11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(8) does not except from discharge a student debt owed to a strictly for-profit educational lender.

United Resource Systems, Inc. v. Meinhart (In Re Meinhart) · filed 1997-08-07(a)(8)

This Court concludes that a strictly for-profit educational lender does not qualify as a creditor which may exempt from discharge its claim against a student pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)’s educational-loan exception requires an advance of funds; allowing a student to defer tuition payment does not create such a loan.

DePasquale v. Boston University School of Dentistry (In Re DePasquale) · filed 1997-08-14(a)(8)

Two further considerations support applying this meaning to section 523(a)(8). First, the statute itself makes it clear that an advance of funds must be involved for a loan to be present.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts post-petition interest on a student loan from discharge, even when the debtor pays the loan claim in full through a Chapter 13 plan.

Boone v. I.S.S.C. (In Re Boone) · filed 1997-12-02(a)(8)

This Court likewise holds that interest may accrue on a nondischargeable student loan obligation during the pendency of a Chapter 13 proceeding, even where the underlying obligation is paid in full through the debtor’s plan.

Section 523(a)(8) treats credit extended for educational expenses as a nondischargeable loan when the debtor promises to repay it, even if the creditor does not give the debtor cash.

Missouri Baptist College v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1997-12-03(a)(8)

This court chooses to follow the approach of Merchant, Hill and Stone, and holds that a broader understanding of the term “loan” which focuses on the intent of the parties provides a preferred method for determining whether an extension of credit is a non-disehargeable “loan” under § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) treats tuition credit evidenced by a promissory note as a loan even when no money changes hands.

Johnson v. Missouri Baptist College (In Re Johnson) · filed 1998-03-26(a)(8)

Applying these definitions to the facts before us, we conclude that the arrangement between Johnson and the College constitutes a loan. Johnson’s promise to remit the cost of tuition to the College in exchange for the opportunity to attend classes created a debtor/creditor relationship. She signed a promissory note to evidence her debt. By allowing Johnson to attend classes without prepayment, the .College was, in effect, “advancing” funds or-credits to Johnson’s student account. Johnson drew upon these advances through immediate class attendance. It is immaterial that no money actually changed hands.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a college’s extension of tuition credit evidenced by a promissory note as a loan, even when no money changes hands.

MO. Baptist College v. Johnson · filed 1998-03-26(a)(8)

We conclude that the College’s extension of credit to Johnson was a loan for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)(A) treats credit for unpaid tuition evidenced by a promissory note as an educational loan even when no money changes hands.

Roosevelt University v. Oldham (In Re Oldham) · filed 1998-03-30(a)(8)(A)

The Court holds that an extension of credit for unpaid tuition evidenced by a promissory note constitutes a “loan” for purposes of § 523(a)(8)(A) even though no money exchanged hands between the Creditor and the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(8) applies to covered educational loans even when the borrower was not the student.

Stein v. Bank of New England, N.A. (In Re Stein) · filed 1998-04-07(a)(8)

The introductory language of Section 523(a)(8), plainly read or reasonably interpreted, clearly suggests that educational loans are nondischargeable regardless of whether the borrower was the student.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge as an educational loan when the school advanced no funds to the debtor.

Johnson v. Virginia Commonwealth University (In Re Johnson) · filed 1998-05-07(a)(8)

This court holds that nonpayment in this situation cannot be an educational loan for purposes of the discharge exception under § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) automatically excepts qualifying educational debts from discharge unless the debtor establishes a statutory ground for discharging them.

Stuart v. Parr (In Re Parr) · filed 1998-07-14(a)(8)

The Defendant acknowledges that she did not establish either of the grounds for discharge under § 523(a)(8)(A) — (B) in BKY 92-32677; indeed, she never commenced a proceeding to determine whether she could. The main provision of § 523(a)(8) is self-executing, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978); thus, the exception from discharge was automatically effective for the earlier case.

Section 523(a)(8) does not make unpaid tuition nondischargeable as an educational loan merely because a school lets a student attend on credit without agreeing to a liquidated amount.

Feyes v. Spring Arbor College (In re Feyes) · filed 1998-09-23(a)(8)

However, Spring Arbor’s policy of allowing students to attend classes without signing any loan documentation pertaining to a liquidated amount (at least after their first year), is even beyond this broad scope. Indeed, the position Spring Arbor now advances would in effect give any educational debt to an educational institution blanket nondischargeability. This is simply not what Congress provided for in § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) may treat educational credit as a loan when a qualified institution or agency provides it under a mutual understanding of future repayment, even if no funds are advanced.

DePasquale v. Boston University School of Dentistry (In Re DePasquale) · filed 1998-10-15(a)(8)

We conclude that the proper focus under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) must be on the substance of the transaction. If a qualified institution or agency provides funds, credit, or financial accommodations to a debtor for educational purposes under a contemporaneous, mutual understanding of future repayment, the arrangement may be a loan within the statute’s meaning, whether or not funds, as such, were advanced.

Section 523(a)(8) applies to an educational loan even when a non-student parent is its sole obligor.

James v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In Re James) · filed 1998-10-20(a)(8)

The Court finds that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) applies to non-student debtors who are the sole obligors on an educational loan.

Section 523(a)(8) applies to an educational loan even when the borrower uses it to pay for a child’s education.

New York State Higher Education Services Corp. v. Kaplan · filed 1999-01-28(a)(8)

Moreover, we reject defendant’s contention that 11 USC § 523 (a) (8) does not apply to the subject debt because he applied the loans to his daughters’ educations rather than his own. The statutory language does not make a distinction based upon a borrower’s status, i.e., whether a borrower is the, direct beneficiary of the educational loan (see, In Re Pelkowski., 990 F2d 737, 741).

Section 523(a)(8) does not treat unpaid tuition as an educational loan merely because a school lets a student attend on credit.

In Re Renshaw · filed 1999-02-05(a)(8)

We also agree with the Bankruptcy Court that when Cazenovia provided Renshaw with certain goods and services (classes, room and board), which resulted in an unpaid balance due on Renshaw's student account, it did not make an educational loan which would be nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) does not make unpaid tuition a nondischargeable loan merely because a school permits a student to attend classes without prepaying.

College of Saint Rose v. Regner · filed 1999-02-04(a)(8)

This Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court here and those cases that have found that, under circumstances similar to those here, the debt is dischargeable.

A loan used solely to refinance earlier student debt, without paying for the debtor’s education, is not an educational loan under § 523(a)(8).

Flint v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In Re Flint) · filed 1999-02-23(a)(8)

A more straightforward interpretation of § 523(a)(8), which we adopt, is that the loan proceeds must be used to pay for the loan recipient’s education.

Section 523(a)(8) does not cover a loan made to recruit a physician’s services rather than to fund education.

