Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-166

Section 4-166(2) does not treat an agency’s rejection of a bid or award of a contract as a contested case when no formal hearing occurs or is required by law.

Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman · filed 1983-11-15(2)

An agency decision to reject a bid or to award a contract has none of the attributes of a formal hearing, nor is a formal hearing required by law.

Section 4-166(1) includes a state board authorized to determine contested cases within the definition of an agency.

Wagner v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board · filed 1976-04-20(1)

The state personnel appeal board is a state board which is authorized to determine contested cases, and it is not exempted from the act.

Section 4-166(1) excludes town and regional boards of education from the definition of “agency” under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.

Mauriello v. Board of Education · filed 1979-01-16(1)

The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, since the effective date of 1975 Public Acts, No. 75-529, excludes town and regional boards of education from the definition of “agency” in §4-166 (1).

Section 4-166 (1) includes the Indian Affairs Council as an agency because its designation as a council does not exclude it and it is authorized to adopt regulations.

Hopkins v. Pac · filed 1980-05-06(1)

The fact that it is denominated a council does not necessarily exclude the IAC from the definition of agency contained in § 4-166 (1) of the General Statutes. ... We answer the question reserved for our advice in the affirmative; the Indian Affairs Council is an agency within the meaning of § 4-166 (1) of the General Statutes.

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency to include a state commission or an officer authorized by law to determine contested cases.

Catholic Family & Community Services v. Commission on Human Rights · filed 1985-04-02(1)

The construction of “agency” as used in General Statutes § 4-183 (b) to mean “hearing officer” would contravene General Statutes § 4-166 (1) which defines an agency as a state commission or an officer authorized by law to determine contested cases. The use of the disjunctive “or” in that statutory section makes it clear that, at the very least, service upon the commission by the plaintiff was sufficient to withstand the jurisdictional attack which the defendant made.

Section 4-166(1) does not treat a hearing board appointed by the state department of education for a single contested case as an agency for purposes of an administrative appeal.

Board of Education v. Department of Education · filed 1986-01-28(1)

It was not necessary to name and serve the hearing board under General Statutes § 4-183 (b) because the hearing board is not an agency within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (1) for purposes of appeal under the UAPA.

Section 4-166(1)’s 1975 amendment clarified that town and regional boards of education were excluded from the original definition of “agency.”

Lee v. Board of Education · filed 1980-06-03(1)

We consider the 1975 amendment as construing and clarifying the original scope of § 4-166 (1) and, therefore, a legislative declaration ... of the meaning of the original act.

Section 4-166’s definition of agency excludes boards of education, including for actions taken before the 1975 amendment.

Neyland v. Board of Education · filed 1985-02-05(1)

As construed in Lee, the UAPA never applied to boards of education, Murphy and Adamchek notwithstanding.

A state board authorized to determine contested cases is an agency under § 4-166(1), separate from its supervisory department.

Nanavati v. Department of Health Services · filed 1986-03-18(1)

The board being an agency within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (1), separate from the department of health services, held the disciplinary hearings involved in this case. Because the board was the sole agency that took the action by which the plaintiff claims to be aggrieved, it and not the department of health services, was the proper party defendant.

Section 4-166(1) limits the UAPA’s definition of an agency to qualifying state bodies; a town code enforcement committee does not become a state agency because its ordinances reference state laws.

Edwards v. Code Enforcement Committee · filed 1987-12-15(1)

The second claim of the plaintiffs that the legislature deleted from § 4-183 (b), via Public Acts 1979, No. 79-163, the requirement that service of process in administrative appeals be carried out in accordance with the provisions for service of process in civil actions, falls with our conclusion that the defendant agency does not come within the meaning of state “agency” under the provisions of § 4-166 (1) of the UAPA.

Section 4-166 includes the department of health services and the Connecticut medical examining board as state agencies.

Pet v. Department of Health Services · filed 1988-05-10

The department of health services and the Connecticut medical examining board are agencies of the state within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166.

Section 4-166(1) excludes municipal boards from the UAPA’s definition of a state agency.

Danziger v. Demolition Board · filed 1989-02-07(1)

Although the plaintiffs have purported to treat their appeals to the Superior Court and to this court as pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-183 and 4-184 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), it is clear that the UAPA does not apply because the defendant is not a state “agency.” General Statutes § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166(1)'s definition of “agency” covers the Department of Income Maintenance.

DelVecchio v. Department of Income Maintenance · filed 1989-03-28(1)

The department of income maintenance is an agency within the scope of UAPA.

Section 4-166(1) does not treat a municipal inland wetlands commission acting under local authority as a UAPA agency.

Klug v. Inland Wetlands Commission · filed 1989-09-12(1)

We conclude that the commission was not an agency under § 4-166 (1), and that the appeal was jurisdictionally proper.

Section 4-166 (1) excludes the statewide grievance committee from the definition of “agency” because it acts as an arm of the court.

Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee · filed 1990-06-26(1)

In sum, the SGC is an “arm of the court,” and is not a body in which the legislature has reposed general powers of administration of a particular state program with which it has been given statutory authority to act for the state in the implementation of that program. We therefore hold that the SGC is excluded under the definition of “agency” set forth in § 4-166 (1).

The state board of examiners in podiatry is an agency under § 4-166 (1) and is subject to the UAPA.

Fleischman v. Connecticut Board of Examiners in Podiatry · filed 1990-07-03(1)

The board is an agency within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (1) and is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.

A municipal aviation commission is not itself a state agency under § 4-166(1), but its decisions may be attributed to a state officer when it acts as that officer’s agent; if that relationship exists, a hearing determining a legal right is a contested case under § 4-166(2).

Connecticut Air Service, Inc. v. Danbury Aviation Commission · filed 1989-06-27(1), (2)

As an agent, the commission, therefore, is not, in and of itself, a “state . . . commission” within the meaning of § 4-166 (1) and, therefore, its decisions do not, per se, qualify for appellate review under the UAPA. ... Accordingly, if, on remand, an agency relationship is found to exist between the commissioner and the commission, a hearing involving the determination of a legal right will be deemed to have taken place thereby making the proceeding below a “contested case” within the meaning of § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166(1) defines agency to include the Department of Health Services and the medical examining board, making both subject to the UAPA.

Pet v. Department of Health Services · filed 1994-03-08(1)

The defendants are agencies within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (1) and are subject to the provisions of the UAPA, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.

Section 4-166(1) excludes a town board of selectmen from the definition of an agency under the UAPA.

