11 U.S.C. § 523

A state court judgment establishing fiduciary fraud can preclude relitigation of those issues and support nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4).

Reed & Reed, Inc. v. Parks (In Re Parks) · filed 1991-02-14(a)(4)

Since Reed pleaded these matters in the State Court Action and obtained a judgment in its favor, this issue has been actually litigated and determined. ... Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court is bound by the State Court judgment, and such judgment is conclusive on these issues.

A prior judgment does not establish that a debt is nondischargeable for willful and malicious injury or fraud unless the record shows those issues were determined as the basis for the debt.

Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Los Angeles v. Weaver (In re Weaver) · filed 1991-04-09(a)(6), (a)(2)(A)

Thus, the Court is unable to determine from the record presented here that the debt which is the money judgment in this case resulted from the jury’s determination that the Debtor acted willfully and maliciously to injure the property of another, or that the jury determined that said debt was based upon the Debtor’s fraud. The record has not established that the issues actually litigated in the District Court proceeding were outcome determinative with respect to the debt in this adversary proceeding.

In a § 523 dischargeability action, Florida collateral estoppel rules can make a state default judgment conclusive on facts supporting exceptions for false representations, embezzlement, and willful and malicious injury.

Florida Municipal Self Insurers Fund v. Heuser (In Re Heuser) · filed 1991-05-10(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6)

Whereas the plaintiff alleges the same facts as alleged in the state court action, the debtor is precluded, under Florida law, from raising any defenses to the plaintiff’s dischargeability action. Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment finding that, pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6), the plaintiff’s claim against the debtor is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) permits collateral estoppel when a prior action resolved the same issues under the same standard of proof.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,972 in Re Barry Stephens Yanks, Debtor. Martha Hoskins v. Yanks · filed 1991-05-13(a)(6)

Because the issues at stake and the standards of proof in the Florida defamation action and the dischargeability analysis under section 523(a)(6) are identical, Hoskins is entitled to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

An interlocutory state court judgment finding a breach of fiduciary duty does not prevent the bankruptcy court from deciding whether the debt arose from fiduciary defalcation under Section 523(a)(4).

Tobkin v. Waltrip (In re Waltrip) · filed 1991-08-01(a)(4)

As a result, the bankruptcy court properly found that the issue of fiduciary defalcation had not been finally determined and that the bankruptcy court was not collaterally estopped from making its own findings on the issue of fiduciary defalcation.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for a fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty from discharge; collateral estoppel can establish the necessary facts when a state court actually and necessarily decided them.

In Re Tsamasfyros · filed 1991-08-05(a)(4)

In such circumstances, collateral estoppel is binding on the bankruptcy court and precludes relitigation of factual issues if (1) the issue to be precluded is the same as the one litigated in the earlier state proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; and (3) the state court's determination of that issue was necessary to the resulting final and valid judgment. ... The issue was actually and necessarily litigated in the state court proceeding. Therefore, under Brown and In re Wallace, the principle of collateral estoppel precludes Tsamasfyros from relitigating the same matter.

In § 523(a)(2)(A) proceedings, a state court fraud judgment can establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel even if the debtor defaulted, when the debtor had a full opportunity to defend and the fraud finding was necessary to the judgment.

Melnick Ex Rel. Melnick's Self-Directed Interest in the Office Automation, Inc. v. Seifert (In Re Seifert) · filed 1991-08-21(a)(2)(A)

“Actually litigated” only contemplates that the defendant have been given a full opportunity to defend himself. Defendants in this case chose not to answer the state court complaint and cannot now claim that the judgment should be discounted because of their decision not to participate in the state court case. ... The elements of Halpem have been satisfied and the application of collateral es-toppel is appropriate in this proceeding. Consequently, pursuant to § 523, the Final Judgment entered on June 2, 1989, by the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, and recorded in Book 3313 Page 410, shall be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) allow a debtor’s admission of fraud and willful and malicious injury in a state court judgment to preclude relitigation of those issues in a discharge proceeding.

Nier v. Hansen (In Re Hansen) · filed 1991-08-29(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Debtor admitted to willful misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement. Willful injury, and actual fraud are necessary elements to those acts. By admitting to the acts, debtor necessarily admitted to committing fraud and willful/malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a damages debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the state court’s findings are entitled to collateral estoppel effect.

Engh v. Spray (In re Spray) · filed 1991-08-30(a)(6)

Based on the overwhelming authority set forth in the above text, this Court finds no reason that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply here. Hence, the Miera case governs this issue and the defendants’ debt to plaintiff is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

A debtor may contest the fraud exception to discharge for a tax debt when fraud was not actually litigated in an earlier tax proceeding.

Graham v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Graham) · filed 1991-08-23(a)(1)(C)

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, does not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy court. Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, does apply to proceedings in bankruptcy court, it only forecloses the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and essential to the judgment. As a result of the stipulation of no contest signed by the Grahams, the issue of fraud was never litigated in the tax court. Therefore, Thomas Graham was not collaterally es-topped from contending in the bankruptcy court that his federal tax liabilities did not fall within the fraud exception to discharge set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).

Section 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) permits a prior jury verdict to establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel when the verdict establishes the same elements under a sufficient standard of proof.

Scarfone v. Arabian American Oil Co. (In Re Scarfone) · filed 1991-09-26(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6)

Therefore, this Court finds the issues and elements required to prove the nondis-chargeability of a debt under Sections 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) are identical to those issues and elements litigated in the District Court. ... This Court finds the elements of the doctrine of collateral estoppel have been met by Aramco.

Section 523(a)(6) permits collateral estoppel to resolve whether an injury was malicious when that issue was determined in a prior judgment.

Corbett v. Picard (In Re Picard) · filed 1991-10-24(a)(6)

After comparing the definition employed in the state court case with that applicable to dischargeability proceedings, this Court concludes that the first prong of the issue preclusion test is satisfied and that collateral estoppel is appropriate in this case. Because Debtor’s conduct was previously found by the Superior Court justice to be non-malicious, that factual issue has been determined and the Debtor is collaterally estopped from relitigating that point.

A creditor may pursue a § 523(a)(4) nondischargeability claim based on alleged conversion despite an earlier breach of contract judgment when conversion was not litigated in the earlier action.

Napshin v. Goetz (In Re Goetz) · filed 1991-12-05(a)(4)

Based on the foregoing, I find that neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata apply to prevent Plaintiff from seeking a determination that the debtor committed conversion, and from seeking a further determination that any debt owed by reason of such conversion is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) except debts established by fraud or willful and malicious injury from discharge, and prior state-court findings may establish those grounds through collateral estoppel.

Maximus International Trading Corp. v. Arguez (In Re Arguez) · filed 1991-11-19(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Therefore, applying collateral estoppel to the State Court judgment, this Court finds that the debt owed by the DEBTORS to MAXIMUS is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... Accordingly, this Court also finds the State Court judgment is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge of a debt obtained by false representation, and an agreed state-court judgment can establish the necessary facts through collateral estoppel.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 74,343 in Re Ben F. Lacy, Debtor. Ben F. Lacy v. Dorsey · filed 1992-01-10(a)(2)(A)

The court expressly adjudicated precise facts which bring Lacy’s conduct within § 523(a)(2)(A). ... Under similar conditions, an agreed judgment is entitled to collateral estoppel effect.

A state court judgment can preclude relitigation of whether a debt is actually alimony under § 523(a)(5)(B) when the parties intended that issue to be settled.

Carter v. Carter (In Re Carter) · filed 1992-03-17(a)(5)(B)

As noted, the parties expressly stated in the Agreement that “This obligation [to pay alimony] shall be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.” Thus, they clearly intended that issue be foreclosed in any future bankruptcy proceeding. ... For the foregoing reasons I conclude that collateral estoppel precludes the § 523(a)(5)(B) litigation in this court, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

In a § 523(a) dischargeability proceeding, collateral estoppel may give a state court judgment preclusive effect when the relevant conduct was actually litigated and necessary to that judgment.

Sonographics, P.C. v. Khullar (In Re Khullar) · filed 1992-04-08(a)

Therefore, in applying this analysis to the case at bar, if the aforementioned criteria can all be answered in the affirmative, then the state court judgment is entitled to preclusive effect in this dis-chargeability proceeding. ... Therefore, based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in the aforementioned analysis, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

A debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) when a prior valid, final judgment actually and necessarily established willful and malicious injury.

