11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(b)(3) exempts qualifying property interests, but an independent prepetition counterclaim is not exempt merely because it relates to property claimed as a homestead.

In Re Larkin · filed 2012-03-30(b)(3)

In any case, the Debtor’s Counterclaim against Wells Fargo must be treated the same as any other pre-petition counterclaim of a debtor. The Counterclaim is property of the estate. It is not imbued with any special status merely because it relates to an asset that may be exempt under the Bankruptcy Code or applicable non-bankruptcy law. The exemptions provided under section 522 and under Florida law extend only to the assets themselves and the basic property rights associated therewith. ... The Counterclaim is not exempt from administration in this case.

Section 522(c) protects properly exempted property from liability for prepetition debts, allowing the exemption to defeat a creditor’s preserved setoff right.

Addison v. United States Department of Agriculture (In re Addison) · filed 2015-07-13(c)

Accordingly, “absent relief from the stay and a challenge to the claimed exemption,” the ... Debtor’s properly claimed exemption in the amount of $2,319.00 trumps the USDA’s setoff rights preserved under Section 553.

Section 522(c) generally protects properly exempt property from prepetition debts, but it does not displace a creditor's valid setoff right preserved by § 553.

Benson v. United States (In re Benson) · filed 2017-04-03(c)

Thus, the preservation of the setoff right should be paramount to the right to claim an exemption giving full accord to the statutory language.

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, protecting it from a creditor’s setoff right.

Commerce Union Bank v. Haffner (In Re Haffner) · filed 1981-06-25(b)

Following the majority view under applicable nonbankruptcy law, the court concludes that a creditor may not exercise a right of setoff against property exempted from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).

Section 522(c) limits setoff against exempt property: a creditor may apply it to a qualifying nondischargeable tax debt, but not to a dischargeable debt.

Jones v. United States (In Re Jones) · filed 1997-08-01(c)

Strict construction of the right of setoff requires recognition of the limitation in 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) on the exercise of the right to setoff using exempt property.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to claim exemptions, and exempting property cannot itself establish substantial abuse of Chapter 7.

In Re Attanasio · filed 1998-02-06(b)

Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a debtor to use either state law exemptions or federal law exemptions without limitation. Therefore, this Court may not assume that Congress intended, by way of 707(b), to punish debtors who utilize the rights to withhold exempt property as specifically provided for them in section 522(b).

Section 522(c) permits a creditor with a valid setoff right to offset against exempt property; any excess remains exempt from other creditors’ claims.

In Re Allen · filed 2001-08-21(c)

Permitting the offset would give effect to both § 553 and § 522(c). Only a creditor with a valid right of setoff is able to exercise the right against exempt property. Exempt property in excess of the amount of setoff remains exempt from the claims of all other creditors.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from pre-petition debts, but a debtor may exempt only the balance remaining after a valid setoff.

United States, Internal Revenue Service v. White · filed 2007-02-28(c)

Once a right of offset preserved by § 553 has been established in a debt owed to the estate, a debtor may claim an exemption only in the balance of the debt turned over to the estate after the offset has been exercised. Thereafter, the exempted property is protected from all other pre-petition debts pursuant to § 522(c).

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt property only after it enters the bankruptcy estate.

Sommers v. Dale (In re Dahlin) · filed 2018-08-28(b)

Once Ms. Dahlin filed her bankruptcy petition, the property became part of her bankruptcy estate. Only after the property was incorporated into the estate could Ms. Dahlin designate it as exempt. The statute does not provide any different order for this process.

Section 522(f)(2) cannot constitutionally be applied retroactively to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest created before the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s enactment.

Hammer v. Beneficial Finance Co. (In Re Hammer) · filed 1981-03-02§ 522(f)(2)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be applied retroactively to avoid the fixing of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in the Debtors’ exempt household goods which was created prior to the enactment date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, i. e., November 6, 1978.

The “any property” language in section 522(d)(5) includes estate property held solely as an investment, not only property specifically listed elsewhere in subsection (d).

In Re Hilbert · filed 1981-07-06§ 522(d)(5)

Based upon In re Smith, supra, and our reading of the Code and the decisions construing it, we conclude that Congress intended the phrase “any property” in Section 522(d)(5) to mean any property of the estate, including as here, real property owned by the debtor but not used as his residence.

Section 522(f)(1) does not apply retroactively to judgment liens perfected before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.

Negri v. State Tax Commission (In Re Negri) · filed 1983-03-07(f)(1)

Section 522(f)(1) is unavailable to the debtor vis-a-vis the Banks’ judgment liens.

A welfare reimbursement lien created by recording a confession of judgment is a judicial lien, not a security interest or statutory lien, and may be avoided to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Griggs (In Re Griggs) · filed 1981-07-07§ 522(f)(1)

We further conclude that the lien obtained by the D.P.W. by virtue of the confession of judgment was a judicial lien, not a security interest nor a statutory lien.

A state’s opt-out from the federal exemptions does not eliminate section 522(f), so a debtor using South Dakota exemptions may avoid a qualifying nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money household-goods lien.

Fredrickson v. Household Finance Co. (In Re Fredrickson) · filed 1981-07-10§ 522(f)

For the following reasons, this Bankruptcy Court holds that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) survives 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and S.D.C.L. 43–45–13.

Section 522(a)(2) requires fair-market-value valuation without deducting hypothetical sale costs when determining whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption.

Nellis v. Rosenbaum (In Re Nellis) · filed 1981-07-10§ 522(f)

I therefore conclude that in determining value in a § 522(f) proceeding, fair market value is to be determined and such determination is not thereafter to be reduced by any expenses or costs which might be incurred in a sale of such assets.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judgment lien using a homestead exemption, and a lien filed before a later increase in the exemption amount does not prevent use of the increased exemption.

In Re Trudell · filed 2008-01-14(f)

What the Legislature gave to holders of judgment liens, the Legislature may take away prior to sale or other satisfaction of the judgment lien. The Court thus concludes that the fact that the judgment lien that is the target of this 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) motion was filed in the County Clerk’s Office and became a lien on the Debtor’s homestead before the enactment of the increase in homestead exemption from $10,000 to $50,000 does not affect the Debtor’s right now to claim the $50,000 exemption in order to accomplish the avoidance of the judgment lien.

Section 522(f)(2) allows a judgment lien to be avoided in its entirety when it fully impairs a debtor's exemption.

Twin Boro Lumber v. James K. Bogie, Inc. · filed 2024-01-11(f)(2)

Nor do we discern any error in the judge's crediting the value of Bogie's residential real property as declared in his bankruptcy petition, which was accepted by the bankruptcy court, as the basis for her conclusion that "plaintiff's judgment lien impair[ed] defendant's exemption" and the "entirety of the lien was subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)."

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid judgment liens that impair an applicable homestead exemption, including liens perfected before an increase in that exemption.

In Re Calloway · filed 2010-02-16(f)

Therefore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the debtor may now avoid judgment liens that impair a homestead not exceeding $50,000 in value.

A judicial lien does not impair a section 522(d)(1) exemption in a life estate when the debt secured by a prior deed of trust exceeds the life estate’s value.