Community Memorial Hospital v. Gordon (In Re Gordon) · filed 1999-03-22(a)(8)

It was this type of business purpose that Congress recognized was distinctive from the kind of loans § 523(a)(8) was intended to protect. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the loans cannot be characterized as “educational” obligations under § 523(a)(8). Accordingly, the First Count of the Complaint must be dismissed.

Section 523(a)(8) requires a nonprofit institution’s educational loan to be made under a funded program; an established policy of extending room-and-board credit can qualify, but ad hoc extensions do not.

George Washington University v. Pelzman (In Re Pelzman) · filed 1999-05-14(a)(8)

The term “program” connotes more than just the fiat of the University’s administrators allowing a student to continue to incur room and board on credit on an ad hoc basis, devoid of any demonstrated existing criteria or policies. ... Although no formal proof of a program reduced to writing was received in evidence, the evidence established that the University’s established policy was to allow students to obtain room and board on credit for the first semester they attend the University as long as they had paid at least one-half of their combined bill for tuition and room and board. This sufficed to constitute a program.

Section 523(a)(8) does not bar discharge of a student loan debt owed by a co-signer.

Pryor v. H & W Recruiting Enterprises, L.L.C. (In Re Pryor) · filed 1999-06-08(a)(8)

This Court agrees with this interpretation of the applicability of § 523(a)(8) to co-maker debtors.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts a qualifying educational loan from discharge even when the debtor is the student's parent rather than the student.

Kentucky Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Norris (In Re Norris) · filed 1999-07-08(a)(8)

Section 523(a)(8) does not differentiate between a debtor who is a loan beneficiary and a debtor who is the parent of a loan beneficiary. Therefore, the court finds that Debtor’s PLUS/SLS loan debt is an “educational loan” under § 523(a)(8) and, accordingly, is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a federally insured loan that consolidates educational loans under 20 U.S.C. § 1078-3 as an educational loan excepted from discharge.

Shaffer v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In Re Shaffer) · filed 1999-08-16(a)(8)

Based on the policy considerations behind the FFEL Program and behind the enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), as well as the overwhelming recognition of consolidation loans as educational loans within the meaning of § 523(a)(8) by other courts, this Court concludes that a federally insured consolidation loan made under 20 U.S.C. § 1078-3 is an educational loan within the meaning of § 523(a)(8) and is, therefore, nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a loan consolidating earlier student loans as an educational loan for discharge purposes.

United Student Aid Funds v. Flint (In Re Flint) · filed 1999-08-27(a)(8)

Based on the above analysis the court finds that the consolidation loan at issue is an “educational loan” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) excepts reasonable student loan collection costs from discharge unless the debtor proves undue hardship.

In Re Featherston · filed 1999-08-19(a)(8)

Moreover, the court will follow other bankruptcy courts in holding that reasonable collection costs fall under the exception to discharge for student loan obligations found in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) leaves debtors liable after discharge for postpetition interest on nondischargeable student loans.

In Re Girard · filed 1999-09-07(a)(8)

However, since the underlying debt is nondischargeable, so is the interest and debtor must pay the interest after discharge.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except a salary advance from discharge merely because it pays off and consolidates student loans.

Resurrection Medical Center v. Lakemaker (In Re Lakemaker) · filed 1999-12-08(a)(8)

Although the parties have stipulated that the advance constituted a consolidation, that does not automatically bring the new loan within the terms of § 523(a)(8). ... Thus, while the advance consolidated Debtor’s student loans, that is not enough to bring Resurrection’s claim within the student loan exception.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a consolidation loan made under § 428C of the Higher Education Act as an educational loan excepted from discharge.

Sheer v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Sheer) · filed 1999-12-15(a)(8)

The court, therefore, joins the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue and holds that a consolidation loan made under § 428C of the Higher Education Act is an “educational loan” within the meaning of § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts from discharge a loan that consolidates debts incurred to pay for higher education.

Lapusan v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Lapusan) · filed 2000-01-19(a)(8)

Since it is clear that the essential purpose of the loan was the restructuring of debt incurred to pay the costs of higher education, the consolidated loan can only be characterized as an educational debt that is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge as an educational loan unless the student and college agreed before or during attendance to defer payment.

In Re: Kevin Renshaw, Debtor. Cazenovia College v. Kevin Renshaw, in Re: David W. Regner, Debtor. The College of Saint R · filed 2000-07-24(a)(8)

Absent such an agreement, failure to pay a bill when due does not create a loan.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge when the creditor cannot show that the debt arose under a qualifying funded program.

Boston University v. Mehta (In Re Mehta) · filed 2001-05-10(a)(8)

Here BU cites no facts in the record or stipulation that would support a conclusion that the student’s debt was incurred under a program, let alone a “funded” program. Consequently, the bankruptcy court’s determination that BU had failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 523(a)(8) to establish that the debtor’s unpaid tuition balance was nondischargeable is upheld.

Section 523(a)(8)'s undue hardship exception does not apply to education debt incurred after the bankruptcy petition.

Clarke v. Paige (In Re Clarke) · filed 2001-08-21(a)(8)

Nothing in § 523(a)(8) excepts post-petition education debt, even where it may place an undue hardship upon the debtor.

Section 523(a)(8) covers government-funded tuition that a student must repay after failing a service obligation as a student loan and educational benefit.

Mehlman v. New York City Board of Education (In Re Mehlman) · filed 2001-10-16(a)(8)

The debt arising from plaintiffs breach of the service obligation required by her Contract with the defendant is a “student loan” which provided an “educational benefit” to the plaintiff under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) applies to an educational loan made to a student's parent who is the sole obligor.

Clark v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Clark) · filed 2002-01-18(a)(8)

There are no reported decisions in this district as to whether the discharge exception of section 523(a)(8) applies to an educational loan made to the parent of a student when the parent is the sole obligor on the note. There are a significant number of cases that hold that it does. ... I agree with these decisions.

Section 523(a)(8) makes a federally guaranteed student loan nondischargeable based on its educational purpose, even if the borrower spends some proceeds on living expenses.

Murphy v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency & Educational Credit Management Corp. · filed 2002-03-05(a)(8)

In other words, it is the purpose, not the use, of the loan that controls.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts a parent’s government-guaranteed educational loans from discharge even when the parent received no educational benefit.

Hamblin v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Hamblin) · filed 2002-04-09(a)(8)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the “PLUS” loans obtained by the Debtor for the benefit of her daughter are non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) requires an agreement to repay made before or when educational services are provided for the resulting debt to qualify as a loan; tuition billed on an open account without such an agreement is dischargeable.

Chambers v. Manning (In Re Chambers) · filed 2002-10-01(a)(8)

This definition requires at least some agreement to repay before the transfer is made. ... Therefore, Manning has not met her burden of establishing that UIC made a loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8), and the debtor has established that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that her debt to UIC is discharged.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge as an educational loan without evidence that the school and student intended a loan.

