Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period measured from the violation, including CUTPA claims based on CUIPA violations.

Colman v. Cna Insurance Company, No. Cv93 030 09 66s (Sep. 20, 1994) · filed 1994-09-20(f)

The statute of limitations for claims under CUTPA is three years from the occurrence of the violation of the statute. General Statutes § 42-110g (f). CUIPA is silent as to the statute of limitations, but in a CUTPA Claim based on CUIPA violations, the CUTPA statute of limitations is applied.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims; a defendant must raise its expiration by motion to strike.

Blue Hills Ins. v. Col. L. Acc. Ins., No. Cv94 31 69 32 (Mar. 10, 1995) · filed 1995-03-10(f)

In the present case, the sheriff attests that he received the summons and complaint on September 6, 1994, after the applicable three year statute of limitations had expired. ... Thus, the defendant should have raised its statute of limitations argument on a motion to strike. ... Accordingly, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Section 42-110g(f) provides a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims, but whether it bars a claim may require factual resolution at trial.

Krondes v. Norwalk Savings Society, No. Cv91 28 88 29 S (Apr. 3, 1995) · filed 1995-04-03(f)

The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's tort claims are barred by the three year statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-577 , and on the ground that the plaintiff's CUTPA claim is barred by the three year statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... The evidence and testimony that is presently before the court is insufficient for purposes of determining whether the plaintiff's claims are time barred. These issues cannot be resolved in the context of this motion for summary judgment, and therefore, must be resolved upon the trial of this matter.

Section 42-110g(f)'s limitations period begins when a CUTPA violation occurs, regardless of when the claimant discovers it.

New Haven Savings Bank v. Common Construction, No. 0100742 (Jun. 2, 1995) · filed 1995-06-02(f)

Although Country Lumber asserts that it was unable to learn of the improper advancements until soon after the initiation of the foreclosure action, as noted by the supreme court in Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 212 , the commencement of the limitations period in General Statutes § 42-110g (f) is not conditioned upon the discovery of the violation.

A § 42-110g(f) limitations defense must be pleaded as a special defense when the parties dispute the facts relevant to whether the time limit has expired.

P G Enterprises v. Skw Real Estate, No. Cv 94 053 97 28 (Mar. 27, 1995) · filed 1995-03-27(f)

Accordingly, the defendant argues that this claim is barred pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... Against this background, we conclude that a statute of limitations defense should be pleaded as a special defense rather than a ground for a motion to strike. Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike the second and third counts for reasons that the statutory time limit had expired is denied.

Section 42-110g(f)'s three-year limitations period may be tolled by a continuing course of conduct involving a special relationship or later related wrongful conduct.

Daum v. Rare Coin Investments Portfolios, No. Cv 30 24 36 (Aug. 23, 1995) · filed 1995-08-23(f)

The issue before this court is whether the statute of limitations for misrepresentation and CUTPA under the circumstances of this case, have been tolled by a continuing course of conduct on the part of the defendants. ... The court should therefore determine whether (1) there is a special relationship between the parties, or (2) the defendants committed a later wrongful act. ... Accordingly, the court denies the Motion for Summary Judgment on Count one and Count two.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the alleged violation, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Geladino v. Pizzitola, No. Cv 94-0463918 (Sep. 6, 1995) · filed 1995-09-06(f)

The time limitation in which to bring a CUTPA claim begins to run on the date of the act or omission complained of and not when the plaintiff discovers the alleged violation.

Section 42-110g(f)'s three-year limitations period is jurisdictional and may be raised by a motion to dismiss.

Butler v. Dolphin Cove Yacht Club Corp., No. Cv92 0125436 S (Sep. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-09-12(f)

The three year statute of limitations period applicable to CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (f), is jurisdictional in nature, and therefore, may be raised by motion to dismiss.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA claim to be brought within three years.

Triangulum Associate v. Harrison Conference, No. 099881 (Oct. 17, 1995) · filed 1995-10-17(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) does require a CUTPA claim to be brought within three years and may have run against Harrison to bring the CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims; a factual dispute about when that period began prevents summary judgment.

Campion Ambulance v. Medstar, Inc., No. 111175 (Nov. 8, 1995) · filed 1995-11-08(f)

The defendants argue that the motion for summary judgment should be granted against the plaintiffs on all counts because the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to the CUTPA claims, General Statutes § 42-110g (f), and the three year statute of limitations applicable to tort claims under General Statutes § 52-577 . ... The court finds the date the statute of limitations began to run presents a material question of fact in dispute. A trier of fact may find Gentile's ex-parte communications and improper influence extended over the administrative proceedings beyond May, 1989. Those dates have not been clearly demonstrated beyond dispute. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied as to the statute of limitations issue.

Section 42-110g(f) imposes a three-year limitations period on CUTPA claims.

Close, Jensen, Miller v. Lomangino, No. Cv 91 48419 S (Nov. 29, 1995) · filed 1995-11-29(f)

Also, the proposed amendment sets out new causes of action sounding in fraud and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. These causes of action are controlled by three year statutes of limitations (General Statutes § 52-577 and 42-110g (f). The proposed complaint alleges the actionable conduct took place prior to February 2, 1990. As noted, these claims are based on new facts and circumstances. That being so, they do not relate back to the original action.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA action brought more than three years after the violation, and allegations of fraudulent concealment do not toll that period.

