Cal. Civ. Code § 1624

Section 1624(1) does not require a writing for a contract terminable at either party’s will when no definite term longer than a year is agreed upon.

Russel v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees · filed 1944-11-02(1)

“It is clearly the general rule that a contract terminable at the will of either party, in which no definite term longer than a year is agreed upon, is not within the Statute of Frauds.”

Section 1624(1) makes an oral agreement void when its terms cannot be performed within one year of its making.

McClure v. Cerati · filed 1948-06-08(1)

No valid cause of action based on the oral agreement, as distinguished from the subsequent executed written contract, was alleged because the services were not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, and it was therefore within the statute of frauds and void. (Civ. Code, § 1624.)

Section 1624, subdivision 1, invalidates an unwritten contract only if its terms make performance within one year impossible.

El Rio Oils Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co. · filed 1949-12-20(1)

A contract is invalid under subdivision 1, section 1624 of the Civil Code only where by its very terms it cannot be performed within a year from the date it is made.

Section 1624 permits an oral employment agreement for a one-year term beginning when the agreement takes effect.

Goad v. Rogers · filed 1951-04-06(1)

It is defendant’s position on this appeal that in the preliminary negotiations there was no agreement reached as to the fact that the employment contract was to be for one year, and likewise that there was no agreement that it was to take effect on August 1, 1948, it being defendant’s contention that the contract of employment, if any, was an oral agreement extending beyond the one-year period and was unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 1.) The evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding that the employment agreement was for the definite period of. one year, commencing August 1, 1948.

Section 1624's one-year writing requirement does not apply to a multiyear employment contract that can be terminated within a year.

Pecarovich v. Becker · filed 1952-09-29(1)

Moreover, the statute cited does not apply because the coaching contract was not one which by its terms was not to be performed within a year from its making.

An oral contract that can be performed within one year remains valid under Section 1624(1) even if options may extend performance beyond that year.

Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth · filed 1948-09-20(1)

The fact that option provisions, which, if exercised, enlarged the time of performance beyond a year, were included in the oral agreement did not invalidate it under the statute of frauds, “for it is nevertheless a contract which may be performed within a year from the time of its inception.” (49 Am.Jur. §25, p. 387.)

Section 1624, subdivision 1, bars an oral agreement whose terms require performance to extend beyond one year from its making.

Tostevin v. Douglas · filed 1958-05-12(1)

At the outset, the alleged oral agreement by its terms was not to be performed within a year from the making thereof and is invalid and barred by the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code,§ 1624, subd. 1; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 1.)

Section 1624 requires a writing for an agreement that by its terms cannot be performed within one year; whether an oral distributorship falls within that rule may depend on factual findings about its duration and termination.

Connelly v. Venus Foods, Inc. · filed 1959-10-20(1)

That poses the question: Can it be held, as a matter of law, that this contract is an “agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof” (Civ. Code, § 1624, and Code Civ. Proc., § 1973) ? The answer is “No.”

Section 1624(1) does not bar an oral distributor contract that could end within a year because a contingency stops performance.

Mangini v. Wolfschmidt, Ltd. · filed 1961-05-12(1)

In the ease before us there could easily have been, within the year from the date of the making of the agreement, regulations adopted by the proper authorities which would have effectively put a stop to the doing of the business in the manner in which it was done. In fact prohibition could have come into effect which certainly would have stopped any further sales and the contract put to an end.

Section 1624's one-year rule applies only when an agreement cannot possibly be performed within one year of its making.

Keller v. Pacific Turf Club · filed 1961-05-17(1)

Thus, it appears that the basis for the granting of the nonsuit was the ground that the exercise of the option was required to be in writing under the statute of frauds (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973; Civ. Code, § 1624). Defendants argue that this ruling was proper as the agreement was one which by its terms could not be performed within a year from the making thereof. We cannot agree. It is well settled that oral contracts invalidated by the statute of frauds, include only those which cannot be performed within that period. Even though a promise may not by its terms be performed within a year, yet, it is not inhibited by the statute if there is a possibility that it may be.

Section 1624(1) bars an oral employment agreement that cannot be performed within a year, but permits a one-year term followed by at-will employment.

