Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584

The former one-year period bars a renewed personal-injury action when Connecticut's accidental-failure-of-suit statute does not apply because the prior action was decided on the merits.

Masterson v. Atherton · filed 1963-07-25

Since § 52-592 does not apply to Civil Action No. 9313 and since the parties to and the cause of action alleged therein are the same as in the state court action which has been determined on its merits ... the judgment entered pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Errors in the Superior Court for Fairfield County on March 16, 1962 is res adjudicata as to Civil Action No. 9313; ... For the same reasons, the cause of action in Civil Action No. 9313 is barred by the one year statute of limitations (Conn.Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (1958)).

A Connecticut negligence action is commenced for section 52-584 limitations purposes upon actual service, although an action dismissed for untimely service may qualify for the separate accidental-failure savings statute.

Chappetta v. Soto · filed 2008-09-29

In Connecticut, personal injury suits alleging negligence must be brought within two years from the date the injury is first sustained or discovered. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584. Furthermore, Connecticut follows the actual service rule, meaning a lawsuit is only “commenced” upon actual service on the defendant. ... Therefore, because Chap-petta actually served Soto on or after September 22, 2005, more than two years after the accident occurred, I concluded Chap-petta’s claims against Soto were untimely and granted summary judgment.

A personal-injury action filed more than two years after injury is barred when the accidental-failure saving statute does not cover the prior out-of-state federal action.

Jarvis v. Levitsky · filed 1996-01-24

The defendants contend that this action is barred by Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584, which requires that a personal injury suit be brought within two years of the date the injury is sustained or discovered. ... However, like the Appellate Court in Lippmann, I believe that the language of the statute, as amended, does not permit a construction that extends the statute’s coverage to actions commenced in other states. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim against a defendant first added more than two years after injury when the wrong-defendant saving statute does not apply because the original action remains pending and the plaintiff sued the party intended.

Woolf v. City of New Haven, No. Cv98-0409917 (Aug. 23, 2000) · filed 2000-08-23

Barrie has now moved for summary judgment in its favor on the basis that it was sued four years and two months after the event in question and therefore this claim is barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 which would require this negligence action to have been instituted within two years of the plaintiffs injury. ... This is not a case where the plaintiff named the wrong defendant. He sued the party he intended to sue. ... Therefore, for the above stated reasons the motion for summary judgment of the defendant Barrie Ltd. of New Haven is granted.

As a procedural Connecticut limitation, the former one-year period applies in a Connecticut diversity action to a common-law negligence claim that accrued outside Connecticut unless the foreign limitation is an element of the foreign-created right.

Mizell v. Welch · filed 1965-07-07

The one-year Connecticut statute of limitations (Conn.Gen. Stat. § 52-584) applies to plaintiff’s action because ... Section 52-584, deemed procedural in nature ... would be applied by a Connecticut state court, and, therefore, by a federal court sitting in Connecticut, when the cause of action accrued outside of Connecticut ... unless— as is not the case here — the foreign statute of limitations “is so interwoven with the statute creating the cause of action as to become one of the congeries of elements necessary to establish the right”.

Under the former one-year period, an action transferred into Connecticut is timely only if it was commenced within that period in a court having jurisdiction; filing within another jurisdiction's longer period does not suffice.

Bealle v. Nyden's, Incorporated · filed 1965-07-30

The phrase, “no action * * * shall be brought,” as used in Section 52-584, is construed by this Court to mean that no action shall be prosecuted in this Court — -whether initially commenced here or maintained here upon transfer from another jurisdiction — unless, within the period prescribed by Section 52-584, the action has been commenced pursuant to Rule 3, Fed.R.Civ.P., in a court having jurisdiction. ... Plaintiffs’ action in this Court, therefore, is barred by Section 52-584, unless defendant, as plaintiffs urge, is equitably estopped from asserting that bar.

Section 52-584's two-year period applies under Connecticut choice-of-law rules when a tort injury occurred in Connecticut and the claim was filed within two years after discovery.

Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. · filed 2007-09-28

The applicable Connecticut statute imposes a two-year limitation period. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584. Neither party disputes that IAGC discovered the PCB contamination in October 2004 and that the complaint was filed in August 2006. Therefore, IAGC’s claim against Metro-North is timely, and its motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Connecticut treats section 52-584 as procedural and applies its two-year negligence period in a diversity action when the common-law claim is substantively governed by another state's law.

Norton v. Michonski · filed 2005-04-19

The present case is governed by Connecticut’s two year statute of limitations, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (2005). ... Plaintiffs negligence claim existed at common law. As such, the facts present no reason to depart from Connecticut’s general practice of treating statutes of limitations as procedural. Accordingly, Connecticut’s two year statute of limitations applies to the present case. ... Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact, and it cannot be said that Defendants áre entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 52-584’s two-year limit applies to a negligence action filed in Connecticut even when the accident occurred in another state, because the forum’s limitations law governs.

Somohano v. Somohano · filed 1992-11-03

The two year Connecticut statute of limitations1 expired before this negligence action was commenced but prior to the expiration of the four year Florida statute of limitations.2 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Connecticut statute of limitations applied. The trial court was correct. The established law of this state is that the statute of limitations is procedural and, therefore, the law of the forum applies.

Section 52-584 does not apply when the plaintiff alleges no injury to person or property.

Dolven v. Fitzgerald, No. Cv 97 032 90 26 S (Aug. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-08-03

The defendant argues that the relevant statute of limitations is Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584, which is a two year statute to recover damages for injury to the person or to real or personal property caused by negligence. This argument is incorrect because the plaintiff does not allege injury to person or property.

The former one-year period governs negligence and reckless-or-wanton personal-injury claims but not intentionally inflicted injuries, which receive the general tort period.

Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corporation · filed 1966-06-20

Under Connecticut law a cause of action founded on a wilful or intentional tort is governed by the three year statute of limitations (Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577 (1958)), rather than the one year statute of limitations (Conn.Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (1958)) which governs an action founded on negligence or reckless or wanton misconduct. ... Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence, having been brought in this Court more than one year after the injury was sustained, is barred by the Connecticut one year statute of limitations (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (1958)).

Section 52-584's two-year period applies to claims for injury caused by reckless or wanton misconduct and bars such a claim filed more than two years after the last complained-of act.

Bello v. Barden Corp. · filed 2002-01-07

Thus, at most, the plaintiffs had two years from the occurrence of the last act or omission complained of in which to file their action based on the claim in Count Two. As discussed above in connection with § 52-577, they failed to do so, and this claim is also barred under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584.

Section 52-584's two-year period applies to negligence claims, including negligent misrepresentation.

OBG Technical Services, Inc. v. Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corp. Ex Rel. TRW, Inc. · filed 2007-08-30

However, for claims alleging negligence, including negligent misrepresentation, the applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 52-584's two-year period governs negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims and property-damage claims caused by negligence.

Spencer v. Connecticut · filed 2008-06-18

Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are subject to a two-year limitations period. ... If the Plaintiff is alleging that the damage to his property was caused by negligence, the limitations period is two years from when the injury is first sustained or discovered. ... In either case, his claims are time-barred.

Section 52-584's two-year period bars a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim brought more than two years after the complained-of governmental decision.

Jaeger v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2013-04-05

The Council issued its ruling on- March 12, 2009. Thus, any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress had to be brought prior to March 12, 2011. Because the plaintiff filed this action on December 18, 2011, count eight is barred as untimely under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584.

Negligence, negligent-infliction, and reckless-conduct claims fall under section 52-584's two-year period.

Schachter v. Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc · filed 2020-03-16

Under Connecticut law, the limitations periods for plaintiffs’ claims are: two years for personal-injury negligence and reckless conduct claims, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 ... all the remaining claims against Robbins and Welltower for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and reckless conduct fall outside Connecticut’s two-year statute of limitations for such claims. ... Accordingly, I will grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against Robbins and Welltower for negligence (Count One), for negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Three), and for reckless conduct (Count Eight).

Connecticut negligence claims are subject to section 52-584's two-year limitations period.

Whitehead v. Traveler's Insurance Company Inc · filed 2021-07-23

Connecticut law applies a two-year statute of limitation to negligence claims under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584. Mr. Whitehead, however, brought his claims well after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations period. ... Mr. Whitehead has failed to meet the statute of limitations for any of the claims made in the second amended complaint.

Section 52-584 ordinarily begins to run on an indemnity claim when judgment establishes the third-party plaintiff’s liability, rather than when the underlying injury occurs.

Ryder v. Hertz Corporation · filed 1970-08-28

Ordinarily, a statute of limitations does not commence to run against a defendant (third-party plaintiff) and in favor of the third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against the defendant.