Estate of Jones v. Walters (In re Walters) · filed 1992-06-12(a)(6)

All elements requisite to the application of issue preclusion exist in this proceeding. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the Common Pleas Court of Miami County, Ohio is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a) dischargeability proceedings may give preclusive effect to a prior fraud finding when the elements of collateral estoppel are met.

In Re Michael Bronstein, Debtor. Teamsters and Food Employers Security Trust Fund v. Bronstein · filed 1992-07-02(a)

The debtor, Michael Bronstein, appeals the district court's decision holding that a prior finding of fraud precludes relitigation of the fraud issue for purposes of determining dischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Because the elements of collateral estoppel were met, affirmance is required by the rule announced in Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991), held to apply retroactively in Melton v. Moore, No. 91-35080, slip op. at 5569, 5573-75 (9th Cir. May 15, 1992).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of a particular debtor’s fraud; a jury verdict that does not identify which debtor committed the fraud does not establish nondischargeability.

Williams v. Zachary (In Re Zachary) · filed 1992-07-14(a)(2)(A)

Aside from the underlying state court second amended petition, the state court charge and the state court petition, the live evidence produced by Plaintiff on July 6, 1992 was not sufficient to support a § 523(a)(2)(A) complaint. ... From the jury verdict, it is impossible to determine that both Mr. and Mrs. Zachary actually .made a fraudulent representation or committed fraud, or which one of them actually made a fraudulent representation or committed fraud.

A debt established by a consent judgment can be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) or (a)(6) when the judgment conclusively establishes embezzlement or willful and malicious injury.

Valcour Printing, Inc. v. Poole (In Re Poole) · filed 1992-07-07(a)(4), (a)(6)

Based on the record as presented here, including the fact that Debtor voluntarily entered into the consent judgment in response to a civil complaint based on embezzlement and fraud that prayed for punitive, as well as actual damages, this Court concludes that the consent judgment is conclusive of the facts alleged in the civil complaint and has collateral estoppel effect in this- objection to discharge. Plaintiff has met its burden of proof, and the Court finds this debt is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(4) or Section 523(a)(6).

In a § 523 dischargeability proceeding, collateral estoppel applies only when the identical issue was actually litigated and necessary to the prior judgment.

Faw v. Wiles (In re Wiles) · filed 1992-09-22(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

Consequently, this Court cannot conclude that the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, embezzlement, or larceny issues in the state proceeding were a critical and necessary part of the judgment as entered. Accordingly, the third element has not been satisfied and the collateral estoppel doctrine cannot be applied to the proceeding at bar.

A debtor’s confession of judgment on fraud and willful injury claims can preclude relitigation of those facts in a § 523 dischargeability proceeding, even without specific state court findings.

In Re Norman Gerard Hansen, Debtor. Harry Nier v. Hansen · filed 1992-09-30(a)(2), (a)(6)

We have considered them carefully and affirm the order of the district court reversing the ruling of the bankruptcy court for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, entered August 29, 1991, a copy of which is attached. ... He confessed judgment to a complaint charging him with fraud and willful misrepresentation. ... By admitting to the acts, debtor necessarily admitted to committing fraud and willful/malicious injury.

Section 523(b) preserves a debt’s prior exception from discharge under § 523(c) in a later bankruptcy without requiring relitigation or a new complaint within Rule 4007(c)’s deadline.

Royal American Oil & Gas Co. v. Szafranski (In Re Szafranski) · filed 1992-12-10(b)

Debts which were excepted from discharge in a first bankruptcy case under § 523(c), remain excepted from discharge in a subsequent bankruptcy case under § 523(b), without need of relitigation under § 523(c). Since § 523(c) does not apply, such continuing exception to discharge may be established in the normal manner — i.e., either by reply to affirmative defense of discharge on a suit in non-bankruptcy court; or by adversary proceeding, not subject to deadlines under F.R.B.P. 4007(c), 9006(b)(3), in Bankruptcy Court.

Section 523(a)(2) and (4) permit a stipulated state court judgment to be declared nondischargeable when the judgment has preclusive effect on allegations of fraud and conversion.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Stanley (In re Stanley) · filed 1993-03-30(a)(2), (a)(4)

There are no material issues of fact in dispute — the Defendant having stipulated to judgment for a sum certain ($25,000) in response to a state court complaint alleging nondischargeable conduct. Since the Defendant was at all relevant times represented by counsel, we conclude that said judgment is res judicata in this Court, and the Plaintiff’s complaint to have the above referenced judgment declared nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (4) is GRANTED.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a state court fraud finding to establish nondischargeability when it meets the federal fraud standard, and intent to deceive may be inferred from a knowingly false statement.

Hill v. Horst (In Re Horst) · filed 1993-03-08(a)(2)(A)

This is equivalent to the finding of fraud necessary to deny discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). As the cases cited above indicate, it is not necessary for the state court to find specifically that the debtor’s actions were done with the intent to deceive. Rather, the intent to deceive may be inferred from a knowingly made false statement.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a default judgment can establish the required elements when its allegations support them.

Ride v. Medeiros (In Re Medeiros) · filed 1993-04-05(a)(6)

These allegations, apparently accepted fully by the Rhode Island Superior Court in rendering judgment in Plaintiffs favor, are clearly sufficient to establish a claim for relief under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and therefore, said judgment must be given res judicata effect in this proceeding.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a prior state-court fraud judgment to establish fraud through collateral estoppel when the debtor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, even if the debtor did not appear at trial.

Symes v. Mironuck (In Re Mironuck) · filed 1993-06-10(a)(2)(A)

The Plaintiff’s adversary complaint requests that the Court determine that the debt owed by the Debtor is not dischargea-ble as being based upon fraud pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... This does not prevent the Bankruptcy Court from determining that, in fact, the Debtor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of fraud in the state court proceeding, and that the issue of fraud was litigated prior to the judgment against the Debtor. ... Therefore, by separate order, the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a fraud debt to be excepted from discharge based on preclusive fraud findings, even without a formal prior judgment when an equitable exception applies.

Moodie-Yannotti v. Swan (In Re Swan) · filed 1993-07-14(a)(2)(A)

On the unique, even anomalous procedural history of this case, then, the Defendant should be bound to the Hennepin County jury’s findings on the fraud issue— even though those findings were never merged into a formal judgment, and even though they technically were rendered a nullity when Judge Hartigan granted a new trial. Since those findings and Judge Hartigan’s conclusions of law on them match up to the elements of a debt nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A), the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in her favor on the issue of the dischargeability of the Defendant’s debt to her under that provision.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) allows a state court fraud finding to establish nondischargeability when the findings satisfy the section’s fraud requirements.

Nemec v. Bolzle (In Re Bolzle) · filed 1993-09-13(a)(2)(A)

It follows that the jury’s findings in State court suffice to establish exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) in this Court as a matter of law; and that relitigation of such matters in this Court is precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In a § 523(a)(2) dischargeability action, a prior default judgment does not establish alleged fraud through collateral estoppel when the fraud issue was not actually litigated.

Hall v. Mady (In Re Mady) · filed 1993-10-04(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)

Mady is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issues of his alleged fraudulent conduct under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(2)(B) because of the default judgment in the District Court proceeding.

A debtor who fails to raise whether a marital debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) in an earlier state court proceeding may be barred from raising it later in bankruptcy court.

Nutter v. Reed (In Re Reed) · filed 1993-10-19(a)(5)

Thus, Reed’s failure to raise the issue of the nondisehargeability of the Marital Debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) in his prior bankruptcy case or in the State Court proceeding precludes him from raising this issue in the instant proceeding.

A consent judgment does not preclude litigation of dischargeability under § 523(a)(6) unless the debtor clearly intended it to have that effect.

Roeder v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1993-11-29(a)(6)

There is nothing in the criminal ease plea, the journal entry of judgment, or the Agreement in Lieu of Execution to indicate that Brown intended to agree that the dischargeability of Roeder’s claim could not be addressed in any later bankruptcy. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the issues sought to be precluded were not litigated by the parties in the prior state court action and cannot be given preclusive effect.

In a § 523 nondischargeability action, an arbitration award does not establish fraud or willful and malicious injury by collateral estoppel when its grounds for liability cannot be identified.

A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Sams (In re Sams) · filed 1994-01-07

The award does not specify the grounds on which this conclusion is based. ... The court is, therefore, of the opinion that since it has broad discretion in whether or not to give arbitral findings preclusive effect, that collateral estoppel should not apply in this situation.

