11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(37)'s definition of a lien includes an inchoate prejudgment garnishment lien.

In Re Flynn · filed 1999-08-18(37)

Second, the inchoate nature, under Ohio law, of a prejudgment garnishment lien does not affect whether such an interest qualifies as a “lien” under § 101(37) as the legislative history of this section specifically states that the definition includes “inchoate liens.”

Section 101(53) treats a landlord’s crop lien arising solely under statute as a statutory lien even when a lease merely recites that lien.

Marshall v. Aubuchon (In Re Marshall) · filed 1999-09-02(53)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “statutory lien” as [a] hen arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or hen of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include security interest or judicial hen, whether or not such interest or hen is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or hen is made fully effective by statute. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). The Illinois statutory landlord hen provision clearly falls under this definition and, therefore, may be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien by how it arises; a lien created by agreement is a security interest even if a court later fixes its amount.

Thompson v. Unruh (In Re Thompson) · filed 1999-11-15(36)

A “judicial hen” is defined as: “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A security interest is a “hen created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). ... It was not the action in state court that created the lien. The lien came into existence when the mortgage proceeds were used as a down payment on the marital residence. Even though the Ap-pellees brought an action in state court which ultimately settled the amount of the hen, it is not a “judicial hen.”

Section 101(36) excludes an equitable lien that merely recognizes a lien existing before judicial process from the definition of a judicial lien.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Carpenter (In Re Carpenter) · filed 2000-01-18(36)

In that respect, Wal-Mart’s lien does not arise by judgment or by any other means in which a judgment lien arises under 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). Wal-Mart’s equitable lien therefore would not be avoidable under Section 522(f) as a judicial lien.

Section 101(36) includes a recorded judgment lien against a debtor’s interest in property held with a non-debtor spouse as a judicial lien.

In Re Mukhi · filed 2000-04-05(36)

A judicial lien is one “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A lien filed and recorded with respect to property held in tenancy by the entirety by a debtor and his non-debtor spouse fits this definition.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by levy, even when a statute provides for the lien.

Roberts v. Horstmann (In re Horstmann) · filed 2000-09-26(36)

Section 101(36) contemplates such a statutory scenario by setting forth the ways a judicial lien may be obtained in the alternative — by judgment, by levy, by sequestration, or by other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

A tax lien that arises solely by force of statute is a statutory lien, even when a certificate of debt is filed as a collection remedy.

In Re Sullivan · filed 2000-11-01(53)

This court concludes that a chapter 7 trustee cannot avoid a state tax lien under § 544 or § 545 where the State files a COD but has not levied because: (1) the tax lien arises solely by force of statute under N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:49-1 and 49-12, thereby satisfying the definition of “statutory lien” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(53); (2) 11 U.S.C. § 545 is the exclusive provision available to a trustee when avoiding statutory liens; and (3) a state lien with a COD is superior to the rights of a bona fide purchaser under § 545(2) and thus cannot be avoided.

A lien arising only upon entry of judgment, without a pre-existing property interest, is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor) · filed 2001-01-02(36)

A judicial lien is defined in the bankruptcy code as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the lien is a judgment lien, and the debtor meets the first prong of the § 522(f) avoidance test.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing an obligation; an equitable interest in statutory trust assets is not a lien.

In Re Regional Building Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-02-23(37)

The term “lien” “means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... But trust claims are not lien claims; they are, instead, an ownership of an equitable interest in the trust assets, with the trustee of the trust holding only bare legal title. Accordingly, the statutory trusts created by N.Y. Lien Law Article 3-A are not statutory liens or any other kind of lien.

A construction lien that arises under state law is a statutory lien even when its enforcement requires a judgment.

In re Mitchell · filed 2001-03-01(36), (53)

Based on the analysis of the Mississippi statutes apphcable to the creation, perfection, and enforcement of a construction hen, set forth in paragraph IV, the court concludes that the hen in this proceeding is a statutory hen which may not be avoided by the debtors pursuant to § 522(f)(1).

Section 101(53) treats a Virginia mechanics’ lien as a statutory lien because it arises under state law, even though filing a memorandum perfects it.

Concrete Structures, Inc. v. Tidewater Crane & Rigging Co. (In Re Concrete Structures, Inc.) · filed 2001-03-30(53)

These instructions are precisely those contemplated by § 101(53) which indicates that a statutory lien arises by statute (here, the Virginia mechanic’s lien statute) on specified circumstances and conditions (those set forth in § 43-4).

Section 101(53) treats a West Virginia mechanic’s lien as a statutory lien because it arises by force of statute, even though it is enforced through judicial proceedings.

In re Chambers · filed 2001-07-12(53)

In West Virginia, the mechanics’ liens arise and are created by the force of statute, and are merely enforced through judicial proceedings. Therefore, since a mechanic’s lien under West Virginia law is a statutory lien, the Court finds that the Debtor may not avoid the lien of 84 Lumber under § 522(f).

Section 101(53) treats a condominium association’s lien for unpaid assessments as a statutory lien when the recorded declaration and assessment create it; a later action to enforce the lien does not change its character.

Reece v. Parkview Villas of Scottsdale Owners' Ass'n (In Re Reece) · filed 2001-08-24(53)

In this case, the “specified circumstances or conditions” stated in 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) were the filing of the declaration and the assessment by the Association. When the debtor failed to make payments on the assessment issued by the Association, the Association had a vahd and perfected hen against the property without need for further action. There was no additional legal or equitable process invoked to create the hen. Additionally, the Association’s later efforts to enforce the hen in Justice Court did not, in any way, alter the essential statutory nature of the hen.

Section 101(37) defines a lien to include a deed of trust even when the creditor’s claim has no supporting collateral value.

Kolich v. Antioch Laurel Veterinary Hospital, Inc. (In Re Kolich) · filed 2002-02-22(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a lien as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). Norbank’s second Deed of Trust falls within that definitional language and accordingly should have been included in the calculation. The lien avoidance formula and the statutory definition, read together, plainly so require.

Section 101(37)'s definition of a lien does not include a seller's right to withhold and stop delivery of goods.

In Re Kellstrom Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-08-20(37)

Section 101(37) defines a “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” ... Therefore, the right to withhold and stop delivery is not a “lien” for purposes of section 363(f)(3).

A lien under § 101(37) requires an interest in property that secures a debt or obligation; without property to which it can attach, the lien is not enforceable.

Mechling v. Bonner County (In Re Mechling) · filed 2002-09-26(37)

A “lien” is defined as “a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). Based on this definition, Clowney and other courts have determined that two things are necessary before an enforceable lien exists: an interest in property and a debt or obligation. ... At and from the time the County recorded its Notice, and up to the time the Debtors filed bankruptcy, no res ever existed on which the lien could attach. Thus, the Court concludes that the County held no valid and enforceable lien in property of the Debtors in existence at the time of the bankruptcy filing.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing payment of a debt or performance of an obligation; that definition includes a lien on real property.