Yates v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (In re Yates) · filed 1981-07-10§ 522(d)(1)

Since, in the present case, the outstanding balance secured by the deed of trust is more than the value of the debtors’ life estate, First-Citizens’ lien does not impair an exemption to which the debtors would be entitled to under § 522(d)(1).

A pre-enactment judgment lien cannot be avoided under section 522(f)(1) where the court applies the rule that retroactive avoidance would be unconstitutional.

Melvin v. Republic National Bank of Miami (In re Melvin) · filed 1981-07-13§ 522(f)(1)

I have held in that case (13 B.R. 96) that § 522(f)(2) cannot be constitutionally applied to a creditor’s security interest which vested before the enactment date of the section in question. I adopt by this reference the discussion in that decision as being equally applicable here.

Section 522(f)(1) cannot constitutionally be applied to a judgment lien vested before enactment of the provision.

Melvin v. Bank of Mount Dora (In re Melvin) · filed 1981-07-14§ 522(f)(1)

Rodrock dealt solely with § 522(f)(2), whereas the issue here is the applicability of § 522(f)(1). The fact that § 522(f)(2) permits avoidance of certain contractual liens which impair exemptions on certain personal property while (f)(1) permits avoidance of all judicial liens which impair exemptions affords no basis for distinction under the rationale of Rodrock.

A debtor cannot claim a section 522 exemption in property voluntarily transferred before bankruptcy and later recovered by the trustee.

Hill v. Quinlan (In Re Quinlan) · filed 1981-07-16§ 522(g)

The Debtor’s rights under 522(g) are not available to him since he voluntarily transferred the property by quit claim to his mother on May 9, 1980.

A California debtor using state exemptions cannot avoid a household-goods lien under section 522(f)(2)(A) to the extent California law makes the exemption subordinate to enforcement of that valid lien.

Falck v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Flack) · filed 1981-07-17§ 522(f)(2)(A)

Since the exemption granted by Section 690.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is subordinate to the enforcement of a valid lien, the enforcement of HFC’s security interest in this case would not impair an exemption to which the debtor wife would have been entitled under the statutes of the State of California.

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent that it impairs the debtor's exemption, not for the entire lien.

Menell v. First National Bank of Boston · filed 1994-02-23(f)(1)

Section 522 operates to aKow this judicial Ken to be avoided to the extent that it impairs the exemption, which in this case is limited to $2,100.00.

Under § 522(f)(1), a judicial lien is avoidable to the extent that it impairs the debtor’s claimed exemption, while remaining valid to the extent it does not impair the exemption.

Coles v. Frye Construction, Inc. (In re Coles) · filed 1994-05-03(f)(1)

the judicial lien of Frye Construction, Inc. ... IS AVOIDED to the extent of $28,873.00. The judgment lien remains unavoided and valid in the amount of $127.00.

Section 522(f)(2) is constitutional as applied to a pre-effective-date nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money household-goods lien and allows avoidance to the extent the lien impairs an exemption.

Burkholder v. AVCO Financial Services Consumer Discount (In Re Burkholder) · filed 1981-07-17§ 522(f)(2)

we conclude that Section 522(f) is not so grossly unreasonable or arbitrary as to be inconsistent with fundamental law; we believe the section is constitutional, as applied.

An unrecorded equitable interest that a bankruptcy trustee’s lien-creditor status defeats cannot support a debtor’s exemption under section 522(d)(1) or (5).

Matter of Trotta · filed 1981-07-20§§ 522(d)(1), 522(d)(5)

I find that Thomas’ interest in the property is not such an interest as to permit him to claim his exemptions under § 522(d)(1) and (5), and hold that the Trottas’ joint estate is solvent.

A lien securing a divorce-property equalization award is not avoidable under section 522(f) when state law makes the homestead exemption unavailable against that lien.

Cowan v. Cowan (In Re Scott) · filed 1981-07-27§ 522(f)

In consideration of the foregoing findings of fact and legal authorities this Court finds that Plaintiff’s lien is not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

A pre-enactment judgment lien that impairs a homestead exemption is unconstitutional to avoid under section 522(f)(1), although the statute otherwise reaches the lien.

Washington v. Brunswick Hospital Center (In re Washington) · filed 1981-07-27§ 522(f)(1)

However, this Court is of the opinion that the statute is an unconstitutional taking of property as applied to the answering defendant’s lien.

Section 522(f) is not clearly repugnant to due process and permits avoidance of a qualifying household-goods lien to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Hall v. Landmark Finance Corp. (In re Hall) · filed 1981-08-04§ 522(f)

The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) are not clearly repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

A creditor’s late service of objections to a debtor’s section 522(d)(1) exemption may be excused for good-faith neglect, allowing the court to reach the merits of lien avoidance.

In Re Wallace · filed 1981-08-05§ 522(d)(1)

Because of our conclusion that the existence of excusable neglect shall permit an extension of time to serve the aforementioned objections, we are able to reach those objections on the merits.

Section 522(c) does not preempt state law defining the scope of a state-law homestead exemption; the state statute determines the extent of the exempt property.

In Re Lewis · filed 2009-02-05(c)

In this case, § 107 explicitly limits the extent of the homestead exemption, and must be given effect.

Section 522(c)(1) preserves liability of exempt property for certain debts but does not preempt Texas homestead law or provide a means to execute against a homestead.

Davis v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 1995-11-08(c)(1)

Section 522(c)(1) does not preempt Texas homestead law. Accordingly, Sandra’s ability to collect the Judgment is determined according to the terms of the Texas Turnover Statute. Because this statute prohibits recovery from exempt property, and Cullen’s Homestead is exempt under Texas law, Sandra may not invoke the Turnover Statute to force conveyance of the Homestead.

A debtor may recover involuntary wage garnishments under section 522(h) by motion when the transfers were preferences, the trustee did not avoid them, and the debtor could have exempted the recovered property.

In Re Schweitzer · filed 1981-08-10§§ 522(g), 522(h)

It is evident from the facts of this case that the garnishments in the total amount of $250.32 meet all the criteria of a § 547 preference; that the transfers could have been avoided by the trustee; and further that the debtor has the prerogative of pursuing the return of the subject funds in the absence of action to do so on the part of the trustee.

A qualifying lien under section 522(f) may be avoided by motion with notice and an opportunity for hearing rather than only by adversary complaint.

In Re Schrimp · filed 1981-08-10§ 522(f)

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the procedure prescribed in Rule 914 is applicable to § 522, and that granting the relief by motion is constitutionally permissible.

Section 522(f) applies in Chapter 13 cases, and a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money household-goods lien may be avoided through the plan when due process is provided.

In Re Jones · filed 1981-08-10§ 522(f)

Nevertheless, section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), is applicable to a Chapter 13 case.

Sections 522(g) and (h) allow a debtor to avoid and recover an otherwise avoidable transfer to the extent the debtor claimed the transferred property as exempt.

In re Banks · filed 2017-08-31(g) and (h)

The Debtor was entitled to avoid and recover from Baumann the amount he had claimed as exempt in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) and (h).

After the purchase price is nearly paid, the remaining lien is purchase-money only to the unpaid balance; the rest is nonpurchase-money and avoidable under § 522(f).

