id. at (d)(2). Where controlling weight is not given to a treating source’s opinion, it is weighed according to the factors enumerated above. Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the decision maker to give greater weight to treating-source medical opinions when the regulation’s factors support that treatment.

Leonovich v. Barnhart · filed 2003-02-26(d)(1)-(5)

Based on the above regulation, clearly Dr. Phillips’ and Dr. Gold’s opinions should carry great weight in this case. Although the Commissioner relies on contrary medical evidence in the record, that evidence does not come from treating sources and, thus, is not accorded the great weight that the treating physicians’ evidence is under this regulation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) directs the Commissioner to give greater weight to a medical opinion that is more consistent with the record as a whole.

Kearse v. Massanari · filed 2003-08-26(d)

The medical source opinion regulations indicate that the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight the Commissioner will give it. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2000).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to give less weight to a medical opinion that is inconsistent with the medical evidence and to treat an opinion as having limited probative value when it was made with knowledge that the claimant had already retired.

Woolfolk v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2004-01-15(d)(3), (e)

We recognize that Dr. Ani’s progress notes consistently documented that Wool-folk was unable to work and that this opinion was not contradicted by any other health practitioners. The ALJ, however, appropriately gave less weight to Dr. Ani’s opinion that Woolfolk was unable to work inasmuch as it was inconsistent with the documentation that Woolfolk’s pain was gone, he was walking well and the strength in his legs was intact. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d at 429 (recognizing that a practitioner’s opinion may be rejected if there is contradictory medical evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (specifying that the “more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion”). Because Dr. Ani’s opinion that Woolfolk could not work after the removal of the bone growth stimulator was made with the knowledge that Woolfolk had already retired, that opinion was of limited probative value in determining whether Woolfolk was disabled for purposes of Social Security. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to classify a medical expert who did not treat or examine the claimant as a non-examining source when determining the weight of the expert’s opinion.

Olivares v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2004-04-06

Although the ALJ’s observations that Dr. Mylod was frequently used by claimants and that he was being paid to testify in this proceeding may have been an inartful way of explaining one of the bases for discounting Dr. M ylod’s opinion, they did provide an appropriate basis for classifying Dr. Mylod’s opinion as that of a “non-examining source” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(5) gives greater weight to a medical opinion from a specialist about issues related to the specialist's area of expertise.

Benecke v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2004-08-09(d)(5)

Each rheumatologist's opinion is given greater weight than those of the other physicians because it is an "opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). Rheumatology is the relevant specialty for fibromyalgia.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to weigh medical opinions using factors such as examining and treatment relationships, support, consistency, and specialization, while considering the opinions with the rest of the relevant evidence.

Kerwick v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-11-17(b), (d)(5)

Social security regulations also provide guidelines for the ALJ to use when evaluating medical opinion evidence. Id. § 404.1527. The ALJ considers many factors when weighing medical opinions, including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, whether an opinion is amply supported, whether an opinion is consistent with the record, and a doctor’s specialization. Id. § 404.1527(d). ... Additionally, the opinion of a specialist is generally entitled to more weight than the opinions of other non-specialists. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). However, the ALJ must “always consider the medical opinions in [the] case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence . . . receive[d].” Id. § 404.1527(b).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(6) directs the ALJ to weigh medical opinions using examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors; an examining opinion that is not a treating-source opinion is not entitled to treating-source presumptive weight.

Kornecky v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-02-09(d)(1)-(6)

Given our finding that Lian was merely an examining physician, his opinion was not entitled to the presumptive weight accorded a treating physician’s opinion. ... The regulations provide: ... (3) Supportability. The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion. ... (4) Consistency. Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion. ... 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(6). Applying this standard, the ALJ reasonably found that Lian’s opinion was not as well supported as the other medical opinions, and that his assessment of Kornecky’s limitations was not consistent with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(4).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives more weight to a medical opinion when the source provides a better explanation for it.

Kratman v. Barnhart · filed 2006-06-30(d)(3)

The ALJ thereby disregarded the mandate of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3) and 416.927(d)(3) which states that the “better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires considering the examining relationship, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization when deciding the weight to give a medical opinion.

