Cal. Civ. Code § 1624

Section 1624 does not bar a lease unsigned by the lessee when the lessee accepts it and acts under it by taking possession or paying rent.

Hines v. Hubble · filed 1956-10-05

Similar facts were considered in Munford v. Humphreys, 68 Cal.App. 530, 535 [229 P. 860], where it was held that it is not essential to the validity of a lease for the purpose of binding the lessee that it be signed by him provided he accepts the lease and acts thereunder, which exception is generally shown by taking possession or by the payment of rent; that a lease must be signed by the lessor, but need not, as a general rule, be signed by the lessee if accepted by him, as his acceptance of the lease not only binds him but the lessor as well and obviates the unilateral character of the instrument; and that to accept a written lease is to consent to the terms thereof, and the physical taking possession or retention of the instrument is merely evidence of such acceptance or consent. There is sufficient evidence to show that the lease was in effect and plaintiffs were in possession of the property under it during the time the Hineses attempted to establish their own title thereto by filing their own location notices. The lease was properly received in evidence.

Section 1624 requires a writing for a contract to convey an interest in real property.

Contreras v. Loya · filed 1961-05-16

The contract was one to convey an interest in real property and as such invalid unless in writing. (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973.)

Section 1624 makes an oral sublease of real property for longer than one year invalid without a written memorandum subscribed by the party sought to be charged.

Kevich v. R. L. C., Inc. · filed 1959-08-27

As- an oral sublease of real property “for a longer period than one year” it was a “contract” declared “invalid” by the express terms of section 1624 of the Civil Code, there being no “note or memorandum thereof” in “writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”

Section 1624(4) requires a writing memorializing a two-year leaseback that is a crucial part of a real property sale agreement.

Truslow v. Woodruff · filed 1967-06-29(4)

Respondent’s affidavits establish a complete defense to the action: the two-year leaseback, a crucial aspect of the sales agreement, was oral, and is not "memorandized ” by any writing as required by the statute of frauds.

Section 1624, subdivision 4, requires a lease for more than one year to be in writing.

Maron v. Howard · filed 1968-01-31(4)

The lease was for a period of five years commencing January 1, 1960, and at the time of the incorporation of Marón Litho, Inc. the lease had a period of approximately three years and ten months until its expiration if the option for renewal was not exercised. Such a lease must be in writing (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) and the assignment of such a lease must be by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, unless such assignment be by operation of law.

Section 1624 requires a lease for more than one year to be in writing; in this case, estoppel could not make an oral promise for such a lease enforceable.

State of California v. Haslett Co. · filed 1975-01-09(4)

In the instant case, the basic protection of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) would be thwarted should an estoppel be raised since appellant seeks to enforce an oral agreement to grant a lease for a period over one year.

Section 1624 does not require an agent’s authority to exercise a renewal option in a valid written lease to be in writing.

Ripani v. Liberty Loan Corp. · filed 1979-07-30(4)

Likewise, we find that nothing in Civil Code section 1624 requires that any right exercised under a valid written agreement of the parties be supported by written authorization of the agent exercising the right.

Section 1624(5) does not require a written agreement to compensate an agent for obtaining amendments or modifications to an existing lease.

Shell v. Darneille · filed 1984-12-18(5)

The statute, on its face, does not apply to an agreement to procure an amendment or modification of an existing lease and we perceive no basis for giving it such a broad interpretation.

Section 1624(c) bars a claim for breach of an oral agreement to enter into a three-year lease.

Dameshghi v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. · filed 1992-02-25(c)

Moreover, to the extent that Dameshghi alleges that Texaco breached an oral contract to tender and enter into a three-year lease, such contention runs afoul of the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 1971.)

Section 1624(d) requires an agreement to lease property for more than one year to be written and signed by the party to be charged, even if it can be terminated before the lease begins.

Bed, Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners · filed 1997-02-10(d)

Therefore, we hold that an agreement to lease real property for a term exceeding one year is within the statute of frauds of Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (d) regardless whether such agreement provides that it may be canceled or terminated within one year of the date of its making and prior to commencement of the lease term.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires a lease of real property for more than one year to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC · filed 2014-06-10(a)(3)

Under the statute of frauds, to be enforceable an agreement for the lease of real property for more than one year must be in writing signed by the party to be charged. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)

Section 1624(a) allows extrinsic evidence to explain an essential lease term implied by a written agreement, but not to supply a term wholly absent from it.

