Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929

Section 33-929(e) requires a claim against a foreign corporation to arise from business the corporation conducted in Connecticut.

Ryan v. Cerullo · filed 2007-04-17(e)

The plaintiff, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that his claim arises out of any business that Cerullo & Company conducted in this state, as required by § 33-929 (e).

Subsection (e) permits suit against a foreign corporation on a claim arising from business it conducts in Connecticut without required authority; the plaintiff must prove that condition.

Snow v. Nation Auto USA, Inc., No. Cv 98 489979 (Jun. 18, 1999) · filed 1999-06-18(e)

It is a requirement, however, for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under this subsection that the foreign corporation be conducting business in this state in violation of General Statutes §33-920. ... Thus, Snow has failed to meet his burden of proof that personal jurisdiction exists over Condor pursuant to subsection (e) of General Statutes § 33-929, and, for that reason, Condor's motion to dismiss must be granted.

Section 33-929(e) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a claim arises from business it transacted in Connecticut without a certificate of authority.

Gerber Trade Finance, Inc. v. Davis, Sita & Co., P.A. · filed 2001-01-09(e)

We therefore find that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to show that Defendant’s conduct constituted the transaction of business within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

Section 33-929(e) permits personal jurisdiction over an unlicensed foreign corporation only when the suit concerns the Connecticut business for which it was required to obtain a Certificate of Authority.

Sanchez v. Corona · filed 2003-08-29(e)

Sanchez’s allegation that BBVA is operating without a required Certificate is insufficient because even if the allegation is true, personal jurisdiction is only proper under § 33-929(e) when the suit concerns those specific business activities for which the corporation was required to, but did not, procure a Certificate of Authority.

Section 33-929(e) permits suit against a foreign corporation that transacts business in Connecticut without a certificate of authority when the claim arises from that business. Substantial Connecticut work by an alleged joint employee can support jurisdiction at the pleading stage.

Hajela v. ING Groep, N.V. · filed 2008-08-26(e)

To establish jurisdiction under § 33-929(e), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant corporation transacted business in Connecticut without a valid eertifi-cate of authority from the Secretary of State. ... Thus, because of all of this activity in Connecticut, if Haje-la's allegation that ING and NAIC are joint employers is correct, it can certainly be said that ING was "transacting” business in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(e) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on negotiating two contracts through meetings and phone calls in Connecticut.

Goudis v. American Currency Trading Corp. · filed 2002-11-18(e)

In this case, Goudis and Kabilnitsky allege that ACT negotiated two contracts during meetings held in Connecticut and phone calls made to Connecticut. As the above cases indicate, this activity is insufficient to support jurisdiction under Section 33-929(e).

Section 33-929(e)’s “transacts business” requirement is not broadly construed.

Mills · filed 2026-01-05(e)

The phrase “transacts business” in Section 33-929(e) is not broadly construed.

Section 33-929(a) can confer personal jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation, subject to due process requirements.

Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. CBS Corp. · filed 2014-05-14(a)

Based upon review of the case law discussing § 33-929(a), the court concludes that § 33-929(a) can confer personal jurisdiction on a registered foreign corporation for purposes of the long-arm statute, but the requirements of the due process clause must also be met.

Section 33-929(a) provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Connecticut, subject to due process requirements.

Uses Manufacturing, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Institute · filed 2000-03-17(a)

Where, as here, any due process challenge has been voluntarily waived, ... the Court finds Section 33-929(a) provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over NEPSCo.

Section 33-929(a) makes an authorized foreign corporation’s registered agent its agent for service of process, but registration alone does not establish personal jurisdiction unless exercising jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.

WorldCare Ltd. Corp. v. World Ins. Co. · filed 2011-02-28(a)

In the interest of fairness, a foreign corporation, or in this case alien insurer, that properly complies with the Connecticut registration statute should be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction only where such jurisdiction is otherwise constitutionally permissible.

Section 33-929(e) does not authorize personal jurisdiction when the complaint alleges no facts supporting jurisdiction under that provision.

Joseph Simeone Arch. v. Beverly Ent. Ct., No. Cv 98-0417311 (Feb. 8, 1999) · filed 1999-02-08(e)

The complaint, moreover, contains no allegations that would allow the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant under General Statutes §33-929(e). The plaintiff has not met its burden of proving jurisdiction over the person. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Service under § 33-929 was effective on the mortgagee shown in the land records despite a later assertion that it had sold its loans.

Thompson Gardens West Condominium Ass'n v. Masto · filed 2013-01-22

Deutsche attempts to assert that the facsimile purportedly sent to the association from the trust, *280informing the association that New Century had sold all of its loans, somehow rendered ineffective service that comported with § 33-929. The fact remains, however, that the association served the party recorded on the land records in accordance with the statutory requirements.

Section 33-929(g) governs service on a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Connecticut.

Nieves v. Tri-State Construction Planners, No. Cv00 0176157 (Feb. 1, 2001) · filed 2001-02-01(g)

At oral argument on November 27, 2000, the defendant conceded that it is a foreign corporation not authorized to do business within the state. Moreover, process was served upon the defendant in accordance with General Statutes § 33-929 (g). Consequently, the court finds that General Statutes § 33-929 (g) is the applicable subsection of the statute and that there was proper service on the defendant.

Section 33-929 permits service on a foreign corporation by certified mail to the address specified in subsection (g), with service effective five days after mailing under subsection (d)(3).

Minkowski v. Mirsky, No. Cv01-0381557-S (Nov. 8, 2001) · filed 2001-11-08(g), (d)(3)

The court finds that service of process was properly made on defendant Chimney Store, Inc. as a foreign corporation under § 33-929. The marshal's return and affidavit indicate that the marshal sent a copy of the writ, summons and complaint to the Chimney Store, Inc., directed to its secretary at 2463 North Jerusalem Road, East Meadow, New York 11554, the address listed by the New York secretary of state, via certified mail, return receipt requested as required by § 33-929 (g). Thus, the plaintiff has complied with § 33-929 and service was effective five days thereafter pursuant to § 33-929 (d)(3).

Section 33-929(d) makes mailed service on a foreign corporation effective on the earliest of receipt, the date on a signed return receipt, or five days after a properly addressed, prepaid mailing shown by its postmark.

Uygur v. S.E. Minor Co., No. Cv 01 0184035 (Dec. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-12-04(d)

As Superior Walls is a foreign corporation, the earliest date that service can be considered complete is determined by General Statutes § 33-929 (d), which governs service of process on out-of-state corporations. Section 33-929 (d) provides that out-of-state service on a foreign corporation is deemed to be effective "at the earliest of: (1) the date the foreign corporation receives the mail; (2) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the foreign corporation; and (3) five days after its deposit in the United States mail, as evidenced by the postmark, if mailed postage prepaid and correctly addressed." In this case, the evidence provided to the court is only sufficient as to subsection (1) of § 33-929.3 Superior Walls submitted an affidavit in which Tamara Ackert, the Vice President and General Manager, attests that the corporation received service on October 2, 2001.