Section 52-584 does not apply to an intentional battery action.

Alteiri v. Colasso · filed 1975-04-15

Consequently, the Statute of Limitations relied upon by the defendant, then General Statutes § 52-584,... by its terms does not apply to this action; rather General Statutes § 52-577, which requires actions founded upon a tort to be brought within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, would govern.

Section 52-584 governs the limitations period for negligence actions, not actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances.

Einbinder & Young, P.C. v. Soiltesting, Inc. · filed 1980-04-02

Although the defendants assert the applicability of a three year period for actions grounded in tort, they incorrectly cite General Statutes § 52-584, which governs the limitations period for negligence actions.

Section 52-584’s two-year limitation applies to a property-damage complaint that sounds in negligence, even when the parties had a contract.

Morrison v. Zenobia · filed 1983-10-06

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint sounded in tort and was, therefore, barred by the two year statute of limitations under General Statutes § 52-584. The plaintiffs claim that their one count complaint can be construed as alleging an action in contract for which the applicable statute of limitations is six years under General Statutes § 52-576. After a review of the plaintiffs’ complaint, this court finds that the substance of the complaint clearly sounds in tort.

Section 52-584’s two-year limitation does not govern fraudulent misrepresentation claims, which fall under the three-year period in § 52-577.

Wedig v. Brinster · filed 1983-10-14

The complaint and proof clearly sounded in the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation which is governed by the three year statute of limitations period for general torts.

Section 52-584’s limitation period applies to a patient’s claim against a physician for lack of informed consent because the claim is malpractice.

Lambert v. Stovell · filed 1987-08-18

Consequently, where a patient seeks recovery against a physician based upon a lack of informed consent, he is bringing a “malpractice” action as contemplated by § 52-584.

Section 52-584’s limitations period does not bar a claim for intentional assault.

Griffin v. Parker · filed 1990-07-12

We conclude that the court was not prevented from granting summary judgment for the plaintiff because of the period of limitations of General Statutes § 52-584. This is so because the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint included a cause of action for intentional assault, based on the prior criminal conviction under § 53a-59 (a) (1).

Section 52-584’s limitation period for negligence actions does not bar an indemnification claim arising from an independent contractual relationship.

McElvery v. Research Park Prop., No. Cv88-0091552 (Mar. 23, 1992) · filed 1992-03-23

Accordingly the cause of action asserted by the defendants are claimed to arise from a contractual relationship between the parties and would not be barred by the statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions.

Section 52-584 does not bar a common-law indemnification claim when Public Act 93-370 applies retroactively.

Shuhl v. New Haven Food Terminal, Inc., No. Cv 910309459s (Apr. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-04-26

Pursuant to the aforementioned legal presumption, Public Act 93-370 should be applied retroactively to the present case, in that the statute of limitations created by Public Act 93-370 is procedural. Thus, the statutes of limitations contained in General Statutes §§ 52-577 and 52-584 do not bar the defendant/third-party plaintiff's claim for indemnification, and CT Page 4512 the third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the first count must be denied.

Section 52-584 gives an insurer bringing a subrogated personal injury negligence claim two years from the collision to commence suit.

Sentry Insurance Co. v. Buy-Rite Fuel Oil, No. Cv94-0359815 (Sep. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-09-26

The plaintiff argues unpersuasively that the applicable period of limitation is not § 52-584 because of its written contract of insurance with the party whose right it is asserting via subrogation. ... The insurer can take no more by subrogation than the insured possesses: in this case, the right to bring an action within two years of the collision to recover for personal injuries and property damage.

Section 52-584's time limit applies to actions seeking damages; without a demand for relief, the court could not determine whether it applied to the negligence count.

Hazard v. City of Torrington, No. Cv920059425 (Dec. 2, 1994) · filed 1994-12-02

Since the plaintiff in this action has not filed a demand for relief, the court cannot assume that the relief sought is for monetary damages. Moreover, the plaintiff only filed the amended complaint pursuant to a court order, which was the result of a motion to add the defendant as a party on the grounds of assessing the parties proportionate share of liability. These factors prevent the court from determining that Sec. 52-584's time limitation applies to the second count of the plaintiff's complaint.

Section 52-584 requires property damage claims caused by negligence or reckless misconduct to be brought within two years of discovering the injury.

Lodrini v. Brito Enterprises, No. 100226 (May 22, 1995) · filed 1995-05-22

Therefore, the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the tolling of the statute of limitations as set forth in Section 52-584.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year limitation period for negligence claims, running from discovery of the injury.

Lumber Mutual Insurance Co. v. Holmes, No. Cv 94 55508 S (Nov. 28, 1995) · filed 1995-11-28

The applicable statute of limitations in the present case is two years, pursuant to General Statutes section 52-584. Thus, no CT Page 13083 action against Captain Papp or the Town of South Windsor could have been brought after two years from the date the plaintiff discovered the injury. ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations precludes an action for damages against Captain Papp and the Town of South Windsor.

Section 52-584 limits negligence claims to two years after the injury is discovered or should have been discovered and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Grigerik v. Sharpe · filed 1997-07-22

As the defendants requested, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the negligence count of the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, and directed a verdict for the defendants on that count. Accordingly, we order that judgment on the negligence count of the amended complaint be rendered for the defendants.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions for personal injury to be brought within two years of discovery and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Mitchell v. Otis Elevator Company · filed 1998-06-05

More than three years have passed since Otis' alleged or omission of negligent repair to the elevator, which could have occurred subsequent to May 8, 1963. (Motion For Summmary Judgment, Exhibit A). Therefore, the plaintiff's negligence claim in count one against Otis is barred by the statute of limitations in § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim brought more than two years after the injury is discovered or should have been discovered.

Bruder v. N. Haven Mem. vet/coliseum Auth., No. Cv94-0367859 (Jun. 24, 1998) · filed 1998-06-24

The defendants also move for summary judgment on the negligent design and installation portion of count three as the claim is time barred by the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584. At oral argument, this court granted partial summary judgment on count three as to the plaintiff's claim for negligent design and installation.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be filed within two years after the injury is discovered or should have been discovered and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Decorso v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society · filed 2000-03-21

General Statutes § 52-584 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the ... person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . ." ... The claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is time barred by the two year statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 applies to mental suffering even when there is no physical trauma.

Rivera v. Double A Transportation, Inc. · filed 1999-03-16

Accordingly, we conclude that mental suffering, even if unaccompanied by physical trauma to the body, constitutes an injury to the person under § 52-584.

Section 52-584 requires negligence claims for injury to personal property to be brought within two years of when the injury is sustained or discovered, and never more than three years after the act or omission.

Barron v. Benton Auto Body, Inc., No. Cv97-0573293-S (Dec. 21, 2000) · filed 2000-12-21

The plaintiff's negligence claims are subject to the limitation of CT Page 15682 actions set forth through General Statutes § 52-584. ... General Statutes § 52-584 thus establishes the limitation period for actions in which both the losses caused by negligence, and the-identity of the tortfeasor, are immediately recognizable. ... Therefore, the three year provisions of General Statutes § 52-584 would apply to this case, requiring that the action be brought to court no "more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." Id. ... the negligence claims are found to have been timely brought within the application of § 52-584. Accordingly, the defendants cannot prevail on this special defense.

Section 52-584 limits the time to sue for tort claims based on negligent or other non-intentional conduct.

Agnes v. Grem, No. Cv 99 0587276s (Jun. 26, 2001) · filed 2001-06-26

Grem has provided this court with insufficient basis for determining that §52-584, which applies only to torts based on non-intentional conduct, should constitute the statute of limitations for Agnes's second count in which intentional assault and battery is expressly alleged.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions for injury to person or property to be brought within two years of discovery and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Johnson v. Town of North Branford · filed 2001-07-31

Here, the negligent act complained of occurred in either 1969 or 1970, when the town filled the swale on the neighbor’s property with riprap. The evidence further shows that the plaintiffs were aware of actionable harm in 1990, when they experienced severe flooding for the first time after they purchased the property.12 The plaintiffs did not commence this action, however, until July, 1994, which is beyond the time period permitted by § 52-584. We conclude, therefore, that the court properly determined that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs’ common-law claims.