In Re Ganders · filed 1995-01-10§ 522(f)(2)(A)

Except to the extent of $104.89, Sears’ lien on the mower is of non-purchase-money type and is avoidable.

Refinancing an earlier loan with proceeds used to pay an antecedent debt destroys the purchase-money character of the security interest, making it avoidable under section 522(f).

Johnson v. Citizens’ Discount Loan & Savings Co. (In Re Johnson) · filed 1981-08-12§ 522(f)

As such, there is no question that the defendant would have a nonpurchase-money security interest in the furniture which would be subject to § 522(f) lien avoidance.

A docketed confession-of-judgment lien is created by judicial process and is therefore a judicial lien subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1).

Fisher v. Commonwealth National Bank (In Re Fisher) · filed 1981-08-13§ 522(f)(1)

We conclude that the lien held by the Bank is a judicial lien, and therefore, subject to the debtor’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code.

Applying section 522(f)(2) to a security interest created before enactment substantially impairs the creditor’s property rights and violates due process.

Household Finance Corp. v. Glynn (In Re Glynn) · filed 1981-08-13§ 522(f)(2)

This court, therefore, concurs with the result reached in Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981) and holds that the application of section 522(f)(2) to avoid plaintiffs’ security interests would violate the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment.

A refinancing loan used to pay off the original purchase-money debt is not a purchase-money security interest for § 522(f) purposes, so the resulting nonpossessory lien may be avoidable on qualifying household property.

In Re Rushdi · filed 1994-10-31(f)(2)(A)

Pursuant to the authority of these decisions, the security interest held by Norwest in the keyboard is not a purchase money security interest.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a non-purchase-money security interest in household goods; refinancing that pays off the original purchase loan extinguishes the security interest’s purchase-money character.

In Re Matthews · filed 1984-01-24(f)

The new security interest in the piano and stereo taken by Transamerica at the time of the refinancing was therefore not a "purchase money security interest" as the Code has defined it.

Section 522(f) contains no express deadline, so a lien-avoidance complaint filed during the still-open bankruptcy administration is timely.

Smart v. AVCO Financial Services of Maricopa, Inc. (In Re Smart) · filed 1981-08-31§ 522(f)

absent an express statutory pronouncement of a point at which a debtor can no longer bring an action under Sec. 522(f) to avoid a lien, that the debtors’ complaint was timely brought herein, and a hearing will be duly held before the court on the resolution of the matters of avoidance.

A debtor may avoid a qualifying household-goods lien after discharge and after the case is closed when the creditor shows no prejudice; section 522(f) itself sets no deadline.

Associates Financial Services v. Swanson (In Re Swanson) · filed 1981-09-01§ 522(f)

I therefore find that defendant’s counterclaim is not barred by failure to assert it either before the issuance of debt- or’s discharge or the close of administration of debtor’s estate.

When tenancy-by-the-entirety property is exempt under Tennessee law, the bankruptcy estate contains only the debtor’s survivorship interest, so the trustee may not sell the parcels in fee simple.

Ray v. Dawson · filed 1981-09-04§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, the decision of Judge Kelley in the bankruptcy court permitting only the sale of the debtor’s right of survivorship in the two parcels, and not allowing the sale of the parcels in fee simple, is affirmed.

A confession-of-judgment lien is a judicial lien, not a purchase-money security interest, and is avoidable under section 522(f)(1) when it impairs an exemption.

Jones v. McWilliams (In Re Jones) · filed 1981-09-09§ 522(f)(1)

The Court finds that this lien is a judicial lien which may be avoided pursuant to § 522(f)(1).

An unmatured life-insurance contract exempt under section 522(d)(7) remains exempt when it matures within 180 days after filing; the resulting proceeds are not captured by the estate under section 541.

In Re Walters · filed 1981-09-10§ 522(d)(7)

The contract of life insurance being exempt and possessed by the Debtor as of the date of the petition, there is no source from which the benefits can be captured for the estate during the 180-day period.

Section 522(f) authorizes a debtor to avoid a judgment lien on property allowed as a homestead exemption.

In Re Jefferson · filed 1993-11-30(f)

Debtor is entitled to an Order overruling the Objection to Amended Claim of Exemption and granting the Motion to Avoid Judgment Lien.

A debtor must take affirmative steps under § 522(f) to avoid a judicial lien on the debtor’s residence; absent avoidance during the bankruptcy case, the lien survives the discharge.

PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Balsamo · filed 1993-12-02(f)

For bankruptcy law purposes, however, a judicial lien on a debtor’s residence arising from a properly recorded confessed judgment against the defaulting debtor, is a protectable property interest which the debtor must take affirmative steps to avoid in the bankruptcy action.

Section 522(f) avoids a judicial lien only to the extent necessary to preserve the debtor’s exemption: the lien is eliminated if full avoidance is required, but otherwise is reduced only as necessary.

In Re Garro · filed 1993-12-20(f)

Where, as here, the judicial hens must be fully avoided in order to preserve the exemption, the hens win be completely eliminated. Where this is not necessary, the hens will be reduced as necessary.

A debtor must still own the property when seeking to avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1).

In Re Sizemore · filed 1995-01-30(f)(1)

The debtors herein sold the subject property in December 1993, and moved to avoid Laurel’s lien almost a year later.

In a lien-avoidance proceeding, the impairment calculation uses the exemption the debtor could claim if there were no liens, rather than the amount claimed and allowed on the exemption schedule.

In Re Moe · filed 1995-03-28(f)(2)(A)

The definition of impairment under § 522(f)(2)(A) specifically requires, as part of the mechanical test, to include “the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property.”

The court holds that a judicial lien impairing an exemption may be avoided based on the exemption existing on the petition date, and calculates the avoidable amount under § 522(f)(2).

In Re Johnson · filed 1995-05-30(f)

Thus, the hen can be avoided if the debtor had an exemption on the date of filing, whether or not the exemption existed when the lien attached.

Under § 522(f)(2)(A), a judgment lien impairs the debtor’s exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption exceed the debtor’s equity absent liens; the court therefore avoided Pioneer’s lien only to the calculated extent.

In Re Todd · filed 1996-04-12(f)(2)(A)

Therefore, Pioneer’s judgment lien is avoidable under § 522(f) to the extent of $16,595.44 and is not avoidable to the extent of $33,404.56.

For lien avoidance under § 522(f), calculate surplus equity by subtracting all encumbrances from the residence’s total value before applying the debtor’s fractional ownership share; if surplus equity remains after the homestead exemption, the lien does not impair the exemption and cannot be avoided.

Wiget v. Nielsen (In Re Nielsen) · filed 1996-04-26(f)

We hold that in order to determine the existence of surplus equity, all encumbrances must be deducted from the total value of the residence before the debtor’s fractional interest is determined.

Section 522(f) does not allow a debtor to avoid a judicial lien when the debtor had no interest in the property at filing and therefore had no exemption for the lien to impair.

In Re Luhr · filed 1997-02-07§ 522(f)

Since Debtor held no interest in the subject property when the petition was filed, the property is not property of the estate. Given that the property is not property of the estate, Debtor is not entitled to any exemption on the property. Debtor is asking the Court to avoid the judgment lien to the extent it impairs his exemption for the property. His exemption is not impaired because none exists. Therefore, the lien cannot be avoided under the provisions of Section 522(f).