Maxwell v. Barnhart · filed 2007-01-31(d)

However, in the event a medical opinion is not given controlling weight under the “treating physician” rule, the regulations provide factors to consider in deciding the weight [to] give to any medical opinion, including: (1) the “examining relationship” — more weight is given “to the opinion of a source who has examined [a patient] than to the opinion of a source who has not;” (2) the “treatment relationship” — more weight is given “to opinions from ... treating sources ...(3) “supportability” — “[t]he more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion;” (4) “consistency” — “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion;” (5) “specialization” — “more weight [is given] to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who, is not a specialist.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). These factors weigh against according dispositive probative weight to Dr. Campagna’s testimony as he did not examine plaintiff and, as detailed above, his findings are not consistent with the medical record as a whole.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires the Commissioner to explain the weight given to a source opinion and the reasons for that weight.

Shivel v. Astrue · filed 2008-01-07(d)

On remand, the Commissioner shall discuss both the evidence relied on and rejected to determine Mr. Shivel’s mental RFC, as well as the weight given to any source opinion and the reasons for the weight assigned, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844). The 2012 rule moved the former treating-source provisions from § 404.1527(d) to (c) (77 FR 10651).

Section 404.1527(d)(2) does not require controlling weight for a medical opinion that lacks objective support and conflicts with other medical opinions.

Giordano v. Astrue · filed 2008-12-04(d)(2)

The ALJ was not required to give Dr. Saadi’s opinion controlling weight because it was not well-supported by objective medical evidence and conflicted with other medical opinions.

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d) requires the ALJ to weigh every medical opinion using factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors, and to give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating source’s opinion.

McPherson v. Astrue · filed 2009-03-02(d)

Every medical opinion received by the ALJ must be considered in accordance with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) (2006). These factors include: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of evaluation, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) various other factors. Additionally, the Regulations state that the Commissioner “will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source’s opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The six factors in subsection (d) apply only to treating physicians’ medical opinions, not to opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work, which are legal conclusions reserved to the Commissioner.

Villalpando v. Astrue · filed 2009-03-20(d)

Unless the ALJ gives a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, he must consider the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) to decide the weight to be given to any medical opinion. However, “[t]he ALJ has the sole responsibility of determining the disability status.” Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990). The six factors in subsection (d) of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 apply only with respect to the medical opinions of treating physicians. ... Subsection (d) is entitled "How we weigh medical opinions" and explicitly applies only to "medical opinions." Subsection (e) of the regulation expressly explains that some opinions by physicians are not medical opinions, and as such have no "special significance" in the ALJ's determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) &(e)(3). Among the opinions by treating doctors that have no special significance are determinations that an applicant is "disabled" or "unable to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). These determinations are legal conclusions that the regulation describes as "reserved to the Commissioner." The factors set out at subsection (d) apply only to medical opinions, not opinions "reserved to the Commissioner."

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For a nontreating source, the ALJ need not give the opinion controlling weight and may weigh it based on other relevant factors.

Simila v. Astrue · filed 2009-07-22(d)(2)-(6)

If Dr. Caillier is a “nontreating source,” however, the ALJ was not required to assign his opinion controlling weight. White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the ALJ was permitted to evaluate the opinion’s weight in light of other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6); Elder, 529 F.3d at 415.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight to evaluate the medical opinion using specified factors, including examination, treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency, and specialization.

Lorence v. Astrue · filed 2010-02-23(d)

If an ALJ determines not to grant controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, medical opinions are further evaluated under the framework described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Under such framework, the ALJ should consider the following factors in according weight to medical opinions: (1) whether the source has examined the claimant; (2) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) the quantity of evidence in support of the opinion; (5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and (6) whether the source is a specialist. ... The ALJ’s analysis of the physicians’ opinions was also deficient because, after declining to give controlling weight to certain physicians’ opinions and ignoring others, the ALJ did not weigh the medical opinions in accordance with the framework described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to treating and examining physicians than to non-examining physicians, while reserving RFC determinations to the Commissioner.