Section 52-584 requires negligence personal injury actions within two years of injury discovery and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Lind-Larsen v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, No. (X02) Cv 97-0159662 S (Jun. 26, 2002) · filed 2002-06-26

As a claim to recover damages for personal injury allegedly caused by negligence, the claim presented in Count Four is governed by General Statutes § 52-584, which provides in part as follows: No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or . . . should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. Under Section 52-584, the plaintiff had at most three years from the date of the defendant's final act or omission to file her negligence claim against it.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of injury discovery and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Smith v. Fredericksen, No. Cv 96 0383172 (Dec. 17, 2002) · filed 2002-12-17

General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence, or CT Page 16290 by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. . . ." The statute of limitations on the plaintiffs' negligence claim has passed.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of discovery and no more than three years after the negligent act.

Hanover Insurance v. Valley Elec., No. X02 Cv 99-0174400-S (Dec. 24, 2002) · filed 2002-12-24

The applicable statute of limitations allows for suit within two years of plaintiffs discovery of the negligence but in no event no more than three years after the negligence. General Statutes § 52-584. The plaintiff filed this suit in approximately September 2000, which is more than three years from Custom Air's alleged negligence in discovering the defect in the heating unit and omitting to notify the landlord. Thus, at first glance, the statute of limitations bars this suit.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year limit from when property injury is sustained or discovered, with a three-year outer limit from the negligent act or omission.

Rickel v. Komaromi · filed 2013-08-13

This continuing underground and above ground activity on the plaintiffs property created a genuine issue of material fact about whether §§ 52-577 and 52-584 were a bar to all of her claims encompassed in her trespass and nuisance counts.

Adding a malpractice defendant after the former one-year period expired begins an untimely new action against that defendant and does not relate back to the timely original complaint under Connecticut law.

Nave v. Ryan · filed 1967-03-28

The relevant limitations period under Connecticut law is one year. ... Amending the complaint to bring in an additional party defendant after the year has run is also an attempt to institute an untimely action, and is similarly barred by the statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, the amendment naming Dr. Mastrangelo as an additional party defendant having been filed after the one year period had run, the action as against that defendant is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 gives two years from injury for an automobile-negligence action, and adding the driver after expiration is untimely unless the amendment relates back.

Cabrera v. Lawlor · filed 2008-08-29

Both parties agree that Connecticut’s statute of limitations for such claims is two years. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (personal injury actions must be brought within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained). Therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Mr. Henry expired in early May 2007, about six months after the original Complaint was filed but approximately a full year before Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and add Mr. Henry as a defendant, in April 2008.

A negligence action must be filed within two years, and an original defendant's cross-claim does not toll the period for a later direct claim against a new defendant.

Scharrer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1992-06-02

The statute of limitations for this negligence claim is two years. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (1991). ... In addition, the filing of a cross claim by a defendant in the original action does not toll the statute of limitations on a plaintiff’s claim against a third-party defendant.

Section 52-584’s limitation period is not tolled when an original defendant impleads a third party; a plaintiff’s direct claim against that party is time-barred if filed after the period expires.

Vincent v. Litchfield Farms, Inc. · filed 1990-05-15

The issue of this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in granting the third party defendants’ motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the basis that the period of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584 had run as to any action by the plaintiff against them. ... The plaintiffs complaint was amended after the statute of limitations had run as to the third party defendants. The claim was, therefore, time-barred, and the trial court was correct in granting the third party defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim against a defendant added after the limitations period expires, with no exception for adding that defendant to apportion damages.

Belanger v. Maynard, No. Cv91-445978 (Jun. 25, 1992) · filed 1992-06-25

This court believes that Sec. 52-584 requires a finding that the action against Jamie Jacobs is barred. While sympathetic to the defendants' argument, the legislature has not seen fit to grant any exclusions or exemptions to this situation.

Section 52-584 bars a plaintiff's injury claims against defendants previously joined as third-party defendants when the plaintiff first attempts to add them to her own action after the limitations period expires.

Bosco v. J. Neale MacDonald Company, Inc., No. 094078 (Apr. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-04-12

The plaintiff does not dispute Interdome and Pinheiro's contention that § 52-584 applies in this case, nor the purported date of the alleged injuries. ... Assuming her amendment was effective to do so, the plaintiffs' amendment attempted to bring in Interdome and Pinheiro into the first-party action on July 26, 1993, over four and one-half years after the alleged injuries occurred. Interdome and Pinheiro's motion for summary judgment is granted as the applicable statute of limitations has run.

A negligent failure to warn may constitute a continuing course of conduct whose three-year repose period does not begin until the course ends, while noncontinuing design, manufacture, sale, and testing acts remain barred three years after they occurred.

Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. · filed 1981-10-09

The operative language for purposes of the present motion is “the act or omission complained of.” ... When the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed. ... Thus, in the present case the statute of limitations did not begin to run on plaintiff’s negligent failure-to-warn cause of action until January 10, 1973, the date plaintiff sustained his injury. ... Although proof of the failure-to-warn claim might entail proof of these specifications, the relevant “acts or omissions complained of” occurred prior to January 7, 1972 (three years before this action was brought) and are not of a continuing nature. Therefore, these particular claims are time-barred and may not serve as the basis for any recovery by plaintiff.

Section 52-584's three-year repose limit bars negligent acts or omissions before the cutoff, and a continuing-course theory does not extend the period absent a continuing duty or later related wrongful conduct.

Standish v. Stapleton, No. 394608 (Nov. 8, 2000) · filed 2000-11-08

It is common ground that, whatever the precise statute of limitations cited, the applicable limitations period is three years. ... Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 ("[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. . . ."). ... In the absence of such a duty, there is no continuing course of conduct of which Gail may legally complain in order to avoid the running of the statute of limitations. The motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 52-584 applies to a negligence counterclaim like an independent action, and continued billing under an already executed erroneous note is not a continuing course of conduct that tolls the three-year limit.

The Savings Bank of Rockville v. Wielgos, No. Cv 97-0065409 (Dec. 19, 2001) · filed 2001-12-19

The statute of limitations applies to a counter-claim as it does to an independent action. ... Thus the three year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 applies to Wielgos' counterclaim. ... Yet the Bank's mistake was complete when the note, with the erroneous payment amounts, was signed. ... Therefore the Third Count of her counterclaim is barred by the statute of limitations.

A sufficiently pleaded continuing course of negligent conduct tolls section 52-584 even when the alleged negligence began before the limitations period.

Moreland v. Beso Lounge & Restaurant, LLC · filed 2020-09-04

The Connecticut Supreme Court “has recognized the continuing course of conduct doctrine in many cases involving claims sounding in negligence,” ... Plaintiffs adequately plead that Defendants’ alleged negligence, even if it began well before the applicable statute of limitations ran, continued “well after the original wrong,” and is therefore, “sufficient to allege the application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine.” ... Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Hazell, Acosta, and Valencia’s Count Six Negligence and Respondeat Superior Claims on statute of limitations grounds is DENIED.

Section 52-584 has a two-year discovery period running from actionable harm and a three-year repose period running from the defendant's conduct; the continuing-course doctrine can toll only repose and cannot toll the discovery period after harm is known.

Pourkavoos v. Avon · filed 2023-03-10

The Connecticut Supreme Court has made clear that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 contains two separate provisions limiting the time in which a negligence claim can be brought. ... The Court concludes that the continuing course of conduct doctrine does not operate to toll the two-year statute of limitations. ... Here, Dr. Pourkavoos knew of his injury, and thus each essential element of the negligence cause of action, no later than January 22, 2014. Therefore, any claim for negligence was required to be filed no later than January 22, 2016. ... Dr. Pourkavoos’ claim for negligence is time-barred and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Two.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit may be tolled by a continuing course of conduct, but an action filed more than three years after the tolling ends is barred.

Connell v. Colwell · filed 1990-03-20

We conclude, therefore, that the statute of limitations, if tolled at all due to a continuing course of conduct on the part of the defendant, remained tolled only until the decedent was diagnosed in December, 1982, as having cancer of the prostate. Since suit was brought more than three years from that date, it was barred under § 52-584.

A physician’s continuing duty to disclose a diagnosis can keep a malpractice claim timely under § 52-584 until the patient learns of the condition.

Vernali v. Daukis, No. 58428 (Jun. 25, 1992) · filed 1992-06-25

In the present case, it is decided that Nicholas Daukis's duty to disclose his diagnosis that John Vernali was at a high risk of suffering an attack of glaucoma continued until John Vernali was informed that he had glaucoma on March 16, 1989. Because the action was commenced on June 13, 1990, it is found that the action was brought within the time allowed by General Statutes 52-584.

Section 52-584’s three-year repose period is not tolled merely because a physician failed to correct a misdiagnosis, absent proof that the physician later learned it was wrong.

