Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages to deter unfair trade practices, making the defendant’s financial circumstances relevant to the amount.

Lenz v. Cna Assurance Co. · filed 1993-05-10(a)

Once deterrence rather than compensation becomes the focus of CUTPA punitive damages, however, then the financial standing of the party against whom damages are sought becomes relevant and material. ... The objection to the request for admission is, therefore, overruled.

Section 42-110g(a) does not authorize prejudgment interest on punitive damages, even as equitable relief.

Nielsen v. Wisniewski · filed 1993-07-20(a)

We agree with the defendants that the trial court lacked the power, statutorily or equitably, to award prejudgment interest on punitive damages.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages for CUTPA violations involving reckless indifference to others’ rights or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.

Tessmann v. Tiger Lee Construction Co. · filed 1993-12-07(a)

The defendants’ actions clearly rise above simple negligence and support a finding of reckless or intentional conduct by the defendants to the plaintiffs’ detriment. Given the extensive testimony as to issues relevant to punitive damages, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that punitive damages were warranted in the amount of $30,000 was supported by the record and did not constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages for an isolated unfair trade practice; a pattern of misconduct is not required.

Tingley Systems, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Norse Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1995-03-13(a)

We do not agree that CUTPA punitive damage awards are limited to long-term practices.

Section 42-110g allows actual damages for a defective used truck based on repair costs and reasonable alternative transportation costs.

Altberg v. Paul Kovacs Tire Shop, Inc. · filed 1993-06-15(a)

The plaintiff’s actual damages in this case would amount to the cost of repairing his vehicle plus the cost of reasonable alternative transportation. Again, the court rendered a judgment that included repayment to the plaintiff of the purchase price of the truck.

Section 42-110g(a) permits recovery of actual damages, including repair costs, alternative transportation costs, and unreimbursed car payments.

Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc. · filed 1994-02-08(a)

CUTPA allows the recovery of actual damages; General Statutes § 42-110g (a); which would include at least the cost of repairs and alternative transportation, as well as the balance of the sum the plaintiff spent out-of-pocket on car payments.

Section 42-110g requires proof of a loss caused by an unfair trade practice before a claimant may recover; a contract’s missing dates do not support additional compensatory damages without resulting loss.

Cimino v. Ciaramella, No. Cv91-0312359 (Jun. 5, 1995) · filed 1995-06-05(a)

While proof of a violation of the Home Improvement Act thus establishes proof of an unfair trade practice, a party is eligible for remedies under that statute only if he proves that he has suffered a loss as a result of the unfair practice. A claimant who establishes a CUTPA violation may recover proven actual damages and, at the discretion of the court, punitive damages, equitable relief, costs and attorneys fees. General Statutes §§ 42-110g (a) and (d). As to actual damages, the plaintiff has proven only the damages for the cost of remedying defective workmanship set forth above and has not proven that he was damaged in any way by the defendant's failure to include starting and completion dates in the contract. The court therefore finds no basis for a further award of compensatory damages.

Section 42-110g permits equitable relief when a plaintiff proves an ascertainable loss, even if the jury finds no actual money damages.

S. Pope, Inc. v. Pope Exterminating Inc., No. 066712 (Jul. 6, 1994) · filed 1994-07-06(d)

Accordingly, this court will not disturb the jury's verdict, on the grounds that the plaintiffs have proven an "ascertainable loss" and are entitled to the equitable relief sought under the statute, without a finding of actual money damages.

Section 42-110g(a) leaves the amount of punitive damages to the trial court’s discretion.

Jones v. Ippoliti, No. Cv 93 53116 S (Jun. 30, 1995) · filed 1995-06-30(a)

The awarding of punitive damages is within the discretion of the trial court. See General Statutes § 42-110g (a) and Staehle v. Michael's Garage, Inc., supra and Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616 , 622 (1978).

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages and attorneys’ fees for a CUTPA violation even without proof of actual damages from the unlawful entry.

Conway v. American Excavating, Inc. · filed 1996-05-28(a), (d)

Even without proof of actual damage from the unlawful entry, ... authorizes an award of punitive damages as well as attorneys’ fees for a violation of § 42-110b.

A claim for punitive damages under § 42-110g(a) must allege facts showing wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence, reckless indifference to others' rights, or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.

Mungham v. Prudential Home Mtge. Co., No. Cvbr 9603-03056 (Jul. 3, 1996) · filed 1996-07-03(a)

8) If punitive damages are claimed pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (a), facts must be alleged to show "wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence" or a "reckless indifference to the rights of others" or "an intentional and wanton violation of those rights."

Section 42-110g permits discretionary punitive damages for a CUTPA violation; a plaintiff need not allege reckless, wanton or malicious conduct to seek them.

Witham v. Itt Hartford, No. Cv96-0132891 (Jun. 4, 1997) · filed 1997-06-04(a)

The court also denies the motion to strike plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. "Awarding punitive damages and attorney's fees in CUTPA is discretionary"; General Statutes § 42-110g (a) and (d) (internal citations omitted); Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616 , 622 (1987). Therefore, the issue is whether the evidence reveals "reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Id. There is no requirement that the plaintiff allege conduct that was reckless, wanton or malicious.

Section 42-110g permits a court to grant injunctive relief in lieu of damages, and ascertainable loss need not be a demonstrable monetary loss.

Service Road Corporation v. Quinn, No. Cv 93-0704722 (Apr. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-04-29(d)

The statute does not limit relief to actual damages because it permits the court to order, "in addition to damages or in lieu of damages, injunctive or other equitable relief." "Ascertainable loss" within the meaning of § 42-110g is not limited to demonstrable monetary loss. ... The permanent injunction sought by the plaintiffs is granted.

Section 42-110g allows recovery of actual damages caused by an unfair trade practice; proven lost profits can fully compensate that loss.

Elliott v. Staron · filed 1997-07-29(a)

The plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable compensation for the losses caused by the defendant's wrongful actions. Under CUTPA, the plaintiffs are entitled to "actual damages." General Statutes § 42-110g . These damages are appropriately and fully represented by the plaintiffs' recovery of lost profits.

Section 42-110g(a) requires a private CUTPA plaintiff seeking damages to allege actual damages; nominal and punitive damages alone do not suffice.

Criscuolo v. Shaheen, No. 413072 (Mar. 22, 1999) · filed 1999-03-22(a)

Criscuolo's concession that, under the facts alleged in her complaint, she could only receive nominal and punitive damages if the case were to be tried today makes it clear that she is cannot recover actual damages within the meaning of § 42-110g (a) on the basis of the facts alleged in her complaint.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages for reckless indifference to another's rights or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.

Scribner v. Aiu Insurance Company, No. 527659 (Dec. 22, 1997) · filed 1997-12-22(a)

Accordingly, under General Statutes § 42-110g (a) the "court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages." The standard for awarding punitive damages under CUTPA is evidence of a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees for a CUTPA violation.

Cody v. Fieldbrook Corporation Barnett, No. 96-038 93 78 (Jul. 7, 1998) · filed 1998-07-07

The findings of a CUTPA violation permits of course an award of punitive damages, General Statutes § 42-110g (a) plus the fee of the expert witness and a reasonable attorney's fee. General Statute § 42-110g (d). ... Compensatory damages are assessed at $7,800.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $2,000.00 are awarded.

Section 42-110g(a) does not provide punitive damages when the underlying CUTPA claim fails.

Benvenuti Oil Co. v. Foss Consultants, Inc., No. 054 27 55 (Apr. 6, 1999) · filed 1999-04-06(a)

It follows that the courts granting of the motion for summary judgment as to the defendants' CUTPA claim makes General Statutes § 42-110g (a) inapplicable.

Section 42-110g(d) permits equitable relief alongside legal relief, so a plaintiff seeking a CUTPA injunction need not plead a lack of an adequate remedy at law.