Cassidento v. Mathis, No. Cv.-94-0537124 (Jan. 24, 1996) · filed 1996-01-24(f)

The three year statute of limitations found in § 42-110g (f), therefore, cannot be tolled by allegations of fraudulent concealment.

Section 42-110g(f) bars an action brought more than three years after the occurrence of a CUTPA violation.

Bainer v. Milum, No. Cv94-0246558 (Apr. 8, 1997) · filed 1997-04-08(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides that no action "may be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." There are no allegations of violations after July 1991. The count is time barred under General Statutes § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from the conduct causing the harm to bring a CUTPA action.

Benoit v. Adams, No. Lpl-Cv-92-0122352s (Aug. 12, 1997) · filed 1997-08-12(f)

There is no significant distinction between the "act or omission" language in one statute and the "occurrence of a violation" language in the other. ... The three year statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the conduct that caused the harm.

A special defense invoking subsection (f)'s statute of limitations must allege supporting facts, rather than merely state a legal conclusion.

Neylan v. Pinsky, No. Cv 95-0375368 (Oct. 9, 1997) · filed 1997-10-09(f)

By way of a third special defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim is barred by General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... The plaintiffs' motion to strike the third special defense, the statute of limitations should be granted. Although the defendant failed to allege any facts to support this legal conclusion.

Section 42-110g(f)'s limitations period can be tolled by a continuing course of conduct.

Times Fiber Comm. v. Trilogy Comm., No. Cv-95-0552603-S (Nov. 26, 1997) · filed 1997-11-26(f)

As stated in part IIIB of this opinion, the circumstances in this case present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's actions constituted a continuing course of conduct, thus tolling the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation, and fraudulent concealment under § 52-595 does not toll that period.

Caldrello v. Gordon, No. 533626 (Jan. 9, 1998) · filed 1998-01-09(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f), of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, states, "[a]n action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." ... Contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the Supreme Court has held that General Statutes § 52-595 does not operate to toll the statute of limitation set forth in § 42-110g (f). ... Therefore, count three of the plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitation set forth in § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Grant v. City of New Haven, No. 382068 (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03(f)

CUTPA contains its own statute of limitations. "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g (r). Sec. 42-110g (f) is, on its face, an "occurrence" statute, and our Supreme Court has held that it is to be construed in the same way as § 52-577 .

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the alleged violation.

A.P. Development Services v. St. John, No. Cv93 0129171 (Feb. 20, 1998) · filed 1998-02-20(f)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is General Statutes § 42-110g (f). This statute reads: "An action under [CUTPA] may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." ... The plaintiff's argument is without merit because the plaintiff does not allege in its complaint that the defendants' failure to acknowledge responsibility for the plaintiff's damages, and to reimburse it as such, is a violation of CUTPA. The plaintiff alleges, in its complaint, that the violations of CUTPA are the false representations and breach of warranties that formulate the breach of contract claim. The false representations and breach of warranties of which the plaintiff complains occurred more than three years prior to the filing of this action. Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the fifth count of the complaint is also granted.

Section 42-110g(f) starts the three-year period for a CUTPA action when the violation occurs.

Bridgeways Communications v. Time Warner, No. Cv95 05 06 19 (Sep. 4, 1998) · filed 1998-09-04(f)

Under General Statutes § 42-110g (f), the statute of limitations for CUTPA violations runs from the occurrence of a violation.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be commenced within three years of the violation.

Kennedy v. Westledge, No. Cv-98-0262278s (Mar. 12, 1999) · filed 1999-03-12(f)

CUTPA has a three-year statute of limitations. General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... Similar to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a CUTPA action must be commenced within three years of the occurrence of the CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110g(f) requires an action for CUTPA damages to be brought within three years of the violation, subject to tolling for a continuing course of conduct.

Hill v. Schneider, No. 538386 (Apr. 13, 1999) · filed 1999-04-13(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides that an action for damages under CUTPA "may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter."

Section 42-110g(f) provides a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims.

Kaplan v. Gruder, No. Cv96 033 43 08 S (May 19, 1999) · filed 1999-05-19(f)

The deceptive acts and practices which form the basis for the plaintiffs' CUTPA claims occurred within three years from the time the plaintiffs instituted this action. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim has been brought within the three year statute of limitation provided for in § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Winsted Land Dvl. v. Design Collab. Arch., No. Cv-96-0071571 (Aug. 12, 1999) · filed 1999-08-12(f)

The plaintiffs filed their complaint against Kasper and DCA in 1996, well beyond CUTPA's three-year statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, § 42-110g (f) bars the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA claim to be brought within three years after the violation.

Gardella v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, No. Cv 96-0150585s (Jan. 20, 2000) · filed 2000-01-20(f)

A claim for a violation of CUTPA may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of the violation. See General Statutes § 42-110g (f); Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204 , 212-13 , 541 A.2d 472 (1988). The executors claim that their CUTPA claims should relate back to the filing of the original complaint because the facts pleaded by the original plaintiffs are identical. This court concludes that the executors have attempted to plead a new cause of action beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, count six must be stricken.

Section 42-110g(f) imposes a three-year limitations period on CUTPA claims; a defendant seeking summary judgment on that ground must establish when the challenged conduct last occurred.

Palmer v. Claydon, No. X01 Cv 91 0154046 (Apr. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-04-13(f)

The movant also asserts that the events at issue in the CUTPA claim are barred by the three year statute of limitations made applicable to such claims by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g (f). Again, the movant has failed to establish what the facts are with regard to the date on which the last conduct complained of occurred.