Blanchette v. Barrett · filed 1994-03-23

More fundamentally, we disagree with the premise that a physician who has performed a misdiagnosis has a continuing duty to correct that diagnosis in the absence of proof that he subsequently learned that his diagnosis was incorrect.

Section 52-584 may be tolled by a continuous course of conduct when an ongoing physician-patient relationship, negligence, and conduct continuing beyond the initial treatment are shown.

Starkweather v. Helen · filed 1994-05-17

The continuous course of conduct doctrine requires that three requirements be met: (1) an ongoing physician-patient relationship; (2) negligence by the defendant; and (3) some form of conduct that continued beyond the initial treatment. ... Therefore, there exists an issue of material fact as to whether the relationship between the plaintiff and Patel was a physician-patient relationship and whether such relationship was ongoing. Thus, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit is not tolled by a later radiologist’s use of earlier mammograms when the original radiologist provided no continuing treatment.

Copeland v. Radiology Associates, Inc., No. 63525 (Jan. 21, 1993) · filed 1993-01-21

Kiwak's statement that she utilized the 1985 mammogram in her 1988 examination and an affidavit from a radiologist on the comparison use of such mammograms does not indicate that Radiology Associates continued to provide treatment to Ruth Copeland beyond 1985. To allow the tolling of the statute of limitations to the date of subsequent examinations performed by a radiologist utilizing x-rays or reports would render the statute of limitations meaningless.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year limitations period that may be tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine until the physician's treatment ends.

Cipriano v. Brown, No. Cv-92-0508205 S (Oct. 5, 1995) · filed 1995-10-05

Our Supreme Court has held that the statutory period does not commence to run, under the continuous treatment doctrine, until the doctor's treatment has been terminated. Blanchette v. Barrett,229 Conn. 256, 274, 640 A.2d 74 (1994). To toll the statute of limitations under the continuous treatment doctrine, the jury must find: (1) an ongoing physician-patient relationship that had not terminated on November 9, 1989, the last time the plaintiff had an appointment with the defendant; (2) the negligence by the defendant in 1989; and (3) some form of treatment or required conduct that continued beyond November 9, 1989. Id., 278.

Section 52-584 sets the time limit for negligence claims and may be affected by a continuing course of conduct.

Rivera v. Connecticut Light Power Co., No. 341570 (Nov. 14, 1997) · filed 1997-11-14

With respect to the third special defense, the court cannot determine as a matter of law from the complaint and the special defense that the plaintiff's claim is not time-barred by General Statutes § 52-584, specifically that there was a continuing course of conduct as the plaintiff claims.

Section 52-584's limitation period may be tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine when the physician-patient relationship has not terminated.

Roach v. Newington Children's Hospital, No. Cv 95-0469052 (Jul. 14, 1998) · filed 1998-07-14

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the statute of limitations may be tolled under the doctrine of "continuous treatment. The parties have presented to the court conflicting evidence as to when the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Russman and the plaintiff terminated. ... Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 52-584's repose period may be tolled by a continuing course of conduct involving breach of a continuing duty related to an initial wrong.

Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital · filed 2000-02-29

Therefore, we conclude that, because the plaintiff presented “evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Blanchette v. Barrett, supra, 229 Conn. 275; there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the repose section of the statute of limitations in § 52-584 was tolled by the defendant’s continuing course of conduct.

The three year repose period in § 52-584 may be tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine when a defendant has an ongoing duty to warn.

Witt v. St. Vincent's Medical Center · filed 2000-03-14

We conclude that there existed a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the repose section of the statute of limitations contained in § 52-584 was tolled by the defendant’s ongoing failure to warn the plaintiff of his concern of cancer, triggering the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Section 52-584's limitations period may be tolled by a continuous course of conduct, and whether that doctrine applied here presented a genuine issue of material fact.

Mercury v. Usi, Inc., No. Cv 97 0402651s (Aug. 5, 2002) · filed 2002-08-05

Because (1) a landowner has a duty to avoid improving his land "in such a way as to increase the total volume of surface water which flows from it to adjacent property"; Tide Water Oil Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, supra, 114 Conn. 189-90; and (2) the parties have submitted conflicting affidavit testimony with respect to (a) whether, and to what extent, additional work was performed on the defendant's property in 1995; and ... (b) whether, or to what degree, such work affected the plaintiff's property, genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the defendant engaged in a continuous course of conduct which tolled the statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584. Therefore, summary judgment as to the first count of the plaintiff's complaint must be denied.

Section 52-584 sets two-year and three-year limitation periods for medical malpractice actions, subject to tolling under the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Zielinsky v. Kotsoris, No. Cv 01 0185802 (Mar. 24, 2003) · filed 2003-03-24

A jury could reasonably find that this duty to disclose or correct the initial incomplete diagnosis lasted until the plaintiff was properly diagnosed and treated in December of 1999. Based on the foregoing, the court denies all motions for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584's limitations period may be tolled when the defendant continuously breaches a continuing duty related to the original wrong.

Assurance Co. of America v. Yakemore · filed 2005-05-09

Section 52-584, applicable to both the negligence and recklessness claims, provides in pertinent part that an action must be brought “within two years from the date when the injuiy is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . .” ... The plaintiffs object, claiming that the named defendant engaged in a continuous course of conduct and that, therefore, the statute was tolled under Johnson v. North Branford, 64 Conn. App. 643, 781 A.2d 346, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001). ... Our Supreme Court, in Witt v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363, 370, 746 A.2d 753 (2000), enunciated a three-pronged test to determine whether there is a continuous course of conduct that will toll the time limitations of § 52-584 by stating that the defendant must have “(1) committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a continuing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the alleged original wrong; and (3) continually breached that duty.” ... Given that the court must assume the truth of the factual allegations and construe them broadly for the purpose of deciding this motion, the motion to strike these counts is denied.

Section 52-584's limitations period cannot be tolled by a continuing course of conduct when the later conduct is absolutely privileged.

Brady v. Bickford · filed 2018-02-27

Because Bonnie Bickford’s testimony was privileged, the plaintiffs cannot establish a continuing course of conduct that bars the application of the statute of limitations to their claims.

Section 52-584 sets a limitation period that begins when the plaintiff discovers actionable harm and does not apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine after discovery.

Tunick v. Tunick · filed 2020-12-01

Although the continuing course of conduct doctrine has been applied in medical malpractice cases; see, e.g., Witt v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363, 746 A.2d 753 (2000); we note that such actions are governed by the limitation period contained in General Statutes § 52-584, which ‘‘begins to run when the plaintiff discovers some form of actionable harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 405, 844 A.2d 893 (2004). For that reason, ‘‘the continuing course of conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff has discovered the harm’’ in actions subject to § 52-584.

Section 52-584 permits tolling of its limitation period and repose period in proper circumstances, but bars a negligent hiring claim filed more than three years after the hiring when no tolling doctrine applies.

Bucci v. Bridgeport · filed 2024-08-27

Our Supreme Court has recognized . . . that the statute of limitations and period of repose contained ... in . . . § 52-584 may be tolled, in the proper circumstances, under . . . the continu[ing] course of conduct doctrine . . . thereby allowing a plaintiff to bring an action more than three years after the commission of the negligent act . . . . ... Accordingly, we conclude that court properly determined that the plaintiff’s claim for the defendant’s negligent hiring of Carrano was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584's two-year negligence period does not govern a consolidated product-liability claim controlled by the specific product-liability limitation, although it bars any separately treated negligence theory filed more than two years after injury.

Collucci v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1984-05-10

Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584 bars actions in negligence unless brought within two years of the injury or its discovery and not more than three years from the act or omission complained of. ... To the extent it might be deemed to assert a claim in negligence, it would be barred by § 52-584, as not brought within two years of the injury. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied except as it is granted to bar a claim in breach of warranty and a claim in negligence, both of which are barred, except conceivably a claim in continuing negligence for failure to warn.

Section 52-584 does not govern a consolidated Connecticut product-liability claim when the specific product-liability limitation in section 52-577a applies.

Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1987-09-21

In the absence of the longer period prescribed for product liability actions, the limitations of § 52-584 (for personal injury negligence actions) and § 52-577 (for general tort actions) would bar plaintiff’s claim. ... Accordingly, the Connecticut statute of limitations provision for product liability actions, § 52-577a, was applied despite the fact that another state’s law governed the substantive issues. ... Accepting the reasoning of Mikulis and Bowman and, in the absence of any clear indication that a Connecticut court would rule otherwise, the Connecticut product liability limitations, § 52-577a will be applied in this diversity action.

Section 52-584 does not govern product liability claims filed after October 1, 1979, even if they accrued earlier.

Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. · filed 1989-08-08

Additionally, the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to advise the jury that the action had to be commenced within three years of the act or omission complained of under General Statutes § 52-584 is without merit because we have determined that that section is inapplicable.

The two-year discovery period begins when the plaintiff discovers actionable harm—both physical harm and its causal connection to the defendant's alleged negligence—while the separate three-year repose period runs from the defendant's act or omission and can expire before discovery.

Hamilton v. Smith · filed 1985-09-20

By equating “injury” with “actionable harm” the Supreme Court of Connecticut has indicated that the two-year limitation of § 52-584 starts to run when the plaintiff discovers both that he has suffered physical harm and the causal connection between that harm and the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant. ... The second part of the Connecticut statute provides that no action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. This three-year time limit causes the statutory clock to begin running when the negligent conduct of the defendant occurs. ... In short, three years constitutes the cutoff beyond which all actions under § 52-584 are permanently stilled.

Section 52-584's two-year discovery period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover both physical injury and its causal connection to the defendant's negligence, not necessarily when an accident occurs.

Slekis v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1999-06-14

The term ‘injury’ as used in § 52-584 does not mean mere physical injury but requires actionable harm, that is ‘[a] breach of duty by the defendant and a causal connection between the defendant’s breach of duty and the resulting harm to the plaintiff....’ ... Thus, actionable harm that could constitute an “injury” under this section occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, in the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she suffered some physical injury and that the defendant’s negligent conduct caused the injury. ... Therefore, finding genuine issues of material fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run, we must DENY defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 9].

Section 52-584's two-year discovery period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover actionable harm, including an unknown tortfeasor's identity, but the claim remains subject to the three-year repose limit plus any statutory extension.

Vincent v. ESSENT HEALTHCARE OF CT · filed 2007-01-18

Tamowsky holds that identity of the tortfeasor is a necessary element of a personal injury suit and that “the two year statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584 does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, the identity of the tortfeasor,” but “that a plaintiffs ignorance of the identity of a tortfeasor will not excuse the plaintiffs [sic] failure to bring a negligence action within three years of the date of the action or omission complained of.” ... Therefore, whether the legal injury (“actionable harm”) is discovered before or after the two-year point from when the actual injury was sustained is irrelevant, since it is the point of discovery that begins the running of the statute of limitation, up to three years from when the actual injury was sustained.

Section 52-584’s limitations period is not postponed when an injury was reasonably ascertainable on the day of the accident, even if additional symptoms appeared later.

Coffin v. Faggella · filed 1967-12-01

From the papers and affidavits in the file, it is apparent to us that the plaintiffs’ injuries were capable of ascertainment on the day of the accident. ... Moreover, in our view of the ease, the plaintiffs have not met the burden of demonstrating an exception to the usual running of the statute.

Section 52-584 requires a malpractice action within two years of discovering actionable harm, even if the harm has not fully developed.

Burns v. Hartford Hospital · filed 1984-03-13

The statute requires that the injured party bring suit within two years of discovering the injury. General Statutes § 52-584. In this context an injury occurs when a party suffers some form of actionable harm. The harm need not have reached its fullest manifestation before the statute begins to run.

Section 52-584’s two-year period can begin when a patient reasonably discovers an injury, even without an expert opinion confirming malpractice.

Barnes v. Schlein · filed 1984-04-17

The operative language in the statute unambiguously provides, however, that “[n]o action to recover damages . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” Although an expert opinion may lead to discovery of an “actionable harm”; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 460, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984); it does not follow that a plaintiff cannot reasonably discover an injury absent verification by a qualified expert.

Section 52-584’s two-year period begins when a plaintiff discovers, or should discover through reasonable care, a causal relationship between the alleged negligence and the resulting harm.

Catz v. Rubenstein · filed 1986-08-12

Consequently, the plaintiffs’ decedent did not have an “injury” as contemplated by the statute until she discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered a causal relationship between the defendant’s allegedly negligent diagnosis of August, 1979, and subsequent lack of treatment, and the metastasis of her cancer which she discovered on May 1, 1980. Only then did she sustain “actionable harm.”

Section 52-584's limitations period for malpractice involving a retained foreign object runs from discovery unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered the malpractice earlier.

Puro v. Henry · filed 1975-05-01

An examination of the policy behind the statute makes it clear that the better reasoned approach is to measure the running of the statute from the date of discovery of the malpractice, unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered it earlier.

Section 52-584 begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting actionable harm, rather than a legal theory based on those facts.

Aviles v. Gugliotti, No. 107015 (Sep. 20, 1994) · filed 1994-09-20

This court finds that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint, namely the date of the car accident on October 24, 1990, not the date of the third party complaint.

Section 52-584’s discovery period requires the plaintiff to discover, or reasonably be able to discover, both the injury and its connection to the defendant’s wrongful conduct.

Dupont v. Pet, No. 50 86 73 (Jan. 29, 1991) · filed 1991-01-29

Under the circumstances presented here, the defendant has not met his burden of proving that the plaintiff had discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence CT Page 610 should have discovered, that she had been injured and also that her injury was caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct, before October 24, 1986.

Section 52-584’s two-year period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable care should discover, the injury and its cause.

Parker v. Northeast Transportation Co., No. 097457 (Jan. 21, 1992) · filed 1992-01-21

The statute places a burden on a plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to discover the cause of her injury. ... Similarly, in the instant case, where the plaintiff simply claims that she fell as a result of defective stairs on a bus, her delay in filing also constitutes, as a matter of law, the failure to exercise reasonable care to discover her legal injury.

Section 52-584 delays the start of its two-year limitations period when the injury is discovered later or reasonably should have been discovered later.

Gallop v. Commercial Painting Co. · filed 1992-02-05

Section 52-584 designates a limited set of events (delayed actual or reasonable discovery of the injury) that delay the commencement of the two year period of limitation.

Section 52-584's two-year limitation period begins when a plaintiff discovers actionable harm; a factual dispute about that date can preclude summary judgment.

Thoennes v. Wu, No. 29 94 98 (Jun. 22, 1994) · filed 1994-06-22

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there exists a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the defendant's claim that the two year statute of limitations had started to run more than two years prior to May 4, 1990.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence or malpractice action to be brought within two years after the injury is sustained or discovered, or should have been discovered with reasonable care, subject to a three-year limit from the act or omission.

Deegan v. Veterans Memorial Medical Center, No. Cv94-0246992s (Nov. 7, 1995) · filed 1995-11-07

The difficulty with the defendant's position is that it is not dear from the pleadings and affidavits that the plaintiff knew that she had suffered an actionable harm on July 16, 1991. While it has been made clear that she knew that she had been injured on that date, it cannot be said that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether she knew or had reason to know that the injury was one that might give rise to a cause of action against the defendant on that date, or whether this was something that was discovered at a later date, but not more than two years prior to the granting of the automatic extension.

Section 52-584 starts its two-year limitation period when actionable harm is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered.

Cwikla v. Shelton, No. Cv94 0532907 (Aug. 17, 1995) · filed 1995-08-17

Consequently, a plaintiff would not be the subject of an "injury", as "contemplated by the statute [Section 52-584]" until the plaintiff has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, a causal relationship between the alleged negligence and the resulting harm.

Section 52-584 starts the limitations period when actionable harm is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, and a genuine factual dispute over that date prevents summary judgment.

Dixon v. Herzog, No. Cv94 31 14 18 S (Jul. 25, 1996) · filed 1996-07-25

Section 52-584 "provides that an action for the negligence of a physician must be brought `within two years from the date when the injury was first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . . . Blanchettev. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 263, 640 A.2d 74 (1994). ... Therefore, that when the plaintiff should have discovered that she had suffered actionable harm from Herzog's actions is a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, Herzog's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 52-584's two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover an injury and its causal connection to the defendant's conduct.

Smirnioudis v. Bragdon, No. Cv96 033 68 001 (Jul. 2, 1998) · filed 1998-07-02

The two year statute of limitations in § 52-584 begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should discover, through the exercise of reasonable care, that he has been injured and the defendant's conduct caused such an injury.

Section 52-584’s limitations period runs from discovery of actionable harm; later discovery of related defects or their precise cause does not toll it.

