11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) permits a claimant to seek a determination that a drunk driving debt is nondischargeable without first obtaining a judgment, despite the enactment of subsection (a)(9).

Bippus v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1985-08-29(a)(6)

There is no requirement under § 523(a)(6) that the plaintiff have a judgement before bringing a complaint to determine dischargeability. The enactment of § 523(a)(9) does not preclude a claimant from proceeding under § 523(a)(6) for relief in a drunk driving situation.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for an ordinary drunken-driving injury from a Chapter 7 discharge solely because the debtor drove while intoxicated.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Reeves (In Re Reeves) · filed 1985-12-23(a)(6)

Having, however, re-examined § 523(a)(6), the bankruptcy judge concludes that neither its terms nor those of its near-identical predecessor excludes this type of debt from a debtor’s discharge in a case under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy statute, and a judgment based upon this conclusion will be entered.

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a state court judgment to expressly find that liability resulted from intoxicated driving.

Sickel v. Pahule (In Re Pahule) · filed 1987-09-25(a)(9)

Furthermore, the provisions of § 523(a)(9) do not require a precise legal determination by a state court that the liability was incurred as a result of the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.

Section 523(a)(9) requires the debtor to have operated the motor vehicle while legally intoxicated; ownership and vicarious liability alone do not qualify.

Gray v. Lewis (In Re Lewis) · filed 1987-09-25(a)(9)

In summary, the Court finds that since the debtor was not the operator of the motor vehicle, but was only connected with the vehicle in question by his ownership of same, the plaintiff’s state court judgment against the debtor is not eligible for an exception from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a judgment or consent decree to be entered before the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Jones v. Hager (In Re Jones) · filed 1987-10-15(a)(9)

Thus, even where no pre-petition judgment or decree is obtained, liability arising from intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(9) requires some showing that the debtor’s intoxication caused the injury before the debt is nondischargeable.

Commercial Union Insurance v. Christiansen (In Re Christiansen) · filed 1987-12-14(a)(9)

I doubt that Congress intended the punitive result of nondischargeability to apply without some showing of causation, particularly where, as here, both drivers involved in the accident were “obviously intoxicated.” In this respect I agree with the bankruptcy judge.

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a judgment to be entered before the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Allstate Insurance v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1988-02-26(a)(9)

To the extent that Jackson holds that under § 523(a)(9) it is not necessary to obtain a judgment before the petition is filed, this Court agrees.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts injury debts caused by drunk driving from discharge even if the injured person has not obtained a judgment before the driver files bankruptcy.

Young v. Rose (In Re Rose) · filed 1988-02-05(a)(9)

It is this Court’s opinion that notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs did not reduce their claim against the debtor for injuries sustained as a result of his driving while intoxicated to judgment before he filed bankruptcy, the claim for injuries is nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) prevents discharge of a drunk-driving debt even when the civil judgment does not recite intoxication, if the debtor’s related guilty plea establishes it.

In the Matter of Edward Joseph PAHULE, Debtor-Appellant · filed 1988-06-29(a)(9)

Section 523(a)(9) is designed to prevent using the bankruptcy laws to extinguish debts incurred as a result of drunken driving. ... The failure of the judgment to recite the basis of the monetary award is irrelevant.

Section 523(a)(9) does not make a contractual debt nondischargeable merely because a debtor drove while intoxicated; the debt must arise from that operation.

Beck Motors, Inc. v. Gill (In Re Gill) · filed 1988-12-08(a)(9)

That reason is that the debt plaintiff seeks to exempt does not arise from the operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated but arises from the contract (security agreement and note) entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants on or about April 25, 1987.

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a creditor to obtain a judgment before the debtor files for bankruptcy to preserve a drunk-driving debt from discharge.

In Re David Rock Hudson, Debtor. Gregory Stackhouse and Esther Stackhouse v. David Rock Hudson · filed 1988-10-27(a)(9)

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(9), requires that a creditor obtain judgment for damages against a debtor prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy as a prerequisite to having declared nondischargeable a debt arising from damages caused by drunk driving. We hold that a prepetition judgment is not required, and reverse the decision of the BAP.

Section 523(a)(9) treats a motorboat as a motor vehicle for purposes of excepting a judgment arising from its operation while legally intoxicated from discharge.

Radivoj v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1989-04-25(a)(9)

A motorboat is a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) excepts from discharge a judgment arising from a debtor’s intoxicated operation of a motorboat.

Williams v. Radivoj · filed 1989-09-20(a)(9)

Accordingly, we agree with the bankruptcy court that, “[i]n this context, [there is] little distinction between a highway, an airway, and a waterway, or between an automobile, an airplane, and a boat.”

Under the version of Section 523(a)(9) applicable before November 15, 1990, a judgment debt arising from driving while legally intoxicated does not require proof that intoxication was the principal or sole proximate cause of the injury.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kupinsky (In Re Kupinsky) · filed 1991-11-19(a)(9)

The focus of section 523(a)(9)’s first element relates to the debt arising from a judgment or consent decree imposing such liability on the Debtor. It makes no mention of any additional requirement that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the judgment or decree be entered on a showing that the Debtor’s intoxication was the principal or sole proximate cause of injury.

Section 523(a)(9) bars discharge of a death debt caused by unlawful intoxicated driving when intoxication is proved by a preponderance of the evidence; § 523(a)(6) also bars discharge when the conduct is willful and malicious.

Simpson v. Phalen (In Re Phalen) · filed 1992-07-23(a)(9), (a)(6)

Similarly, this Court finds that there is a preponderance of evidence to sustain a factual finding that Phalen was intoxicated at the time of the tragic accident and that the debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(9). ... Her willful and malicious conduct resulted in John Culp, Jr.’s death, and such conduct must preclude her from being discharged from that debt.

Former § 523(a)(9) allows a default judgment to satisfy its judgment requirement for a debt arising from intoxicated driving.

State Automobile Insurance v. Kerpely (In re Kerpely) · filed 1992-08-10(a)(9)

Default judgments are appropriate for application of Section 523(a)(9) dischargeability provisions.