Lazzaro v. Jfs, Inc., No. Cv96 0150751 S (Jan. 15, 1998) · filed 1998-01-15(d)

Additionally, General Statutes § 42-110g (d) states that a party alleging a violation of CUTPA may properly be awarded an equitable remedy in addition to a legal remedy. 2 Therefore, it would be antithetical to require a party to allege that it lacks an adequate remedy at law when it is seeking both an equitable and legal remedy under CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to rescind a stipulated judgment as equitable relief for a CUTPA violation even after the four-month period for opening judgments has expired.

Kim v. Magnotta · filed 1999-06-01(a)

Second, we are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that, in the absence of an express reference by CUTPA to § 52-212a, § 42-110g (a) of CUTPA does not qualify as a remedial authority “otherwise provided by law.” ... We are persuaded that our conclusion that CUTPA’s remedial provision falls within the “otherwise provided by law” provision of § 52-212a creates a workable basis for reconciling the underlying agenda of each statute.

Section 42-110g(a) gives the court discretion to deny punitive damages even when the defendant may have acted with reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights.

Dunsmore Associates v. D'alessio, No. 409906 (Jan. 6, 2000) · filed 2000-01-06(a)

Here, while it may be said that the defendant acted in reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights, the evidence lacks the pungent "flavor" that usually accompanies an award of punitive damages. ... The plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (a) is denied.

Section 42-110g(a) permits discretionary punitive damages for a CUTPA claim; whether the evidence supports them need not be decided on a motion to strike.

Day v. Yale University School of Drama, No. Cv 97-0400876s (Mar. 7, 2000) · filed 2000-03-07(a)

CUTPA provides that "[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper." General Statutes § 42-110g (a); Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., Inc. , 238 Conn. 293 , 311 , 680 A.2d 1274 (1996). ... Having concluded the plaintiff has alleged a viable CUTPA claim in count three, whether the evidence offered thereunder is sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under CUTPA is beyond the scope of this motion. The defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages in count three is denied.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages for CUTPA violations when the defendant recklessly or wantonly disregards the plaintiff’s rights.

United Technologies Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co. · filed 2000-06-05

Because CUIPA violations can be the basis for violations under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, ... punitive damages may be awarded (Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g), ... In light of both the evidence presented at trial and the post-trial disclosure of internal documentation, the Court concludes that a punitive damages award is appropriate under Connecticut law.

Section 42-110g permits claims for attorney fees and punitive damages when the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a CUTPA cause of action.

Suto v. Deerfield Realty Co., No. Cv99 068553 (Jun. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-06-27(a), (d)

The Court finds that the pleadings set forth by the plaintiff are sufficient to state a cause of action under CUTPA. Therefore, the plaintiff's claims for attorney fees and punitive damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (d) and § 42-110g (a) are also legally sufficient.

Section 42-110g(a) sets no statutory cap on punitive damages for a CUTPA violation.

Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2000-08-31(a)

CUTPA, as discussed above, places no limits on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded for a violation of the statute under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a).

Section 42-110g(a) cannot support a request for punitive damages when the underlying CUTPA claim fails.

Ricketts v. Sheresky, No. Cv99 0175446 (Nov. 21, 2000) · filed 2000-11-21(a)

In order to recover under General Statutes § 42-110g (a) of CUTPA, the plaintiff must successfully prevail in her CUTPA claim in count four. Since the defendants' motion to strike count four of the plaintiff's third amended complaint is granted, the defendants' motion to strike paragraph three of the prayer for relief is also granted.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 42-110g(d) must allege an ascertainable loss resulting from the conduct the injunction would address.

Kessler v. Securitylink, No. 071451s (Jan. 29, 2001) · filed 2001-01-29(d)

Instead, the plaintiffs must allege that they have suffered an ascertainable loss, which is the "threshold barrier which limits the class of persons who may bring a CUTPA action seeking either actual damages or equitable relief." ... Because it fails to allege an ascertainable loss resulting from the defendant's actions at these homes, the motion to strike count three of the complaint is granted.

Section 42-110g(a) leaves punitive damages and injunctive relief to the court’s discretion; a plaintiff may seek a judicial decision on those remedies even though neither is guaranteed.

Rizek v. Connecticut Coast Fitness, No. Cv 00 0504463s (Sep. 12, 2001) · filed 2001-09-12(a)

While plaintiff has no absolute right to either CUTPA punitive damages or injunctive relief, even if she prevails in the case, she does have the right to have a court decide whether such relief is warranted. She also has the right to have the court, and not the defendant, determine the amount, if any, of punitive damages. Therefore, on the basis that the settlement offer provides only partial relief, this court finds that it does not extinguish plaintiff's claims.

Section 42-110g(a) permits the court to award punitive damages and injunctive relief at its discretion; a settlement offer that omits both does not fully resolve a claim seeking them.

Hennessey v. Connecticut Valley Fit., No. Cv 98 0504488 S (Sep. 12, 2001) · filed 2001-09-12(a)

While plaintiff has no absolute right to either CUTPA punitive damages or injunctive relief, even if she prevails in the case, she does have the right to have a court decide whether such relief is warranted. She also has the right to have the court, and not the defendant, determine the amount, if any, of punitive damages. Therefore, on the basis that the settlement offer provides only partial relief, this court finds that it does not extinguish plaintiff's claims.

Section 42-110g permits discretionary punitive damages and equitable relief, as well as costs and reasonable attorney's fees, for a CUTPA claim.

Heche v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Cv00 0070970s (Jul. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-07-10(a), (d)

Under CUTPA, the plaintiff may be entitled to additional damages. "The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages, and may provide equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper." General Statutes § 42-110g (a). The court may also award costs and reasonable attorney's fees, General Statutes § 42-110g (d). ... Because the court denies the motion to strike count three sounding in CUTPA, the court also denies the motion to strike the plaintiff's request for relief.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a plaintiff alleging a CUTPA violation to request punitive damages.

Panamsat Corp. v. Millennium Tele. Net., No. Cv01 0181722 (Jul. 20, 2001) · filed 2001-07-20(a)

The court recognizes that a plaintiff may request punitive damages as a remedy when alleging claims of CUTPA and bad faith. See General Statutes § 42-110g (a); Gaiolini v. Harloc Products, Inc. , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 280976 (October 26, 1990, Dorsey, J. ) (court found that as plaintiff plead bad faith on part of defendant then complaint sufficiently set forth claim for punitive damages). The plaintiff's request for punitive damages and attorney's fees in its prayer for relief may stand.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages for a CUTPA violation when the defendant acts with reckless indifference to others' rights.

Advanced Financial v. Associated Appr., No. Cv 98-0580372 (Jul. 23, 2001) · filed 2001-07-23(a)

This court, having found a CUTPA violation is now charged with considering whether or not to award punitive damages. General Statutes § 42-110g (a). ... That standard is that the court may award punitive damages under CUTPA if it finds that the defendants' conduct was recklessly indifferent to the rights of others. ... It now finds that an award of punitive damages is appropriate in this case.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages and attorney fees for a CUTPA claim, but those remedies are unavailable when the claim is stricken and no other basis supports them.

McHenry v. Lubell, No. Cv 034 68 42 S (Aug. 2, 2001) · filed 2001-08-02

In addition, punitive damages and attorney fees may also be awarded pursuant to a cause of action based on CUTPA. ... Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn. App. 189 , 197-98 , 752 A.2d 1096 (2000); see also, General Statutes §§ 42-110g (a) and (d). ... Because the court has stricken the plaintiff's causes of actions for recklessness and CUTPA, and her complaint does not otherwise support an award for such relief, the plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages and attorneys fees is stricken by the court.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages for a CUTPA violation involving reckless indifference to others’ rights or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.

