Statute Annotations › Connecticut › Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a

Rate recoverable as damages; rate on debt arising out of hospital services: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Connecticut
Case notes
298
Cited in passing
111
Citing cases indexed
436
Case dates
1976–2026
Screened through
2026-03-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

409 citing cases reviewed of 436 in the citation index: 298 interpreted the section (annotated below), 111 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-30 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1979-10-01 P.A. 79-364 raised § 37-3a’s maximum interest rate from 6% to 8%. Source
  • 1983-10-01 P.A. 83-267 raised § 37-3a’s maximum interest rate from 8% to 10%. Source
  • 2003-10-01 P.A. 03-266 limited prejudgment and postjudgment interest on debt arising from hospital services to 5% a year and left the award discretionary. Source

Interest on detained money

Section 37-3a(a) permits prejudgment interest when a payment is due and is wrongfully withheld without a good faith basis.

Griffin Hospital v. ISOThrive, LLC · filed 2022-03-15(a)

On the basis of our review of the procedural history of this matter and the trial court’s findings as set forth in its memorandum of decision, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding prejudg- ment interest. This is because the record supports the court’s finding that the defendant had no good faith basis to withhold final payment and, therefore, doing so was a wrongful detention of money due under the contract.
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Law changed since P.A. 79-364 raised the cap from 6% to 8% on October 1, 1979, and P.A. 83-267 raised it to 10% on October 1, 1983.

Section 37-3a permits interest at 6 percent a year for the detention of money after it becomes payable.

Nigro v. Hagearty · filed 1976-05-28

General Statutes § 37-3a provides that interest at the rate of 6 percent a year may be recovered and allowed in civil actions for the detention of money after it becomes payable.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest at 10 percent a year when the detention of money is wrongful under the circumstances.

Ottaviani v. Pechi · filed 1988-10-25

General Statutes § 37-3a allows parties in civil actions to recover interest at the rate of 10 percent a year as damages for the detention of money. ... “The equitable determination of whether interest is to be recognized as a proper element of damages [in contract actions] turns in each case on whether the detention of money is wrongful under the circumstances.” ... In this case, the trial court was within the scope of its discretion in discrediting the defendant’s testimony and in awarding prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on wrongfully withheld money, ordinarily from when it became due and payable.

Marcus v. Marcus · filed 1978-05-16

Under this statute, interest ordinarily begins to run from the time when the money was due and payable. It is a proper element of damages if the detention of the money was wrongful under the circumstances.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award interest as damages for money detained after it becomes payable.

Williams v. Vista Vestra, Inc. · filed 1979-07-17

All that was due on the contract became payable on that day. General Statutes § 37-3a provides for interest “as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.” The awarding of interest is within the proper discretion of the court.
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Section 37-3a provides interest on payments made toward a purchase from the date the seller breaches the contract; accrued interest may be credited against the buyer’s remaining payment.

Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts · filed 1984-05-30

Further, Fast is clearly entitled to incidental damages in the form of statutory interest on the monies paid by him running from the date of the breach until the present. ... Counsel shall determine, if they can agree, or submit their positions to the court if they cannot, the calculation of the interest due under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award interest as an element of damages in appropriate circumstances.

Perl v. Case · filed 1985-01-01

General Statutes § 37-3a codified the common law of this state that the trial court could in appropriate circumstances award interest as an element of damages.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on an unpaid debt to be included in a money judgment.

Fales v. Violette, No. Cv90-45889 S (Sep. 18, 1992) · filed 1992-09-18

Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff in the amount of $26,366.60, which includes the debt of $25,875.20 plus CT Page 8825 interest per Connecticut General Statutes Section 37-3a . (10% from October 16, 1990 to September 17, 1992-$491.40).
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Section 37-3a permits statutory interest on an unpaid contract amount.

Post Road Stages, Inc. v. P B Tours, No. Cv 91 47008 S (Oct. 28, 1992) · filed 1992-10-28

Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff in the amount of $2400.00 plus statutory interest of $775.00 (Connecticut General Statutes Section 37-3a ) for a total of $3,175.00.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully detained, beginning when the wrongful detention began.

Caciopoli v. Latella, No. Cv92 0338761 (Oct. 18, 1995) · filed 1995-10-18

The moneys due Caciopoli by way of interest was wrongful under the circumstances. The date the wrongful detention began was June 1, 1991 and Caciopoli claims the § 37-3a interest from that date. As to his claim for interest under General Statutes § 37-3a the plaintiff Caciopoli is awarded § 37-3a interest in the amount of $11,929.80.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary interest when money is wrongfully withheld, including payments made after a contract's deadline.

Quinn Assoc. Inc. v. Fga Serv. Inc., No. Cv91 0315433s (Dec. 22, 1995) · filed 1995-12-22

The allowance of interest, pursuant to C.G.S. § 37-3a , is CT Page 13381-E a matter within the discretion for the trial court. ... The allowance turns on whether the detention of the money is or is not "wrongful" under the circumstances. ... This court finds that the failure to make payments in accordance with the time requirements of the contracts in this case is a wrongful detention of monies due to the plaintiff.
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Section 37-3a does not provide interest damages when the complaint does not allege detention of money after it became payable.

Gochee v. Town of Vernon, No. Cv 91 46756 S (Apr. 15, 1993) · filed 1993-04-15

The Court finds section 37-3a inapplicable to the present action because the plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations that the defendant detained money which has become payable.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at ten per cent a year for the wrongful detention of money, calculated here from the date the action began to judgment.

Centore v. Smith, No. Cv 92 0122082 (May 23, 1994) · filed 1994-05-23

Accordingly, judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff to recover $1,150 from the defendant, plus interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a at the rate of ten per cent a year for the wrongful detention of money, from the date this action started, January 18, 1992, to the date of judgment, which is calculated as $202.08, for a total judgment of $1,352.08.
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Section 37-3a permits interest for the detention of money.

Yale School of medicine/ops v. Cooper, No. 275867 (Feb. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-02-26

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted and summary judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Leon Cooper in the amount of $2,012.00 plus interest of $1,106.00 for the detention of money, pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a allows interest as damages while payable money remains detained, including after an earlier judgment is set aside.

Patron v. Konover, No. 395106 (Apr. 24, 1994) · filed 1994-04-24

The only question under § 37-3a is whether there is a "detention of money after it becomes payable." Because the money in question here continues to be detained, an award of interest is plainly appropriate in this case regardless of the precise scope of the Appellate Court's order.
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Section 37-3a requires the court to determine whether money was wrongfully detained and when the detention began before awarding compensatory interest.

Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc. · filed 1997-01-21

A trial court must make two determinations when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-3a: (1) whether the party against whom interest is sought has wrongfully detained money due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated.
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Section 37-3a allows interest for money wrongfully withheld; interest is unavailable when the court cannot find wrongful withholding.

Algiere v. J.D.C. Enterprises, Inc., No. Cv95-554924 (Jan. 30, 1997) · filed 1997-01-30

The plaintiff also claims interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a . The question for the court on this claim is to decide whether or not the defendant wrongfully withheld the plaintiff's money under the circumstances. ... Under these circumstances, the court cannot find that the money was wrongfully withheld and awards no interest.
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Section 37-3a requires wrongful detention of money due another party before compensatory interest may be awarded.

State v. Lex Associates, No. 92044259 (Dec. 10, 1997) · filed 1997-12-10

While the defendant argues that General Statutes § 37-3a applies to this case, the court does not agree. ... A trial court must make two determinations when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-3a : (1) whether the party against whom interest is sought has wrongfully detained money due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated. ... The plaintiff has not wrongfully detained money (the purchase CT Page 12325 price) from the defendant.
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Section 37-3a does not authorize prejudgment interest when the party charged has not wrongfully detained money owed to the claimant.

State v. Lex Associates · filed 1999-05-11

The trial court previously had determined, and we have agreed, that the state’s payments to Lex after October 15, 1990, were a setoff against the purchase price and, therefore, not funds to which Lex was entitled as a matter of law prior to its conveyance of the property to the state. None of those payments, therefore, was wrongfully detained by the state. The provisions of § 37-3a do not authorize an award of interest under the circumstances of this case.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest only when a claim involves the wrongful detention of money.

Fletcher v. Mead School for H. Dev., No. X05 Cv96 0152138s (Jun. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-06-04

Because the remaining claims do no involve the wrongful detention of money, the court finds that General Statutes § 37-3a is inapplicable.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest when a claim involves the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable.

Scalzi v. the Mead Sch., Hum. Dev., No. X05cv95 0148213s (Jun. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-06-04

Because the remaining claims do not involve the wrongful detention of money, the court finds that General Statutes § 37-3a is inapplicable.
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Section 37-3a permits interest as damages for detained money when the detention is wrongful under the circumstances.

Devito v. Defrancesco, No. Cv 99 0171842s (Aug. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-08-04

"Interest at the rate at ten per cent a year, and no more may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable." General Statutes § 37-3a . The issue of awarding interest is "whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances." Cecio Bros. Inc. v. Feldmann, 161 Conn. 265 , 275 (1971). Under the facts of this case with both parties having insufficient financial ability to remove the soil contamination and the Board not advancing clean up funds until early 1995, this court cannot find "wrongful detention" even though the defendants both breached the lease and their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
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Section 37-3a allows interest after money becomes payable; lost profits that became payable only when awarded do not earn prejudgment interest.

J. Iapaluccio, Inc. v. City of Torrington, No. 318143 (Mar. 7, 1997) · filed 1997-03-07

In view of the foregoing, the court declines to award the plaintiff any prejudgment interest on its claims under General Statutes § 37-3a , and awards interest on the full amount of the damage award, $184,195, to run from the date of judgment on December 2, 1995.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money only from the date the money becomes due and payable.