Keller v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 2003-02-04(37)

It does define “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). We therefore conclude that a lien is an interest in real property and qualifies as an aggregate interest in the minor child’s residence under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing a debt or obligation, even when the lien has no secured value.

Kolich v. Antioch Laurel Vet. · filed 2003-05-02(37)

But that parlance is not reflected in the Code’s definition of a lien: “‘lien’ means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). We find no indication that Congress intended a different definition of “liens” in § 522(f)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising solely by force of statute on specified circumstances or conditions.

In Re Sheldahl, Inc. · filed 2003-09-09(53)

The term “Statutory Lien” means a lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). ... The City’s lien is a statutory lien and is not subject to avoidance under § 544(a)(3) because Congress expressly limited the trustee’s powers to avoid statutory liens in 11 U.S.C. § 545.

Section 101(53) includes an Illinois statutory landlord lien on crops within its definition of a statutory lien.

Pogge v. Powers (In re Smith) · filed 2003-12-11(53)

The Illinois statutory landlord hen provision of 735 ILCS 5/9-316 clearly falls within the definition of a statutory hen set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). Therefore, it may be avoided by a trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 545.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing an obligation; the definition does not depend on the property's value.

In Re Harris · filed 2004-02-09(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “lien” to mean a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). This definition of the word “lien” in the Code does not refer to the value, or to any particular value, of the “charge against or interest in” the collateral.

Section 101(36) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing an obligation; a garnishment lien prevented from attaching to wages creates no such interest.

In Re Earley · filed 2004-03-05(36)

A “lien” is a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). But there is no “charge against or interest in property” if the automatic stay prevents the lien from attaching.

Section 101(53) treats a lien arising by force of statute without judicial action as a statutory lien, even when a clerk dockets it as a judgment.

In Re Schick · filed 2004-05-04(53)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that because the NJ MVC’s hen arises by force of the surcharge statute, the NJ MVC’s hen is statutory under 11 U.S.C. § 101(53), and thus cannot be avoided under section 522(f).

Section 101(53) classifies an Illinois mechanics lien as a statutory lien.

Golfview Developmental Center, Inc. v. All-Tech Decorating Co. (In Re Golfview Developmental Center, Inc.) · filed 2004-05-11(53)

First, the Court notes that an Illinois mechanics lien pursuant to the Act is a “statutory lien” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien to include a lien arising solely by force of a statute.

In re Nicolescu · filed 2004-06-03(53)

The Medicaid lien asserted by Anthem clearly falls within the definition of a statutory lien as it arose solely by force of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17b-94(a).

Section 101(37) includes an established attorney’s charging lien within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a lien, whether it is legal or equitable.

Corzin v. Decker, Vonau, Sybert & Lackey, Co. (In Re Simms Construction Services Co.) · filed 2004-07-08(37)

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines a “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). Once the existence of an attorney’s charging lien is established, it is treated as a lien for all purposes under the Bankruptcy Code. It does not matter whether the lien is characterized as “legal” or “equitable.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property that secures payment or performance; a lis pendens that merely gives notice does not qualify.

In Re Adamson · filed 2004-07-12(37)

A lien is a “charge against or interest in property to secured payment of debtor or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... Accordingly, the lis pendens, which as the Court has stated is the equivalent of a notice, does not secure payment, performance or constitute a charge against the Debtor’s property.

Section 101(37)’s definition of a lien includes an unrecorded mortgage that remains valid against the mortgagor under state law.

In Re Smith · filed 2004-09-30(37)

It follows that even an unrecorded mortgage is “an interest in property to secure payment of a debt” and thus a lien within the meaning of §§ 101(37) and 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment; an interest the creditor cannot use to collect payment does not secure its claim.

In re White · filed 2004-12-09(37)

If the IRS has no ability to convert its lien on personal property to payment, then the property does not “secure payment” and it has no value to the IRS. The effect of the IRS’s inability to enforce its lien and collect payment is that its claim is not a secured claim, but is an unsecured claim.

Section 101(37) defines a lien to include statutory liens as well as recorded liens.

Radcliffe v. LPP Mortgage Ltd · filed 2005-03-30(37)

Making matters worse for LPP’s argument, the Bankruptcy Code defines “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), a definition that applies equally to statutory and recorded liens.

A mechanic’s lien that arises by statute remains a statutory lien under § 101 when a later judgment enforces it.

In re Thames · filed 2005-06-20(36), (53)

Stronks’s lien is a statutory lien, not a judicial lien, and may not be avoided under § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 101 treats a lien created by statute and perfected through ministerial docketing as a statutory lien, even when docketing gives it the effect of a judgment.

In Re: Schick · filed 2005-08-09(36), (53)

As we made clear in Graffen, the mere act of docketing a debt by the Clerk of the Superior Court as part of his ministerial duties is insufficient to render the MVC’s lien a judicial lien. ... In these circumstances, the lien held by the MVC is one that arises “solely by force of statute” within the definition of a statutory lien, in 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

An assignment of proceeds that serves as payment of an obligation rather than securing payment is not a lien.

Dircks v. Global Financial Credit, L.L.C. (In re Dircks) · filed 2005-08-15(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... However, a consideration of the Agreement reveals that it does not convey a “lien” to the Defendant, regardless of the fact that the Plaintiff-debtors refer to the interest conveyed to the Defendant as a “lien.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing payment or performance; immediate ability to seize the property is not required.

United States v. White · filed 2006-03-06(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a lien as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... The Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the IRS’s claim was unsecured. Any exemption applicable to Debtor’s personalty does not void the tax lien. The IRS’s tax lien has value independent of the IRS’s ability to immediately seize the property.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures an obligation; an ownership interest is not a lien.

In Re Anderson · filed 2006-04-18(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a lien as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of the debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). The interest that the Respondent owns in the Property is an ownership interest, not a lien.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing a debt or obligation.

In Re Murray · filed 2006-06-06(37)

The Court must look to § 101(37) to determine whether a debt is “secured” by a lien. ... As such, the claim of Nuvell is “secured.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing payment of a debt or performance of an obligation; an Ohio dower interest is not a lien.

In Re Rudicil · filed 2006-06-07(37)

Nor is the dower interest a lien. “Lien” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as “[a] charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property that secures payment of a debt.

In Re Bufford · filed 2006-06-13(37)

11 U.S.C. § 101 establishes that a debt is “secured” by a lien. ... This Court agrees.

Section 101(37) defines a lien broadly enough to include an inchoate lien on a debtor’s interest in property.