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from the occurrence of a CUTPA violation to bring a private action; a claim based on maintaining allegedly vexatious litigation is timely if that conduct occurred within the three-year period.

Shea v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. Cv 96 0149647s (Jul. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-07-27(f)

The statute of limitations on a claim for a CUTPA violation, like that for vexatious litigation, is three years. General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... For the reasons set forth above in finding that the vexatious litigation claim was brought within three years of an "act or omission complained of" the court finds that the CUTPA claim is also timely.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Franco v. Mediplex Construction, Inc., No. Cv 96-390458s (Aug. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-08-25(f)

Pursuant to CUTPA, "[a]n action . . . may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." General Statutes § 42-110g (f). The three year period begins to run from the date that the violation occurs, and not from the date that the plaintiff discovers the violation.

A private CUTPA action must be brought within three years of the violation; discovery of the conduct or fraudulent concealment does not delay that deadline.

Dudrow v. Ernst Young, LLP, No. Cv98-0144211s (Sep. 16, 1999) · filed 1999-09-16(f)

The Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled in Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204 , 212 (1988) that the provision in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g (f) that provides that "(a)n action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter" precludes constructions concerning the date of discovery of the act or omission that delay the running of that statutory limitation period. The Court in Fichera explicitly rejected a claim that the equitable tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment could operate to toll the statutory period. Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 216 . The motion is granted as to any CUTPA claim based on any conduct of the defendants in any of their capacities that occurred prior to January 12, 1995.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

New Milford Savings Bank v. Zandy, No. Cv 99 0078766s (Jan. 11, 2001) · filed 2001-01-11(f)

Section 42-110g (f) requires that CUPTA actions may not be brought more than three years after a CUPTA violation occurs.

Section 42-110g(f) bars an action brought more than three years after the alleged CUTPA violation occurs.

Steenson v. Total Lighting Service, No. Cv00 0071803s (Jun. 4, 2001) · filed 2001-06-04(f)

Therefore, any action by the plaintiff is subject to the three year limitation of action proviso in General Statutes § 42-110g (f). As the plaintiff failed to commence his action within this three year limit, the CUTPA claim in Count Three is also barred.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Infante v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. Cv95 032 74 22 S (Jun. 5, 2001) · filed 2001-06-05(f)

The plaintiff's claim for violation of CUTPA is governed by the statute of limitations set out in General Statutes § 42-110g (f), which provides, in pertinent part: "An action . . . may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." This statute is also an occurrence statute and the three year period begins to run from the date that the violation occurs, and not from the date that the plaintiff discovers the violation.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a private CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Steenson v. Total Lighting Service, LLC, No. Cv00 0071803s (Jun. 26, 2001) · filed 2001-06-26(f)

Therefore, any action by the plaintiff is subject to the three year limitation of action proviso in General Statutes § 42-110g (f). As the plaintiff failed to commence his action within this three year limit, the CUTPA claim in Count Three is also barred.

Section 42-110g(f) imposes a three-year limitation period on CUTPA claims; summary judgment based on that period requires facts establishing when the challenged conduct occurred.

Armetta v. Wheelabrator Technologies, No. X01-Cv 98-0154590 (Jun. 27, 2001) · filed 2001-06-27(f)

The movants have not shown what the facts are with regard to that claim, though they have observed that if it occurred more than three years before suit was commenced, it is beyond the statute of limitation applicable to claims of CUTPA violations pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g (f). It cannot be determined from the allegations of the complaint or from any undisputed facts submitted in connection with this motion when the claimed refusal to provide information occurred. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to this single part of the CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f)'s limitations period is not tolled by a continuing course of conduct when the complaint alleges no ongoing duty or facts showing that the violation continued.

Matza v. West, No. Cv00-0160324s (Jul. 9, 2001) · filed 2001-07-09(f)

While Matza argues in his brief that June 23, 1998 is the operative date for purposes of § 42-110g (f), the amended complaint itself fails to allege that West had an ongoing fiduciary duty to Matza so as to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation, unless the limitations period is tolled.

Gianetti v. Greater Bridgeport Indiv., No. Cv98 35 57 18 S (Aug. 29, 2001) · filed 2001-08-29(f)

Therefore, absent some action that would toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff's CUTPA claim is barred because it accrued more than three years before the commencement of this action.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA claim to be brought within three years of the alleged violation; a continuing course of conduct may toll that period.

Gianetti v. Bridgeport Association, No. Cv98 35 57 18 S (Aug. 29, 2001) · filed 2001-08-29(f)

All of the conduct which the plaintif relies upon for his CUTPA claim occurred more than three years prior to that date. In addition, none of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact that GBIPA engaged in a continuing course of conduct which would toll the statute of limitations.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation within the three-year limitations period.

Pereira v. Maresca, No. Cv00-0378076-S (Nov. 15, 2001) · filed 2001-11-15(f)

Therefore, as the plaintiff has failed to establish as a basis for a CUTPA violation any acts or omissions on the part of the bank occurring within the three year limitations period, § 42-110g (f) bars the plaintiff's CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) requires CUTPA damages actions to be brought within three years of the violation; fraudulent concealment does not toll that period.

