11 U.S.C. § 523

A § 523(a)(2)(B) complaint filed after the Rule 4007(c) deadline may be dismissed when it alleges no facts that plausibly explain the late filing.

Regency Finance Co. v. Trichilo (In re Trichilo) · filed 2015-11-16(a)(2)(B)

It is undisputed that the Complaint was filed seven days after the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) deadline. Therefore, I conclude that Regency has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

Section 523(a) nondischargeability requests are moot when the debtor has been denied a discharge under § 727(a).

Chen v. Wen Jing Huang (In re Wen Jing Huang) · filed 2016-01-15(a)

Because this Court has already determined that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge pursuant to § 727(a), it need go no further. The Plaintiffs’ requests for a determination that their claims are nondischargeable under § 523(a) are now moot.

An extension to object to a debtor’s general discharge does not extend the deadline to seek an exception for fraud under § 523(a)(2).

Cohen v. Abramowitz · filed 2016-02-08(a)(2)

Consequently, the allegations in Cohen’s first Complaint challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment under § 523(a)(2) were untimely — see Fed. R. Banke. P. 4007(c) — and Cohen conceded this point to the bankruptcy court.

Section 523 allows only a party with a valid claim under non-bankruptcy law to challenge the dischargeability of that claim.

Skinner v. Skinner (In Re Skinner) · filed 2016-03-04

While section 523 provides that certain claims are non-dischargeable, William ignores the essential prerequisite that only a party to whom a claim is owed may seek to make its claim non-dischargeable under section 523.

Section 523(c) subjects complaints alleging nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) to Rule 4007(c)’s filing deadline.

Golden v. Gibrick (In re Gibrick) · filed 2016-05-05(c)

Because Golden’s complaint alleged nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(A), the complaint was one under section 523(c) and was subject to that deadline.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to except a fraud debt from discharge to obtain a bankruptcy court determination; without a timely complaint, the debt is discharged even in Chapter 13.

Kansas Department of Labor v. Singleton (In re Singleton) · filed 2016-07-07(c)

To have a kind of debt excepted from discharge under § 523(c), there must be an adjudication in conformity with § 523(c). Section 1328 incorporates by reference § 523(a)(2) and, as such, also incorporates by reference the procedures to adjudicate dischargeability of such debts. Thus, Sheila’s 2006 bankruptcy discharged the 2004 Overpayment principal and interest because KDOL failed to file a complaint seeking nondischargeability of its debt in Sheila’s 2006 bankruptcy.

Section 523(c) allows an intervening creditor who adopted a timely dischargeability complaint to continue that claim after the original filer is dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Bustos v. Molasky · filed 2016-12-12(c)

Accordingly, Bustos is entitled to continue prosecuting the § 523 claim originally filed by OneCap.

A complaint to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) must meet Rule 4007(c)'s deadline, which an extension for objecting to the debtor's general discharge does not extend.

BiTech, Inc. v. Withrow (In re Withrow) · filed 2017-04-10(c)

Likewise, Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) provides that a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) (that is, under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6)) must be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors. The court may extend this deadline, on motion, as long as the motion is filed before the time has expired.

Section 523(c)(1) requires a creditor owed a debt under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to request a determination that the debt is excepted from discharge.

Okoro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-04-20(c)(1)

Debtors could not and did not bring an action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1), and the creditors did not challenge the dischargeability of the debt under this provision.

Section 523(a)(6) dischargeability requires an adversary proceeding initiated by a separate complaint.

In re Minick · filed 2018-05-31(a)(6)

The Code sets forth a procedure to address if a debt should be excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6). The procedure requires the plaintiff to initiate an adversary proceeding. This means the plaintiff must file a separate complaint by a certain deadline, serve the complaint, and if answered, proceed to try the matter.

Section 523(a)(3)(B) sets no statutory deadline for filing a dischargeability action, but laches can bar an action when unreasonable delay prejudices the debtor.

Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Santos (In re Santos) · filed 2018-05-31(a)(3)(B)

Second, as the court in the Jenkins case noted, there is no statutory time limit for filing actions under § 523(a)(3)(B) ; thus, laches is an appropriate defense. ... This Court, as a court of equity, views this case as one justifying the application of laches to DHS.

A complaint to determine dischargeability under Section 523(c) must meet Rule 4007(c)’s filing deadline unless the creditor obtains an extension before the deadline expires.

Akins v. Jones (In re Jones) · filed 2018-07-02(c)

In accordance with Rule 4007 (c) and as set forth on the official notice, the sixty (60) day deadline to file a Section 523 complaint against this Defendant ran on December 15, 2017. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint six (6) days after the deadline. At no point did Plaintiffs file a motion to extend the deadline.

Section 523(c)(1) covers nondischargeability claims under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6), which are subject to the Rule 4007(c) filing deadline.

Sadlon v. Sadlon (In re Sadlon) · filed 2018-09-04(c)(1)

Section 523(c) covers causes of actions to determine a debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6). ... Notably, only one of those provisions-Ms. Sadlon's fraud claim under § 523(a)(2) -is included in § 523(c) and is, thus, subject to the Rule 4007(c) deadline.

A creditor's failure to investigate a potential nondischargeability claim diligently does not justify extending the time to file a § 523 complaint.

In re Tumbleson · filed 2018-08-01

That business decision, and its adverse consequences, are not sufficient grounds to grant CCB an extension of time to sue Mr. Tumbleson under § 523 more than the initial sixty days provided in the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.

Section 523(c)(1) requires a creditor to seek a timely exception from discharge for an intentional injury debt; otherwise, the debt is discharged, subject to the notice exception in subsection (a)(3).

BAILEY VS. JOSEPH GIBBONS (L-0673-09, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-15(c)(1)

So, if a creditor having a claim against the debtor does not file a timely exception to discharge application, the intentional tort liability is still discharged.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking a fraud exception to discharge to obtain a timely determination in an adversary proceeding.

In re Bagbag · filed 2018-11-15(c)

However, under the Bankruptcy Code the alleged exception to discharge could only be established through the timely filing of an adversary proceeding and a determination by the Bankruptcy Court, in such an adversary proceeding, that the debt was not discharged. ... Alcobi never filed such an adversary proceeding and the deadline for the filing of such a proceeding expired on December 16, 2008.

An agreed extension of the deadline to object to discharge can cover an objection to dischargeability under § 523(c) when the parties intended it to do so.

Smith v. Mid-South Maint., Inc. · filed 2019-03-25(c)

The meaning of these two terms is of considerable importance in this case, since it seems clear that, if the deadline for filing objections to dischargeability under 523(c) was not extended, then appellees failed to object in a timely manner to the dischargeability of appellants' debts. ... It thus seems clear to this court that Judge Woodard found, in reading the parties' Agreed Order in light of their actual intent (and his own), that there was no non-compliance with relevant deadlines at all, so as to raise the question of whether Rule 4004 is jurisdictional or not. ... Either way, this court concludes that Judge Woodard's ruling on the timeliness issue is due to be affirmed, and this court will turn to the next point of error.

Section 523(c) requires a bankruptcy court proceeding to determine whether debts under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) are nondischargeable; dismissal of that proceeding leaves the underlying liability claim intact.

In re Johnson · filed 2019-04-12(c)

The dismissal of the adversary proceeding only precludes a determination by the Bankruptcy Court that the underlying debt is nondischargeable, vis-à-vis , whether it will survive the Debtor's discharge under § 1328, should he fulfill all the terms of his confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) from discharge to request a court determination.

Robinson v. Zakarin (In re Zakarin) · filed 2019-05-09(c)

Section 523(c) of the Code provides that a debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4) or (6) of section 523(a) unless the creditor requests that the court determine that such debt be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4) or (6) of section 523(a).

Section 523(c), read with Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), requires complaints objecting to dischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to be filed within 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.