In a § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud dischargeability action, a Florida default judgment can preclude relitigation of fraud when Florida law gives the judgment preclusive effect.

Nourbakhsh v. Gayden (In Re Nourbakhsh) · filed 1994-01-10(a)(2)(A)

After the Florida State Court issued a default judgment against Nourbakhsh based on a complaint for fraud, the bankruptcy court correctly precluded Nourbakhsh from litigating the issue of fraud pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2) permits a state fraud judgment to establish nondischargeability when the state court necessarily decided the same fraud elements and state law gives the judgment preclusive effect.

Rally Hill Productions, Inc. v. Bursack (In Re Bursack) · filed 1994-01-31(a)(2)

These jury instructions, together with the rest of the state court record in this case, clearly indicate that each of the elements necessary to prove fraud for purposes of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) was pleaded, argued, and considered by the jury in the state court action. ... Because a Tennessee court would give preclusive effect to the judgment in this case, this court must do likewise. Therefore, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment will be granted, and the indebtedness of debtor to plaintiff resulting from the state court judgment will be declared nondischargeable.

An unexplained arbitration award that may rest on nonfraud claims does not establish fraud through collateral estoppel for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A).

Arndt v. Hanna (In Re Hanna) · filed 1994-02-14(a)(2)(A)

Thus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the issue of fraud was necessary to the arbitrators’ decision because although presented with multiple causes of action, the Award itself is devoid of any factual findings and thus could have been based on any one or more theories of liability as set forth in the complaint. ... Indeed, if the Award was based on a theory other than fraud, section 523 would not apply and the debt could be dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of knowing false representations, intent to deceive, and justified reliance; a state court fraud judgment lacking findings on those elements does not establish nondischargeability by collateral estoppel.

Miller v. Apfel-Wilson (In Re Apfel-Wilson) · filed 1994-03-29(a)(2)(A)

Notably absent are findings that the debtor knowingly made false representations, with the intention of deceiving the plaintiff. ... The Superior Court made no finding that the plaintiffs reliance on the debtor’s representations were justified. Without these findings, the Superior Court record is not sufficient to operate as collateral estoppel in an action under § 523(a)(2)(A).

A state court judgment does not establish nondischargeability under § 523(a) through collateral estoppel unless the creditor shows that the relevant issues were actually litigated and necessarily decided.

Tulin v. Recck (In Re Recck) · filed 1994-03-30(a)

Accordingly, the court finds that an implied exception to the full faith and credit statute exists with respect to dischargeability proceedings over which this court has exclusive jurisdiction, and will apply collateral es-toppel as the Sixth Circuit has instructed in Spilman. ... Accordingly, the court believes that giving collateral estoppel effect to the judgment presented in this case is not in keeping with the Sixth Circuit’s instruction and the court finds that Tulin may not use the state court judgment against Recek for its collateral es-toppel effect in this proceeding.

Section 523(a)(1)(C) requires proof of a fraudulent return or willful tax evasion; a consent judgment imposing a civil fraud penalty does not, by itself, establish either ground.

Olson v. United States Ex Rel. Department of Treasury (In Re Olson) · filed 1994-04-07(a)(1)(C)

Thus, the entry of the civil fraud penalty by the Tax Court under I.R.C. § 6653(b), while disposing of the issue of liability, does not resolve the issues for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(1)(C).

Section 523(a)(2) permits a debtor to litigate whether a debt arose from fraud when the fraud issue was not actually litigated and determined in the earlier action.

Kulesa v. Stankovich (In Re Stankovich) · filed 1994-04-15(a)(2)

In light of the Raynor and Combs decisions, this Court finds that the fraud judgment of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County does not collaterally estop the debtor from litigating the issues presented under 11 U.S.C. § 523 in the Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt. The elements of fraud and the issue of whether the debtor perpetrated a fraud on the plaintiffs have not yet been presented to, litigated before and carefully determined by any court.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a state court finding of willful and malicious injury to establish that a debt is nondischargeable through collateral estoppel.

Dunn v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 1994-05-11(a)(6)

Inasmuch as a court of competent jurisdiction determined that the debtor wilfully and maliciously injured property of the plaintiff, the state court determination is entitled to collateral estoppel effect in this nondischargeability proceeding relating to that injured property. Since it has already been held that the debtor acted wil-fully and maliciously with regard to the subject debt, the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(6).

In a § 523(a)(6) dischargeability proceeding, a default judgment does not establish willful and malicious injury by collateral estoppel when the issue was not actually litigated.

Brose v. Hubbard (In Re Hubbard) · filed 1994-05-16(a)(6)

A default judgment merely disposes of the cause of action before the court and is not a reliable adjudication of any issue except for that case, and should not have a collateral estoppel effect in a bankruptcy dischargeability proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) dischargeability cannot be decided through collateral estoppel based on a default judgment when the relevant issues were not actually litigated.

Mitchell v. Kirby (In Re Kirby) · filed 1994-05-19(a)(6)

In the case at bar, the precise issues now before this Court were not actually litigated in the state court proceeding, and this Court may not, therefore, employ the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluding the parties from relitigating any fact herein.

Section 523(a)(11) gives default judgments preclusive effect in discharge proceedings when they arise from a debtor’s fraud or defalcation while acting as a fiduciary for a financial institution.

Meyer v. Rigdon · filed 1994-09-22(a)(11)

In summary, we conclude that Congress pre-empted the common law collateral estoppel doctrine when it enacted section 523(a)(11). Under the plain language of that section, any final judgment, including default judgments, must be given preclusive effect so long as they arise from the debtor's fraud or "defalcation" while acting in a fiduciary capacity for a financial institution.

In a § 523(a)(2) dischargeability proceeding, a fraud judgment entered after a debtor deliberately obstructed discovery can preclude relitigation of fraud.

In Re Sammy G. Daily, Debtor. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Receiver for Indian Springs State Bank v. Sammy G. Daily · filed 1995-02-03(a)(2)

A party who deliberately precludes resolution of factual issues through normal adjudicative procedures may be bound, in subsequent, related proceedings involving the same parties and issues, by a prior judicial determination reached without completion of the usual process of adjudication. ... In these circumstances, collateral estoppel was available to the FDIC, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the doctrine to preclude further litigation of issues determined in the RICO action.

In a § 523 dischargeability action, a state court default judgment does not establish issue preclusion without proof that the relevant issues were actually litigated.

Bay Area Factors v. Calvert (In Re Calvert) · filed 1995-02-15

The principles underlying the “fresh start” concept, the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers exercised within the framework of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable case law as applied to the totality of the relevant background facts here, all support a conclusion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied in this particular proceeding to prevent the debtor from actually litigating on the merits the issues raised and alleged in BAF’s bankruptcy complaint pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not permit a creditor to relitigate a factual issue already decided against it when that issue is the basis of its fraud theory of nondischargeability.

RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost · filed 1995-02-17(a)(2)(A)

Because the issues of ultimate fact in the two proceedings are identical, we hold that the RTC was precluded from asserting its "participation in a fraudulent scheme" theory of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), and the district court was bound by the jury's verdict in Carpenter's favor on the factual issue underlying the RTC's theory.

Section 523(a)(2)(B) and (a)(6) do not except a debt from discharge when collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the fraud issue and no evidence supports the nondischargeability claim.

Warrick v. Browning (In re Browning) · filed 1995-05-02(a)(2)(B), (a)(6)

Thus, this Court finds collateral estoppel is appropriate in this proceeding to bar the relit-igation of the fraud issue decided by the state court, and no evidence supports plaintiffs nondisehargeability claim pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) and § 523(a)(6).

A creditor seeking to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4) from a prior judgment must show that the judgment actually resolved fraud or defalcation.

Estate of Samson v. Ward (In Re Ward) · filed 1995-05-03(a)(4)

Because the transcript from the State Court proceeding was not before this Court and for the other reasons stated within, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied as an issue of fact exists as to whether the Defendant, in allowing judgment to be taken against him, consented to a finding that he had committed the type of fraud or defalcation that would prevent the discharge of this debt.

In a fraud dischargeability proceeding under § 523(a)(2)(A), a prior settlement does not preclude litigation of fraud when the issue was not actually litigated.