S.A. Candelora Enterprises v. Wild, No. Cv 01 0447877 S (Feb. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-02-04(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides that an action for damages under CUTPA "may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." ... Accordingly, a claim of fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations set for CUTPA violations. Furthermore, in the present case the plaintiff's complaint is time barred because it was filed more than three years after the last possible actionable occurrence of the defendants' breach of the covenant not to compete.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA private action brought more than three years after the violation.

Ocwen Federal Bank v. Rivas, No. Cv 99 0368135 S (Feb. 21, 2002) · filed 2002-02-21(f)

Section 42-110g (1) clearly states: "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." In the present case, there is no dispute between the parties that the allegations of fraud took place prior to the signing of the note on October 29, 1997. The counterclaims were initially filed in July 2001, well beyond the three-year limitation period.

Section 42-110g(f) gives private CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period.

Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc. · filed 2002-03-27(f)

CUTPA has a three year statute of limitations. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Her CUTPA claim is thus time-barred, and it is not necessary to address Midway’s claim that the CUTPA action did not survive Noah’s death.

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from the occurrence of an unfair practice to bring a CUTPA claim.

Pereira v. Maresca, No. Cv00 037 80 76 (Jun. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-06-04(f)

The plaintiff's CUTPA claim is governed by the three year statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... The limitations period for claims brought under CUTPA begins to run on the date that the unfair practice occurs.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA claim brought more than three years after the violation, even if the claim relates back to an original complaint filed after that period.

Chiccarello v. Ghallilli, No. Cv00-034 03 57 S (Jun. 10, 2002) · filed 2002-06-10(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) states that "[a]n action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." ... Thus, even if the plaintiff's CUTPA claim relates back to the date the plaintiff commenced the original complaint, her CUTPA claim is barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g(f) requires a private CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Lind-Larsen v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, No. (X02) Cv 97-0159662 S (Jun. 26, 2002) · filed 2002-06-26(f)

As alleged violations of CUTPA, the claims presented in Counts Two and Three are governed by the special statute of limitations for CUTPA claims set forth in General Statutes § 42-110g (f). Under that statute, a private action to recover damages under CUTPA "may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter."

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of a violation; evidence of a continuing course of wrongful conduct can defeat summary judgment on limitations.

Deolivelira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. Cv96 032 93 90 (Jul. 25, 2002) · filed 2002-07-25(f)

The applicable statute of limitation is set out in General Statutes Sec. 42-110g (f), which states, "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." ... The action is not barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant engaged in a continuing course of wrongful actions against him.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation.

Harte Nissan Inc. v. Market Scan, No. Cv99 0268959-S (Jan. 17, 2003) · filed 2003-01-17(f)

The court finds that because this date is more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint, it is barred by General Statutes § 42-110g (f) and summary judgment shall be granted in favor of Market Scan as to count eight of the second amended complaint.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Cocchiola Paving v. Peterbilt of So. Ct, No. Cv01-0168579s (Mar. 3, 2003) · filed 2003-03-03(f)

As to count five, the statute of limitations period for a CUTPA action is governed by § 42-110g , which provides in relevant part: "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... The motion to strike counts three, four and five on the ground that the claims are time barred is denied.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year occurrence-based limitations period for CUTPA claims.

Sutera v. Washton, No. 556177 (Mar. 14, 2003) · filed 2003-03-14(f)

The problem the court has is that § 42-110g (f) of CUTPA setting a three-year limitations period is explicitly an occurrence statute. ... In any event, the court concludes the CUTPA claim is not viable and it should be dismissed.

Section 42-110g(f) gives plaintiffs three years to bring a CUTPA claim, measured from the challenged act or omission.

Timmons v. City of Hartford · filed 2003-09-16(f)

The statute of limitations for a CUTPA claim is three years. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim must be granted because that claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period.

Petrolito v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC · filed 2004-04-08(f)

The FDCPA has a one-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), while CUT-PA has a three-year limitations period. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f).

Section 42-110g(f) gives three years to bring a CUTPA claim; a deceptively induced purchase, without a continuing duty to the buyer, does not extend that period beyond the sale.

Phelan Ex Rel. Estate of Phelan v. Daimler Chrysler Corp. · filed 2004-06-28(f)

CUTPA wrongs stemming from fraudulently inducing an overpayment, without more, do not implicate any ongoing relationship after the sale is consummated such that a lawsuit against the deceiving seller would be premature as of the sale date, justifying shit beyond the three year period prescribed in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f).

Section 42-110g(f)’s three-year limitations period may be tolled by a continuous course of conduct.

Assurance Co. of America v. Yakemore · filed 2005-05-09(f)

Moreover, since this court has concluded earlier that the facts asserted permit a finding of a continuous course of conduct with regard to the negligence claims and since no reason exists to conclude that the same is not applicable to a CUTPA claim, the court rejects the defendants’ first argument.

Section 42-110g(f)'s limitations period begins when a CUTPA violation occurs and does not wait for discovery of actionable harm.

Bogdan v. Zimmer, Inc. · filed 2006-01-06(f)

At any rate, plaintiffs arguments are wholly without merit, inasmuch as the plain language of the statutes at issue indicates that the applicable limitations periods commence upon the “occurrence of a violation,” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f) (CUTPA), or the “act or omission complained of,” id. § 52-577 (action founded upon a tort), rather than when a plaintiff “discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have ... discovered” actionable harm, see id. § 52-577a (product liability); id. § 52-584 (negligence, misconduct, or malpractice).

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA action brought more than three years after the unfair practice occurs, regardless of the nature of the alleged practice.

Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. · filed 2006-04-04(f)

Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 42-110g (f), no cause of action can be maintained under CUTPA if brought more than three years after the unfair practice occurs.

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from the alleged violation to bring a CUTPA claim.

Independence Insurance Service Corp. v. Hartford Life Insurance · filed 2007-01-29(f)

The appropriate statute of limitations for CUTPA claims is three years.

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from the complained-of act or omission to bring a CUTPA claim.

Guillory v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2007-03-08(f)

Defendant correctly states that the statute of limitations under CUTPA is three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577; Willow Springs Condo. Ass’n v. Seventh BRT Dev. Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 717 A.2d 77, 101 (1998).

Section 42-110g gives a plaintiff three years from a CUTPA violation to bring an action, subject to tolling under the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Estate of Axelrod v. Flannery · filed 2007-03-12(f)

Count Six (Unfair Trade Practices) is subject to the three-year statute of limitations specifically set forth for CUPTA claims. ... In light of the fact that Connecticut law recognizes the “continuing course of conduct” doctrine, and given that the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, it is not apparent, on the face of the Amended Complaint, that Plaintiffs remaining claims are time-barred.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year filing period for CUTPA actions, but an action filed within that period may still be subject to laches.

City of Bridgeport v. C. R. Klewin Northeast, LLC · filed 2007-06-18(f)

After oral argument, the court granted the motion to strike the third special defense, alleging a laches defense, to the extent that it was directed to count six of the complaint claiming a violation of CUTPA. For the same reasons explained previously, that order is vacated as improvidently issued. The time period within which suit must be filed under CUTPA is governed by that statute’s three year limitation period. General Statutes § 42-110g (f). ... However, a court of equity “has discretion to dismiss for laches an action initiated within the period of [limitation].”

Section 42-110g(f) imposes a three-year limitations period on CUTPA claims.

Chisholm v. United of Omaha Life Insurance · filed 2007-09-28(f)

To the extent that Ms. Chisholm’s Complaint should be construed to include claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42a-110 el seq., those claims also are subject to a three-year limitations period. See Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 219 Conn. 644, 653, 594 A.2d 952 (1991) (stating that CUTPA claims are subject to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f)’s three-year time bar), and thus are time-barred.

Section 42-110g(f) governs the limitations period for CUTPA claims, which is three years.

Rossman v. Morasco · filed 2009-06-23(f)

The court was free not to apply § 52-577, the only statute of limitations cited in the motion in limine, to the admission of evidence relating to the CUTPA count because § 42-110g (f) governs such claims. At any rate, like the tortious interference count, the CUTPA count in the May 10,2002 counterclaim relates back to the May 25, 2000 counterclaim, and the applicable statute of limitations is also three years.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinsky · filed 2009-08-04(f)

The CUTPA claim was also subject to a three year statute of limitations. See General Statutes § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the complained-of act or omission occurs.

RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. PEER BEARING COMPANY · filed 2009-10-29(f)

CUTPA, upon which Plaintiffs rely in part for several of their state law claims, has a statute of limitations of three years. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Under Connecticut law, both the general tort statute of limitations and the CUTPA statute of limitations are occurrence statutes, meaning that the limitations period begins to run from the date of the act or omission complained of, rather than the date the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred.

Section 42-110g’s three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims begins when the alleged violation occurs.

Johnson v. Walden University, Inc. · filed 2011-12-09

Conn. GemStat. § 52-577, which is Connecticut’s general tort statute of limitations, and Conn. GemStat. § 42-llOg, which is the CUTPA statute of limitations, are both “occurrence statute[s], meaning that the time period within which a plaintiff must commence an action begins to run at the moment the act or omission complained of occurs.” Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn.App. 449, 451, 671 A.2d 1329 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Independence Insurance Service Corp. v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 472 F.Supp.2d 183, 190 (D.Conn.2007) (CUTPA limitation period is “triggered upon the occurrence of the alleged violation, not the discovery of the alleged practice” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA action brought more than three years after the alleged violation occurred.

Asymmetrx Medical, Inc. v. McKeon · filed 2013-03-21(f)

An action brought under CUTPA may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f). The allegations within the Counterclaim do not relate to the incorporation of AMI but rather to the misappropriation of five checks payable to *240AI from Ventana between March and December, 2010 and to the alleged ongoing interference of the counter-defendants with AI’s contractual relationships. Those alleged unfair trade practices occurred, if at all, within three years of the filing of the counterclaim and therefore are not barred.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims; the claimed continuing course of conduct did not toll that period here.

Ride, Inc. v. APS Technology, Inc. · filed 2014-03-31(f)

They also agree that the statute of limitations on CUTPA claims is three years under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... The plaintiffs have not raised any other argument as to why their CUTPA claims toll under the continuing course of conduct doctrine. Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA claim based on a statement to be filed within three years after the statement is made.

CSL Silicones, Inc. v. Midsun Grp. Inc. · filed 2018-03-15(f)

In line with these principles, a defamation-based CUTPA claim premised on any statement made in the Sun West correspondence would have had to be brought within three years of July 12, 2002, to be timely under CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three year limitations period measured from the violation.

Carson v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North America · filed 2018-08-21(f)

Count three, the CUTPA claim, is subject to the three year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years from a CUTPA violation to bring an action; later related wrongful conduct can toll that period under the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Gibson v. Metropolis of CT LLC · filed 2020-02-27(f)

The statute of limitations for a CUTPA claim is three years. ... As in other instances where the doctrine applies, in order to invoke it as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations on a CUTPA claim, Connecticut courts require “evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto” as demonstrated by “either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.” ... The motion to dismiss is denied as to Count Five.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims.