In Re: Rajesh Mehta, Debtor. Boston University v. Mehta · filed 2002-11-13(a)(8)

Absent some similar evidence of a “loan,” § 523(a)(8) does not apply.

Section 523(a)(8) covers educational loans made through a program funded in part by a nonprofit institution, even when the particular loan type is not federally subsidized.

Bolen v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. · filed 2002-10-11(a)(8)

The Debtor’s two Law Access Loans were part of the Law Access program, which was funded in part by nonprofit institutions. Thus, the Court finds that these two loans fall within the category of debts that may be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge when the student agreed to pay tuition as it came due but did not agree to repay a loan later.

Navarro v. University of Redlands (In Re Navarro) · filed 2002-10-15(a)(8)

For the reasons stated, this Court holds that Navarro did not receive an educational loan for the purposes of § 523(a)(8), and accordingly, his debt to the University of Redlands is dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(8) does not treat unpaid tuition as an educational loan without an agreement to make a loan.

Manning v. Chambers · filed 2003-02-25(a)(8)

No evidence is presented in the record of any agreement between Chambers and Manning to enter into a loan arrangement prior to the transfer of services. By attending classes and failing to pay, Chambers merely failed to pay her tuition obligations when they became due. That is a debt or an extension of credit but not a loan.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a nonprofit institution’s guarantee of an educational loan as funding when the guarantee meaningfully contributes to providing the loan.

O'Brien v. First Marblehead Education Resources, Inc. (In Re O'Brien) · filed 2003-10-10(a)(8)

This Court agrees that the word “funded” should be liberally construed to include “any meaningful contribution” to the provision of the loan, including the guarantee of the loan.

Section 523(a)(8) treats unpaid tuition as an educational loan when funds changed hands or the parties agreed before or during the educational services to defer payment.

Chambers, Sandra Ann v. Manning, Sylvia · filed 2003-11-04(a)(8)

A separate agreement to accept later payment would create a loan and would be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) treats a loan consolidating existing educational loans as an educational loan excepted from discharge.

Levernier v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Levernier) · filed 2004-02-02(a)(8)

The court agrees with ECMC that the consolidated loan obtained by Levernier is an educational loan within the meaning of § 523(a)(8) and that it therefore is not dischargeable under this section.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except an apprenticeship training debt from discharge when the agreement secures workers for participating contractors rather than making an educational loan.

Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of United Ass'n Local Union No 307 v. Rezendes (In Re Rezendes) · filed 2004-02-05(a)(8)

In like manner, the purpose of the JATC program is not to impart an educational benefit to persons participating in the apprenticeship program, but rather to secure a trained source of employees for the signatory union contractors by whom JATC’s funding was exclusively provided. ... Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the obligations of Rezendes to JATC are not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) applies to a parent who is solely obligated on PLUS loans, even when the parent received no educational benefit from them.

Votruba v. Florida Department of Education (In Re Votruba) · filed 2004-06-16(a)(8)

The Court finds that § 523(a)(8) applies to parent-obligors and that the Debtor has established an undue hardship sufficient to warrant an equitable remedy of partial discharge of his PLUS loan debts.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge when the school permits attendance without first agreeing to extend credit.

Davis v. Finance Committee of Cardinal Spellman High School (In Re Davis) · filed 2004-07-09(a)(8)

Similarly, in this case, the debt did not arise out of an educational loan. Instead, Debtor over time failed to pay the tuition when due, and the school allowed the student to attend classes despite the lack of payment. There is no evidence of a prior agreement signed by the parties agreeing to a loan.

Section 523(a)(8) treats a nonprofit institution’s guarantee as funding an educational loan program when the guarantee plays a meaningful part in providing the loan.

In Re O'Brien · filed 2004-08-27(a)(8)

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Appellee’s guarantee played a meaningful part in the funding of the Loan to the Appellant through the Program. Thus, the Loan was “funded” by the Appellee within the meaning of that term pursuant to § 523(a)(8) and is non-dischargeable thereunder.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except an educational obligation from discharge as a loan unless its repayment terms reflect the value of the benefit the debtor received.

President of Ohio University v. Hawkins (In Re Hawkins) · filed 2004-10-25(a)(8)

While an educational loan need not include an actual transfer of money or some form of cash equivalent to Debtor, in order to fall within the definition of a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(8), the loan instrument must sufficiently articulate definite repayment terms and the repayment obligation must reflect the value of the benefit actually received, rather than some other ill defined measure of damages or penalty.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts qualifying educational loans from discharge unless the debtor establishes undue hardship.

Southwest Student Services Corp. v. Ma · filed 2004-11-12(a)(8)

This places the “College Card” debt squarely within the provisions of section 523 (a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code. Defendant had the responsibility of seeking the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the student loan was discharged for undue hardship.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except an apprenticeship training debt from discharge when the agreement creates no obligation to repay for the training.

Rezendes v. Rezendes (In Re Rezendes) · filed 2004-12-28(a)(8)

As a result, the nature of the contract is not one of an educational loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8), and the debt was correctly discharged by the bankruptcy court.

Section 523(a)(8) gives way to the more specific discharge rule for military education reimbursement obligations in 10 U.S.C. § 2005(d).

Udell v. United States (In Re Udell) · filed 2004-12-20(a)(8)

As can be seen from a review of these statutes, both deal with the dischargeability of educational obligations or loans. However, Title 10 is the more specific statute targeted only to educational obligations arising in connection with service in the armed forces. As such, we find that Title 10 controls whether Plaintiffs educational obligation to Defendant is dis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(8) bars discharge of a former service academy cadet’s education debt after the five-year period in 10 U.S.C. § 2005(d) unless an undue hardship exists.

Udell v. United States · filed 2005-04-07(a)(8)

Section 2005(d) absolutely prohibits the discharge of the debt in question during the first five years, and § 523(a)(8) prohibits a discharge thereafter unless an undue hardship exists.

Section 523(a)(8) does not permit partial discharge of a single consolidated student loan, but permits discharge of the entire loan when repayment would cause undue hardship.

Richardson v. United States Department of Education (In Re Richardson) · filed 2005-04-29(a)(8)

Having concluded that the flexibility of the hybrid approach to partially discharge individual student loans is inapplicable to a single consolidated debt such as the loan at issue here and that the Debtor does not have the ability to pay back the entire consolidated debt owed to the United States Department of Education absent undue hardship, the debt so owed is dis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(8) covers educational loans made under loan programs guaranteed by nonprofit institutions.

O’Brien v. First Marblehead Education Resources · filed 2005-08-15(a)(8)

For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that § 523(a)(8) includes within its meaning loans made pursuant to loan programs that are guaranteed by non-profit institutions.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts a student loan from discharge when the lending program is funded in part by a governmental unit, even if the particular loan is privately funded.

Drumm v. New England Loan Marketing Ass'n (In Re Drumm) · filed 2005-08-19(a)(8)

Section 523(a)(8) does not require that the actual loan itself be funded by a governmental unit, only that the program pursuant to which the loan was made be funded in part by a governmental unit.