Maresca v. Town of Ridgefield · filed 1994-07-22(1)

The board of selectmen of the town of Ridgefield does not meet the statutory definition of an agency and therefore this appeal is not governed by the UAPA.

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency as a state body or officer, excluding a city civil service commission.

Anastasio v. Civil Service Commission, No. Cv94 0361462 (Mar. 14, 1995) · filed 1995-03-14(1)

In the present case the Civil Service Commission of the City of Bridgeport is not an "agency" as defined in General Statute § 4-166 (1) and therefore, the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act is not applicable to the appeal and confers no jurisdiction on this court.

Section 4-166(1) excludes boards of education from the UAPA definition of an agency, so their decisions are not subject to its appeal procedures.

Perry v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., No. Cv94 0361257s (Aug. 2, 1994) · filed 1994-08-03(1)

The failure of the General Assembly expressly to provide for appeals from expulsions and the express exclusion of school boards from the scope of the UAPA signal that no right of appeal from such an administrative action exists.

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency to include a state department authorized to make regulations or determine contested cases; the Department of Public Safety qualifies.

Dyno New England, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, No. 31 93 64 (Mar. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-03-26(1)

General Statutes § 4-166 (1) defines an agency as "each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases, but does not include either house or any committee of the general assembly, the courts, the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, the governor, lieutenant governor or attorney general, or town or regional boards of education, or automobile dispute settlement panels established pursuant to section 42-181 ." ... Therefore, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) is a state agency headed by the DPS commissioner.

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency to include a state department authorized to make regulations or determine contested cases; the Department of Public Safety qualifies.

Fairfield Resources Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, No. 31 91 56 (Apr. 25, 1996) · filed 1996-04-25(1)

General Statutes § 4-166 (1) defines an agency as "each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases, but does not include either house or any committee of the general assembly, the courts, the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, the governor, lieutenant governor or attorney general, or town or regional boards of education, or automobile dispute settlement panels established pursuant to section 42-181 ." ... Therefore, the DPS is a state agency.

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency to include a state commission authorized by law to determine contested cases.

Young v. Commission on Human Rights, No. Cv 32 38 83 (Sep. 10, 1995) · filed 1995-09-10(1)

In the present case, the plaintiff properly cited the state agency that rendered the decision from which the plaintiff appeals (the CHRO) as a party defendant. Thus, the plaintiff's appeal is not subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the mandates of § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166(1)'s definition of an administrative agency includes the Psychiatric Security Review Board.

Zinkerman v. State, No. Cv 960565171 (Jun. 2, 1997) · filed 1997-06-02(1)

The PSRB is an administrative agency of the State pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166(1) excludes a city police chief from the definition of an agency when the chief lacks authority to make regulations or determine contested cases.

Vlacich v. Sweeny, No. Cv97 034 73 18 (Dec. 4, 1997) · filed 1997-12-04(1)

A review of the statutes relating to pawnbrokers do not reveal any authorization to "make regulations" or any requirement that a hearing beheld. ... The defendant is not acting as a "agency" of the state within the meaning of Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.

Section 4-166(1) defines “agency” to exclude local zoning commissions.

Graziano v. Planning Comm'n, Southbury, No. Cv96-0055562s (Jul. 23, 1997) · filed 1997-07-23(1)

However, § 4-183 (h) does not apply to appeals from a local zoning board because a zoning commission is not a state "agency" as defined by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. See General Statutes § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166 defines an Adoption Review Board waiver proceeding as a contested case and the board as an agency.

In re Baby Z. · filed 1999-01-26(1), (2)

We conclude, therefore, that aproceeding of the board constitutes a “contested case” within the meaning of § 4-166 (2) and that the board is an “agency” within the meaning of § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166 (1) includes the liquor control commission within the definition of an agency subject to the UAPA.

Rivera v. Liquor Control Commission · filed 1999-05-04(1)

The commission is an agency within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (1) and is subject to the provisions of the UAPA.

Section 4-166(1)'s definition of agency excludes a town board of selectmen that is neither a state agency nor acting as the state's agent in performing a state function.

Stosuy v. the Board of Selectmen, Bolton, No. Cv 99 70569 S (Feb. 15, 2000) · filed 2000-02-15(1)

While the Court would not impose the harsh penalty of dismissing the suit because the brief was not timely filed (at least under the circumstances where a jurisdictional challenge is pending), it does agree with the defendant that the Board of Selectmen is not an agency under § 4-166 (1) and orders the dismissal for that reason.

Section 4-166’s definition of an administrative agency excludes a board of education considering a tenured teacher’s termination.

Rogers v. Board of Education · filed 2000-05-03

a board of education is not an administrative agency as defined by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.; and is not subject to the provisions of the UAPA.

Section 4-166 (1) excludes the statewide grievance committee from its definition of an agency.

Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee · filed 2002-06-04(1)

Consequently, we have determined that the defendant is not an agency within the definition provided in General Statutes § 4-166 (1). ... Therefore, our cases treating the failure to properly serve or notice necessary parties to administrative appeals as depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction are inapposite.

Section 4-166(1) does not define the Statewide Grievance Committee as an administrative agency.

Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance Committee · filed 2007-09-04(1)

At the same time, the defendant patently is not an administrative agency as defined in General Statutes § 4-166(1) of our UAPA.

The Connecticut Medical Examining Board is an administrative agency under the UAPA’s definition.

Jones v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board · filed 2011-06-21(1)

It “patently is not an administrative agency as defined in ... § 4-166 (1) of our UAPA.” ... In contrast, the defendant is an administrative agency within the meaning of the UAPA.

Section 4-166(1) defines agency to cover state agencies, excluding a municipal hearing officer from the UAPA.

Petrucelli v. Meriden · filed 2020-07-07(1)

The hearing officer is not an agency for purposes of the UAPA, and, therefore, the UAPA is inapplicable.

Section 4-166(1) limits UAPA appeals to final decisions of state agencies, excluding municipal agencies.

Meyers v. Middlefield · filed 2021-01-19(1)

The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), codified at General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., by its terms does not apply to appeals from municipal administrative agencies. An appeal is governed by the UAPA only if the aggrieved party is appealing a final decision of a ‘‘state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-166 (1); see also General Statutes § 4-183 (a).

Section 4-166(1) defines an agency under the UAPA as a state entity; a municipal housing code enforcement division is not a state agency.