Brandenberger v. Chinnery (In Re Chinnery) · filed 1995-05-17(a)(2)(A)

The Court determines that because the previous district court lawsuit was resolved by a settlement agreement, the fraud issue was not actually litigated in the prior action. Chinnery is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of fraud in the present nondischargeability proceeding.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) allows a state court's fraud finding to establish fraud in a dischargeability proceeding when collateral estoppel applies.

In Re: Harry F. Malzeke, Debtor Charles R. Jelm v. Malzeke · filed 1995-05-24(a)(2)(A)

Collateral estoppel, therefore, barred relitigation of the fraud issue and bound the bankruptcy court's fraud analysis under Sec. 523(a)(2)(A).

In a § 523(a)(6) dischargeability proceeding, a prior default judgment cannot establish the amount of damages through collateral estoppel.

Colwell v. Lucas (In Re Lucas) · filed 1995-06-01(a)(6)

Although Raynor did not raise the specific issue of the default judgment amount, the court categorically barred collateral estoppel of issues adjudged by default. I therefore find the ruling leaves no room for an exception as to damages.

A Texas deceptive trade practices verdict does not establish an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) or (a)(6) unless its findings establish actual fraud or willful and malicious injury.

Ragupathi v. Bairrington (In Re Bairraington) · filed 1995-06-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Therefore, a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, at least with respect to unconscionable actions, misrepresentations based on subdivision 17.46(b)(5) and (7) or “knowing violations”, can be founded on behavior that lacks all of the required elements necessary to support a finding of non-dischargeability under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) or (6).

In a § 523(a)(6) discharge proceeding, a bankruptcy court must review the prior proceedings to determine whether the issues were actually litigated before giving a state court judgment preclusive effect.

Polechronis v. Cape Cod Needleworks, Inc. (In Re Polechronis) · filed 1995-08-22(a)(6)

While this determination does not demand a fresh adjudication of the merits of the previous action, it does require that the bankruptcy court actually review the proceedings that culminated in the previous court judgment to determine if the issues presented there were “actually litigated”.

Section 523(a)(2) permits issue preclusion when a prior judgment resolved every fraud element needed for nondischargeability.

In Re Jack Wayne Bursack, Debtor. Rally Hill Productions, Inc. v. Bursack · filed 1995-08-25(a)(2)

We agree with the bankruptcy court that the “jury instructions, together with the rest of the state court record in this case, clearly indicate that each of the elements necessary to prove fraud for the purpose of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) was pleaded, argued, and considered by the jury in the state court action.”

In a § 523(a)(2)(A) dischargeability proceeding, a prior state court fraud judgment receives the collateral estoppel effect required by state law.

Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh) · filed 1995-09-28(a)(2)(A)

The full faith and credit requirement of § 1738 compels a bankruptcy court in a § 523(a)(2)(A) nondisehargeability proceeding to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior state court judgment.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a court to use a fraud default judgment to establish nondischargeability when the debtor substantially participated in the earlier action, had a fair opportunity to defend, and then obstructed it.

In Re Freddie Maxton Bush, Debtor. Freddie Maxton Bush v. Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Limited · filed 1995-08-31(a)(2)(A)

Where a party has substantially participated in an action in which he had a full and fair opportunity to defend on the merits, but subsequently chooses not to do so, and even attempts to frustrate the effort to bring the action to judgment, it is not an abuse of discretion ... for a district court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent further litigation of the issues resolved by the default judgment in the prior action.

A prior negligence judgment alone does not eliminate a triable issue of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper) · filed 1996-01-08(a)(6)

Neither party presented a transcript of the District Court trial or an Order relating to the allegations of willful or malicious injury which would allow this Court to make a determination of whether the issue has been previously litigated. Therefore, viewing the evidence before the Court in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and without ruling with prejudice upon the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of Judge Carr’s Orders, the Court finds that the Debtor has failed at this time to meet his burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.

Section 523(a)(2)(A)’s reliance requirement cannot be established by collateral estoppel when the prior judgment did not necessarily decide reliance.

Irwin v. O'Bryan (In Re O'Bryan) · filed 1995-12-28(a)(2)(A)

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the resolution of the issue of reliance of any kind was necessary to the jury’s determination, or that it was even considered. Collateral estoppel does not apply, therefore, as concerns § 523(a)(2)(A).

A Georgia default judgment for fraud can establish the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A) through collateral estoppel, making the debt nondischargeable.

League v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 1996-01-16(a)(2)(A)

The default judgment of fraud entered against the Defendant by the Cobb County Superior Court meets the criteria of Georgia’s collateral estoppel doctrine and, as such, serves to settle those issues underlying the instant section 523(a)(2)(A) dischargeability action in the Plaintiff’s favor.

A prior fraud judgment can establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) or (B) when its necessary findings satisfy the applicable elements.

Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Schwarten (In Re Schwarten) · filed 1996-02-28(a)(2)

Each of the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A) is satisfied. At least one of the Schwartens made representations concerning Sonic Technologies’ joint venture with two other companies, those representations were false, those representations were made for the purpose and with the intent to deceive Mark Twain, Mark Twain’s reliance was justifiable, and Mark Twain suffered a loss as a result of the representation. The elements of § 523(a)(2)(B) are also satisfied. At least one of the Schwartens obtained credit by submitting a written statement about Sonic Technologies’ net income, the statement was materially false, Mark Twain reasonably relied on that statement, and the statement was submitted with the intent to deceive.

In a fraud-based dischargeability claim, a prior judgment precludes relitigation only if the bankruptcy judge carefully determines that the fraud issue was actually litigated and necessary to the earlier decision.

L & R ASSOCIATES v. Curtis · filed 1996-03-22(a)(2)(A)

This Court finds that “with particular care” describes the nature of the inquiry by the bankruptcy judge into whether the previously decided issue was actually litigated and the issue was necessary to the decision. ... The Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court determined “with particular care” that the Circuit Court’s default judgment should not collaterally estop Mr. Curtis from relit-igating the issue of fraud as it relates to the dischargeability of this debt.

Section 523(a) requires facts supporting an exception to discharge; a consent judgment declaring a debt nondischargeable alone does not foreclose later litigation.

American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Hernandez (In Re Hernandez) · filed 1996-04-23(a)

However, this without more, does not preclude further litigation on the issue of dis-chargeability of the claim in that the facts necessary to support an exception were not contained in the stipulation and/or the consent judgment.

Section 523(a)(5) excepts support obligations from discharge, and a state divorce decree’s declaration of nondischargeability does not bind the bankruptcy court.

Marriage of Price v. Price · filed 1996-05-14(a)(5)

The final determination, however, clearly rests with the bankruptcy court. Thus, because the marriage dissolution laws of Missouri do not require the trial court to proclaim the dischargeability of marital debts and the trial court’s judgment in that respect has no effect, there is no reviewable issue for this court.

Collateral estoppel may apply in § 523 nondischargeability proceedings, but a state default judgment that does not identify the grounds for decision does not resolve the dischargeability issues.

Robert B. Wilcox, M.D., P.C. v. Hritz (In Re Hritz) · filed 1996-06-03(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Principles of collateral estoppel apply in nondischargeability proceedings. ... For the reasons above, the court concludes that collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of the dischargeability issues in this adversary proceeding.

A stipulated fraud judgment can have preclusive effect in a § 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability action when the parties actually litigated the fraud issue before settling.

Genel Co. v. Bowen (In Re Bowen) · filed 1996-07-16(a)(2)(A)

Therefore, we hold that the parties actually litigated the fraud issue in the prior action, and the stipulated judgment was intended to have preclusive effect in any future nondischargeability action.

Section 523 dischargeability determinations use federal preclusion principles to assess state court judgments; state preclusion law does not bind the bankruptcy court.

Wood v. Dealers Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1996-07-31

In light of this precedent, this court concludes that there is a judicially created exception to § 1738 for dischargeability determinations in bankruptcy courts. Thus, a bankruptcy court is not bound by state law when deciding whether to give preclusive effect to state court judgments relating to § 523 dischargeability issues.

Section 523 permits a bankruptcy court to decide whether a fraud debt is dischargeable even if the creditor failed to raise fraud as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier state court action.

In Re Jack R. Armstrong, Dba Armstrong Construction, Debtor. Jack F. Staten and M. Jane Staten v. Armstrong · filed 1996-08-23(a)(2)(A)

It is within the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction to consider the issue of fraud anew as it relates to a nondischargeability claim under § 523. Likewise, although the Statens' fraud claim may have been a compulsory counterclaim which cannot now be asserted in state court, the failure to assert such a counterclaim does not prevent a bankruptcy court from making a nondischargeability determination under federal law.