Carmel Homes v. Bednar, No. Cv 99-0079393 S (Oct. 1, 2001) · filed 2001-10-01(a)

Under CUTPA, "[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages . . . as it deems necessary or proper." General Statutes § 42-110g (a). ... The court concludes that an award of punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 is, taking into consideration all the applicable factors, appropriate here.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to consider punitive damages when a person suffers an ascertainable loss from a CUTPA violation.

Smith v. Snyder, No. Cv99-0362743-S (Dec. 14, 2001) · filed 2001-12-14(a)

General Statutes § 42-110g (a) provides, in pertinent part, any person who suffers any ascertainable loss as a result of a violation of General CT Page 17184 Statute § 42-110b , "is entitled to have the trial court consider awarding both punitive damages . . . and attorney's fees." Id. ... In addition, the court finds the defendants' conduct revealed reckless indifference to the plaintiffs' rights and awards the plaintiffs punitive damages.

Section 42-110g(a) does not allow emotional distress damages because emotional distress is not an ascertainable loss of money or property.

Jaworski v. Anderson, No. Cv 94-0537265 S (Aug. 7, 2001) · filed 2001-08-07(a)

To that end, CUTPA provides a remedy for "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property." General Statutes § 42-110g (a). The plaintiffs' claim that monies expended for emotional distress represent a "loss of money" within this provision masks the reality that the occurrence of emotional distress is more of a loss of mental stability than a loss of money. ... For all these reasons, the court believes that emotional distress damages are not available under CUTPA.

Section 42-110g permits a court to decline punitive damages and to deny actual damages that would duplicate another award.

Coleman v. Hernandez · filed 2007-05-24(a)

I do not find this to be a situation in which punitive damages are appropriate, principally because the False Claims Act penalties serve the purpose of punitive damages. Moreover, I decline to award any further damages under CUTPA. All actual damages requested would be duplicative of those already awarded.

Section 42-110g(d) permits equitable relief in addition to or instead of damages for CUTPA violations.

Chase v. Cohen · filed 2007-10-11(d)

A reading of the ascertainable damages as grounded in the CUTPA violations satisfies this test, and Defendants appear to concede that such awards are permitted under CUTPA. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d) (“In any action brought under [CUTPA], the court may, in its discretion, order, in addition to damages or in lieu of damages, injunctive or other equitable relief.”).

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages when a CUTPA defendant's conduct is recklessly indifferent to the rights of others.

Lenge v. Beizer, No. Cv 00-0802145 (Dec. 30, 2002) · filed 2002-12-30(a)

The court is charged with considering whether or not to award punitive damages pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g (a). Our Supreme Court has articulated a standard for the court's guidance in making this determination. That standard is that the court may award punitive damages under CUTPA if it finds that the defendant's conduct was recklessly indifferent to the rights of others. Gargano v. Heyman , 203 Conn. 616 , 622 (1987). The court finds that the defendant Beizer's actions in making the fraudulent transfers were, in fact, recklessly indifferent to the rights of the plaintiff.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages, but reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s rights is required for an award.

Clark v. Hunt, No. Cv 02-87877 (Jan. 16, 2003) · filed 2003-01-16(a)

The plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages in accordance with § 42-110g because the defendant did not display a reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages in its discretion when the defendant intentionally and wantonly violates another’s rights.

Storts Welding v. Utah Machine Tool Ex., No. Cv01-0275573-S (Mar. 17, 2003) · filed 2003-03-17(a)

General Statues § 42-110g (a) provides that in addition to an award of actual damages "the court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages . . ." ... Based upon the evidence presented, the court finds that the plaintiff has proven its entitlement to punitive damages. The intentional unscrupulous actions of the defendant justify an award of these extraordinary damages. Accordingly, the court in the exercise of its discretion awards the plaintiff $5,000 in punitive damages.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages when a plaintiff has suffered an ascertainable loss from a CUTPA violation, even without proof of actual damages.

Larobina v. Home Depot, USA, Inc. · filed 2003-05-13(a)

Thus, a court may award punitive damages under § 42-1 lOg (a) for a violation of CUTPA even when the plaintiff has failed to show any actual damages flowing from that violation.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages when the evidence shows wanton and malicious injury or reckless indifference to another’s rights.

New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida, Inc. · filed 2004-03-29(a)

The standard for awarding punitive damages under the CUTPA is whether the evidence reveals “wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence” such that “a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of [Plaintiffs’] rights” is apparent. ... Certainly if a jury were to disbelieve Defendants’ arguments concerning its good faith an award of punitive damages could be proper.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages and contains no express cap on their amount.

Medvalusa Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc. · filed 2005-05-17(a)

...CUTPA, which expressly allows the award of punitive damages, and does not, by its express terms, provide a cap on the amount of damages awarded. See General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (a).

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages for a CUTPA violation when the defendant acts with reckless indifference to others’ rights.

Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2005-09-30(a)

The plaintiff seeks punitive damages under CUTPA. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a). The court has discretion to award punitive damages for a CUTPA violation. ... The court finds that punitive damages are appropriate and recommends that they be awarded in the amount of $7500.

Section 42-110g(a) does not permit punitive damages when there is no CUTPA violation.

Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer · filed 2007-04-24(a)

Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly determined that Ruschmeyer had violated CUTPA. Therefore, Lydall was not entitled to punitive damages under § 42-110g (a).

Section 42-110g(a) requires proof of actual damages, which must be reduced by any refund or reimbursement for the same loss.

Speaks v. Donato · filed 2003-03-31(a)

For her CUTPA claim, Speaks was awarded $1,000 as “statutory” damages under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a),17 which permits the recovery of actual damages derived from any ascertainable loss of money or property. ... Thus, where plaintiff claims a CUTPA violation based on a purchase of a defective automobile with a rolled back odometer and subsequent expenditures for repairs and alternative transportation, plaintiffs actual damages, if established, must be reduced by the amount of any refund of purchase price or other reimbursement of related expenditures.

Section 42-110g(a) does not provide damages automatically for a CUTPA violation; a claimant must establish an unfair trade practice and provide a basis for reasonably estimating the damages suffered.

New England Custom Concrete, LLC v. Carbone · filed 2007-07-24(a)

Litigants who seek to recover damages under CUTPA must meet two threshold requirements. First, they must establish that the conduct at issue constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice. Second, they must present evidence providing a basis for a court to make a reasonable estimate of the damages that they have suffered.

Section 42-110g(a) makes punitive damages for a CUTPA violation discretionary.

A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Gause · filed 2018-09-11(a)

Awarding punitive dam- ages under CUTPA is discretionary.

Section 42-110g(a) permits punitive damages for CUTPA violations without a fixed cap on the award.

Murillo v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. · filed 2019-07-15(a)

Connecticut law clearly establishes that there is no set cap on the permissible amount of a punitive damages award for CUTPA violations.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages for a CUTPA violation; an award equal to compensatory damages can serve deterrence.

Hernandez v. Apple Auto Wholesalers of Waterbury LLC · filed 2020-05-18(a)

Because “in terms of consistency or frequency, punitive damage awards under CUTPA are generally equal to or twice the amount of the compensatory award,” Bridgeport Harbour Place, 131 Conn. App. at 145, the Court will award punitive damages equal to the compensatory damages, a reasonable number to achieve the goal of deterrence.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to deny punitive damages when other statutory awards already address the same conduct.

Cartagena-Cordero v. Five Star Cars, LLC · filed 2020-10-06(a)

In any event, I decline to award Cartagena-Cordero punitive damages under CUTPA because Cartagena-Cordero has already recovered statutory double damages on two other claims (TILA and civil forgery).

Section 42-110g permits discretionary punitive damages for an ascertainable loss caused by a prohibited practice and allows costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; allegations supporting an unfair practice and loss can make a proposed claim for those remedies viable.