Wansor v. First Place Bank (In Re Wansor) · filed 2006-07-25(37)

Section 101(37) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[t]he term ‘lien’ means a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... The legislative history thus makes clear the term “lien” includes inchoate liens. ... The Bank has at least an inchoate lien.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

In Re Murray · filed 2006-08-22(37)

The Court must look to § 101(37) to determine whether a debt is “secured” by a lien. ... Section 101(37) provides: “The term ‘lien’ means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” ... As in Brown, there is no argument that Nuvell does not hold a valid lien against Debtors’ vehicle that secures payment of the underlying debt. As such, the claim of Nuvell is “secured.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing a debt; a due-on-sale clause is not a lien.

Federal Communications Commission v. Airadigm Communications, Inc. (In Re Airadigm Communications, Inc.) · filed 2007-04-17(37)

A due-on-sale clause is not a lien. It is a contractual right to accelerate the payment period for a debt upon the sale of property that secures the debt. A lien is “a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). A contractual right to accelerate payment on sale of collateral is entirely distinct from the lien itself.

Section 101(37) defines a lien but does not determine how a secured claim is treated under a Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Kinsey · filed 2007-05-09(37)

The mere definition of “lien” found in § 101(37) does not contemplate the manner in which a secured claim is treated under a Chapter 13 plan as § 506 does.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing a debt, allowing a claim backed by such a lien to qualify as secured.

Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson · filed 2007-05-17(37)

Thus, because the 910 claims are deemed “allowed” under § 502(a) and “secured” under § 101(37), the claims are “allowed secured claims” and § 1325(a)(5) applies to require payment of those claims on the basis of their present value.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2008-03-12(37)

The due-on-sale provision contained in the federal regulation is not a “charge against or interest in property” but is instead a regulation regarding the terms of payment for the debt.

A lien is a charge against or interest in property securing a debt or obligation; a due-on-sale payment term is not a lien.

Airadigm Comm Inc v. FCC · filed 2008-03-12(37)

The bankruptcy code defines a “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obliga- tion.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). The due-on-sale provision contained in the federal regulation is not a “charge against or interest in property” but is instead a regulation regard- ing the terms of payment for the debt.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one that arises by force of a statute under specified conditions or circumstances.

Zebley v. McKay (In Re Nicolls) · filed 2008-03-18(53)

Parkview’s lien qualifies as a statutory lien for purposes of this provision. A lien is defined for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code in general as a charge or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). A statutory lien is a lien that arises by force of a statute under specified conditions or circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing a debt or obligation; state law determines whether a particular mortgage creates that interest.

Riley v. Sullivan (Sullivan) · filed 2008-05-09(37)

Further, and importantly in this appeal, under § 101(37) of the Code, a lien is “a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), and while the classification of a lien is a matter of federal law, “the issue of whether a particular mortgage is a ‘charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt’... is one of state law.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

In Re Mirant Corp. · filed 2008-05-15(37)

Because Woodstone’s claims against N.Y. Gen in the Barrett Litigation do not secure a debt or an obligation to perform, Woodstone cannot be asserting a lien.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising solely by force of a statute; a lien created without a hearing or trial falls within that definition.

Smith v. Botzet (In Re Smith) · filed 2009-02-10(53)

The term “statutory lien” means lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or lien for distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute. ... The Real Property Lien was created solely by force of Section 428 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, and not by virtue of any hearing or trial.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising by force of a statute under specified conditions; a California family law attorney’s real property lien fits that definition.

In Re Scott · filed 2009-03-04(53)

A Family Law Attorney’s Real Property Lien created under Cal. Faro.Code § 2033 falls squarely within the definition of a statutory lien. A “statutory lien” is a lien “arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, ... but does not include security interest or judicial lien.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

A lien that arises by statute without prior judicial action is a statutory lien, even if judicial proceedings occur after it is recorded.

In Re Newton · filed 2009-03-20(53)

By contrast, a statutory lien arises “solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). ... No judicial action was needed before the lien could be recorded, and thus, this is a statutory liens and not a judicial lien subject to lien avoidance.

Section 101(53)’s definition of a statutory lien includes a federal tax lien assessed under IRC § 6321.

Spicer v. United States (In Re Motion Marketing Solutions, Inc.) · filed 2009-04-16(53)

A statutory lien is a “lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). There can be no dispute that a tax lien assessed under IRC § 6321 falls within the Code’s definition of a statutory lien.

Section 101(37) defines a lien to include mortgages and deeds of trust that secure a debt.

In Re Roderick · filed 2010-03-08(37)

All such forms of security are within the definition of “lien” under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(53) excludes security interests from the definition of a statutory lien.

In Re DBSI, Inc. · filed 2010-05-12(53)

The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code provides that security interests are not statutory liens.

Section 101(37)’s definition of a lien covers an interest that secures payments on a debt and the remaining balance, regardless of the collateral’s value.

White v. Wachovia Dealer Services, Inc. (In Re Wyatt) · filed 2010-11-17(37)

First, the Habermans did not default on their loan payments: they continued (as did Wyatt here) to make the monthly payments postpetition, and the avoided lien had, by reason of the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), secured those payments of the debt, and continued as those payments were made to secure the payment of the remaining balance of the debt, without regard to the value of the collateral.

Section 101(37) requires an in rem property claim, rather than a personal claim, for a lien.

In re Arnold · filed 2012-11-28(37)

For example, the Code’s use of the phrase “charge against or interest in property” in the definition of “lien” implies that the claim referred to in § 1322(b)(2) must be an in rem claim, rather than an in personam claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(37) includes condominium assessment liens in its definition of liens because they charge property to secure an obligation to pay assessments.

In re Plummer · filed 2013-01-14(37)

But no matter the specific definitional category in which condominium assessment liens fall, there is no question but that an assessment lien is a charge against the condominium owner’s property to secure performance of the owner’s obligation to pay assessments. As such, condominium assessment liens squarely fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of liens and are subject to the application of Bankruptcy Code section 506.

Section 101(37) does not require a lien to be perfected against other creditors.

In re Turner · filed 2013-04-02(37)

It follows that § 101(37) does not include in the definition of “lien” that the charge against the debtor’s property have been perfected against other creditors.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien to include a lien that arises by statute when specified conditions, such as insolvency or bankruptcy, occur.

Willson v. McPhersons Partnership (In re Central Louisiana Grain Cooperative, Inc.) · filed 2013-08-08(53)

Because this privilege arises by statute upon “specified circumstances or conditions” — insolvency or bankruptcy — it satisfies the definition of a statutory lien under section 101(53).

Section 101(37)'s definition of a lien includes both mortgages and deeds to secure debt.

In re Smith · filed 2014-07-23(37)

11 U.S.C. § 101(37) states: “'Lien' means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt....” So the bankruptcy definition encompasses both mortgages and deeds to secure debt, also referred to frequently as security deeds.