Section 523(a)(8) requires a debtor seeking to discharge a student loan guarantor’s separate claim to obtain an undue hardship determination in an adversary proceeding against the guarantor.

Wedell v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Wedell) · filed 2005-08-22(a)(8)

If Ms. Wedell wishes to discharge her obligations to ECMC as successor in interest to the guaranty, she must seek determination of dischargeability under the undue hardship standard set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) by commencing an adversary proceeding against ECMC.

Section 523(a)(8) requires courts to examine the substance of a loan transaction to determine whether the loan had an educational purpose.

Tift County Hospital Authority v. Nies (In Re Nies) · filed 2005-09-20(a)(8)

Upon consideration of the standard for summary judgment and the case law summarized above, the Court finds that the undisputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Debtor compel the conclusion that Tift County Hospital did not establish that it made an educational loan to the Debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The substance of the transaction between the Hospital and the Debtor, as set forth in the Agreement between the parties, reflects a business, rather than an educational purpose for the loan.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts student loan collection costs from discharge even when the lender omitted them from its chapter 13 proof of claim.

Belton v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Belton) · filed 2006-02-14(a)(8)

Although collection costs may not have been part of the allowed claim in the present instance, those collection costs are appropriately part of the educational loan that is excepted from the debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(a)(8) prevents discharge of a nonprofit institution's educational loan unless the debtor obtains an undue hardship determination.

Southwest Student Services Corp. v. Jong I Ma · filed 2006-06-28(a)(8)

Since educational loans are not automatically discharged in bankruptcy (11 USC § 523 [a] [8]), and since defendant did not establish that he received a hardship determination excepting said debt from discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding (see Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v Hood, 541 US 440 [2004], supra), the court below properly granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

Section 523(a)(8) bars discharge of a government-funded military education debt after the five-year period in 10 U.S.C. § 2005(d) unless the debtor shows undue hardship.

Udell v. United States (In Re Udell) · filed 2006-07-10(a)(8)

While § 2005(d) prohibits a cadet from discharging his debt for any reason for the first five years after he leaves the military, § 523(a)(8) applies thereafter, prohibiting the discharge of a debt unless undue hardship can be demonstrated.

Section 523(a)(8) bars discharge of a government-funded educational benefit debt unless the debtor demonstrates undue hardship.

Udell v. United States (In Re Udell) · filed 2006-07-10(a)(8)

Because Udell's debt is plainly an educational benefit made under a program funded by the government and Udell has an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, his debt falls within § 523(a)(8). Udell's debt is also not dischargeable under the plain language of § 523(a)(8), which provides that such a debt cannot be discharged "unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor." Because Udell has not alleged undue hardship, he cannot discharge his debt under § 523(a)(8) on that ground.

Section 523(a)(8) does not prevent discharge of a breach-of-contract judgment that fails to qualify as a loan or educational benefit.

Ohio University v. Hawkins · filed 2006-12-04(a)(8)

The BAP held that this debt and the resulting judgment did not meet the criteria for a loan or edu- cational benefit that are excluded from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). We adopt the opinion of the BAP and affirm its judgment.

Under the pre-BAPCPA version of § 523(a)(8), a private lender’s loans for post-secondary education can be nondischargeable as obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, even without government or nonprofit funding.

In Re Micko · filed 2006-12-05(a)(8)

To hold that Section 523(a)(8) applies to "obligation[s] to repay funds received as an educational benefit" if they were extended only by governmental units or nonprofit entities would depart from the plain meaning of the statute.

A student loan remains subject to Section 523(a)(8) after the lender obtains a default judgment on the debt.

Burrell-Richardson v. Massachusetts Board of Higher Education · filed 2006-12-28(a)(8)

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that the Debtor’s obligation did not lose its student loan characteristics when the Commonwealth obtained a default judgment based on the Debtor’s nonpayment of her student loan obligation.

Section 523(a)(8) makes a debt for educational services nondischargeable when a university extends credit that lets a student attend classes before paying tuition.

McKay v. Vanderbilt University (In Re McKay) · filed 2007-03-19(a)(8)

In addition to the convenience, the educational benefit to debtor was that she could start classes without paying tuition up front. I conclude that this is a student loan as contemplated by § 523(a)(8). Consequently, the debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(8) treats tuition credit documented by a contemporaneous promissory note as a loan even when no money changes hands.

Gakinya v. Columbia College (In Re Gakinya) · filed 2007-03-20(a)(8)

This Court interprets the term “loan” in its “commonly understood meaning,” and finds that actual money need not have changed hands between the Debtor and Columbia College as the parties intent that the transaction be a “loan” is clearly evidenced by the contemporaneous execution of a promissory note.

Section 523(a)(8) makes a ratified consolidated student loan obligation nondischargeable even when the debtor did not receive the loan’s full educational benefit.

Kuschel v. Kuschel (In Re Kuschel) · filed 2007-04-12(a)(8)

Here, Plaintiff did not receive the full educational benefit of the consolidation loan at issue in this case. Plaintiff did obligate herself to repay the Consolidation Note when she ratified the consolidation agreement by signing the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement and two forbearance agreements. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs obligation under the Consolidation Note is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(8).

Under the pre-2005 version of § 523(a)(8), a nonprofit institution’s guaranty of a student loan does not itself fund the loan program.

Taratuska v. Education Resources Institute, Inc. (In Re Taratuska) · filed 2007-08-23(a)(8)

The Court disagrees and holds that the giving of a guaranty does not constitute funding within the meaning of Section 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers an obligation to repay an employer’s educational expense reimbursements when the debtor leaves employment before completing the required service period.

Sensient Technologies Corp. v. Baiocchi (In Re Baiocchi) · filed 2008-06-04(a)(8)(A)(ii)

In short, the plain meaning of the text of § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) favors Sensient’s position. The Debtor agreed to a program under which, if she stopped working at Sensient, she would be obligated to repay the funds she received from Sensient as an educational benefit. She did stop working at Sensient, triggering the repayment requirement. This is a clear example of an “obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend.”

Section 523(a)(8)(A) excepts an educational loan from discharge when it is made under a program funded by a nonprofit institution, even if a for-profit bank initially funds the loan.

Sears v. Educap, Inc. (Sears) · filed 2008-07-14(a)(8)(A)

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the debt owed by the Debtor to EduCap, Inc., is an educational loan made under a program funded by a nonprofit institution subject to exception from the Debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A).

Section 523(a)(8) can except a university student account agreement from discharge as an educational loan when the student receives educational services on credit and agrees to repay the charges; a stated sum certain is not required.

McKay v. Ingleson · filed 2009-02-23(a)(8)

We are not convinced that a loan requires a sum certain. ... Because McKay’s student loan was exempt from discharge under § 523(a)(8), In-gleson could not have violated the discharge injunction by attempting to collect the loan.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts a university student loan from discharge when a student agrees to repay deferred charges for educational services.