A judicial lien impairs the debtor’s exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption amount exceed the value of the debtor’s interest without liens.

Lashley v. Fuhrer (In Re Lashley) · filed 1997-03-19§ 522(f)(2)(A)

A lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of the judicial lien, all other liens on the property and the amount of the exemption that the Debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property, exceeds the value that the Debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens.

Under § 522(f)(1)(A), a debtor may avoid a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled, and a lien creditor may contest the exemption amount in defending the avoidance motion.

Canelos v. Mignini (In Re Canelos) · filed 1997-07-22(f)(1)(A) and (f)

This Court holds that a creditor may contest the amount of an exemption for the first time in defending against a motion to avoid lien, not to attack the exemption itself, which is inviolate, but to contest the amount of the exemption for the purpose of limiting the amount of the hen to be avoided, pursuant to Section 522(f).

Section 522(f) authorizes a debtor to avoid a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption in certain exempt property.

Matter of Walker · filed 1997-11-07§ 522(f)

Under section 522(f), the debtors are authorized to avoid a lien which impairs certain exempt property.

Section 522 provides the federal remedy for lien avoidance, which does not exist as a matter of state law.

In Re Garrett · filed 2001-08-03

Likewise, I hold that a debtor who fails the good faith test loses the federal remedy of lien avoidance as a result of the bad faith omission of a debt. This remedy exists only pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522 and does not exist as a matter of state law. Therefore, if a case is not reopened, the loss of federal jurisdiction will, unlike the dischargeability question, preclude debt- or’s lien avoidance.

Section 522(f) requires a mechanical mathematical formula for avoiding a lien that impairs an exemption and does not permit consideration of prejudice or other factors.

Snyder v. Rockland Trust Co. (In Re Snyder) · filed 2002-06-13(f)

While the Panel agrees that prejudice to a creditor is a factor that can be taken into account when deciding whether to allow a debtor to amend his or her schedules, such factors are not appropriate when considering a motion to avoid a lien pursuant to section 522(f). The statute on its face provides for a straight mathematical formula and contains no provision for a court to consider other factors. Further, case law has not established any exceptions to the formula provided in section 522(f) and this Panel does not find any ground for establishment of such an exception.

Section 522(f) sets no filing deadline for a lien-avoidance motion, but a debtor’s delay combined with creditor prejudice may be barred by laches.

In Re Frasier · filed 2003-06-16(f)

Unlike other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(d) do not set forth a deadline for the filing of a hen avoidance motion. ... Nevertheless, the defense of laches — in other words, a long delay in reopening a case — in conjunction with other factors, may constitute prejudice.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a lien impairing an exemption and is constitutional as applied to qualifying pre-existing security interests.

Head v. Home Credit Co. (In Re Head) · filed 1980-05-20(f)

For these reasons this Court finds that the provisions of section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code are constitutional as applied to the contracts involved in these proceedings. Further, Home Credit’s liens on the household goods and appliances of plaintiffs, Head and the Byrds, claimed by them as exempt, may be avoided.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to seek avoidance of an otherwise avoidable lien after discharge, and a pre-discharge exemption objection or stay-relief motion does not by itself make the request untimely.

Fleet Bros., Inc. v. Newsome ( In re Newsome) · filed 1986-04-02(f)(2)(B)

as the avoidance relief that the debtors seek is clearly available post-discharge absent such a showing, the mere fact that an objection to a claim of exemption and a motion for relief from stay have been filed, both prior to discharge, does not bar the debtor from exercising the rights contained under § 522(f).

Section 522(f) permits lien avoidance based on applicable state-law exemptions; a later state exemption amendment changes the statute’s effect in Iowa without amending the federal text.

Ackley State Bank v. Van Hove (In Re Van Hove) · filed 1987-09-29(f)

This court, like the lower court, finds no merit in the Government’s contention that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) was amended by the amendment to § 627.6. The Government presents no authority for its proposition. To the contrary, the amendment to § 627.6 did not alter the language of the federal lien avoidance statute but merely altered its effect in Iowa.

Section 522(f)(1) does not let a debtor avoid a judicial lien unless the debtor held the property interest to which the lien attached before the lien attached.

In Re Remington · filed 2004-07-12(f)(1)

Because Evergreen’s lien became fixed to the real estate before Katrina obtained her interest in it, I conclude that she cannot successfully wield § 522(f)’s lien avoidance powers.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, but this court conditioned the avoidance on completion of the chapter 13 plan and entry of discharge when the creditor objected.

In re Harris · filed 2012-11-26(f)(1)(A)

Having considered both sides of the issue, the Court agrees with the majority and concludes that, in light of the Creditor’s objection, lien avoidance in this case must be conditioned on the Debtors’ completion of their chapter 13 plan and the granting of a discharge in order to ensure that the Creditor’s interests are protected. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that the judicial hen here may be avoided, provided that the Debtors make all of their plan payments and obtain a discharge in the bankruptcy case.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien on a homestead only when the debtor acquired the property interest before the lien attached; a lien attaching before or simultaneously with acquisition cannot be avoided.

Patrusky v. Jungle Treats · filed 2020-02-25(f)

First, a lien on one’s homestead can only be avoided under § 522(f) where the lien attached to the real property after the debtor acquired their interest in the real property; if the lien attached prior to, or even simultaneous with, the debtor’s acquisition, the lien cannot not be avoided.

Section 522(f) permits the bankruptcy court to determine under state law whether a valid judicial lien attached to the debtor’s property as a necessary first step in deciding the lien-avoidance claim.

Ahn v. Sanger · filed 2020-02-28(f)

Further, the district court correctly determined that the bankruptcy court could address the validity of the Sangers’ purported judicial lien as a part of Ahn’s lien avoidance claim, because a court applies state law as the first step in a lien avoidance action to determine whether a valid lien attached to the debtor’s property.

A motion to avoid a lien under § 522(f) may be subject to the equitable defense of laches based on unreasonable delay and prejudice.

Ricky Robert Smith · filed 2020-07-16(f)

The parties agree that a laches defense can apply to a motion to avoid a lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). They are correct. ... Therefore, I hold that the avoidance claim is subject to a laches defense and will enter a separate order denying Debtor’s motion.

Rule 4003(d) governs proceedings to avoid liens under § 522(f) without a separate time limit, leaving the timing to the bankruptcy judge’s discretion.

Smith v. Kleynerman · filed 2024-02-27(f)(1)

Rule 4003(d), which applies to proceedings under §522(f) to avoid liens, does not have a separate time limit. That leaves timing to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.

Section 522(f) allows Chapter 12 debtors to avoid liens, with avoidance taking effect upon discharge.

Matter of Hunerdosse · filed 1988-04-27(f)

The court further finds that lien avoidance is available to the debtors but only upon discharge.

Section 522(f) sets no fixed deadline for seeking lien avoidance after discharge, absent prejudice or fraud affecting creditors.