Shaw v. Astrue · filed 2010-08-12(d)(1)–(2), (e)

An examining physician’s opinion is generally given more weight than a non-examining physician, and more weight is generally given to a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(2). ... An opinion on an applicant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but rather a decision reserved to the Commissioner, to be based on medical sources, and the physician’s opinion in this respect is not entitled to deference. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a physician’s judgments about an impairment’s nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, functional capacity, and restrictions, as medical opinions that the ALJ must consider and whose weight must be explained.

Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2011-01-24(a)(2), (d)(1)-(2)

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to consider the treating physician’s treatment notes because they did not constitute a “medical opinion,” but this argument ignores the language of the regulations. The treating physician’s treatment notes included a description of Winschel’s symptoms, a diagnosis, and a judgment about the severity of his impairments, and clearly constituted a “statement[] from [a] physician . . . that reflect[s] judgments about the nature and severity of [Winschel’s] impairment(s), including [Winschel’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [Winschel] can still do despite impairment(s), and [Winschel’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) permits an ALJ to give less weight to a medical opinion that is cursory and lacks supporting analysis or references to the medical record.

Egan v. SSA · filed 2012-01-31(d)(3)

Further, D r . Estey’s functional analysis was rendered in cursory fashion, and as such, the ALJ could properly give it less weight. See Coggon v . Barnhart, 354 F. Supp. 2d 4 0 , 53 (D. Mass. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(5) directs adjudicators to consider a medical source's specialization and may support giving less weight to an opinion outside the source's expertise.

Akey v. Astrue · filed 2012-03-13(d)(5)

Although Akey points to Nurse Practitioner Jacobsen’s report that Akey suffered from a “marked limitation” in dealing with work stress, the ALJ did not err in discounting her opinion because she has no expertise in psychology or psychiatry. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(5), 416.927(d)(5).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to explain why the RFC differs from a medical-source opinion, but it does not make a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled binding because disability is reserved to the Commissioner.

McGrath v. SSA · filed 2012-03-22(d), (e)(1)

The decision that a claimant is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). As such, "[a] statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] ''disabled' or 'unable to work'" does not compel a finding that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (e) (1). ... Where an ALJ's functional assessment is at odds with a medical source opinion, he must adequately explain his reasons for disregarding that opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7; Marshall v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-147-JD, 2008 WL 5396295, at *3 (D.N.H. Dec. 22, 2008); cf. Monroe v. Barnhart, 471 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211-13 (D. Mass. 2007) (ALJ must give sufficient explanation for adopting contrary view of disability).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to treating and examining medical sources than to non-examining sources, while requiring consideration of consistency, supporting evidence, and the explanations for an opinion.

Dragon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2012-03-26(d)(1)–(4)

In weighing medical opinions, generally, a treating source is to be given more weight than an examining source and an examining source (Dr. Deardorff) more weight than a non-examining source (Dr. Pawlarcyzk). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(2). ... Whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole or supported by relevant evidence will also factor into the evaluation of medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(4). The weight of non-examining sources will be given weight dependant on the “degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires the ALJ to assess a nonexamining source’s opinion by considering the explanation supporting it and the evidence the source considered.

Nicolls v. Astrue · filed 2012-07-12(c)(3)

Because nonexamining sources have no examining or treating relationship with the claimant, the weight given to their opinions “depend[s] on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3). ... Because the ALJ is required to evaluate nonexamining sources’ opinions depending on the degree to which they consider all the pertinent evidence in the claim, and the degree to which they provide supporting evidence to their opinions, the ALJ could properly leave out this limitation if the record supported such a determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires medical opinions to be weighed based on factors including their support in relevant evidence and consistency with the record as a whole, while reserving the ultimate determination of a claimant's residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

O'Neill v. Astrue · filed 2013-05-06(e)(2)

RFC refers to the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The RFC assessment must be based upon all relevant evidence, including medical records, medical source opinions, and a claimant’s description of his own symptoms. In addition, the final responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC is reserved exclusively for the Commissioner, who will not give any special significance to the source of another opinion on this issue. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 416.927(e)(2). Moreover, the weight afforded to a medical opinion is dependent upon a variety of factors, including the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence and consistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to evaluate medical opinions, generally gives controlling weight to a treating or primary physician's opinion about the nature and severity of impairments, and leaves conflicting evidence and the ultimate disability determination to the ALJ.