McKay v. Universit · filed 2009-02-23(a)(8)

Because McKay’s student loan was exempt from dis- charge under § 523(a)(8), Ingleson could not have violated the discharge injunction by attempting to collect the loan.

Section 523(a)(8)(A) covers an apprenticeship training loan when the apprentice agrees to repay the training costs, even if the creditor may waive repayment if the apprentice works outside the trade.

Indiana/Kentucky Regional Council of Carpenters Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee v. Kesler (In Re Kesler) · filed 2009-03-09(a)(8)(A)

Even if the creditor agreed to waive the repayment of the loan in those circumstances, this does not negate the fact that there was an obligation to repay on the part of the debtor if those circumstances did not transpire. ... For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the debt owed by the debtor, Michael O. Kesler, to the creditor, JATC, is an educational loan within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) and is not discharge-able in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(8)(B) does not except a loan from discharge as a qualified education loan when the borrower was not a taxpayer under the incorporated Internal Revenue Code definition.

S.B.R. Investments, Ltd. v. Luxa-LeBlanc (In Re Luxa-LeBlanc) · filed 2009-04-17(a)(8)(B)

In this case, the unrebutted testimony was that the Debtor did not file a United States tax return during this relevant time period (Audio Record of 02/22/2008 at 9:45 AM), and so she could not have been a taxpayer. If she was not a taxpayer, then the loan extended to her could not have qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 221(d) and would not be a student loan under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) applies to a covered student loan even when the debtor is an unrelated, non-student co-obligor.

Cockels v. Mae · filed 2009-07-30(a)(8)(A)(i)

Despite Debtor’s arguments to the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court did not err as a matter of law when it interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and held that this section applies to unrelated, non-student co-obligors like Debtor.

Section 523(a)(8) does not protect a student loan co-borrower’s reimbursement claim merely because the co-borrower paid the lender.

Gorosh v. Posner (In Re Posner) · filed 2010-09-08(a)(8)

This Court concludes, based on the Bankruptcy Code and the relevant case law, that, as a third party who paid off Defendant’s student loan debt, Plaintiff is an unsecured creditor and not entitled to the protections afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8) does not except an ex-spouse’s settlement-agreement claim from discharge merely because the underlying debt paid for education.

Corso v. Walker (In Re Walker) · filed 2010-10-22(a)(8)

There is simply no evidence to suggest that the protections afforded to student loan lenders under 523(a)(8) should extend to the Plaintiff in this instance as the Plaintiff is not a member of the class of creditors protected by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

A loan’s purpose, rather than how the borrower uses its proceeds, determines whether it is educational under § 523(a)(8)(A)(i).

Busson-Sokolik v. Milwaukee School of Engineering (In Re Busson-Sokolik) · filed 2011-02-10(a)(8)(A)(i)

In so doing, we hold that it is the pur- pose of a loan which determines whether it is “educa- tional.” This approach seems most consistent with the language of § 523(a)(8)(A).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) can except a nonprofit apprenticeship program’s training loan from discharge when the debtor does not establish undue hardship.

Capron v. Cedar Rapids Electrical Apprenticeship Training & Educational Trust (In Re Capron) · filed 2011-06-10(a)(8)(A)(i)

After carefully considering this well-argued and well-briefed case, the Court adopts the “majority view” and concludes the JATC debt is a nondischargeable educational loan under § 523(a)(8)(A)(i).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) covers a student loan made under a program meaningfully funded by a nonprofit guarantor.

Kidd v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc. (In Re Kidd) · filed 2011-08-16(a)(8)(A)(i)

LEARN’s guarantor role was meaningful and satisfies the statute’s funding requirement.

Section 523(a)(8) classifies a loan by the circumstances in which it was made, rather than how the borrower spent the proceeds.

Rumer v. American Educational Services (In Re Rumer) · filed 2012-03-05(a)(8)

Section 523(a)(8) is concerned with the circumstances surrounding the origination of the loan, rather than what benefits the debtor may have derived.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts an educational loan from discharge when a nonprofit funds the loan program by guaranteeing and servicing its loans, even if a for-profit lender supplies the loan funds.

Decker v. EduCap, Inc. · filed 2012-05-22(a)(8)(A)(i)

The court finds that EduCap, by acting as a disbursement agent, servicer and guarantor for education loans, funded the program under which plaintiffs loan was issued.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts an obligation to repay employer tuition reimbursement from discharge when the funds were received as an educational benefit.

Chicago Patrolmen's Federal Credit Union v. Daymon (In re Daymon) · filed 2013-04-02(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Therefore, because the funds disbursed to Defendant under the Tuition Assistance Program were received as an educational benefit, Defendant’s obligation to repay those funds to the Credit Union is nondis-chargeable under section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

The educational purpose of a loan determines whether it is an educational benefit under § 523(a)(8)(A).

Maas v. Northstar Education Finance, Inc. (In re Maas) · filed 2013-07-08(a)(8)(A)(i) and (ii)

This court agrees that it is the purpose of the loan which determines whether the loan constitutes an “educational benefit.”

A creditor must show that the debt underlying a judgment is covered by § 523(a)(8) before it is excepted from discharge.

Dudley v. Southern Virginia University (In re Dudley) · filed 2013-07-23(a)(8)

Therefore, SVU has failed to carry its burden of showing that the debt underlying the state court default judgment was a non-dischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)(B) requires a debt to be an educational loan before it can qualify for the exception from discharge; an unpaid tuition balance alone is not a loan.

In re Oliver · filed 2013-10-08(a)(8)(B)

But by retaining the phrase “any other education loan,” it appears that Congress has not departed from the notion that a “student loan” excepted from discharge still must be a loan.

Section 523(a)(8) makes educational loan debts presumptively nondischargeable unless the debtor obtains an undue hardship determination.

In re McKinnie · filed 2013-11-14(a)(8)

As matters currently stand, therefore, the discharge granted to her under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) in this case did not discharge any educational loan debt.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers a student's obligation to repay a cosigner who paid a loan obtained for the student's educational expenses, subject to the undue hardship exception.

Benson v. Corbin (In re Corbin) · filed 2014-03-05(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The Judgment Benson holds against Corbin therefore represents an obligation to repay the funds received as an educational benefit to the debtor.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) makes a debtor’s obligation to reimburse an accommodation party for paying an educational loan nondischargeable unless repayment would cause undue hardship.

Brown v. Rust (In re Rust) · filed 2014-05-06(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Rust owes the Brown a debt of $25,337.33, plus interest from date of the entry of judgment, based on the state court judgment and Brown’s status as an accommodation party. The debt is nondis-chargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) because the debt is an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit and Rust has not established that repayment of the debt is an undue hardship.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except a deferred-tuition debt from discharge when neither the student nor the school received funds.