In Re Jacobs · filed 1992-09-29(f)

In light of the fact that neither the Bankruptcy Code or Rules provide any particular time constraints for raising lien avoidance, the majority of jurisdictions hold that there is no time limit absent prejudice or fraud to creditors and given that the creditors in the instant case have not shown or even posited that the debtor’s motion for lien avoidance is fraudulent or has a prejudicial impact on their interests, the Court finds that the creditors are not prejudiced by the debtor’s motion for lien avoidance.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid certain liens that impair an exemption, subject to its stated conditions.

Pierce v. Oklahoma Health Services Federal Credit Union (In Re Pierce) · filed 1980-06-17(f)

Therefore, in light of the foregoing authority, this Court feels compelled to hold that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) of the new Bankruptcy Act shall not be given retrospective effect.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens on specified property to the extent the lien impairs an exemption.

Curry v. Associates Financial Services · filed 1981-05-29(f)

This Court holds that section 522(f) constitutionally reaches pre-enactment liens.

Section 522(f) lien avoidance in a Chapter 13 case becomes operative only after the debtor completes the plan and receives a discharge.

Castle v. Parrish (In Re Parrish) · filed 1983-05-02(f)

As the debt secured by the judgment lien is not dischargeable, the lien avoidance provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) cannot be invoked. ... It necessarily follows that the right to avoid a lien has not fully matured in a Chapter 13 context until a discharge is granted upon successful completion of the Chapter 13 Plan. ... To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the intent and purpose of both Sections 522(f) and 1328.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to file a lien avoidance complaint after discharge.

Beneficial Finance Co. of Virginia v. Lazrovitch · filed 1983-08-02(f)

The Court thus holds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing debtors to file § 522(f) lien avoidance complaints after discharge.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a qualifying lien on property to the extent that it impairs the debtor’s exemption.

Salamone v. Bank of Commerce (In Re Salamone) · filed 1984-10-24(f)

The court holds therefore, that in a chapter 13 case, a debtor’s equity in his homestead should be valued for purposes of section 522(f) lien avoidance as of the effective date of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, which is generally the date on which the order of confirmation becomes final.

Section 522(f) allows post-discharge lien avoidance, subject to conditioning only when a creditor proves by clear and convincing evidence that the debtor's unreasonable delay prejudiced the creditor.

Webb v. Robert A. Boroughs, Ltd. (In Re Webb) · filed 1985-03-25(f)

Moreover, this Court is of the opinion that it should not condition post-discharge relief under § 522(f) unless a creditor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the debtor was guilty of unreasonable delay which prejudiced that creditor, i.e., laches.

Section 522(f) does not permit a debtor to avoid a mortgage on an exempt homestead merely because the mortgage impairs the exemption.

MBank Garland v. Skinner (In Re Skinner) · filed 1987-06-10(f)

Under the facts of this case, the Court is without authority to avoid the lien claimed by the Bank. The determination that the exemption claim is proper has removed the homestead from the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). It is true that the asserted mortgage on the Debtor’s homestead “impairs an exemption to which the debtor [is] entitled under [11 U.S.C. § 522(b)]”, but the provision permitting the avoidance of liens on exempt property does not cover this situation. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f) permits lien avoidance only to the extent a lien impairs an exemption available under federal or applicable state law.

In re Clausen · filed 1988-01-11(f)

However, section 522(f) permits debtors to avoid liens on property to the extent the liens impair exemptions to which the debtors otherwise would have been entitled under the federal exemptions or under applicable state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) authorizes states to “opt out” of the federal exemption scheme. Iowa has done so by virtue of Iowa Code section 627.10. Therefore, the court must turn to Iowa law to determine whether Glenn Clausen is a farmer for purposes of Iowa’s exemption statute.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying lien to the extent it impairs an exemption and sets no filing time limit.

In re Marsh · filed 1988-08-02(f)

We can find no language in § 522(f) setting any kind of a time limit, and in the case at hand know of no other code sections or equitable reasons which should bar the debtors’ filing of their motion.

Section 522(f) sets no specific deadline for filing a motion to avoid a lien.

Matter of Caicedo · filed 1993-09-24(f)

Section 522(f) and Rule 4003(d), which govern the avoidance of liens, also are devoid of any specific time limitations by which a motion to avoid a lien must be brought.

A debtor may seek lien avoidance under § 522(f) before receiving a Chapter 13 discharge, but laches can bar an inexcusable delay that prejudices the lienholder.

In Re Levy · filed 2000-12-20(f)

The only reason offered by Levy in filing this motion is the argument that a debtor cannot move to avoid a lien under Code section 522(f) until the debtor receives a discharge, which in a chapter 13 case is virtually always three to five years after the petition is filed. Levy cites no authority for this argument, however, and the court is not aware of any. Since the only reason offered for the delay is a legal argument which is incorrect, the delay in bringing this motion was not excusable. ... Since, however, the delay was inexcusable, the court holds that Goldstein has met his burden of proving the defense of laches.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien if the debtor owned the property before the lien fixed, even if the debtor no longer owns it when moving to avoid.

In Re: Thomas Kai-Ming Chiu in Re: Linda Luk Chiu, Debtors, Culver, LLC v. Thomas Kai-Ming Chiu Linda Luk Chiu · filed 2002-09-18(f)(1)

We therefore agree with Vincent that the debtor need not have an interest in the property at the time it moves to avoid: ... It is undisputed that debtors owned the subject property before the lien fixed upon it. Culver concedes that the lien impaired an exemption to which debtors were entitled. Because debtors satisfied the requirements of § 522(f)(1), they were entitled to avoid the hen.

Section 522(f) authorizes a bankruptcy court to quash a lis pendens that impairs a debtor’s homestead exemption.

Blandino v. Bradshaw (In Re Bradshaw) · filed 2004-04-29(f)

Therefore, since the lis pendens impairs both the debtors’ right to a fresh start and their homestead exemption, this court will enter a judgment which quashes it. ... The court’s authority for quashing the lis pendens is 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(entry of any order which is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and to prevent an abuse of process).

Section 522(f)(1) permits debtors to avoid judicial liens and liens on certain personal property to the extent they impair an exemption.

Ostroff v. American Home Mortgage (In Re Ostroff) · filed 2010-08-16(f)(1)

Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to avoid judicial liens and liens on certain personal property to the extent those liens impair an exemption. The liens here are neither judicial liens nor do they encumber personal property.

Section 522(f) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs a debtor’s exemption; a motion under it does not decide who receives funds that remain encumbered.

Katherine E. Wyatt-Burrows · filed 2025-09-29(f)

These arguments are not properly before the Court on a motion made pursuant to section 522(f) (or on Linkus’ claim objection), which is limited to determining whether, and to what extent, a judicial lien may be avoided as impairing a debtor’s exemptions.

Entireties property enters the bankruptcy estate but may be exempted against individual creditors; joint creditors may reach it only to the extent state law permits and the debtor’s homestead exemption does not cover it.

Michigan National Bank—Michiana v. Chrystler (In Re Trickett) · filed 1981-09-10§ 522(b)(2)(B)

it is, therefore, my conclusion that the entireties property comes into the bankruptcy estate by operation of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541, and may be claimed as exempt as to joint creditors who, under Michigan law could have obtained a joint judgment and satisfied the judgment out of the entireties property only to the extent of the $3,500 homestead exemption.