Section 523(a) permits summary judgment on dischargeability based on the collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgment.

Piperi v. Gutierrez · filed 1996-09-13(a)

For purposes of § 523(a), a bankruptcy court may grant summary ... judgment based on the collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgement.

Section 523(a)(2) requires a determination that the debt was obtained by fraud; a prior judgment establishing only the debt does not resolve that issue.

Janess v. Messick · filed 1996-10-15(a)(2)

There were no specific conclusions reached on the issue of fraud. Therefore, there is still a question of whether the debt was obtained by fraud, and thus nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Section 523 permits a creditor to seek an exception from discharge for a judgment debt despite an earlier state court judgment; the bankruptcy court must decide dischargeability.

Vogel v. Kalita (In Re Kalita) · filed 1996-11-18

The doctrine of res judicata does not bar Vogel from filing an adversary proceeding against Kalita alleging that the judgment debt should be excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) require facts establishing nondischargeability; an arbitration award establishing liability does not suffice when its grounds are unclear.

Tower Oak, Inc. v. Selmonosky (In Re Selmonosky) · filed 1996-11-21(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

Based on the present record, however, this Court is unable to determine whether the liability award of the arbitrator was supported by the required finding of fraud or other alternative factual findings that would deny the dischargeability of the debt in question under Section 523(a)(2)(A) or (a)(4).

Collateral estoppel applies in § 523(a) dischargeability proceedings, and a state default judgment receives the preclusive effect the rendering state would give it.

Word v. Bailey (In re Bailey) · filed 1996-11-22(a)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in dischargeability actions under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). ... In light of the Migra and Bursack decisions, to determine if the plaintiffs are correct in their assertion, this court must look to the law of the state, Nevada, where the default judgment was entered against the defendant to see what preclusive effect must be given to the judgment. ... This court, therefore, cannot grant preclusive effect to the Nevada judgment, and the motion of plaintiffs must fail, for they are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A creditor seeking to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) may rely on the collateral estoppel effect of an earlier judgment that established the necessary elements.

Namer v. Fed Trd Cmsn · filed 1996-12-03(a)(2)(A)

A creditor seeking to establish the nondischargeability of its debt under section 523 may do so directly or, where appropriate, may rely on the collateral estoppel effect of an earlier court decision that establishes the nondischargeability.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a bankruptcy court to examine whether a debt was obtained by fraud despite a state court judgment awarding only contract damages.

Fielder v. King (In Re King) · filed 1997-01-09(a)(2)(A)

The bare fact that the state court awarded only contract rather than fraud damages does not preclude the bankruptcy court from inquiring into the true nature of that debt.

A prior judgment that an insurance agent acted in a fiduciary capacity can establish that element of § 523(a)(4) through collateral estoppel.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Miller (In re Miller) · filed 1991-01-16(a)(4)

The issue of fiduciary capacity is identical to the one before the District Court, was actually litigated there, resulted in a valid and final judgment, and was necessary to the outcome of the case. Accordingly, collateral estoppel applies to this first prong of the dischargeability analysis under § 523(a)(4).

In § 523(a) dischargeability proceedings, a state court default judgment has collateral estoppel effect if the rendering state gives it that effect.

In Re Dennis Amiel Calvert, Debtor. Bay Area Factors, a Division of Dimmitt & Owens Financial, Inc. v. Calv · filed 1997-01-28(a)

In the absence of any indication in the Bankruptcy Code or legislative history suggesting that Congress intended an exception to § 1738 apply to true default judgments and with no principled distinction between cases where a defendant participates in part in defense of the state court suit and cases where the defendant does not respond at all, we conclude that collateral estoppel applies to true default judgments in bankruptcy dis-chargeability proceedings in those states which would give such judgments that effect.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a fraud debt nondischargeable when the fraud issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior state action.

Cresap v. Waldorf (In Re Waldorf) · filed 1997-03-13(a)(2)(A)

After examining the pleadings and transcripts of the state case, this Court concludes that the issue of fraud and misrepresentation was actually litigated and necessarily determined in the prior state action and that Cresap is entitled to a judgment of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523 dischargeability claims may rely on a state court default judgment through collateral estoppel only when the state court record shows evidence and findings establishing a nondischargeable debt.

Angus v. Wald (In Re Wald) · filed 1997-03-26

Whether state or federal law is applied to determine the issue preclusive effect of a state court default judgment, two threshold requirements must be met before the judgment may, in any case, be accorded collateral estoppel effect in a bankruptcy dischargeability proceeding. These are: (1) the state court judgment must be supported by at least some evidence that can be discerned from the record of the state court proceedings; and (2) the state court judgment, either alone or in conjunction with the rest of the state court record, must indicate that the court actually considered the evidence presented and, based on that evidence, that the state court found facts that prove a nondisehargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523.

In a § 523 dischargeability proceeding, a federal default judgment does not establish elements of nondischargeability through issue preclusion if those elements were never actually litigated.

Marlee Electronics Corp. v. Antonakis (In Re Antonakis) · filed 1997-03-27

The doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply to a United States District Court default judgment when the parties have failed to actually litigate the issues sought to be precluded. Since the parties never litigated any of the elements necessary to sustain a finding of nondisehargeability, issue preclusion does not apply in this case.

Issue preclusion may apply in a § 523 nondischargeability proceeding, but a default judgment has preclusive effect only if the issue was fully and fairly litigated.

Reliance Ins Co v. Pancake · filed 1997-06-02

For purposes of collateral estoppel, however, the critical inquiry is not directed at the nature of the default judgment but, rather, one must focus on whether an issue was fully and fairly litigated.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of willful and malicious injury; a tortious interference verdict does not establish those elements unless the jury necessarily decided them.

Rupert v. Krautheimer (In Re Krautheimer) · filed 1997-06-18(a)(6)

To summarize, Rupert has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating within the high standard required for summary judgment that the state court jury “necessarily decided” that Krautheimer acted with willful and malicious intent to injure Rupert within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The elements of a state law claim for tortious interference with contract have not been shown to be the same as the elements for a claim under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a bankruptcy court to find a debt nondischargeable for actual fraud when a state court judgment conclusively established that fraud under applicable collateral estoppel law.

Wauben v. Watergate at Land · filed 1997-08-05(a)(2)(A)

The issue is whether the bankruptcy court (as affirmed by the dis- trict court) properly held that, as a matter of law,"actual fraud" for § 523(a)(2)(A) purposes was conclusively established by the state court judgment. Reviewing that ruling de novo , we affirm it.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) allows a state court fraud judgment to establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel when the judgment necessarily resolves the statute’s fraud elements.

Robinson v. Callender (In Re Callender) · filed 1997-08-26(a)(2)(A)

Thus, a state court judgment based upon fraud necessarily encompasses a finding of all the elements of Section 523(a)(2)(A) and is entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent bankruptcy court action.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires a finding of actual fraud attributable to the debtor before a prior judgment can establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel.

Citibank v. Hyland (In Re Hyland) · filed 1997-10-08(a)(2)(A)

The exception to discharge in section 523(a)(2)(A) extends to debts that result from actual fraud that is attributable to the debt- or. In the present instance, the state court’s order granting summary judgment was a mere recitation of result, with no specific statement of findings. Fully consistent with the language of the order would be a holding that Hyland’s joint and several liability derives solely from his position within the partnership. Accordingly, as to Hyland, there is no determination of actual fraud to which the Effect of collateral estoppel could attach in the present proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a state court sanctions finding conclusively establishes that the debt arose from willful and malicious injury.

In Re: Stephen E. Blaine Cheryl A. Blaine, Debtors. Lynette Martin Dougls Harwood Company v. Stephen E. Blaine Cheryl A. · filed 1997-10-14(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court correctly determined that the state court's finding that the Blaines had brought in bad faith a frivolous state action against Martin and Harwood conclusively established that the debt was incurred "for wilful and malicious injury" and was thus non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a debt for money obtained by fraud nondischargeable; collateral estoppel can establish that the debt arose from fraud.

In Re Jerome Berg, Debtor. The Dentists Insurance Company v. Berg · filed 1997-11-03(a)(2)(A)

Accordingly, both the district court and bankruptcy court correctly concluded that, pursuant to collateral estoppel, the debt Berg owed TDIC was a debt for money obtained by fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), and consequently nondischargeable.