Mention v. Kensington Square Apartments · filed 2022-08-30(1)

In the present case, we conclude that the New Haven housing code enforcement division is not a state agency as defined in § 4-166 (1).

Section 4-166 excludes automobile dispute settlement panels established under § 42-181 from the definition of “agency,” so the administrative substantial evidence standard does not govern review of their factfinding.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. O'Neill · filed 1989-07-04

The legislature promptly enacted Public Acts 1987, No. 87-522, § 1, which amends General Statutes § 4-166, the definitions section of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, to exclude “automobile dispute settlement panels established pursuant to section 42-181” from the definition of “agency.” In effect, that amendment repudiated the suggestion that the administrative appeal standard of “substantial evidence” was intended to govern the judicial review of factfinding of Lemon Law II arbitrations.

Section 4-166(1) excludes town and regional boards of education from the definition of “agency.”

Halpern v. Board of Education · filed 1994-11-08(1)

We direct the board to adopt this procedure in the special circumstances of this case by analogy only, as we recognize that the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act defines the term “agency” to exclude “town or regional boards of education.” General Statutes § 4-166 (1); see Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 177-78 and n.5, 487 A.2d 181 (1985).

Section 4-166(1) excludes town boards of education from the definition of an agency under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.

Packer v. Board of Education · filed 1998-08-04(1)

... the legislature amended the definition of agency contained in § 4-166 (1) to exclude town boards of education.

Section 4-166(7) treats a generally applicable agency policy as a regulation even when the agency calls it a guideline.

Cheshire Convalescent Center v. Comm. on Hospitals · filed 1977-12-09(7)

The conclusion that the criterion is a regulation which was not lawfully promulgated, that it is therefore void, and that actions taken upon it also are void is supported not only by the plain meaning of the UAPA and § 4-166 (7), but also by law from other jurisdictions.

Section 4-166(7) treats agency guidelines as regulations when they operate as substantive rules with a substantial impact on those regulated.

Salmon Brook Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1979-04-24(7)

That the so-called “guidelines” were “regulations” is patent. They were applied as substantive rules. Their use has a substantial impact upon those regulated by the commission who file applications such as the Salmon Brook application.

Section 4-166(7) treats a generally applicable bus fare increase that implements law or policy as a regulation, rather than an internal management statement.

City of Hartford v. Powers · filed 1981-02-03(7)

That the present fare increase is a statement issued by the defendant cannot be questioned. Nor can it be disputed that the fare increase applies generally to Connecticut Transit operations in the Hartford, New Haven and Stamford regions. It clearly implements and prescribes law and policy pursuant to §§ 13b-32, 13b-17, 13b-34a and 13b-35. The conclusion, therefore, that a fare increase constitutes a regulation is unavoidable.

Section 4-166 (7) requires a regulation to be an agency statement of general applicability; a through truck restriction on parts of two streets does not qualify.

Maloney v. Pac · filed 1981-03-17(7)

We conclude therefore that the traffic regulation adopted by the state traffic commission as § 14-298-270 is not a regulation within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (7) and is therefore not subject to the LRRC’s review pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 4-170.

Section 4-166(7) treats a generally applicable agency policy affecting private rights as a regulation that must be formally promulgated.

Walker v. Commissioner · filed 1982-06-29(7)

The prior approval policy is a statement of general applicability because it applies to all AFDC recipients seeking help with their moving expenses. ... As a regulation subject to the UAPA, the policy was required to be promulgated with certain formalities. Because the policy was not so promulgated, it may not be enforced to deny the payment of moving expenses for which an applicant is otherwise qualified.

Section 4-166 (7) treats a generally applicable agency policy that substantially affects providers and patients as a regulation, regardless of its label.

Persico v. Maher · filed 1983-09-13(7)

The policy constitutes a rule of sufficient generality to impinge substantially on dentists and their welfare patients who will deal with the agency at a future time. By its precise terms it is clearly not an interdepartmental statement or memorandum “concerning only the internal management of” the department which does not affect “private rights or procedures available to the public.” The policy promulgated by the defendant’s predecessor agency on October 1,1973, is unmistakably a regulation under the UAPA. See General Statutes § 4-166 (7).

An agency’s application of its published regulations to capital carryovers is not a separate regulation requiring promulgation.

Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1986-07-15(7)

While the commission’s choice of words may have been regrettable, we do not think that its “posture” on carryovers can sensibly be viewed as anything other than a necessary application of its published regulations.

Section 4-166(7) defines a regulation to include an agency statement of general applicability that describes agency procedure or practice requirements.

Goldberg v. Insurance Department · filed 1987-02-10(7)

A “regulation” is statutorily defined as an “agency statement of general applicability, without regard to its designation, that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency.” General Statutes § 4-166 (7). ... The trial court was correct in concluding that the section was invalid on the ground that it was an unlawful regulation not promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking provision of the UAPA.

Whether an agency policy is a regulation under § 4-166(7) depends on its general applicability, which may require evidence of how the agency applies it.

Control Module, Inc. v. Groppo · filed 1989-03-17(7)

In the present case, there is no evidence that the “throw-out rule” has been applied by the commissioner in the past, or that it is consistently being applied in the present, or that it will have a substantial impact on the rights and obligations of those corporate taxpayers who may appear before the commissioner in the future. Whether the “throw-out rule” is one of general applicability within the meaning of § 4-166 (7) is a question of fact which cannot be decided by this motion, but must be determined after a trial.

Section 4-166(7) does not treat an agency’s interpretation of a statute in an adjudication as the promulgation of a regulation.

Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities · filed 1987-07-07(7)

It maintains that by interpreting the statute to apply to the plaintiff, the commission was in fact promulgating a regulation, as defined in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 (7), and circumventing the detailed statutory procedures for the adoption of regulations by administrative agencies. See General Statutes § 4-168 (a). Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, however, the commission has authority to interpret statutory law through the adjudication process.

Section 4-166(13)(A) excludes statements concerning only an agency’s internal management from the definition of a regulation when they do not affect private rights or procedures available to the public.

Pierce v. Lantz · filed 2009-03-10(13)(A)

Administrative directives are created for the internal management of the correctional institutions and are not regulations that are subject to the TJAPA requirements. See General Statutes § 4-166 (13) (A).

Section 4-166(16)’s definition of “regulation” does not cover the shared clean energy program requirements developed under § 16-244z for PURA’s approval.