Section 101(53) treats a condominium association’s lien arising from a statutory privilege as a statutory lien, even when the association must take steps to preserve it.

In re Green · filed 2014-09-12(53)

The fact that a creditor must take certain subsequent steps to preserve a privilege does not affect the fact that the privilege arises “solely by force of a statute.”

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or as a lien for distress of rent.

In re City of Stockton · filed 2015-02-27(53)

The PERL § 20574 termination lien qualifies as a “statutory lien” under the Bankruptcy Code. A “statutory lien” is a lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions or lien for distress of rent, even if not based on statute. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

Section 101(53) treats a lien arising solely by force of statute as a statutory lien, including AEELA’s lien on members’ savings and contributions.

Fonseca v. Government Employees Ass'n (In re Fonseca) · filed 2015-05-07(53)

It is evident that a member’s loans with AEELA are secured by the collateral mentioned in article 7 of P.R. Law 133, including their savings and contributions. This lien arises solely by force of such statute and would therefore qualify as a statutory hen as defined by § 101(53) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as a lien arising solely by force of a statute under specified circumstances or conditions.

Fonseca v. Government Employees Ass'n (Fonseca) · filed 2015-12-24(53)

This lien arose solely by force of the statute and, therefore, qualified as a statutory lien as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

In re Scarver · filed 2016-08-24(37)

To have a secured claim in bankruptcy, the creditor must have recourse in property; if there is no property, the creditor’s claim is not secured.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions; a lien created by loan documents does not qualify.

In re Wildgoose · filed 2016-09-30(53)

The lien is not, for bankruptcy purposes, a statutory lien. A statutory lien is a “lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

Section 101(37) defines a lien broadly enough to include an unenforceable charge against property.

CRP Holdings, A-1, LLC v. O'Sullivan (In Re O'Sullivan) · filed 2016-11-14(37)

Judicial liens are a subset of "liens," which are defined as "charge[s] against or interest[s] in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). This definition of "liens" suggests that both unenforceable "charge[s] against" property and enforceable "interest[s] in" property fall within its scope.

Section 101(53) requires a statutory lien to arise by force of statute, either outright or automatically upon a specified condition, rather than from an agreement to grant the lien.

Peaje Investments LLC v. PR Highways and Transportation · filed 2018-08-08(53)

Because the Act does not automatically trigger a lien upon the performance of a specified condition, apart from the Authority's decision to grant a lien, it does not create a statutory lien.

Section 101(53) requires a statutory lien to arise by force of statute, rather than from a voluntary agreement to grant a lien.

Peaje Invs. LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) · filed 2018-08-08(53)

The Enabling Act differs from these statutes in an important respect: A pledge of revenues does not attach automatically when the Authority passes a resolution issuing bonds. Rather, it arises only when the Authority chooses to grant it. Because the Act does not automatically trigger a lien upon the performance of a specified condition, apart from the Authority's decision to grant a lien, it does not create a statutory lien.

A lien secures payment or performance of an obligation without transferring ownership of the property to the lienholder.

In re Shannon · filed 2018-09-07(37)

In other words, a lien is simply a means of securing payment of a debt; it does not confer ownership of the property.

Section 101(37) includes a cloud on title created by a recorded judgment as a lien, even when the judgment creates no lien under state law.

CRP Holdings A-1, LLC v. O'Sullivan (In Re O'Sullivan) · filed 2019-02-01(37)

We agree with the BAP that CRP’s recording of the foreign judgment created a cloud on title under Missouri law sufficient to constitute a “charge against or interest in” O’Sullivan’s property under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(37) requires a charge against or interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation; an order governing occupancy alone is not a lien.

In re Mus · filed 2019-03-01(37)

True, the Code does not define the term "obligation," however, this Court must return to the statutory definition of "lien." In this definition, "a charge against or interest in property" must be read to modify both "to secure payment of a debt" and also "to secure performance of an obligation."

Section 101 distinguishes judicial liens from statutory liens by how they arise: a statutory lien arises solely by force of a statute, while a judicial lien is obtained through legal process.

Wigger v. State Treasurer (In re Wigger) · filed 2019-04-16(36), (53)

The italicized text of the statute directs the court to consider the inception or origin of the challenged lien and makes clear that, as between the statutory and judicial categories, a lien must be either a statutory lien, or a judicial lien, but not both.

Section 101(37) requires an underlying debt or obligation for a lien to exist.

Kellogg v. First Land Dev., LLC (In re Kellogg) · filed 2019-05-08(37)

A lien cannot be created in the absence of an underlying debt or obligation.

Section 101(53) distinguishes a statutory lien from a security interest, but separate liens of each kind may support the same claim.

Holmes v. Cmty. Hills Condo. Ass'n, Inc. (In re Holmes) · filed 2019-05-21(53)

Even so, there is no text or even legislative history suggesting that a single claim cannot be supported by more than one category of lien. Two liens-one statutory, and the other a security interest-can coexist and support the same claim without violating the principle that any particular lien must be one thing or the other.

A lien on a contingent future property interest remains a lien even if enforcement depends on a future event.

Davis v. Carrington · filed 2019-08-28(37)

The bankruptcy code defines a “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37)1. ... Even if enforceability of the lien is dependent on the happening of the contingent, that does not make is any less a lien.

Section 101 defines a judicial lien as one obtained through legal process and a security interest as a lien created by agreement, a distinction that places deeds of trust in the latter category.

Hall v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-02-07(36), (51)

Notably, the bankruptcy code also distinguishes between a “judicial lien,” defined as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding,” and a “security interest,” defined as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(36), 101(51). Thus, use of the term “judgment” in § 524(a)(1) indicates that § 524 is limited only to that specific type of judicial lien and does not apply to security interests like deeds of trust.

Section 101(53) defines statutory liens to include real property tax liens.

In re: Christopher Barksdale · filed 2020-08-28(53)

Real property tax liens are statutory liens, not judicial liens.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing a debt; state law determines whether a mortgage creates that interest.

In the Matter of: Carlos A. Rodriguez-Quintana and Luz Marie Vazquez-Santiago · filed 2020-08-19(37)

For purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 544, a lien is defined under federal law as “a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt” (11 U.S.C. § 101(37)) but the issue of whether a particular mortgage meets that definition is one of state law. ... The creditors do not have a valid mortgage because it was not recorded, which is an essential act. The most they could hold is an unsecured personal obligation, which is not an unperfected security interest as suggested by Trustee.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation; judicial liens therefore count as interests in property.

Hamilton Road Realty LLC · filed 2021-04-26(37)

A lien is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” (emphasis added). It follows that “a lien is but one type of interest.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien to include a recorded judgment against a Florida homestead even when the judgment is presently unenforceable under state law.