Section 33-929(d)(1) does not make service on a foreign corporation effective merely because process was mailed.

Drennan v. Geist, No. Cv-089114-S (Oct. 6, 2000) · filed 2000-10-06(d)(1)

Furthermore, § 33-929 (d)(1) is not applicable as the service of process was only mailed on April 20, 2000.

Section 33-929(b) requires service by registered or certified mail addressed to a foreign corporation’s secretary at its principal office; service addressed only to the corporation is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

Estate of Gartland v. Doucette, No. Cv98 0167971 (Jun. 1, 1999) · filed 1999-06-01(b)

However, service upon these foreign corporations was improper since service was not made upon the foreign corporations' secretaries pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the action against the foreign corporations are granted on the ground that the court does not have jurisdiction over them because of the insufficiency of process.

Section 33-929(a) permits service on an authorized foreign corporation through its registered agent; serving an assistant who is not an authorized recipient is insufficient.

LINK GROUP INTERN., LLP v. Toymax (HK) Ltd. · filed 2000-09-26(a)

Clearly Lebensfeld's assistant was not herself "an officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant cashier" of Toymax H.K. for purposes of New York C.P.L.R. 311(a), nor any of the persons listed in Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 33-929(a) or 52-57(c).

Section 33-929(b) permits service on a foreign corporation without a Connecticut registered agent by registered or certified mail addressed to its secretary at its principal office.

Wilcox v. Fishers Island Ferry District · filed 2021-03-01(b)

A foreign corporation that, like CSEA, does not have a registered agent in Connecticut may be served under Section 33-929 by registered or certified mail addressed to the secretary of the corporation at its principal office.

Section 33-929 does not prescribe the only means of serving a foreign corporation.

Vernon v. Able Employment Service Center · filed 2021-07-19(h)

However, that statute explicitly provides that: “This section does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the required means, of serving a foreign corporation.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(h).

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a claim arising from a Connecticut contract was reasonably foreseeable, including when the corporation acted as an agent of a party to that contract.

Loughery v. Commissioner of Corrections, No. Cv 01-0812161s (Jul. 9, 2002) · filed 2002-07-09(f)(1)

In applying the reasonably foreseeable test from Thomason v.Chemical Bank, supra, 296, to § 33-929 (f)(1), a cause of action arises out of a contract formed in Connecticut if it is reasonably foreseeable that a defendant could be haled into court on a cause of action based on a cause of action similar to the one now being brought against it. ... Thus, as both an agent of the Virginia department of correction and as a provider of medical services to Connecticut inmates who are transferred to Virginia pursuant to a contract, this cause of action arises out a contract made in Connecticut. As such, the requirements in § 33-929 (f) of Connecticut's long-arm statute are satisfied.

Section 33-929(f)(1) requires a contract claim against a foreign corporation to arise from a contract made or to be performed in Connecticut.

Sanchez v. Corona · filed 2004-03-24(f)(1)

Moreover, even if the complaint could be construed as alleging such a claim, personal jurisdiction would still be lacking because Sanchez has failed to allege that the contract supposedly breached was made in Connecticut or was to be performed in Connecticut, as required under the applicable long-arm statute.

Section 33-929(f) does not confer jurisdiction based on an implied contract unless it was made or to be performed in Connecticut; buying parts and making resales initiated by Connecticut customers do not constitute soliciting business there.

In Re Helicopter Crash Near Wendle Creek, British · filed 2007-04-16(f)

In short, because the Sikorsky defendants have failed to allege or show facts giving rise to an inference that Croman entered into a contract that was made or to be performed in Connecticut, they have not established a basis for personal jurisdiction pursuant to a contractual theory. ... Buying helicopter parts, however, is not a business solicitation, it is a purchase transaction, and Cro-man did not “solicit” any of the resale transactions because it did not initiate any of those sales.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on a resident’s claim arising from a contract made in Connecticut.

H. LEWIS PACKAGING, LLC v. Spectrum Plastics, Inc. · filed 2003-12-11(f)(1)

As doubts as to factual allegations will be resolved in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff has satisfied a prima facie showing under the long-arm statute that the oral agreement was made in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction when the plaintiff performs the contract in Connecticut; the defendant need not perform there.

JOHNSEN, FRETTY & CO., LLC v. Lands South, LLC · filed 2007-12-06(f)(1)

These services, which the Plaintiff maintains were performed in Connecticut, are sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the Agreements were performed in Connecticut. It does not matter whether performance of the Agreements was done by the Plaintiff or the Defendants.

Section 33-929(f)(1) reaches a foreign corporation when a contract clearly contemplates performance in Connecticut, even if performance also occurs elsewhere.

Marcus v. American Contract Bridge League · filed 2008-06-20(f)(1)

The employment contract giving rise to this claim clearly contemplated performance in Connecticut. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs established a prima facie showing under the Connecticut long arm statute that the contract was meant to be performed in this state.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for claims arising from a contract the parties contemplated would be performed in Connecticut.

Trade Links, LLC v. de CV · filed 2020-03-23(f)(1)

Given that Trade Links, Essagof and a third of BI-QEM’s customers were identified as being located in Connecticut, it is clear that the SRA contemplated that performance would occur in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the parties contemplated that a contract would be performed in Connecticut.

Callahan v. Wisdom · filed 2020-04-29(f)(1)

The Court concludes that Callahan has established a factually supported case of personal jurisdiction over the Company based on the evidence that at the time the parties entered into the contract, it was understood and expected that Callahan would perform the majority of his obligations thereunder from his home in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(1) supports personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a contract that contemplated performance in Connecticut, subject to the separate requirements of due process.

Schlechtweg v. Celularity, Inc. · filed 2022-02-23(f)(1)

In sum, the Court concludes that Schlechtweg has adequately alleged existence of an oral contract, performance under which was contemplated and substantially performed in Connecticut. As noted, this conclusion does not resolve the question of whether Schlechtweg has stated a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); it merely establishes the existence of a contract in support of the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 33-929(f)(1).

Section 33-929(f)(1) does not confer jurisdiction merely because some services were performed in Connecticut; the contract must have been made there or contemplate performance there.

Murphy Medical Associates, LLC v. Centene Corporation · filed 2023-03-06(f)(1)

The fact that some services may have been performed in Connecticut does not satisfy section 33-929(f)(1).

Section 33-929(f)(1) does not provide jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on a Connecticut contract to which it was not a party in these circumstances.

Success Systems, Inc. v. CRS, Inc. · filed 2023-03-31(f)(1)

Similar reasoning applies here; because Shin Heung was not a party to the NDA, section 33-929(f)(1) does not apply.

A contract found to be substantially performed outside Connecticut does not satisfy § 33-929(f)(1)'s in-state performance basis for service on a foreign corporation.

BICC Brand-Rex Co. v. Arthur, Harris & Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-04-14(f)(1)

This appeal implicates Connecticut’s corporate long arm service of process statute. General Statutes § 33-929 (f) (1). The dispositive issue in this case is whether the contract between the parties was to be substantially performed in this state. The trial court found as a fact that the contract was to be substantially performed outside Connecticut. That factual finding was supported by the evidence and, thus, cannot be overturned by this court.