117 Degrees, LLC v. Risi · filed 2019-08-07(c)

Read in combination with Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), Bankruptcy Code § 523(c) requires that any objection to dischargeability under these three subsections (§ 523(a)(2), § 523(a)(4) or § 523(a)(6)) shall be filed no later than sixty (60) days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a).

A creditor seeking the tax fraud exception under § 523(a)(1)(C) need not object during bankruptcy and may establish the exception when the debtor raises discharge as a defense to collection.

United States v. MORALES, JR. · filed 2019-09-12(c)(1)

Therefore, the United States may as it did here, wait until the bankruptcy discharge is raised as a defense to its collection efforts and then challenge the discharge.

Section 523(c)(1) makes dischargeability complaints under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) subject to Rule 4007(c)'s filing deadline; a request to extend that deadline must be filed before it expires.

Edwards v. Wilkerson · filed 2019-09-26(c)(1)

Section 523(c) concerns debts “of a kind specified in” § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6). ... The Court cannot grant a request to extend the filing deadline, because such request was not filed prior to the expiration of the deadline.

An amended §523(a)(2)(A) fraud claim cannot relate back past the filing deadline unless the original complaint gave the debtor fair notice of the facts supporting it.

Brett Dolfi, Sr. and Brian Dolfi v. Dolfi · filed 2019-10-03(a)(2)(A)

The Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rule 15(c)(1)(B) to permit an amendment beyond the deadline to commence an action under §523(a)(2) is misplaced.

A creditor seeking a nondischargeability determination under § 523(a)(3) in bankruptcy court must file an adversary complaint rather than a motion.

Delali Dedo · filed 2020-02-24(a)(3)

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6) requires that a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(3) be sought in an adversary proceeding, not by way of a motion.

Section 523(c)(1) requires a dischargeability determination to be made in an adversary proceeding, rather than at a Chapter 13 plan confirmation hearing.

Chambers · filed 2020-02-26(c)(1)

Determining whether a debt is dischargeable must be resolved in an adverse proceeding initiated under Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6). 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1).

A creditor seeking to except a debt from discharge under § 523(c)(1) must file a complaint within the Rule 4007(c) deadline, which can be extended only on a motion filed before the deadline expires.

Gary v. Palmer · filed 2020-03-25(c)(1)

Moreover, while leave to amend is to be freely given, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and Kontrick imposes no limitation on an amended answer asserting an untimeliness defense, see 540 U.S. at 459, the plain language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(3) precludes any enlargement of the 60-day time period following the initial creditors’ meeting for filing a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), except as specifically provided under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), namely through a motion filed by the party in interest “before the time period has expired.”

Section 523(c) requires complaints seeking to except debts from discharge under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to be filed in bankruptcy court.

Nelson v. Williams · filed 2020-04-21(c)

Section 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), requires complaints to determine the dischargeability of debts under any of § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to be filed in the bankruptcy court.

An order extending time to object to a debtor’s discharge does not also extend the Rule 4007(c) deadline to file a § 523(c) nondischargeability complaint.

Tanner Scott Campbell · filed 2020-04-20(c)(1)

The Order Extending Time to Object to Exemptions and to Discharge plainly did not extend the time under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) to file a complaint governed by 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

Section 523(c)(1) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) from discharge to obtain a court determination; a fraud debt is discharged if the creditor misses the complaint deadline.

Mardi Lynn Topcik · filed 2020-05-22(c)(1)

To obtain an order that a debt is not dischargeable in a debtor’s bankruptcy under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), an adversary proceeding must be filed. ... Mr. Hornback did not timely file a complaint objecting to the dischargeability of the debt and did not seek an extension of time to do so. ... Thus, Mrs. Topcik will receive her chapter 7 discharge, and to the extent that there is a debt owed by Mrs. Topcik to Mr. Hornback as a result of fraud, that debt will be discharged.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking a fraud or willful-injury exception to discharge to request a dischargeability determination.

Richard Stephen Quinlan · filed 2020-06-11(c)

Fraud and willful/reckless injury are relevant to determining whether a claim is non- dischargeable under §§ 523(a)(2) or (6) of the Bankruptcy Code, but Ms. Christine did not commence an adversary proceeding seeking such a determination. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). Accordingly, the matter before the court is limited to determining whether the claim is a DSO, and I need not make any determinations regarding fraud or malicious injury.

A timely stipulation resolving a section 523 dischargeability dispute may be approved without an adversary complaint when the parties agree and no one is prejudiced.

Mella Denise Williams · filed 2020-06-16

The stipulation as to dischargeability had been filed when discharge was entered. No one is prejudiced by the parties' agreeing on dischargeability without filing an adversary proceeding under the circumstances surrounding this filing. Accordingly, the parties' agreement will be approved.

A complaint to determine whether a debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) must meet the Rule 4007(c) deadline unless that deadline is extended.

Mosex Exhibit 1, LLC v. Campbell · filed 2020-08-13(c)

Mosex failed to obtain an extension of the April 22, 2019 deadline under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) for Mosex to file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) to determine that the debt owed it is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). Mosex filed its complaint after the expiration of the April 22, 2019 deadline, and thus its claims of nondischargeability must be dismissed.

A creditor seeking to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6) must file a timely dischargeability complaint unless grounds exist to excuse the late filing.

Halaw v. Wilding · filed 2020-08-17(a)(6)

For the forgoing reasons, the Court finds the Bankruptcy Rules express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 4004(b)’s and Rule 4007(c)'s deadline and the Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving to this Court that their affirmative defenses should overcome an untimely filing.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking an exception from discharge under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to file a complaint by the Rule 4007(c) deadline or timely seek an extension.

In re: Arno Arutyunyan · filed 2021-02-26(c)

To challenge the dischargeability of a debt under §§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), a creditor must affirmatively request an exception from discharge. § 523(c). Rule 4007(c) requires that “a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a).”

Section 523(c) does not cover child support debts, so Rule 4007(c)’s deadline does not apply to a complaint seeking a dischargeability determination.

Joseph Connell · filed 2021-03-02(c)

A complaint seeking a determination of dischargeability of an indebtedness other than under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) may be filed at any time. Because an indebtedness for child support is not a § 523(c) debt the Rule 4007(c) bar date does not apply.

Section 523(c), together with Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), limits the time to object to discharge of a debt.

Greene v. Sampson · filed 2021-03-15(c)

As further set forth in the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff did not file an objection to the Sampsons’s discharge within the time permitted to file such objections, and her time to object to discharge of the debt was long expired pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c). ... While the Court is sensitive to Plaintiff’s dilemma with her neighbors, and under no circumstances does the Court condone the alleged “intimidation tactics” described by Plaintiff (id. at 1), its hands are tied by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c). Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED.

A complaint may proceed under § 523(a)(2) and (4) without naming a discharge exception if its allegations otherwise show possible entitlement to relief.

Knowlton v. Knowlton · filed 2021-07-21(a)(2), (a)(4)

Although the Complaint includes minimal recitations and identifies no specific discharge exception under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), the Court finds that Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 showing he may be entitled to relief from Defendant. He may proceed under §§ 523(a)(2) and (4).

Section 523(a) provides no gap period protection for a creditor seeking to add a dischargeability claim after the objection deadline.

SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart · filed 2022-03-14(a)

As will be discussed in more detail below, no such sixty-day, or any, “gap period” protection exists for claims of non-dischargeability of a debt brought under § 523(a).

Section 523(c)(1) covers actions to determine nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6); the filing deadline for those actions can be equitably tolled when a timely misdocketed complaint is promptly corrected.

Gbaz, Inc. v. Conte · filed 2022-04-25(c)(1)

Section 523(c) encompasses causes of action to determine a debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6). ... Therefore, to the extent that the “Adversary Proceeding Complaint” filed on December 17, 2021, was procedurally deficient, the Court will treat the corrected filing on December 20, 2021, as timely filed under the principles of equitable tolling and Maughan and deny the debtors’ motion to dismiss.