Woolf v. Simone · filed 2020-10-14(a), (d)

Further, Section 42-110g(a) provides the court discretion to award punitive damages to “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b,” while Section 42-110g(d) allows the court to award “costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed.” ... Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that, if proven at trial, would support a finding of unfair and deceptive trade practices and as such, the proposed amendment seeking punitive damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees is not futile.

Section 42-110g does not permit punitive damages based solely on alleged negligence.

Smulley v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois · filed 2021-08-03(a)

Therefore, even assuming that the complaint plausibly alleges a CUTPA claim at all (which CCC strongly disputes), there is no legal basis for a punitive damages award under CUTPA based on CCC’s alleged acts of negligence.

Section 42-110g(a) permits a court to award punitive damages for a CUTPA violation when the defendant shows reckless indifference to others’ rights or intentionally and wantonly violates those rights.

Rhomes v. Mecca Auto LLC · filed 2022-08-03(a)

Under CUTPA, “[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages[.]” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a). ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the circumstances warrant an award of punitive damages.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages only when the defendant acted with intentional, wanton, or reckless indifference to the rights of others.

Reale v. Providence and Worcester Railroad Company · filed 2024-03-28(a)

Even assuming that Reale could prevail on this CUTPA theory of liability, there is no realistic prospect that a jury would award punitive damages. Under CUTPA, punitive damages are available only if a defendant is intentionally, wantonly, or recklessly indifferent to the rights of others.

Section 42-110g(a) permits discretionary punitive damages in addition to treble damages for identity theft because the awards redress distinct harms.

White v. FCW Law Offices · filed 2025-08-05(a)

Thus, although a claim for punitive damages under § 42-110g (a) and a claim for treble damages under § 52-571h (b) may rely on the same or overlapping proof, they seek relief for distinct categories of legal harm, and the court’s discretion as to whether to award damages and the amount to award is very different under each statute.

Section 42-110g(a) permits discretionary punitive damages; an award is reviewed for abuse of discretion in light of factors including the defendant’s blameworthiness and whether the wrongdoing was hard to detect.

Curto v. Hartmann · filed 2025-09-09(a)

‘‘In determining whether a punitive damages award pursuant to § 42-110g (a) is so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion, we look to the factors that the United States Supreme Court discussed in Exxon Ship- ping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008).’’

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award injunctive or other equitable relief in lieu of damages, including a judgment without money damages.

Associated Investment Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams Associates IV · filed 1994-07-19(d)

The significance of the broad equitable remedies authorized under CUTPA is underscored by the express language of § 42-110g (d), which, in affording the court discretion to order injunctive and other equitable relief in lieu of damages, “contemplates plaintiffs’ judgments which do not include an award of money damages.”

Section 42-110g(a) permits the trial court to award punitive damages in its discretion after a jury finds CUTPA liability.

Perkins v. Colonial Cemeteries, Inc. · filed 1999-06-08(a)

Under CUTPA, once there is a finding of liability by the jury, the trial court may then, “in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.” General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (a).

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees for a CUTPA violation.

Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House · filed 1987-01-20(d)

Since CUTPA expressly permits the court to award “costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney”; General Statutes § 42-110g (d); the defendants are clearly entitled to such fees.

Section 42-110g(d) gives the court, rather than the jury, authority to determine an award of attorney’s fees.

Gill v. Petrazzuoli Bros. · filed 1987-02-24(d)

We hold, on the basis of the statutory language and legislative history of General Statutes § 42-110g (d), and the policy underlying CUTPA, that the court rather than the jury determines an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award attorney’s fees and costs in its discretion when CUTPA liability is established.

Nguyen v. DaSilva · filed 1987-04-21(d)

When liability under CUTPA is established, attorney’s fees and costs may be awarded at the discretion of the court and the successful litigant must be given the opportunity at trial to provide evidence to establish a basis for the award.

Section 42-110g(d) makes reasonable attorney’s fees a discretionary CUTPA remedy that can be incorporated into Lemon Law arbitration.

Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco · filed 1989-01-17(d)

Finally, subsection (d) of § 42-110g states in part that “[i]n any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, to the plaintiff . . . costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery.” ... Thus, attorney’s fees are a “remedy.”

Section 42-110g(d) permits a successful CUTPA plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Gibbs v. Southeastern Investment Corp. · filed 1989-01-30(d)

CUTPA allows for the awarding of costs and reasonable attorney fees to a successful plaintiff. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d). ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s application for attorney fees is granted in the amount deemed reasonable by the court, as specified below.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award attorney’s fees and costs in a class action that obtains nonmonetary relief through a stipulated judgment.

Hernandez v. Monterey Village Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1989-01-31(d)

The statute does not expressly condition the plaintiffs’ ability to seek and receive an award for attorney’s fees and costs on the obtaining of a judgment rendered after full adversarial litigation on the merits.

Section 42-110g permits a court to award punitive damages and attorney’s fees for a CUTPA violation even when the plaintiff proves no actual damages.

Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1989-06-15(a), (d)

Although the plaintiff has failed to show any actual damages resulting from the violations of these statutes, the Court in its discretion may award punitive damages and attorney’s fees under the CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(d) does not support an award of attorney’s fees and costs when the defendant has not violated CUTPA.

A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. · filed 1990-08-07(d)

Because Pepperidge Farm’s negligence did not constitute a violation of CUTPA, however, the court’s judgment awarding $91,334.78 in attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiff pursuant to CUTPA must be set aside. See General Statutes § 42-110g (d).

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award attorney’s fees and costs after CUTPA liability is established, even if it awards no damages under CUTPA.

Freeman v. Alamo Management Co. · filed 1991-02-12(d)

Once liability has been established under CUTPA, attorney’s fees and costs may be awarded at the discretion of the court.

Section 42-110g(d) entitles plaintiffs seeking attorney’s fees and costs after a stipulated judgment to an evidentiary hearing on whether an award is warranted and, if so, its amount.

Hernandez v. Monterey Village Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1991-04-30(d)

Instead, the trial court denied relief because there was no contractual authorization in the settlement agreement without the required evidentiary hearing. For purposes of General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (d), the plaintiffs are entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 42-110g(d) provides for an award of costs and attorney fees, with the amount determined after a documented claim is submitted.

Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc. · filed 1993-10-25(d)

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d); Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989). Plaintiffs may submit their claim within ten (10) days hereof with the documentation to be available to defendant for objecting within fourteen (14) days thereafter.

Section 42-110g leaves awards of CUTPA damages and attorney’s fees to the trial court’s discretion.

Woronecki v. Trappe · filed 1994-02-22

Both CUTPA and General Statutes § 49-51 provide that damages and attorney’s fees may be awarded at the discretion of the court.

Section 42-110g does not allow attorney’s fees when the defendant did not violate CUTPA.

Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank · filed 1994-08-02

Because we conclude that the bank did not violate CUTPA, Josef is unable to collect attorney’s fees under the provisions of CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(d) gives the trial court discretion to exclude attorney’s fees incurred in a related DMV proceeding from a CUTPA fee award.

Staehle v. Michael's Garage, Inc. · filed 1994-08-16(d)

There being no indication of either in this case, we conclude that it was within the discretion of the trial court to exclude attorney’s fees related to the DMY proceeding in its award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(a) makes an award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA discretionary.

Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works · filed 1994-09-14(a)

Under CUT-PA, an award of attorney’s fees is discretionary. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a). For the reasons noted above, on neither ground is it found that such fees should be awarded.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees for a CUTPA claim, but those requests fail when the claim is stricken.