Institute of Imaginal Studies v. Christoff (In re Christoff) · filed 2014-06-13(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Despite the dire consequences, real or imagined, suggested by plaintiffs counsel that a ruling in defendant’s favor may put his client out of business, the plain words of the applicable statute lead the court to conclude that the debt in question in this case, which did not include any receipt of funds by the student or the institution, is not excepted by § 523(a)(8) and is discharged in the student’s bankruptcy.

A loan can be received under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) without a direct transfer of funds to the debtor.

Desormes v. United States Trustee (In Re Desormes) · filed 2014-06-17(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The district court correctly held that the debt in question was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Contrary to Desormes’s argument, if a transfer of funds directly to the debtor is not necessary for the creation of a loan, there is little reason to think such a transfer is necessary for the loan to be received within the meaning of the statute.

Section 523(a)(8) determines whether a loan is excepted from discharge by its stated educational purpose, rather than how its proceeds were spent.

Maas v. Northstar Education Finance, Inc. · filed 2014-08-12(a)(8)

When determining whether a loan falls within the educational benefit exception, courts look to the stated purpose of the loan, not how the loan’s proceeds were actually spent.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) does not except unpaid tuition from discharge as an educational loan when the payment agreement extends no credit and the parties did not intend a loan.

Barstow School v. Shojayi (In re Shojayi) · filed 2014-09-09(a)(8)(A)(i)

Because the debt does not constitute a loan under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A), the Court denies the creditor’s motion for summary judgment and instead grants summary judgment to the debtor.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit from discharge; the loan’s stated purpose determines whether it qualifies.

Accounts Management, Inc. v. Vasa · filed 2014-11-19(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, Debtor has an obligation to repay the funds he received from Avera. Thus, the question presented is whether those funds were received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend. They were.

Section 523(a)(8)(B) excepts a qualified education loan from discharge only if the debt is also a loan.

D'Youville College v. Girdlestone (In re Girdlestone) · filed 2015-02-10(a)(8)(B)

Thus, section 523(a)(8)(B) will deny discharge to certain types of educational indebtedness, but only if the obligation can satisfy the prerequisite of being a “loan.”

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except every obligation to repay funds received for an educational benefit from discharge; it requires a governmental or nonprofit connection.

Nunez v. Key Education Resources (In re Nunez) · filed 2015-03-13(a)(8)(A)(ii)

I see no basis to untether the language in § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) to apply the student loan exception to discharge to “all obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend,” without limitation. ... In these circumstances, based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that Mr. Nunez’s debt to Key Education is not excepted from his discharge under § 523(a)(8)(A).

Section 523(a)(8) covers educational loans made by state governments.

Corletta v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board · filed 2015-05-19(a)(8)

Section 523(a)(8), as written in 1997, is not ambiguous regarding whether loans provided by state governments qualify as “educational loans.”

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) covers tuition debt when a college extends educational services under a contemporaneous agreement for payment later.

D'Youville College v. Hardy (In re Hardy) · filed 2015-08-13(a)(8)(A)(i)

In the present instance, even without a transfer of funds, the Financial Agreement and subsequent note together stand as evidence of a loan agreement to repay the cost of tuition at a future date.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except an arm’s-length consumer loan on commercial terms from discharge as an educational benefit merely because it finances bar exam preparation.

Campbell v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Campbell) · filed 2016-03-24(a)(8)(A)(ii)

In this case, the Bar Loan, a product of an arm’s-length agreement on commercial terms, is not an “educational benefit” under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts one and two of the Complaint is denied.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except ordinary loans from discharge as obligations to repay educational benefits.

Decena v. Citizens Bank (In re Decena) · filed 2016-04-04(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Because loans are specifically mentioned in subsection 523(a)(8)(A)(i) and are not mentioned in subsection 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), and because “educational benefit” refers to funds not required to be repaid, the Court finds that Congress intended subsection 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) to refer to educational debts other than loans.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers an obligation to repay education funds paid directly to a school for the debtor’s benefit.

Rizor v. Acapita Education Finance Corp. (In re Rizor) · filed 2016-06-13(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Although in the Christoff case the BAP focused on money that the debtor received,23 the restriction to only money paid directly to the debtor does not appear in § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Money paid to the education institution for a debtor’s educational benefit which the debtor is required to repay to the lender also qualifies.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts federally insured educational loans and loans made under a program partly funded by a nonprofit institution from discharge unless repayment would impose undue hardship.

Hoffman v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Hoffman) · filed 2016-09-07(a)(8)(A)(i)

The SLS loans at issue in this case qualify under § 523(a)(8)(A)® because they are education loans insured by the federal government, made under a program funded in part by the federal government and in part by USA Funds, a private non-profit corporation.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts educational loans made under government-funded or nonprofit-funded programs from discharge, even if they do not qualify under subsection (B).

Cleveland v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Cleveland) · filed 2016-09-16(a)(8)(A)(i)

Here, the ECMC loan is made under the FFELP, which is a program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit. The NCSLT loans were made under a program funded in whole or in part by a non-profit institution, in this case, The Education Research Institute, Inc. Consequently, all of the loans of ECMC and NCSLT qualify to be non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) includes a bar examination loan within its educational-benefit exception to discharge.

Brown v. CitiBank, N.A. (In re Brown) · filed 2016-10-09(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The court is persuaded by these authorities, and concludes that § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) should be interpreted broadly to include a bar examination loan under the definition of “educational benefit.”

Section 523(a)(8) does not except a tuition agreement from discharge when it creates no educational loan and the debtor receives no funds.

D'Youville College v. Tucker (In re Tucker) · filed 2016-11-01(a)(8)

It is the holding of this Court that the Financial Agreement entered into between the parties is no more than an agreement to pay for tuition, fees and other registration costs (whatever they turn out to be), at some unspecified future time, and not an “educational benefit overpayment or loan” as contemplated in § 523(a) (8) (A) (i). Further, given the fact that no “funds” were “received” by the Debtor, Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not apply.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts educational debts such as conditional grants and stipends from discharge, but does not cover loans as educational benefits.

Dufrane v. Navient Solutions, Inc. (In re Dufrane) · filed 2017-03-23(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts from discharge educational debts, other than loans, such as conditional grants and stipends that generally are not required to be repaid.

A loan is not an “educational benefit” under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), even when the lender pays the school on the debtor’s behalf.

Kashikar v. Turnstile Capital Management, LLC (In Re Kashikar) · filed 2017-04-28(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Therefore, we hold that a “loan” is not an “educational benefit” within § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not treat a loan as an “educational benefit.”

In re: Melissa Hoda Kashikar · filed 2017-04-28(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Therefore, we hold that a “loan” is not an “educational benefit” within § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except a loan from discharge merely because its proceeds were used for educational purposes.