Ricardo Ruben Uliambre Pettengill · filed 2021-12-09(37)

Consequently, a recorded judgment, irrespective of its present enforceability, is a prototypical example of a “charge” and falls within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a “lien.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, including a tax certificate holder’s right to payment from foreclosure sale proceeds.

Ammar Yassin · filed 2022-03-30(37)

The Tax Certificate Statute’s payment scheme for the distribution of the sale proceeds also meets the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a lien, which is a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(37) defines a lien to include a seller’s interest securing payment under a Pennsylvania land installment contract.

Belarminio Peralta v. · filed 2022-09-07(37)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a lien is a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). And Per- alta’s contract fits the bill.

Section 101(37)’s definition of a lien covers the interest securing payment under a Pennsylvania installment land contract.

Robyn E. Pennington · filed 2022-10-05(37)

When the McDonalds entered the Land Contract with the Penningtons, a lien attached. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a lien is a “charge against or interest in the property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. Section 101(37). That lien was maintained when the McDonalds transferred their interest in the Property to the Plaintiffs.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

Keech v. Pennington · filed 2022-10-05(37)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a lien is a “charge against or interest in the property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. Section 101(37). That lien was maintained when the McDonalds transferred their interest in the Property to the Plaintiffs.

Section 101(37)’s definition of a lien includes the interest unpaid produce suppliers hold in assets subject to a PACA trust.

Peterson Farms, Inc. v. Something Sweet Acquisition · filed 2025-10-20(37)

The statutory trust that arises under PACA satisfies this definition of the term “lien.”

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property that secures payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

In re Fulcrum Loan Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-10-31(37)

As Part II explains, the interests the Plaintiffs claim in the Fulcrum Property constitute the assertion of a lien, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), on it.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien as one arising by force of statute when specified conditions occur; later judicial enforcement does not make it a judicial lien.

In re Hicks · filed 2026-02-26(53)

The Court finds that the City’s lien arose after the events and circumstances articulated in the statute occurred and the lien is limited to the costs expended by the City to abate the ordinance violation and quantified in the amount of those costs. The City’s lien was not due to any prior consensual arrangement between the parties and could not have been obtained through judicial means by any creditor other than the City, which is the entity authorized by the statute to abate the ordinance violation in the event the debtors did not. For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the City’s lien is statutory rather than judicial.

Section 101 defines a lien as an interest in property securing an obligation and a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment, levy, or other legal process.

Dowding v. Open Terrace Associates, LLC (In Re Dowding) · filed 2005-02-04(36)–(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “lien” as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,” and recognizes a “judicial lien” as a variety of “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36)–(37); ... Open Terrace acquired and recorded its liens against the Jackson County property in March of 2001, thus becoming a secured creditor well before Dowding’s bankruptcy filing.

Section 101(37)’s definition of a lien does not include a cautionary notice of complaint that gives notice of litigation but creates no interest in property securing a debt.

MB Joma, Inc. v. Nieves · filed 2009-04-10(37)

Because we agree with the bankruptcy court that the cautionary notice of complaint did not create a lien on MB Joma’s property, and because the Creditors did not comply with §§ 1801-1805 of the Mortgage Law so as to obtain a lien on MB Joma’s property pursuant to § 1806 of the Mortgage Law, we hold that the bankruptcy court’s determination that the Creditors were unsecured must stand.

Section 101(31)(B)’s list of insiders is nonexclusive and can include an entity whose close relationship with the debtor warrants closer scrutiny of its dealings.

Gould v. Liebl-Weaver · filed 2024-12-16(31)(B)

KT Weaver Construction does not fit tidily into this definition; however, Section 101(31)(B) is not exclusive, and insiders include “those not listed in the statutory definition, but who have a ‘sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that . . . conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.’” ... The Court finds KT Weaver Construction did not deal with Debtor at arm’s length as evidenced by the lax invoicing policy, undocumented work, and the fact KT Weaver, the sole owner, is Liebl-Weaver’s husband.

Section 101(31)'s non-statutory insider inquiry considers the creditor's closeness to the debtor and whether their transaction was at arm’s length.

Halperin v. Wills · filed 2024-08-13(31)

While the In re Hollaway court looked to each factor separately, 955 F.2d at ... 1011–14, it also cited the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 101(31), which defines an insider as “a person or entity with ‘a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.’” Id. at 1010–11. ... The Court finds the undisputed facts to raise genuine issues about how close the Wills Trust was to SCC.

A person who controls a corporate debtor qualifies as an insider under § 101(31).

Garcia Grain Trading Corp. v. Plascencia, Sr. · filed 2024-06-24(31)(B)(iii)

This Court finds that this fact, when accepted as true, is sufficient to demonstrate Insider status under § 101(31), through control of the Debtor.

Section 101(31)(B)(ii) treats an officer of a corporate debtor as an insider.

Smith v. DiSeveria · filed 2024-03-11(31)(B)(ii)

As DiSeveria was an officer, he was a statutory “insider” on the dates of the Transfers.

The spouse of an LLC debtor’s sole owner and manager is an insider under § 101(31)(B)(vi).

Exigent Landscaping, LLC · filed 2024-02-12(31)(B)(vi)

The proposed purchaser, Ms. Pisarski, is an “insider” of the Debtor, under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “insider.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(vi).

Section 101 treats a controlling member of a limited liability company as an insider.

SCHWARTZER v. PISANELLI BICE, PLLC · filed 2023-10-20(31)(B)(iii) and (31)(E)

Moreover, GFSI, as the sole petitioning creditor, filed the involuntary bankruptcy though it was clearly a statutory insider.8 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(31)(B)(iii) and (E).

For an individual debtor, § 101(31)(A) defines the relationships that qualify a creditor as an insider; a preference claim must allege facts showing the required relationship.

Mendelsohn v. The Dalton School, Inc. · filed 2023-12-28(31)(A)

Here, where the Debtor is an individual, Defendant must be one of the following to qualify as an insider for purposes of § 547: “(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; (ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (iii) general partner of the debtor; or (iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A). ... According to the Trustee, the tuition payments made to Defendant outside the 90-day preference period total $111,740.98, Compl ¶ 14, yet the Trustee includes no allegations demonstrating the requisite relationship between Defendant and the Debtor beyond merely quoting the relevant statutory language. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 64; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A); Fitzsimons, 2018 WL 6329139, at *20 (dismissing preference claim where complaints “fail to allege any facts demonstrating” insider relationship).

An appellate court reviews for clear error a bankruptcy court’s application of an arm’s-length test to determine non-statutory insider status under § 101(31).

U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC · filed 2018-03-05(31)

The Court of Appeals therefore applied the appropriate standard in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determina­ tion that Rabkin did not qualify as an insider because his transaction with MBP was conducted at arm’s length. A conclusion of that kind primarily rests with a bankruptcy court, subject only to review for clear error.

Under § 101(31)(B)(iii), a person in control of a corporate debtor is a statutory insider.