Jefferson Solar, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection · filed 2024-04-16(16)

Therefore, because the program requirements are not regulations under the UAPA, the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s action seeking a declaratory judgment under § 4-175, as the plaintiff’s requested ruling did not ask the court to decide whether a regulation is valid or to determine the application of a regulation, statute, or final decision.

Section 4-166(2) does not treat a disclosure decision as a contested case when no hearing is required by statute and none is held.

Steadwell v. Warden, Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers · filed 1982-02-02(2)

Although the DOC is an "agency" for purposes of the UAPA; General Statutes §§ 4-166 (1), 4-185, 18-78a (a); disclosure decisions are not "contested cases," because the administrative proceeding pursuant to a disclosure request does not require an opportunity for a hearing according to statute; nor was a hearing in fact held in the present case.

A hearing required solely by the constitution does not satisfy § 4-166 (2)’s requirement that a hearing be “required by statute” for a contested case.

Retzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges · filed 1984-02-02(2)

Thus, we conclude that if an opportunity for a hearing is required by the constitution, it is not “required by statute” under General Statutes § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166 (2) excludes initial hospital rate-setting from the definition of a contested case when no hearing is required or held.

Connecticut Business & Industry Ass'n v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1990-05-01(2)

Such a procedure does not constitute a “contested case,” which is a prerequisite for an appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a), upon which the plaintiffs rely. It is not a proceeding ... and thus does not satisfy the definition of a “contested case” in General Statutes § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166(2) requires a right to be heard for a proceeding to qualify as a contested case; allowing people to address an agency does not itself create that right.

Town of Southington v. State Traffic Com., No. Cv36 28 40 (Jan. 14, 1991) · filed 1991-01-14(2)

Thus, without a statutory right to, or an opportunity for, a hearing, or, at least, a statutory expectation of a hearing, the proceeding does not become a "contested case".

Section 4-166 (2) does not treat the department’s review of a merger as a contested case when the party has no statutory or regulatory right to a hearing.

All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control · filed 1989-12-05(2)

To qualify a proceeding as a “contested case” under § 4-166 (2) and, thus, to be entitled to a “hearing,” a party must have a statutory or regulatory right to be heard by the agency.

A directive to cease an activity is not a contested case under § 4-166(2) when the agency had not licensed or approved that activity and no prior hearing was required.

Easter House, Inc. v. Department of Children & Youth Services · filed 1990-04-17(2)

We conclude that the plaintiff has never obtained DCYS approval of its activities in the placement of Connecticut children and, therefore, that § 4-182 (c), requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing before a revocation of a “license,” as defined in § 4-166 is inapplicable. Since there is no prior notice and hearing requirement absent a license, the issuance of the DCYS letter prohibiting such activities was not illegal and did not constitute a “contested case” within § 4-166.

Section 4-166 (2) excludes a general agency investigation from the definition of a contested case when the investigation does not determine a party’s rights, duties, or privileges.

New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1992-07-20(2)

While the right to cross-examine is expressly provided for in contested hearings conducted by agencies pursuant to General Statutes § 4-178 (5), an investigation of general issues pursuant to § 19-149 is not a “contested case” which is defined in General Statutes § 4-166 (2) as “a proceeding ... in which the legal right and duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing. ...” The commission’s general research into existing and needed rehabilitation services did not have as its focus the rights of the plaintiffs and did not determine or adjudicate their application.

Section 4-166(2) treats a permit proceeding as a contested case when a hearing is held and the agency must decide the applicant’s entitlement.

Department of Utilities v. Carothers · filed 1992-08-18(2)

A contested case is defined by General Statutes § 4-166 (2) as a proceeding “in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held . . . .” Because a hearing was in fact held in this case and because General Statutes §§ 22a-368 (b) and 22a-373 require the commissioner to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to a water diversion permit, this case falls within the definition of a contested case.

Section 4-166(2) generally excludes nonadversary regulatory investigations from the definition of a contested case.

New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1993-06-22(2)

Because investigations in this regulatory context are generally nonadversary proceedings, they are not contested cases within the meaning of the UAPA.

A legal right to seek agency approval alone does not create a contested case under § 4-166(2) when the agency has no statutory duty to provide a hearing.

Parcc, Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n, Hosp, No. Cv94-310124s (Jun. 16, 1994) · filed 1994-06-16(2)

Therefore, since the commission is not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing to determine the plaintiff's legal right to pursue licensure of the ten-bed addition, the present case is not a contested case within the meaning of the UAPA.

Section 4-166(2) does not make an agency’s denial of a hearing a contested case when no statute entitles the party to that hearing.

Orsi v. Senatore, No. 750239 (Aug. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-08-26(2)

In this case the plaintiffs have no statutory right to an administrative removal hearing. Therefore, the Commissioner's decision to deny the plaintiffs such a hearing is not a contested case and this court cannot review that decision.

Section 4-166 does not make agency answers to informal questions a contested case when no statute requires a hearing and none is held.

Polchlopek v. Office of St. Comptroller, No. Cv 94 070 49 27 (Sep. 16, 1994) · filed 1994-09-16

General Statutes §§ 4-166 and 4-183 provide only a limited right of appeal from state agency actions to this court. ... A "contested case" is a proceeding "in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." ... In particular, they do not require the defendant in this case to hold a hearing prior to answering questions received from retired employees or their representatives, and, of course, no hearing was held. For that reason, the plaintiff has no statutory right of appeal, and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 4-166 defines a final decision as an agency determination in a contested case; a contested case requires an opportunity for a hearing or a hearing actually held.

Newington Children's v. Comm. on H. H., No. Cv 93 053 14 94 (Oct. 5, 1994) · filed 1994-10-05

One of those provisions is, of course, that the subject of the appeal be a "final decision." That provision, in turn, invokes the § 4-166 definition of "final decision" and the concomitant requirement that there be a statutory right to a hearing.

An agency decision is not final under § 4-166 when no hearing is required by statute.

Williams v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., No. Cv 950550698 (Oct. 19, 1995) · filed 1995-10-19

A "contested case," as defined in § 4-166 , is a proceeding "in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." ... Since the applicable statute in this case did not require a hearing to be held, the board's decision was not a final decision in a contested case, within the meaning of the administrative procedure act.

Section 4-166(2) treats a hearing required to make a statute constitutional as a hearing required by statute for purposes of defining a contested case.

Karan v. Dept. of Pub. Health Addiction S., No. Cv950551022 (Nov. 8, 1995) · filed 1995-11-08(2)

This court holds, therefore, that the procedure ordered by the federal court in this case is "required by statute" within the meaning of § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166(2) treats a hearing needed to make a statute constitutional as “required by statute” for purposes of the contested case definition.