Under the pre-1990 version of § 523(a)(9), a judgment for injury caused by intoxicated driving can make a debt nondischargeable even when entered after the bankruptcy petition.

Spencer v. Shearer (In Re Shearer) · filed 1994-04-05(a)(9)

Therefore, I find that the obligation arising out of the automobile accident which occurred as a result of debtor’s illegal operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and which debt was reduced to judgment on Jan. 5, 1994, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri (Case No. CV91-7236), is a non-dischargeable debt pursuant to Section 523(a)(9) of the Code as in effect at ... the time debtor’s petition in Bankruptcy was filed.

Section 523(a)(9) can except a debt for injuries caused by unlawful intoxicated driving from discharge even when a reckless-driving conviction prevents a conviction for driving while intoxicated.

Hildebrand v. Kugler (In Re Kugler) · filed 1994-07-29(a)(9)

Under the Virginia statute, the term “unlawful” is defined by the driver’s conduct, namely driving while intoxicated. Unlawfulness does not depend on the ability of the Commonwealth of Virginia to punish Kugler for that conduct.

Section 523(a)(9) does not except property damage caused by intoxicated driving from discharge.

Moore v. Brisson (In Re Brisson) · filed 1995-03-22(a)(9)

Notwithstanding this finding, it is incontestable that since the 1990 Bankruptcy Code amendments, § 523(a)(9) does not except property damage from discharge.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts debts for personal injury caused by unlawful intoxicated driving from discharge, but does not except debts for property damage.

Wiggins v. Harper (In Re Wiggins) · filed 1995-04-13(a)(9)

Section 523(a)(9) exempts a debt for personal injury, but not a debt for property damage.

Section 523(a)(9) includes motorboats within its exception to discharge for injuries caused by unlawful intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle.

Boyce v. Greenway (In Re Greenway) · filed 1995-04-11(a)(9)

Therefore, the Court finds that a motorboat is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) excepts from discharge a debt for death or personal injury caused by a debtor’s intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle.

Alge v. Mellott (In re Mellott) · filed 1995-06-23(a)(9)

Section 523(a)(9) exempts from discharge under Chapter 7 death and personal injury claims arising from debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle while debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, drugs, or other similar substances.

Section 523(a)(9) treats a motorboat as a motor vehicle, so a personal injury debt arising from its unlawful operation while intoxicated is excepted from discharge.

Willison v. Race · filed 1995-08-10(a)(9)

Having determined that a motorboat is a “motor vehicle” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), this matter is remanded for a determination of whether Race’s operation of the motorboat was unlawful because Race was intoxicated from using alcohol when the accident giving rise to Willison’s injury occurred.

Section 523(a)(9)’s discharge exception for injuries caused by unlawful intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle does not cover boats.

Schachter v. Fall (In Re Fall) · filed 1995-11-20(a)(9)

This Court believes that the meaning of “motor vehicle” is clear under both federal and state law and does not include a “boat.”

Section 523(a)(9) requires proof that the debtor’s intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle was unlawful under applicable state law.

State Automobile Mutual Insurance v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 1996-03-19(a)(9)

For this court to ascertain whether the debtor was operating a motor vehicle unlawfully because he was intoxicated from using alcohol, the court must determine whether the debtor violated the provisions of Ohio Rev.Code § 4511.19(A).

Section 523(a)(9) requires proof that the debtor was intoxicated when operating the vehicle that caused the injury.

Wilson v. Race (In Re Race) · filed 1996-07-05(a)(9)

Charles Willison has failed to prove that Harley Race was intoxicated under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) and the Court denies his nondisehargeability complaint.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts a drunk-driving personal injury debt from discharge even when a subrogated insurer holds the claim, but does not cover property damage.

Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Peppers ( in Re Peppers) · filed 1996-10-30(a)(9)

This Court, having thoroughly reviewed and considered the briefs filed by both parties, as well as the entire file, and having conducted its own independent research, rejects Debtor’s argument that § 523(a)(9) applies only to claims held by the actual victims of drunken driving accidents. This Court also finds, however, that a portion of Kentucky Farm Bureau’s claim, $10,065.00, is for property damage, which Debtor is correct in arguing is not within the scope of § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) treats a snowmobile as a motor vehicle when determining whether a debt for injuries caused by intoxicated operation is dischargeable.

Schwartz v. Dunn (In Re Dunn) · filed 1996-12-05(a)(9)

Because Congress clearly intended to protect victims of drunk driving when it enacted and amended § 523(a)(9) of the Code, this Court is satisfied that a reasonable construction of the term “motor vehicle” under this section includes a snowmobile.

Section 523(a)(9) covers debts for death or personal injury caused by an intoxicated driver, but does not cover motor vehicle surcharges.

In Re Burkhardt · filed 1998-05-13(a)(9)

The amendment effectively limited non-dischargeable debts under subsection 523(a)(9) to debts premised on death or personal injury caused by an intoxicated driver. The section no longer has applicability to motor vehicle surcharges.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts a drunk driver’s debt for loss of consortium from discharge because loss of consortium is a personal injury.

Longhenry v. Wyatt (In Re Longhenry) · filed 2000-02-25(a)(9)

That a loss of consortium claim under Maryland law is properly characterized as a personal injury comports with this court’s reading of federal law and Congressional intent concerning 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). Therefore, the court concludes that Plaintiffs liability for a debt awarded to compensate Defendants for loss of consortium is properly excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) treats a motorboat as a motor vehicle for debts arising from unlawful operation while intoxicated.

Morse v. Soda (In Re Soda) · filed 2001-04-17(a)(9)

For these reasons this Court concludes that the phrase “motor vehicle” as used in Section 523(a)(9) includes a motorboat.

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a criminal conviction for drunk driving to except a qualifying debt from discharge.

United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Pair (In Re Pair) · filed 2001-07-13(a)(9)

The Court declines to construe Section 523(a)(9) to require an actual criminal conviction as a condition for its operation.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts a personal injury debt from discharge when the debtor caused the injury by unlawfully operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Boone v. Barnes (In Re Barnes) · filed 2001-09-10(a)(9)

Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents the discharge of any debt for personal injury caused by the Debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle, if such operation was unlawful because of the Debtor’s intoxication.