Gressley v. Williams · filed 1961-07-10(1)

It is manifest that the contract pleaded in count I is invalid and unenforceable. An oral agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof is invalid. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 1.) ... We construe the contract of November 30, 1957, as alleged as one for a term of one year and at will thereafter. As thus alleged, the contract is not within the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(1) does not bar an oral loan agreement described as “long-term” when its terms allow repayment within one year.

Lacy v. Bennett · filed 1962-09-25(1)

“Long-term” does not of itself denote any specific length of time. It is possible within the terms of such an agreement that the money might be repaid within one year.

Section 1624 permits enforcement of an oral lease of indefinite duration if its terms allow performance within one year.

Fisher v. Parsons · filed 1963-03-13(1), (4)

The language of the two subdivisions expresses the same thought, that the agreement or lease must be so worded that it cannot be performed within a year.

Section 1624 applies to a bilateral oral contract if either party’s promise cannot be performed within one year.

Winburn v. All American Sportswear Co. · filed 1963-04-23(1)

In a bilateral contract, if the promise of either party cannot be performed within one year, the entire contract falls within the statute of frauds (Rest., Contracts, § 198; 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 456, p. 572).

Section 1624 bars enforcement of an oral contract when its implied reasonable duration exceeds one year.

San Francisco Brewing Corp. v. Bowman · filed 1959-08-10(1)

Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed as requested, for if the contract did carry within it an implied agreement that it should endure for a reasonable time, and if in fact such reasonable time amounted to a period in excess of the period allowed by the statute, then the contract being wholly oral could not be enforced.

Section 1624(1) does not bar an oral contract of indefinite duration that could be fully performed within one year.

Burgermeister Brewing Corp. v. Bowman · filed 1964-05-18(1)

The contract we examine is not one which by its terms could not be performed within one year. Had Bowman failed to devote his best efforts or to take care of the territory, the contract would have terminated and this was an event which might have occurred within a year.

Section 1624 does not require a writing for an oral employment contract that can be fully performed within one year, even when compensation is measured by annual receipts.

White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson · filed 1968-03-14(1)

Even though part of an employee’s compensation is to be measured by annual receipts of the employer, the statute of frauds does not apply to an employment contract unless its terms provide that the employee cannot completely perform it within one year from the making of the contract.

Section 1624(1) applies only when a contract’s terms make performance within one year impossible; unlikely or indefinite performance does not bring it within the statute.

Blaustein v. Burton · filed 1970-05-28(1)

Furthermore, to fall under the bar of subdivision 1 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, the contract must, by its terms, be impossible of performance within a year. If it is unlikely that it will be so performed, or the period of performance is indefinite, the statute does not apply.

Section 1624(1) does not bar an oral employment agreement that can be performed within one year, even if the employer may terminate only for good cause.

Steward v. Mercy Hospital · filed 1987-01-26(1)

As codified in Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (1), the statute of frauds provides that an oral contract is unenforceable if “by its terms” it will not be performed within one year. ... Therefore, since the employment contract in the instant case is capable of being performed within one year, it falls outside the statute of frauds and is not barred.

Section 1624(a) does not bar an oral or implied employment contract if the employment could end within one year, including through resignation or discharge for cause.

Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. · filed 1988-12-29(a)

In sum, the contract between plaintiff and defendant could have been performed within one year of its making; plaintiff could have terminated his employment within that period, or defendant could have discharged plaintiff for cause. Thus, the contract does not fall within the statute of frauds and the fact that it was an implied or oral agreement is not fatal to its enforcement.

Section 1624’s one-year provision does not bar an oral employment agreement that could be completed within a year because the employee could quit or the employer could discharge the employee for cause.

Jenkins v. Family Health Program · filed 1989-09-281

Here, as in Foley, the contract “could have been performed within one year of its making; plaintiff could have terminated [her] employment within that period, or defendant could have discharged plaintiff for cause. Thus, the contract does not fall within the statute of frauds and the fact that it was an . . . oral agreement is not fatal to its enforcement.”

Section 1624 does not invalidate an oral contract when its terms permit full performance through authorized termination within one year or during the promisor’s lifetime.

Plumlee v. Poag · filed 1984-01-06(1), (6)

Although we are not unmindful of the compelling logic of the majority view, we follow stare decisis and conclude that under the minority California rule the contract we consider is not invalid under the statute of frauds as being “an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.” ... Our analysis of the effect of subdivision 1 on the contract alleged by appellant also disposes of the application of section 1624, subdivision 6, which requires a writing where a contract “. . . by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promissor . . . .” ... Thus, at least upon this review after demurrer, the contract is not within the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(1) does not bar an oral employment agreement terminable at will, but bars one whose terms clearly imply employment for more than one year.

Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West · filed 1984-05-17(1)

Either his employment relationship was a contract in which both parties had equal rights to terminate at will (in which case it was not in violation of the statute of frauds), or it was a contract where the employer did not have the right to terminate at will, and there was a reasonable expectation of employment for more than one year (in which case the statute of frauds does apply, barring this action).

Section 1624(1) bars contract and promissory fraud claims based on an oral promise of employment for at least three years unless a sufficient writing or estoppel removes the bar.

Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. · filed 1984-06-04(1)

As a matter of law, the oral employment contract asserted by plaintiff is unenforceable on account of the statute of frauds as embodied in subdivision 1 of Civil Code section 1624 either in a contract action or a promissory fraud action.

Section 1624’s one-year provision did not warrant sustaining a demurrer to an oral employment contract claim while its application was uncertain.

Gray v. Superior Court · filed 1986-05-01(1)

Given the uncertainty of present law in this regard, it is fairer, we believe, not to sustain the demurrer to the contract cause of action on a statute of frauds basis.

Section 1624 requires a writing for an agreement that cannot be performed within one year.

Fredianelli v. Jenkins · filed 2013-03-14(a)(1)

Here, the promise to make Plaintiff a co-owner after a two year probationary period would thus be subject to the statute of frauds, as there is no way in which it could be performed in less than a year. Plaintiff has not produced any writing indicating this promise, and thus it could not serve to create a contract.

Section 1624(a)(1) makes an oral agreement invalid if, by its terms, it is not to be performed within one year of its making.

Roger Cleveland Golf Co. v. Krane & Smith, APC · filed 2014-04-15(a)(1)

An oral agreement “that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof” is invalid. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1).) Because RCG presented evidence of a one- year distributorship agreement, it presented sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case of lack of probable cause.

An oral employment contract falls outside the statute of frauds if it can be terminated within one year, even when it specifies a longer term.

Abeyta v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY. · filed 1993-08-06(a)

If performance under a contract could be terminated within one year under some contingency it makes no difference whether the contract has a definite outside term of two years, three years or five years—or whether it is for the employee’s lifetime or some other “indefinite” period.

Section 1624(a) requires a contract that cannot be performed within one year, or a memorandum of it, to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or its agent.

Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Sys., Inc. · filed 2017-08-15(a)

Under California's statute of frauds, when, as here, a contract is not to be performed within one year it "or some note or memorandum thereof, [must be] in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent." ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a).) ... Nor is there any evidence of any writings that satisfy the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(a)(1) does not bar an arbitration agreement attached to at-will employment of indefinite duration because the employment could end within a year.

Raymond v. Compucom Systems, Inc. · filed 2022-07-27(a)(1)

As an at will employee with no defined end date to his employment Raymond cannot succeed by citing the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(a)(1) requires a signed writing for an agreement that, by its terms, cannot be performed within one year.

Cosmonova, LLC v. Biofilm, Inc. · filed 2025-01-28(a)(1)

Additionally, California’s general Statute of Frauds provides that “[a]n agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof” is invalid unless it, “or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(1). Plaintiff ... pleads that performance of the agreements was to take place over five-year terms. FAC ¶ 14. Thus, under either the California Commercial Code or California’s Civil Code, the contracts are subject to the Statute of Frauds.

An agreement with no mandatory timeframe falls outside the statute of frauds when its terms permit performance within one year.

Geadau v. Evans · filed 2025-05-21(a)(1)

Indeed, the agreement and subsequent modification set no mandatory timeframe at all, as far as alleged, and thus fall outside the Statute of Frauds.

Section 1624 makes an unwritten agreement for the sale of an interest in land void.

Smith v. Taylor · filed 1890-01-15

If there was such an agreement, it was one for or in relation to the sale of an interest in lands, and was not in writing. It was therefore void under section 1624 of the Civil Code.

Section 1624 requires a writing for the sale of real property to describe the land well enough to identify it without using extrinsic or parol evidence to supply the description.

Hines v. Copeland · filed 1913-10-08(5)

It does not contain a description of the property to which it purports to relate, and thus it is wanting in one of the first essentials of an agreement for the sale of real property to render it valid or subject to recognition either at law or in equity. Not only must there be a description of the property which is the subject of the agreement, but the description must be such as to facilitate, without the necessity of resorting to extrinsic or parol evidence, a ready identification of the property.