Klauder v. Echo/Rt Holdings, LLC (In re RayTrans Holding, Inc.) · filed 2017-08-10(31)(B)(iii)

Control, as enumerated in section 101(31)(B)(iii), is the only potentially applicable part of the definition of insider that would render the defendants statutory insiders. ... This Court finds that the defendants are not statutory insiders, as they do not fall within any of the enumerated examples defining “insider” under the Code.

Section 101(31)(B) includes a corporation’s directors, officers, persons in control, and their relatives as insiders.

Brown v. Luboff (In re Sigma-Tech Sales, Inc.) · filed 2017-07-07(31)(B)

First, the Transfers were made to the Luboffs, who are insiders of the Debt- or, Disc-O-Tech, Gold Star and Triple Play. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (defining insider of a corporation to include directors, officers, persons in control, and relatives of the foregoing parties).

For a corporate debtor, an officer and the officer’s spouse are insiders.

California Bank & Trust v. Licursi (In re Licursi) · filed 2017-07-12(31)(B)

The insider of a corporate debtor is defined as a director or officer or person in control of the debtor or a relative of a director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. 11 USC § 101(31)(B). The Court has not been given evidence of Susan’s actual status in Spectrum Aluminum, but it is clear that John is an officer and that Susan is his wife. Thus the December 2010 financial statements and her letters to CB & T impose liability on Susan as well as John.

Section 101(31) does not make a corporation a statutory insider of a debtor merely because its owner formerly served as a director of a different debtor.

Spradlin ex rel. J.A.D. Coal Co. v. Wrigley's 7-711, Inc. (In re Licking River Mining, LLC) · filed 2017-06-21(31)

Rather, the only plausible inferences supported by factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are that non-debtor Whitt wholly owns Wrigley and that Whitt served on U.S. Coal’s board of directors at some point. These facts are insufficient to impute statutory insider status upon Wrigley under § 101(31) as to any Transferor Debtor.

Members of a debtor’s board are statutory insiders under § 101(31)(B).

In re CS Mining, LLC · filed 2017-07-27(31)(B)

As members of the Board, Richards, Walker, Cooper, Karban, Bryan, and Reilly are statutory per se insiders as the term is defined by § 101(31)(B).

Section 101(31)’s list of insiders is illustrative, so a person outside its listed categories may still qualify as an insider based on a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor.

Seaver v. Glasser · filed 2017-06-12(31)

The parties agree that Ms. Glasser does not fall within any of the statutorily defined categories of insiders with respect to the Debtor, but the list of insiders in § 101(31) “is illustrative, not exclusive,” and so we must look beyond the statutory categories to determine if Ms. Glasser is an insider of the Debtor.

Section 101(31)(A)(i) includes a debtor’s mother as an insider because she is a relative.

Williams v. McNabb (In re McNabb) · filed 2017-05-05(31)(A)(i)

The Bankruptcy Code defines an “insider” as the “relative of a debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i). Section 101(45) defines “relative” as an “individual related by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(45). In the case at bar, the Defendant is Joseph McNabb’s mother and is clearly an insider within the meaning of §§ 101 and 547(b).

Section 101(31)(B) includes a corporate debtor’s director among statutory insiders.

Gordon v. Rogich (In re Alpha Protective Services, Inc.) · filed 2017-04-24(31)(B)

In accordance with the reasoning articulated above, the Court will GRANT partial summary judgment to the Trustee as to Rogich being an insider of the Debtor. The Trustee has shown Rogich is a statutory insider pursuant to § 101(31)(B)(ii) due to his status as a director at the time of the transfer on March 11, 2011, and Rogich does not refute that fact.

Section 101(31)(B) treats a corporate debtor’s director as an insider.

Gordon v. Hackenberry (In re Alpha Protective Services, Inc.) · filed 2017-04-24(31)(B)(ii)

The Trustee has shown Hackenberry is a statutory insider pursuant to § 101(31)(B)(ii) due to his status as a director at the time of the transfer on February 11, 2011, and Hackenberry does not refute that fact.

Section 101(31)(B)(vi) does not treat an LLC as a debtor’s relative or make it a statutory insider merely because its owner is related to a debtor’s insider.

Spradlin v. Monday Coal, LLC (In re Licking River Mining, LLC) · filed 2017-04-14(31)(B)(vi)

Monday, an LLC, cannot be a “relative” of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of a Debtor, as the term “relative” connotes an “individual” under § 101(45). ... Thus, Monday is not alleged to be a statutory insider of any Debtor, including Resources, under § 101(31)(B).

Section 101(31)(B) does not make a corporate creditor a statutory insider solely because its president is a director of the debtor.

Gordon v. Security Essentials, Inc. (In re Alpha Protective Services, Inc.) · filed 2017-04-24(31)(B)

Because Security Essentials was not of the types of statutory insiders enumerated in § 101(31)(B), it was not a statutory insider.

Section 101(31) includes an officer of a corporate debtor among its insiders.

Mangan v. Mason (In re Save Home Energy Inc.) · filed 2017-03-31(31)

The Defendants here are insiders pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(81), which defines an insider by setting forth a list of relationships, including officer or director of a corporate debtor.

Section 101 treats a debtor’s parents-in-law as insiders because they are relatives by marriage within the third degree.

Kohut v. Wandrie (In re Wandrie) · filed 2017-02-10(31)(A)(i), (45)

As Debtor’s father-in-law and mother-in-law, Peter and Genevieve Wandrie were "insiders” under the definition in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(31)(A)(I) ("Insider” includes, in the case of an individual debtor, a "relative of the debtor.”), 101(45) ("The term ‘relative’ means individual related by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law ,...”) Debtor's father-in-law and mother-in-law were related to Debtor by “affinity” (t.e., by marriage rather than by blood) within the first degree.

Section 101(31)(E) includes an insider of a corporate debtor’s affiliate among the debtor’s insiders.

Howell v. Fulford (In re Southern Home & Ranch Supply, Inc. ) · filed 2016-12-28(31)(E)

Therefore, as an insider of an affiliate, SRH is an insider of the Debtor.

Section 101(31)(A)(i) treats a debtor’s mother-in-law as an insider.

Ruiz v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy) · filed 2017-02-08(31)(A)(i)

Since Federico is Mr. Kennedy’s mother-in-law and therefore an “insider” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i), section 727(a)(7) is also applicable to deny Mr. Kennedy a discharge.

A corporation whose president is an individual debtor is an insider of that debtor.

Sammarco v. Dini (In re Dini) · filed 2016-12-15(31)(A)(iv)

The Code defines the term “insider,” in relevant part, as a “corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control” if the debtor is an individual and as an “officer of the debtor” if the debtor is a corporation. ... Here, the parties do not dispute that Dini was the president of NTMS. Thus, he and NTMS were “insiders” of one another for purposes of § 727(a)(7).