Section 523(c)(1) requires a creditor to bring an adversary complaint to obtain a ruling under a discharge exception that is not self-executing.

Indar Ramsoomair · filed 2022-03-18(c)(1)

Code Section 523(c)(1) requires that a creditor proceed by adversary complaint to obtain a ruling under the non-self-executing exceptions applicable to an individual debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(c)(1) discharges debts described in subsections (a)(2), (4), and (6) unless a creditor asks the bankruptcy court to determine that the debt is nondischargeable.

Louis N. Delloso · filed 2022-03-24(c)(1)

Section 523(c)(1) provides that a debtor shall receive a discharge from debt specified under subsections (a)(2), (4), or (6) (the provisions under which Kapitus contends that the debt it alleges Delloso owes to it is nondischargeable) unless, upon the request of a creditor, the bankruptcy court determines that such a debt is nondischargeable.

A creditor seeking to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6) must file a complaint; a stay motion that neither requests a nondischargeable judgment nor gives notice of that challenge does not suffice.

IN RE: Bethany Eleese Eden · filed 2023-02-28(a)(6)

For a creditor to properly challenge the dischargeability of her/his claims against the debtor under § 523(a)(6), the creditor is to file a complaint for discharge with the bankruptcy court. ... But here, as the Court has already stated, Mundy neither requested a nondischargeable judgment nor did he ever cite to Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... As such, it is too much to ask this Court to say the Bankruptcy Court should have somehow appropriately construed Mundy’s stay motion as, and converted the motion into, a challenge to the discharge of his claims.

A complaint to determine dischargeability under § 523(c) must meet Rule 4007(c)’s deadline, which cannot be extended through equitable tolling.

Louis N. Delloso v. · filed 2023-07-10(c)

Thus, while Rule 9006(b) generally grants the bankruptcy courts power to enlarge time limits imposed under the bankruptcy rules, Rule 9006(b)(3) expressly limits the power to enlarge the time limit for filing a complaint under § 523 “to the extent and under the conditions stated in [Rule 4007(c)].” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3). Taken together with the text of Rule 4007(c), we conclude that this expresses a clear intent to preclude exceptions to the time limit for challenging the dischargeability of a debt, including those based on equitable tolling.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) from discharge to file an adversary complaint, subject to Rule 4007(c)’s deadline.

Hendrickson-Skanes v. McNeece, Jr. · filed 2023-07-10(c)

Creditors seeking to except a debt specified in § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) from a debtor’s discharge must file an adversary complaint seeking a determination from the court that the debt fits into one of those paragraphs. ... Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) fixes the deadline to file a dischargeability complaint raising issues under paragraphs (2), (4) or (6) of § 523(a) in chapter 7 cases.

Under the Bankruptcy Code applicable in 2004, a creditor had to file a dischargeability complaint for a non-support marital debt to survive bankruptcy.

In Re: Alan Couture v. Moore · filed 2023-09-18(c)(1)

Under the Bankruptcy Code as it existed during the 2004 Indiana bankruptcy, Moore was required to file a dischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) in order for the debt to survive the bankruptcy.

A creditor seeking to establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523 must file an adversary complaint within sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.

LAW OFFICES OF ROGER R MUNN JR LLC v. COLLINS · filed 2024-01-24

Because he did not file a complaint within sixty days of January 10, 2022, his non-dischargeability claim based on § 523 is time-barred, as correctly held by the bankruptcy court.

Section 523(c)(1) requires a creditor to request a determination that a debt arising from willful and malicious injury is excepted from discharge; otherwise, the debt is discharged.

Just Funky, LLC v. Boom Trendz, LLC · filed 2024-10-16(c)(1)

Chapter 7 debtors are discharged of their debts unless, on request of a creditor and after notice and a hearing, the court determines the debt is excepted from discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

Section 523(a)(3) claims are outside § 523(c), so Rule 4007(c)’s 60-day filing deadline does not apply.

Yakubova · filed 2026-05-06(a)(3)

Because Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) by its terms applies only to complaints under section 523(c), and because section 523(c) applies only to non-dischargeability claims under subsections 523(a)(2), (a)(4) or (a)(6), it is clear that Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c)’s deadline does not apply to plaintiffs’ claim under section 523(a)(3).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts for actual fraud from discharge; a prior fraud judgment can establish the exception when the same fraud issue was actually litigated and necessary to the judgment.

McCarron v. Andrews (In Re Andrews) · filed 2008-04-08(a)(2)(A)

Based on the foregoing, the district court’s instructions on fraud under California law and the plaintiffs’ claim for fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) here involve the identical issue of fraud. ... Accordingly, the elements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied and the entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is appropriate on their claim for fraud.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for willful and malicious injury when collateral estoppel establishes the required malice.

Taylor v. Jasper (In Re Jasper) · filed 2008-04-15(a)(6)

In sum, as the bankruptcy court and the BAP correctly found, Jasper had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the maliciousness issue in the Texas civil case, both at the trial court and appellate court levels, and he failed to put forth any defense. Consequently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars him from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that was presented at the trial in the civil case. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court and the BAP correctly concluded that the Texas criminal conviction for aggravated assault embodies a malice finding that collaterally estops Jasper from relitigating the issue in his bankruptcy case.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a Michigan fraud judgment to establish actual fraud for nondischargeability because the elements are almost identical.

Transnation Title Insurance Ex Rel. Mulloy v. Livingston (In Re Livingston) · filed 2008-03-19(a)(2)(A)

As such, the Court finds that a state court judgment of fraud is sufficient as a determination of actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), and therefore rejects this part of Appellants’ appeal.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) except a debt from discharge when a preclusive judgment establishes fraud or breach of fiduciary duty underlying that debt.

Nissan v. Weiss (In Re Weiss) · filed 2000-10-31(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

The confession of judgment on this record represents a confession as to each claim in the complaint, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable and satisfied. The decision of the bankruptcy court must be affirmed and the debtor is precluded from relitigating the fraud or breach of fiduciary duty raised in the Texas state court. Thus, the debt owed to the Appellees as a result of the Texas Judgment, and any accrued interest, is not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) allows state court findings of intentional and malicious conduct to preclude relitigation of whether a debtor’s injury was willful and malicious.

Skinner v. Lesh (In Re Lesh) · filed 2000-09-01(a)(6)

In summary, the Court concludes that the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the Judgment Entry entered by the Allen County Court of Common Pleas collaterally estop the Defendant from contesting the dischargeability of his debt to the Plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a debt from discharge when a state court jury’s specific finding of actual fraud is conclusive under collateral estoppel.

In Re Wallace W. Mading, Debtor. Wallace W. Mading v. Ronald D. Shepherd Ramona Shepherd Ralph L. Shepherd Virginia v. Shepherd Gene Huntley · filed 1994-12-27(a)(2)(A)

Here the jury made a very specific finding of actual fraud by MADING and his co-defendants. The judgment would therefore be conclusive on that specific finding of the jury and supports the damages found by the jury to be the result of the fraud.

A state default judgment for conversion does not establish the willful and malicious injury exception in § 523(a)(6) when that issue was not actually litigated.

Jones v. Indiana Finance Co. · filed 1994-09-23(a)(6)

Even were we to follow the cases that read the “actually litigated” requirement less strictly ... and allow the default judgment against Debtors in state court to collaterally estop any further litigation as to the conversion issue, we find that the issue of whether the conversion was “willful and malicious,” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) was not actually litigated in state court.

A final arbitration award can preclude relitigation of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) when its findings establish that issue.