A debtor is not barred from avoiding a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money household-goods lien after discharge when no applicable local rule imposes an earlier deadline.

Baskins v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Baskins) · filed 1981-09-11§ 522(f)(2)(A)

This Court concludes that the debtors are not barred from bringing this adversary proceeding to set aside the nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest of Household Finance Corporation in the debtors’ household goods.

When renewal-loan proceeds satisfy the original debt, the security interest loses its purchase-money character and becomes avoidable under section 522(f)(2).

Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Co. (In Re Rosen) · filed 1981-09-16§ 522(f)(2)

When the proceeds from the renewal note were used to satisfy the original note, the purchase-money character of the security interest was extinguished with the result that it became a nonpurchase-money security instrument.

A camper trailer is not “household goods” or another listed category in section 522(f)(2), so a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on it is not avoidable under that subsection.

Thorp Credit Inc. v. Nason (In Re Nason) · filed 1981-09-16§ 522(f)(2)

It is apparent from Congress’ careful delineation of the types of property for which nonpos-sessory, nonpurchase-money security interests could be avoided, that it was not intended that the section would be applicable to the type of property in dispute here.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) does not exempt tenancy-by-the-entireties property from joint creditors’ claims when applicable state law makes the property reachable by creditors of both spouses.

In Re Colston · filed 1988-06-01§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, if there exists a creditor who holds a claim against both debtor and his non-filing spouse then the property which the debtor has an interest as a tenant by the entireties is not “exempt from process” under Florida law as to that creditor and cannot be excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(b)(2)(B).

Joint indebtedness precludes exemption of entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) to the extent of the joint indebtedness, while surplus equity remains exempt.

In Re Houck · filed 1995-07-17(b)(2)(B)

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the existence of joint indebtedness precludes exemption of the entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) to the extent of the joint indebtedness.

A joint creditor retains the same state-law rights against a married couple’s entireties property in bankruptcy as outside bankruptcy; separate bankruptcy filings do not defeat those rights.

In Re Wetzler · filed 1996-01-11(b)(2)(B)

Following ... Sumy’s ... teachings, the Debtor and his wife cannot utilize bankruptcy to deprive a creditor of his state law property rights. A joint creditor maintains the same property rights in bankruptcy as outside.

Property held by a debtor as a tenant by the entirety is exempt from Chapter 7 trustee administration to the extent applicable Missouri law protects it from process for a debt owed by only one spouse.

In Re Smith · filed 1996-07-26§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Literal application of this Missouri non-bankruptcy law under § 522(b)(2)(B) exempts from a Chapter 7 trustee’s administration the non-exempt entirety equity in Debtors’ principal residence from their respective bankruptcy estates to the extent only one spouse is liable on a debt.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) makes the entireties-property exemption depend on whether the property is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law, so Florida law controls whether joint creditors can reach it.

In Re Campbell · filed 1997-10-20§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Section 522(b)(2)(B), requires a court to ascertain whether property is “exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptey law.”

Section 522(b)(2)(B) remains available to both spouses filing a joint Chapter 7 petition when state law exempts their entireties property from individual creditors.

Thomas v. Peyton · filed 2001-08-06(b)(2)(B)

the § 522(b)(2)(B) exemption must remain available to both spouses when they have filed a joint petition in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Once husband and wife properly claim the exemption, the trustee may not administer their entireties property for the benefit of their individual creditors.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) permits an individual debtor to exempt tenancy-by-the-entireties property only to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law exempts that interest from process.

In Re Bell-Breslin · filed 2002-06-17(b)(2)(B)

Because a debtor’s interest in tenancy by the en-tireties property is exempt from process under Maryland law, “the debtor’s interest in property which he holds as a tenant by the entirety may be exempted from the estate ... under [11 U.S.C. § ] 522(b)(2)(B).”

Section 522(b)(2)(B) allows a debtor using state exemptions to exempt entireties property only to the extent the interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law; the non-exempt portion is available for all unsecured creditors.

In Re Raynard · filed 2005-11-04(b)(2)(B)

I concluded instead that the non-exempt portion of the equity referenced in Section 522(b)(2)(B) must be administered for the benefit of all of the Raynards’ unsecured creditors, both joint and individual. Consequently, the Raynards would have to contribute a sufficient amount to their Chapter 13 plan to ensure that their unsecured individual creditors would receive at least their portion of the non-exempt equity that they would have received had the Raynards elected Chapter 7.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) does not protect tenants by the entirety property from joint creditors when spouses file separate bankruptcy petitions close in time.

In Re Tyler · filed 1983-01-20(b)(2)(B)

Upon the reopening of Earnest Tyler’s bankruptcy case and the consolidation of his case with his wife’s case, the U.S. Trustee should promptly appoint a trustee for the purpose of administering the debtors’ property which they claimed exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B). Any proceeds from the sale of this property should be available only to satisfy the joint obligations of the debtors.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) exempts a debtor's interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety or joint-tenancy property only to the extent that the interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight · filed 1985-03-22(b)(2)(B)

The circuits have split on the question whether entireties property is exempt from joint creditors under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(B). ... The distinction between the two views is of theoretical and procedural rather than substantive significance. From that perspective, however, we believe that the better view is that expressed by the Third Circuit in Napotnik. ... But, because each spouse owns the whole estate and each spouse is liable for the whole debt, it is a false distinction to declare that a joint creditor cannot reach a spouse's individual undivided interest in entireties property. A joint creditor would inevitably seek the joint interests to satisfy a joint and several liability, and under state law he could do so. See Napotnik, 679 F.2d at 321 & n. 10.

Section 522(f) constitutionally avoids qualifying nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money household-goods liens acquired before the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment.

Gonser v. C. I. T. Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1981-09-18§ 522(f)

These plaintiffs are entitled to judgments avoiding the liens of defendants.

Tennessee could not withdraw the federal exemption option through an exemption scheme that discriminated against non-homeowners; the conflicting state provision was invalid and debtors retained the choice of section 522(d) exemptions.

Rhodes v. Stewart (In Re Rhodes) · filed 1981-09-22§ 522(b)

Section 26-2-112 of the Tennessee Code is invalid. Residents of this state continue to have the option of exempting property from their bankruptcy estates pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).

A debtor may not switch from state exemptions under section 522(b)(2)(B) to federal exemptions after the trustee has objected and the election has become final.

In Re Korff · filed 1981-09-24§ 522(b)

it is the considered opinion of this Court that the debtors are not entitled to amend their claim for exempt property and that the trustee may forthwith liquidate the estate in accordance with this opinion and pursuant to the statutes in such case as made and provided.

A state that opts out of the federal exemption system may condition its exemptions on the absence of valid liens, so section 522(f)(2)(A) does not override Ohio’s restriction on exempting lien-encumbered household goods.