Section 101(31)(A)(i) includes a debtor’s relatives, such as a mother or brother, in the definition of an insider.

Layng v. Urbonas (In re Urbonas) · filed 2015-09-30(31)(A)(i)

Similarly, it is clear that the mother and brother were insiders of the Debtors as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i).

Section 101(31)(A)(i) includes a relative of an individual debtor in the definition of insider.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Evans (In re Evans) · filed 2015-09-25(31)(A)(i)

Mr. Evans’s grandmother is an insider as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (3 l)(A)(i).

Section 101(31)(A)(iv) treats a corporation as a debtor’s insider when the debtor is its director.

Paik v. Lee (In re Lee) · filed 2015-09-08(31)(A)(iv)

Lee’s admitted role as a director of SNC makes SNC his insider for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(B).

Section 101(31)(A) includes an individual debtor’s relative within the definition of an insider.

Ellis v. Mirghanbari (In re Pittman) · filed 2015-09-04(31)(A)

The transfer in this case occurred 92 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The Defendant is the mother of Debtor Shawna Pittman. For an individual, an insider is defined in § 101(31)(A) to include a relative of the debtor. The Trustee has therefore established that the transfer was made within one year of the bankruptcy filing to an insider.

Section 101(31)(A) gives a nonexclusive list of insiders; a creditor may qualify when its close relationship with an individual debtor leads to dealings that are not at arm’s length.

Walters v. Farmers Korner, Inc. (In re Smith) · filed 2015-08-17(31)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code’s use of the term “includes” means the list is not limiting. Rather, the term “insider” is inclusive and is defined by way of examples.

Section 101(31)(B) does not classify an independent contractor as a corporate insider when he holds none of the listed roles or relationships.

In re Experient Corp. · filed 2015-08-12(31)(B)

Regardless, the testimony of both McCarthy and O’Neil support a conclusion McCarthy is not a statutory insider.

Section 101(31) recognizes insider relationships based on a debtor’s ownership and control of a corporation.

Seror v. Lopez (In re Lopez) · filed 2015-06-19(31)(A)(iv), (31)(B)(iii)

As such, she is considered an insider of LDT under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(iv), and LDT is an insider of debtor Lopez under § 101(31)(B)(iii).

Section 101(31)'s definition of insider is nonexclusive and can cover people outside its listed categories.

Butler v. Wojtkun (In re Wojtkun) · filed 2015-07-20(31)

Nevertheless, the word “includes” indicates that the definition of “insider” is not limited to the enumerated list.

Section 101(31)(B) determines whether a corporate employee is an insider by the employee’s actual role and authority, not a job title alone.

In re Global Aviation Holdings Inc. · filed 2012-07-24(31)(B)

Given their intermediate positions in the corporate chain of command, their distance from the board and senior management, and the limited extent of their corporate authority, it is apparent that none of the KERP Employees are insiders under § 101(31)(B).

A partnership’s general partner is not a statutory insider of an individual debtor merely because the debtor is a limited partner.

In re Butler · filed 2012-05-29(31)

CSI, Inc. does not employ the debtor. Even if it did, CSI, Inc. is not a general partner of the debtor — it is a general partner of the limited partnership, CSI. Therefore, CSI, Inc. is not a statutory insider.

Section 101(31)(B) allows insider status to be determined from the totality of the circumstances, including a person’s involvement in the debtor’s affairs.

In re Velo Holdings Inc. · filed 2012-06-06(31)(B)

Although the term “insider” is specifically defined by the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B), insider status can also be determined on a case-by-case basis from the totality of the circumstances, including the degree of an individual’s involvement in a debtor’s affairs. ... Additionally, based on the information provided in the DiBenedetto Declaration, the Court is satisfied that those individuals who originally concerned the U.S. Trustee are not insiders of the Debtors.

Section 101(31)(A) includes an individual debtor’s relative and a corporation the debtor controls among the debtor’s insiders.

Mungenast v. Darr (In re Darr) · filed 2012-03-20(31)(A)

An “insider” of an individual debtor includes a “relative of the debtor ... or [a] corporation of which the debtor is ... [a] person in control.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A). The Trust established that there were two insiders of the Debtor (the Debtor’s brother and DDC).

Section 101(31) does not make an auctioneer an insider of a partnership debtor merely because the debtor’s restructuring officer formerly owned the auctioneer and his son now owns it.

Lynch v. Joe Denning & Sons Farms (In Re Joe Denning & Sons Farms) · filed 2012-03-23(31)

As explained below, Country Boys is not a statutory or non-statutory insider under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31).

Section 101(31)(B)(i) treats a corporate debtor’s director as an insider, but a creditor corporation does not become the debtor’s director merely because an individual serves on both boards.

In RE QuVIS, INC. · filed 2012-03-13(31)(B)(i)

In light of the Court's earlier finding that Seacoast was not a member of QuVIS's board of directors, Seacoast was not a "director of the debtor" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(i). And because section 101(31)(B) does not include "de facto director," Seacoast is not a statutory insider of QuVIS under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(31)(B) includes a corporate debtor’s officers and their relatives among its insiders.

In re Strategic Labor, Inc. · filed 2012-03-05(31)(B)

The family wage claimants were Michael Gondek, the debtor’s president and 20% shareholder; James Gondek, the debtor’s secretary and 50.5% shareholder; Richard Gondek, the debtor’s director of professional services and 27% shareholder; and Daniel Gondek, whose primary duties have been described as handling customer support. James is the father of Michael, Richard and Daniel. All are insiders as defined in Bankruptcy Code § 101(31)(B).

Section 101(31) permits a finding of non-statutory insider status based on the closeness of a party’s relationship with the debtor and whether their transaction was conducted at arm’s length.

Lynch v. Winslow (In re Winslow) · filed 2012-02-22(31)

Non-statutory insider status centers on the closeness of the relationship between the debtor and the employed professional, as well as on whether the challenged transaction was made at arm’s length. Both inquiries are fundamentally factual.

Section 101(25)(B)(iii) treats a person who controls a corporate debtor as an insider.

Hunter v. Babcock (In Re Babcock Dairy Co. of Ohio) · filed 1986-12-09(25)(B)(iii)

Without such control, this Court cannot conclude that Babcock was an insider within the contemplation of 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(B)(iii).

Section 101(25)(F) includes a debtor’s managing agent within the definition of an insider.

In Re Bel Air Associates, Ltd. · filed 1980-05-02(25)(F)

Under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(F), P. M. & M. is, therefore, an insider.

Section 101(25) includes a debtor corporation’s director as an insider; the court applied that definition to the director’s status at the time of the transfer.

Jensen-McLean Co. v. Crouthamel Potato Chip Co. (In Re Crouthamel Potato Chip Co.) · filed 1980-09-25(25)

Section 101(25) defines insider to include a director of the debtor corporation.