Pollock v. Marx (In Re Marx) · filed 1994-08-23(a)(6)

According to Mr. McCall’s unambiguous findings, the arbitration award was for “willful and malicious injury” to Ms. Pollock and her day-care business within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) permits a bankruptcy court to rely on findings from a state court fraud judgment when determining the nondischargeability and amount of a debt.

Northwestern National Insurance v. Barnhart (In Re Barnhart) · filed 1990-03-22(a)(2)(A)

I conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in basing its determination as to the nondischargeability of the Barnharts’ debt on findings made in the state court proceedings. ... Moreover, in computing damages the bankruptcy court is entitled to look to the factual findings underlying a state court judgment given preclusive effect on the issue of liability, as this furthers the purposes of the doctrine to protect parties and the courts from relitigating the same issues and to give full faith and credit to state court judgments.

Section 523(a)(2) dischargeability is not conclusively established by a settlement and consent order that lack factual findings sufficient for collateral estoppel.

Del Rey v. Pearson (In Re Pearson) · filed 1990-03-28(a)(2)

The Court grants Defendant’s alternative motion for summary judgment and finds that any nondischarge-ability provisions contained in the note, the Settlement Agreement and stipulated order are not entitled to collateral estoppel effect and are not finally determinative of the issue of dischargeability of Defendant’s debt.

Section 523(a)(6) permits litigation of whether an injury was willful and malicious when a prior negligence verdict did not decide that issue.

Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In Re Geiger) · filed 1990-04-17(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debtor is not discharged from any debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity. A review of the jury instructions and the special verdict form reveals that the issues of willfulness and maliciousness were not actually litigated or necessary to the jury determination. Therefore, the Court finds that the precise issue of whether the Plaintiffs’ injuries arose from the willful and malicious conduct of the Debtor was not actually litigated in the Hawaii court. Accordingly, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist on this issue and, holds that summary judgment in favor of Debtor-Defendant is not appropriate.

Section 523 permits a bankruptcy court deciding whether a fraud debt is dischargeable to give collateral estoppel effect to state court findings if the issues were properly decided under the appropriate standards.

Petruzzi v. DeLuca (In Re DeLuca) · filed 1990-02-23(a)(2)(A)

However, in making its independent determination the bankruptcy court may exercise its discretion by giving collateral estoppel effect to the findings of another court if it decides that the issues before the court were properly decided in the state court action by the appropriate standards.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not permit a general fraud verdict to establish nondischargeability when the jury may have relied only on statements about the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.

Bender v. Tobman (In Re Tobman) · filed 1989-11-03(a)(2)(A)

Thus, it cannot be said that the jury “actually decided” that Tobman had committed fraud cognizable under § 523(a)(2)(A). Under these circumstances, the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not properly be invoked.

A prior fraud judgment does not preclude a § 523(a)(4) dischargeability trial when the court cannot determine that the earlier judgment used the required standard of proof.

McKnight v. Morgan (In re Morgan) · filed 1989-10-04(a)(4)

This matter requires the Court to address the preclusive effect of an earlier civil non-jury determination of fraud on a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... The Court cannot conclude that the state court used the identical standard to render judgment against Morgan as the bankruptcy court would use to determine that a debt should be excepted from discharge based on fraud.

In a Section 523(a)(2)(A) dischargeability proceeding, a bankruptcy court may give preclusive effect to facts established in a state court consent judgment.

In Re Howard I. Halpern, Debtor. Howard I. Halpern v. First Georgia Bank · filed 1987-02-20(a)(2)(A)

The bankruptcy court in the instant case therefore correctly concluded that collateral estoppel may be applied to foreclose relitigation of certain facts in a discharge-ability proceeding.

In a § 523(c) dischargeability proceeding, a prior state court judgment may preclude relitigation of issues actually and necessarily decided under the requisite elements and standard of proof.

Estate of Schubert v. Rudd (In Re Rudd) · filed 1987-01-08(c)

The Court will consider those matters as evidence in the bankruptcy proceeding, carefully review the same and decide what issues, if any, should be given collateral estoppel or issue preclusion effect based on whether the state court proceeding applied the requisite standard of proof and elements of the cause and the relevant issue was actually and necessarily litigated, and then hold a trial as to those remaining issues that must be actually and necessarily litigated in the dischargeability proceeding.

A prior state court judgment establishes nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) or (a)(6) only if the relevant fraud or willful and malicious injury issue was actually litigated and necessary to the judgment.

Benson v. Haskin (In Re Haskin) · filed 1986-12-29(a)(2), (a)(6)

For plaintiff here to be entitled to judgment, he must show that the elements of a fraud claim, or a willful and malicious injury claim, were actually litigated and, if actually litigated, were necessary to the decision in the state court. On this record, it is clear that neither such claim was actually litigated.

A prior Ohio fraud judgment can establish fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) because Ohio’s fraud standard is at least as demanding.

Alsan Corp. v. DiPierro (In Re DiPierro) · filed 1987-01-02(a)(2)(A)

It is clear that the standard for finding fraud in Ohio is at least as high, if not higher than that under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a) permits the bankruptcy court to determine dischargeability without giving collateral estoppel effect to the prior administrative decision in this case.

Goldsmith v. Harck (In Re Harck) · filed 1987-01-16(a)

Accordingly, collateral estoppel should not be applied in a dischargeability proceeding similar to that presented in this case under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).

A separate judgment for investigation costs based on breach of contract remains dischargeable despite the debtor’s earlier embezzlement.

United States Trust Co. v. Martonak (In Re Martonak) · filed 1986-11-25(a)(4), (a)(6)

The state court did not find that the damages arose out of the Debtor’s fraudulent acts. ... The judgment won by USTC in state court for compensatory damages arising out of the Debt- or’s breach of his employment contract is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; collateral estoppel can establish that requirement when a prior judgment necessarily decided the issue under an almost identical standard.

Hiller v. Fahey (In re Fahey) · filed 1986-09-11(a)(6)

The determination that this injury was a “willful and malicious” one was clearly litigated in the prior proceeding, and a jury, after a three day trial, determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment. Said judgment was based on jury instructions which contain a standard which is almost identical to the applicable standard in bankruptcy pursuant to Section 523(a)(6). Collateral estoppel bars relit-igation of this issue by this Court.

Section 523(a)(4) requires the bankruptcy court to decide dischargeability using competent, relevant evidence; a hypothetical future judgment cannot establish nondischargeability.

Harris v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (In Re Harris) · filed 1980-10-25(a)(4)

Harris is entitled to have the Bankruptcy Court reach a decision on the dischargeability of the debt by considering all competent and relevant evidence. An existing judgment may be such relevant evidence; but a hypothetical judgment is not.

An assault and battery judgment does not by itself establish a willful and malicious injury when the verdict did not necessarily decide those elements.

Fowler v. Cooney (In Re Cooney) · filed 1980-12-22(a)(6)

We therefore agree with the debtor that a willful and malicious injury is sufficient, but not necessary, to produce an assault and battery judgment.

In a § 523 dischargeability proceeding, collateral estoppel applies only when the prior record shows that the facts at issue were actually litigated and necessary to the judgment.

King v. Whitmore (In Re Whitmore) · filed 1980-12-23(a)(4)

The rule of this case appears to be that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does apply in suits to determine dischargeability, but the application is limited to those situations where it is clear from the record that the particular facts in question were actually liquidated and were necessary to the decision of the court which rendered the judgment. ... Because there is no record of the pri- or state court proceeding from which the Court may discern the basis for the judgment entered against Debtor, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply as a bar to the litigation in this Court of the issues presented by Plaintiff’s complaint to determine dischargeability.

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive authority to decide covered dischargeability questions, but factual issues actually and necessarily decided in state court may be subject to collateral estoppel.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,272 Gail Spilman v. Harley · filed 1981-08-07(c)

Congress intended to take the determinations governed by 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) away from state courts and grant exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. ... This Court holds that where all the requirements of collateral es-toppel are met, collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of factual issues.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury under federal standards; a prior state judgment precludes relitigation only if it decided the same issue under identical standards.