Schachter v. Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc · filed 2020-03-16(f)

Under Connecticut law, the limitations periods for plaintiffs’ claims are: two years for personal-injury negligence and reckless conduct claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584; three years for tort claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577; three years for CUTPA claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f); three years for oral contract claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-581; and six years for implied or written contract claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-576.

Section 42-110g(f) requires an action to be brought within three years of the violation, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Hylete, Inc. v. Hybrid Athletics, LLC · filed 2020-05-21(f)

The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act states that “[a]n action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the Act’s three-year limitation period is triggered upon the occurrence of the alleged violation, not the discovery of the alleged practice.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation.

Williams v. Countrywide Bank, FSB · filed 2020-07-19(f)

All of Ms. Williams’s state law claims have a three-year statute of limitations period, except the unjust enrichment claim, which has a six-year statute of limitations period. ... For all of Ms. Williams’s claims with a three-year statute of limitations period, the statute of limitations period has lapsed.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the alleged violation occurs, rather than when it is discovered.

McCarter and English LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc · filed 2021-03-22(f)

That statute of limitations is three years and is “triggered upon the occurrence of the alleged violation, not the discovery of the alleged practice.”

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation.

Edwards v. McMillen Capital, LLC · filed 2021-03-29(f)

Actions under CUTPA must be brought within three years of the occurrence of a violation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Accordingly, the claim under CUTPA is time-barred.

Section 42-110g(f) gives plaintiffs three years from a CUTPA violation to bring a damages action; adequately pleaded fraudulent concealment can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

PALMIERI v. INTERVET INC. · filed 2021-06-01(f)

These allegations sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment under Connecticut law such that the Court cannot resolve the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law at this stage. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CUTPA claims based on the statute of limitations is denied.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation; the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not toll that period on the facts alleged.

Edwards v. McMillen Capital, LLC · filed 2021-12-10(f)

Actions under CUTPA must be brought within three years of the occurrence of a violation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Accordingly, the claim under CUTPA is time-barred.

A CUTPA plaintiff cannot avoid § 42-110g(f)’s three-year limit through continuing course of conduct tolling without evidence of an initial wrong.

Normandy v. American Medical Systems, Inc. · filed 2021-08-09(f)

Because there is no evidence that the defen- dant committed the initial wrong of marketing the prod- uct in a way that contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, the continuing course of conduct doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA claim brought more than three years after the violation occurs.

Edwards v. McMillen Cap., LLC · filed 2022-11-17(f)

A plaintiff may not bring a CUTPA claim “more than three years after the occurrence of a violation.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). Edwards’s claim, stemming from the 2012 loan transaction, is clearly beyond this three-year period.

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a private CUTPA claim.

Scillia v. American Education Services · filed 2023-07-27(f)

A CUTPA claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). Therefore, any CUTPA claim against AES is time-barred for the same reasons I have explained above with respect to the disability discrimination claims.

Section 42-110g(f) gives plaintiffs three years from the occurrence of a CUTPA violation to bring an action, regardless of when they discover it.

Speer v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2023-07-28(f)

The same 3-year limitation applies to CUTPA claims. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f) (“An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.”). ... Notwithstanding Speer’s claim that these statutes of limitations should run from the date she discovered or realized that the assignment was not valid, these statutes make clear that they run from the date of the occurrence of the violation, not the date when a plaintiff discovers or realizes that there has been a violation.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation; the period does not wait for the claim to accrue.

Mark Breiner DDS, LLC and Emsculpt of CT, L.L.C. v. BTL Industries · filed 2026-01-15(f)

The CUTPA claim is therefore time-barred because it was “brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation” of the statute and Connecticut law does not permit the limitation period to be tolled until a plaintiff’s claim accrues.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a private CUTPA action to be brought within three years after the violation occurs.

Tarzia · filed 2026-04-10(f)

The same three-year statute of limitation applies to CUTPA claims. See Speer v. Select Portfolio Servicing, No. 3:23-CV-192 (JAM), 2023 WL 4850556, at *6 (D. Conn. July 28, 2023); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f) (providing that an action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation).

Section 42-110g’s notice requirement and remedies support enforcing CUTPA claims in court rather than through arbitration.

Bill Butler Associates v. New England Savings Bank · filed 1991-05-13

Nevertheless, General Statutes § 42-110g (c), for example, mandates that a private plaintiff mail a copy of his complaint and judgment to the Attorney General. ... In the opinion of this court, CUTPA and its extensive body of case law reflect a well defined and dominant public policy that should be enforced in a judicial forum rather than before an arbitral tribunal.

Section 42-110g requires allegations of more than one act of misconduct to sustain a CUTPA claim.

Magnano v. Witham, No. 127485 (Nov. 27, 1995) · filed 1995-11-27

A single act is not enough to sustain a CUTPA claim. The simple words of the statute, General Statutes § 42-110g , speaks of "methods and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or business." General Statutes § 42-110g . Where all of the critical words in the statute are plural, the plain meaning of these words suggests that more than one act of misconduct is necessary.

Section 42-110g(a) allows a private CUTPA claim based on a single unfair act.