Karan v. Dept. of Pub. Hlth. Add. Ser., No. Cv 95 055 10 22 (Nov. 8, 1995) · filed 1995-11-08(2)

The court holds, for the reasons set forth above, that if a statute must be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality, such hearing is deemed "required by statute" within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (2) and may qualify the proceeding as a contested case under the administrative procedure act.

A permit decision made without a statutorily required hearing is not a contested case under § 4-166.

Professional Wc. Trans. v. Comm. of Tr., No. Cv 95 055 53 61 (Jun. 4, 1996) · filed 1996-06-04

A "contested case," as defined in § 4-166 , is a proceeding "in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." ... Since § 13b-105 does not require but only permits the department to hold a hearing on an application for an handicapped and elderly livery permit, the proceeding is not a contested case, and the agency's decision is not appealable under the provisions of § 4-183 .

An agency decision is not final under § 4-166(3) unless made in a contested case; a permit decision with no statutory hearing requirement does not qualify.

Town of Monroe v. Department of Liquor, No. Cv 950547141 (May 22, 1995) · filed 1995-05-22(2), (3)

Pursuant to § 4-183 (a), a person may appeal only a final decision, which is defined as "the agency determination in a contested case." General Statutes § 4-166 (3). A contested case is defined as "a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held. . . ." General Statutes § 4-166 (2). ... In the present case, neither General Statutes § 30-52 nor any other statute required that the department hold a hearing on Loulis' application for permission to move to the new location on Main Street. Accordingly, the department's order granting such permission was not a "final decision" appealable under § 4-183 .

An agency determination made with no hearing held or required by statute is not a final decision in a contested case under § 4-166.

Connecticut Res. Rec. Aut. v. Dep. of Env., No. Cv95-0544912 (May 1, 1996) · filed 1996-05-01(2) and (3)

To the extent that this determination is at variance with the decision of Judge Maloney in denying the motion to dismiss this action, this court is not bound by that decision, see State v. Almeda, 211 Conn. 441 , 453 (1989); Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86 (1982); rather, this court concludes that since no hearing was either held or required, the matter of which the plaintiff complains was not a "final decision" within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-183 (a) because a "final decision" is one issued in a contested case, that is, pursuant to § 4-166 (2) and (3), one in which a party's rights, duties or privileges are required by statute to be determined by the agency after an opportunity for a hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held.

Section 4-166(2) excludes a DPUC prudency investigation from the definition of a contested case when no statute requires an opportunity for a hearing.

Co-Operative Cit. Mon. v. Pub. Util. Cont., No. Cv94 0364861 (Jun. 21, 1995) · filed 1995-06-21(2)

Section 16-19 (a) does not require the DPUC to conduct a hearing in prudency investigations, such as docket #92-04-15. Since the DPUC was not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing in docket #92-04-15, that decision was not a "final decision in a contested case."

Section 4-166(2) defines a contested case as a proceeding with a statutorily required opportunity for hearing or a hearing that is in fact held; an agency's investigatory letter issued before a hearing was not a final decision.

Salmon v. State Dept. of Health, No. Cv95 0323809 (Mar. 11, 1998) · filed 1998-03-11(2)

A "contested case" is a proceeding "in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a CT Page 3011 party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." General Statutes § 4-166 (2). As is clear from the record, the case had not yet proceeded to the hearing stage, and the department was in the investigatory phase of the case when it sent out the May 9, 1994 letter. No final decision on the merits had entered.

Section 4-166(2) defines a contested case to include an agency determination of a party’s legal rights after an opportunity for a hearing.

Stafford Bd. of Ed. v. State Bd. of Ed., No. Cv95 0057771 S (Nov. 13, 1996) · filed 1996-11-13(2)

The determination of Stafford's obligation to transport St. Edward School students presented a contested case pursuant to General Statutes § 4-166 (2).

A parole revocation proceeding is not a contested case under § 4-166(2) when no statute requires a hearing.

Reid v. Board of Parole, No. 0568311 (Nov. 12, 1997) · filed 1997-11-12(2)

The board's decision is not a "final decision" in a "contested case" because a hearing on the plaintiff's revocation of parole is not statutorily required.

Section 4-166(2) does not treat a licensing exemption proceeding as a contested case when the governing statute does not require a hearing.

Alai v. Div., Special Rev., No. Cv96 0562134 (Feb. 19, 1998) · filed 1998-02-19(2)

The absence of any similar reference to a hearing requirement in (n) leads this court to conclude that the legislature did not intend to require a hearing before action on an exemption. ... Because these appeals are not contested cases, there is no final decision from which the plaintiffs have a right to appeal under § 4-183 .

A proceeding is a contested case when an agency determines a party’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after a statutorily required opportunity for a hearing.

Board of Education v. State Board of Education · filed 1998-03-03(2)

A contested case, on the other hand, is “a proceeding ... in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held. . . .” General Statutes § 4-166 (2). ... Here, § 10-186 required that the transportation rights of St. Edward School students be determined by the state board, after an opportunity for a hearing. The state board’s decision regarding the rights of the parties, therefore, was a final decision in a contested case, not a declaratory ruling.

Section 4-166(2) treats a hearing required before a deputy sheriff’s termination as a contested case.

Epstein v. Kupchunos, No. Cv96 0557888 (Oct. 13, 1998) · filed 1998-10-13(2)

Because § 6-43 requires that the plaintiff receive a hearing before being deprived of his employment, the hearing fits within the definition of a "contested case."

A proceeding is a contested case under § 4-166(2) when a statute provides an opportunity for a hearing, even if the person does not request one.

Bower v. Commissioner of the Dmv, No. Cv97 0575396 (Apr. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-04-06(2)

A contested case is defined as "a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held. . . ." General Statutes § 4-166 (2). Under subsection (d) of General Statutes § 14-227b , the plaintiff had an opportunity for a hearing. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss the appeal on this ground.

Section 4-166(2) does not treat notice of a failed licensing examination as a contested case when no statute requires a hearing on the result.

Mandanici v. State Comm., Env. Prot., No. Cv 99 0498474s (Dec. 3, 1999) · filed 1999-12-03(2)

However, the notification of the failure of a licensing examination is not a final decision in a contested case. Here, there is no mandated hearing. DEP simply is not required under the statutes to hold a hearing concerning its examination results or on its notification of a failure of an examination.