MA&M Inc. v. Supple (In Re Supple) · filed 1981-10-21(a)(6)

Without specific findings of fact from the state court, this court cannot| conclude that the state court judgment was predicated upon a finding of willful and malicious injury employing standards of review identical to § 523(a)(6). ... It would be error, therefore, to give collateral estoppel effect to the state court judgment on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the second count, and the motion is hereby denied.

In a § 523 dischargeability action, a party opposing the effect of a prior judgment must have an opportunity to rebut its evidence unless both parties choose to rely on that judgment.

Archibald v. Busby (In Re Busby) · filed 1981-12-16

Under the 9th Circuit decisions, which bind this court, the Bankruptcy Court is more than “permitted” to hear additional evidence, it is required to grant the party opposing the collateral estoppel effect of the earlier judgment an opportunity to rebut any evidence shown by that earlier judgment, at least in those situations where both parties have not chosen to rest upon the determination of the earlier court. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the matter will be set for trial on the merits.

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction to decide dischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6); a prior judgment did not bar that determination here.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Huff (In Re Huff) · filed 1982-01-27(c)

Subsection 523(c) does not effect a change from prior law and grants to the Bankruptcy Courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of debts listed in subsections 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that res judicata is inapplicable to this proceeding.

Section 523 permits a bankruptcy court to consider evidence outside a prior state court judgment and record when deciding whether a debt is nondischargeable.

Phase I Inc. v. Black (In Re Black) · filed 1982-03-18

Therefore, this Court finds that it is not limited to the state court judgment and record relating to the plaintiff’s claim in determining dischargeability of said claim. Consequently, this Court will consider evidence extrinsic to the state court judgment and record in order to determine discharge-ability of the plaintiff’s claim.

Under § 523(a)(2), a bankruptcy court may grant summary judgment based on fraud findings from an earlier case after reviewing that case’s record and finding that the proven elements satisfy the discharge exception.

Wiese v. Sloan (In Re Sloan) · filed 1982-04-02(a)(2)

Applying the approach set forth in Herman and Greenblatt, this Court is obligated to review the record of N. Y. Stock Exchange. ... In conclusion, the Court finds that the elements of fraud which were proven in N. Y. Stock Exchange are sufficient to meet the test of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Section 523(a)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to consider the fraud underlying a debt even when the debt has become a state court judgment based on another transaction.

Marx v. Laughlin (In re Marx) · filed 1982-06-24(a)(2)

The bankruptcy court was not barred from noting that the debt was fraudulently induced, notwithstanding the fact that the debt had taken the form of a judgment which is not based on the original fraud.

A prior judgment precludes relitigation of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) only if it shows that the fraud issue was decided under sufficiently identical standards.

Revelle Motors, Inc. v. Spector (In Re Spector) · filed 1982-07-20(a)(2)(A)

Having observed the Creditors’ interposed state court pleadings, motion papers, and judgment and applying the requisite test for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Court concludes that (1) the amount of the debt owing to the Creditors for dishonored checks is $16,249.78, and (2) although the issue of fraudulent utterance of such checks was necessarily determined in the state court, the judgment does not show it was determined under standards sufficiently “identical” to those required by § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the fraudulent nature of the Debtors’ dishonored check debts is not an issue precluded from relitigation but rather must be tried in this Bankruptcy Court.

Section 523(b) provides limited exceptions to the finality of prior nondischargeability judgments.

Matter of Hochdorf · filed 1982-12-03(b)

The underlying non-dischargeable debt here, unlike in Bonder, is not one available as an exception to the finality of non-discharge-ability judgments as set forth in the present Bankruptcy Code § 523(b).

A state court consent judgment does not bar a later claim that the debt is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6).

Owen v. Haney · filed 1982-11-04(a)(6)

The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Felsen, supra, is controlling in the present case and thus the consent entry in state court in the present proceeding is no bar to Defendants’ counterclaim that the debt in question is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires a creditor relying on a prior judgment to establish the elements of fraud; a default judgment without supporting findings is insufficient.

Zeunert v. Brink (In Re Brink) · filed 1983-02-04(a)(2)(A)

Whether prior proceedings are sufficient to establish the fraud required by § 523(a)(2)(A) is entirely dependent on the contents of the individual record. ... This record is too sparse to establish the required elements. The Illinois court documents establish no basis for the judgment other than defendant’s default and provide no findings of fact to evaluate the elements of fraud required to bar discharge.

A creditor relying on state-court findings to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) must show that the state court decided the same factual issues under identical standards.

Friedman v. Huriash (In Re Huriash) · filed 1982-12-28(a)(2)(A)

Even if collateral estoppel might apply to prove individual factual issues in a dischargeability case, plaintiff must demonstrate to the bankruptcy court that the same factual issues were decided in the state court, using standards identical to those under 11 U.S.C. § 523.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when findings from a prior proceeding establish every element of the federal claim and collateral estoppel applies.

Jaffa v. Shacket (In Re Shacket) · filed 1983-01-28(a)(2)(A)

As the findings of fact made in the state proceedings satisfy all of the elements of a § 523(a)(2)(A) cause of action, this Court finds that collateral estoppel applies herein; that there is not a genuine issue of material fact to be litigated; and, that the debt is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

A consent judgment can establish fraud for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A) when the parties intended to settle the fraud issues and those issues satisfy the section’s fraud elements.

Shelton v. Wells (In Re Shelton) · filed 1983-03-08(a)(2)(A)

Moreover, the Missouri elements are identical to the elements necessary to make a nondischargeability fraud ease under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... Under these circumstances, Debtors are to be deemed to have intended to settle the fraud issues raised by the Circuit Court petition. ... Accordingly, upon Count I of the Amended Counterclaim, judgment is being entered, this date, for the Defendants, that the judgment debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) permits collateral estoppel in a dischargeability proceeding when a prior judgment actually and necessarily decided the same issue of willful and malicious injury.

Torrez v. Rizo (In Re Rizo) · filed 1983-11-09(a)(6)

This Court agrees that collateral es-toppel applies to bankruptcy dischargeability determinations where the issue decided in the prior proceeding is identical to the issue to be decided under § 523, the issue in the prior action was actually litigated, and the determination of the issue in the prior action was necessary and essential to the prior judgment.

Section 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6) require proof of intentional wrongdoing; a prior judgment that does not establish the debtor’s intent cannot support summary judgment on nondischargeability.

Moreno v. Schwartz (In Re Schwartz) · filed 1984-01-13(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6)

The failure of the state court to make findings of the requisite scienter necessary to support a determination of nondis-chargeability under either § 523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(4) or 523(a)(6) precludes the granting of creditor’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not make a state judgment’s conclusory false-pretense finding conclusive when the judgment lacks facts sufficient to meet the federal dischargeability standard.

In the Matter of Ronald Shuler A/K/A Ronnie Shuler F/d/b/a Delta Motor Company, Bankrupt. Harold v. Simpson and Company · filed 1984-01-20(a)(2)(A)

Unlike the consent judgment in Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, supra, see 615 F.2d at 378, the judgment in the present case did not contain detailed facts sufficient as findings to meet the federal test of nondis-chargeability; it contained merely a conclu-sory statement that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on a false-pretense cause of action.

Section 523(a)(6) dischargeability issues may be barred by collateral estoppel when a jury previously decided the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct under substantially equivalent instructions.

Thompson v. Thompson (In Re Thompson) · filed 1984-02-22(a)(6)

Having previously found that the jury in the state court action was not silent on the issue of debtor’s willful or malicious conduct but expressly and consciously made no award, such determination meets those tests for application of the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to effectively preclude a redetermination by this Court of those issues previously resolved.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a separate determination of dischargeability; a prior damages verdict using similar willful-and-malicious language does not by itself warrant summary judgment.