Section 33-929(e)(1) permits jurisdiction when the parties contemplated sufficient performance of a contract in Connecticut, even if the foreign corporation itself had no contact with the state under the contract.

Kmh Partners v. New World Coffee Bagels, No. Cv 98 68192 S (Nov. 25, 1998) · filed 1998-11-25(e)(1)

First of all, it's not necessary that the foreign corporation itself have contact with Connecticut. It is enough that the parties contemplate there would be a sufficient performance of the contract within this state to encompass a finding of contact.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for a claim arising from a contract made or to be performed in Connecticut. A contract formed when an escrow agent accepted a check in New Jersey was made in New Jersey.

Wellner v. Kasarjian, No. Cv 96 562940 (Apr. 6, 1999) · filed 1999-04-06(f)(1)

General Statutes § 33-929(f)(1) provides that a foreign corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut if the cause of action arises "[o]ut of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state. . . ." ... This court holds the last act necessary to create a contract between Summit Bank and the plaintiff was Summit Bank's receipt and acceptance of the plaintiff's check in New Jersey. Therefore, any contract between the plaintiff and Summit Bank would have been made in New Jersey.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a contract contemplates performance in Connecticut by the plaintiff, even if the defendant performs elsewhere.

Idv North America v. Saronno, No. Cv-99-058059 (Sep. 9, 1999) · filed 1999-09-09(f)(1)

Additionally, while it is clear that the agreement must contemplate or encompass some performance in Connecticut, that performance need not be by the defendant. ... Thus, the court finds as a factual matter that the defendant entered into a contract which clearly contemplated substantial performance in this state. This is sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statutory requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from a contract made or to be performed in Connecticut; a notice that is not a contract does not satisfy that rule.

Brookridge Funding v. Dist. of Columbia, No. Cv99 033 78 58 S (Sep. 5, 2000) · filed 2000-09-05(f)(1)

Connecticut's long arm statute confers jurisdiction where the cause of action arises out of a contract made or to be performed in this state. See § 33-929 (f)(1) of the General Statutes. ... As to the notice of purchase of accounts receivable, the notice is not a contract, and thus does not lead to jurisdiction here for having been formulated, in part, in Connecticut. ... The court finds, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, that § 33-929 (f)(1) does not convey jurisdiction over DCHA.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its contract calls for substantial performance in Connecticut by the plaintiff.

Advanced Claims Service v. Franco Ent., No. Cv00 037 45 48 S (Oct. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-10-13(f)(1)

In this case, the plaintiff was to perform investigative services in Connecticut. Consequently, Franco Enterprises entered into a contract which contemplated substantial performance, albeit by the plaintiff, in this state. This is sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statutory requirements of § 33-929 (f)(1) for establishing personal jurisdiction over Franco Enterprises.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction when a contract contemplates performance in Connecticut, even if the plaintiff rather than the defendant performs there.

Integrated Corp. Rel. v. zoggle.com, No. Cv00 037 64 68 S (Dec. 11, 2000) · filed 2000-12-11(f)(1)

While the agreement must contemplate or encompass some performance in Connecticut, that performance does not, however, need to be by the defendant. The phrase "to be performed in this state" does not require performance in this state by the party over whom jurisdiction is sought.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a contract calls for performance in Connecticut, even if the plaintiff performs that work.

Resource Sys. Grp. v. Internetcash Corp., No. Cv 00 0181480 (Jun. 12, 2001) · filed 2001-06-12(f)(1)

In order to satisfy this provision of §33-929(f)(1), the agreement serving as the basis for jurisdiction must contemplate or encompass some performance in Connecticut, but that performance does not need to be by the defendant.

Subsection (f)(1) requires the agreement supporting jurisdiction to contemplate some performance in Connecticut, but the defendant need not perform it.

Miller v. American Bank Note Holographics, No. Cv 010181989 (Sep. 11, 2001) · filed 2001-09-11(f)(1)

In order to satisfy this provision of General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(1), the agreement serving as the basis for jurisdiction must contemplate or encompass some performance in Connecticut. However, that performance does not need to be by the defendant.

Section 33-929(f)(1) permits suit against a foreign corporation on a contract performed in Connecticut, even if the contract was made elsewhere.

Integrated Corp. Relat. v. Tag-It Pac., No. Cv01 038 27 62 S (Jan. 10, 2002) · filed 2002-01-10(f)(1)

While the contract was not made in the State of Connecticut, the fact that the performance by the plaintiff was in the State of Connecticut comes within the statute, and accordingly, Connecticut may exercise jurisdiction under General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(1) because the contract was performed in this state.

Section 33-929(f)(1) covers performance the parties contemplated in their contract, even if it has not occurred.

Samelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co. · filed 2018-06-12(f)(1)

We conclude that the phrase "to be performed" as used in § 33-929 (f) (1) refers to the performance that the parties contemplated in the contract, without regard to whether it has actually been performed.

Section 33-929(e)(1) permits a Connecticut resident to sue a foreign corporation on a claim arising from a contract made in Connecticut.

Bruce's Marble v. Johnson Marble MacH., No. Cv97 0158435 S (Oct. 3, 1997) · filed 1997-10-03(e)(1)

General Statutes § 33-929 (e) governs service of process on foreign corporations. It is the appropriate "long arm statute" to apply to the present case. ... The defendant concedes that this provision of the long arm statute was satisfied when the contract was executed in Connecticut by virtue of the plaintiff signing it in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(2) and (f)(4) do not confer jurisdiction when solicitation and tortious conduct in Connecticut have not been proved.

Pitruzello v. Muro · filed 2002-06-04(f)(2), (f)(4)

The plaintiff, therefore, has not proven that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of § 33-929 (f) (2). ... Having failed to establish this predicate, the plaintiff has not alleged jurisdictional facts sufficient to prove that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of § 33-929 (f) (4).

Section 33-929(f)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that repeatedly solicits business in Connecticut through a Connecticut reservation agent.

Schwartz v. Bitter End Yacht Club Int., No. Cv 97 0398306 (Nov. 9, 1999) · filed 1999-11-09(f)(2)

Although the original wording of the complaint, (which said only that "upon information and belief" the defendant, Bitter End, had solicited business in Connecticut through Bitter End International's Connecticut office) was rather ambiguous, the additional material filed in connection with the reargument establishes that Bitter End does indeed solicit business in Connecticut through its United States reservation agent, Bitter End International. The court therefore does have personal jurisdiction over Bitter End pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(2).

Section 33-929(e)(2) permits suit against a foreign corporation that repeatedly solicits business in Connecticut when a similar claim by a solicited person was reasonably foreseeable.

O'BRIEN v. Okemo Mountain, Inc. · filed 1998-07-21(e)(2)

These allegations, coupled with the defendant’s acknowledgment of repeated business solicitation, is a sufficient showing, at this early stage of litigation, that the defendant worked to solicit business repeatedly from customers in Connecticut, so as to subject it to suit under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(e)(2). ... Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action “arises out” of business solicited in Connecticut as required under § 33-929(e)(2).