Northrop v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1998-12-01

The detention of the money must be determined to have been wrongful. ... Its detention can only be wrongful, however, from and after the date on which the court, in its discretion, determines that the money was due and payable.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully withheld after its return is demanded, beginning when repayment becomes due.

Fielding v. Spinnato, No. Cv-97-0081056 S (Dec. 14, 2001) · filed 2001-12-14

In addition, the plaintiffs are entitled, under the first and second counts, to an award of interest under General Statutes § 37-3a , 9 since the defendant wrongfully withheld their money after its return was demanded.
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Section 37-3a permits interest as damages when money is wrongfully retained after it becomes payable.

MacKenna v. Gooding, No. 557621 (Dec. 19, 2001) · filed 2001-12-19

On July 20, 2000, she informed both defendants Epstein and Gooding that she could not get financing and therefore she is entitled to interest under the statute from that date.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment and postjudgment interest on defense and settlement funds wrongfully withheld by an insurer.

General Plasma v. Reliance Ins. Co., No. Cv 97-0575899s (Jun. 23, 2000) · filed 2000-06-23

For the reasons articulated in the memorandum of decision, dated January 11, 2000, this court holds that Reliance's conduct amounted to a wrongful withholding of General Plasma's money; ... and, therefore, General Plasma is entitled to § 37-3a prejudgment and postjudgment interest on moneys it spent defending and settling the UTC action.
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Section 37-3a provides 10% interest for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes due.

Knapp v. Haehl, No. Cv 95 0148527 (Feb. 26, 2001) · filed 2001-02-26

(2) the decedent's certificate of deposit in the amount of $35,407.17 was taken by the Gateway Bank to satisfy the defendant's debt based on a demand note for $38,000 dated October 11, 1990, and interest thereon should run from November 4, 1992, at 10%, the rate specified in General Statutes § 37-3a for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes due; ... As to the second count, the plaintiff should recover $35,407.17, plus interest at 10% from November 4, 1992, amounting to $29,412.16, for a total of $64,819.33 on that count, and a total of $83,307.73 on both counts.
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Section 37-3a permits ten percent annual interest as damages for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable when equitable considerations warrant it.

Ali v. Morse Brothers, Inc., No. Cv98-0489792 S (Aug. 28, 2001) · filed 2001-08-28

By the terms of General Statutes § 37-3a interest at the rate of ten percent per annum may be recovered as damages for the wrongful detention of money damages after they become payable. Prejudgment interest, as an element of damages, may be awarded by the trial court when equitable considerations deem that it is warranted.
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Section 37-3a permits 10% interest on a refund of overpaid legal fees.

Mulvey v. Rucci, Burnham, Carta Edelberg, No. Cv-99-0174702 (May 29, 2002) · filed 2002-05-29

It follows that the plaintiff would be entitled to a refund of $9,520.16, the difference between $35,770.61 and the cap of $26,250, plus interest at 10%, in accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits the court to award interest on withheld money at 10% per year when the circumstances warrant it.

Stein v. Nanos, No. Cv 01 0074753 S (Sep. 12, 2002) · filed 2002-09-12

Under the circumstances interest should be awarded and interest at the rate of 10% per annum is ordered (Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a ) @ $2.962 per diem — 807 days from July 1, 2000 = $2390.34.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary interest when money is wrongfully detained after it becomes due and payable.

Fitzpatrick v. Scalzi · filed 2002-10-08

The security deposit was wrongfully detained after it became due and payable. Therefore, it was within the discretion of the referee to determine the amount of interest. We find no abuse of that discretion in the award of interest under § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a permits interest of up to 10 percent a year for wrongful detention of money; bad faith is not required.

Ferrato v. Webster Bank · filed 2002-01-15

Although bad faith is one factor that the court may look at when deciding whether to award interest under § 37-3a, we note that, in the context of the statute, “wrongful” is not synonymous with bad faith conduct. Rather, wrongful means simply that the act is performed without the legal right to do so.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money, and an improper detention alone does not establish wrongfulness.

Maloney v. PCRE, LLC · filed 2002-03-26

A plaintiffs burden of demonstrating that the retention of money is wrongful requires more than demonstrating that the opposing party detained money when it should not have done so. The fact that an award of such interest is discretionary and subject to equitable considerations, rather than automatic, reflects the reality that not all improper detentions of money are wrongful.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when money is wrongfully withheld after it becomes due and payable.

Killion v. Davis · filed 2002-04-23

Because the defendant wrongfully withheld the moneys owed the plaintiffs at the time they were payable, § 37-3a provides that the plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest from June 15, 1992.
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Section 37-3a permits compensatory interest when payment for services is wrongfully withheld without a good faith dispute.

Anquillare, Lipnicki, Ruocco v. Vcr Realty, No. Cv00-007017s (Feb. 5, 2003) · filed 2003-02-05

The funds that should have been paid to the plaintiff as payment for the accounting services it rendered were wrongfully withheld by the defendants. The amount due was liquidated in that the defendants knew how much they were to pay and to whom to pay it.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on damages a defendant wrongfully withholds after they become payable.

Advanced Financial Services, Inc. v. Associated Appraisal Services, Inc. · filed 2003-08-26

By not compensating the plaintiff for the damages it sustained after the foreclosure of the property that was supposed to secure the loan, the defendants wrongfully detained the plaintiffs money. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest because the court’s finding of facts were not clearly erroneous.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully detained, but not on money the defendant was entitled to possess.

Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank · filed 2004-11-16

Because we have determined, however, that the defendant had a right to possess the remainder of the money, it was improper to award the rest of the prejudgment interest. The defendant could not improperly detain what it had a right to possess. Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by awarding the plaintiffs the entire $4794.42 in prejudgment interest. The court should have awarded the plaintiffs only whatever prejudgment interest accrued on the $1502.78 in attorney’s fees, pursuant to § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at 10 percent on a contract payment improperly withheld, beginning when the claimant sought payment.

Conn Strux, Inc. v. Town of East Granby, No. Cv99-0497551s (Apr. 15, 2002) · filed 2002-04-15

That the said sum of $23,500.00 is owed to the plaintiff together with interest per Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a at 10 percent from April 1999 when the plaintiff sought the resolution of its claim (Exhibit 8) to the approximate date of judgment, April 2002, amounting to $7,050.00.
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Section 37-3a allows interest at ten percent per year on sums that are due and payable.

Zanker Group v. Summerville, No. Cv 00 0446374 S (Sep. 19, 2002) · filed 2002-09-19

In addition to the foregoing, Zanker is also entitled to recover interest at the rate of ten percent a year on all sums that are due and payable at this time. General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award up to 10 percent interest on a judgment payment wrongfully withheld from its due date until payment.

Sosin v. Sosin · filed 2008-08-12(a)

Accordingly, if the court determines that the plaintiff wrongfully withheld all of the $23,834,900 payment that became due and payable on April 21,2005, a proper application of the statute would permit an award of interest, up to 10 percent, on that amount until it was paid fully. It remains within the court’s discretion, in light of its factual findings, to award interest on any portion of this payment that it determines was withheld wrongfully until payment was made.
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Section 37-3a requires a claim for a liquidated sum of money wrongfully withheld before prejudgment interest may be awarded.

Reyes v. Chetta · filed 2013-07-02

Here, Reyes did not assert a claim for a liquidated sum of money that Amoroso wrongfully withheld from him. The court’s award of prejudgment interest therefore was improper.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on a judgment award only after the payment becomes due.

Picton v. Picton · filed 2008-10-02(a)

The judgment is reversed only as to the date on which interest began to accrue and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment ordering interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a from ninety days after the date of judgment.
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Section 37-3a(a) permits a court to award interest on wrongfully withheld money even when the debtor believed in good faith that payment was not owed.

Sosin v. Sosin · filed 2011-02-22(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that, even if the plaintiff had withheld the $3,828,081 on the basis of a good faith belief that he was entitled to that sum, the trial court was not foreclosed from awarding interest pursuant to § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a(a) allows prejudgment interest for money wrongfully detained after it becomes due and payable, but not for an undetermined corporate valuation or tax penalties.

System Pros, Inc. v. Kasica · filed 2016-07-12(a)

The corollary to that principle is that § 37-3a does not provide for interest on money that is not due and payable.
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Interest ordered by utility regulators

Section 37-3a does not limit interest payments ordered by the Public Utilities Control Authority.

Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Control Authority · filed 1981-02-13

General Statutes § 37-3a does not apply to interest payments ordered by the PUCA.
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Contractual and choice-of-law limits on interest

Section 37-3a is substantive for choice of law purposes because prejudgment interest requires an inquiry into whether money was wrongfully withheld and whether equity warrants interest.

Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc. · filed 2025-11-11

Because an award of prejudgment interest requires a determination that the losing party wrongfully withheld a liquidated sum after it became payable and that equity warrants payment of interest, § 37-3a necessarily requires an inquiry into the substantive issues in the case.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award interest as damages on a loan only if the parties expressly reject postmaturity interest.

American First Federal, Inc. v. Gordon · filed 2017-06-06(a)

Nowhere in them does the plaintiff expressly disclaim its right to postmaturity interest. The court therefore did not have discretion to award interest as damages under § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a does not apply to an unapportioned judgment based on both state and federal claims; the federal interest rate applies.