Renz v. Milano Development, No. Cv94 0361546 (Oct. 20, 1994) · filed 1994-10-20(a), (d)

Under CUTPA, a plaintiff may receive punitive damages; General Statutes § 42-110g (a); and "reasonable attorneys' fees." General Statutes § 42-110g (d). ... The motion to strike the CUTPA claim is granted, and the plaintiffs' prayer for punitive damages and attorney's fees also must fail regarding this claim.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a prevailing CUTPA plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for work related to the CUTPA claim even if some theories fail.

Boulevard Associates v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc. · filed 1994-11-14(d)

Pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d), plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. ... In light of controlling Connecticut case law, this court will not reduce the award of attorneys’ fees solely based upon the fact that plaintiff did not succeed on all of its theories. The fees requested are necessary and reasonable as long as they were “related to the prosecution of the CUTPA cause of action”.

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of attorney's fees for a CUTPA claim, but a legally insufficient claim cannot support a request for those fees.

Jaser v. Mansi, No. Cv N.H. 9303-5706 (Feb. 21, 1995) · filed 1995-02-21(d)

Under CUTPA, a plaintiff may receive reasonable attorneys' fees. General Statutes § 42-110g (d). ... Inasmuch as the Third Count of defendant's Counterclaim is legally insufficient to support a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, the plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Third Count, as well as to strike the prayer for attorney's fees, is granted.

Section 42-110g provides punitive damages and attorney's fees as remedies for a CUTPA violation.

Chaspek Manufacturing Corp. v. Tandet, No. Cv 9309-2714 (Jun. 16, 1995) · filed 1995-06-16(a) and (d)

Punitive damages are awarded for a violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices as a statutory remedy. Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (a) ... The plaintiffs did not establish probable cause regarding any CUTPA violation. Therefore no prejudgment remedy will be granted for punitive damages or attorney's fees.

Section 42-110g(d) gives the court discretion to deny attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff whose conduct toward the defendant was unfair.

S. Pope, Inc. v. Pope Exterminating Inc., No. 66712 (Jul. 6, 1994) · filed 1994-07-06(d)

What the court is saying is that the statutory provision in § 42-110g (d) gives the court the discretion to award "to the plaintiff . . . costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." The court concludes that CUTPA is all about fairness. Before this court will exercise its discretion and award attorneys' fees in this case, the court should at least be satisfied that the plaintiff's behavior in dealing with the defendants was fair. This court is not so satisfied.

Section 42-110g(d) does not allow attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff fails to establish a CUTPA violation.

Brandewiede v. Emery Worldwide · filed 1994-10-12(d)

A party may be awarded actual and punitive damages as well as attorneys’ fees for any ascertainable loss under CUT-PA. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a), (d). ... Since the court does not find liability under CUTPA, plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 42-110g(d) requires courts setting reasonable attorney’s fees to consider the relevant factors rather than basing the award solely on its relationship to damages.

Steiger v. J. S. Builders, Inc. · filed 1995-08-29(d)

In this case, the trial court focused on only one of the twelve enunciated guidelines—the reasonableness of the relationship between the award of attorney’s fees and the award of damages. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in seizing from the full panoply merely one guideline, to the exclusion and disregard of the others.

Section 42-110g(d) allows reasonable attorney's fees and costs for a proven CUTPA violation.

Amato v. Sherwood Forest, Inc., No. Cv 920341185 (Sep. 14, 1995) · filed 1995-09-14(d)

Pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g (d), the plaintiffs claim costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The court finds that such damages are warranted since the defendant's steadfast refusal to address the problems detailed above necessitated this litigation. The court finds that plaintiffs' counsel reasonably spent 38 hours in representing the plaintiffs at trial and in proceedings prior to trial and that his claimed rate of $150.00 per hour is reasonable given the level of complexity of the case and the issues presented. The court awards counsel fees in the amount of $5,700.00, and expert witness fees in the amount of $900.00, which the court finds to be reasonable compensation for Mr. Oppel's preparation and time spent testifying.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages and attorney's fees for a CUTPA violation even when the plaintiff fails to prove an ascertainable loss.

Wagner v. Bezzini, No. Cv-94-0541364 (Nov. 7, 1995) · filed 1995-11-07

General Statutes § 42-110g provides that any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of a violation of CUTPA may recover actual damages. That statute also provides for punitive damages plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees where appropriate. As stated above, plaintiff has failed to prove any ascertainable loss because of the violation of CUTPA. However, the court believes he is entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $1700 and an attorney's fee in the amount of $3501.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a reasonable attorney's fee based on the CUTPA claim rather than the total recovery on all claims.

Schultz v. Tool Tek, Inc., No. Cv89 028346s (Mar. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-03-29(d)

Under such circumstances, an award of attorney's fees based upon the total amount recovered is not necessary in order to encourage attorneys to accept and litigate CUTPA cases. The jury awarded the plaintiff the sum of $20,000 with respect to the CUTPA claims and the court deems a fair and reasonable attorney's fees, in light of the contingent fee arrangement between the plaintiff and his attorney, to be $10,000, and accordingly awards that amount as attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g (d).

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of attorney’s fees, but the parties must have an opportunity to litigate whether the fees are reasonable.

Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Spencer · filed 1996-06-18(d)

Because General Statutes § 42-110g (d) expressly permits the court to award attorney’s fees,... the defendant clearly is entitled to such fees. ... Although the plaintiff, the Masottas and the defendant submitted sworn affidavits of attorney’s fees to the trial court, no opportunity was ever presented for either side to litigate that issue. The issue of attorney’s fees must be fully addressed at a further hearing.

Section 42-110g(d) bases attorney’s fees on the work reasonably performed, rather than the amount recovered.

Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown · filed 1996-07-09(d)

Additionally, the amount of attorney’s fees that the trial court may award is based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (d).

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of attorney’s fees on a CUTPA claim, which can provide a basis for an arbitration award when the claim and allegations support it.

Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co. · filed 1996-07-30(d)

In light of the defendant’s claim for relief in its demand for arbitration and the factual allegations regarding the plaintiffs conduct, we conclude that the arbitration panel’s award of attorney’s fees could have been made pursuant to the defendant’s CUTPA claim. Thus, the resulting award was within the scope of the submission.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages and attorney's fees for a CUTPA violation; the court may award punitive damages to deter misconduct.

Rosen Realty Assoc. v. the Green Giraffe, No. Cv95 0373219 S (Aug. 1, 1996) · filed 1996-08-01(a), (d)

As recipients of a CUTPA violation, the defendants are entitled to punitive damages and an attorney's fee. General Statutes § 42-110g (a) (d); Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corporation, 184 Conn. 607 , 617 (1981). Under CUTPA, punitive damages are not limited, as at common law, to costs of litigation and attorney's fees but may be awarded at the court's discretion on a theory of deterrence, Lenz v. CNA Assurance Co., 42 Conn. Sup. 514 , 515 (1993).

Section 42-110g allows punitive damages in addition to attorney's fees in a CUTPA action.

Willow Springs v. Seventh Brt, No. Cv 062549 (Sep. 11, 1996) · filed 1996-09-11(a), (d)

In keeping with the statutory language of General Statutes 42-110g (a) and (d) allowing for punitive damages separate and distinct from attorney's fees, and the decisions of the district court pursuant to the statutes, the court finds that punitive damages may be awarded in addition to attorney's fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees without the showing required for punitive damages.

Willow Springs Condo. v. Seventh Brt Dev., No. Cv 93-062549 (Sep. 11, 1996) · filed 1996-09-11(d)

The defendants second argument, that the evidence must show that the defendants acted with reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of the rights of others, is misplaced. The standard argued by the defendants is the standard applied in awarding punitive damages.

Section 42-110g does not provide punitive damages or attorney's fees when the underlying CUTPA claim has been stricken.

Ricotta v. Drummond, No. 32 40 47 (Feb. 25, 1997) · filed 1997-02-25

However, the striking of the defendants' CUTPA claims makes General Statutes § 42-110g (a) (g) inapplicable.