Section 33-929(f)(2) permits jurisdiction based on repeated solicitation in Connecticut when that solicitation made it reasonably foreseeable that the corporation could be sued here on a similar cause of action.

Delvecchio v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. 430408 (Feb. 22, 2000) · filed 2000-02-23(f)(2)

Under these circumstances, it was not reasonably foreseeable that, as the result of its solicitation, the defendant could be sued in Connecticut by a solicited person on a cause of action similar to that now being brought by the plaintiff. The long-arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929 (f)(2) does not authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 33-929(f)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that repeatedly solicits business in Connecticut when the claim is of a kind it could reasonably anticipate from that solicitation.

A Slice of Pie Productions, LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entertainment · filed 2005-09-21(f)(2)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Slice of Pie, it can be inferred that Gold repeatedly solicits scripts from Connecticut for its clients such that it was aware that disputes might arise in Connecticut from its or its clients’ mishandling of any of those scripts, and that Gold solicited plaintiffs script from Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(2) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that repeatedly solicits business in Connecticut when the claim is similar to one foreseeably arising from that solicitation.

Milne v. Catuogno Court Reporting Services, Inc. · filed 2002-11-19(f)(2)

Because the plaintiffs causes of action are similar to those that foreseeably could have resulted from CCRS’s solicitation in Connecticut, the plaintiff has satisfied the “arising out of’ test. ... Consequently, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f)(2) brings CCRS within the personal jurisdiction of this state.

Section 33-929(f)(2) does not treat a foreign corporation’s website as solicitation of business in Connecticut merely because it offers information of interest to Connecticut consumers.

West World Media, LLC v. Ikamobile Ltd. · filed 2011-08-12(f)(2)

Ikamobile’s maintaining a website that provides information about Connecticut movie theaters and can be accessed by people who patronize movie theaters in Connecticut is not properly characterized as an affirmative measure designed to attract business for Ikamobile from Connecticut consumers. Thus, Ikamobile’s actions do not constitute solicitation of business in Connecticut and it has not purposefully availed itself of the laws of the State of Connecticut as contemplated by § 33-929(f)(2).

Section 33-929(f)(2) requires a connection between the foreign corporation’s repeated solicitation of business in Connecticut and the cause of action.

Rajkarnikar v. Springfield · filed 2022-10-19(f)(2)

The plaintiff points to nothing that connects repeated solicitation of business in Connecticut by MGM Resorts to her employment. Therefore, construing the Amended Complaint and the plaintiff’s other submissions to the court in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, MGM Resorts is not covered by Section 33-929(f)(2).

Section 33-929(f)(2) does not authorize jurisdiction over a foreign retail chain for an injury at an out-of-state store based on its Connecticut advertising without evidence that the advertising sought to draw Connecticut residents to that store.

DEMATTEO v. WALGREEN EASTERN CO INC · filed 2024-07-29(f)(2)

I conclude that DeMatteo has failed to show that the applicable Connecticut long-arm statute allows the courts of Connecticut to exercise personal jurisdiction over national retail chain stores like Walgreens for acts of premises liability negligence that occur in stores outside Connecticut, at least in the absence of any evidence to suggest that Walgreens targeted its advertising to induce Connecticut residents to leave Connecticut to shop at Walgreens’ out-of-state store locations.

Section 33-929(e) does not establish personal jurisdiction when the foreign corporation’s Connecticut contacts are insufficient.

MacMullen v. Villa Roma Country Club, No. Cv97-0405070s (Dec. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-12-03(e)(2)

Defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction under Section 33-929(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes because its contacts with Connecticut are insufficient.

Section 33-929(f)(2) requires repeated business solicitation in Connecticut from which the cause of action arose; general worldwide advertising and a single later, unrelated letter do not establish jurisdiction.

Liberty Aircraft v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., No. Cv 99-0428927s (Oct. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-10-10(f)(2)

It is a chronological impossibility therefore to find that the cause of action at issue here arose out of the defendant's magazine and Internet solicitations. The correspondence of May, 1999 from a purchasing agent of the defendant to the plaintiff, similarly, does not bring the defendant within the scope of this statutory provision. It is not a repeated solicitation, it postdates the cause of action's genesis and origin, and it is for a purchase and not a sale by the defendant, so it can not be said to have resulted in the cause of action at issue, certainly not within the meaning of the Thomason v. Chemical Bank criteria.

Section 33-929(f)(2) requires repeated solicitation of business in Connecticut to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

Nevins v. American Airlines, Inc., No. Cv98-04878295 (Oct. 12, 2000) · filed 2000-10-12(f)(2)

Even if these two advertisements could be found to be solicitations by the Braco entities of business in Connecticut, they are not repeated solicitations of such business as is required for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction under § 33-929 (t)(2) because there is no evidence as to the frequency of these advertisements.

Section 33-929(f)(3) reaches a foreign corporation whose Connecticut contacts satisfy the subsection’s requirements for goods used there.

Ff Screw v. Clark Screw MacH., No. Cv 00-0500360s (Dec. 10, 2002) · filed 2002-12-10(f)(3)

On the basis of these statements and the court's adoption of the Thomason holding in Goldstein v. Nutrition Now, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 96 0150429, it is this court's conclusion that Turret had sufficient contacts with Connecticut and that General Statutes § 33-929 (f) (3) does reach Turret.

Section 33-929(f)(3) can cover goods incorporated into another product if they are reasonably expected to be used or consumed in Connecticut in substantially the same condition.

Goldstein v. Nutrition Now, Inc., No. X02cv 96 0150429 S (Aug. 23, 1999) · filed 1999-08-23(f)(3)

In light of these essential elements, a defendant that produces, manufactures or distributes goods is subject to this Court's jurisdiction under Section 33-929 (f)(3) if, in so doing, it can reasonably foresee that those goods will be used or consumed in Connecticut in substantially the same condition as that in which the defendant first sold, leased or bailed them. It does not matter if the defendant's goods are incorporated into another product before they are used or consumed in Connecticut as long as their condition, when used or consumed here, is expected to be substantially similar to that in which the defendant first placed them into the stream of commerce.

Section 33-929(f)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that distributes goods with a reasonable expectation that they will be used or consumed in Connecticut.

Goldstein v. Nutrition Now, Inc., No. X02 Cv 96 0150429 S (Aug. 11, 1999) · filed 1999-08-11(f)(3)

Therefore, when, after September 1, 1992, Forage Research manufactured its ProBiotic Supplement and sold and distributed it exclusively to Nutrition Now, it clearly did so with the reasonable expectation that that product would be marketed throughout the United States, and thus that it would reach and be used or consumed in the State of Connecticut. The Court therefore finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant under Section 33-929 (f)(3) as well as under Section 33-929 (f)(2).

Section 33-929(f)(3) reaches a foreign corporation that reasonably expects its goods to be used in Connecticut when they are actually used there and the claim arises from that use.