Section 523(a)(9) treats an assigned claims insurer’s claim for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid for accident injuries as a debt for personal injury, even when state law supplies the reimbursement right.

Michigan Assigned Claims Facility v. Felski (In Re Felski) · filed 2002-05-13(a)(9)

Although there are various statutory mechanisms which link the responsibility for payment of this claim back to the uninsured driver, the statutory scheme does not change the essential character of the debt as one arising from personal injury. In fact, PIP benefits are not payable unless they arise from personal injury.

Section 523(a)(9) requires proof that the debtor’s unlawful operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated caused the personal injury; drinking on the night of an accident alone does not establish nondischargeability.

Huffer v. Fearn (In Re Fearn) · filed 2003-07-21(a)(9)

Genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute relating to the legal determinations that must be made under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). Defendant’s alleged consumption of alcohol on the same night of a motor vehicle accident does not necessarily equate to a conclusion that the debt is nondischargeable because the personal injury was caused by the Defendant’s unlawful “operation of motor vehicle... because the Debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol...” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) covers debts for personal injuries caused by a debtor’s unlawful operation of a motorboat while intoxicated.

Delph v. Dilk (In Re Dilk) · filed 2004-07-13(a)(9)

Clearly, the distinction between “motor vehicle” and “motorboat” propounded by Dilk leads to an inequitable and unreasonable result at odds with the overall purpose of the statute. To hold otherwise would allow a class of intoxicated drivers to escape liability under the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, further victimizing those injured by their criminal behavior.

Section 523(a)(9) does not require a criminal charge or conviction for an injury debt caused by unlawful intoxicated driving to be nondischargeable.

Simons v. Hart (In Re Hart) · filed 2006-08-02(a)(9)

There is no requirement in the bankruptcy statute that the Defendant must actually be charged and convicted with an alcohol related crime, just that his motor vehicle operation was unlawful.

Section 523(a)(9) requires a causal relationship between the debtor’s intoxication and the injury; it does not require findings on the elements of a dram shop claim.

Katz v. Mondelblatt (In Re Mondelblatt) · filed 2006-09-12(a)(9)

While this court must find a causal relationship between the intoxication and the injury in order to except the debt from discharge under § 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, ... under the Dram Shop statute, the Plaintiff will have to prove a proximate relationship between the negligent service and the injury in order to establish Trump’s liability.

Section 523(a)(9) makes a debt for injuries caused by a debtor’s unlawful drunk driving nondischargeable, including a bar’s statutory indemnification claim arising from those injuries.

Micon Wayside Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Delia (In Re Delia) · filed 2006-10-03(a)(9)

The language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) is clear and unambiguous in expressing Congress’ intent when it states that a bankruptcy discharge does not discharge an individual from any debt for death and personal injury caused by the debtor’s unlawful operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. ... The judgment of $50,000.00 awarded the Wayside Bar in Oceana County Circuit Court under the indemnification provisions of MCLA § 436.1801(6) is not dischargeable by the Debtor in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(9) uses “vessel” to mean watercraft or waterborne transportation, which does not include a horse and buggy.

Young v. Schmucker (In Re Schmucker) · filed 2007-07-27(a)(9)

As used in § 523(a)(9), a vessel is not a container and it does not include a horse and buggy.

Section 523(a)(9) does not except injury debts arising from the operation of a horse and buggy from discharge because it is neither a motor vehicle nor a vessel.

Young v. Schmucker · filed 2008-07-28(a)(9)

This Court is only empowered to decide whether a horse and buggy is a “vessel” or a “motor vehicle.” It is neither.

Section 523(a)(9) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor was unlawfully intoxicated; proof that the debtor had been drinking is insufficient.

Wood v. Loader (In Re Loader) · filed 2009-09-28(a)(9)

But to satisfy her burden under § 523(a)(9), it was not enough that Wood show Loader had been drinking alcohol prior to the accident. Instead, it was Wood’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Loader was unlawfully intoxicated.

Section 523(a)(9) uses the relevant state law definition of intoxication to determine whether a motor vehicle injury debt is nondischargeable.

Henney v. Rumfield (In Re Henney) · filed 2011-04-25(a)(9)

As noted above, section 523 does not define “intoxication” or borrow any definition of the term from elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code or federal law, so a federal court analyzing the applicability of section 523(a)(9) must follow a suitable state-law definition of the term “intoxication.”

Section 523(a)(9) excepts a personal injury debt from discharge when the debtor caused the injury by operating a motor vehicle while unlawfully intoxicated.

Bucher v. Hughes (In re Hughes) · filed 2013-02-26(a)(9)

The Court finds that the factual evidence of Defendant’s unlawful intoxication when he injured the Plaintiff while operating a motor vehicle is more than sufficient, based upon the affidavits, reports, and depositions offered in support of Plaintiffs SOUF Facts 11, 12 and 13. The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied his burden under § 523(a)(9) to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(9) excepts debts for injuries caused by a debtor’s intoxicated driving from discharge, including post-petition interest on the judgment.

American Family Mutual Insurance v. Reichartz (In re Reichartz) · filed 2013-08-22(a)(9)

The issue in this appeal arises from the fact that, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), debts for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated are not dischargeable. ... Thus, Reichartz’s obligation to pay any post-judgment interest that accrued after the filing of his Chapter 13 petition was not discharged.

Section 523(a)(9) does not except a wrongful death debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove the debtor was intoxicated while operating the vehicle.

Cobb v. Clampitt (In re Clampitt) · filed 2013-10-15(a)(9)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden pursuant to Missouri Statute Section 577.037.5(3) and as such, any debt for the wrongful death of Decedent will not be excepted from discharge pursuant to Section 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(9) excepts from discharge the full debt for personal injury caused by unlawful intoxicated driving, including pain and suffering and medical expenses.

Helmrich v. Paul · filed 2024-02-28(a)(9)

Therefore, the Court finds that the award for past and future pain and suffering, as well as past medical expenses, is debt for personal injury as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)’s consumer debt presumption does not cover debt incurred to speculate in futures for profit.