Section 1624 requires a memorandum of a land-exchange agreement to contain the agreement’s terms; a deed alone does not suffice without evidence that it contains those terms.

Swain v. Burnette · filed 1891-06-23

It is unnecessary for us to determine, at this time, whether a deed not delivered, nor intended by the party signing it as a memorandum, if otherwise sufficient, could be treated as a memorandum of an agreement for the sale of land within the meaning of the statute, because there is nothing in the evidence to show that this writing, which lacked only delivery to constitute a deed, contained a memorandum of the terms of the agreement, which plaintiff claims that he made with defendants in reference to an exchange of lands, and unless it did, it would not satisfy the statute.

Section 1624(6) allows a signed brokerage memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds even if the complaint must supply additional facts.

Hill v. McCoy · filed 1905-06-10(6)

In the present case, we think the contract signed by defendant was sufficient as a “note or memorandum thereof,” under subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, and was valid within the meaning of the section, but it failed to state with fullness and precision sufficient to permit its use alone as a pleading, and hence it became necessary, and it was entirely within the rules of pleading, to' set forth, in aid of the memorandum, the facts essential to make the pleading complete.

Section 1624 bars enforcement of an oral promise to convey real estate unless fraudulent conduct takes the case outside the statute of frauds.

Schwarz v. Bohle · filed 1920-05-11

The provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code embracing the statute of frauds is another insurmountable barrier to the defendants’ recovery in this action in the absence of those elements of fraudulent conduct on the plaintiff’s part taking the case outside of the requirements of said statute. The trial court properly ruled that the defendants had presented no such case in their pleadings as would permit them to make their proffered proofs.

Section 1624 requires a contract for the sale of real property to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

Simpson v. Schurra · filed 1928-05-08

A holding that she is liable on such a contract which she did not execute at all would directly contravene this section and also section 1624 of the Civil Code, which requires such a contract to be in writing subscribed by the party to be charged.

A lessee may ratify a lease signed by an agent without written authority by knowingly accepting the lease and occupying the premises under it.

Chain v. Ehrman · filed 1928-05-31(5)

Defendants knew the date of the expiration of the first lease; that they had an option to renew it and that in February, 1924, their general manager paid three months’ rent in advance on the new lease. Under these circumstances the trial court was justified in holding that defendants accepted the lease, occupied the premises thereunder and thereby ratified the action of their agent.

Section 1624 bars enforcement of an oral option to purchase land that is not to be performed within one year.

Bovo v. Abrahamson · filed 1929-08-20(1), (5)

The court found that-the cause of action was barred by subdivisions 1 and 5 of section 1624 of the Civil Code and subdivisions 1 and 5 of section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The agreement being an option to purchase and not being in writing nor to be performed within one year, the court’s finding is correct.

Subdivision 5 requires a land sale memorandum to identify the property without parol evidence supplying a missing description; a complete oral agreement does not cure a deficient writing.

Gordon v. Perkins · filed 1930-09-17(5)

If, in this case, as contended by the respondent, a complete oral agreement was entered into, it does not obviate the objection that subdivision 5 of section 1624 of the Civil Code has not been complied with, and that under its terms the writing is void.

Section 1624 requires correspondence offered as a memorandum of a land sale to show an agreement with sufficiently definite terms.

Cook v. Mielke · filed 1935-01-18

The most that can be said of the whole transaction is that the parties were negotiating by correspondence for the sale of the ranch and that at no time did the minds of the parties meet by offer and acceptance sufficiently definite and certain in terms to make a contract. Since this is true it follows that there was no sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds.

Subdivision 4 makes an oral agreement to transfer an interest in oil rights unenforceable; performing legal services in return does not remove the statutory bar.

Denio v. Brennecke · filed 1935-05-10(4)

It is therefore our conclusion that the complaint shows on its face that the agreement which forms the foundation for the various causes of action therein alleged is an oral agreement to assign or to transfer an interest in real property which is rendered unenforceable by the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 1624 of the Civil Code and that the allegation that plaintiffs had fully performed their part of the agreement does not constitute an allegation of such part performance as to ... render the pleading immune to the objection that it is barred by the provisions of the above-mentioned statute.