Goldstein v. Nutrition Now, Inc., No. X0cv 96 0150429 S (Jul. 22, 1999) · filed 1999-07-22(f)(3)

Whether or not Mess'rs White and Rifkin ever specifically discussed the likely sale of PB 8 or any other product in Connecticut, the Court concludes that Mr. White, and through him Cappseals, had a "reasonable expectation" that that very product was to be used or consumed all over the country, including in Connecticut. Therefore, since the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that PB 8 was actually sold and used in Connecticut, and this case involves a cause of action arising out of just such a reasonably expected sale and use, this Court finds that the defendant's alleged conduct brings it well within the statutory reach of Section 33-929(f).

Section 33-929(e)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its goods are distributed and purchased in Connecticut and the claims arise from its production or distribution of those goods.

Merrick v. Sandair Nevada, Inc., No. Cv97 34 53 27 S (Apr. 7, 1998) · filed 1998-04-07(e)(3)

Accordingly, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over SandAir pursuant to §33-929 (e)(3), as the product was distributed and purchased in Connecticut, thereby satisfying the reasonable expectation requirement found in the statute. Moreover, the plaintiff's causes of action can be said to arise out of SandAir's production and distribution of goods in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(e)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that supplied asbestos fiber to Connecticut companies when a Connecticut resident alleges injury from that product.

MacVane v. Cassiar Mining Corp., No. 537006 (Jul. 15, 1997) · filed 1997-07-15(e)(3)

Applying the Thomason analysis to the facts in this case,11 this court finds that the statutory requirements set forward in § 33-929 (e)(3) for asserting jurisdiction over a foreign corporation have been met.

Section 33-929(f)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation even when its only contact with Connecticut is through an independent contractor or distributor.

Tomra of North America, Inc. v. Environmental Products Corp. · filed 1998-03-31(f)(3)

Furthermore, under section 33-929(f)(3), the fact that the foreign corporation’s only contact with the state is through an independent contractor or distributor does not bar personal jurisdiction.

Section 33-929(f)(3) does not reach goods that were not used or consumed in Connecticut, while subsection (f)(4) reaches a sale of allegedly infringing goods in the state.

Edberg v. Neogen Corp. · filed 1998-08-04(f)(3), (f)(4)

Therefore, by its very terms, subsection (3) would not apply. ... Because Neogen did sell allegedly infringing products in the State of Connecticut, we find that subsection (4) of Connecticut’s long-arm statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f)(4), would reach this activity.

Section 33-929(f) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a claim arises from infringing sales in Connecticut or from goods the corporation reasonably expects to be used there.

Broadcast Marketing International, Ltd. v. Prosource Sales & Marketing, Inc. · filed 2004-11-22(f)(3), (f)(4)

Indeed, evidence of infringing sales to Connecticut customers is sufficient to establish that PSMI is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33 — 929(f)(4). ... Because PSMI had a “reasonable expectation” that its products would be used in Connecticut, the court concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is also authorized by Connecticut’s long arm statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f)(3).

Section 33-929(f)(3)-(4) permits personal jurisdiction when a corporation’s request for payment concerns goods distributed in Connecticut and implicates allegedly tortious conduct there.

Roller Bearing Co. of America, Inc. v. American Software, Inc. · filed 2008-08-13(f)(3)-(4)

This request for payment of the additional user fee — which is the very act that prompted RBC to file its complaint — is sufficient to satisfy the relevant Connecticut long-arm statute because it concerns the distribution of goods in the state and implicates allegedly tortious conduct in the state.

Section 33-929(f)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer when its relationship with a regional distributor gives it a reasonable expectation that its goods will be sold or used in Connecticut.

OneBeacon Insurance Group v. AB · filed 2010-08-04(f)(3)

Based upon these facts, the Court holds that Tylo should have reasonably expected that its products would be sold or used in Connecticut. Therefore, long-arm jurisdiction exists over Tylo pursuant to Conn. GemStat. § 33 — 929(f)(3).

Section 33-929(f)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that distributes goods to Connecticut residents outside the state with a reasonable expectation that the goods will be used in Connecticut, when they are used there.

Divicino v. Polaris Industries · filed 2001-01-25(f)(3)

Based on these facts, the distribution of merchandise by CVM (including the ATV in question) to Connecticut residents in Vermont (including Divicino) and its subsequent use in Connecticut provides an adequate basis to assert long-arm jurisdiction over CVM under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f)(3).

Section 33-929(f)(3) requires allegations that the foreign corporation reasonably expected its goods to be used or consumed in Connecticut.

Metro Business Systems, LLC v. PlanitROI, Inc. · filed 2022-07-18(f)(3)

Since the Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendant had a reasonable expectation that its goods would be distributed or used in Connecticut, the only remaining provision of the long-arm statute is not satisfied, and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 33-929(f)(3) requires the cause of action to arise from the foreign corporation’s production, manufacture, or distribution of goods used or consumed in Connecticut.

Nutmeg Gaming and Bingo Products, LLC v. Abbott Products, Inc. · filed 2023-01-09(f)(3)

In any event, even if I give Nutmeg the benefit of the doubt and assume that Diamond Distributors sold at least one order of paper to Atlas Paper Supply of Connecticut, this would still not be enough to establish jurisdiction, because § 33-929(f)(3) requires that the cause of action itself arise out of the foreign company’s production, manufacture, or distribution of goods to be used or consumed in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f) does not provide personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations when the alleged tort occurred outside Connecticut and they did not solicit business there.

Emiabata v. Seton Healthcare Family · filed 2020-05-05(f)

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f). There is no personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants under either of these statutes. ... Neither corporation solicits, advertises or does business in Connecticut, nor do they have a formal referral program in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(4) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for tortious conduct that occurred outside Connecticut.

Rafi v. Yale School of Medicine · filed 2020-07-28(f)(4)

The plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that this court has personal jurisdiction over the BWH Defendants under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a) or Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f)(4), Connecticut’s long-arm statutes pertaining to nonresident individuals and corporations, respectively. Because these statutes do not authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case, the court need not address whether it would offend due process to assert such jurisdiction.

Section 33-929(f)(4) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation merely because the effects of its tortious conduct were felt in Connecticut.

On-Line Technologies v. Perkin Elmer Corp. · filed 2001-02-01(f)(4)

To summarize, the long-arm statute does not provide for jurisdiction over Sick AG in this case, as the simple fact that consequences of tortious conduct were felt in Connecticut is insufficient to provide jurisdiction under § 33 — 929(f)(4).

Section 33-929(f)(4) requires tortious conduct in Connecticut to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

American Wholesalers Underwriting, Ltd. v. American Wholesale Insurance Group, Inc. · filed 2004-03-30(f)(4)

AWIG has not committed a tort within the State of Connecticut, and is therefore not subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 33 — 929(f)(4).

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of tortious conduct in Connecticut.