A prior bankruptcy court determination that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(9) bars relitigation of dischargeability in a later bankruptcy under res judicata.

In re Bezold · filed 1997-12-11(a)(9)

In the present case, the cause of action in the Kentucky Bankruptcy Court — the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(9) — is identical to the cause of action before this Court. The parties to the Kentucky Bankruptcy Court Adversary Proceeding are the same parties before this Court. As such, the principles of res judicata apply, rendering the former action dispositive not only of issues which were actually litigated but which could have been litigated.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a debt for common-law fraud nondischargeable, but a consumer protection judgment that does not establish reliance and causation does not alone establish that exception.

Cranfill v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1998-01-14(a)(2)(A)

In consideration of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that the plaintiffs have carried forward their burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the defendant’s debt to them is nondischargeable as to the elements of common law fraud. ... The plaintiffs have not, however, established that they are entitled to summary judgment as to the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act cause of action, and their Motion for Summary Judgment should be overruled in that regard.

Section 523(c) does not permit redetermination in a later bankruptcy when a court approved a stipulation that the debt was nondischargeable.

Saler v. Saler · filed 1998-02-18(c)

The court agrees with the bankruptcy court’s finding that the exception to this rule set forth in section 523(c) is inapplicable in this case.

An arbitration award may establish the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A) through issue preclusion when it necessarily determines fraud and justifiable reliance.

O'Brien v. Zangara (In Re Zangara) · filed 1998-02-25(a)(2)(A)

This Court finds that a Texas court would give preclusive effect to the Arbitration Award insofar as it bars dischargeability of the debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Sections 523(a)(4) and (6) require proof of embezzlement, larceny, or willful and malicious injury; a judgment that did not actually decide those issues cannot establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel.

Schriver v. Valley Stream Financial Corp. (In Re Schriver) · filed 1998-03-20(a)(4), (a)(6)

To prove that Schriver’s debt was nondisehargeable under the applicable portions of § 523(a)(4) and (6), Valley Stream had to prove that Sehriver committed either (i) “embezzlement or larceny,” or (ii) a “willful and malicious injury” to Valley Stream or its property. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (6).

Section 523 permits a debt to remain nondischargeable in a later bankruptcy when the debtor agreed to its nondischargeability in a prior bankruptcy judgment and is judicially estopped from reversing that position.

Shearer v. Dunkley (In Re Dunkley) · filed 1998-05-21

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants the motion and finds the debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), (5) and (6). The Court holds that Defendant is judicially estopped in this matter to assert that the debt should be found dischargeable.

A final arbitration award can establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) when its fraud and fiduciary-duty findings satisfy the requirements for issue preclusion.

Wilbert Life Insurance v. Beckemeyer (In Re Beckemeyer) · filed 1998-07-09(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

The Debtor is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of actual fraud, false pretenses, false representations, and breach of fiduciary duties under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4). By virtue of this determination, the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the nondischargeability of the Debtor’s debt to Wilbert Life pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires the elements of common law fraud; materiality in a securities fraud judgment can satisfy the reliance requirement through collateral estoppel.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bilzerian · filed 1998-09-09(a)(2)(A)

While some courts have not required proof of actual reliance in SEC enforcement actions,18 we nevertheless believe that the causation requirement of "materiality" in Rule 10b(5) satisfies the requirement for actual reliance necessary to apply collateral estoppel in a § 523(A)(2)(A) case.

A prior judgment supports collateral estoppel under § 523(a)(6) only if its findings clearly establish the same willful and malicious injury elements.

Dennis v. Novotny (In Re Novotny) · filed 1998-10-01(a)(6)

In sum, it is not at all clear, at present, that the state court’s finding of “intent” and “malice” on the part of Mr. Novotny for purposes of the Dennises’ civil action against him are identical to the elements which, if established here, would preclude the discharge in bankruptcy of his debt stemming from the civil judgment.

A prior fraud verdict can establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) through collateral estoppel when the jury necessarily decided every element of the dischargeability claim.

Dement v. Gunnin (In Re Gunnin) · filed 1998-10-13(a)(2)(A)

The issues in this § 523(a)(2)(A) action have already been decided by the jury in the Chatham County Litigation.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not make a debt nondischargeable solely because the debtor agreed before bankruptcy that it would be.

Hayhoe v. Cole (In Re Cole) · filed 1998-10-27(a)(2)(A)

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis that the Stipulated Judgment was not entitled to collateral estoppel effect because it contained an unenforceable waiver of discharge and did not establish the elements necessary for a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(b) permits certain debts previously excepted from discharge to be discharged in a later case, but a fraud-based debt remains nondischargeable in a later Chapter 7 case.

Monica v. Simpson (In Re Simpson) · filed 1999-01-29(b)

The negative implication of this provision is that debts excepted in one case under other subsections of § 523(a) are not dischargeable in a subsequent ease, at least one under Chapter 7 such as the present case.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not make an entire judgment nondischargeable when the judgment rests on fraud and other claims without allocating damages among them.

Sterling Factors, Inc. v. Whelan (In Re Whelan) · filed 1999-06-30(a)(2)(A)

Count IV appears to set forth the elements of a fraud claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Counts VI and VII, however, do not set forth claims that would give rise to a non-dischargeable judgment under any subsection of § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Since the default judgment fails to apportion the damages clearly among the three counts, making it impossible to find that the entire judgment is based on the nondischargeable fraud claim in Count IV, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the § 523(a)(2) claim should be denied.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment conclusively establishes the facts needed to prove fraud.

Miles v. Rutledge (In Re Rutledge) · filed 1999-07-09(a)(2)(A)

In sum, based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the Rutledges are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of fraud. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their complaint requesting a determination that their claim should be exempted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable reliance for a fraud debt to be nondischargeable; a prior fraud judgment can establish that element when state law requires the same level of reliance.

Neal v. Surls (In Re Surls) · filed 1999-08-23(a)(2)(A)

From these cases it is clear that Missouri requires the same level of reliance in order to find fraud that the Supreme Court requires in order to have a judgment debt for fraud held nondis-chargeable. Since the Circuit Court found that the Neals had sustained their burden in proving fraud, it must have held that they had satisfied all nine elements of fraud in Count II of their Petition. The Circuit Court, therefore, found that the Neals justifiably relied upon Henry Suris’ misrepresentation. Thus, I find that as to Henry Suris, the issue sought to be precluded in this proceeding is the same issue that was decided in the Greene County case.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable reliance on a debtor’s fraudulent representation; a creditor’s negligent failure to investigate does not necessarily defeat reliance.

First American Title Insurance v. Lett (In Re Lett) · filed 1999-08-24(a)(2)(A)

The Court finds that although the failure of Hawkins Title to pick up a phone and call Southwest Missouri Bank to make a simple inquiry about the Deed of Release (Partial) strains the credulity of a reasonable person, the standard under § 523(a)(2)(A) is not reasonable reliance, but justifiable reliance, which tolerates such unreasonable and even negligent behavior.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when a Georgia default judgment for fraud has collateral estoppel effect, including when the debtor’s failure to participate caused the default.

Branton v. Hooks (In Re Hooks) · filed 1999-09-10(a)(2)(A)

The default judgment against Defendant has collateral estoppel effect in the adversary proceeding to determine nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when a state court default judgment establishes the fraud allegations under applicable collateral estoppel law.

Lasky v. Itzler (In Re Itzler) · filed 2000-01-20(a)(2)(A)

Collateral estoppel, under Florida law, prevents Itzler from relitigating the truth of the allegations of fraud. Applying collateral estoppel to the state court default judgment, this Court holds that the debt owed by Itzler to the Laskys is nondisehargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a state default judgment entered as a discovery sanction can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Luedtke v. Hodges (In Re Hodges) · filed 2000-02-16(a)(6)

The Court concludes that the default judgment entered against Debtor as a sanction for discovery abuses has collateral estoppel effect. ... FURTHER, Plaintiff Kurt Luedtke’s judgment claim against Debtor is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a state fraud judgment to establish the elements of fraud through collateral estoppel when the debtor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate liability.

Sterling Factors, Inc. v. Whelan · filed 2000-02-25(a)(2)(A)

Appellant Sterling’s motions for summary judgment are GRANTED as to the issue of the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to the judgment of the Superior Court of DeKalb County on the issue of Appellees Whelan’s and Schaner’s liability as to the elements of fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523 requires an independent determination of whether a state-court default judgment is dischargeable, and the passage of time alone does not bar that determination.