Vera v. Alstom Power, Inc. · filed 2016-05-24

Vera seeks prejudgment interest under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a. That statute does not apply. Where, as here, the judgment is based on both state and federal claims, and is not apportioned between the two, the Court must apply “interest calculated at the federal interest rate.”
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Section 37-3a’s final sentence can prevent Connecticut usury law from governing notes when the parties intended another state’s law to apply.

Albano v. City National Bank of Connecticut · filed 1981-03-18

The notion that the rights of the parties are governed by the usury laws of Connecticut is contrary to what appears to have been intended by the original parties to the notes ... and is expressly rejected by the provisions of the last sentence of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a (1972).
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Section 37-3a permits interest as damages for wrongful detention of money, but it cannot authorize interest on a debt when the governing law and contract bar it.

Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters · filed 1990-08-21

It is clear that the court here could not have granted the plaintiff interest pursuant to the substantive rule § 37-3a because the promissory notes and New York law barred interest on the debt itself before judgment.
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Section 37-3a’s 10% interest rate does not apply when a contract expressly provides a higher rate.

Holmes v. General Electric Capital Corp. · filed 2008-03-20

Because Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a set the statutory rate at 10%, the district court did find that an interest rate of 10% was appropriate. In this case however, the parties specifically agreed on a default interest rate of 18%. As explained in detail by the Bankruptcy Court, courts in Connecticut uniformly hold that the statutory rate does not apply to contracts in which there is an express agreement for the payment of a higher rate.
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Prejudgment interest

An award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a must specify the awarded rate to be a final judgment because 10 percent is the maximum rate, not a fixed rate.

Randazzo v. Sakon · filed 2018-04-17(a)

Because the defendant’s original appeal was taken before the rate of statutory prejudgment interest was determined, the appeal is subject to dismissal pursuant to Gianetti v. Meszoros, 268 Conn. 424, 426, 844 A.2d 851 (2004), for lack of a final judgment. In Gianetti, our Supreme Court explained that, because the 10 percent interest rate set forth in § 37-3a is not a fixed rate of interest but, rather, is the maximum rate of interest that may be awarded under its provisions, a judgment awarding prejudgment interest under the statute must set forth the rate awarded in order to be a final judgment.
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Section 37-3a permits a discretionary award of interest of up to ten percent a year to compensate for the loss of use of money after it becomes payable.

Negron v. Patriot Auto Sales, LLC · filed 2019-09-17

In order to ensure that the Negrons obtain their full judgment, including loss of the use of their money, the court will impose post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of ten percent.
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Law changed since P.A. 83-267 raised § 37-3a’s cap from 8% to 10% on October 1, 1983.

Section 37-3a supplies the statutory rate for prejudgment interest awarded on damages.

Walter Kidde Constructors, Inc. v. State · filed 1981-03-30

Prejudgment interest on the damages found to be due to the plaintiffs is assessed at the statutory rate of 8 percent running from October 1, 1974 until the date of judgment. General Statutes § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest on funds a bank wrongfully sets off.

Vic Gerard Golf Cars, Inc. v. Citizen's National Bank · filed 1981-11-16

With respect to the issue of prejudgment interest under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 37-3a, equity requires that Citizen’s National pay for the use of the funds wrongfully set off on April 15, 1976.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when the detention of payable money is wrongful under the circumstances.

Town of Newington v. General Sanitation Service Co. · filed 1985-04-30

General Statutes § 37-3a allows the recovery of interest in civil actions “as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable . . . .” We have construed the statute to make the allowance of interest depend upon “whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances.”
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest as damages for money detained after it becomes due, with the award left to the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Nor'easter Group, Inc. v. Colossale Concrete, Inc. · filed 1988-05-17

Interest “may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes due and payable.” General Statutes § 37-3a. The allowance of interest as an element of damages is primarily an equitable determination and a matter within the discretion of the trial court. ... The plaintiff’s suit against the defendants obviously falls within the category of “civil actions” and our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. The trial court, therefore, did not err in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a makes prejudgment interest depend on whether the detention of payable money was wrongful, a factual determination within the trial court’s discretion.

Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon · filed 1989-04-18

Because an award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a raises a question of fact which is not evident in the record before us, we decline to review the plaintiff’s claim for interest.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest in a civil action for money due and payable, with the award subject to the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Metcalfe v. Talarski · filed 1989-12-05

The plaintiffs suit against the defendants is clearly a “civil action,” and our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Thus, the trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest from January 8, 1986, to the date of judgment.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest as damages for wrongful detention of money, ordinarily beginning when the money becomes due and payable.

Alderman v. RPM of New Haven, Inc. · filed 1990-01-23

The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to interest on $38,972.05 at the statutory rate of 10 percent per annum for the period from April 30, 1986, through October 5, 1988.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest for the detention of money after it becomes due, with the award and its accrual period subject to the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Atlas v. Miller · filed 1990-02-13

The court’s computation of the time period over which interest should be awarded was not clearly erroneous. ... The allowance of interest is primarily an equitable determination within the discretion of the trial court. ... Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. The trial court, therefore, did not err in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable; an unexplained denial must allow for meaningful appellate review.

Prime Management Company, Incorporated, Cross-Appellee v. John F. Steinegger and Nancy J. Steinegger, D/B/A Franz Melzer Associates, Cross-Appellants · filed 1990-05-24

In the present case, the district court made no findings and gave no explanation with respect to its denial of prejudgment interest, and the reason for denying Stein-egger such interest in the present case is not clear to us. While the granting or denial of such interest is committed to the court’s sound discretion, the uninformative denial prevents us from determining whether discretion has been properly exercised.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest against the state in a § 4-61 contract action when money was payable and wrongfully withheld.

White Oak Corp. v. Department of Transportation · filed 1991-01-29

Having concluded that § 4-61 puts the state in the same position as a private party with respect to an award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a, we next consider whether the trial court’s reasons for refusing to award interest under § 13a-96 would also justify refusing to award interest under § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a provides a ten percent rate for prejudgment interest.

Star Technologies, Inc. v. Philips Medical Systems, N.A. · filed 1991-03-14

Prejudgment interest is awarded at ten percent pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

O'Hara v. State · filed 1991-05-14

We conclude that the trial court reasonably determined that there was no evidence that the defendant had wrongfully withheld money from the plaintiffs and, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs.
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Section 37-3a leaves the award of prejudgment interest to the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Wilson v. Kapetan, Inc. · filed 1991-08-20

Wilson’s assertion that the court incorrectly failed to award prejudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3a is also without merit. “The allowance of interest as an element of damages is primarily an equitable determination and a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” ... Our careful review of the record discloses no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to award prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award prejudgment interest at 10% per year when money has been wrongfully withheld.

Ferraro v. St. Vincent Depaul Society, No. 096226 (Feb. 6, 1992) · filed 1992-02-06

With exceptions that are inapplicable, General Statutes Section 37-3a provides for interest of 10% per year to be added to damages. ... In the exercise of discretion, the court adds interest of 10% per annum to $8,250.00 from April 1, 1989 to the date that this judgment is filed.
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Section 37-3a permits a discretionary award of interest when payable money is wrongfully detained.

Bodner v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 1992-06-16

General Statutes § 37-3a provides, with certain exceptions inapplicable here, that “interest . . . may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909 . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable . . . .” ... Absent such an articulation, we presume that the trial court properly relied on a reasonable construction of the tender documents and made a proper award of interest.
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Section 37-3a allows ten percent annual interest as damages for detained money from the date it becomes payable through the verdict.

Konover Development Corporation v. Zeller, No. 053231 (Aug. 18, 1992) · filed 1992-08-18

According to General Statutes Section 37-3a , the plaintiff is entitled to ten percent (10%) interest on the verdict ($1,052,633.67) from February 22, 1990, the date the money became due, until June 24, 1992, (845 days) when the jury entered its verdict.
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Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest when money payable to another has been wrongfully detained.

Solomon v. Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc. · filed 1993-01-26

In its discretion in civil actions for the detention of money after it becomes payable, the trial court may award prejudgment interest. General Statutes § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a allows interest for wrongfully withheld money even when the parties have a legitimate dispute over the contract.

Harris Calorific Sales Co. v. Manifold Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-06-06

We disagree with the defendant’s contention that an award of interest is not appropriate whenever there is a legitimate dispute concerning the construction of a contract.
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Section 37-3a does not allow prejudgment interest on punitive damages because they do not become payable before judgment.

Nielsen v. Wisniewski · filed 1993-07-20

Since punitive damages do not become payable before judgment, however, § 37-3a is inapplicable.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest when payable money is wrongfully detained, but the award is discretionary.

Maluszewski v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1994-04-05

The court determined that the defendant had made good faith arguments in moving to vacate the arbitration award, implying that the detention of moneys prior to judgment by the defendant was not wrongful. Upon review of the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award prejudgment interest to the plaintiff.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when money is wrongfully detained; if a contract requires notice before a payment default, interest cannot accrue before that default.

Patron v. Konover · filed 1994-08-16

In deciding whether interest is due under General Statutes § 37-3a, a trial court must determine not only whether the money is payable but also whether the detention of the money is wrongful. ... The default clause of the termination contract, by definition, makes the detention of money that is due wrongful only after a default notice.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a defendant wrongfully retains a deposit that has become payable.

Shah v. Lee, No. Cv 93-0456753s (Sep. 14, 1994) · filed 1994-09-14

The existence of any "bona fide" dispute between the parties appears tenuous, considering that the written offer and counter-offer made the sale specifically contingent upon the plaintiff's satisfaction with the lease procured. The defendant "wrongfully" retained the deposit money within the meaning of the case law.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to deny prejudgment interest when the claimant’s delay contributed to the time before judgment.