Hernandez v. King, No. Cv 94 0536321 S (Jan. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-01-29(a)

General statutes § 42-110g (a) makes reference to the singular `method, act or practice.' ... This court finds that the language of these provisions allows a single unfair act to form the basis for a CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a CUTPA action based on a single act of misconduct.

Valle v. Andrews, No. Cv 95 0552111 (Mar. 9, 1996) · filed 1996-03-09(a)

In contrast, General Statutes § 42-110g (a) refers to "a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b ." (Emphasis added.) ... Although the present action arises from a single act, this single instance of misconduct could support a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a CUTPA claim based on a single unfair or deceptive act.

Bonnell v. United Parcel Service, No. 315927 (Feb. 7, 1997) · filed 1997-02-07(a)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a), the section that prohibits unfair trade practices, refers to the plural "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," while General Statutes § 42-110g (a), the section that creates a cause of action for CUTPA violations, refers to the singular "method, act or practice." ... It appears to this court that the cases holding that a single act can constitute a CUTPA violation are better reasoned in light of principles of statutory construction and the remedial intent of the act.

A private CUTPA claim requires proof of more than one unfair act by the defendant.

Connecticut Nat. Gas Corp. v. Yankee Gas, No. Cv-97-0482269s (Oct. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-10-30(a)

The court must reconcile the conflicting language of General Statutes §§ 42-110b (a) and 42-110g (a). ... This court is of the opinion that in order to give purpose to the legislature's use of the plural terms in section 42-110b (a), more than one such unfair act by a defendant is required to be proven by plaintiff.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a CUTPA action based on a single act of misconduct.

Roache v. Rogers, No. Cv98 035 41 14 S (Jul. 26, 1999) · filed 1999-07-26(a)

CUTPA authorizes actions based upon "a method, act or practice." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 42-110g (a). ... Accordingly, this court finds a single instance of misconduct may state a cause of action for a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a remedy for a single unfair act if that act qualifies as a CUTPA violation.

Gramazio v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. X01-Cv-00-0160391 (Feb. 7, 2001) · filed 2001-02-07(a)

This court finds that the wording of CUTPA, at § 42-110g (a), is broad enough to indicate application to a single act if the act is within the definition of a violation pursuant to what has been called the "cigarette rule."

Section 42-110g(a) permits a private CUTPA claim based on a single unfair act; a pattern of misconduct is not required.

Walk v. Lupia Renovating Co., Inc., No. Cv-000504205s (Apr. 18, 2001) · filed 2001-04-18(a)

This court finds most persuasive the reasoning of those cases that have determined that a CUTPA violation can be based upon a single act of misconduct. ... CUTPA, however, refers not only to the plural "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices;" General Statutes § 42-110b (a); but also to the singular "a method, act or practice." General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

Section 42-110g(a) allows a private CUTPA action based on a single prohibited act that causes an ascertainable loss.

Rohan v. Rosenblatt, No. Cv93-0116887s (Aug. 13, 1999) · filed 1999-08-13(a)

Moreover, CUTPA specifically provides for a cause of action based on a single act. "Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b may bring an action . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

Section 42-110g permits a private damages action based on a single unfair act or practice that causes an ascertainable loss.

Turner v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Cv00-0177471 S (May 11, 2001) · filed 2001-05-11

Furthermore, this court finds persuasive the well-reasoned opinion in Roncari Development Co. v. GMG Enterprise, Inc ., 45 Conn. Sup. 408 , 718 A.2d 1025 (1997), which determined that a single act of misconduct can constitute a violation of CUTPA. ... General Statutes § 42-110g , which establishes the right to bring an action for money damages under CT Page 6162 CUTPA, describes the conduct necessary to recover such damages in the singular as follows: ... It also clearly establishes that each such act, practice and method of competition affords a proper basis for a damages action under CUTPA.

A plaintiff seeking a private CUTPA remedy must allege more than one deceptive or unfair act.

Brahm v. Demuzzio, No. 555568 (Sep. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-09-10(a)

Because of the introductory language of General Statutes § 42-110b (a), which refers to the plural "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and General Statutes § 42-110g (a), which refers to the singular "method, act or practice," there is a split in the Superior Court as to whether a single deceptive act can constitute a CUTPA violation. ... This court has held repeatedly that a plaintiff must allege more than a single deceptive or unfair act in order to invoke CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(b) permits CUTPA plaintiffs to bring class actions for similarly situated persons under the Superior Court’s class action rules.

Walsh v. National Safety Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-02-09(b)

In addition to Practice Book §§87 and 88, General Statutes § 42-110g (b) allows CUTPA plaintiffs to bring class actions on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated pursuant to rules established by the judges of the Superior Court. This means, of course, that even though the plaintiffs motion for certification has a statutory source, it is the judge that made Practice Book rules that are controlling.

A CUTPA class action must meet the same certification requirements as a class action under Practice Book §§ 9-7 and 9-8.

Maltagliati v. Wilson, No. Cv 97-0575612 (Oct. 7, 1999) · filed 1999-10-07(b)

The requirements for certification of a class action are listed in §§ 9-7 and 9-8 , of the Practice Book. ... The requirements for bringing a class action under CUTPA are identical. See General Statutes § 42-110g (b).

Section 42-110g(b) permits CUTPA class actions, subject to the ordinary class certification requirements in Practice Book §§ 9-7 and 9-8.