Lind-Waldock & Co. v. Morehead · filed 2001-01-03(a)(2)(C)

The Moreheads incurred the debt while speculating in the futures market. The debt is therefore not a consumer debt.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s cash advance presumption requires the debtor to present substantial, believable evidence that raises substantial doubt about the presumed intent not to repay.

FCC National Bank v. Orecchio (In Re Orecchio) · filed 1989-11-30(a)(2)(C)

To harmonize the two requirements, the Court must interpret the sufficiency requirement of the “bursting bubble” theory to mean substantial and believable evidence contrary to the presumed intent. Such evidence need not be of the same clear and convincing nature as the creditor is required to show to invoke the presumption, but the Debtor’s rebuttal evidence must raise a substantial doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the existence of the presumed intent.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) requires courts to consider both the quality and quantity of purchases when deciding whether goods are luxury goods.

J.C. Penney Co. v. Herran (In Re Herran) · filed 1986-09-12(a)(2)(C)

The standard for determining luxury goods under the statute implies that consideration be given to reasonableness in both quality and quantity.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) presumes qualifying debts for nonessential, indulgent, or extravagant luxury goods are nondischargeable, subject to rebuttal by the debtor.

Hudson Belk Co. v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1989-10-20(a)(2)(C)

Under the circumstances, it is beyond question that the items of these types and amounts were nonessential, indulgent and extravagant, and as such, constitute “luxury goods” within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s luxury goods presumption excludes loans of unrestricted cash, even if the debtor uses the proceeds to buy luxury goods or services.

Aetna Finance Co. v. Neal (In Re Neal) · filed 1990-05-09(a)(2)(C)

In any event, whether or not taken in view of the legislative history, the language of § 523(a)(2)(C) does not plainly express a discharge exception for cash loans, even if the proceeds are used to purchase luxury goods or services. Since discharge exceptions must be strictly construed in favor of the debtor, § 523(a)(2)(C) cannot be construed to include cash loans.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) may treat an additional automobile as a luxury good when the debtor already owns other vehicles.

Lorain County Bank v. Triplett (In Re Triplett) · filed 1992-03-11(a)(2)(C)

When the purchase was completed, the Debtors owned four (4) vehicles. No testimony was presented to indicate that the Debtors were attempting to rid themselves of the alleged unreliable vehicles. The Ohio legislature, in exempting from execution one automobile, has expressed its belief that an automobile is necessary for a fresh start. Therefore, it is conceivable that more than one automobile would be a luxury, as in this case.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) can make casino gambling credit nondischargeable as a luxury expense when it exceeds $500 and is incurred within forty days before bankruptcy.

Trump Plaza Associates v. Poskanzer (In Re Poskanzer) · filed 1992-05-28(a)(2)(C)

It is undisputed that the acts complained of all occurred within forty days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition and involve amounts exceeding $500. Moreover, the debtor has argued neither that he utilized the casino chips for support and maintenance nor that the casino credit does not constitute a luxury good or service. ... This court is therefore satisfied that the casino creditors have alternatively proven their claims as nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence.

A debtor can rebut § 523(a)(2)(C)’s luxury goods presumption with credible evidence that the purchases were not made with fraudulent intent.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johannsen (In Re Johannsen) · filed 1993-09-29(a)(2)(C)

Similar to the Leaird case, then, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor. ... As this Court held in Leaird, such evidence is required for a finding of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption of nondischargeability is not rebutted unless the debtor raises substantial doubt about fraudulent intent.

Signet Bank/virginia v. Abbas A. Rawoot, Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Abbas A. Rawoot · filed 1993-12-10(a)(2)(C)

The bankruptcy judge did not err in holding that Mr. Rawoot failed to raise substantial doubt as to his fraudulent intent.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)’s presumption for luxury services generally does not apply to legal fees incurred in divorce proceedings.

Carroll v. Vernon (In Re Vernon) · filed 1996-01-26(a)(2)(C)

Indeed, legal fees and expenses incurred during divorce proceedings do not generally qualify as “luxury goods or services” within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(C) creates a rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability for debt incurred to buy luxury goods shortly before bankruptcy.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hernandez (In Re Hernandez) · filed 1997-04-11(a)(2)(C)

On the second dischargeability claim, however, the court finds that the creditor has made the necessary showing to establish that the goods were “luxury goods” purchased within 90 days of bankruptcy, raising a presumption of nondisehargeability under § 523(a)(2)(C). Because the debtor has not rebutted this presumption, the court concludes that the debt for these purchases is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(C) does not automatically treat gambling as a luxury service; the debtor’s circumstances determine whether the presumption of nondischargeability applies.

Boyd Gaming Corp v. Hall (In Re Hall) · filed 1998-09-17(a)(2)(C)

As such, this Court does not find that his gambhng activity meets the definition of a luxury. Therefore, the provisions of section 523(a)(2)(C) have not been satisfied, and there is no presumption in this case that the $14,000.00 debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) places the burden on the debtor to prove that a debt covered by its presumption is dischargeable.

Novus Services, Inc. v. Cron (In Re Cron) · filed 1999-04-28(a)(2)(C)

Some courts hold, as I am doing in this decision, that the presumption transforms the burden into one of proving the debt is dischargeable and places that burden squarely on the shoulders of the debtor.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption of nondischargeability requires a consumer debt and does not apply to purchases made for a commercial purpose.

John Deere Community Credit Union v. Feddersen (Feddersen) · filed 2001-12-11(a)(2)(C)

Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Debtor made the purchases from McCormick for other than a commercial purpose. The charges were not intended primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Therefore, it is not a “consumer debt”. The record does not support a conclusion that the debt to Plaintiff is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(C).

Under § 523(a)(2)(C), services are not luxuries merely because they are unnecessary; luxuries are extravagances or self-indulgences.

Shah v. Shaw (In Re Shaw) · filed 2003-06-26(a)(2)(C)

Because the Court, for the reasons set forth above, is constrained to hold, as a matter of law, that the legal services the charges for which comprise Plaintiffs Claim do not constitute luxury services within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(C), the Court must also hold, as a matter of law, that the § 523(a)(2)(C) presumption does not apply to Plaintiffs Claim.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s cash-advance presumption does not cover a balance transfer that puts no cash in the debtor’s pocket.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Green (In Re Green) · filed 2003-07-01(a)(2)(C)

A balance transfer that shifts the debt from one creditor to another, but puts no cash in the debtor’s pocket, is outside the scope of the term “cash advance.”