Brandewiede v. Emery Worldwide · filed 1994-10-12

An award of prejudgment interest would not be appropriate under the circumstances since plaintiff was partially responsible for the lengthy span of time which expired from breach until judgment. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 37-3a.
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Section 37-3a does not allow prejudgment interest when money was not wrongfully withheld.

Roper v. Richland, No. Cv 85 0078807 (Feb. 2, 1995) · filed 1995-02-02

Prejudgment interest based on General Statutes § 37-3a is not awarded because the money was not wrongfully withheld.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest as damages when money was wrongfully withheld after it became payable.

Chapman v. Ei Constructors, Inc., No. Cv 0040938 (Feb. 21, 1995) · filed 1995-02-21

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a provides that prejudgment interest "may be recovered and allowed in civil actions as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable." This court must determine "whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances." Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh , 218 Conn. 681 , 701-702 (1991). This court has utilized and applied these legal principals in determining whether to award prejudgment interest in the various counts in which it has found for the plaintiff.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award prejudgment interest for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable.

Republic Insurance v. Pat Dinardo Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 1995-02-23

It is undeniable, in this commercial transaction, that since it paid the town $91,000 on account of the defendants’ breach of their contract with the town, the plaintiff has been denied the use of this money and the defendants have had the use of that money. The plaintiff is awarded interest at the rate of 10 percent from May 2, 1991, for a total award of interest of $40,000.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money, but a good faith dispute can justify denying it.

Nynex Meridian Systems v. Moore Medical, No. Cv91-0392717s (May 12, 1995) · filed 1995-05-12

Interest is not assessed or awarded on the lost profits of $29,808, however, for though the Court disagrees with Moore's reading of the Contract and its resulting understanding of its obligations thereunder, it finds that Moore s detention of money was not "wrongful under the circumstances." Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Feldman, 161 Conn. 265 , 275 (1971). As Moore appears to have taken its position on this matter in good faith, the interests of justice do not require the allowance of pre-judgment interest on that portion of Nynex's claim. See General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits a court to deny prejudgment interest when the claimant fails to promptly state the amounts due.

Route 80 Associates v. Hrampanis, No. Cv N.H. 9308 5958 (Aug. 10, 1995) · filed 1995-08-10

The Court finds that since the plaintiff did not render prompt written statements to the defendant as to the amounts due for taxes, as required by the lease, and did not render prompt verbal statements of the amounts due for taxes, the awarding of prejudgment interest is not appropriate.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at the statutory rate of 10% when money is wrongfully detained after it becomes payable.

Douglas v. Bogdan Aldrich, No. Cv95-0074840 S (Feb. 21, 1996) · filed 1996-02-21

Notwithstanding the above reading of Section 52-245 , having considered the full record, some three years ago, I also conclude that plaintiff should be awarded interest as a consequence of the CT Page 1365-GG wrongful detention of money after it became payable at the statutory rate of 10%, from February 3, 1993, until January 4, 1996, as against each defendant, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 37-3a , as determined by the clerk.
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Section 37-3a permits 10% interest as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.

Greater Hartford Ob-Gyn v. Aetna L. C., No. Cv-91-0398086 S (Apr. 2, 1996) · filed 1996-04-02

The court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to interest in accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a . That section provides for interest at the rate of 10% as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. Although it was not made clear at trial when the money became due and payable if at an earlier date, the court finds that it became due and payable no later than May 6, 1991 when Aetna's claim counsel sent to plaintiff's counsel a formal denial of the claim. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). Plaintiff is entitled to recover interest from May 7, 1991 through February 22, 1996, the date of the judgment.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when the detention of money is wrongful under the circumstances.

Benjamin v. Sheinbaum, No. Cv 89 0102359 (May 29, 1996) · filed 1996-05-29

The court finds that the detention of money was "not wrongful under the circumstances." Spearhead Construction Corporation v. Bianco, supra, 39, Conn. App. 135. The debt in issue was not a liquidated amount, as evidenced by the decision of the court which adopted neither parties' calculation of damages. There was also evidence that the defendant paid to the plaintiff the sums he did upon the advice of his attorney. Under all of the circumstances of this case, the awarding of prejudgment interest is not warranted.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when money was wrongfully withheld under the circumstances; a good faith dispute or an unliquidated amount does not decide the issue.

Wellington Systems v. Redding Group, No. Cv 84 0073826 (Aug. 23, 1996) · filed 1996-08-23

The defendants also seek prejudgment interest on this sum pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , which permits such interest if money has been retained "after it becomes payable." ... The decision whether to order prejudgment interest is not to be based on whether the issues in this case were contested in a good faith dispute between the parties, or whether the amount of the judgment was a liquidated sum (see Alderman v. RPM of New Haven, Inc., 20 Conn. App. 566 , 570 , 568 A.2d 1068 (1990)), but rather the issue is solely whether the money was withheld wrongfully under the circumstances. ... This court does not believe that the money due RGI was withheld wrongfully and therefore declines to award prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest when money due and payable is wrongfully detained, but it does not cover the benefit-of-the-bargain damages awarded here.

Foley v. Huntington Co. · filed 1996-08-27

On the basis of our review of the applicable cases, we conclude that § 37-3a does not apply to these facts and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to that statute.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on a liquidated contract debt when the money was wrongfully withheld after it became payable.

Mayer-Wittmann Jt. Ventures v. Gunther I., No. Cv93 0134790 (Aug. 28, 1996) · filed 1996-08-28

General Statutes § 37-3a permits prejudgment interest if money has been retained "after it becomes payable." ... The underlying claim in this case is for liquidated damages based on a contract where the referee found as a fact that the money owed to the plaintiff was wrongfully detained after it becomes due and payable. The referee's findings of fact must stand unchallenged because of the absence of valid and proper exceptions, and his conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest from October 14, 1992, follows legally and logically from those facts.
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Section 37-3a authorizes prejudgment interest on a damages award.

Kish v. Burgess, No. Cv93 0129004 (Sep. 9, 1996) · filed 1996-09-09

Therefore, as to the complaint, judgment is entered in accordance with the recommendation of the referee in favor of the plaintiff to recover $13,668.22, plus prejudgment interest, pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , which amounts to $6,958, for a total recovery due the plaintiff in the amount of $20,626.22.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on unpaid legal fees.

Zeman v. Town of Rocky Hill, No. Cv93 0522576s (Mar. 6, 1995) · filed 1995-03-06

The court does believe, however, that the plaintiffs are entitled to interest in accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits ten per cent interest on unpaid lease obligations from when each item fairly became payable, even when the lease has no interest provision.

Kitts Lane Associates v. Lewandowski, No. Cv 94 0545628 S (Apr. 15, 1996) · filed 1996-04-15

The lease does not contain any provision for interest but statutory interest of ten per cent pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a is awarded based on findings when each item fairly became payable, as follows: ... Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiffs for $8,291.64 in addition to $2,271.77 interest computed to April 15, 1996.
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Section 37-3a allows 10% annual interest on overdue attorney fees.

Kearns v. Maresca, No. 301120 (Jul. 3, 1996) · filed 1996-07-03

Pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , the plaintiff is entitled to interest of 10% per annum.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on unpaid condominium charges from the dates they became due.

Moraski v. Four Beaches Condo. Assn., No. Cv 94-0359109 (Oct. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-10-29

The defendant condominium association has established that it is entitled to $330.00 plus $135.00, or $465.00, plus interest from the various dates on which each unpaid charge became due. The amount of that interest, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a , is $204.60.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at 10% per year on retainage wrongfully withheld after substantial completion.

A.O.D. Construction Co. v. Plymouth, No. Cv 92-0449974s (Jun. 5, 1995) · filed 1995-06-05

Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover its retainage of $18,062.92 plus interest pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a , at the rate of 10% per year, commencing from the substantial completion date of October 5, 1990.
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Section 37-3a permits 10% interest on rent and other damages that have been unreasonably withheld.

Barone v. O'connell, No. Cvbr 9407-02447 (Dec. 13, 1995) · filed 1995-12-13

The court finds that the rent and other damages have been unreasonably withheld by the plaintiff, Alice Barone. Cecio Brothers, Inc. v. Feldmann , 161 Conn. 265 , 275 (1971). Interest at the rate of 10% is awarded on $21,382.72 from August 1, 1991 through November 30, 1995 in the amount of $11,297.44. Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on liquidated contract damages when money due has been wrongfully withheld, with the award determined by the trier of fact.

Mimms v. Darien Capital Management, Inc., No. Cv 93 0135013 (Nov. 27, 1996) · filed 1996-11-27

The underlying claim in the present case is for liquidated damages based on a contract and thus fits within the broad spectrum of those actions in which prejudgment interest may be ordered. ... Therefore, the referee's recommendation regarding prejudgment interest is an equitable determination for the trier of fact, and her conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest may not be overturned.
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Section 37-3a permits a discretionary award of prejudgment interest when money is wrongfully withheld.

Milazzo v. Schwartz · filed 1997-03-11

General Statutes § 37-3a provides for the legal rate of 10 percent. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of interest.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest for the wrongful retention of money, and that interest is an element of damages on debts owing.

IBM Credit Corp. v. Mark Facey & Co. · filed 1997-03-18

Section 37-3a is “a substantive law that requires an analysis of the merits of the underlying claim. [It] allows the court, in its discretion, to award prejudgment interest for the wrongful retention of money. . . . Interest awarded pursuant to the substantive rule § 37-3a constitutes an element of the damages awarded on debts owing.”
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a contract payment is wrongfully withheld after it becomes payable.