Section 42-110g(d) permits reasonable attorney's fees based on the work performed on a successful CUTPA claim, regardless of the amount recovered.

Fournier v. Gama Developers, Inc., No. Cv95-0125666 (Jul. 29, 1997) · filed 1997-07-29(d)

The court further finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under CUTPA. With respect to the amount to be awarded, Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides that the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees "based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery." ... It should be further noted that the attorney's fees to be awarded will be limited to the fees incurred in making the CUTPA claim against Docchio only. The plaintiffs did not sustain their CUTPA claim against GAMA and cannot be awarded any attorney's fees for their claims against GAMA.

Section 42-110g(d) allows a defendant who brings a CUTPA counterclaim to seek attorney's fees as a plaintiff on that counterclaim.

Jacques All Trade Corp. v. Brown, No. Cv-90-0381618-S (Oct. 31, 1997) · filed 1997-10-31(d)

General Statutes § 42-110g (d) as amended by the legislature in 1976 allows for the awarding of attorney's fees to a plaintiff only, whereas, prior thereto, attorney's fees could be awarded to either plaintiff or defendant. ... This court concludes that this defendant, Brown, having raised General Statutes Section 42-110b by counterclaim, satisfies the requirement of a proper status to claim attorney's fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a later evidentiary hearing to determine attorney's fees when fee evidence was not presented at the damages hearing.

Malizia v. Marini, No. Cv 96 0152381 (Nov. 28, 1997) · filed 1997-11-28(d)

The court agrees with this recommendation of the referee. ... Therefore, an evidentiary hearing will be held in accordance with General Statutes § 42-110g (d) on December 17, 1997, at 9:30 a.m.

Section 42-110g does not provide punitive damages or attorney's fees when the plaintiff has failed to plead a viable CUTPA claim.

Boyce v. Canby, No. Cv 96 0153623 (Feb. 27, 1998) · filed 1998-02-27(a), (d)

In the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts in count four of the complaint to demonstrate that the defendant was engaged in the business of selling real estate. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' prayer for relief for punitive damages and attorney's fees under CUTPA cannot be maintained.

Section 42-110g(d) permits the court to award reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiffs who prevail on a CUTPA claim.

Malizia v. Marini, No. Cv 96 0152381 (May 4, 1998) · filed 1998-05-04(d)

The referee also recommended that a hearing be scheduled to determine the amount of attorney's fees to which the plaintiffs were entitled by virtue of General Statutes § 42-110g (d). This court held a hearing on this subject at which time the plaintiffs sought attorney's fees in the amount of $9,252, subsequently amended to $10,219 to reflect additional work performed after the hearing held on December 17, 1997. The court awards $5,000 in attorney's fees as a reasonable amount for the work performed.

Section 42-110g(d) requires an opportunity to present evidence and be heard on the reasonableness of attorney’s fees before they are awarded.

Levesque Builders, Inc. v. Hoerle · filed 1998-08-11(d)

Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was improper because the award was made without affording the parties the opportunity to present evidence and to be heard on the issue of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits courts to award attorney’s fees to corporate plaintiffs in CUTPA actions.

Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo · filed 1998-11-03(d)

If the legislature intended the remedy afforded by CUTPA to apply to all persons, including corporations, the entire statute, with all its provisions, must also apply to corporations. Therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees in the discretion of the trial court.

Section 42-110g(d) does not entitle plaintiff attorneys to fees for their own work assisting trial counsel when that work amounts to pro se representation.

Jones v. Ippoliti · filed 1999-03-16(d)

Even if we were to conclude otherwise, i.e., that Pepe and Hazard represented the plaintiffs, such representation would have been of a pro se nature. The law of this state is that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney’s fees. See Lev v. Lev, 10 Conn. App. 570, 575, 524 A.2d 674 (1987). Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees for the services provided by Pepe and Hazard, and the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs’ request for them.

Section 42-110g(d) permits attorney's fees under CUTPA, but a request for fees cannot stand when the CUTPA claim is legally insufficient.

Colon v. Geico Casulalty Company, No. Cv 98-0419197 (Jul. 28, 1999) · filed 1999-07-28(d)

Although attorney's fees may be awarded under CUTPA; General Statutes § 42-110g (d); as stated above, Colon has failed to set forth CT Page 9860 a legally sufficient CUTPA claim. Therefore the court strikes ¶ 4 of Colon's prayer for relief.

Section 42-110g permits discretionary attorney's fees and punitive damages even if the plaintiff has no ascertainable damages.

Cavendish-Pell v. Howell, No. Cv 96-0153146 (Mar. 3, 2000) · filed 2000-03-03(a)

However, a trial court is not precluded from exercising its discretion to award attorney's fees and punitive damages even if it finds that the plaintiff has not suffered any ascertainable damages.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a request for attorney's fees on a CUTPA claim.

Consumer Incentive v. Memberworks, No. Cv99 036 26 55 S (Apr. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-04-25(d)

Moreover, CISI's claim for attorneys' fees in the eleventh and twelfth counts is proper because those counts are based on the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. See General Statutes § 42-110g (d).

Section 42-110g permits a court to award damages and reasonable attorney's fees in a private CUTPA action.

Wesley v. Cinnamon Ridge Co., No. Cv 980077761s (Jul. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-07-13

Based upon the probative and credible evidence, the court awards damages of $12,234.08 plus reasonable attorney's fees of $1,036.70 under General Statutes § 42-110g .

Section 42-110g(d) authorizes attorney’s fees in a CUTPA action but does not itself authorize a fee award in a legal malpractice action.

Lorenzetti v. Jolles · filed 2000-07-21(d)

Plaintiff cites to that provision of CUTPA which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees “[i]n any action brought by a person under this section ... based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery.” Conn.Gen.Stat. 42-110g(d). This statute, however, does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees in a legal malpractice action, nor does plaintiff point to any contractual language between the parties that would authorize attorney’s fees in this malpractice case.

Section 42-110g(d) permits reasonable attorney's fees for work on a successful CUTPA claim, including work in an earlier trial and appeal.

Urich v. Fish, No. 360659 (Jan. 24, 2001) · filed 2001-01-24(d)

Because Fish has now prevailed on his CUTPA Counterclaim, he is entitled to attorney's fees based on all of the work reasonably performed by his attorney on that claim. In this case, that work reasonably included the initial trial and appeal.

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of attorney's fees for a CUTPA claim.

Poulos v. Jones, No. Cv 00-0503315 S (Feb. 9, 2001) · filed 2001-02-09(d)

Since CUTPA, at General Statutes § 42-110g (d), provides for the award of attorney's fees, the motion to strike paragraph 11 of the claim for relief is also denied.

Section 42-110g gives courts discretion to award punitive damages and attorney's fees for a CUTPA violation.

Cohn v. Harco International, No. Cv-99-0089169 (May 2, 2001) · filed 2001-05-02(a), (d)

Balancing the equities in this case, the court finds that an award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees is not justified. Though Komondy's actions were fraudulent, this court finds that the actions were not egregious nor outrageous, nor the result of reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiffs rights. Accordingly, this court, in exercising its discretion, will decline to award punitive damages and attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.

Section 42-110g permits punitive damages under subsection (a) and attorney's fees under subsection (d) for an unfair trade practice.

Silmarket Trading, Inc. v. Central Sports, Inc., No. 120131 (Dec. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-12-10(a), (d)

Accordingly, the court awards attorney's fees in the amount of $7,732.55 to the plaintiff (Exhibit 39) under Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (d) and punitive damages in the amount of $140,008 pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

Section 42-110g(d) bases reasonable attorney fees on the attorney’s work, so a contingent fee agreement does not cap the award.