Mountaindale Condominium Ass'n v. Zappone · filed 2000-08-15

In this case, Portanova discovered the absence of fire walls in the attic in 1989, which constitutes actionable harm. The fact that the plaintiff did not discover other related harms, such as defective roofs or the cause of the injury until some years later, namely the precise violations of the fire and building codes, is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 starts the two-year limitation period when actionable harm is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Heldreth v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, No. 541080 (Sep. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-09-27

The present medical malpractice action is governed by the applicable statute of limitations, § 52-584, which provides in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by . . . malpractice of a physician, surgeon . . . [or] hospital . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is firstsustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should havebeen discovered . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statues § 52-584. ... In the present case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to which date Larry Heldreth discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that he sustained some form of actionable harm, which started the running of the statute of limitations. ... Therefore the defendants' motions for summary judgment (#176 and #181) is denied.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence or malpractice action to be brought within the statutory period running from discovery of the injury.

Henry v. Zborowski, No. Cv 94 0056151 S (Jul. 2, 1999) · filed 1999-07-02

The defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the plaintiff failed to bring her action within the CT Page 9193 applicable statute of limitations. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584. ... When did the plaintiff's concerns about the cosmetic results turn into her discovery of the alleged injury? This is a question of fact that cannot be determined by the documents supplied.

Section 52-584 requires discovery through reasonable care of injury and causation but does not impose an affirmative duty to investigate a potential malpractice claim.

Taylor v. Winsted Memorial Hospital, No. Cv-96-0071167s (May 16, 2001) · filed 2001-05-16

Since no affirmative duty to investigate is imposed on the plaintiff, the verdict will not be set aside on the basis of the claimed errors in the charge.

Section 52-584 starts its two-year period when injury is first sustained, discovered, or should have been discovered, and whether actionable harm was discoverable here was for the factfinder.

Dawson v. Kuehn, No. Cv 01-0806725 S (Aug. 2, 2001) · filed 2001-08-02

This court finds that, at the very least, the question of when the plaintiffs decedent should have known of the actionable harm against the defendants is an issue of fact, which means that summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 52-584 starts its two-year limitation period when the plaintiff discovers or should discover actionable harm, rather than when the plaintiff identifies the tortfeasor.

Tarnowsky v. Socci, No. Cv 00 0177148 (Jan. 23, 2002) · filed 2002-01-23

General Statutes § 52-584 refers to the discovery of an injury, which is defined as "actionable harm" in Catz v. Rubenstein, supra,201 Conn. 43. The plaintiff fell and knew that she was injured on March 14, 1997. This statute does not refer to discovering the identity of the tortfeasor who caused the injury. The issue is whether a plaintiff "discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that she suffered some form of actionable harm." (Internal quotation ... marks omitted). Id., 48. Actionable harm in this case arose on the day the plaintiff fell on the ice and injured himself, but he did not bring suit until more than two years had expired.

Section 52-584 starts a two-year period when actionable harm is discovered and bars an action more than three years after the complained-of act or omission.

Cole v. Angeluzzi, No. X05cv010185027s (Jun. 27, 2002) · filed 2002-06-27

In the present case, the plaintiff did not have an "injury" as contemplated by the statute until he discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, a causal relationship between defendant Angeluzzi's alleged impairment issues and defendant Hospital Association's alleged negligent hiring and supervision practices and Sadie Cole's care and treatment on July 15, 1998. Only when this information was obtained during discovery did the plaintiff sustain "actionable harm." The plaintiff brought these claims within two years from the "actionable harm" and in any event, within three years of the surgery and brain injury. The claims, therefore, are not time barred. Accordingly, Norwalk Hospital Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations is denied.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be brought within two years after the injury is discovered or should have been discovered, subject to a three-year limit from the act or omission.

Weigold v. Patel, No. X07-Cv99 0071743s (Jul. 9, 2002) · filed 2002-07-09

Section 52-584 requires that the injured party bring suit within two years of discovering the injury. ... Therefore, summary judgment cannot be granted on the basis of a violation of the statute of limitations because of this factual dispute.

Section 52-584 requires a plaintiff to sue within two years after discovering, or when reasonable care should have led the plaintiff to discover, actionable harm, without imposing a separate duty to investigate.

Taylor v. Winsted Memorial Hospital · filed 2003-03-25

The plain language of the statute does not, therefore, impose any specific affirmative duty on the plaintiff to investigate a potential claim of malpractice.

Section 52-584’s limitation period depends on when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the tortfeasor’s identity, which may present a factual question.

Jackson v. TOHAN · filed 2009-04-21

The question of whether the plaintiff reasonably should have obtained that report, or otherwise ascertained the identity of the defendant, prior to February, 2004, in light of her incapacitation for the period of time between her initial surgery and February, 2004, is a question of fact that is not properly decided on summary judgment.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be filed within two years after actionable harm is discovered or should have been discovered, subject to a three-year repose period.

Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital · filed 2019-10-01

Thus, the plaintiff did not sustain an ‘‘injury’’ for purposes of § 52-584 until she had knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge of sufficient facts to bring a cause of action against the defendants, including knowledge of facts that the defendants breached a duty owed to her and the causal nexus between that breach and the resulting harm. Because the evidence before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury as contemplated by § 52-584, the court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff’s action was time barred.

Section 52-584’s two-year period begins when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, actionable harm, including a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct.

Caswell v. Bristol Hospital, No. Cv95-0469665s (Dec. 6, 1999) · filed 1999-12-06

Because the pleadings and deposition testimony submitted by the parties leave open for resolution by the trier of fact a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiffs discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that they sustained actionable harm to commence the running of the statute of limitations to determine if a timely action was brought, this court hereby denies the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Section 52-584 is limited to negligence and reckless-or-wanton misconduct and does not govern intentionally inflicted personal injuries or section 1983 claims analogous to intentional torts.

DiVerniero v. Murphy · filed 1986-04-03

However, § 52-584 goes on to limit its application to injuries “caused by negligence or by reckless or wanton misconduct____” The Connecticut Supreme Court has determined that this limiting language makes § 52-584 inapplicable to intentionally inflicted personal injuries. ... Accordingly, this court holds that the three-year limitations period of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577 is applicable to section 1983 suits brought in Connecticut.

Section 52-584's two-year period does not govern section 1981 claims, which are analogous to intentional torts and receive Connecticut's general three-year tort period.

Napoleon v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1987-03-26

The defendant next contends that the plaintiff’s § 1981 cause of action is barred by Connecticut’s two-year statute of limitations, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (Injury to Person or Property). ... Based on the principles established in Wilson and the compelling authority of Goodman, the Court is convinced that Connecticut’s three-year statute of limitations, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577, governs § 1981 actions as well as § 1983 actions. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint is denied.

Section 52-584's limitations period restricts section 1983 damages claims to acts occurring within two years before filing.

Mihalcik v. Lensink · filed 1990-03-09

In this action, defendant accurately notes and plaintiffs agree that under Connecticut Law, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584, plaintiffs’ claims for damages are restricted to acts subsequent to August 15, 1987.

Section 52-584 does not govern section 1983 claims in Connecticut; the general tort period in section 52-577 applies instead.

Silberberg v. Lynberg · filed 2002-02-20

The court notes that in at least one instance, ... the defendants have erroneously claimed that the governing statute is Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584. The opinion in Lounsbury explicitly states that § 52-577 applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 52-584's narrow, enumerated two-year period does not govern federal civil-rights claims analogous to intentional torts, for which Connecticut's broader three-year tort period applies.

Napoleon v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1987-10-06

Unlike the New York statutes considered in Okure, this state’s three-year tort statute is more “general” and “remedial,” and, coincidentally, more analogous to intentional civil rights violations than the narrow, specifically enumerated language of the state’s two-year statute.

Section 52-584 does not govern a section 1983 equal-protection claim that does not seek damages for negligent or reckless injury to person or property.

Rohner v. Town of Coventry · filed 2008-10-10

Section 52-584 does not apply here, however, because this is not an action to recover for damages caused to real property. Instead, this is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 52-584 sets a three-year outer limit from the act or omission for injury claims based on negligence or reckless misconduct.

Altfeter v. Borough of Naugatuck, No. Cv 96 0136342 (May 15, 2001) · filed 2001-05-15

In addition, General Statutes §52-584 provides: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct. . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." Pursuant to the foregoing statutes, the maximum time period that the plaintiffs had to initiate their tort actions against Olson was three years.

The three-year repose period runs from the negligent act or omission itself, not from the plaintiff's later injury.

Doe v. British Universities North American Club · filed 1992-04-07

The court agrees with BUNAC’s assessment that the statute runs from the date that the negligent conduct occurred and not the date of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations would appear to be fatal to all of Doe's negligence claims against the BUNAC defendants since the negligence complained of, negligent hiring and screening of Drummond, occurred in February of 1987 and Doe filed the action more that three years later in August of 1990.