Richardson v. Combs (In Re Combs) · filed 1984-06-18(a)(6)

The language of § 523(a)(6) and the wording of the jury verdict are essentially similar and, hence, it would appear that there is no issue which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. However, the courts have held that the rendition of a judgment upon the issue of liability is quite different from the issue raised in this court, which is one of dischargeability. ... Viewing the allegations of the complaint and documentation in support of the motion for summary judgment against the backdrop of the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions necessarily precludes the granting of summary judgment and, accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is ORDERED denied and this case set for further pre-trial conference before this court at Abingdon on July 20, 1984, at 10:30 a.m., in Chambers.

Section 523(a)(2) does not make a debt nondischargeable by collateral estoppel when an agreed state court judgment contains no findings that the debt arose from fraud or false pretenses.

Allman v. Allman · filed 1984-07-09(a)(2)

Like the bankruptcy court, we can find nothing in the state court judgments against the debtors to suggest that the court necessarily determined that the creditor's funds had been obtained by false pretenses. Without even a conclusory statement as to the debtors' false-pretense conduct, which would itself be insufficient if unsupported by actually-litigated subsidiary facts in the record, see Shuler, supra, 722 F.2d at 1257-58, the bankruptcy court did not err in refusing collateral estoppel effect to the agreed upon state court judgments.

Section 523(a)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to refuse collateral estoppel effect to a prior judgment that lacks findings establishing false pretenses.

Tober Saifer Shoe Co. v. Allman · filed 1984-07-09(a)(2)

Therefore, in eases where the state court judgment “[does] not contain detailed facts sufficient as findings to meet the federal test of nondischargeability”, leaving the bankruptcy court “unable to discern from the record the subsidiary facts upon which the false-pretense allegation was made,” the bankruptcy court may properly refuse to accord collateral estoppel effect to the state court judgment.

Section 523 requires a creditor relying on a prior state judgment to show subsidiary facts sufficient to establish nondischargeability.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,937 in the Matter of James Larry Poston, Bankrupt. Patino's, Inc. v. Poston · filed 1984-07-09(a)(2), (a)(4)

The recitals and conclusions contained in the state court default judgment, therefore, must be supported by “detailed facts sufficient as findings to meet the federal test of nondischargeability” and allow the bankruptcy court “to discern from the record the subsidiary facts upon which the false pretense allegation was made.”

A consent judgment does not preclude litigation of whether a debt arose from willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Aslakson v. Anderson (In Re Anderson) · filed 1984-11-20(a)(6)

A default judgment is not an adjudication on the merits for collateral estoppel purposes because it is not the result of actual litigation. ... The same reasoning is applicable to a consent judgment.

In a § 523(a)(6) proceeding, a state court judgment fixes the validity and amount of the claim, while the bankruptcy court decides dischargeability.

Stazio v. Hogan (In Re Hogan) · filed 1985-02-20(a)(6)

Furthermore, the very reason that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel control on questions of discharge-ability suggests that those doctrines should apply to liability. The state court is, or at least may be, hearing quite a different legal issue when it makes a determination under any state fraud standard than is the bankruptcy court hearing a proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523. But the bankruptcy court would be applying the controlling state law in determining the extent of the debtor’s liability on a claim. The plaintiffs’ claim in this case has been determined by the state court applying state law. It follows that the question of liability and the amount of the plaintiffs’ claim in this bankruptcy case is controlled by the state court’s ruling.

Section 523 permits a state default judgment to preclude relitigation of issues in a dischargeability proceeding to the extent the rendering state would give it that effect.

Harris v. Byard (In Re Byard) · filed 1985-03-15

In the opinion of this court, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or Congressional statements of intent in the enactment of § 523 indicating that some kinds of state court judgments — those that are fully and actually litigated by the state court — can have issue preclusive effect in § 523 litigation but other kinds of state court judgments cannot — for example, a default judgment like the one here at issue.

A § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability complaint is not barred by the state limitation period for the underlying tort when the debt was timely established, or by res judicata when dischargeability was not decided in the earlier action.

Fabick Tractor Co. v. Soules (In re Soules) · filed 1985-06-04(a)(6)

In conclusion, we find that Fabick’s Section 523(a)(6) nondischargeability complaint is not barred by either the Kentucky statute of limitation on actions for conversion or by the doctrine of res judicata.

A prior fraud judgment supports collateral estoppel under Section 523(a)(2)(A) only if the relevant issue was actually litigated.

Luton v. Sostarich (In Re Sostarich) · filed 1985-07-22(a)(2)(A)

Thus, before applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the bankruptcy court must determine if the issue was actually litigated in the state court. The debtor has raised a question as to whether the issue of fraud by the defendant that meets the standards set forth in Section 523(a)(2)(A) was actually litigated. ... Therefore, we find that the plaintiff has failed to sustain her burden of proving that the requirements of estoppel have been met.

Section 523 permits a state default judgment to have issue preclusive effect in a dischargeability proceeding when the rendering state's law gives it that effect.

Bend v. Eadie (In Re Eadie) · filed 1985-08-06

This Court finds the analysis of In re Byard quite persuasive and adopts it. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether the Michigan courts would preclude relitigation of the issues raised in this case as a result of the earlier judgment.

A state court fraud judgment can establish an exception to discharge when the same fraud issues were actually and necessarily decided.

Cash v. Armstrong (In Re Armstrong) · filed 1985-10-22(a)(2)(A)

However, in all except the Ninth Circuit, collateral estoppel may be applied if the identical issues required to decide dischargeability were actually and necessarily litigated in reaching the prior judgment. ... Balancing the applicable principles of law in the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the Cashes’ state court judgment is entitled to preclusive effect in determining the exception sought to the Armstrongs’ discharge.

A fully litigated state court finding of willful and malicious injury can establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) even if the jury awards no punitive damages.

Bryant v. Bishop (In Re Bryant) · filed 1985-12-23(a)(6)

We hold, then, that an award of punitive damages is not necessary to a state court verdict of willful and malicious intent for us to accept the verdict as controlling on that point.

A state court contract judgment does not bar the bankruptcy court from deciding whether the debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4).

Brown v. Sachs (In Re Brown) · filed 1986-01-24(a)(4)

Contrary to Debtor’s contention, the claim for exception to discharge is not barred by res judicata.

A state court’s determination that a debt is nondischargeable support under § 523(a)(5) binds the bankruptcy court when the requirements for collateral estoppel are met.

Grimshaw v. Grimshaw (In Re Grimshaw) · filed 1986-01-22(a)(5)

Having found that all four elements of the preclusion doctrine for collateral estop-pel have been met, the Court finds that the prior state court determination that the obligations were in the nature of maintenance and support and therefore nondis-chargeable should be binding in this adversary proceeding.

Section 523(c) requires a bankruptcy court considering a state judgment in a dischargeability proceeding to examine the state court’s standard of proof and the proof presented and recited in the judgment.

Shafer v. Wintrow (In Re Wintrow) · filed 1986-02-12(c)

A bankruptcy court in a discharge-ability proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) must examine both the standard of proof required for the state court judgment and the proof actually presented and recited in the state court judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a Georgia default judgment for defamation does not necessarily establish one.

Wright v. McIntyre (In Re Wright) · filed 1986-02-20(a)(6)

This comparison between defamation actions under Georgia law and nondischarge-ability actions under § 523(a)(6) shows that the default judgment against Wright in the Superior Court was not necessarily based on a finding that there was a willful and malicious injury by Wright sufficient to support a finding of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523 requires a creditor to prove a ground for nondischargeability; an arbitration award does not establish that ground through collateral estoppel when the issues were not actually litigated.