Section 523(a)(2)(C) requires a factual basis for deciding whether purchases were luxury goods.

In RE McGUINESS · filed 2006-07-12(a)(2)(C)

The court concludes that whether any or all of the purchases were luxury goods within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) is a factual issue which cannot be determined based on the current state of the record.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) gives a creditor a presumption of nondischargeability only if the creditor proves every required base fact, including that the debt was for luxury goods or services.

Capital One Bank v. Zeman (In re Zeman) · filed 2006-06-19(a)(2)(C)

In an action brought under section 523(a)(2)(C), if a base fact is missing, then so also is the cause of action under that subsection, because subsection (C)’s only function is to afford the creditor the presumption.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption of nondischargeability can be rebutted by substantial doubt that the debtor incurred the charges in contemplation of a bankruptcy discharge.

GE Money Bank v. LaBovick (In Re LaBovick) · filed 2006-11-15(a)(2)(C)

The Court holds that the Debtor rebuts a presumption of nondischargeability via § 523(a)(2)(C) in any event because, the Court holds in turn, the Debtor (a) raises a substantial doubt that any portion of the aforesaid $7,608.67 in credit card charges were incurred in contemplation of his discharge in bankruptcy, and (b) thus sufficiently demonstrates that no portion of such credit card charges were so incurred.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption of nondischargeability does not apply to advances used to pay off existing debts with the same creditor.

In Re Pugh · filed 2006-11-15(a)(2)(C)

Therefore, the Court determines that the funds at issue in this case were not "cash advances" within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(C) and Plaintiff may not rely on "presumptive fraud" to establish that its debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(I)’s presumption for luxury services does not apply to legal services incurred in a divorce proceeding.

Varble v. Chase (In Re Chase) · filed 2007-05-18(a)(2)(C)(I)

The Court finds that the legal services performed by Varble fall far short of being characterized as “extravagant,” “indulgent,” or “nonessential.” ... Therefore, the Court concludes that such fees are not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(C)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(I)’s presumption for recent luxury services does not cover forensic psychiatric services incurred in a child custody proceeding.

Lubit v. Chase (In Re Chase) · filed 2007-05-18(a)(2)(C)(I)

Therefore, the Court concludes that the $46,550.00 worth of services performed within the 90 days prior to Debtor filing for bankruptcy are not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(C)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) does not treat a modest used family vehicle as a luxury item triggering a presumption of nondischargeability.

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Park (In Re Park) · filed 2007-09-19(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II)

The Court’s view is that a 2001 Caravan for a husband, wife and three (3) children, such as in this case, cannot be considered to be a luxury item.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) creates a rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability for more than $550 in luxury goods purchased from a single creditor within 90 days before bankruptcy.

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Swanson (Swanson) · filed 2008-11-13(a)(2)(C)

Chase Bank has established by a preponderance of evidence that Debtor, within ninety days of filing her bankruptcy petition, purchased luxury goods with a total value over $550. This has created a presumption of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(C) which Debtor has failed to rebut.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) presumes a qualifying debt for luxury goods nondischargeable, and an upgrade to a timeshare is a luxury good.

Capital Communications Federal Credit Union v. Crowson (In Re Crowson) · filed 2008-10-09(a)(2)(C)

Thus, it follows that the Option, basically an upgrade to the timeshare, is a luxury good. As the conditions of § 523(a)(2)(C) have been satisfied, the $800.00 Charge is presumed nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) creates a rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability for qualifying debts under § 523(a)(2)(A), rather than a separate ground for nondischargeability.

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hampson (In Re Hampson) · filed 2009-09-14(a)(2)(C)

As a starting point in this analysis, it must be noted that § 523(a)(2)(C) itself does not create a separate class of nondis-chargeable debts; section 523(a)(2)(C) merely creates a presumption of nondis-chargeability for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A) for certain debts based on the nature of the debt, its amount, and the date on which it was incurred. If the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to the Debtor to rebut the presumption of nondischargeability.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(ii) does not treat a lawn mower purchased for a lawn care business as a luxury good.

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Turnbow (In Re Turnbow) · filed 2010-05-10(a)(2)(C)(ii)

Based on the credible testimony of Defendant and Defendant’s wife, and Plaintiffs failure to provide any evidence otherwise, the Court must conclude that the Lawn Mower did not constitute a “luxury good” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii).

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption does not arise merely because a debtor uses a convenience check to pay an existing debt; the creditor must show that the debt was for luxury goods or services.

Fifth Third Bank v. Alexo (In Re Alexo) · filed 2010-08-11(a)(2)(C)

The use of a convenience check, thus, on its own cannot be said to be a luxury purchase.

Section 523(a)(2)(C) does not require a creditor pleading the luxury-goods presumption to identify the precise goods purchased when the complaint alleges facts supporting their luxury characterization.

Discover Bank v. Warren (In re Warren) · filed 2013-02-21(a)(2)(C)

This Court has been unable to find any support for the bankruptcy court’s requirement that a party pleading the luxury goods provision of § 523(a)(2)(C) must specify in its complaint the actual luxury goods purchased. In fact, the authority on point indicates a contrary result.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)'s 90-day presumption applies only to purchases of luxury goods or services; timing alone does not establish that a purchase qualifies.

Target National Bank v. Nelson (In re Nelson) · filed 2013-12-11(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)

However, Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) only applies to purchases for “luxury goods or services.” There is no presumption that all charges made within 90 days of bankruptcy are for “luxury goods or services.”

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II) excludes goods reasonably necessary for a debtor’s support from luxury goods, including a vehicle used in part for that support.

AmeriCredit Financial Services Inc. v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez) · filed 2016-03-10(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II)

Subsection (ii)(II) of that provision states that the term luxury goods does not include goods reasonably necessary for the support or maintenance of a debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II). The Court finds that the vehicle was used in part for the Debt- or’s support. For that reason the debt is not nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) raises a rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability when qualifying luxury purchases exceed $650 within 90 days before the bankruptcy petition.