Plaza Rlty. Mgmt. Corp. v. Sylvan Knoll, No. Cv 95 0148938 (Apr. 18, 1997) · filed 1997-04-18

Hence, the amount due the plaintiff was "wrongfully withheld," and interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a is payable, commencing on April 7, 1995, thirty days after the plaintiff submitted its bill, to the date judgment entered on November 22, 1996.
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Section 37-3a authorizes prejudgment interest on a damages award.

Gentile v. Reed, No. Cv 91 0115805 (Jul. 22, 1997) · filed 1997-07-22

Hence, as to the plaintiffs' complaint, judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant Reed in the amount of $22,080, plus prejudgment interest in accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest at 10% per year on the unpaid check from the date payment would have been credited through judgment.

City Check Cashing, Inc. v. Westport Pool, No. Cv 96 0153143 (Jul. 28, 1997) · filed 1997-07-28

Therefore, judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff on the complaint against the defendant Westport Pool, Inc. only, in the amount of $1,250. plus prejudgment interest of 10% per year pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , from May 21, 1992 to the date of this judgment, in the amount of $651.33, plus attorney's fees and costs to be calculated pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a , at a hearing scheduled for Monday, August 11, 1997, at 2:00 p. m., 123 Hoyt Street, Stamford.
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Section 37-3a prejudgment interest runs until judgment when money remains wrongfully withheld after trial begins.

Paulus v. Lasala, No. Cv 87 0089213 (Jan. 20, 1998) · filed 1998-01-20

Also, if the plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for money wrongfully withheld, such wrong does not stop when the trial begins, but continues until the date of judgment. ... Thus, although the factual finding that prejudgment interest is due is accepted, the determination of law that interest should terminate when the trial started is rejected.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a party wrongfully detains money due to another, based on the court's equitable assessment of the circumstances.

Lawler v. Blazawski, No. Cv 94 0056909 S (Feb. 11, 1998) · filed 1998-02-11

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is allowed prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a from March, 1995 in the amount of $2,093.00 in addition to his contract damages of $8,974.00.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest at 10% per year for money wrongfully detained after it becomes due.

Frenkel v. Schroer, No. Cv 96 0155450 (Mar. 27, 1998) · filed 1998-03-27

The plaintiffs also claim interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes due. The plaintiffs' work was satisfactory, was performed pursuant to a written contract in a timely fashion, and was unilaterally terminated by the defendants for their own personal reasons. Thus, prejudgment interest is warranted under the circumstances. Interest on $8,000 at 10% per year from November 1, 1996, to the date of this judgment, amounts to $1,133.33.
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Section 37-3a prejudgment interest runs until judgment enters, rather than stopping when trial begins.

Paulus v. Lasala, No. Cv 87 0089213 (Aug. 13, 1998) · filed 1998-08-13

(5) even if oral argument is a matter of right, and even if it was not waived by the defendants, the main issue that the court was faced with is the date when prejudgment interest, General Statutes § 37-3a , should terminate. The referee thought it should cease to run when the trial started. This court thought it should run until judgment actually entered.
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Section 37-3a requires a court considering prejudgment interest to determine whether money was wrongfully detained and when the detention began.

Rapin v. Nettleton · filed 1998-10-06

It is obvious from the memorandum of decision that the trial court did not address whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest under § 37-3a, even though the plaintiff requested such relief in its motion for entry of judgment to the trial court.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest, and whether to award it is a question for the trier of fact.

Darien Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Giordano, No. Cv 90 0107529 (Oct. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-10-30

The defendants also dispute the recommendation of the referee that interest be awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a . ... Therefore, this recommendation for prejudgment interest is accepted.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at 10 percent on an unpaid amount from the date payment was due.

Crider v. McAndrew, No. 114379 (Nov. 18, 1998) · filed 1998-11-18

The court finds that Crider was due to be paid on February 10, 1997, 30 days from the date of the final bill. The court enters judgment for Crider in the amount of $16,459.20, plus interest from February 10, 1997, of 10 percent in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a prejudgment interest is excluded from a prejudgment remedy amount when the notes provide for interest upon default.

The Rxr Group v. McConnon, No. Cv 97 0160800 (Jan. 6, 1999) · filed 1999-01-06

This amount does not include prejudgment interest as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a , because the notes themselves provide for the payment of interest upon a default.
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Section 37-3a gives courts discretion to deny prejudgment interest.

Motif Designs, Inc. v. Chase Assoc., No. Cv-97-0571571-S (Apr. 13, 1999) · filed 1999-04-13

The court exercises its discretion under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a to deny to plaintiff prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a permits an award of ten percent annual interest on damages from the date of the wrongful conduct to judgment.

Kaplan v. Gruder, No. Cv96 033 43 08 S (May 19, 1999) · filed 1999-05-19

The court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages against Gruder in the amount of $175,000 plus interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a at the rate of ten per cent per year from October 9, 1989 (the date when Gruder first took the stock of Enertronix as trustee and changed the name of that company) to the date of judgment.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a claim involves the wrongful detention of money that is payable.

Tankoos v. the Mead School, No. X05 Cv95 0145853s (Jun. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-06-04

Because the remaining claims do not involve the wrongful detention of money, the court finds that General Statutes § 37-3a is inapplicable. The defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' prayer for prejudgment interest, therefore, is granted.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest when a party wrongfully detains money that is due and payable.

Brodsky v. the Mead Sch., Hum. Dev., No. X05 Cv97 0156788s (Jun. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-06-04

Because the remaining claims do not involve the wrongful detention of money, the court finds that General Statutes § 37-3a is inapplicable.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an unpaid contract balance when the debtor's conduct warrants it.

Connecticut Carpentry v. Maranba Bldrs., No. Cv 96-0573579s (Jun. 8, 1999) · filed 1999-06-08

In addition it is entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a . Accordingly, judgment may enter for plaintiff Connecticut Carpentry against Maranba for $64,088.04 plus 10% interest from February 26, 1996.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an unpaid insurance premium through the date of judgment.

John M. Glover Agency v. Rdb Building, No. Cv 97-0162410 (Jul. 2, 1999) · filed 1999-07-02

(3) the plaintiff was entitled to recover prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a from July 1, 1996 to the date of judgment. ... Accordingly, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff to recover $5,878 as damages, plus prejudgment interest from July 1, 1996 to the date of this judgment in the amount of $1,762.95, for a total judgment for the the plaintiff for $7,640.95.
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Section 37-3a permits an award of ten percent annual interest on lease damages.

90 Avon Lane v. Apple Health Care, No. Cv-95-552502 (Nov. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-11-29

The court, however, awards to the plaintiffs statutory interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a from March 1, 1995 through November 30, 1996 in the amount of ten percent per annum of $102,812.60 for 21 months totalling $17,997.20.
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Section 37-3a permits an interest award in an action for unpaid rent and damage to leased property.

Dematteo v. Villano, No. Cvnh 9604-7493 (Jul. 10, 1997) · filed 1997-07-10

Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the amount of $9,846.50, plus interest of $2,461.00 pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , plus attorney's fees of $1,300.00, plus taxable costs.
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Section 37-3a permits interest on damages for a contractual underpayment of tips.

Conroy v. Foxwoods Casino Dealers' Toke Comm., No. 114947 (Oct. 26, 1999) · filed 1999-10-26

The court also awards interest on these amounts from March, 1997 in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits recovery of interest at ten percent per year on unpaid invoices.

Bic Sport USA, Inc. v. Kerbel · filed 1997-03-31

Plaintiff is entitled to interest at the statutory rate of ten (10) percent per year, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a, calculated from the date each invoice became thirty (30) days past due.
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Section 37-3a permits an award of 10% annual interest on a debt from the date payment was due.

Route 59 v. Central Sports, No. 115349 (Oct. 12, 1999) · filed 1999-10-12

The court also awards the plaintiff statutory interest Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a of 10% per year from the date the debt was payable, March 5, 1998, the date the plaintiff made demand for payment, plus costs.
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Interest awarded under § 37-3a runs until judgment is rendered.

Paulus v. LaSala · filed 1999-12-21

We hold that § 37-3a interest when awarded runs until judgment is rendered.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest on funds illegally detained after the debtor has had a reasonable opportunity to determine the amount owed.

Santangelo v. Elite Beverage, Inc., No. Cv97-0484715 (Feb. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-02-25

I conclude that Elite's failure to make any such effort calls for me to exercise my discretion to award prejudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3a . I conclude that from October 1, 1997 forward Elite illegally detained the funds I have found due to Mr. Santangelo. This was the date by which it had had a reasonable opportunity to examine its books and records, after counsel's demand of September 8, 1997, to determine how much it owed Mr. Santangelo, especially in view of the fact that he had made repeated verbal and written demands for repayment in the months leading up to his termination.
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Whether to award prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is exclusively for the trier of fact.

Tds Painting v. Copper Beech Farm, No. Cv 92 0124488 (Apr. 18, 2000) · filed 2000-04-18

The attorney trial referee specifically determined in his original report that prejudgment interest should not be awarded under the provisions of General Statutes § 37-3a . Whether to award such interest is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact, the referee in this case, and cannot be challenged.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest when detention of money is wrongful under all the circumstances, a determination left to the trier's discretion.

Cheverie v. Ashcraft Gerel, No. Cv-99-0594359-S (May 5, 2000) · filed 2000-05-05

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a the allowance of prejudgment interest depends on whether the detention of the money is wrongful under all the circumstances. ... The court can see no abuse of such discretion by the arbitrator.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on settlement costs and reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in related litigation.