Sixteen Twenty Eight Bellevue Ltd. Partnership v. Barigian (In Re Barigian) · filed 1987-04-14

It is the conclusion of the Court that the issues decided by the arbitrator were not “actually litigated” for purposes of the application of the doctrine of collateral es-toppel. ... The Court having concluded that the Arbitration Award is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect, the plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proof on their “Complaint for Non-dischargéability of Debt”. The debts are therefore dischargeable.

Section 523 fraud allegations can be barred by collateral estoppel when the same issues were fully litigated and necessarily decided in a prior court martial proceeding against that debtor.

United States v. Daves (In re Daves) · filed 1987-04-30

The fraud issues raised in this dis-chargeability suit under § 523 are identical to the fraud and larceny allegations litigated in the court martial proceeding. ... Accordingly, the United States of America is barred from relitigating the fraud allegations brought against Mr. Daves in this dischargeability suit. However, Mrs. Daves was not a party to the court martial proceeding; therefore, the fraud allegations against her have not been fully and fairly litigated.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a bankruptcy court to rely on detailed state court findings that establish every element of willful and malicious injury, provided it independently determines dischargeability.

Tilbury v. Walden (In Re Tilbury) · filed 1987-05-11(a)(6)

We hold that the documents before the bankruptcy court in the present case did permit it to form an independent judgment regarding dischargeability. The factual issues here were tried to the state court over a 10-day period. The state court entered unusually detailed findings of fact, as noted by the bankruptcy court below. These findings cover all of the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and the bankruptcy court so found.

A state court consent judgment dismissing fraud claims with prejudice does not preclude a creditor from pursuing a fraud nondischargeability claim under § 523(a)(2).

Day v. Manuel (In Re Manuel) · filed 1987-07-22(a)(2)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the parties’ prior state court consent judgment dismissing the fraud claim with prejudice does not preclude relitigation of Day’s claim in the present proceeding.

A guilty plea to fraud can establish that a debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), while leaving the amount of the debt open to dispute.

CPI Oil & Refining, Inc. v. Dennis (In Re Dennis) · filed 1987-07-06(a)(2)(A)

Dennis’ plea of guilty in the criminal case before Judge Allgood precludes his contesting here that he was indebted to CPI in some amount and that Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts that debt from discharge. ... The plea of guilty in the interstate wire fraud case does not preclude Dennis from questioning the amount of his debt to CPI because the amount was not in issue in that criminal case.

Section 523(a) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor obtains a judgment of nondischargeability.

Watson v. City National Bank (In Re Watson) · filed 1987-09-09(a)

A creditor bringing a successful action under Section 523(a), such as CNB, thereby precludes a discharge of the debt owed by the individual debtor to the respective creditor. Therefore, as to a creditor holding a judgment of non-dischargeability, the general discharge provided to the debtor under Section 727(a) is ineffective.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a prior battery verdict can establish that injury when the issue was actually litigated under an equivalent standard.

Molldrem v. Wagner (In Re Wagner) · filed 1987-10-28(a)(6)

The verdict, based on jury instructions which are essentially identical to the standards required in section 523(a)(6), found that a battery had been committed. There is no doubt that Wagner’s actions on February 12, 1983, constituted a willful and malicious injury to Conrad. Thus, Wagner is barred from relit-igating that issue in this forum.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires actual fraud to except a debt from discharge; a default judgment does not establish fraud by collateral estoppel when the issue was not actually litigated.

Epic Realty Services, Inc. v. Turner (In re Turner) · filed 1987-11-02(a)(2)(A)

The factual issue before me under § 523(a)(2)(A), whether the debtor obtained money from the plaintiff by “actual fraud”, was the issue presented by Count II in plaintiff’s State court action. ... I find, therefore, that defendant is not collaterally estopped to litigate here the charge against him of actual fraud and I find that there was no fraud in the debtor’s defaults upon his contracts.

Section 523(a)(5) makes support obligations nondischargeable, and a fully litigated state court determination applying the same standards can bind the bankruptcy court.

Rickman v. Rickman (In Re Rickman) · filed 1987-11-05(a)(5)

This Court is not avoiding its responsibility under sec. 523(a)(5); however, there simply is no requirement to relitigate the decision of the Chancellor when he followed the Calhoun requirements, and under those standards, concluded that the support was alimony and was not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt for embezzlement nondischargeable, and collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of facts established in a prior state-court judgment.

In Re William Wallace, Debtor. Mark Klemens v. Wallace · filed 1988-02-29(a)(4)

Consequently, the bankruptcy court was correct in according collateral estoppel effect to the state-court finding and judgment of embezzlement in determining that Wallace’s debt to Klemens was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4).

A criminal insanity verdict does not bar a § 523(a)(6) claim unless it necessarily resolved whether the injury was willful and malicious.

Sciarrone v. Brownlee (In Re Brownlee) · filed 1988-03-15(a)(6)

Collateral estoppel cannot apply here to bar the plaintiff's claim for at least two reasons. First, the defendant has not shown that the issues of willfulness and maliciousness in the § 523(a)(6) case at bar were identical to or directly decided in the criminal case. In order to find the requisite identity of issues, the Court would have to find that the jury, in finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, necessarily found that the defendant’s conduct was not willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof that the debtor knew a representation was false and intended to deceive; a prior fraud judgment does not establish those elements unless its findings resolve them.

Howkins v. Butler (In Re Butler) · filed 1988-05-25(a)(2)(A)

In deciding the case, Judge Salus did not feel compelled to resolve whether the Sellers “knew” or whether they merely “should have known” or “had reason to know” of the defects in the premises. This is, however, the very issue that we must decide to determine whether the debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The possibility that the Sellers did know of the defects and nevertheless misrepresented them with the express purpose of deceiving the Plaintiffs cannot be ruled out on the basis of the Opinion, and hence of the record as it stands in this proceeding. We therefore conclude that we cannot decide this proceeding in favor of the Debtor or the Plaintiffs on the ground of collateral estoppel based on this Opinion.

Section 523 permits a state court judgment to establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel only when the facts necessarily decided meet the federal standards for nondischargeability.

Atchley v. Stover (In Re Stover) · filed 1988-07-18

In order for the state court litigation to have collateral estoppel effect in a bankruptcy court, it must be clear that the factual determinations made by the trier of fact parallel the facts necessary to meet the federal standard of nondischargeability.

A state-court finding that the debtor did not intentionally cause harm does not preclude a § 523(a)(6) claim when the record does not establish that the jury decided the same intent issue.

Arndt v. Holzinger (In Re Holzinger) · filed 1988-08-18(a)(6)

Since we do not know the basis for the jury’s conclusion that debtor did not intentionally cause harm to plaintiff, we can not determine whether the issue which debtor seeks to preclude plaintiff from litigating in this § 523(a)(6) proceeding is identical to the issue actually litigated in the state court action.

Claim preclusion does not bar litigation of dischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) after a prior judgment establishes the debt.

National Acceptance Co. of America v. Bathalter (In re Bathalter) · filed 1988-08-30(a)(2), (4), (6)

Therefore, the doctrine of res judi-cata, or claim preclusion, does not prevent NAC from litigating the issue of whether conduct on the part of the Defendant would render his indebtedness to NAC non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) and/or (6).

Section 523 permits a reinstated claim to be declared nondischargeable if the original debt qualifies for an exception to discharge.

County of Sacramento v. Hackney (In Re Hackney) · filed 1988-10-18

The court concludes that the avoidance of a transfer under the bankruptcy avoiding powers cited in 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) reinstates the transferee’s nondischargeable claim against the debtor. Thus, if the transferee can satisfy the requirements of the Code and Rules for having its original debt declared nondischargeable, it may do so equally with respect to its reinstated claim.