World's Foremost Bank v. Del Aguila (In re Del Aguila) · filed 2016-09-01(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)

Combining the restaurant charge with the tattoo parlor expenses, the Plaintiff clears the $650 threshold, and the rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability arises. Given the disputed facts as to whether the charges are for luxury goods, summary judgment is not appropriate on the first count of the Complaint.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) does not presume a debt nondischargeable when the loan proceeds were spent on necessary household expenses rather than luxury goods or services.

GulfCo of Alabama, LLC d/b/a Tower Loan of Dothan v. Mock · filed 2022-12-05(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)

Because Tower has failed to establish that Mrs. Mock spent the live check funds for anything other than necessary household expenses, much less luxury goods or services, the Court finds that Tower has not met its burden.

Section 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumption for cash advances applies only to credit under an open-end credit plan, not a fixed, closed-end loan.

ITT Financial Services v. Woods (In Re Woods) · filed 1986-11-13(a)(2)(C)

We therefore have no hesitancy in concluding that the transaction in issue was not “under an open end credit plan” as contemplated by the TILA and hence by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II)’s presumption of nondischargeability does not apply to payday loans because they are not open end credit plans.

Americash Loans, LLC v. Marquardt (In re Marquardt) · filed 2016-12-29(a)(2)(C)(i)(II)

Payday loans are not open end credit plans as defined by TILA and are not entitled to any presumption of nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523 does not except debts for interim general assistance benefits from discharge.

Dias v. Sacramento County Welfare Department (In re Dias) · filed 1987-02-20

Since a debt- or creditor relationship existed at the time the petitions were filed herein, such obligations, not being an exception to discharge as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 523, were discharged under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).

Section 523(a)(2) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from fraudulent, unauthorized use of a credit account bearing another person’s name.

Higdon v. Blair (In Re Blair) · filed 2007-11-07(a)(2)

While Debtor herein did not obtain a new line of credit in Higdon’s name, her use of the existing account with his name on it was clearly unauthorized and fraudulent. The debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not except credit-card debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove a knowingly or recklessly false material representation made with intent to deceive.

Chase Bank v. Brumbaugh (In re Brumbaugh) · filed 2007-10-03(a)(2)(A)

As such, the Court cannot find that, as applied to § 523(a)(2)(A), Ms. Brumbaugh, with the intent to deceive, knowingly or with reckless disregard as to its truth made a materially false representation to the Plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) leaves credit card debt dischargeable when the creditor fails to prove that the debtor did not intend to repay it.

First USA Bank, N.A. v. Mikolowski (In re Mikolowski) · filed 2001-03-02(a)(2)(A)

The Court finds that First USA did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mikolowski did not intend to repay her credit card debt.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a fraudulently incurred debt nondischargeable when the debtor’s default admits well-pleaded fraud allegations.

American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Jawish (In Re Jawish) · filed 2000-11-20(a)(2)(A)

The Court determines that Defendant’s ... debt to Plaintiff is nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) treats credit purchases made without a reasonable expectation of payment as a false representation that can make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

American Express Centurion Bank v. O'Brien (In Re O'Brien) · filed 1995-01-06(a)(2)(A)

This Court subscribes to the theory that purchases of goods on credit by a debtor who has no reasonable expectation of being able to pay for them constitutes a false representation under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly uses the card with a false or unfounded intention to repay.

FCC National Bank v. Berz (In Re Berz) · filed 1994-10-21(a)(2)(A)

The burden on the creditor attempting to show fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) is to prove that the debtor knew full well that any professed or implied intention to repay was false or was known by the debtor not to be well-grounded, and that he or she nonetheless deliberately used the card to obtain goods or money that he or she knew were beyond his or her ability to pay.

Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s actual-fraud test applies to credit card cash advances obtained directly from the issuer as well as charges involving third-party vendors.

Karelin v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n (In Re Karelin) · filed 1990-02-01(a)(2)(A)

The Dough-erty test therefore should be applied to credit card debts regardless of whether the charges involve third-party vendors or cash advances directly from the issuer to the cardholder.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when the debtor incurs it without intending to pay.

Mercantile Trust Co. v. Pozucek (In Re Pozucek) · filed 1987-05-01(a)(2)(A)

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is granted in favor of Mercantile Trust against Jerry Pozucek in the amount of $5442.28. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), this judgment is not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit-card charges from discharge when clear and convincing evidence shows that the debtor made them with no intention to repay.

Chase Manhattan Bank (USA) NA v. Doggett (In Re Doggett) · filed 1987-04-30(a)(2)(A)

Having analyzed the facts of this case and applying the factors enumerated in Carpenter, supra, the Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that those charge transactions made beyond the credit limit of $3,500 were made with no intention to repay and are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes credit card charges incurred after the debtor receives notice that the cards have been revoked nondischargeable.

Chase Manhattan Bank (U.S.A.), N.A. v. Fisher (In Re Fisher) · filed 1987-06-12(a)(2)(A)

Since the revocation notices were sent by Chase Manhattan and received by the defendant, the Court finds all charges made by the defendant or her husband on either of the credit cards after the receipt of such notices to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card purchases from discharge when the debtor makes them without an intent to repay and the creditor relies on that implied representation.

Greenwood Trust Co. v. Barger (In Re Barger) · filed 1988-01-05(a)(2)(A)

The Court finds that most of the relevant tests set forth in Faulk, when measured against the evidence in this adversary action, indicate that Dorothy Barger made the purchases at issue in September and October 1986 with her Discover card with no present intention of paying for those purchases. Such conduct establishes the elements of material false representations with intent to deceive.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt incurred after the creditor communicates an unconditional revocation of the debtor’s card privileges.

Amerifirst Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solano (In re Solano) · filed 1988-05-10(a)(2)(A)

An indebtedness that is incurred by the use of a credit card will be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2)(A) after the creditor has communicated to the debtor the unconditional revocation of the debtor’s privilege to use or possess the card. ... The Court finds that the debtor was noticed of the unconditional revocation of her credit card privileges on June 9, 1987 and all charges incurred subsequent to that date are excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) treats a credit card purchase as an implied representation that the cardholder can and intends to pay the charge.