Fabri v. UNITED TECHS. INT'L., INC. · filed 2002-03-29(d)

Defendants’ argument would do what the statute expressly precludes, namely, to base a CUTPA award on the amount of recovery, rather than the reasonable work performed by an attorney. As contrary to CUTPA, Defendants’ argument is without merit.

Section 42-110g permits an award of damages and attorney fees on a successful private CUTPA claim.

Miller v. Guimaraes, No. Cv 00-0596354 (Apr. 18, 2002) · filed 2002-04-18

As to count three, the CUTPA claim, judgment may enter in favor of the Plaintiff Layne Miller and Paula Miller against the defendants Peter Guimaraes and Guimaraes Construction, Inc. in the amount of $41,000 together with attorney fees to be determined in a separate hearing.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award reasonable attorney's fees based on the work reasonably performed, rather than the amount recovered.

Arroyo v. Safe Home Security, No. Cv00-0499980s (Apr. 23, 2002) · filed 2002-04-23(d)

General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in part that "the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorney's fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not the amount of recovery." ... In applying the foregoing analysis to the entire record, the court finds that a reasonable attorney's fee is $4,000.00 plus costs and awards this amount.

Section 42-110g(d) allows attorney fees only for work related to prosecuting the CUTPA claim.

Northington Partners v. Executive Risk, No. X03 Cv99 0506449s (Oct. 3, 2002) · filed 2002-10-03(d)

Courts can award attorneys' fees under CUTPA only for those expenses that were related to the prosecution of CUTPA claim. ... Based on a review of the billing records submitted by Northington's counsel it appears that no more than one tenth of the total fees and costs were devoted to the CUTPA claim. Therefore, the court awards the plaintiff attorneys' fees under CUTPA in the amount of $47,150.

Section 42-110g(d) does not permit an award of attorney’s fees without a legally sufficient basis for CUTPA liability.

International Brands USA, Inc. v. Old St. Andrews Ltd. · filed 2004-06-15(d)

Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d) provides that “the court may award, to the plaintiff ... costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery.” ... Regrettably, however, this Court cannot award International Brands its legal fees under CUTPA because the Court does not believe that there are legally sufficient grounds to impose CUTPA liability in this case.

Section 42-110g(d) allows a court to award attorney’s fees to a successful CUTPA plaintiff without limiting the award to the amount in a contingency fee agreement.

Charts v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-10-25(d)

Thus, a contingency fee agreement does not limit the amount a court may award to a successful CUTPA plaintiff.

Section 42-110g(d) makes attorney’s fee awards discretionary; factors for calculating fees apply only after the court decides to award them.

MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc. · filed 2008-07-22(d)

Additionally, we note that the twelve factors set forth in Steiger do not govern the issue in the present case. Those factors govern the standard for setting the amount of attorney’s fees once a trial court has exercised its decision to award such fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees based on the attorney’s work rather than the amount recovered.

Thorsen v. DURKIN DEVELOPMENT, LLC · filed 2011-05-31(d)

General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (d) provides in relevant part that “[i]n any action brought by a person [pursuant to CUTPA], the court may award . . . costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. . . .” ... On the basis of our review of the record, and under these circumstances, we cannot say that the award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff was unreasonable and excessive.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in an action brought under the section.

Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry · filed 2017-12-26(d)

We note also that CUTPA expressly authorizes attorney’s fees. See General Statutes § 42-110g (d) (‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award . . . costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .’’).

Section 42-110g allows reasonable attorneys’ fees for a CUTPA claim and gives courts discretion to include work on related claims.

ALV Events International v. Johnson · filed 2010-08-20(d)

It is in the court’s discretion to include as part of the attorneys’ fee award expenses that are associated with non-CUTPA or unsuccessful claims when the claims as a whole are related or arise out of essentially the same transactions.

Section 42-110g(d) permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees for pro bono representation.

Parris v. Pappas · filed 2012-01-04(d)

Defendants argue that no fees should be awarded to the law firm Bingham McCutchen because their representation of plaintiff was undertaken on a pro bono basis; thus, “a reasonable, paying client” would expect to pay nothing. ... Accordingly, defendants’ request is denied on this basis.

A plaintiff who cannot maintain a CUTPA claim cannot recover expert witness fees under § 42-110g(d).

Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc. · filed 2013-10-01(d)

Because the plaintiff could not maintain a claim under CUTPA and, thus, could not prevail under CUTPA, the plaintiff could not recover expert witness fees under § 42-1 110g (d).

Section 42-110g (d) leaves an award of attorney’s fees to the trial court’s discretion, without a presumption favoring a prevailing plaintiff.

Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC · filed 2019-07-02(d)

The rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff con- tends that we should recognize, whereby a plaintiff ‘‘should ordinarily recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,’’ is in conflict with this court’s holding in Staehle and contrary to the plain language of the statute. With the operation of such a presumption, the trial court would lose its statutory discretion in determining whether to award attorney’s fees.

Section 42-110g(d) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for defending a CUTPA judgment on appeal and pursuing a related fee motion, based on work reasonably performed rather than the amount recovered.

Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. · filed 2019-07-02(d)

In summary, the plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees of $49,980 for the time reasonably expended by her attorneys on appeal and on the fee motion.

Section 42-110g(d) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for work on a CUTPA claim and factually related claims, but excludes work solely on unrelated claims.

Negron v. Patriot Auto Sales, LLC · filed 2019-09-17(d)

Because the court can only award attorney’s fees pursuant to CUTPA for work reasonably performed and related to the CUTPA claim, it will not award fees for work solely related to the civil forgery claim.

Section 42-110g(d) bases a CUTPA attorney fee award on the work reasonably performed by counsel, not the amount recovered.

Murillo v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. · filed 2019-10-10(d)

The statute expressly provides that an award of attorney fees is not to be based on “the amount of recovery,” but rather “on the work reasonably performed by an attorney.”

Section 42-110g(d) gives courts discretion to deny attorney’s fees when the plaintiff does not identify work attributable to its CUTPA claim and an award is unnecessary in light of the damages received.

Graduation Solutions LLC v. Acadima, LLC · filed 2020-03-30(d)

Here, Plaintiff brought its CUTPA claim based on Loukaides’s violations of federal statutes and has not provided the Court with any breakdown of which hours were attributable to those claims related to its CUTPA claims, so the Court is not persuaded that an attorney’s fee award is necessary.

Attorney’s fees under § 42-110g (d) are discretionary, with no presumption favoring prevailing plaintiffs; courts must consider CUTPA’s purpose when deciding whether to award them.

Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC · filed 2020-12-11(d)

Accordingly, we decline to adopt a presumption in favor of attorney’s fees under § 42-110g (d). ... Moreover, in exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider the purpose of CUTPA attorney’s fees when deciding whether a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded such fees.

Section 42-110g permits an award of attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff establishes a CUTPA violation.

Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon · filed 2021-09-28(d)

Because a finding of liability under CUTPA is a neces- sary prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA, we also set forth the applicable standard of review for a finding that a defendant violated CUTPA.

Section 42-110g(d) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing claimant for work reasonably performed.

Hernandez v. Saybrook Buick GMC, Inc. · filed 2021-07-05(d)

A reasonable award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party is authorized under the CUTPA and TILA. ... For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion and awards attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $8,400.93.

Section 42-110g(d) authorizes reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for a successful CUTPA plaintiff.

Cartagena-Cordero v. Five Star Cars, LLC · filed 2022-03-28(d)

Both TILA and CUPTA authorize a successful plaintiff to be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (TILA); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42–110g(d) (CUTPA). ... For these reasons, I grant Cartagena-Cordero’s motion and awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,000.

Section 42-110g(a) permits discretionary attorney’s fees, which do not count toward the federal amount in controversy because they are not recoverable as a matter of right.