Robichaud v. Hewlett Packard Co., No. X01 Cv 01 0165706 (Oct. 31, 2002) · filed 2002-10-31(b)

CUTPA contains no provision varying the requirements for a CUTPA class action from those made generally applicable to class actions by CT Page 13955 Practice Book § 9-7 and 9-8.

Section 42-110g(b) limits CUTPA class actions to claims on behalf of similarly situated Connecticut residents or people injured in Connecticut.

In re Trilegiant Corp. · filed 2014-03-28(b)

The statute permits any person authorized to bring a CUTPA action on their own behalf to bring a class action only on behalf of similarly situated residents of Connecticut or those that were injured in Connecticut.

Section 42-110g(b) limits CUTPA damages classes to Connecticut residents or people injured in Connecticut, and that substantive limit applies in federal court despite Rule 23.

Fraiser v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. · filed 2015-06-09(b)

Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110g(b) (“Section 42—110g(b)”), however, limits Fraiser’s standing to raise a claim on behalf of a class, stating that: “[pjersons entitled to bring an action under subsection(a) of this section may, pursuant to rules established by the judges of the Superior Court, bring a class action on behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated who are residents of this state or injured in this state to recover damages.” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(b). ... Accordingly, the CUTPA class action restriction is not preempted by Shady Grove, and Fraiser may not bring a nationwide class action under CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(c) requires a copy of a complaint asserting a CUTPA claim to be sent to the attorney general.

McMaster v. High Ridge Oil Company, No. Cv95 0148154 S (Jan. 21, 1997) · filed 1997-01-21(c)

Section 42-110g (c) requires a copy of a complaint asserting a CUTPA (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act) action to be sent to the attorney general. Therefore, this paragraph is neither impertinent, immaterial, nor improper.

Failure to mail a CUTPA counterclaim to the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Consumer Protection under § 42-110g(c) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Ciuffi v. Jerolman, No. Cv 01 0449452 S (May 16, 2002) · filed 2002-05-16(c)

The court finds that the defendants' failure to file a copy of the counterclaim with the Attorney General and the Department of Consumer Protection is not a jurisdictional defect.

Section 42-110g(d) permits discretionary costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, but a CUTPA claim for damage to goods transported by an interstate carrier is preempted by the Carmack Amendment even if the plaintiff seeks only attorney's fees.

Davis Shanaphy Group v. Morse Moving Co., No. Cv96 0153385 S (Jul. 16, 1997) · filed 1997-07-17(d)

In addition to these actual damages, CUTPA allows the court to award, in its discretion, "costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." General Statutes § 42-110g (d). The mere fact that a plaintiff is only seeking attorney's fees as relief for CUTPA claim is irrelevant. A cause of action under CUTPA is preempted by the Carmack Amendment because both statutes allow a plaintiff to bring a cause of action seeking recovery for actual damages incurred from the acts of carriers.

Section 42-110g requires an alleged unfair or deceptive practice to occur in the defendant’s primary trade or business.

Phillips Ind. v. Connecticut L. P., No. X02cv98 04099665 S (Jun. 18, 1999) · filed 1999-06-18

Its firm conclusion, as previously derived from the text of CUTPA, is that the allegations of the third count fail to state a valid cause of action under General Statutes § 42-110g because they do not tend to establish that the defendants committed any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of its own primary trade or business.

Section 42-110g is remedial and is construed liberally to allow a private CUTPA claim based on an insurer’s settlement policy when the alleged practice implicates public policy.

Smith v. Allstate Indemnity Co., No. Cv98 035 41 37 S (Nov. 30, 1999) · filed 1999-11-30

In view of the remedial aspects of both § 42-110g and § 38a-336 , and in light of the liberal construction afforded these statutes, combined with the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant's minimum damage/impact policy was the basis for its decision in refusing to settle plaintiff's claim, the defendant insurer has sufficiently implicated public policy to allow plaintiff to maintain her CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110g(g) gives a party a jury trial on a CUTPA counterclaim, but that right does not extend to an opposing equitable foreclosure action.

Bank of America v. Greca, No. Cv 98-0581664s (Dec. 11, 2000) · filed 2000-12-11(g)

The defendants' right to a jury trial on their CUTPA counterclaim, however, encompasses only that and does not create a right to a jury trial as to the plaintiff's equitable foreclosure action.

Section 42-110g(g) gives a claimant a jury trial on a private unfair trade practices claim, except for specified awards of damages, costs, fees, and equitable relief.

Dime Savings Bank v. Perlucci, No. Cv 96-0151353 S (Dec. 29, 2000) · filed 2000-12-29(g)

The defendant's chose to make this claim and to have this claim tried to a jury, i.e., to take advantage of their statutory right to a jury trial on this issue.

Section 42-110g(a) permits actual and punitive damages, but federal bankruptcy law preempts CUTPA claims seeking penalties for abuse of the bankruptcy process.

Metcalf v. Fitzgerald · filed 2019-09-03(a)

Similarly, CUTPA permits a plaintiff to recover actual and punitive damages. General Statutes § 42-110g (a). ... Accordingly, we conclude that Congress impliedly pre- empted state law CUTPA and vexatious litigation claims.

Section 42-110g(a) does not provide a private CUTPA claim for alleged deception in a securities transaction governed by federal securities antifraud law.

Tarpon Bay Partners LLC v. Zerez Holdings Corporation · filed 2023-08-11(a)

Because the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws would regulate allegedly deceptive conduct in section 3(a)(10) transactions, the dispute at bar falls outside of CUTPA’s scope.