MAY CO. v. Chech (In Re Chech) · filed 1988-10-20(a)(2)(A)

While there is some disagreement, the majority view appears to find that credit card purchases include an implied representation that the cardholder has the ability and intention to pay for the charge incurred. ... After a considered review of the law, this Court chooses to follow the majority view in adopting the “implied representation” analysis. Accordingly, because the Debtor admits making the purchases in dispute, MAY CO. is entitled to judgment on the first requirement as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) can make credit card cash advances nondischargeable when the debtor falsely implies an ability and intent to repay, intends to deceive the creditor, and the creditor reasonably relies on that representation and suffers a resulting loss.

First National Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Wellen (In re Wellen) · filed 1989-01-12(a)(2)(A)

The Court concludes that Mrs. Wellen falsely implied an ability to repay the withdrawals. The magnitude of her withdrawals suggests a conscious intent to deceive FNB.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when the debtor incurs it without intending to pay; fraudulent intent may be inferred from the circumstances.

Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank v. Conroy (In re Conroy) · filed 1989-03-31(a)(2)(A)

A debt for obtaining credit by false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). ... The circumstances here do not reflect that the debtor’s conduct in using the credit card was so reckless it compels the inference of an actual intent to deceive or defraud.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a credit card debt claim based on use of the card without the ability or intent to repay, even if the creditor never revoked the card privilege.

Chevy Chase F.S.B. v. Hable (In re Hable) · filed 1989-06-20(a)(2)(A)

In a situation where the debtor knows at the time he makes the purchases with the credit card or takes a cash advance, that he has no ability or intent to repay the indebtedness, then he has incurred the liability under false pretenses, notwithstanding that the credit privilege was never revoked.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly uses the card after notice of revocation and falsely represents that she is entitled to use it.

Notre Dame Federal Credit Union v. Tondreau (In Re Tondreau) · filed 1989-06-26(a)(2)(A)

Courts have considered various factors in determining whether a debtor’s use of a credit card amounts to a false representation which should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). ... In this case the court finds that each time the debtor used her Mastercard after she had notice that the Credit Union had revoked her account privileges, she falsely represented that she was entitled to use the Mastercard.

Section 523(a)(2) excepts credit card debt from discharge when a debtor obtains the card through a materially false written statement about income and incurs charges intending not to pay them.

Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank v. Hall (In Re Hall) · filed 1989-06-28(a)(2)(A), (B)

In this instance, the Debtor obtained the card first by submitting a materially false statement in writing concerning his financial condition by stating that his annual salary is $80,000.00, when, in fact, he knew that he never earned this amount in his life; second, when he incurred the charges through the use of the credit card, he knew, or at least should have known, that he would not be able to meet his obligation owed to the Bank. ... Based on the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that the obligations owing by the Debtor, Mr. Hall, to the Plaintiff shall be declared to be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B).

Exceeding a credit card limit alone does not prove fraudulent intent under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Ohio Savings Bank v. Larson (In Re Larson) · filed 1989-07-18(a)(2)(A)

Exceeding one’s credit card limits is not ipso facto proof of intent to obtain money or property by false pretenses, false represeñtation, or fraud in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not except credit card debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove that the debtor intended to deceive it.

May Department Stores, Co. v. Kurtz (In Re Kurtz) · filed 1990-01-24(a)(2)(A)

In applying the above factors to the facts in the instant dispute, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proof. Based on the evidence before us, we find absolutely no indication of an intent to deceive by Ms Kurtz.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes credit card debt nondischargeable when the debtor intended not to pay or used the card knowing, or having reason to know, that its credit limit was exceeded.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Cirineo (In Re Cirineo) · filed 1990-02-22(a)(2)(A)

For this reason, we conclude that actual fraud, as opposed to any variety of constructive fraud, should alone constitute an alternative basis for finding nondis-chargeability, in addition to the situation in which the card user makes use of the card in excess of what is known or should be known are its limits.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not bar discharge of credit card debt when the creditor fails to prove that the debtor obtained credit through a material falsehood or intended not to repay the charges.

Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank v. Getreu (In re Getreu) · filed 1990-03-23(a)(2)(A)

The Bank in this case failed to present any evidence to show that the Debtor had no intention of paying his credit card charges. There was neither evidence to show that he never intended to repay the charges, nor was there evidence to show that he was incapable of paying the charges when they were incurred. Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court is satisfied that the Bank’s Complaint objecting to the dischargeability of its debt based on § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) should be dismissed, and the debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes credit card debt nondischargeable when the debtor uses the card intending to deceive the issuer and without intending to repay the charges.

Williamsport National Bank v. Sutliff (In Re Sutliff) · filed 1990-03-27(a)(2)(A)

Finally, the sudden change in the debtor’s buying habits together with the proximity in time of the bankruptcy and the credit purchases leads to a conclusion that the debtor did not intend to pay for the charges when made and did intend to deceive the plaintiff through the continued use of the credit card. ... Consequently, the entire credit card debt owed to the plaintiff is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not require a specific intent to deceive when credit card debt is incurred under circumstances objectively showing an inability to pay.

Nordstrom, Inc. v. Borste (In Re Borste) · filed 1990-08-03(a)(2)(A)

Likewise, § 523(a)(2)(A) does not require a specific intent. It only requires that a debtor incur debt under circumstances objectively evidencing an inability to pay that debt.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) treats a credit card purchase as an implied representation that the cardholder can and intends to pay for it.

Household Bank, N.A. v. Touchard (In Re Touchard) · filed 1990-11-02(a)(2)(A)

In ascertaining whether Toueh-ard made a materially false representation or willful misrepresentation, this court adopts the “implied representation” doctrine relating to credit card purchases. Under that doctrine, “credit card purchases include an implied representation that the cardholder has the ability and intention to pay for the charge incurred.”

Under § 523(a)(2)(A), using a credit card for a cash advance implies a representation of present intent and ability to repay, and a debtor who knows he cannot repay may lack good faith intent.