Foster v. City Loan & Savings Co. · filed 1981-09-30§ 522(f)(2)(A)

this court declines to follow the cases noted above and holds that a state which opts out of the federal exemption system pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) may condition the granting of property exemptions to debtors on the absence of any valid outstanding liens at the time a debtor petitions for bankruptcy and that if a State does impose such a condition, it does not conflict with either 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) or, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Ohio tenancy-by-the-entireties property is exempt from an individual creditor’s process and therefore exempt from the bankruptcy estate under section 522(b)(2)(B).

In Re Thomas · filed 1981-10-01§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, the real property is exempt from process under state law and 11 U.S.C. Section 522(b)(2)(B) applies so as to make this property exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

A renewal that replaces an earlier security agreement can make the operative lien post-enactment and therefore constitutionally avoidable under section 522(f); the appellate court affirmed the lien avoidances.

Safeway Finance Co. v. Ward (In Re Ward) · filed 1981-10-02§ 522(f)

Accordingly, the orders of the bankruptcy court in these appeals are affirmed.

Under § 522(f)(1), a state exemption’s timing requirement may prevent avoidance of a judicial lien when, even without the lien, the debtor would not yet be entitled to claim the exemption; Ohio’s homestead exemption was therefore unavailable absent a pending judicial sale or involuntary execution.

In Re Ethelrine Moreland, Debtor. Resolution Trust Corporation v. Moreland · filed 1994-04-06(f)(1), in conjunction with (b)(1)

But for the RTC’s lien, Moreland still would not have been entitled to her claimed homestead exemption as there was no judicial sale or involuntary execution pending.

In Ohio, a debtor cannot avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1) merely because the lien exists; the lien must impair an exemption that is effective because the property is subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, or judicial sale.

Ameritrust Company, N.A. v. Robert Coley Calloway, Jr. · filed 1994-08-01(f)(1), in conjunction with (b)(1)

The statute is conditional. The mere existence of a judicial lien is insufficient to create a homestead exemption.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) prevents a state from opting out of the federal lien-avoidance protection for qualifying household-goods liens.

Maddox v. Southern Discount Co. · filed 1983-09-09(f)(2)(A)

This court finds persuasive Judge Dyer’s argument that the federal statute does not permit a state to “opt out” of the lien avoidance provisions of § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(2) permits avoidance only for a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest, and § 522(f)(2)(A) limits eligible property to listed items held primarily for personal, family, or household use.

Franchi v. Stanley's Boat Yard, Inc. (In re Franchi) · filed 1992-11-30(f)(2), (f)(2)(A)

In addition, the Debtor has not explained at all how a sailboat fits within the “household use” types of property enumerated in § 522(f)(2)(A), which are even susceptible to lien avoidance. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to include a recreational sailboat within the classification of either a “household furnishing” or “household goods” “held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor” as required in that section.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods, trade tools, and health aids to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Coleman v. American Finance Corp. (In Re Coleman) · filed 1981-04-29(f)(2)

For these reasons it is apparent that § 522(f)(2) cannot constitutionally be applied so as to avoid security interests created prior to the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Gap period security interests, however, are fully subject to avoidance pursuant to § 522(f)(2).

A debtor may use Georgia’s “any property” exemption to avoid a judicial lien impairing equity in Florida real property even when the property is not the debtor’s homestead.

In re Pietrocola · filed 1981-10-13§ 522(f)

Because Prestige’s judicial lien, which resulted from its final judgment of $2,072.87 against the Debtors, impairs the Debtors’ exemption in the Florida property, the Debtors may avoid the lien.

Applying section 522(f) to a pre-enactment judicial lien on Florida homestead property does not violate the Takings Clause or due process, and the creditor receives the required opportunity to contest avoidance.

Golden v. City National Bank of Hallandale (In Re Golden) · filed 1981-10-14§ 522(f)

The Court finds further that Section 522(f) bears a rational relationship to the permissible legislative purpose of giving the Debtors a “fresh start” by protecting through specific enumerated exemptions, the basic necessities of life, such as the Debtors’ home.

Section 522(f) constitutionally permits avoidance of a pre-enactment judicial lien on Florida homestead property when the creditor receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Golden v. Flagship Factor Corp. (In Re Golden) · filed 1981-10-14§ 522(f)

The Court finds that the due process constraints have been observed.

Colorado’s rule that a debtor’s exemption is measured by equity does not eliminate section 522(f); a qualifying household-goods lien is void to the extent it impairs the equity exemption.

Redin v. Fidelity Financial Services (In Re Redin) · filed 1981-10-14§ 522(f)(2)(A)

it is ORDERED that the nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest of Fidelity in the debtors’ household goods and household furnishings is void to the extent that it impairs the exemption to which the debtors would be entitled under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-54-102(e) if no security interest existed.

Avoiding a pre-enactment judicial lien on Florida homestead property does not violate the Takings Clause or due process, and section 522(f) bears a rational relationship to the fresh-start purpose of bankruptcy.

Rapp v. Pan American Bank of Miami (In Re Rapp) · filed 1981-10-14§ 522(f)

The Court finds further that Section 522(f) bears a rational relationship to the permissible legislative purpose of giving the debtor a “fresh start” by protecting through specific enumerated exemptions, the basic necessities of life, such as the debtor’s home.

Section 522(f)(1) does not allow a debtor to avoid a judicial lien on homestead property when the debtor had no interest in that property before the lien attached.

In Re Seth W. Yerrington, Debtor. Luba Yerrington v. Yerrington · filed 1994-03-03(f)(1)

The BAP answered the question in the negative, and we agree with that determination.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on property that is exempt under applicable Oklahoma law.

In re Payne · filed 1997-11-13§ 522(f)

The lien held by Beneficial is a nonpossessory, non-purchase money lien. Debtors will be able to avoid the lien of Beneficial on the hand tools and lawn mowers if they are exempt property undei- Oklahoma law as provided by OMa.Stat.Ann. tit. 31, § 1 et seq. (West 1991 & Supp.1998).

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien impairing an exempt homestead interest in community property, even when the lien attached before the property later became the debtor’s separate property.

In Re Schmiedel · filed 1999-07-09§ 522(f)(1)

The Jolliffs’ lien against the debtor’s homestead property is avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on exempt household goods when the application is constitutionally permissible.

In re Proctor · filed 1982-05-10(f)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the debtor’s motion to avoid the lien of Peoples Security Finance Company be and is sustained.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not let a debtor avoid a judicial lien encumbering property owned by someone else at the petition date.

In re Bogetti · filed 2006-08-18(f)(1)(A)

This motion is necessary only insofar as it is possible to avoid the fixing of the judicial lien on the real property. Because the debtors did not own that property when the petition was filed, this is not possible. The debtors may not utilize section 522(f)(1)(A) to avoid a judicial lien that encumbers property owned by another.

Section 522(f) treats a judgment against only one spouse as not constituting a judicial lien against property held by both spouses as tenants by the entirety when bankruptcy is filed.

Hatu v. Southco Distributing Company · filed 2022-05-05(f)

Applying this state law to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the court agrees with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina that a judgment against only one spouse does not constitute a judicial lien against property owned as a tenancy by the entirety at the time of a bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not permit a debtor to avoid a divorce lien on former community property when the lien attaches as the debtor acquires the property interest.