Essangui v. SLF V-2015 Trust (In re Essangui) · filed 2017-10-02(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Rather, the Defendant asserts, and the record supports, only that the Loan was used by the Debtor for educational purposes. That is not enough to bring the Loan within the subsection.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts educational loans made under a program funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution from discharge, unless repayment would impose an undue hardship.

Jean-Baptiste v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Jean-Baptiste) · filed 2018-02-23(a)(8)(A)(i)

Thus, based upon the record placed before it, the Court finds that the Access Loans are educational loans for purposes of § 523(a)(8)(A)(i), to wit, educational loans made under a program funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except every loan used for education from discharge; it covers obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.

Crocker v. Navient Solutions, LLC (In re Crocker) · filed 2018-03-26(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The Court concludes that § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) created a new category of nondischargeable debts specifically tailored to address a perceived need. That need did not include all loans that were in some way used by a debtor for education.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except loans from discharge as obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.

McDaniel v. Navient Solutions, LLC (In re McDaniel) · filed 2018-09-24(a)(8)(A)(ii)

But given the specific language employed by Congress in Sections 523(a)(8)(A)(i) and (B) and the absence of the word "loan" from Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), the Court concludes "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend" does not include a loan.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts an educational loan made under a program funded by a nonprofit institution from discharge absent undue hardship.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4 v. Debra Vance (Bock) (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-10-29(a)(8)(A)(i)

Although Vance suggested that a question of fact remained as to whether the loan was a “qualified educational loan” under Section 523(a)(8)(B), we agree with Lender that such a determination is not warranted under the facts of this case, where the loan satisfied the parameters of Section 523(a)(8)(A).

Under § 523(a)(8)(A)(i), a nonprofit's provision of an address for loan applications alone does not establish that it funded the loan program.

Richelle Page v. NCSLT · filed 2018-11-20(a)(8)(A)(i)

TERI merely provided an address to which applications could be delivered, and that is not sufficient to support the inference that TERI “funded” this loan program.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) covers educational loans made under a nonprofit-funded program, but a nonprofit’s provision of an application address alone does not establish that it funded the program.

Page v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Page) · filed 2018-11-20(a)(8)(A)(i)

Based on the record below and considering the established case law on the meaning of "educational loan," we hold that the bankruptcy court did not err in characterizing the Debtor's Loan as an "educational loan" within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)(A)(i). However, we conclude that the bankruptcy court's inference in NCST's favor that TERI "funded" the loan program was not reasonable as it was not supported by the evidence.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except every education-related loan from discharge as an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit.

Homaidan v. SLM Corp. (In re Homaidan) · filed 2019-01-31(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), both by its terms and read in context, does not sweep in all education-related debt, or all loans that support a student's efforts to gain the benefits of an education.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except every education-related loan from discharge merely because it helps a borrower obtain an education.

Golden v. JP Morgan Chase Bankt (In re Golden) · filed 2019-01-31(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), both by its terms and read in context, does not sweep in all education-related debt, or all loans that support a student's efforts to gain the benefits of an education.

A nonprofit institution’s guarantee of all loans in an educational loan program can establish that it funded the program in part, excepting those loans from discharge.

Greer-Allen v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1, Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3, (In re Greer-Alle · filed 2019-07-29(a)(8)(A)(i)

While the record lacks direct evidence of payments from TERI to the program, TERI's guaranty of all loans made under the Program conclusively establishes that the Program was funded in part by TERI.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not except a cosigner’s contribution claim from discharge merely because the cosigner made payments on a student loan.

Kristine Marie Shuey · filed 2019-08-15(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Allowing Creditor to recharacterize his right to contribution as an “educational loan” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code would go far beyond the plain language expressed therein.

Section 523(a)(8)(B) excludes a debt from discharge only if it is an educational loan; paying off an existing student loan does not alone make a personal loan educational.

Liana Sue Conklin - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2019-08-26(a)(8)(B)

Based on the statutory language as interpreted by the relevant case law, the Oral Loan was not an educational loan within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)(B).

Section 523(a)(8) does not except a loan from discharge when the loan was not made, insured or guaranteed by the government and was not used for an accredited school.

Weissmuller v. Tech Ed. Service, Inc. dba Aviation Institute of M · filed 2019-08-27(a)(8)

The loan made by Tech Ed. Service, Inc. dba Aviation Institute of Maintenance to Debtor is not an “educational loan” within the meaning of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers conditional educational payments resembling scholarships or stipends, but not education loans with unconditional repayment obligations.

Crocker v. Navient Solutions, L.L.C. · filed 2019-10-21(a)(8)(A)(ii)

We conclude that “education benefit” is limited to conditional payments with similarities to scholarships and stipends. The loans at issue here, though obtained in order to pay expenses of education, do not qualify as “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend” because their repayment was unconditional. They therefore are dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) makes student loans guaranteed by a governmental unit presumptively nondischargeable unless the debtor establishes undue hardship.

In re: Channer · filed 2019-12-11(a)(8)(A)(i)

The sole issue is whether PHEAA falls within the definition of “governmental unit” for purposes of Section 523(a)(8), which it clearly does.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) can treat a nonprofit institution’s guaranty of an educational loan program as funding, but the guaranty must have been in effect when the loan was made.

Holguin v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2, a D · filed 2019-12-17(a)(8)(A)(i)

The Court is persuaded that in many circumstances the existence of a guaranty itself is sufficient to satisfy the “funded” requirement under § 523(a)(8)(A)(i).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts an educational consolidation loan from discharge when it is made under a program funded by a nonprofit institution, even if the loans it repaid came from private lenders.

Moon v. Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corporation · filed 2019-12-18(a)(8)(A)(i)

The record establishes that Moon’s debt to ISL falls squarely within the first statutory subsection, section 523(a)(8)(A)(i), and, as a result, the debt was not discharged.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts a cosigner’s claim for reimbursement of prepetition student loan payments from discharge unless the debtor obtains an undue hardship determination.

WHITE v. Tekely · filed 2020-01-10(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Accordingly, this Court’s order of discharge does not relieve the debtor of her personal liability to repay the defendant for funds received as an educational benefit.

Section 523(a)(8)(B) determines whether a loan is a qualified educational loan by its purpose, rather than how the borrower spent the proceeds.

MacEwen Conti · filed 2020-01-21(a)(8)(B)

This Court agrees that that the question of whether Conti’s loans are “qualified educational loans” under § 523(a)(8)(B) should be determined by examining the purpose of the loan, rather than how the debtor actually spent the loan proceeds.

An employer-funded training debt tied to continued employment is not an educational loan under § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) when the employer incurred the cost to retain an employee.

Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation v. Webb · filed 2020-03-03(a)(8)(A)(i)

To the contrary, Baptist did so to retain the Debtor as a long-term employee. Baptist has failed to show a genuine dispute that the Epic Certification Debt is educational in purpose within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)(A)(i). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Debtor is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law that the Epic Certification Debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers educational assistance akin to scholarships or stipends, not a school treasurer’s liability for school funds that gave the treasurer no educational benefit.