Martin v. Stoddard (In Re Stoddard) · filed 2000-02-11

Upon considering these arguments, however, the Court, although agreeing with the Defendant that this Court must make an independent determination as to the dischargeability of the Plaintiffs state court judgment, does not find, based upon equitable principles, that the mere passage of thirty (30) years entitles the Defendant to a judgment as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when the debtor’s deceptive false representation causes the creditor justifiable reliance and loss; a Florida default judgment can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Lang v. Vickers (In Re Vickers) · filed 2000-04-04(a)(2)(A)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Florida collateral estoppel law prevents Defendant from relitigating the truth of the allegations of fraud. Accordingly, the Court finds the debt owed by Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount of $42,398.50 is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

A preliminary ruling that a debt is in the nature of support for automatic stay purposes does not preclude a later determination of its dischargeability under Section 523(a)(5).

Montoya v. Vigil (In Re Vigil) · filed 2000-04-14(a)(5)

However, res judicata principles do not bar litigation of the dischargeability of debt in the adversary proceeding.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) supports a default judgment when the admitted allegations sufficiently establish a claim for nondischargeability.

American General v. Washington · filed 2000-05-23(a)(2)(A)

AGF’s complaint alleged facts that were sufficient to make out a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A).

In a § 523(a)(6) dischargeability action, a state-court default judgment entered after hearing evidence can preclude relitigation of the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Gilleylen v. Evans (In Re Evans) · filed 2000-06-27(a)(6)

In the opinion of this court, in keeping with the standards articulated by the Fifth Circuit, coupled with the status of the law in the State of Mississippi, the default judgment entered by Judge Russell against Evans, after considering all of the proof, must be given preclusive effect.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts for fiduciary defalcation from discharge, but a prior judgment precludes litigation of that issue only if the finding was essential to the judgment.

Chapman v. Tracey (In Re Tracey) · filed 2000-06-30(a)(4)

Clearly, a finding on the issue of a breach of fiduciary duty was not essential to the judgment entered as summary judgment on the contract count had already been entered, and the damages awarded were those for a breach of contract plus sanctions. Therefore, the Court cannot find that a finding of defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity was essential to the final judgment awarding the Plaintiff damages in the amount of $38,898.35 or sanctions in the amount of $1,549.00. It is for this reason that the motion for summary judgment is denied.

A default judgment does not establish nondischargeability under § 523 on summary judgment when the debtor’s failure to defend may have been innocent and the record does not establish grounds for issue preclusion.

Lincoln Trust Custodian FBO Wendell William Mercer No. 61067486 v. Parker (In Re Parker) · filed 2000-06-30

Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate under these circumstances, where the evidence suggests the possibility of innocent indiscretion on the part of the debtor, and where there is no legal support for the per se collateral application of default judgments.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts obtained by actual fraud from discharge, and a prior judgment can establish the fraud issue through collateral estoppel.

Stoehr v. Prince Mohamed Bin · filed 2001-04-03(a)(2)(A)

These findings make clear that the issue of fraud was actually litigated in the superior court, was a necessary component of the court's judgment, and was the same as the issue adjudicated in the section 523(a)(2) proceeding.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of the fraud elements; a theft-by-deception conviction alone does not establish them.

Massie v. Pate (In Re Pate) · filed 2001-05-17(a)(2)(A)

In regard to § 523(a)(2)(A), it does not establish the knowingly false representation of material fact upon which Defendant intended Plaintiff to rely and on which she justifiably relied to her injury. Plaintiff asks the Court to presume too much from the fact of conviction of the offense.

In a § 523(a)(2)(A) action, a state default judgment does not preclude litigation of fraud when the fraud issue was neither actually litigated nor necessarily decided.

In Re: Charles Michael Harmon, Debtor. Charles Michael Harmon v. Kobrin · filed 2001-05-09(a)(2)(A)

The issue of whether Harmon committed fraud against Kobrin within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) was neither “necessarily decided” by nor “actually litigated” in the state court proceeding. Under California law, Harmon is not precluded from contesting the issue in Kobrin’s adversary action.

Under § 523(a)(2), stipulated facts can establish that a debt is nondischargeable and preclude relitigation when the parties intended the stipulation to bind them in bankruptcy.

Kohlenberg v. Baumhaft (In Re Baumhaft) · filed 2001-06-06(a)(2)

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs’ motion should be granted because the parties’ factual stipulations both support a judgment for the plaintiffs under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and preclude the debtor from relitigating those facts.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when a prior state judgment preclusively establishes the fraud and false representation.

Walls v. Jones (In re Jones) · filed 2001-06-06(a)(2)(A)

Consequently, the Court finds that all of the elements of collateral estoppel have been established in this case. Jones is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of fraud and false representation which form the basis of the state court judgment which Walls seeks to have declared excepted from discharge. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to Walls under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a) makes debts for money obtained by fraud or willful and malicious injury nondischargeable, and collateral estoppel may establish that a debt falls within those exceptions.

Creasy v. Creasy · filed 2001-05-31(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Accordingly, both the district court and bankruptcy court correctly concluded that, pursuant to collateral estoppel, the debt Creasy owed appellee was a debt for money obtained by fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and for money obtained by willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and consequently nondisehargeable.

A debtor’s admissions in a plea agreement can establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Fifth Third Bank v. Baumhaft (In Re Baumhaft) · filed 2001-06-15(a)(2)(A)

The statements in Baumhaft’s Rule 11 plea agreement also fully establish the elements of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A). There are no genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Fifth Third Bank’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

A default judgment entered as a discovery sanction can establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) when the debtor extensively participated in the earlier case and the judgment establishes the exceptions’ elements.

Herbstein v. Bruetman · filed 2001-09-06(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

The principles apply in discharge proceedings in bankruptcy court. ... The issues underlying the New York default judgment were “actually litigated” for purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) dischargeability claims are decided by the bankruptcy court, so a state court declaration that a debt is nondischargeable has no res judicata effect.

Spires v. Gregg (In Re Gregg) · filed 2001-09-24(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

Furthermore, since this court has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of dis-chargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(4), the state court judgment declaring the debt to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy is not entitled to res judicata.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable; a prior judgment finding those acts can preclude relitigation of dischargeability.

Hardesty Co. v. Edwards (In re Edwards) · filed 2001-10-04(a)(6)

The Oklahoma court’s judgment is preclusive on the issue of whether there were willful and malicious acts by the debtor, and, therefore, it is preclusive on the non-discharge-ability of the debt to THC.

Section 523(a) permits a bankruptcy court to determine whether a state court judgment debt is dischargeable, but does not authorize it to replace that judgment with a new money judgment.

Dotson v. Heckert · filed 2001-11-16(a)

In sum, the authority granted the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to enter orders, and the authority granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007 to determine the dischargeability of a debt does not either explicitly or implicitly amend the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires the courts of the United States to give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts.

Section 523(a) permits a bankruptcy court to determine whether a debt is dischargeable, but does not authorize it to replace an existing state court money judgment.

In Re: Ransford Craig Heckert, Debtor. Ransford Craig Heckert, A/K/A R.C. Heck Heckert v. Dotson · filed 2001-11-16(a)

In sum, the authority granted the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to enter orders, and the authority granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007 to determine the dis-chargeability of a debt does not either explicitly or implicitly amend the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires the courts of the United States to give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts.

A tax fraud default judgment does not establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(1)(C) when fraud was not actually litigated and the debtor’s conduct in the prior case was not seriously obstructive.

Sly v. United States (In Re Sly) · filed 2002-02-26(a)(1)(C)

The Slys failed to respond to the Court’s order and were properly sanctioned by the entry of a default judgment against them. That judgment still stands. However, the issue here is not whether the debt is owed, but whether the debt is nondischargeable. This Court does not find as a matter of law that it is nondischargeable.

A prior fraud judgment can establish actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) when the jury’s findings cover every required element, barring relitigation in bankruptcy court.

In Re: Bailey · filed 2002-03-14(a)(2)(A)

Thus, we think it is clear that the state court jury’s findings address all of the elements of fraud required under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when preclusive state-court findings establish the required elements of fraud.