In Re Levi · filed 1995-06-05(f)(1)(A)

An equitable lien on property which was previously community property, therefore, fixes at the same time the acquiring spouse’s interest in the property is created. ... A debtor cannot avoid those liens under § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a judgment recorded against a Florida homestead when it clouds title and impairs the exemption, even if the judgment is presently unenforceable under state law.

Ricardo Ruben Uliambre Pettengill · filed 2021-12-09(f)(1)(A)

The Court disagrees and finds that § 522(f)(1) applies to avoid the Recorded Judgment.

Section 522(f)(1) cannot avoid a judgment lien that was never enforceable against the debtor’s property.

Earnhardt v. Herring National Lease, Inc. (In Re Earnhardt) · filed 1981-10-19§ 522(f)(1)

It appearing that the judgment creates no enforceable lien on any of the plaintiff’s real or personal property, there is, therefore, no lien avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

A debtor’s undivided interest in Virginia tenancy-by-the-entireties property is exempt from the bankruptcy estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) when individual creditors cannot reach it under state law.

Waldrop v. Phillos (In Re Phillos) · filed 1981-10-23§ 522(b)(2)(B)

the interest of the debtor alone, without joining that of his spouse is exempt from process under Virginia law, and may be exempted from his bankruptcy estate under § 522(b)(2)(B).

Section 522(d)(1) requires the debtor to reside in the claimed residential property itself, not merely in part of a trust’s real-estate assets.

In Re Bowers · filed 1998-07-01§ 522(d)(1)

however, the Debtor must reside in the personal property. This is the step on which the Debtor falters. He does not reside in his one-third interest in the Trust.

When no surplus equity remains after accounting for the homestead exemption, avoiding the judicial lien may be reasonably necessary to preserve the exemption’s full value.

In Re Wilson · filed 1994-11-22§ 522(f)

It is undisputed that Wilson has no surplus equity in the property once his homestead exemption is accounted for. Avoiding Wynns’ lien is reasonably necessary to allow Wilson to obtain the full amount of his exemption.

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent that it impairs the debtor’s available exemption.

In Re Paul Menell, Debtor. Paul Menell v. First National Bank of Boston · filed 1994-09-28§ 522(f)(1)

The approach which we believe is dictated by the statute results in lien avoidance only to the extent that a judicial lien impairs an available exemption.

Section 522(f)(1) does not avoid a lien on an interest acquired simultaneously with the lien; Farrey bars avoidance for that acquired interest.

In Re Buffington · filed 1994-05-09§ 522(f)(1)

Therefore, lien avoidance is not applicable under ... since both interests arose at the same time.

Section 522(f) requires the property to be exempt under § 522(b), not merely listed as exempt without objection under § 522(l).

In Re Mohring · filed 1994-05-16§ 522(f)(2)(A)

For lien avoidance under section 522(f), Mohring’s property had to be not only exempt, but exempt under section 522(b).

For § 522(b)(2)(A), domicile is determined under federal law because the bankruptcy exemption rules apply uniformly nationwide.

Farm Credit Bank of Wichita v. Hodgson (In Re Hodgson) · filed 1994-05-19§ 522(b)(2)(A)

Generally, the words and phrases contained in a federal statute are defined by reference to federal law.

In a Chapter 13 valuation for section 522(f), the court should use what the property would bring in a commercially reasonable disposition rather than forced-sale value.

Cohen v. Werner (In Re Cohen) · filed 1981-08-21§ 522(f)

Confining this Opinion to these two alternatives, this Court concurs with the position taken by other bankruptcy courts which have considered this question, that forced sale value should not be used, but rather, what the property would bring if disposed of in a commercially-reasonable manner.

A loss-of-consortium award arising from a spouse’s bodily injury is a payment on account of personal bodily injury that the debtor may exempt under section 522(d)(11)(D).

Matter of Lynn · filed 1981-08-21§ 522(d)(11)(D)

An award for loss of consortium because of a personal injury to the spouse is a payment “on account of personal bodily injury ... of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent” and therefore may be exempted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(D).

Section 522(f)(2) may constitutionally avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien perfected between the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment and effective dates.

Dawkins v. Bakst (In re Dawkins) · filed 1981-08-21§ 522(f)(2)(A)

As I see it, therefore, there is no question as to the applicability of § 522(f) to the defendant’s lien in this case.

A debtor may avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1) only to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption, measured by the liens and applicable priority rules as of the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Koehler · filed 1994-05-19(f)(1)

An exemption is an inchoate interest in the totality of an asset. It becomes impaired only when liens begin to exceed the nonexempt value, that being an amount equal to the value of the asset less the amount of exemption as allowed by statute.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on qualifying household goods when the lien impairs an exemption, with impairment determined under the court’s value-and-encumbrance calculation.

In Re Farson · filed 1994-08-17(f)

To determine whether impairment exists, the sum of all unavoidable hens and encumbrances must be subtracted from the fair market value of the property for which an exemption is claimed.

Under the amended § 522(f)(2)(A) formula, a judgment lien impairs a homestead exemption when the lien, other avoidable liens, and the applicable exemption exceed the debtor's unencumbered property value.

In Re Moe · filed 1995-03-14(f)(2)(A)

using the new mathematical formula of § 522(f)(2)(A), a judgment hen will impair a debtor’s homestead exemption to the extent the sum of that judgment hen, other avoidable hens, if any, and the apphcable exemption exceed the value of the debtor’s interest in the property.

A judicial lien may be avoided only when it actually reduces the value of an exemption.

In Re Alton Wilson, Debtor. George S. Wynns v. Wilson · filed 1996-07-12§ 522(f)(1)

Applying the plain meaning of section 522(f), we held that “an exemption is not impaired unless its amount is diminished in value.”

For purposes of avoiding a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1), property and lien interests are valued as of the petition date using fair market value.

In Re Kerbs · filed 1997-04-02(f)(1)

In addition, when valuing property for the purposes of § 522(f) courts must look to the- petition date and use the “fair market value,”

Section 522(f)(2)'s arithmetic formula treats a judicial lien as impairing an exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption exceed the property value without liens, even if state law prevents foreclosure while the property remains a homestead.

In Re Richardson · filed 1998-09-01§ 522(f)(1); § 522(f)(2)

The Court concludes, therefore, that the judicial lien of Healthcare which attached to the Richardsons’ homestead impairs the Richardsons’ homestead exemption and is therefore avoidable pursuant to Section 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f) permits avoidance without an execution, but a judicial lien is avoided only to the extent it impairs the exemption, so a partially impairing lien survives in part.

Tedeschi v. Falvo (In Re Falvo) · filed 1998-12-09§ 522(f)(1); § 522(f)(2)(A)

However, because the judicial lien only partially impairs the homestead exemption, the bankruptcy court should not have avoided the entire lien.

A state homestead exemption may be protected under § 522(b)(2)(A), and a judicial lien that impairs it may be avoided under the § 522(f) formula.

In Re Sebio · filed 1999-08-05§ 522(b)(2)(A), § 522(f)(1)(A), § 522(f)(2)(A)

For the foregoing reasons, I will enter a separate order overruling Revolution’s objection to the Debtor’s exemption and granting the Debtor’s motion to avoid Revolution’s hen.