Panterra Engineered Plastics, Inc. v. Transportation Sys. Solutions, LLC · filed 2006-10-12(f)(4)

Based on its pleadings and affidavits, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant TSS under subsection (4). While plaintiffs arguments under subsection (3) based on the TSS website and the unexplained knowledge of a customer’s scheduled foray into Connecticut are frail, plaintiff alleges sufficient facts at this stage to support its allegations that defendant TSS committed torts in this forum.

Section 33-929(f)(4) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for defamatory comments made outside Connecticut merely because their impact is felt in Connecticut.

Friedman v. Bloomberg LP · filed 2016-03-25(f)(4)

Defamatory comments made outside Connecticut whose impact was felt within the state do not constitute “tortious conduct in this state” under § 33-929(f).

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when allegedly false representations are mailed into Connecticut and the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of tortious conduct there.

Gianetti v. Teakwood, Ltd. · filed 2021-02-26(f)(4)

Because Gianetti alleges that Houze, Heritage Resources, and Teakwood sent him letters that contained false representations, and because his affidavit makes clear that the letters were mailed to Connecticut, Gianetti has established a prima facie showing that those defendants engaged in tortious activity in Connecticut under Connecticut’s long-arm statutes. ... Accordingly, he has sufficiently established at this early stage that personal jurisdiction exists over Houze and Teakwood pursuant to section 52-59b and over Heritage Resources, Inc. pursuant to section 33-929(f).

Section 33-929(f)(4) requires a foreign corporation’s alleged tortious conduct to occur in Connecticut for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction on that basis.

Collins v. Alonso, Andalkar & Facher, P.C. · filed 2021-09-30(f)(4)

Under section 33–929(f)(4), “a court need only inquire as to the place where the tort occurred because the statute requires tortious conduct in this state.” ... Given the absence of allegations that AAF’s conduct occurred in Connecticut, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over AAF under the state’s long-arm.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for a claim arising from tortious conduct in Connecticut.

Pittman v. Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc · filed 2023-06-23(f)(4)

Read as a whole, and “constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true,” York, 286 F.3d at 125, this is sufficient to satisfy § 33-929(f)(4) because the tortious conduct occurred in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(4) requires the alleged tortious conduct to occur in Connecticut.

Osterman & Co, Inc v. Pignatello · filed 2023-07-31(f)(4)

Here, none of the conduct which is alleged to be tortious occurred in the state of Connecticut. The proposed amended complaint alleges that PolyQuest hired Pignatello while he lived in Connecticut, but the hiring of Pignatello is not the allegedly tortious conduct. Rather, the allegedly tortious conduct is PolyQuest’s action of intentionally and improperly procuring the breach of the agreement between Osterman and Pignatello, and this is not alleged to have occurred in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(4) reaches a foreign corporation when a claim arises from tortious conduct by its agent in Connecticut.

MacDonald · filed 2026-01-15(f)(4)

Plaintiff’s allegations that M81 worked with MacDonald (its agent in Connecticut) to receive allegedly stolen trade secrets suffice to show that M81 engaged in tortious conduct here. As such, the court finds that the long-arm statute is satisfied.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its agent’s tortious conduct in Connecticut gives rise to the claim.

JKB Daira, Inc. v. OPS-Technology, LLC · filed 2022-09-27(f)(4)

JKB additionally alleges that Fukasawa committed tortious conduct within Connecticut, namely by sharing from Connecticut JKB’s proprietary and confidential information with its competitor, and by assisting that competitor in diverting its business opportunities, all in breach of the fiduciary duties he owed to JKB, his employer. Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 33-929(f)(4) is appropriate, and I therefore need not consider whether JKB has met its burden to show that section 33-929(f)(1) affords an alternative basis for exercising jurisdiction.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits suit against a foreign corporation for a claim arising from tortious conduct in Connecticut, but the plaintiff must prove the facts establishing jurisdiction when challenged.

Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp. · filed 1999-08-17(f)(4)

Pursuant to § 33-929 (f) (4), a foreign corporation is subject to suit in Connecticut if the cause of action in question arises “out of tortious conduct [committed] in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.” ... The plaintiff has not done so. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not improperly dismiss the plaintiffs complaint against Teleflex on the basis of the plaintiffs failure to present facts sufficient to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a claim arises from tortious conduct in Connecticut, including a false representation sent into the state by mail.

Piro Paving, Inc. v. National Attachments, No. Cv97 0162190 (Feb. 1, 2000) · filed 2000-02-01(f)(4)

The court has jurisdiction over the defendant, Asphalt Zipper Co., because the plaintiff's cause of action arises from alleged tortious conduct committed in Connecticut. See General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(4). Mailing a publication containing a false representation constitutes tortious conduct committed in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits suit against a foreign corporation when its employee allegedly commits a tort in Connecticut during the course of employment.

Watson v. Wu, No. Cv00 037 77 18 (Apr. 29, 2002) · filed 2002-04-29(f)(4)

Therefore, this court has jurisdiction over Central pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(4), because one of its employees, Wang, allegedly committed a tortious act in Connecticut during the course of his employment.

Subsection (f)(4) permits suit against a foreign corporation for tortious conduct in Connecticut even if it did not transact business or make a contract there.

Bucchere v. BRINKER INTERN., INC. · filed 2005-11-15(f)(4)

Distinct from that, however, General Statutes § 33-929(f)(4) provides that the named defendant may be liable to the plaintiffs whether it transacted business here and whether there was a contract made or to be performed here if it committed a tort here.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for tortious conduct in Connecticut, including conduct that violates a state statute.

Bucchere v. Brinker International, Inc. · filed 2005-11-15(f)(4)

Distinct from that, however, § 33-929 (f) (4) provides that Brinker International may be liable to the plaintiffs whether it transacted business here and whether there was a contract made or to be performed here if it committed a tort here. ... Conduct is “tortious” for the purpose of jurisdiction when it violates a state statute.

Section 33-929(f)(4) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for tortious conduct in Connecticut; an injury felt in Connecticut alone does not establish that conduct occurred there.

Success Systems, Inc. v. Excentus Corporation · filed 2020-02-01(f)(4)

Success Systems’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction through tort also falls short. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f)(4) allows a finding of personal jurisdiction “out of tortious conduct in [Connecticut], whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.” Connecticut courts have rejected the argument that “a tort ‘should be deemed to have been committed in Connecticut’ simply because ‘the injury is felt in Connecticut.’”

Section 33-929(f) allows a person to sue a foreign corporation in Connecticut only if the person is a Connecticut resident or has a usual place of business in the state.

Matthews v. SBA, Inc. · filed 2014-04-22(f)

The explicit language of § 33-929 (f) empowers only ‘‘a resident of this state’’ or a ‘‘person having a usual place of business in this state’’ to sue a foreign corpora- tion in a Connecticut court.

Section 33-929(f) governs personal jurisdiction over foreign limited liability companies and does not reach a suit brought by nonresidents without a Connecticut place of business.