Section 4-166(2) defines a contested case to include a proceeding in which an agency must determine a party’s legal rights after an opportunity for a hearing.

Kiniry v. State, Dept. of Public Health, No. Cv 98 0085189s (May 11, 1999) · filed 1999-05-11(2)

Section 4-166 (2) defines "contested case" as a "proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." ... The argument against the defendant's position is that the Commissioner's obligation to afford a hearing is established by General Statutes § 19a-229 which provides: ... This Court sees no reason to depart from the holdings of the prior cases and the rationales contained therein, which have rejected the defendant's jurisdictional argument.

Section 4-166’s contested-case definition does not treat a hearing required by federal statute as one “required by statute.”

Richards v. Alibozek, No. Cv 01-0510286 S (Jun. 26, 2002) · filed 2002-06-26(2)

The court concludes that the General Assembly did not intend the phrase "required by statute" in § 4-166 (2) to include federal statutes.

Section 4-166 (2) treats a proceeding as a contested case when a statute requires an opportunity for a hearing, even if the agency fails to hold one.

Miller's Pond Co., LLC v. Rocque · filed 2002-07-30(2)

Accordingly, because the commissioner did not give the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy the application’s deficiencies, or to request that the application be deemed complete as submitted and have those deficiencies examined in the forum of a public hearing, the plaintiff was aggrieved by the commissioner’s failure to hold such a hearing, and the case is contested pursuant to § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166(2) requires a statutory opportunity for a hearing before an agency proceeding qualifies as a contested case; a constitutionally required hearing alone does not suffice.

Leach v. Defilippo, No. Cv 02 0515134s (Oct. 31, 2002) · filed 2002-10-31(2)

Under Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commr, of Environmental Protection , 226 Conn. 792 , 811 (1993), to be a contested case under § 4-166 (2), there must be a proceeding in which the agency "is required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing to determine a party's legal rights or privileges."

A hearing required by federal regulations under a state statute’s general authorization does not satisfy § 4-166(2)’s statutory hearing requirement for a contested case.

Morel v. Commissioner of Public Health · filed 2002-12-31(2)

That fact does not lead to the conclusion, however, that the hearing held in the present case was mandated by this state statute within the meaning of § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166 (2) does not treat a hearing required by federal statute as a contested case.

Town of Middlebury v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2007-07-17(2)

In light of the fact that the underlying purpose of the “required by statute” provision in § 4-166 (2) is to ensure that the legislature makes the public policy determination concerning which class of agency decisions is entitled to judicial review under the state act, we conclude that a hearing required to be held by federal statute does not qualify as a contested case.

Section 4-166 (2) defines a contested case to require a legal right, duty or privilege at issue. A resolved disclosure complaint no longer qualifies, even if a hearing was held.

Department of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission · filed 2007-09-04(2)

The General Assembly has defined a “contested case” as “a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held . . . .” General Statutes § 4-166 (2). ... Plainly, the case no longer was contested. Without a contested case, the commission was not statutorily permitted to issue a final decision.

Section 4-166(2) requires a statutory or regulatory mandate for an agency hearing before its determination qualifies as a contested case.

Ferguson Mechanical Co. v. Department of Public Works · filed 2007-06-26(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that, because the department was not under a statutory or regulatory mandate to conduct a hearing with respect to the plaintiffs allegations, there was no agency determination in a contested case.

Section 4-166(2) treats an agency’s rejection of a water diversion application as a decision in a contested case when a hearing is required.

Miller's Pond Co. v. Rocque · filed 2003-06-03(2)

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that the defendant’s notice of rejection was indeed a final decision in a contested case and that under the statutory scheme prescribed in § 22a-371, a hearing was required. ... Because that [majority opinion] fully addresses all arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt it as a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues.

Section 4-166(2) treats a proceeding as a contested case when a statute entitles a party to a hearing to determine legal rights or privileges; a hearing held without that entitlement does not suffice.

Town of Canterbury v. Rocque · filed 2003-07-22(2)

Because the petition was filed in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 22a-208a (e), the town was entitled to a hearing on its license application. Accordingly, the commissioner’s disposition of the application was a final determination in a contested case, entitling the town to judicial review.

A hearing to contest a public assistance lien is not a contested case under § 4-166(2) when no statute requires the hearing.

Peters v. Department of Social Services · filed 2005-04-26(2)

We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs administrative appeal pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., because the administrative appeal did not relate to a “ ‘[contested case’ ” as that term is defined by General Statutes § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166 (2) does not treat a prison classification decision as a contested case when no statute requires a hearing.

Francis v. OFFICER CHEVAIR · filed 2007-03-06(2)

The plaintiffs appeal from the decision of the classification committee, therefore, is not from a “contested case” as defined by § 4-166 (2).

A claim qualifies as a contested case when a statute entitles the party to an agency hearing on the claim.

Earl B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families · filed 2008-07-29(2)

Because we have concluded herein that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing under § 17a-15 on his continued placement at the training school, we further conclude that the plaintiffs claim satisfies the “contested case” requirement of the UAPA.

A Medicaid audit review decision without a formal hearing is not a contested case under § 4-166 (4).

Bridgeport Dental, LLC v. Commissioner of Social Services · filed 2016-05-24(4)

Because the present case was not a contested case and there was no formal hearing, not all of the language of the substantial evidence rule is specifically applicable.

A wage investigation with no required or actual hearing is not a contested case, and its determination is not a final decision subject to judicial review.

Evans v. Tiger Claw, Inc. · filed 2013-03-05(2), (3)(A)

Bertaccini’s decision was not a final decision in a contested case and was not subject to judicial review under the UAPA.

A municipal tax relief appeal is not a contested case under § 4-166(2) when no statute obliges the board to determine the claimant's rights or privileges.

Gianetti v. Dunsby · filed 2018-03-19(2)

Because the General Statutes contain no provision obligating the board to determine the plaintiff's rights and privileges with respect to his municipal tax relief appeal, a contested case does not exist pursuant to § 4-166 (2).

Section 4-166(4) treats an agency proceeding as a contested case when a qualifying request makes a hearing mandatory, even if the agency had already scheduled a discretionary hearing.

High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health · filed 2023-07-25(4)

Once such a request is received, the OHCA is required to hold a public hearing, and the proceeding is considered a contested case for purposes of appeal.

Section 4-166 excludes proceedings before the Board of Pardons and Paroles from the definition of a contested case.