Section 523(a)(4) and (6) allow a consented state court default judgment to preclude relitigation of dischargeability issues when the debtor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Pacific Energy & Minerals, Ltd. v. Austin (In Re Austin) · filed 1988-11-23(a)(4), (a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court is collaterally estopped from relit-igating those issues. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on its claims under Sections 523(a)(4) and (6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a state court fraud judgment from discharge when the prior fraud finding warrants collateral estoppel.

Integrated Computer Solutions, Inc. v. Daniels (In Re Daniels) · filed 1988-12-13(a)(2)(A)

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that the state court final judgement is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment necessarily establishes that the debtor intentionally injured another person without justification.

Oswald v. Gonsor (In Re Gonsor) · filed 1988-12-14(a)(6)

In short, Gonsor could not have committed the assault and battery without inflicting a “willful and malicious” injury as defined in Ertz. The willful and malicious quality of Gonsor’s acts was actually and necessarily adjudicated in a state forum which provided Gonsor with a full and fair opportunity for hearing. He may not now require this Court to look behind the state court judgment and relitigate the nature of his acts.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when the prior trial record establishes the elements of actual fraud.

Bender v. Tobman (In Re Tobman) · filed 1989-02-14(a)(2)(A)

This Court holds that based upon its review of the entire District Court record, there is ample evidence to support a determination of nondischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when issues established in a criminal case show that the debtor deliberately caused injury without just cause or excuse.

Nelson v. Seaton (In Re Seaton) · filed 1989-02-23(a)(6)

In conclusion, the Court has found that the matters litigated in debtor’s criminal case give this Court sufficient basis to hold that plaintiff’s claim is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) using the principle of collateral estoppel.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) allows a bankruptcy court to determine that a debt is nondischargeable from state court findings about the debtors’ knowledge, conduct, and intent when collateral estoppel applies.

Cowlitz Candy & Tobacco v. Hargett (In re Hargett) · filed 1989-03-10(a)(2)(A)

This court finds that the instant case presents an appropriate occasion for applying collateral estoppel; the facts set forth in the memorandum opinion are sufficiently stated for this court to make an individual review of them, and from this review to form an independent judgment regarding dischargeability. The state court’s memorandum opinion addresses the debtors knowledge, their conduct, and their intent during the transaction in question. This court finds that the findings on these matters are sufficient to establish the facts necessary for an exception to discharge under 523(a)(2)(A), and this court is satisfied that the judgment in the state court should be found to be nondischargeable.

Section 523(a) allows a creditor to pursue a nondischargeability claim despite an earlier judgment describing the debt as contractual; claim preclusion does not bar inquiry into the debt’s true nature.

Laborers' Fringe Benefit Funds v. Kaltz (In Re Kaltz) · filed 1989-05-30(a)

Applying claim preclusion rules in discharge-ability proceedings brought under section 523(a) would contravene ah underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a § 523(a) proceeding, a creditor seeking summary judgment based on collateral estoppel must prove that its requirements are met.

Industrial Insurance Services, Inc. v. Zick (In Re Zick) · filed 1989-05-30(a)

A petitioner seeking summary judgment in a section 523(a) proceeding on the basis of a collateral estoppel argument has the additional burden of proving that the requirements of estoppel have been met. ... The materials submitted for the court’s consideration do not establish that the parties mutually intended to be collaterally bound as to the amount of David Zick’s contractual or tort liability. Therefore, the court declines to accord collateral estoppel effect to the August 1988 judgment.

A state court judgment without findings identifying the issues decided or the standards applied cannot establish nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(4) through collateral estoppel.

Herko v. Alba (In re Alba) · filed 1989-09-14(a)(4)

However, the state court Final Judgment entered into evidence in this case contains no findings of fact on which this Court could make a determination of the factual issues decided in the state court, and whether the state court used standards identical to those required under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523. ... In conclusion, this Court finds that said Final Judgment of the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, is insufficient to sustain a finding by this Court that the debt is non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(4).

A prior state court judgment does not bar the bankruptcy court from considering extrinsic evidence to determine dischargeability under § 523(a)(2).

Armstrong v. Glendenning (In re Glendenning) · filed 1989-10-13(a)(2)

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby found that (1) genuine issues of material fact remain; (2) res judicata is not applicable and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to allow the Bankruptcy Court to determine dischargeability under § 523 pertaining to a debt previously reduced to judgment in a state court.

Section 523 dischargeability cannot be conclusively determined by a judgment entered before a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Coopers & Lybrand, Ltd. v. Gibbs (In Re Gibbs) · filed 1989-11-16

An action to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a civil proceeding arising under Code § 523. ... For all of the foregoing reasons, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of whether the judgment or the debt underlying it were dischargeable in bankruptcy, and the judgment is therefore void to the extent that it purported to determine that issue.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence beyond a prior default judgment to establish that a debt arose from willful and malicious injury.

Brockman Music v. Watson (In Re Watson) · filed 1990-08-07(a)(6)

The mere proof of a judgment against the debtor, without additional clear and convincing evidence, is not sufficient to prove that that claim is nondischargeable under § 523.

In § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6) dischargeability proceedings, a state court default judgment does not establish nondischargeability through collateral estoppel unless the relevant issues were actually litigated and necessary to that judgment.

Pizza Palace, Inc. v. Stiles (In Re Stiles) · filed 1990-08-23(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6)

Thus, there has been no showing that the issues of the debtor’s alleged fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity or willful and malicious injury to the plaintiff’s property were actually litigated and necessary to the prior judgment. As such, notwithstanding the fact that this default judgment would be binding on the debtor in a subsequent state court proceeding, the default judgment as to liability is not binding so as to preclude the debtor’s discharge of the judgment debt.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) allow facts established by a state court judgment to support a finding that debts for fraud and embezzlement are nondischargeable when the judgment has preclusive effect.

Fixel v. Marsowicz (In Re Marsowicz) · filed 1990-10-23(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

The requirements of Florida collateral estoppel law have been satisfied so as to preclude the relitigation of the issues conclusively adjudicated in the state court by virtue of the default and final judgement. ... Therefore, applying collateral estoppel to the state court judgment, this Court finds that the debt owed by the debtors to the creditors is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... Accordingly, this Court also finds that the state court judgment is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

A prior judgment precludes relitigation of fraud in a discharge dispute under § 523(a)(2)(A) only if fraud was actually litigated and necessary to that judgment.

In Re Raynor · filed 1991-01-10(a)(2)(A)

Because the issue of fraud was not actually litigated, M & M cannot invoke the default judgment to bar Raynor's discharge by relying on res judicata or issue preclusion.

A stipulated judgment fixing a debt’s amount leaves open whether the debt is excepted from discharge for willful and malicious injury when that issue was not decided.

Wood Ex Rel. Wood v. Neely (In Re Neely) · filed 1991-03-22(a)(6)

The only issue before this court is whether plaintiffs’ conduct, which gave rise to the stipulated judgment, taint the award so that the judgment should be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Because the issue of willful and malicious injury by the debtors to the plaintiffs was not decided under the stipulated judgment, it remains the only issue for this court to resolve with respect to such payment.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a creditor to establish a fiduciary relationship and defalcation; findings on those issues in a prior action can bar their relitigation.

Punton v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1991-02-01(a)(4)

The plaintiffs thus have established in the state court the identical facts and issues that they would have had to establish in the bankruptcy court in the § 523(a)(4) action. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the re-litigation of such facts and issues in a bankruptcy court.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) except a debt from discharge when the necessary elements of fraud and fraud in a fiduciary capacity were established in prior litigation.

Cardinal Service Corp. of Richmond v. Jolly (In Re Jolly) · filed 1991-02-13(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

This Court finds that application of collateral estoppel is appropriate in this proceeding, that each element necessary for a determination of nondischargeability under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) was determined in plaintiffs favor in the state court proceeding, and that the debt arising from the state court judgment is excepted from discharge.