General Plasma v. Reliance Insurance, No. Cv 97-0575899s (Jul. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-07-10

Upon reconsideration and final recalculation this date, it is hereby ordered that judgment enter for the plaintiff as follows: United Technologies Corp. v. General Plasma, Inc. settlement 100,000.00 Reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in the UTC action 179,234.19 General Statutes § 37-3a prejudgment interest on UTC settlement costs and reasonable attorney's CT Page 8172 fees and costs incurred therein 74,855.69 Reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in the present action 48,532.35 General Statutes § 52-192a offer of judgment interest on attorney's fees and costs incurred in UTC and present actions, UTC settlement costs and § 37-3a prejudgment interest 124,746.89 Total Judgment 527,369.12 Peck, J.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money after it becomes due, up to a maximum rate of 10% per year.

Blythe Son, Inc. v. Blue Moon Trucking, No. 412006 (Jul. 21, 2000) · filed 2000-07-21

Interest at 18% per annum is far above the maximum statutory rate of 10% per annum recoverable a damages for the detention of money after it has become payable. General Statute § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits interest at ten percent per year as damages when money remains unpaid after it becomes payable.

Cohen v. Beharry, No. Cv-90-01386103s (Jul. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-07-25

The court is not aware of any good reason for the failure of Cohen to pay to Beharry and Cavanaugh the amounts due them by three years after termination of the 12/31/89 partnership. Accordingly, the court orders that interest at ten per cent a year on the judgment of $69,288.97 for Beharry and on the judgment of $103,897.97 for Cavanaugh from January 1, 1993 be added to those judgments.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest calculated at ten percent per year on the verdict amount.

Bentz v. Halsey, No. X04cv-95-0120413-S (Sep. 1, 2000) · filed 2000-09-01

The court also awarded prejudgment interest under Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a . ... Prejudgment interest awarded by the court on June 30, 2000 and CT Page 10782 calculated to that day involves eight years of interest at ten percent per year on the verdict amount of $50,674.70.
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Section 37-3a does not award prejudgment interest when money was not wrongfully withheld during a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount.

Maloney v. Pcre, No. Cv 98 0168891 (Oct. 2, 2000) · filed 2000-10-02

The plaintiff also argues that she should be awarded prejudgment interest as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a for money wrongfully withheld. This request is denied because the defendants have not withheld the money wrongfully. There was a bona fide dispute concerning the refusal of the defendants to spend $200,000 on advertising and marketing and whether that gave rise to any damages. The amount sought was essentially unliquidated in the sense that the exact amount due was unknown and subject to a possible set-off. Moreover, there was no evidence of bad faith or willfulness on the part of the defendants.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest on an unpaid contractual completion bonus from the date payment was demanded.

Buildings v. Bizier, No. Cv 97 0569290s (Oct. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-10-27

The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is entitled under General Statutes § 37-3a to prejudgment interest on the $25,000 completion bonus from and after the December 5, 1996 (Exhibit 11) demand therefor.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when money due is wrongfully withheld, calculated from the date the wrongful detention began.

Mitchell v. Guardian Systems, Inc., No. Cv97-032 87 05s (Nov. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-11-27

Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to the interest on the account balance of $23,998.20, from the billing date, April 10, 1991 to the time of judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully detained after a breach of contract, calculated from the date the detention began.

Urich v. Fish, No. 360659 (Jan. 24, 2001) · filed 2001-01-24

Using the Blakeslee analysis, the Court first determines that Urich has wrongfully detained money due Fish. ... Similarly, in this case, Fish is not only entitled to compensatory damages but to statutory interest as well.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on wrongfully detained money beginning when the detention becomes wrongful.

Hall v. McCue, No. Cv00-0802415s (Apr. 12, 2001) · filed 2001-04-12

The plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a commencing May 1, 1999, which is the date by which the defendants originally agreed to complete the renovation work. The plaintiff, however, continued to pay portions of the $7700 through February, 2000, and thus the court cannot say that the defendants' CT Page 5143 "detention of the money [was] . . . wrongful" through that time period or for a reasonable time thereafter. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Hara v. State , 218 Conn. 628 , 643 (1991). The court will instead assess prejudgment interest on the $7,700 from mid-October, 2000, when the plaintiff filed suit, to the current time, which is approximately six months. At the 10% statutory rate, interest totals $335.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a defendant wrongfully detains the plaintiff's money, calculated from when the detention began.

Coregis Insurance Co. v. Fleet Nat. Bank, No. Cv 98-0580210 (May 4, 2001) · filed 2001-05-04

There is a two-pronged test for determining whether to award interest under General Statutes § 37-3a . The court must determine: first, whether the defendant wrongfully detained funds of plaintiff; and second, when the funds were first wrongfully detained.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully withheld, with wrongful withholding decided as a question of fact.

Alliance Partners v. Voltarc Technologies, No. Cv 96 0153579 (May 24, 2001) · filed 2001-05-24

As to prejudgment interest, General Statutes § 37-3a , it is well recognized that whether money due a plaintiff was "wrongfully withheld" presents an issue of fact for the trier of fact. Foley v. Huntington Company , 42 Conn. App. 712 , 738 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). Hence, the objection of the defendant is overruled.
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Section 37-3a leaves the decision whether to award prejudgment interest to the trier of fact.

Clarke Builders, Inc. v. Allen, No. Cv 98 0166183 (Jun. 18, 2001) · filed 2001-06-18

There remains the request of the plaintiff to recover prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , a subject which the attorney trial referee obviously did not address because his recommendation for judgment for the defendant was based on non-compliance with the HIA. Whether prejudgment interest under this statute should be awarded is an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact, in this case, the attorney trial referee, under the authority of Foley v. Huntington Company, 42 Conn. App. 712 , 738 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996).
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on liquidated damages wrongfully withheld after they become payable.

Advanced Financial v. Associated Appr., No. Cv 98-0580372 (Jul. 23, 2001) · filed 2001-07-23

The court is satisfied that the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a . The damages in this case became liquidated on November 26, 1996, the day that title vested in the plaintiff. The defendants undoubtedly knew of their wrongdoing at that time. They made no effort to pay the damages and have steadfastly continued such refusal throughout these proceedings. The court finds those damages of $170,646.30 wrongfully withheld. Interest is therefore due the plaintiff from November 26, 1996 until the date of this judgment at the rate of ten percent a year.
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Section 37-3a permits a court to award prejudgment interest as damages when money is wrongfully withheld after it becomes payable.

Aubin v. Miller · filed 2001-08-07

Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded prejudgment interest on the $74,650.
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Section 37-3a permits interest at 10 percent per year as damages for money wrongfully withheld after it becomes payable.

MacDonald v. Pinto, No. Cv97-0479007 S (Aug. 24, 2001) · filed 2001-08-24

Pinto detained the money wrongfully from MacDonald. By the terms of General Statutes § 37-3a , interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum may be recovered as damages for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment simple interest at ten percent a year when money is wrongfully withheld after it becomes payable.

Lombardo v. Matava, No. Cv 99 70844 S (Sep. 21, 2001) · filed 2001-09-21

In addition, the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment simple interest at the rate often percent a year pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a for the period of October 9, 1998 to the date of this judgment. This interest is to compensate the plaintiff for a delay in obtaining money that rightfully belonged to the plaintiff and that the detention of the money by the defendant after it became payable was wrongful.
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Section 37-3a allows prejudgment simple interest to compensate for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable.

J.J. Mottes Company v. Matava, No. Cv 99 71158 S (Sep. 21, 2001) · filed 2001-09-21

In addition, the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment simple interest at the rate of ten percent a year pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a for the period of October 14, 1998 to the date of this judgment. This interest is to compensate the plaintiff for a delay in obtaining money that rightfully belonged to the plaintiff and that the detention of the money by the defendant after it became payable was wrongful.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on money wrongfully detained after it becomes payable.

R L Acoustics v. Liberty Mutual Ins., No. Cv00 0380506s (Sep. 27, 2001) · filed 2001-09-27

This court has already determined that HRH/Atlas wrongfully detained money that it owed to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest under § 37-3a .
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest as damages for detaining money after it becomes payable; the award is for the trier of fact to decide.

Centurion Group v. hrh/atlas Construction, No. Cv 99 0172425 (Oct. 23, 2001) · filed 2001-10-23

The referee also recommended interest as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a for "damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . ." The awarding of prejudgment interest is clearly an issue for the trier of fact. ... 10% interest on $284,492.47, from October 16, 1998 to the date of judgment, amounts to $85,893.35. ... Accordingly, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff against the three defendants in the amount of $370,385.82, which includes prejudgment interest.
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Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money after it becomes due and payable to the claimant.

Security Mutual Life v. Kings West Ltd., No. Cv96 033 27 25 (Nov. 7, 2001) · filed 2001-11-07

KWLP's claim for prejudgment interest on the receivership funds finds no support in the law. "Pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , prejudgment interest is awarded in the discretion of the trial court to compensate the prevailing party for a delay in obtaining money that rightfully belongs to him. The detention of the money must be determined to have been wrongful. Its detention can only be wrongful, however, from and after the date on which the court, in its discretion, determines that the money was due and payable." ... KWLP cannot state a claim for compensatory interest for the simple reason that there is no order of distribution awarding KWLP any of the receivership funds; the money does not rightfully belong to KWLP.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest at ten percent on an awarded amount, accruing from the date specified by the court.

Catchpole v. Mark, No. Cv98 0163439 S (Dec. 5, 2001) · filed 2001-12-05

Judgment may enter as follows: on the first count of its complaint, Catchpole shall have judgment against Mark in the amount of $21,031.00; on the eighth count of its complaint, Catchpole shall have judgment in the amount of $907.20 with prejudgment interest on this latter amount at ten percent, pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , accruing from July 27, 1997.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable.