Missouri Ex Rel. Jeremiah W. v. Audley (In Re Audley) · filed 2002-03-28(a)(2)(A)

We agree with the bankruptcy court that the state court proceeding collaterally estopped the Debtor from relitigating the issue of the nondischargeability of Missouri’s claim under § 523(a)(2)(A).

A state court judgment can preclude relitigation of issues necessary to determine whether a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) or (a)(6).

In Re Ronald R. Diamond and Elaine Diamond, Debtors. Ronald R. Diamond and Elaine Diamond v. Jeffrey R. Kolcum and Linda · filed 2002-04-04(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

The Kolcums are entitled to a declaration of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) because the state court judgment to which they asked the bankruptcy court to give preclusive effect necessarily implicated issues identical to those implicated in the nondischargeability proceeding, and those issues were therefore actually litigated in the state court proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) permits litigation of willfulness and malice despite a prior conversion judgment and denial of punitive damages when those issues were not essential to either state court ruling.

Higgins v. Olson · filed 2002-04-10(a)(6)

The issue of willfulness and malice was not essential to the state court’s determination that Olson had converted the property. ... Neither was the issue essential to the state court's decision not to award punitive damages.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a debt from discharge when preclusive state court findings establish fraud, reliance, and resulting damages.

Henson v. Henderson (In re Henderson) · filed 2002-05-14(a)(2)(A)

Because the issues litigated in state court meet the elements of fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), the court determines that the debt owed by the Debtor to Plaintiff Henson outlined in the state court judgment is nondischargeable.

A general fraud verdict cannot establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) through collateral estoppel when it might rest on an oral statement about the debtor's financial condition.

Spencer v. Bogdanovich · filed 2002-05-15(a)(2)(A)

Thus, even assuming arguendo the bankruptcy and district courts were correct in ruling that the Spencers had alleged at least some cognizable claims barring the dischargeability of the bankrupt's debt, it is not possible to know whether the underlying California jury verdict rested on those same claims. Equally important, were even one representation underlying the general verdict an oral statement respecting the debtors' financial condition, collateral estoppel could not be invoked in the adversary proceeding.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a debt incurred through fraud from discharge; an administrative fraud finding may establish the exception through issue preclusion.

Ohio v. Foster (In Re Foster) · filed 2002-06-27(a)(2)(A)

Given the issue-preclusive effect of the Orders, the BWC has met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Repayment Obligation is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) as a debt incurred through fraud.

Section 523(b) recognizes that a final judgment excepting a debt from discharge generally remains effective in later chapter 7 cases, subject to its enumerated exceptions.

Paine v. Griffin (In Re Paine) · filed 2002-08-30(b)

The rule is that res judicata principles apply in bankruptcy so that once a debt is “excepted from discharge” in a judgment that meets the requirements for preclusion, it is, except for the eight exceptions named in § 523(b), “excepted from discharge” in all subsequent chapter 7 cases without need for an independent basis for excepting the debt from discharge in the later case.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a judgment debt from discharge when a prior fraud finding establishes the debtor’s fraud and the entire damages award arose from it.

Lusk v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 2002-08-22(a)(2)(A)

Therefore, the Court applies the doctrine of collateral estoppel and grants summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on the issue of Debtor’s fraud under section 523(a)(2)(A). Debtor’s conduct being adjudged fraudulent pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A), the debt arising from the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff is deemed non-disehargeable.

A violation of the Ohio Consumer Protection Act alone does not establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A); additional findings can establish the required fraud.

Longbrake v. Rebarchek (In Re Rebarchek) · filed 2002-09-19(a)(2)(A)

As such, a debtor’s violation of the Ohio Consumer Protection Act, without more, does not require that the collateral estoppel doctrine be applied to a creditor’s cause of action under § 523(a)(2)(A).

A consent judgment can establish grounds for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4) through issue preclusion when the parties clearly intended it to resolve those grounds.

Shadow Factory Films Ltd. v. Swilley (In Re Swilley) · filed 2003-04-17(a)(2), (a)(4)

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as recited in the attached Order of the Court, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the debt John F. Swilley (“Debtor”) owes as represented by the Journal Entry of Judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).

A stipulated Tax Court fraud penalty does not preclude a debtor from contesting whether a tax debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(1)(C) when the decision contains no findings or admissions of fraud.

Dorminy v. United States, Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, (In Re Dorminy) · filed 2003-10-02(a)(1)(C)

First, the Debtor is not precluded from asserting that his tax liabilities were dis-chargeable in his bankruptcy case. The stipulated Tax Court Decision does not contain any factual findings pertaining to fraud, nor does it contain any admissions of the elements required for a finding of fraud, so that the Court cannot find that the parties intended the Decision to be afforded collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent action.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment preclusively establishes that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the creditor.

Dominguez Ex Rel. Hamp v. Elias (In Re Elias) · filed 2003-12-19(a)(6)

By contrast, the state civil default judgment does establish, as a matter of law, that Defendant willfully and maliciously injured Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff has suffered damages on account of his injury in the amount of $23,400,000. The debt evidenced by that state court judgment is therefore excepted from discharge in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523 permits the bankruptcy court to determine what portion of a state court judgment is nondischargeable without being bound by a special verdict form awarding punitive damages for fraud.

Bryan v. Bryan · filed 2004-09-16(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

We reject Debtor’s contention that the bankruptcy court was bound by the special verdict form awarding punitive damages for fraud in determining what portion of the state court judgment was nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a fraud debt nondischargeable when findings that establish its required elements are given preclusive effect.

Bard v. Appel (In Re Appel) · filed 2004-09-30(a)(2)(A)

Having found that the Debtor is barred from relitigating the merits of the fraud claim presented in the Arbitration Proceeding, and recognizing that the elements of a fraud claim under Florida law are the same as the- elements for establishing the non-dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a), the Court finds that the debt in question is in fact non-dischargeable and upholds the Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and state court sanctions findings can establish its elements through issue preclusion.

In the Matter Of: Robert Burke Keaty, Sr. Erin Kenny Keaty, Debtors. Roy A. Raspanti v. Robert Burke Keaty, Sr. · filed 2005-01-12(a)(6)

Thus, we conclude that Raspanti’s claim for sanctions under Louisiana law encompasses the elements of the willful and malicious injury requirement under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes a debt nondischargeable when findings in a prior judgment establish the required elements and collateral estoppel bars relitigation.

Federal Trade Commission v. Porcelli (In Re Porcelli) · filed 2005-03-22(a)(2)(A)

This Court is satisfied that the District Court Order satisfies all the elements required to make the Debtor’s liability non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Since collateral es-toppel prevents the Debtor from litigating the case again and there are no issues of material fact as to the nondischargeability of the debt, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

Prior criminal findings may establish that debts are excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(4), and (a)(6) through collateral estoppel.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Young (In Re Young) · filed 2005-04-01(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(4), and (a)(6)

Upon review of the pleadings, Plea Agreement, Criminal Judgment, and relevant law, the Court determines that the debts (set forth in the Criminal Judgment) owed by the Debtor to the Plaintiffs are excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(4), and (a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) addresses whether a debt is nondischargeable; a ruling on that issue does not by itself decide whether the debtor owes the debt.

In re: Ed Lombardo v. · filed 2005-04-28(a)(6)

Because the bankruptcy court’s determination of dischargeability was a separate cause of action from the issue of whether a debt was owed, the court’s ruling in this regard has no res judicata effect on the allowability of Appellant’s claim.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts for money obtained by fraud from discharge, and an actually litigated Michigan fraud judgment can establish the required fraud elements.

Building Communications, Inc. v. Rahaim (In Re Rahaim) · filed 2005-05-05(a)(2)(A)

Because the elements of a state court fraud claim encompass the elements of a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim under the bankruptcy code, the Court must determine whether the issue was “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the state court.

Section 523(a) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a nondischargeability judgment even when a state court has already reduced the debt to judgment.

Sasson v. Sokoloff · filed 2005-08-24(a)

The existence of a state court judgment does not deprive the bankruptcy court of the statutory power to enter a new judgment of nondischargeability.

Under § 523(a)(6), a prior judgment that does not establish intentional injury cannot resolve nondischargeability through collateral estoppel.

Eveland v. Stelbrink (In re Stelbrink) · filed 2005-10-07(a)(6)

Neither the default judgment as to liability nor the jury verdict awarding the $10 million in damages specified that judgment was being entered on the willful and wanton count. In light of this ambiguous record, the Court cannot apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the stabbing was the result of a negligent act or a willful and malicious act.