Section 101(25) includes a corporate debtor’s directors, officers, and controlling persons as insiders.

Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In Re Fulghum Construction Co.) · filed 1980-11-28(25)

Under § 101(25), an “insider” includes, if the debtor is a corporation, a director of the debtor, an officer of the debtor, and a person in control of the debtor. The shareholder was the debtor’s sole shareholder at all times material hereto and was in complete control of the debtor. Both of the general partners were officers and directors of the debtor. The shareholder and its general partners were insiders for the purpose of § 547(b)(4)(B).

Section 101(25) treats a corporate debtor’s president as an insider.

Matter of Skye Marketing Corp. · filed 1981-06-17(25)

Michael Weisman may not be counted as the holder of a claim against the alleged debtor because, as its president, he is an “insider” within the meaning of Code sections 101(25) and 303(b)(2).

Section 101(25) treats a debtor corporation’s officers as insiders.

Seeley v. Church Buildings & Interiors, Inc. (In Re Church Buildings & Interiors, Inc.) · filed 1981-09-16(25)

It is also true that these guarantors were corporate officers of the debtor. Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(25), corporate officers are deemed “insiders” of a debtor corporation, and, § 547(bX4XB) allows avoidance of a preferential transfer for the benefit of a creditor made between 90 days and one year before the petition's filing date where the creditor was an insider who had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.

Section 101(25) includes a corporation’s chief executive officer and principal stockholder in the definition of an insider.

In Re Economy Cast Stone Co. · filed 1981-12-08(25)

This Court further believes that it is not fair and equitable to allow Ernest A. Wiedemann, an insider as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(25), to share the same priority with general unsecured creditors of the Debtor.

Section 101’s insider definition excludes a former shareholder whose stock interest ended by rescission before the transfer at issue.

Lischka v. Vienna International Corp. (In Re Vienna International Corp.) · filed 1982-01-04(25)(E)

At the time that the Garnishee Order After Judgment was entered on Plaintiff’s behalf by the Circuit Court in Civil No. 59679 on December 23, 1980, Plaintiff was not a stockholder in Defendant Vienna. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff was not an insider at the time of the transfer.

Section 101(25)(B)(VI) treats a relative of a corporate debtor’s officer as an insider.

Margraff v. Gruber Bottling Works, Inc. (In Re Gruber Bottling Works, Inc.) · filed 1982-01-05(25)(B)(VI)

It is admitted that the plaintiff is an insider as defined under § 101(25) of the Code. She is a relative of an officer of the debtor. Pursuant to § 101(25)(B)(VI), Mrs. Margraff is, therefore, a statutory insider.

Section 101(25) includes relatives of a corporate debtor’s officer in the definition of insider.

Hafer v. Ardmore Sales Co. (In Re Ardmore Sales Co.) · filed 1982-03-31(25)

Although they are relatives of Molineux and thus insiders of the debtor corporation under the Code, the landlords are not themselves shareholders, officers or directors of the debtor corporation and, consequently, do not owe it any fiduciary duty themselves.

Section 101(25) treats a corporation controlled by an individual debtor as an insider.

Jahanger v. Bedard (In Re Bedard) · filed 1982-04-21(25)

The definition of the term “insider” includes a corporation, if the debtor is an individual and a person in control of the corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25). There is no doubt that the Bedards controlled Family Enterprises, Inc. The corporation, therefore, is a statutory insider.

For a partnership debtor, a person whose veto can prevent the partnership from acting is a person in control and therefore an insider.

In Re Colesville Medical Center Ltd. Partnership · filed 1982-05-10(25)(C)

The existence of the ability to keep the debtor from acting is just as much control as the ability to cause the debtor to act.

Section 101(25) treats a corporation’s chief executive officer and controlling person as an insider.

Lancaster v. Waites (In re Waites Co.) · filed 1982-05-21(25)

Bobby G. Waites, an “insider”, 11 U.S.C. § 101(25), as chief executive officer and the person in control of the corporation, had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor corporation was insolvent at the time of the transfer.

Section 101(25)(A) assesses a former officer’s or director’s insider status by when the person actually gave up the role, even if formal resignation came later.

Guardian Equipment Corp. v. Conkie (In Re Guardian Equipment Corp.) · filed 1982-05-28(25)(A)

Based on the facts above, it would be placing form over substance to find that the formal resignation of rights which accompanied the purchase of stock agreement outweighs other evidence that the actual termination of the debtor’s insider status took place in February, 1980.

Section 101 treats a relative of a person in control of a corporate debtor as an insider.

McCullough v. Camden Nursery, Inc. (In re Camden Nursery, Inc.) · filed 1982-10-11(25)(B)(vi)

11 U.S.C. § 101(25) provides that “Insider includes— ... (vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.” ... Two repayments were made within 90 days before bankruptcy, while the remainder were made within one year before bankruptcy to her, an “insider”, who had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.

Section 101(25)'s definition of insider can cover creditors whose ties to the debtor present conflicts of interest.

In Re Glendale Woods Apartments, Ltd. · filed 1982-11-17(25)

Upon review of the file and testimony taken at the hearing, the court finds Har Pal Singh and Essex Financial Corporation to be insiders, presenting conflicts of interest and not representative of the different kinds of interests to be represented.

Section 101(25) treats corporations owned and controlled by an individual debtor as insiders.

W.E. Davis Co. v. Medow (In Re Medow) · filed 1982-12-10(25)

The corporations are insiders of Julia Medow under 11 U.S.C. § 101(25).

A longtime friend and creditor of an individual debtor is not an insider under § 101(25) based on friendship and prior business dealings alone.

Jackson Purchase Production Credit Ass'n v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 1983-01-31(25)(A)

It is apparent that Harris is not an insider within the definition set forth in § 101(25), and further that even if the granting of a power of attorney is sufficient to establish the insider status necessitated for a preferential transfer beyond ninety (90) days and within one (1) year of the filing of a petition for relief, the actions of Shelton in refusing to recognize the validity of the power of attorney is fatal in this instance.

For an individual debtor, an insider includes a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control.

In Re Blackwell · filed 1983-03-22(25)(A)(iv)

In the instant case, Studio-1 is defined as an "insider". Where an individual debtor is involved, the definition of "insider" includes a "corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(25)(A)(iv) (Supp.1979).

For an individual debtor, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner is an insider.

Alden State Bank v. Anderson (In Re Anderson) · filed 1983-04-11(25)(A)(ii)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)(ii), if the debtor is an individual, an “insider” would include a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner. Myron Anderson was a general partner in Country Wide Tire, according to the partnership agreement. The Profit and Loss Statement and the Financial Statements both deal with the financial condition of the partnership, an insider in this case, and so § 523(a)(2)(B) is applicable.