Coplin v. Hudson United bank/hub, No. Cv00 0176952 (Dec. 20, 2001) · filed 2001-12-20

Thus, he recommended that the plaintiff recover the amount in question, plus interest as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a for "damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . ." ... Although treble damages are not awarded, the defendant is not only obliged to repay the money it took from the plaintiff's account, it must also pay 10% interest per year on that sum for a wrongful withholding of money.
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Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on wrongfully withheld disability benefits from the date they were due.

Uberti v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2001-03-28

Accordingly, on Count One, Mr. Uberti is entitled to retroactive benefits (23 months from April 1999 to March 2001, at a rate of $450 per month) of $10,350, plus $1,035 pre-judgment interest under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a for monies wrongfully withheld from the date they were due to be paid.
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Section 37-3a leaves prejudgment interest for the detention of payable money to the court’s discretion.

A.B. Realty Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2001-09-07

An award of prejudgment interest under Connecticut law for the detention of money after it becomes payable is an equitable determination and a matter within the sound discretion of the Court. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a; ... Moreover, an award of prejudgment interest in favor of MetLife is not warranted because MetLife has not yet paid Advest the $750,000 due and owing to Advest.
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Section 37-3a supports ten percent annual interest on wrongfully collected taxes from the dates the taxpayer paid them.

The Woodhall School v. Town of Bethlehem, No. Cv97-0074492s (Jan. 11, 2000) · filed 2000-01-11

The court further finds that, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 37-3a and 12-119 , it is appropriate to award interest of ten per cent per annum on all taxes the plaintiff paid on the property from the date of such payments. 5 Although the town may not have acted maliciously or intentionally to deprive the school of the tax exemption, the town's actions nonetheless had the effect of wrongfully depriving plaintiff of the use of its moneys.
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Section 37-3a permits an award of interest on damages at 10% per year.

Kaplan v. Gruder, No. Cv96 033 43 08 S (May 25, 2000) · filed 2000-05-25

The plaintiffs are therefore awarded attorneys fees and disbursements in the $403,241.72, in addition to the damages found by the court in the amount of $175,000.00 with interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a at the rate of 10% per annum from 1989 to date in the amount of $185,979. 45.
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Notes 1–150 of 298, oldest cases first.