First National Mortgage Co. v. Federal Realty Investment Trust · filed 2011-02-01(a)

In this case, even assuming the Final Proposal falls within the Statute of Frauds as Federal Realty contends, we reject the argument that it is not binding because it omits an essential term in the form of the duration of the lease.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires a signed writing to enforce an agreement concerning an interest in real property, including an alleged promise about a foreclosure sale.

Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-04-29(a)(3)

The statue of frauds provides that any agreement pertaining to “the sale of real property, or of an interest therein” is invalid unless it is memorialized in writing and signed by the party to be charged. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) ... Here, the alleged promise that no foreclosure sale was scheduled is unenforceable absent a signed writing by Wells Fargo.

Section 1624 does not require a written agreement for the oral coffee-hauling contract at issue.

J. A. Folger & Co. v. Williamson · filed 1954-11-24

An oral contract was sufficient for the purpose. Its subject matter was not such as to require a writing under section 1624 of the Civil Code or section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 1624(6) does not invalidate an oral agreement made and performed in Nevada by Nevada residents concerning debt secured by Nevada land, even if the promisor was domiciled in California.

Bernkrant v. Fowler · filed 1961-04-13(6)

We conclude, thérSóre) that the contract herein does not fall within our statute of frauds.

Section 1624(4)'s writing requirement for real property interests does not apply to a separately sold crop of fruit growing on trees.

Mosekian v. Davis Canning Co. · filed 1964-08-11(4)

First, we note that when sold separately a crop of fruit growing upon trees is not considered to be a part of the real property insofar as pertains to Civil Code section 1624, subdivision 4, which requires the sale of aU interest in real property to be in writing.

An oral agreement subject to section 1624 may still provide sufficient consideration for another agreement.

Milton Meyer & Co. v. Curro · filed 1966-01-20(5)

“The existence of actual fraud is always a question of fact” (23 Cal.Jur.2d 211, Fraud and Deceit, §84) and an oral agreement within the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 5) may still constitute good and sufficient consideration.

Section 1624(a)(7) applies to specified lending and credit agreements, not transfers of stock to a trust.

Kucker v. Kucker · filed 2011-01-26(a)(7)

Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(7), cannot be construed as applying to the transfer of shares of stock to a trust. The plain meaning of the words of the statute manifests a legislative intent to limit the statute’s application to agreements to loan money or extend credit made by persons in the business of loaning money or extending credit.

Section 1624(a)(3) does not bar an oral license to use land, including a license made irrevocable by reliance.

Sierra Northern Railway v. Port of West Sacramento · filed 2024-08-07(a)(3)

Thus, an irrevocable license is not within the purview of the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(a)’s writing requirement for enforcing certain contracts does not bar a copyright infringement claim that does not seek to enforce the contract.

Providence Publications, LLC v. Hub International Insurance Services, Inc. · filed 2024-10-04(a)

California’s statute of frauds requires certain contracts to be “in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged” to be enforceable. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a). ... Providence asserts a violation of the Copyright Act rather than a breach of contract, and the subscription is relevant insofar as it would be a defense to the copyright action if it licensed Hub to make additional copies.

Section 1624(7) requires a grantee’s agreement to assume a debt secured by real property to be in a signed writing or specifically provided for in the conveyance before the grantee is personally liable.

Cornelison v. Kornbluth · filed 1975-12-01(7)

Upon the transfer of real property covered by a mortgage or deed of trust as security for an indebtedness, the property remains subject to the secured indebtedness but the grantee is not personally liable for the indebtedness or to perform any of the obligations of the mortgage or trust deed unless his agreement to pay the indebtedness, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by him or his ... assumption of the indebtedness is specifically provided for in the conveyance.

Section 1624(a)(1)'s writing and signature requirements can be satisfied by an email bearing the charged party's agent's typed name if it contains all material terms of a binding oral agreement.

Lamle v. Mattel · filed 2005-01-07(a)(1)

We can see no meaningful difference between a typewritten signature on a telegram and an email. Therefore, we conclude that under California law the June 26 email satisfies the Statute of Frauds, assuming that there was a binding oral agreement on June 11 and that the email includes all the material terms of that agreement.