The three-year repose period bars negligence claims filed more than three years after the negligent act or omission.

NORTHERN TANKERS (CYPRUS) LTD. v. Backstrom · filed 1996-07-29

Northern Tankers’ negligence claim, however, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Any negligence by defendants in failing to produce the documents occurred at the time of the document production requests in 1990 and 1991. ... we dismiss the nineteenth Claim as time-barred.

Section 52-584 gives negligence claims two years under its discovery rule, subject to an absolute three-year limit from the act or omission.

389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold · filed 1999-03-22

Robinson’s cross-claims were time-barred under Connecticut’s statutes of limitation. The statute for negligence actions provides for two years with a discovery rule, not to exceed three years from the date of the act or omission. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584 (1997); ... All of the acts and omissions which Robinson alleges occurred on or before June 25, 1993, the date of closing the purchase of Robinson’s house. Robinson filed his cross-claims on August 8, 1996, more than three years later.

Section 52-584's discovery rule cannot save a negligence action commenced after the absolute three-year repose period, and the wrong-defendant saving statute does not apply when the first action settled against proper defendants.

Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., No. 445747 (Mar. 25, 2003) · filed 2003-03-25

Cogan concedes, and I agree, that, if Cogan II is not saved by § 52-593 , it is time barred by § 52-584 . ... The "discovery rule" of § 52-584 , which requires an action to be brought "within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered," has no application to actions brought after the expiration of the three-year "repose section" of the same statute. ... The motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action more than three years after the negligent act or omission even when the injury could not reasonably have been discovered in that time.

Grant v. City of New Haven, No. 382068 (Jul. 28, 1998) · filed 1998-07-28

"[A] lawsuit commenced more than three years from the date of the negligent act or omission complained of is barred by the statute of limitations, § 52-584 , regardless of whether the plaintiff had not or, in the exercise of care, could not reasonably have discovered the nature of the injuries within that time period."

For negligent training, section 52-584's time limits begin with the latest allegedly inadequate training, and its repose period bars a claim brought more than three years later.

Breece v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 2009-08-11

The latest date upon which allegedly inadequate training was given is July 24, 2004, the date upon which the time limitations set forth in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584 would begin to run. … Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Section 52-584 is both a statute of limitations, with a two-year period from discovery of injury, and a statute of repose, with a three-year period from the defendant's act or omission.

McCullough v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2016-03-21

Section 584, applicable to Plaintiffs negligence claim, is both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, as it contains both a two-year limitations component running from the date of discovery of the injury as well as a three-year repose component which runs from, the date of the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury.

The two-year discovery period begins with knowledge of sufficient facts, including the tortfeasor's identity, but all negligence actions remain subject to an absolute three-year repose period.

Galea v. Law Offices of Cary Alan Cliff · filed 2021-03-22

The three-year period, however, “specifies the time beyond which an action under § 52-584 is absolutely barred, and the three year period is, therefore, a statute of repose.” ... Even if Galea can establish that she was unable to discover the alleged wrongful conduct or specific identity of each individual tortfeasor until 2018, however, she was still required to bring her claims within the three-year statute of repose provided by section 52-584. Because she brought her claims well outside that period, the claims are time-barred.

Section 52-584 gives negligence, gross-negligence, and negligent-infliction claims a two-year discovery period and a three-year repose period, beginning when some actionable harm is discovered rather than its fullest manifestation.

McDonald v. Molina · filed 2022-05-10

Plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and negligent infliction emotional distress and economic damages carry a two-year statute of limitations and three-year statute of repose. ... For Plaintiff’s state law negligence causes of action, which are governed by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, “[t]he statute [of limitations] begins to run when the plaintiff discovers some form of actionable harm, not the fullest manifestation thereof. . . . The focus is on the plaintiff’s knowledge of facts, rather than on discovery of applicable legal theories.”

Section 52-584's three-year repose period runs from the negligent act rather than the first damage, and equitable tolling cannot extend that repose period.

Galea v. Law Offices of Cary Alan Cliff · filed 2023-09-25

That statute includes a statute of repose, which states that “no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584; ... Because the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be used to toll the statute of repose, Galea’s request to amend her complaint to reassert her negligence claim is denied.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit runs from the negligent act, even if the resulting property damage develops later.

Cacace v. Morcaldi · filed 1981-08-28

The gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim is the defective construction of the chimney, an act which occurred in 1973, the date from which the statute of limitations ran, although the results may not have developed until much later.

Section 52-584 bars malpractice actions filed more than three years after the act or omission, even when the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the claim within that period.

Stein v. Katz · filed 1989-12-26

We affirm our holding in McDonald that § 52-584 must be construed to bar malpractice actions not commenced within three years after the act or omission complained of, even where the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the basis for a claim within that period.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit begins on the date of the negligent act, even if the injury could not reasonably have been discovered within that period.

McDonald v. Haynes Medical Laboratory, Inc. · filed 1984-02-28

Absent any indication that the General Assembly no longer intends the phrase “from the date of the act or omission complained of” to be construed in accordance with our decision in Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra,13 we hold that the three year limitation of General Statutes §§ 52-555 and 52-584 begins to run from the date of the negligent act.

Section 52-584 does not bar a negligence action based on later negligent conduct merely because the defendant also acted years earlier.

Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates, Inc. · filed 1986-05-20

This conclusion also resolves an additional claim of the defendant, raised in its petition for certification and addressed in its brief, that the plaintiffs’ action was time barred by General Statutes §§ 52-584 and 52-576 because it was predicated on 1955 conduct of the defendant. Because we agree with the Appellate Court that the plaintiffs adequately established the defendant’s negligent conduct in 1972, the action was not time barred.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit begins when the negligent act occurs and may bar a claim before an injury occurs.

Nardi v. AA Electronic Security Engineering, Inc. · filed 1993-07-27

The statutory clock on this three year time limit begins running when the negligent conduct of the defendant occurs. ... Consequently, an action may be time barred even if no injury is sustained during the three years following a defendant’s act or omission.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim when the complaint is served more than three years after the work was completed.

Stratfield Associates v. Dansky Corp., No. Cv92-0515537s (Oct. 6, 1994) · filed 1994-10-06

The original complaint was served on Dansky on August 12, 1992, more than three years after work was completed. Hence the plaintiffs' cause of action in Counts Two and Four is barred by the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action filed more than three years after the alleged act or omission.

Sanger v. Town of Darien, No. Cv 96 0150411 (Dec. 22, 1997) · filed 1997-12-22

There is no dispute over the fact that the plaintiffs allege in their complaint that an employee of the defendant, town of Darien, acted negligently on August 28, 1992. This present action was not filed until February 13, 1996. February 13, 1996 is more than three years after August 28, 1992.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions for injury to person or property to be brought within two years after the injury is sustained or discovered and no later than three years after the act or omission.

Lang v. Brom Builders, Inc., No. Cv 95 0369766s (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03

It is clear that the repose portion of 52-584 which provides that `no action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of' bars the bringing of suit more than three years after the alleged negligent conduct of a defendant regardless of when a plaintiff discovers the proximate cause of his harm or any other essential element of a negligence cause of action. ... Therefore, Brom's motion for summary judgment as to count two of the complaint must be granted since the Langs' negligence ... claim is barred by General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars negligence claims brought more than three years after the act or omission causing injury.

Graetz v. Brito, No. Cv95 0052517s (Mar. 2, 1998) · filed 1998-03-02

Application of § 52-584 to the facts of the present case does not unconstitutionally and impermissibly alter or abridge the plaintiffs' cause of action. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning when the action was commenced or the date of the alleged wrongful conduct, the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on General Statutes § 52-584 is granted. Suit was commenced more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.

Section 52-584 imposes a two year limitations period for this negligence claim.

Hamilton v. Orban, No. Cv95 0146587 S (Apr. 29, 1998) · filed 1998-04-29

This assertion is insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact which would impede the application of the two year limitations period to the date of the accident and alleged injuries — August 12, 1993. Summary judgment in favor of Justin Morgan is granted based on the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be brought within two years from the date of injury.

Amaya v. Stamford Propane, Inc., No. Cv94 0139954 S (Jun. 5, 1998) · filed 1998-06-05

The applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-5841, expired two years from the date of Amaya's injuries.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year limitations period for negligence claims, subject to tolling.

Clarke v. Diaz, No. Cv98 0163375 S (Aug. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-08-06

This court finds that the continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to this case. ... Because the facts Clarke alleges do not suffice to toll the two year statute of limitations, the negligence claim is time barred. Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike count one is granted.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim brought more than two years after the injury unless equitable estoppel applies, and the plaintiff failed to establish estoppel here.