111 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation, the opinion quotes the section's interest rate as it stood on the date of the taking without deciding a rule under it. opinion →
Builders Lumber & Supply Co. v. Fasulo (In Fasulo), the court mentions § 37-3a as the source of the legal interest rate requested by a creditor while deciding damages on nondischargeable debts. opinion →
Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Department of Administrative Services, the court cites § 37-3a’s interest rate as a comparison while deciding whether § 5-276b (b) applies to awards against the state. opinion →
Williams v. Breyer, the opinion mentions the section as the basis for the plaintiff’s request for interest but does not decide its rules. opinion →
Automatic Business Prod. Co. v. Hankinson, No. 47066 (May 20, 1992), the opinion lists the section as the basis for the plaintiff’s request for interest but does not decide that request. opinion →
State v. Council 4, the court reports the trial court’s ruling on interest under § 37-3a but affirms on public policy grounds without deciding the interest issue. opinion →
Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc., the court cites the section to compare its damages rate with the lease’s 10 percent interest rate. opinion →
Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller, the court declined to decide whether the trial court improperly awarded prejudgment interest under the section because it remanded the case for a new trial. opinion →
Bunche v. Bunche, the court remanded the case without deciding the plaintiff’s claim for interest under § 37-3a. opinion →
Kaufman Pump Tank, Inc. v. Wgn Corp., No. Cv90 0110664 (Jan. 5, 1995), the court mentions § 37-3a only when describing the referee's recommendation of prejudgment interest. opinion →
Jones v. Ippoliti, No. Cv 93 53116 S (Jun. 30, 1995), the court mentions interest assessed under the section to explain the amount of punitive damages. opinion →
Commission on Hro v. Truelove MacLean, No. 115306 (Jul. 10, 1995), the court deemed the interest claim abandoned because the plaintiff had not adequately briefed it. opinion →
US ON BEHALF OF & FOR USE OF BALF v. Casle Corp., the court cited § 37-3a as guidance while deciding prejudgment interest under federal Miller Act law. opinion →
United States ex rel. Balf Co. v. Casle Corp., the court used § 37-3a as guidance for prejudgment interest under the Miller Act, then set the interest start date under federal law. opinion →
Jones v. Ippoliti, No. Cv 93 53116 S (Aug. 11, 1995), the court mentions § 37-3a while recounting the defendants’ concession about calculating interest under § 52-192a. opinion →
Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, the court cites § 37-3a while deciding that the Connecticut antitrust act does not permit prejudgment interest. opinion →
Ted Rosick Construction v. Rjb Contracting, Inc., No. 381108 (Feb. 29, 1996), the court identifies § 37-3a as the basis for the arbitrator's interest award and decides whether the parties' submission authorized that award. opinion →
Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., the court mentions § 37-3a only while recounting the defendant’s argument about an alternative interest rate. opinion →
Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., the court mentions the § 37-3a interest award while deciding a challenge to additional interest under § 52-192a. opinion →
Forestville Lumber Co. v. Red Oak Development Corp., the court cites § 37-3a to distinguish discretionary interest from contractual interest while deciding the jurisdictional limit in § 52-549n. opinion →
Sloan v. Kubitsky, No. 309828 (Sep. 23, 1996), the court denies the claim for § 37-3a interest because it awards no underlying attorneys fees, without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Vibert v. Atchley, No. Cv93-0346622 (May 23, 1996), the opinion recites the section’s interest standard, then awards interest with a citation to § 37-3c, leaving the basis of the award unclear. opinion →
Moynahan, Ruskin, Mascolo v. McCarroll, No. 0133246 (Nov. 18, 1996), the court mentions § 37-3a as the basis for the plaintiff's interest request while deciding whether to grant a prejudgment attachment. opinion →
Patron v. Konover, the court cites § 37-3a while deciding the scope of its prior remand mandate. opinion →
Engelman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance, the court directs the trial court to consider compensatory interest under the section on remand but does not decide whether it is owed. opinion →
Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Ass'n v. Onolfo, No. Cv 960133750 (Jun. 6, 1997), the court cites § 37-3a as the source of the requested interest but denies interest under the separate statutes governing CIGA. opinion →
Bower v. D'Onfro, the court cites § 37-3a only while describing another case, then decides the timing of a motion for interest under § 37-3b. opinion →
Twachtman v. Hastings, No. Cv 95 57307 S (Jul. 23, 1997), the court mentions the section while rejecting an ethical challenge to interest in an attorney’s mortgage note, without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
Brosnan v. Sacred Heart University, No. 333544 (Oct. 21, 1997), the court cites § 37-3a only as the source of the interest rate available under the workers’ compensation remedy in § 31-300. opinion →
Ninth Rma Partners v. Krass, No. Cv 96 0557305 S (Dec. 10, 1997), the court mentioned § 37-3a as a possible source of an interest rate but expressly declined to decide whether it applied. opinion →
Suarez-Negrete v. Trotta, the opinion reports the trial court’s prejudgment interest award under § 37-3a but decides the limits on trebling attorney’s fees under other statutes. opinion →
Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Society for Savings, the court mentions the defendant’s challenge to prejudgment interest under the section but resolves the appeal on whether a loan contract existed. opinion →
New Haven Postal E.F.C.U. v. McMillian, No. Cv88-0232075s (May 4, 1998), the opinion mentions § 37-3a in the reproduced wage execution but decides the employer’s turnover obligation under wage execution law. opinion →
Tuthill Finance v. Greenlaw, No. Cv91 0115439 (May 4, 1998), the court recounts the referee's use of § 37-3a in calculating interest and accepts the damages recommendation without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
Associates v. Merisel, Inc., No. Cv 95 0144182 (Jul. 6, 1998), the court remanded the referee's recommended interest award for an explanation and did not decide whether § 37-3a interest was warranted. opinion →
Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Zasun, the opinion mentions the section only in describing an interest request the trial court denied and the defendant did not appeal. opinion →
Kuss v. Kuss, No. Fa 89-50950 S (Feb. 7, 2000), the court requested the parties’ views on awarding interest under the section but did not decide whether to award it. opinion →
Yankee Linen Supply Co., Inc. v. Baxter, No. Cv 98 0165515 (Feb. 10, 2000), the court reports the referee's interest award under the section and accepts the recommended judgment without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
Condor Capital Corp. v. Michaud, No. Cv 99-0588911-S (Jul. 25, 2000), the opinion mentions the section only as the plaintiff's basis for seeking interest on its deficiency claim. opinion →
John M. Glover Agency v. RDB Building, LLC, the court reports the fact finder’s award of prejudgment interest under the section without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
Tuthill Finance v. Greenlaw, the opinion cites § 37-3a only when describing the trial court’s interest calculation, then remands for recalculation of damages. opinion →
Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, the court cites the section when noting that interest may be awarded on the damages, without deciding any rule under it. opinion →
S/N1 Reo Ltd. Liability Co. v. City of New London Ex Rel. Ballestrini, the court mentions § 37-3a only as a rate S/Nl cited in its unsuccessful argument that a delinquent-tax charge under another statute was a penalty. opinion →
Adams v. Allen, No. Fa87-0600006 (Dec. 25, 2001), the court cites the section only to explain why an interest award in another case was reversed while it considers a claim for costs. opinion →
Benchmark Investments LLC v. Elms at Mystic LLC, No. 555579 (Jan. 11, 2002), the court cites § 37-3a as the plaintiffs' asserted basis for interest and decides only whether their failure to identify it in the pleading warrants striking the request. opinion →
Precision Comp. Serv. v. Concentrex, No. Cv01 38 28 93 S (Apr. 16, 2002), the court cites the section when denying a motion to strike an interest claim, without explaining any rule of the section. opinion →
Fontaine v. Colt's Manufacturing Co., the court mentions the trial court’s interest award under § 37-3a while deciding the value of the converted revolver. opinion →
Tuxis-Ohr's, Inc. v. Gherlone, the opinion cites § 37-3a only when reporting the trial court’s interest award, which the defendants did not contest on appeal. opinion →
Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Azarigian, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when reporting the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. opinion →
Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission On Human Rights & Opportunities, the court declined to decide whether § 37-3a authorized interest because it found authority under § 46a-86 (b). opinion →
Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., the court declined to review the plaintiffs’ claim for interest under § 37-3a because they had not preserved it for appeal. opinion →
Dey, Smith & Collier, LLC v. Steenson, the court mentions the section only as the basis for the plaintiff’s request for interest and declines to review the attachment amount because the appellate record is inadequate. opinion →
Commissioner of Transportation v. Bakery Place Ltd. Partnership, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when recounting the trial court’s interest award; the appeal decides judicial notice and property valuation. opinion →
Beucler v. Lloyd, the court cites the section only when recounting the fact finder's recommendation of prejudgment interest. opinion →
Knapp v. Knapp, the court cites § 37-3a while explaining that it cannot review the denial of interest without an adequate record. opinion →
Tadros v. Tripodi, the court mentions § 37-3a as the basis for challenged prejudgment interest but treats the interest claim as abandoned without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., the court cites § 37-3a as the basis for the trial court’s interest award but affirms because the defendant waived its challenge to that award. opinion →
Commissioner of Transportation v. Bakery Place Ltd. Partnership, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when recounting the trial court’s interest award. opinion →
American States Insurance v. Allstate Insurance, the court identifies § 37-3a as the basis for the trial court’s interest award but reverses on choice-of-law grounds without deciding the interest issue. opinion →
Vanguard Engineering v. Anderson, No. 559189 (Dec. 19, 2002), the court lists § 37-3a as the basis for an interest amount in its damages award without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, Inc. v. Cantore, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when reporting the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest. opinion →
Dunleavey v. Paris Ceramics USA, Inc., the opinion mentions the trial court’s interest award under the section but decides only whether the plaintiff reasonably mitigated damages. opinion →
American States Insurance v. Allstate Insurance, the court mentions § 37-3a only when recounting the trial court’s interest award; its decision addresses which state’s law governs the insurance policy. opinion →
Persky v. Cendant Corp., the court mentions the section only to describe how the state labor department calculated interest in its earlier award. opinion →
Moasser v. Becker, the court declined to review the plaintiff’s request for interest under § 37-3a because he failed to seek articulation of the trial court’s silence on that request. opinion →
Laser Contracting, LLC v. Torrance Family Ltd. Partnership, the opinion cites § 37-3a only when reporting the trial court’s award of interest. opinion →
Sosin v. Sosin, the court granted certification to review an interest question under the section but did not decide that question. opinion →
Petrucelli v. Palmer, the court discusses the section in connection with prejudgment interest awarded in Metcalfe and says the Petrucellis did not seek interest under it. opinion →
Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, the court cited § 37-3a while discussing a Supreme Court decision by analogy to its ruling on postjudgment interest under § 37-3b. opinion →
Harris v. Harris, the court reports the trial court’s interest award under the section and dismisses the appeal as moot. opinion →
Dougan v. Dougan, a dissenting footnote cites § 37-3a(a) to observe that the interest rate was not at issue. opinion →
Credit One, LLC v. Head, the court mentions the section as the basis for the plaintiff’s interest calculation and rejects an unsupported challenge to that calculation without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Housing Authority, the court mentions § 37-3a only while recounting the commission’s request for interest and decides the complainant’s right to intervene. opinion →
Midland Funding, LLC v. Tripp, the court cites § 37-3a to describe the interest the plaintiff requested, while deciding whether the trial court could reject the parties’ stipulation. opinion →
Morgan v. Morgan, the court cites § 37-3a through a prior decision and dismisses the appeal because the undetermined interest rate meant there was no final judgment. opinion →
Specialized Freight Forwarders v. Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc., the opinion cites § 37-3a only while recounting the trial court’s prejudgment interest award. opinion →
Masse v. Perez, the court mentions § 37-3a when recounting the trial court’s interest award but does not decide any issue under the section. opinion →
Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, the court mentions § 37-3a while applying an earlier ruling that the parties’ stipulation made Maine law govern their interest dispute. opinion →
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Affinity Health Care Management, Inc. v. Wellner (In re Affinity Health Care, Management, Inc.), the court mentions § 37-3a as the basis for the plaintiffs’ requested interest rate, then awards prejudgment interest at the federal rate. opinion →
Computer Reporting Services, LLC v. Lovejoy & Associates, LLC, the opinion cites the section while recounting the plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment interest, without deciding an issue under it. opinion →
Wall Systems, Inc. v. Pompa, the opinion cites the section only when reporting the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest. opinion →
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Accurate Title Searches, Inc., the opinion reports the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a but does not state an appellate ruling on the section’s rules. opinion →
Healey v. Haymond Law Firm, P.C., the court mentions § 37-3a only as the basis for an interest claim that was not challenged on appeal. opinion →
O'Brien v. O'Brien, the court cites § 37-3a through a prior case to illustrate implied subsidiary findings while deciding whether the plaintiff violated automatic orders. opinion →
Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v. Enagbare, the court mentions § 37-3a as the basis for an interest motion but affirms because the defendant did not challenge the interest award and improperly attacked the underlying judgment. opinion →
Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Systems, Inc., the court cites § 37-3a as an example of a statutory cap while interpreting a marshal’s fee statute. opinion →
Hurlburt v. Mass. Homeland Ins. Co., the court mentions the section only when listing the interest the Hurlburts requested. opinion →
Cliff's Auto Body, Inc. v. Grenier, the court cites § 37-3a as the basis for the trial court’s interest award while deciding whether the judgment lien was valid. opinion →
Kuehl v. Koskoff, the court mentions § 37-3a as the basis for a prejudgment interest claim on cross appeal, which it does not address. opinion →
City of Hartford v. CBV Parking Hartford, LLC, the court mentions § 37-3a while recounting the parties' positions and decides the condemnation interest dispute under § 37-3c. opinion →
Dish Network, LLC v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., the court cites § 37-3a through an earlier case as an analogy while deciding interest on tax refunds under § 12-268l. opinion →
Spears v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston, the court considered the section’s 10% rate when setting prejudgment interest in an ERISA case, but chose the prime rate. opinion →
Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., the court cites § 37-3a to distinguish discretionary prejudgment interest in an earlier case from the mandatory interest at issue in this appeal. opinion →
Northeast Builders Supply & Home Centers, LLC v. RMM Consulting, LLC, the opinion mentions the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest under the section and states that the defendants did not appeal it. opinion →
Kelly Services, Inc. v. Senior Network, Inc., the court notes that the § 37-3a interest award was unchallenged and decides whether § 52-192a permits postjudgment offer of compromise interest. opinion →
Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, the opinion mentions § 37-3a (a) only while recounting the trial court’s postjudgment interest ruling. opinion →
Freidburg v. Kurtz, the opinion mentions § 37-3a (a) only when reporting the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest. opinion →
Tahirou v. New Horizon Enterprises LLC, the court cites § 37-3a while describing another case’s interest award, then calculates its own award under §§ 31-72 and 31-265. opinion →
Sitar v. Syferlock Technology Corp., the court declined to review the claim for prejudgment interest under § 37-3a because the plaintiffs did not provide an adequate appellate record. opinion →
Frybarger v. Salemme, the court lists § 37-3a among the proposed claims but evaluates the breach of contract claim without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
Northeast Building Supply, LLC v. Morrill, the court mentions § 37-3a only when recounting a prior award of postjudgment interest while deciding whether a vexatious litigation claim can be assigned. opinion →
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when recounting the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest. opinion →
Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC v. Paige, III, the court mentioned § 37-3a as a possible source of postjudgment interest but declined to decide whether it applied and used the requested federal rate. opinion →
MARN, Inc. v. Aurora Machine, LLC, the court mentions the section as the basis for MARN’s requested prejudgment interest while deciding whether the contract claim was adequately pleaded. opinion →
Schneider v. Federman, the opinion mentions § 37-3a only when recounting the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest; the appeal concerns the denial of a motion to open the judgment. opinion →
Khan v. Khan, the opinion recounts the trial court’s prejudgment interest award under § 37-3a while addressing Khan’s challenge to damages. opinion →
United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Koskerides, the opinion cites § 37-3a while recounting the defendants’ request for clarification of interest rates, without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Coan v. Dunne, the opinion reports that the trustee abandoned the § 37-3a interest claim after accepting the defendants’ position, without deciding that issue. opinion →
Calabro v. Estate of Calabro, No. Cv 87-0024243-S (Jan. 27, 1992), the court lists § 37-3a as the authority for a sum of interest without discussing its requirements. opinion →
LaSalla v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., the court cites § 37-3a while reviewing an arbitration award for manifest disregard, without deciding the statute’s requirements. opinion →
Dupont v. Tobin, Carberry, O'malley, Riley, Selinger, PC, the court quotes § 37-3a while reviewing an arbitrator’s interest award under the deferential manifest-disregard standard. opinion →

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