Section 1624 requires a writing signed by the lender to enforce a forbearance agreement that modifies a note and deed of trust subject to the statute of frauds.

Secrest v. SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2002-2 · filed 2008-10-09(a)(3)

We conclude the January 2002 Forbearance Agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, Civil Code section 1624. The January 2002 Forbearance Agreement constitutes a modification of the note and deed of trust.

Section 1624 requires a written agreement to modify a mortgage loan or forgo foreclosure; oral promises alone cannot support a promissory estoppel claim.

Khan v. Citimortgage Inc. · filed 2013-09-30

The record reveals no written agreement to modify Ms. Khan’s loan or to forego foreclosure of the property. The complaint’s facts and inferences are that no more than oral statements were made to Ms. Khan. In the absence of a written agreement to modify her loan or to forego foreclosure, the statute of fraud bars the promissory estoppel claim.

Section 1624(a)(6) subjects deeds of trust to the statute of frauds.

Jones v. Wachovia Bank · filed 2014-10-21(a)(6)

A deed of trust is covered by the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(6)), and an agreement to modify a deed of trust is governed by Civil Code section 1698 (hereinafter “section 1698”).

Section 1624 requires a written agreement to modify a mortgage or deed of trust.

Dougherty v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2016-04-05

Certain types of contracts are invalid unless memorialized by a written document signed by the party against whom the contract is being enforced, i.e. the statute of frauds. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624. Mortgages and deeds of trust are subject to the statuté of frauds. ... “An agreement to modify a contract that is "subject to the statute of frauds is also subject to the statute of frauds” and so must be in writing.

Section 1624 applies to a modification of a loan secured by real property and requires a signed writing stating the modification’s essential terms.

Szanto v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA · filed 2020-11-05

Szanto is alleging a loan modification of the underlying HELOC, which is secured by a deed of trust. Szanto alleges that the modification reinstates the expired interest-only term and alters his monthly payment. Thus, the statute of frauds necessarily applies.

Section 1624 requires a signed writing for an agreement extending payment on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, even if the agreement does not change the deed of trust or involve a property sale.

David & Bonita Ebenal v. Ellen B. Klyce & Thomas C. Dashiell · filed 2016-11-07(a)(3)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that the Ebenals' oral agreement was subject to the California statute of frauds.

Section 1624 does not bar an action to restore and enforce a lost deed of trust as written.

Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward · filed 2019-03-28(a)

Chase contends there is no statute of frauds problem with such a claim since it seeks to restore and enforce the DOT as written . We agree.

Section 1624 requires an agreement to modify or forgive a secured loan to be in a signed writing.

Perez v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2022-08-26

Under California law an agreement to modify or forgive a secured loan must be in a signed writing. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that her reliance on Ocwen’s oral representation was justifiable, despite that it needed to be in writing to have effect.

Section 1624(a)(6) requires a modification of a mortgage loan agreement to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged; an oral forbearance plan is not part of the contract.

Lombard Flats LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. · filed 2023-06-24(a)(6)

The alleged forbearance plan was an oral modification of the loan and thus violates the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 makes an oral modification to a mortgage invalid under the statute of frauds.

Cline · filed 2025-09-12

Under the statute of frauds, oral modification to a mortgage is invalid. Id.; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1624.

Section 1624(a)(7) limits the writing requirement for loans to those exceeding $100,000 that are made by a lending business and are not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-18(a)(7)

As to the first of the POMS elements, the ALJ correctly noted that oral loan agreements are enforceable in California. See AR at 23. Of course, loans in excess of $100,000 which are “not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(7).

Section 1624(a)(7) invalidates an oral agreement to lend more than $100,000 only if the loan is not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and the lender is in the business of lending money.

Bumb · filed 2025-11-21(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Court cannot say, on the face of the Complaint, that the second and third elements of Section 1624(a)(7) are met.

An agreement to modify a mortgage must be in writing; an alleged oral modification is invalid.

Hart v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2025-03-05

Under California law, which applies here, any agreement to modify a mortgage is subject to the statute of frauds. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1624, 2922; Secrest v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Loan Tr. 2002-2, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 282 (Ct. App. 2008). Consequently, an oral modification to a mortgage is invalid, and claims based on such an alleged modification fail. Secrest, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 282. It is undisputed that Hart has not produced a writing that modifies his mortgage.