In Re Bayou Hedge Fund Investment Litigation · filed 2007-01-19(f)

Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f) provides "Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state. . . ." ... These cases hold that a limited liability corporation is to be treated like any other corporation for long-arm purposes. The Connecticut Supreme Court does not appear to have opined on the issue, but I agree with Judge Eginton and *538 the majority of state court judges in Connecticut. That being so, Connecticut's long-arm jurisdiction does not reach The Hennessee Group in this lawsuit brought by non-resident named plaintiffs.

Section 33-929(f) does not require a plaintiff to be incorporated in Connecticut or to have its principal or only place of business there; a usual place of business suffices.

Preferred Display, Inc. v. Vincent Longo, Inc. · filed 2009-08-04(f)

There is nothing in the plain language of section 33 — 929(f) which supports VLI’s assertion that a plaintiff seeking to take advantage of that provision need be incorporated in Connecticut or have its “principal” or “only” place of business in Connecticut. Rather, the statute merely states that the plaintiff must have “a usual place of business” in Connecticut and contains no indication that these words should be given other than their ordinary meaning.

Section 33-929(f) requires a plaintiff suing a foreign corporation to reside or have a usual place of business in Connecticut.

Mossack Fonseca & Co., S.A. v. Netflix Inc. · filed 2019-10-17(f)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts establishing that they reside or maintain a usual place of business in Connecticut, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 33-929(f) permits a plaintiff to invoke personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only if the plaintiff resides or has a usual place of business in Connecticut.

LEGO A/S v. OYO Toys, Inc. · filed 2020-07-17(f)

As an initial matter, LEGO and LEGO Juris cannot assert personal jurisdiction under Section 33-929(f) because neither are “resident[s] of this state,” nor is Connecticut a “usual place of business” for them.

Section 33-929(f) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff is not a Connecticut resident.

Plimpton v. Bank of Jackson Hole · filed 2021-02-26(f)

As neither Mr. Plimpton nor the foreign corporations he has sued are residents of Connecticut, Compl. at 2-3 ¶¶ 1, 2, 9, 11, there is no personal jurisdiction under Section 33-929(f).

Section 33-929(f) permits a suit against a foreign corporation only when the plaintiff resides or has a usual place of business in Connecticut and the section’s other conditions are met.

Kumaran v. National Futures Association · filed 2024-05-22(f)

The statute states that “[e]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state” provided certain conditions are met. ... Accordingly, Connecticut’s long-arm statute does not provide for personal jurisdiction over ADMIS, and the Court need not analyze whether such personal jurisdiction would make venue proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 33-929(f) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff is neither a Connecticut resident nor a person with a usual place of business in Connecticut.

Remuck v. Pilgrim Insurance Co., No. 559499 (Apr. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-04-04(f)

The relevant portion of § 33-929 (f) provides: "Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state. . . ." In the present action, the plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he is a resident of Massachusetts. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not assert, and offers no evidence demonstrating, that he has a usual place of business within the state of Connecticut. ... Therefore, § 33-929 (f) does not provide this court with jurisdiction over Pilgrim.

Section 33-929(f) can reach a New York district corporation when it qualifies as a corporation incorporated under another state's law.

Wilcox v. Fishers Island Ferry District · filed 2021-03-02(f)

FIFD fails to address these provisions of New York law, which, taken together with Wilcox’s allegations, are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to show that FIFD is a “foreign corporation,” i.e., “a corporation incorporated under a law other than the law of this state,” for purposes of Connecticut’s long-arm statute.

Section 33-929 applies to corporate defendants, not foreign LLCs.

Evergreen Media Holdings, LLC v. Warren · filed 2015-05-15

But the contemporary counterpart to that statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929, applies only to corporate defendants, see Matthews, 89 A.3d at 961, and differs in important ways from the statute applicable to LLCs at issue in this case, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-59b, including the fact that the latter statute expressly covers torts committed "through an agent,” a phrase that has been construed liberally in the context of identical language in the corresponding New York long-arm statute.

Subsection (f)’s residency requirement does not limit personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that is authorized to do business in Connecticut and has appointed a registered agent.

Talenti v. Morgan & Brother Manhattan Storage Co. · filed 2009-04-21(f)

Therefore, when a foreign corporation is authorized to conduct business in this state and has appointed a registered agent, nothing in § 33-929 (f) limits the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation.

Section 33-929(f) does not establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on a Connecticut contract if the corporation was not a party to that contract.

Manka v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 2014-03-25(f)

The court’s finding that the defendant was not a party to the contract defeats the argument that the cause of action is based on a contract entered into or to be performed in this state.

A subsidiary’s solicitation of business in Connecticut does not establish jurisdiction over its foreign parent corporation under § 33-929(f)(2) unless the subsidiary acted as the parent’s agent or grounds exist to pierce the corporate veil.

Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc. · filed 2002-10-15(f)(2)

There was no evidence adduced at trial that would support the conclusion that the corporate entities actually doing business within the state did so as agents of the defendant or that those companies were mere alter egos of the defendant.

Section 33-929 applies to foreign corporations and does not authorize service on a domestic corporation.

Auto Body Assn. v. Southwest Appraisal, No. Cv01 038 61 69 (Mar. 6, 2002) · filed 2002-03-06

MDC is correct that the original return does not supply the court a basis to find sufficient service on it because the marshal claims he made service under § 33-929, which applies to foreign corporations. MDC provides an affidavit from Nicholas J. Fazzino, its operating manager and registered agent for service in which he attests that MDC is a domestic corporation. (MDC's Memorandum, Fazzino Affidavit, ¶ 4.) Therefore, § 33-929 does not apply, and service made under it to MDC is insufficient.

Section 33-929(f) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the evidence fails to show tortious conduct in Connecticut or repeated solicitation of business there.

Pitruzzello v. Muro, No. X07 Cv00 0072168s (Aug. 22, 2001) · filed 2001-08-22(f)

Neither the third party complaint's conclusory statements nor the documents submitted in opposition to Pensco's motion to dismiss support Muro's claim that Pensco has committed tortious acts in Connecticut or that Pensco has repeatedly solicited business in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(f) subjects a foreign corporation to suit only for a cause of action arising from one of the Connecticut-related acts it lists.

McNamara v. Tournament Players Club, No. Cv-00-0093091 (Sep. 4, 2001) · filed 2001-09-04(f)

This court finds that the plaintiffs have not alleged a cause of action arising out of any of the acts enumerated in § 33-929 (f). The complaint does not allege a contract, or a cause of action arising from any business conducted in Connecticut, but does allege tortious conduct within Connecticut. That conduct, however, occurred in 1999. Because PGA has not had any contact with Connecticut since 1991, the cause of action cannot arise from tortious conduct committed by PGA. Accordingly, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over PGA.

Section 33-929(f) does not limit personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Connecticut that has appointed a registered agent for service of process.

Fudge v. Alliant Foodservice, No. Cv 01 0812056 S (Jul. 12, 2002) · filed 2002-07-12(f)

Therefore, when a foreign corporation is authorized to conduct business here and has appointed a registered agent, nothing in § 33-929 (f) limits the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation.