First Deposit Credit Services Corp. v. Preece (In Re Preece) · filed 1991-03-21(a)(2)(A)

Therefore, each time the Debtor used the card to obtain the advances in question he was making an implied representation that he had the present intent and ability to repay them. ... Plaintiff has met its burden of proof with regard to the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not bar discharge of credit card debt when the debtors' spending reflects susceptibility to marketing rather than fraud.

In Re Ashby Hoffman, Jr., Karen Hoffman, Debtors. Chevy Chase, F.S.B. v. Ashby Hoffman, Jr., Karen Hoffman · filed 1991-06-04(a)(2)(A)

We are persuaded that conduct resulting from susceptibility to the kind of market place enticements demonstrated by this case is not the type of conduct contemplated by Sec. 523.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when the debtor uses the card without intending to repay the debt.

Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Hansbury (In Re Hansbury) · filed 1991-06-17(a)(2)(A)

When a person uses a credit card, he or she thereby implicitly affirms his or her intention to satisfy the obligation being incurred. The defendant had no such intention. His debt to the plaintiff is therefore excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) as having been obtained by false pretenses, false representations and actual fraud.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes credit card advances nondischargeable when a debtor knowingly implies an ability and intent to repay that she lacks, and the creditor relies on that representation.

FCC National Bank v. Bartlett (In Re Bartlett) · filed 1991-06-18(a)(2)(A)

The key elements in this case are the representation, and the intent to deceive. Credit card purchases carry the representation that the buyer has the means and intention of repaying the charge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a loan or renewal from discharge only when it was obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud; later fraud involving collateral does not suffice.

Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez (In re Fernandez) · filed 1991-09-30(a)(2)(A)

The Court recognizes that although § 523(a)(2)(A) applies to extensions or renewals of credit, the section only applies when the extensions or renewals are obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. In this case, the fraud, if any, occurred some time after the loan was extended when the debtors cashed the collateral that was securing the loan.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts credit card debt from discharge when the creditor demonstrates that the debtor had fraudulent intent when the charges were incurred.

Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank v. Cacho (In Re Cacho) · filed 1991-10-15(a)(2)(A)

Thus, in a day when credit card companies continuously bombard consumers with “pre-approved” credit cards and when a typical consumer debtor comes before this court with multiple Visa cards, Master-cards, and American Express cards, these companies can only expect to have their claims excepted from discharge when they can demonstrate that the debtor had the requisite fraudulent intent at the time the charges were incurred. The plaintiff in this case has fallen woefully short of demonstrating the existence of actual fraud and accordingly the claim will be discharged.

Section 523(a)(2) requires fraud to occur when the debtor obtains credit.

First National Bank in Blytheville v. Henson (In Re Henson) · filed 1991-12-20(a)(2)

Indeed, the purported fraud or misrepresentation did not occur until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Section 523(a)(2) contemplates fraud at the time the credit is obtained.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excludes credit card debt from discharge when the debtor incurred it without intending to repay, including charges outside § 523(a)(2)(C)'s presumptive period.

Citibank, N.A. v. Edwards (In re Edwards) · filed 1991-12-04(a)(2)(A)

The debtor never intended to repay these debts. ... The debtor's discharge should not include the total amounts owed to the three complaining creditors. The Court specifically includes those amounts charged and/or cash advances taken by the debtor prior to the forty (40) day presumptive period of section 523(a)(2)(C).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not prevent discharge of credit card debt when the debtor made no fraudulent representation and lacked fraudulent intent in using the cards.

Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Haig (In Re Haig) · filed 1991-12-16(a)(2)(A)

The Court finds no evidence which indicates that Haig made any fraudulent statement to the plaintiff, nor misrepresentations. While Haig may not have acted wisely, upon hearing his testimony and viewing his demeanor, the Court finds as a factual matter that there was no fraudulent intent with respect to the use of the credit cards at issue.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of intent to deceive; continued credit card use during Chapter 11 does not by itself establish that intent.

Norwest Bank Iowa, N.A. v. Larson (In Re Larson) · filed 1992-01-27(a)(2)(A)

Thus, the fact that he continued to use the cards is not in and of itself indicative of an intent to defraud.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires a creditor seeking to except credit card debt from discharge for fraud to prove the debtor’s fraudulent intent by a preponderance of the evidence; later nonpayment alone does not establish that intent.

FCC National Bank v. Sharp (In Re Sharp) · filed 1992-01-31(a)(2)(A)

Taking all these factors into account, and given the debtor’s demeanor and the totality of the circumstances, we find that FCC has not met its burden of proving the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a credit card debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly makes false representations with intent to deceive, the creditor reasonably relies on them, and the creditor suffers a loss.

Citibank v. Weaver (In Re Weaver) · filed 1992-01-07(a)(2)(A)

The Court finds that the Debtor, Jacquel-ene Weaver, did knowingly make false representations, that were made with the intent to deceive, and that the Plaintiff did rely on those representations. As a result, a loss was sustained by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the debt owed to the Plaintiff is nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) allows a court to infer fraud in credit card charges from objective facts showing that the debtor knew or should have known they could not repay when making the charges.

Firsttier Bank, N.A. v. Rush (In Re Rush) · filed 1992-01-15(a)(2)(A)

The court agrees that actual fraud may be inferred from objective facts suggesting that the Debtor knew, or should have known, at the time the credit card is used, that the debtor was insolvent and lacked the ability to repay the charge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes credit card cash advances nondischargeable when the debtor obtains them knowing he cannot repay and intending to deceive the creditor.

Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Rodriguez (In Re Rodriguez) · filed 1992-01-27(a)(2)(A)

Accordingly, this court is convinced that when the Debtor obtained the various cash advances through the use of the credit cards issued by Citibank, he knew that he did not have the present ability nor the future realistic possibility to pay off the debts incurred. Such conduct establishes the elements of false pretense with the intent to deceive. There can be no doubt that Citibank relied on those false claims in continuing to extend credit, and discharge of those obligations would be a loss. Therefore, based on the foregoing this court must find that the cash advances obtained by the Debtor in the amount of $7,717.00 are nondis-chargeable.