Kolodziej v. Barron, No. Cv98-0485582s (Oct. 28, 1998) · filed 1998-10-28

Accordingly, the c our finds that the plaintiff has failed to carry her burden with respect to her claim for equitable estoppel, and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the first count of the complaint as the plaintiffs claim is time barred by General Statutes §52-584.

Section 52-584 imposes a two-year limit on the action at issue.

Kropitis v. Llorens, No. Cv97 0058212s (Dec. 8, 1998) · filed 1998-12-08

The complaint against Heath is barred by the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of Heath.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of the injury.

Langella v. G-Wz of Stamford, No. Cv95 0148891 (Feb. 1, 1999) · filed 1999-02-01

General Statutes §52-584 provides that an action to recover for negligence must be brought within two years of the injury.

Section 52-584 bars personal injury claims based on negligence or recklessness brought more than three years after the act or omission.

Martinez v. Maturana, No. Lpl-Cv-95-0473382s (Aug. 12, 1998) · filed 1998-08-12

The eighth, ninth and thirteenth counts are barred by §52-584, which bars all claims for personal injury based on negligence or recklessness not brought within three years of the act or omission.

Section 52-584 requires medical malpractice actions to be filed within two years of injury discovery and bars them more than three years after the act or omission.

Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, No. Cv98-0582094-S (Sep. 17, 1999) · filed 1999-09-17

General Statutes § 52-584 provides that an action to recover damages for medical malpractice must be brought within two years "from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered . . . except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. . . ." Clearly, more than three years have elapsed since the occurrence of the alleged misdiagnosis. Absent an exception, this action is therefore barred.

Section 52-584 requires actions for negligence or recklessness to be brought within three years of the act or omission.

Connors v. Orsine, Cotter, Carson, Inc., No. Cv 95-0248312s (Mar. 7, 2000) · filed 2000-03-07

Section 52-584 requires that an action be brought no later than three years from the date of the act or omission.

Section 52-584's three-year limit runs from the negligent act or omission; a contractor's warranty to a municipality did not extend that limit for an injured third party.

Mayo v. Northeast Conn. Council of Govs., No. Cv 99 9969743 S (May 31, 2000) · filed 2000-05-31

Any breach of duty to construct a safe pit, including duty to inspect, occurred, at the latest, on the date SN ceased work on the site on April 25, 1995. As pointed out in Beckensteinv. Potter and Carrier, Inc., supra, 162, the statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions refers to the date of the untoward act or omission and not to the date when the cause of the injury is determined.

Section 52-584 bars negligence actions brought more than three years after the act or omission unless the statute of repose is tolled by an applicable doctrine.

Gazza v. Bandit Industries, Inc., No. X03 Cv 99 0499931 S (May 11, 2001) · filed 2001-05-11

Based on the foregoing, the court holds that the action against Ciola Services, Inc. is barred by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584 because the initial complaint was served more than three years after the sale of the woodchipper by Ciola Services, Inc. and the statute of repose contained in § 52-584 was not tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Section 52-584 limits medical negligence actions to the period allowed by its repose provision, even when the injury was not discovered during that period.

Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2001-10-30

The plaintiff is not deprived entirely of his right to redress. His right to redress is limited to a specified period of time. The common-law right that the plaintiff claims was abridged by the application of § 52-584 is the right to bring an action in tort for medical malpractice against a hospital and a pathologist. Section 52-584 restricts the right to bring an action for medical negligence only to the extent that it restricts the time for bringing the action, which we conclude is reasonable, as we did relative to § 52-577 in Sanborn.

Section 52-584 bars a medical malpractice action more than three years after the act or omission complained of.

Hernandez v. Cirmo · filed 2002-01-08

Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim must fail under the three year statute of limitations, § 52-584.

Section 52-584 requires negligence and malpractice actions within two years of injury discovery and bars them more than three years after the act or omission.

Nieves v. Cirmo · filed 2002-01-08

Given the lack of evidence to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of an increased risk that the procedure could fail, we conclude that he did not owe the plaintiff a continuing duty to warn. As our Supreme Court has stated, to expect a defendant physician to remedy a diagnosis “in the absence of proof that he subsequently learned that his diagnosis was incorrect” would render the repose part of the statute of limitations a nullity.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be filed within two years after the injury is discovered or should reasonably have been discovered and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Tynik v. Redcoat Home Builders Inc., No. X03 Cv-98-0488994-S (Mar. 22, 2002) · filed 2002-03-22

The Berlin defendants have asserted failure to comply with Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584, the statute of limitations, as an alternative ground for summary judgment as to Counts Twelve, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen. Section 52-584, "imposes two specific time requirements on prospective plaintiffs. The first requires a plaintiff to bring an action within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . . The second provides that in no event shall a plaintiff bring an action more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . ." ... Therefore, § 52-584 is an alternate basis for granting summary judgment in favor of the Berlin defendants on those Counts.

Section 52-584 imposes a three year statute of repose on medical malpractice actions, including claims by disabled minors, and its application has a rational basis.

Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky · filed 2004-06-29

In contrast, in the present case, it was Christopher’s claimed inability to discover his injury within the three year statute of repose that barred the plaintiffs’ cause of action. ... We conclude that there exists a rational basis for Connecticut’s three year statute of repose embodied in § 52-584. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim must fail.

Section 52-584 requires negligence and medical malpractice actions to be filed within two years of discovering the injury and never more than three years after the act or omission.

Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky · filed 2006-10-03

Therefore, we conclude that the continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply and, accordingly, that the plaintiffs’ claims against the hospital are statutorily barred by the repose provision in § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars a property-damage negligence claim filed more than three years after the alleged negligent act or omission.

Maryheart Crusaders v. Barry, No. Cv96-0251647s (Apr. 20, 1998) · filed 1998-04-20

Under such circumstances, the cause of action for negligent installation would be barred by the three year statute of repose not later than 1991. Because the plaintiff's action was commenced on February 1, 1996, at least eight years after the installation of the HVAC unit and fire alarm system, the plaintiff's action is barred by the repose section of General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 gives medical-malpractice claims a two-year period, which may be extended by the automatic ninety-day extension under section 52-190a(b).

Sternberg v. Zuckerman · filed 1993-04-26

The defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584, which establishes a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims. ... The two-year limitations period would therefore have expired on April 18, 1992. If the automatic 90-day extension began on that date, the limitations period would have expired on or about July 18, 1993—well after the service of the complaint in this matter. Consequently, the court concludes that the 90-day extension of the limitations period. obtained by the plaintiff had not yet expired when the plaintiff filed and served the complaint in this matter.

A plaintiff's direct medical-malpractice claim is governed by section 52-584's two-year discovery and three-year repose periods and does not receive the apportionment statute's sixty-day extension when the underlying apportionment claim is dismissed.

Roegiers v. United States · filed 2023-09-22

The court finds that § 52-584 is the applicable statute. ... Plaintiff’s suit is best characterized as a malpractice claim filed under § 52-584, rather than under § 52-102b. ... Plaintiff therefore does not receive the sixty-day extension of the statute of limitations under § 52-102b. ... The filing therefore was untimely, and Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.

Section 52-584 requires a malpractice action to be filed within two years of when the injury is discovered or should have been discovered and within three years of the act or omission.

Nosenzo v. Pesiri, No. Cv94 0135709 S (Jul. 19, 1995) · filed 1995-07-19

Viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the statute of limitations began to run on October 22, 1991. The plaintiffs filed their action on December 16, 1993, after filing a petition for an automatic 90 day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a(b). Therefore, under the allegations in the complaint the plaintiff's action is not barred by the statute of limitations under General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars an action for personal injury caused by negligence or malpractice unless brought within two years after the injury is first sustained.

Reichenbach v. Metpath New England, No. Cv94 053 41 12 (Jul. 24, 1995) · filed 1995-07-24

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant sufficient to permit this plaintiff to recover on a contract theory and its clear that despite the claim of contract this is a negligence act sounding in malpractice and is barred by General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584's two-year medical malpractice deadline is tolled during the statutory ninety-day extension.

Hagbourne v. Campbell, No. Cv96-0132593 (Jan. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-01-06

General Statutes § 52-584 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by . . . malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered. . . ." ... In the present case, the plaintiffs timely filed their petition for a ninety day extension of the statute of limitations. Service was subsequently made upon Waterbury Anesthesiology Associates on April 25, 1996, within the ninety day tolling period. Therefore, the statute of limitations has not run against this defendant, and the motion for summary judgment is denied.