Kwolek v. NRT New England LLC · filed 2023-11-03(a)

However, because the decision to award such fees under CUTPA is within the court’s discretion, id., attorney’s fees are not a matter of right and consequently, are not to be considered in the amount in controversy calculation, see Howard v. Anthem, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 3d 133, 139-140 (D. Conn. 2022); see also Pyskaty, 856 F.3d at 224 n. 14.

Section 42-110g(d) does not provide an attorney’s fee award when the plaintiff has not established entitlement to judgment on the CUTPA claim.

Nilsen v. SJV International Group, Inc. · filed 2024-12-05(d)

Because the Court is denying the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to the requested $10,370.00 award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(d).

Section 42-110g(d) permits attorney’s fees for work related to prosecuting a CUTPA claim, including work on claims based on the same facts, but excludes unrelated work.

Pearlman v. Gervolino · filed 2025-07-29(d)

Thus, in the present case, the defendant’s award of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 42-110g (d) was limited to those fees related to the prosecution of the CUTPA count of his counterclaim.

Section 42-110g(d) treats reasonable attorney’s fees separately from costs, so Rule 68 does not require a fee award when an offer is silent about fees.

Chambers v. Manning · filed 1996-08-22(d)

The present case does not involve statutes that define attorney’s fees “as part of’ costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (1994) (“costs ... together with a reasonable attorney’s fee”); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(d) (1993) (“costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees”). Therefore, Rule 68 does not mandate a fee award simply because defendant’s offer failed to exclude one.

Section 42-110g(d) allows a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees.

THE ESTATE OF LESTER COTTON v. SENIOR PLANNING SERVICES, LLC · filed 2020-11-30(d)

Further, both the CUTPA and New York statutes provide for a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees, while the NJCFA mandates the payment of attorneys’ fees. Compare N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(d) and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h).

Section 42-110g (f) sets a three year limitation period for actions claiming a CUTPA violation.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co. · filed 1987-02-03(f)

Because General Statutes § 42-110g (f) prescribes a three year limitation upon actions claiming a violation of CUTPA, the defendant’s reliance on any other statute of limitations is unfounded.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year statute of limitations for CUTPA actions.

Emhart Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International Inc. · filed 1987-07-02(f)

The CUTPA contains a three year statute of limitations. Conn.Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f).

Section 42-110g(f) starts the three-year period for a CUTPA action when the violation occurs, even if the plaintiff discovers the deception later.

Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp. · filed 1988-04-26(f)

We are unable to perceive any significant distinction applicable to this case between the “act or omission” reference, denoting the start of the limitation period in §§ 52-577 and 52-584, and the “occurrence of a violation” phrase in § 42-110g (f), setting the time when the three year period begins for bringing an action alleging a CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for CUTPA claims.

City of West Haven v. Commercial Union Insurance Company F/k/a Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company · filed 1990-03-20(f)

We agree with the district court that the three-year limitations period applies to the CUT-PA claim, see Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f), and that at the maximum a six-year limitations period applies to the CUIPA claim.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period that operates independently of the one-year limit for suits on a fire insurance policy.

Lees v. Middlesex Insurance · filed 1991-07-23(f)

Thus, we interpret the statute of limitations in § 42-110g (f) to operate independently of that prescribed in § 38-98.

Section 42-110g(f)'s three-year limitations period limits the time for recoverable damages rather than barring a CUTPA claim.

Vallerie Transp. Svc. v. Texaco, Inc., No. Cv86 0083410 (Feb. 10, 1992) · filed 1992-02-10(f)

With respect to such claims the defendant also asserts that the CUPTA actions are time barred, at least in part, at virtue of the three year statute of limitations contained in General Statutes Section 42-110g (f). ... The claim with respect to the statute of limitations contained in CUPTA would not prevent the assertion of a cause of action, but rather, would at most limit the time period within which damages could be recovered.

Section 42-110g(f) allows a CUTPA action only within three years after the violation occurs.

Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc. · filed 1992-03-17(f)

... the jury in the present case was entitled to consider only those actions of the defendants beginning on July 19, 1985, for purposes of determining a CUTPA violation, because the statute of limitations for CUTPA actions is three years.

Section 42-110g(f) bars a CUTPA action brought more than three years after the alleged violation.

Doe v. British Universities North American Club · filed 1992-04-07(f)

This claim, however, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, [a]n action under CUTPA “may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation in this chapter.” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f).

Section 42-110g(f) gives a plaintiff three years to file a CUTPA claim.

Brandewiede v. Emery Worldwide · filed 1992-11-24(f)

Finally, Emery argues that Brandewiede’s CUTPA claim is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(f). ... Because the complaint in this action was brought in November, 1990, it was filed within the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a substantive three-year limit that begins when a CUTPA violation occurs, rather than when the injured party discovers it.

Paganetti v. Curtis, No. 61850 (Dec. 21, 1992) · filed 1992-12-21(f)

The statute of limitations in the present action is substantive or jurisdictional and is a proper ground to challenge this courts subject matter jurisdiction. The three year statute of limitations under General Statutes Sec. 42-110g (f) accrues after the occurrence of a CUTPA violation. The court narrowly interprets General Statutes Sec. 42-110g (f) and holds that the starting point for the running of the statute of limitations is upon the occurrence of the CUTPA violation and not upon any subsequent discovery by the injured party, i.e., no exceptions for latent deceptive practices.

Section 42-110g(f) gives CUTPA claims a three-year limitations period, including claims arising from a contract to purchase real estate.

Bartone v. Robert L. Day Co., Inc., No. 62749 (Jun. 24, 1993) · filed 1993-06-24(f)

Even though the present action arises from a contract for the purchase of realty, the plaintiffs' claims are clearly based in tort and under CUTPA. It is this court's opinion that the three year statute of limitations applies to all counts directed against the defendant corporation. Accordingly, under both General Statutes Sec. 42-110g (f) and Sec. 52-577 , the statute of limitations ran on the plaintiffs' action on February 10, 1990, three years after the transfer of the subject premises from the defendants, sellers, to the plaintiffs, buyers.

Section 42-110g(f) sets a three-year limitations period for a CUTPA claim, measured here from the property transfer.

Bartone v. Robert L. Day Co., Inc., No. 62749 (Aug. 30, 1993) · filed 1993-08-30(f)

Accordingly, under both General Statutes Sec. 42-110g (f) and Sec. 52-577 , the statute of limitations ran on the plaintiffs' action on February 10, 1990, three years after the transfer of the subject premises from the defendants, sellers, to the plaintiffs, buyers.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA claim to be brought within three years of the alleged violation.

Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Reckert · filed 1994-03-08(f)

The statutes of limitation that apply to the negligence and CUTPA claims require suit to be brought within three years of the conduct or violation. General Statutes § 52-577 (tort claim must be brought within three years of act or omission); General Statutes § 42-110g (f) (allegations of CUTPA violations must be brought within three years of conduct). Thus, Reckert’s negligence and CUTPA claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and the trial court properly entered summary judgment in Lackland’s favor.

Section 42-110g(f) requires a CUTPA action to be brought within three years of the violation; a continuing course of conduct can toll that period only if a duty remained in existence after the original wrong.

International Inns, Inc. v. Oja, No. 104344 (Sep. 8, 1994) · filed 1994-09-08(f)

General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides as follows: "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter." In Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp. , 207 Conn. 204 , 209 , 541 A.2d 472 (1988), the court held that in order for a "continuing course of conduct" to toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of duty that remained in existence after the commission of the original wrong related thereto. The plaintiff has not alleged a duty which would establish a "continuing course of conduct" and thus toll the three year statute of limitations. See Id. Because the plaintiff commenced the present action more than three years after the defendants' alleged misrepresentation occurred, count three of the plaintiff's complaint is time barred.