Section 33-929(f) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when an employment contract is partly performed in Connecticut or the corporation repeatedly solicits business there; its product-use provision does not apply when the products were neither expected to be used nor used there.

Miller v. American Bank Note Holographics, No. Cv01 0181989 (Aug. 28, 2002) · filed 2002-08-28(f)(1)-(3)

General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(1) provides a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, although not made in this state, was to be performed at least partially in this state. ... Subsection 2 of General Statutes § 33-929 (f) provides that a foreign corporation can be sued in this state if it repeatedly solicits business here. ... Subsection (3) does not afford a basis for jurisdiction because the holograms that the defendant produced for WWF were shipped directly by the defendant to WWF's licensees all over the country. It cannot be said that the holograms produced by the defendant were reasonably expected to be used in this state or were so used. Thus, subsections 1 and 2 afford jurisdiction because the plaintiff's employment with the defendant was to be performed, albeit only partially, in Connecticut, and because the defendant repeatedly solicited business in this state.

Sections 33-929(e) and (f) require a plaintiff to show facts establishing a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

Speter v. Shikowitz, No. Cv 02 0188488 S (Sep. 16, 2002) · filed 2002-09-16(e), (f)

While Speter's evidence includes a copy of a check purportedly issued to him by Watchdogs and which he alleges to be payment for work done in connection with Prodgenious, he does not clarify how this supports a showing of jurisdiction pursuant to any one of the requirements of General Statutes §§ 33-929 (e) or (f). The court finds that Speter has failed to meet his burden of proving personal jurisdiction over Watchdogs and accordingly grants the motion to dismiss.

Section 33-929(f) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its contacts with Connecticut, considered together, make it reasonably foreseeable that it will be sued there.

Milford Power Co. v. Abb, Ltd., No. X07-Cv02 0078298s (Mar. 26, 2003) · filed 2003-03-26(f)

"Under § 33-929 (f), consistent with the constitutional demands of due process, it is the totality of the defendant's conduct and connection with this state that must be considered, on a case by case basis, to determine whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here." Frazerv. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 249 (1986). ... Given this circumstance, in addition to the strong efforts to procure the Milford Project, it is difficult to conceive that ABB Asea could not have reasonably foreseen being haled into court in Connecticut. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss as to ABB Asea is denied.

Section 33-929 permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that solicits business in Connecticut under subsection (f)(2), or produces or distributes goods with a reasonable expectation that they will be used there under subsection (f)(3).

Mrmc, Inc. v. Industrial Holdings, Inc., No. 062516s (Jul. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-07-30(f)(2), (f)(3)

Philform and Orbitform's solicitation in Connecticut is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(2). Jurisdiction may also be asserted under General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(3). Thus, Philform and Orbitform have produced, manufactured or distributed "goods . . . with the reasonable expectation that such goods [would] be used or consumed in this state." General Statutes § 33-929 (f)(3).

Section 33-929(f) limits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to claims that fit one of its listed grounds.

Bennett v. Performance Racing and Marine, No. Cv 98-0417998 (Jan. 27, 1999) · filed 1999-01-27(f)

If the conduct of a foreign corporation does not fit within the terms of § 33-929(f), the courts of this state do not have personal jurisdiction over that corporation, even though jurisdiction would otherwise be conferred under the federal due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Section 33-929(e) permits suit against a foreign corporation on a claim arising from business it conducted in Connecticut without the required certificate of authority.

Wender v. Trading Cove Associates, No. 549346 (May 21, 1999) · filed 1999-05-21(e)

Since the plaintiff argues that the defendant had procured a certificate of authority at the time in question, there is no allegation that Sun International was transacting business in Connecticut in violation of General Statutes § 33-920. Therefore, General Statutes § 33-929(e) does not apply.

Section 33-929(f) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation with no business ties to Connecticut merely because a lawyer for another company advises its subsidiary.

Schwartz v. the Bitter End Yacht Club, No. Cv 97-0398306 (Jul. 15, 1999) · filed 1999-07-15(f)

This acceptance of legal advice is an insufficient basis for finding that Connecticut courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Gorda Estates Limited, a foreign corporation, which does not have any business ties to this state for purposes of General Statutes § 33-929.

Section 33-929(f)(2) and (f)(3) do not establish jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its Connecticut contacts are too infrequent and insubstantial to give it fair notice that it may be sued there.

Goldstein v. Nutrition Now, Inc., No. Cv 96 0150429 S (Aug. 9, 1999) · filed 1999-08-09(f)(2), (f)(3)

The Court thus agrees with the defendant that all claims now pending against it must be dismissed for failure to satisfy the minimum jurisdictional requirements of Section 33-929 (f)(2) or (f)(3).

Section 33-929(e) provides jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when it transacts business in Connecticut and the claim arises from that business.

Hospitality Syst. v. Oriental World Trading, No. Cv99 0169927 (Feb. 1, 2000) · filed 2000-02-01(e)

General Statutes § 33-929 (e) affords the plaintiff no jurisdictional base in the absence of allegations that the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the defendant's transaction of business in Connecticut.

Section 33-929(e)-(f) requires factual allegations supporting personal jurisdiction; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Southridge Partners II Limited Partnership v. SND Auto Group, Inc. · filed 2019-12-19(e)-(f)

Nor does the SAC allege any facts to support Plaintiff’s conclusory contention that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Randall Goulding or SCI pursuant to Connecticut’s long-arm statute.

Section 33-929(f) is the Connecticut long-arm provision that applies to foreign corporations.

New Leaf Data Services, LLC v. PanXchange, Inc. · filed 2020-09-16(f)

The long-arm statute that would govern in this circumstance is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f), which applies to foreign corporations.

Jurisdiction over a subsidiary under § 33-929 does not by itself establish jurisdiction over its parent corporation.

Leonard v. General Motor Company · filed 2020-11-30

Moreover, even assuming that jurisdiction is proper over General Motors Company’s subsidiaries—General Motors Holdings LLC and General Motors LLC—that alone does not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over General Motors Company under Connecticut’s long-arm statute.

Section 33-929(f) does not confer specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff alleges no conduct in Connecticut that falls within its listed grounds.

Rolo · filed 2026-03-09(f)

Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any conduct that occurred in Connecticut and thus, Plaintiff fails to show that Connecticut’s long-arm statute reaches FINRA.

Section 33-929(f) does not permit long-arm jurisdiction without deliberate targeting of Connecticut residents.

Barnet Marine Inc. v. Laurel D Shipping LLC · filed 2022-07-29(f)

But that open question of law is irrelevant here because, without deliberate targeting of Connecticut residents, “there can be no purposeful availment of the laws of the State of Connecticut, and therefore long-arm jurisdiction cannot be proper” under either provision.

A plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing that a foreign corporation is amenable to service under § 33-929(f) may obtain jurisdictional discovery.

Uniformed Professional Fire Fighters Association of Connecticut v. 3M Company · filed 2026-01-09(f)(3)

The plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations constitute a sufficient start toward establishing that PBI is amenable to service of process under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f).