Missionary Society v. Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2005-01-24(2)

Finally, even if there were a right to an eligibility determination and a hearing, the legislature has expressly excluded proceedings before the board from the class of “contested cases.” Therefore, decisions in such proceedings are not “final decisions” for purposes of § 4-183 (a).

Section 4-166(5) treats a complainant named as a relator in an agency proceeding as a party without a more formal designation.

Hillcroft Partners v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities · filed 1987-11-24(5)

She had thus been “named ... as a party” pursuant to § 4-166 (5). No more formal christening as a party was needed.

An agency admitted as a party and participating in an administrative hearing as of right is a “party” under § 4-166 (5).

Capozziello v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners · filed 1988-05-10(5)

The commissioner was admitted as a party and participated in the board hearing as a matter of right. General Statutes § 29-32b. He therefore falls within the definition of a “party” pursuant to § 4-166 (5).

Section 4-166 (5) includes everyone named or admitted as a party to the administrative proceeding among the parties of record who must be served on appeal.

Tarnopol v. Connecticut Siting Council · filed 1989-07-18(5)

A “party” is defined under the UAPA as “each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party.” General Statutes § 4-166 (5). In the present case, therefore, all of the parties who were named or admitted as parties in the administrative proceeding were “parties of record” whom the plaintiffs were obliged to serve in bringing their appeal.

Section 4-166 (5) includes parties automatically admitted under governing regulations, without requiring them to petition for admission or file a notice of appearance.

Donis v. Connecticut Board of Examiners in Podiatry · filed 1988-06-07(5)

This is consonant with the definition of a party in § 4-166 (5). Neither the department nor Donis was required to seek permission to be a party of record in this case or to file a notice of appearance. Both became parties of record by operation of the statute and regulations in this case.

Section 4-166 (8) does not confer party status in proceedings before a local inland wetlands commission because the UAPA does not govern those proceedings.

Klug v. Inland Wetlands Commission · filed 1993-01-19(8)

The defendants correctly assert that the UAPA does not govern procedures before an inland wetlands commission. Rather the UAPA applies only to appealsjrom the commission to the Superior Court. As such, the plaintiff was not entitled to party status pursuant to §§ 4-166 (8) and 4-177a of the UAPA.

Section 4-166 (8) defines a party as someone whose legal rights, duties or privileges an agency proceeding must determine and who is named or admitted as a party.

Common Coun. of Middletown v. F.O.I.C., No. Cv 95 007 44 06 (Jan. 31, 1996) · filed 1996-01-31(8)

Unquestionably, the council was at all times a proper party to the commission proceeding. General Statutes § 4-166 (8) defines a "party" as one "whose legal rights, duties or privileges are required by statute to be determined by an agency proceeding and who is named or admitted as a party." Libby's complaint to the commission essentially required the commission to determine the council's legal duties under the freedom of information laws. The commission should have named the council as a party respondent in the proceeding at the very outset.

Section 4-166(8) excludes a person who was not a party to the permit application or the agency proceedings from party status.

Brown v. Rocque, No. Cv 98 65924 S (Jun. 22, 1998) · filed 1998-06-22(8)

The plaintiff was not a "party" to the permit application "Water Ski Course Permit #0329108017B (Coventry Lake)," or to the administrative proceedings before the Commissioner. General Statutes § 4-166 (8) defines a party as follows: "(8)`Party' means each person (A) whose legal rights, duties or privileges are required by statute to be determined by an agency proceeding and who is named or admitted as a party, (B) who is required by law to be a party in an agency proceeding or (C) who is granted status as a party under subsection (a) of section 4-177a ."

A reconsideration ruling that elaborates an agency decision may be read with the original decision when reviewing the agency’s reasoning.

Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control · filed 1994-11-21

The court considers the May decision and the July ruling together as constituting the department’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. See General Statutes § 4-166.

Section 4-166(3) excludes the denial of a petition for reconsideration from the definition of a final decision for appeal purposes.

Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Windsor Hall Rest Home · filed 1995-02-07(3)

Further, a denial of a petition for reconsideration does not affect the finality of the original decision, nor is the denial of the petition itself a final decision for purposes of appeal. General Statutes § 4-166 (3).

Section 4-166(3) treats a declaratory ruling as a final decision for purposes of an administrative appeal.

Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney · filed 1993-07-29(3)

A declaratory ruling is a “final decision” under § 4-183. See General Statutes § 4-166 (3).

Section 4-166 treats an agency order that fixes legal duties in a contested case as a final decision even when related issues remain unresolved.

State v. State Employees' Review Board · filed 1994-12-06(3)

General Statutes § 4-166 (3) states that a final decision is an “agency determination in a contested case,” but the term “does not include a preliminary or intermediate ruling or order of an agency, or a ruling of an agency granting or denying a petition for reconsideration.” ... We conclude that the review board decision in this case satisfies the criteria for a final decision of an agency as set forth in New Haven.

Section 4-166(3) excludes an agency’s decision not to issue a declaratory ruling from the definition of a final decision.

Town of New Milford v. Commissioner, No. Cv 95 054 78 64 (Sep. 19, 1995) · filed 1995-09-19(3)

The court finds, therefore, that the commissioner's decision is not a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176 (e)(1), but rather a decision not to issue a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176 (e)(5). Accordingly, the decision is not a "final decision" as defined in General Statutes § 4-166 and fails to provide the basis for an appeal CT Page 11111 under General Statutes § 4-183 .

Section 4-166(3) includes an agency declaratory ruling in its definition of a final decision, but a requested ruling that has not been issued is not final.

Levine v. State, No. Cv94 31 48 38 S (Jan. 31, 1996) · filed 1996-01-31(3)

Under General Statutes § 4-166 (3) final decision means (A) the agency determination in a control cases, (B) a declaratory ruling is issued by an agency pursuant to section 4-176 or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration. ... The declaratory ruling, which the plaintiffs requested from the Board, has not yet been issued. Thus, because the Board has not rendered a final decision, this court lacks the jurisdiction to issue an order that will effect the ongoing administrative proceedings.

Section 4-166(3) treats a declaratory ruling as a final decision only after the agency issues it.

Levine v. State, No. Cv 94314838s (Feb. 13, 1996) · filed 1996-02-13(3)

Under General Statutes § 4-166 (3) final decision means (A) the agency determination in contested cases, (B) a declaratory ruling issued by an agency pursuant to Section 4-176 or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration." ... The declaratory ruling, which the plaintiffs requested from the Board, has not yet been issued. Thus, because the Board has not rendered a final decision, this court lacks the jurisdiction to issue an order that will effect the ongoing administrative proceedings.