Malcom v. Colvin · filed 2013-09-25

The ALJ is required to evaluate all of the medical findings and other evidence that supports a physician’s statement that an individual is disabled. The opinion of a treating or primary physician is generally given controlling weight when evaluating the nature and severity of an individual’s impairments. However, no special significance is given to the source of an opinion on other issues which are reserved to the ALJ, such as the ultimate determination of disablement. ... The record evinces that the ALJ specifically set forth his reasons for discounting the medical opinions and did not substitute his own non-medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) gives more weight to medical opinions from examining and treating physicians than to opinions from non-examining, non-treating physicians.

Radford v. Colvin · filed 2013-10-29(c)

Moreover, the ALJ appeared to totally – and without explanation - reject the opinions of Radford’s treating physicians in favor of the state medical examiners; this raises red flags because the state medical opinions are issued by non-examining physicians and are typically afforded less weight than those by examining and treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (providing that medical opinions from examining and treating physicians are given more weight than those of non-examining, non-treating physicians).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) directs an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion that is more consistent with the record as a whole.

Engebrecht v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2014-07-14(c)(4)

This analysis was consistent with the SSA’s regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) does not entitle an opinion from a nurse practitioner classified as an “other source” to controlling weight.

Roeschlaub v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2014-06-26(d)

As such, Saucedo’s opinion would not be enti-' tied to controlling weight, and it “cannot establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d); SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a well-supported treating-source opinion that is not inconsistent with the record controlling weight, or to provide good, fully explained reasons for declining to do so.

Keeton v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2014-10-14(c)(2)

The failure to discuss Sehbi’s findings also runs contrary to the treating source rule set out at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If an ALJ finds that a treating source’s opinion is well-supported and is not inconsistent with other evidence in the record, the ALJ gives it controlling weight. Even if the ALJ finds that the treating medical source’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, that determination must be fully explained. 29 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2)(ii) requires an ALJ to explain in the decision the weight given to a State agency medical or psychological consultant's opinion.

Shaw v. SSA · filed 2015-03-11(e)(2)(ii)

She did not address the opinion of Dr. Kalfas at all--an omission which by itself would arguably necessitate remand, since the governing regulations require an ALJ to “explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician, psychologist, or other medical specialist.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); ... The case must be remanded to the SSA so the opinions of Drs. Garber, Kalfas, and Jamieson can be evaluated in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives more weight to an examining source's opinion, but permits an administrative law judge to favor a nonexamining source after considering the source relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other factors.

Downs v. SSA · filed 2015-06-08(c)

Generally speaking, Social Security decision makers “give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined [a claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has not examined [him].” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1) & 416.927(a)(1). However, just as an ALJ may properly decline to give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source, see, e.g., Bourinot v. Colvin, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2015 WL 1456183, at *11 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2015) (citing Arroyo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 1991)), an ALJ may also discount the weight given to the opinion of an examining source in favor of the opinion of a nonexamining source. When determining the weight to give to a medical opinion, the ALJ must consider the nature of the relationship between the medical source and the claimant, the supportability of the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, whether the source of the opinion is a specialist, and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ weighing an examining medical-source opinion to consider the regulatory factors and give specific, legitimate reasons for discounting or rejecting it.

Ringgold v. Colvin · filed 2016-04-04(c)

Her opinion is therefore considered an “examining medical-source opinion.” Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1); 416.927(c)(1). Such opinions are “given particular consideration” in that they are “presumptively entitled to more weight than a doctor’s opinion derived from a review of the medical record.” ... An examining medical-source opinion “may be dismissed or discounted, of course, but that must be based on an evaluation of all of the factors set out in the . . . regulations and the ALJ must provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives treating-source opinions more weight, requires good reasons when an opinion is not given controlling weight, and directs the adjudicator to consider the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors.