In re: Edward Dudley, Sr. · filed 2020-03-18(a)(8)(A)(ii)

This Court agrees with the bankruptcy court that the legislative history supports the reading that the statute does not apply to alleged DFO liability for FFRs because it was meant for student loans.

Section 523(a)(8)(B) can except a refinancing loan from discharge when the original loan was a qualified education loan, even if the refinancing loan is not independently educational.

Juber v. Conklin · filed 2020-04-06(a)(8)(B)

So long as the loan being refinanced is a “qualified education loan,” then the refinancing loan may still be considered nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) whether or not it would itself be independently considered an “educational loan.”

An educational loan made under a program funded in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution is excepted from discharge unless the debtor shows undue hardship.

Mader v. Experian Information Soultions, LLC · filed 2020-07-24(a)(8)(A)(i)

The Navient Loan was therefore made “under [a] program funded . . . in part by a government unit or nonprofit institution.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i). The Navient Loan is thus non-dischargeable and can only be discharged on a showing of undue hardship. As Plaintiff made no such showing, the Navient Loan was not discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) treats a nonprofit’s effective guarantees of loans as funding the loan program under which they were made.

Mata v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1 et a · filed 2020-07-31(a)(8)(A)(i)

As such, the Court finds persuasive the Second Circuit’s reasoning in O’Brien, and adopts the expansive test provided for determining exception from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(I); i.e., whether the nonprofit devoted financial resources to supporting a loan program, including whether the nonprofit guaranteed loans made under the loan program that originated the loan in question.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not treat third-party loans or financing as obligations to repay an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.

Palmer, Jr. v. Galaxy Int Purchasing LLC · filed 2021-03-31(a)(8)(A)(ii)

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) does not apply to third-party loans or financing.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts obligations to repay conditional educational grants from discharge, but does not cover private student loans merely because they funded education.

In Re Hilal K. Homaidan · filed 2021-07-15(a)(8)(A)(ii)

“Educational benefit” is therefore best read to refer to conditional grant payments similar to scholarships and stipends.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) requires reliable evidence that a governmental unit or nonprofit institution funded the loan program; a lender’s own statements do not establish the exception on summary judgment.

Mazloom v. Navient Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-03-29(a)(8)(A)(i)

Defendants’ reliance on their own statements to establish the existence of a funded program within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) must fail.

Section 523(a)(8) excepts an educational debt from discharge only if the debt meets the statute’s criteria; otherwise, it is discharged when the general discharge order is entered.

In re: Reanna Leigh Irigoyen · filed 2024-05-03(a)(8)

The debt is excepted from the general discharge order only if it actually qualifies as the type of educational loan covered by § 523(a)(8). Otherwise, the debt is discharged with every other dischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts an overpayment refund from discharge as an educational loan when the school refunds the money to the student and later repays the federal lender on the student's behalf.

Wilson v. Southern Illinois University Carbondale · filed 2024-08-13(a)(8)(A)(i)

Therefore, the overpayment refund constitutes a loan excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(8).

Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) covers a conditional educational grant that becomes repayable when its conditions are unmet, even if the funds were paid directly to the school.

Hall v. Greenway Equipment, Inc. · filed 2024-12-05(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The plain language of the statute supports the conclusion that it is the payment of the funds as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend that brings a debtor’s obligation to repay the funds into the scope of Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), regardless of whether the funds were paid directly to the debtor or to the educational institution.

Section 523(a)(8) does not except a tuition debt from discharge when the debt is not a covered educational loan.

Parker v. Boston University (In Re Parker) · filed 2005-11-17(a)(8)

In Count One of the Complaint, Parker contends that because her debt to B.U. is not an educational loan excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), she is entitled to a judgment that her discharge under § 727 should include that debt. ... In the Answer, B.U. agrees that the debt is not subject to the anti-discharge provision of § 523(a)(8). ... Accordingly, I will enter an order granting Parker summary judgment on this count.

Section 523(a)(8) presumptively excludes covered student loan obligations from discharge absent undue hardship.

Sullivan v. Trans Union LLC · filed 2025-07-10(a)(8)

The Circuit has held that “[s]tudent loan obligations are presumptively nondischargeable in bankruptcy absent a showing of ‘undue hardship.’” Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). ... Thus, the Court finds persuasive defendant’s contention that student loans are “presumptively nondischargeable” and finds dismissal appropriate.

Section 523(a)(8) ordinarily excepts student loans from discharge under a completed Chapter 13 plan.

Dunn · filed 2026-02-25(a)(8)

Third, the bankruptcy proceedings would not have voided Nelnet’s interest even if Nelnet filed no proof of claim at all and Ms. Dunn subsequently completed a Chapter 13 plan because “[s]tudent loans are not ordinarily dischargeable under Chapter 13.” In re Bender, 368 F.3d 846, 847 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a)(2)).

Former § 523(a)(9), now § 523(a)(10), excepts a debt from discharge when it was listed in a prior case and the prior discharge was revoked for concealment of property.

Klapp v. Landsman (In Re Klapp) · filed 1982-10-01(a)(9)

In the appeal before us, the debtors’ discharge was revoked under § 15(2) of the Act for concealment of property. This ground is equivalent to one of the grounds for denying discharge under § 14c(l) of the Act. The latter section is expressly included in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). Appellee’s judgment is therefore excepted from discharge.

Former § 523(a)(9), now § 523(a)(10), excepts a debt from discharge when its discharge in a prior bankruptcy was revoked for qualifying debtor misconduct.

In Re John Michael Klapp and Mary Cook Klapp, Debtors. John Michael Klapp and Mary Cook Klapp v. Landsman · filed 1983-05-24(a)(9)

In short, to give full effect to the Congressional policy of encouraging honesty and cooperation by the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, we must read section 523(a)(9) to make a debt non-dischargeable where the discharge of the same debt was revoked on the basis of section 727 debtor misconduct in a prior bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(10) does not make a debt nondischargeable based on an earlier bankruptcy case in which the debtor received a discharge and did not waive it.

In Re Standfield · filed 1993-03-18(a)(10)

Thus, because the order of discharge in the Debtors’ first case now has been administratively issued and docketed, section 523(a)(10) is wholly inapplicable in the instant case. Moreover, there was no waiver of discharge executed and filed by the Debtors in their first case, nor has any adversary proceeding been filed to seek a determination of nondischargeability or objecting to discharge.

Section 523(a)(10) prevents a debtor from discharging in a later bankruptcy debts covered by an earlier denial of discharge under § 727(a)(3) or (5).

Cassady-Pierce Co. v. Burns (In Re Burns) · filed 1994-07-01(a)(10)

All debts for which a debtor previously had been denied a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(3) and (5) are not dis-chargeable in a subsequent bankruptcy case involving the same debtor.