Section 4-166 (3) (C) includes decisions after reconsideration in contested cases within the definition of a final decision.

Derwin v. State Employees Retirement Commission · filed 1995-07-25(3)(C)

When read in the proper statutory and historical context, § 4-166 (3) (C) may fairly be construed only to include decisions after reconsideration in contested cases.

Section 4-166(3)(C) allows an agency decision after reconsideration to qualify as a final decision only in a contested case.

Bernier v. Commissioner of Health Services, No. 531460 (Sep. 18, 1995) · filed 1995-09-18(3)(C)

Bernier can not rely on 4-166 (3)(C) because he is not appealing from a final order in a contested case.

Section 4-166(3) excludes preliminary agency decisions on whether to reconsider a final decision from the definition of a final decision that may be appealed.

Town of Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council · filed 1996-07-30(3)

The preliminary decision of the agency whether to grant or deny the reconsideration petition is, however, specifically excluded from the definition of “final decision” under the UAPA and, consequently, that initial determination is not appealable to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 4-166 (3). An agency’s preliminary decision whether to entertain a petition under § 4-181a (b) is, for present purposes, in all material respects identical to an agency’s preliminary decision whether to entertain a petition for reconsideration under § 4-181a (a).

Section 4-166 (3) (B) treats an agency declaratory ruling as a final decision that may be appealed.

Cannata v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1996-08-20(3)(B)

Because the record supports the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs sought and obtained a declaratory ruling by the commissioner regarding the applicability of § 22a-349 to their proposed land use, and because a declaratory ruling is an appealable final decision under § 4-183 (a), the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ appeal.

Section 4-166's definition of a final decision does not include an agency's denial of a request to reopen a decision made over ten years earlier.

Book v. Freedom of Information Commission, No. Cv97 0570856 (Jan. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-01-06

The legislature has defined "final decision" in General Statutes § 4-166 : ... The denial of the plaintiff's request to open a decision over ten years old is not a final decision.

Section 4-166(3) does not treat an agency’s denial of a petition for a declaratory ruling as a final decision that can be appealed.

Book v. Burnham, No. Cv97 0573440 (Jan. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-01-06(3)

Since a denial of a petition for declaratory ruling is not a final decision under General Statutes § 4-166 (3), there is no right to appeal from the treasurer's decision.

A permit ruling is a final decision in a contested case when a hearing is required or held.

Loulis v. Liquor Control Commission, No. 320627 (Jul. 8, 1997) · filed 1997-07-08(2), (3)

A "final decision" is defined by statute to include an agency determination in a contested case. General Statutes § 4-166 (3). ... Since a hearing was required, and in fact was held, the Commission's ruling was a "final decision" on a contested case which was appealable under General Statutes § 4-183 (a) by anyone aggrieved by that decision.

Section 4-166(3) does not make an agency's denial of a motion for reconsideration independently reviewable.

Urso v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv970574220 (Dec. 1, 1997) · filed 1997-12-01(3)

To the extent the plaintiff challenges the department's denial of his motion for reconsideration, that issue is not reviewable. Town of Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 238 Conn. 361 , 370-71 (1996); General Statutes §§ 4-166 (3), 4-181a .

Section 4-166 defines a contested case as a proceeding involving a required or actual hearing, and a final decision as an agency determination in a contested case.

Edelman v. State, Build. Codes Stan. Comm., No. Cv97 0573456 (May 4, 1998) · filed 1998-05-04(2), (3)(A)

General Statutes § 4-166 (3)(A) defines "final decision" as "the agency determination in a contested case." A contested cases is a "proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." General Statutes § 4-166 (2). ... This appeal does not involve a contested case and, therefore, is not a final CT Page 5875 decision for purposes of a UAPA appeal.

Section 4-166's definition of a final decision in a contested case does not cover a municipal development proposal.

State P. Ltd. Part. v. Sth. Cen. Reg., No. Cv 99-0421782 (Oct. 20, 1999) · filed 1999-10-20

To begin with, the proposal itself cannot reasonably be considered to be a "final decision in a contested case," as defined in General Statutes § 4-166 .

Section 4-166(3)'s definition of “final decision” excludes an agency's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling and an agency engineer's recommendation to approve a sewage disposal plan.

Pinchbeck v. Connecticut Dep., Pub. Hlth, No. Cv 98 058 3410 (Sep. 28, 1999) · filed 1999-09-28(3)

These cases hold that an agency's decision not to issue a declaratory judgment under § 4-176 (e)(5) does not constitute a "final decision" as defined by § 4-166 (3) which may be appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to § 4-183 . ... Similarly, with regard to the third issue, the recommendation of approval with modifications of the Friedlaenders' proposed subsurface sewage disposal system rendered by the DPH's sanitary engineer on May 11, 1998, is not a statute or regulation which has interfered with or impaired, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the plaintiff's rights. Nor does it fall within any of the definitions of "final decision" enumerated in § 4-166 .

Section 4-166(3)’s definition of a final decision does not determine when to appeal a denial of intervention claimed as a matter of right.

Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission · filed 1999-11-09(3)

The plaintiffs claims miss the mark because he is relying on case law and statutory definitions that are useful in determining when an agency’s decision is final ... for purposes of appeal where the inteivention is not a matter of right. We need not examine these factors to determine whether the commission’s decision here was final because the plaintiff claims the status of an environmental intervenor, pursuant to § 22a-19, as a matter of right.

Under § 4-166(2) and (3), a survey finding followed by no enforcement proceedings is not a final decision in a contested case.

Manchester Health v. Dept. Pub. Health, No. Cv 99 0498514s (Mar. 28, 2000) · filed 2000-03-28(2) and (3)

The defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the finding was not a "final decision" in a "contested case" within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes § 4-166 (2) and (3). ... The court finds the appeal is not a final decision in a contested case and since these are jurisdictional pre-requisites in an appeal under § 4-183 , grants the motion to dismiss.

Section 4-166(3) treats an agency decision on one claim as final when reconsideration and a later decision address only a separate claim.

New London Housing v. State Bd. of Labor Rel., No. 556452s (Mar. 22, 2001) · filed 2001-03-22(3)

Because the respondent's. second decision does not modify or change its first decision regarding the claim by local 171 in any way, the first decision was the "final decision," within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (3), regarding the claim by local 171 from which an appeal lied.