Wallis v. Colvin · filed 2016-06-10(c), (c)(2), and (c)(2)-(6)

The opinions of treating sources are “[generally” given “more weight” than those of non-treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). When a treating source’s opinion is not given “controlling weight,” ... a hearing officer must “give good reasons ... for the weight [he or she] give[s] the opinion.” Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The relevant factors a hearing officer ought consider in determining the appropriate weight are the “[ljength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination!,]” the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship!,]” the “[s]upportability” of the opinion (i.e., the extent to which the medical source has explained her findings and supported them with evidence such as “medical signs and laboratory findings”), consistency with the record as a whole, whether the source specializes in the area on which she has opined, and any other factors that “tend to support or contradict the opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion substantial or considerable weight unless good cause supports giving it less weight.

Thomas Jeffery Grantham, Jr. v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2016-07-11(c)(2)

The ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion “substantial or considerable weight” unless there is “good cause” not to do so. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh a medical opinion using factors including the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and other relevant considerations.

Evans v. Colvin · filed 2016-05-19(c)

Nonetheless, an ALJ must weigh that opinion according to a number of factors, including the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; evidence in support of the opinion; the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; and other relevant factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions using factors such as the treatment relationship and the opinion's support and consistency, and failure to do so requires remand.

Barrett v. Colvin · filed 2016-09-30(c)

An ALJ must weigh certain factors in evaluating both treating and non-treating source statements, including the nature, length, and extent of the treating or examining relationship, as well as whether the medical opinion is supported by, and consistent with, medical signs and laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Remand is required when an ALJ fails to adequately evaluate the weight of a medical opinion in light of the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats the disability determination as an issue reserved to the Commissioner and limits its treating-source controlling-weight rule to opinions from qualifying acceptable medical sources.

LaValley v. Colvin. · filed 2017-01-12(d)(1), (c)(2)

However, whether LaValley qualifies as “disabled” under the statute is a decision reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). ... If so, McClure’s testimony could be entitled to “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). To the extent this is LaValley’s argument, she is incorrect. Only “acceptable medical sources” may be considered “treating sources.” Id. § 404.1502. A nurse practitioner is not an “acceptable medical source.” Id. § 404.1513(a), (d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs the Commissioner to evaluate medical opinions from acceptable medical sources and weigh them according to factors including the treatment relationship, consistency with the record, and source specialty.

Bowman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2017-03-21(a)(2), (b), (c)

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner evaluates all medical opinions, i.e., statements from physicians or other “acceptable medical sources” that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), (b), (c). The weight accorded to an acceptable medical source’s opinion depends upon factors such as the examining and treating relationship, how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. See id. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to explain the weight given to a treating source’s opinion by addressing its supportability and consistency and considering relevant treatment factors, including the treatment relationship, examination frequency, and source specialization.

Allen v. Berryhill · filed 2017-03-31(c)(2)

The explanation above does not comport with the procedural requirements of § 1527(c)(2). First, although it is implicitly clear that the ALJ decided not to give Dr. Wood’s opinion controlling weight, she failed to state whether the opinion was “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” or “inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even assuming the ALJ properly declined to give Dr. Wood’s opinion controlling weight, she also failed to give “good reasons” for giving his opinion “no significant weight.” Namely, she did not balance § 1527(c)(2)’s requisite factors, such as the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, and specialization of the treating source. The ALJ’s entire characterization of Dr. Wood merely stated that he examined Allen in October 2012, that he “primarily treated [Allen’s] husband,” and he also rendered couples therapy to Allen and her husband. (Tr. 19.) This is insufficient and leaves out crucial information, such as that he is a clinical psychologist who treated her for five years.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a statement as a medical opinion when it addresses the nature and severity of an impairment, including the claimant's functional limitations.

Montecalvo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2017-07-13(a)(2)

In any event, the letters are not medical opinions because they do not discuss functional limitations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), and are therefore not entitled to deference by the ALJ, see Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that statements that do not address the specific extent of limitations “appear to be outside the scope of ‘medical opinions’ as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2)”).