Section 1624 treats a joint tenant’s promise, made for valuable consideration, not to alienate an interest so it passes to another joint tenant at death as a contract for the sale of an interest in real property.

Pellerito v. Dragna · filed 1940-10-08

Section 1624 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that a contract “for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein” is invalid unless the same is in writing, etc., and it seems obvious that an oral agreement by one joint tenant not to alienate his interest, in order that it may pass, upon his death, to the other joint tenant, is an agreement for the sale of an interest in real estate where, as here, he receives a valuable consideration for such promise.

Section 1624(4) does not prevent enforcement of a written agreement to exchange real property merely because a supplementary oral agreement may be unenforceable.

Miller v. Dyer · filed 1942-07-10(4)

The contention that the alleged cause of action is barred by the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 1624 of the Civil Code because a part of the alleged agreement for the exchange of real property was not in writing is untenable. The fact that Mabelle Dyer’s supplementary oral agreement to make up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the lender may be unenforceable does, not prevent enforcement of the written contract.

Section 1624 requires a signed writing for a real property sale that identifies the purchaser; an escrow instruction naming a broker or his nominee did not identify the nominees as purchasers.

Cisco v. Van Lew · filed 1943-09-25(4)

It therefore follows that since it affirmatively appears from the complaint itself that the contract relied upon is alleged to be in writing, that Exhibit A is a copy of that contract, that Exhibit A is the only writing subscribed by defendant or by her authorized agent, and that the Ciscos cannot be identified either as parties or purchasers by reference to said Exhibit A, that therefore the alleged contract for the sale of the property involved, to the Ciscos, is uncertain and does not comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds and is not subject to specific enforcement.

Section 1624(4) requires a contract for the sale of real property to be in writing and signed by the seller.

Ajax Holding Co. v. Heinsbergen · filed 1944-06-01(4)

Inasmuch as a contract for the sale of realty is invalid unless in writing signed by the seller (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) such parol proof would have been inadmissible.

Section 1624 requires a contract for the sale of real property, or a memorandum of it, to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

Estes v. Hardesty · filed 1944-11-10

No contract for the sale of real property is enforeible “unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged....” (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973.) The writing before us is nothing more than a memorandum of an oral option agreement.

Section 1624 requires a real property sale agreement or memorandum to be in writing and signed by the owner or an agent authorized in writing.

Holway v. Malloy · filed 1945-07-26

Inasmuch as there was no written agreement of sale or note or memorandum thereof in writing, subscribed by the owner, or an agent authorized in writing, to sell the property, the judgment in favor of plaintiff must be reversed. (Civ. Code, § 1624.)

Section 1624 does not let a buyer in default recover a partial payment under an oral land sale contract when there is no fraud and the seller is ready, able, and willing to perform.

Thompson v. Schurman · filed 1944-08-02(4)

According to the great weight of authorities, including those found in the California jurisdiction, the vendee of real property under an oral contract which is within the ... statute of frauds may not recover partial payment of the purchase price which he has paid pursuant to the agreement, in the absence of fraud, while the vendor is ready, able and willing to fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract.

Section 1624(4) allows a real property sale agreement to be evidenced by a memorandum in one document or several, including exchanged letters or telegrams.

King v. Stanley · filed 1948-09-21(4)

A memorandum of the agreement (Civ. Code, § 1624(4)) is sufficient, and this may be found in one paper or in several documents, .including an exchange of letters or telegrams or both (Breckinridge v. Crocker, 78 Cal. 529 [21 P. 179]; Niles v. Hancock, 140 Cal. 157 [73 P. 840]; Twisselman v. Cohn, 57 Cal.App.2d 987 [136 P.2d 33]), or in a letter from the vendor to the .purchaser which is accepted and acted upon by the latter (De Rutte v. Muldrow, 16 Cal. 505).

Section 1624(4) makes an oral promise to convey real property unenforceable absent actual or constructive fraud.

Mazzera v. Wolf · filed 1947-08-19(4)

[3] But the mere failure to perform an oral promise to convey real property is not itself fraud, and the agreement will be held unenforceable under the statute of frauds in the absence of actual or constructive fraud.

Section 1624(4) makes an oral agreement for an interest in real property unenforceable absent actual or constructive fraud.

Elliott v. Wood · filed 1949-12-23(4)

The oral agreement was invalid and unenforceable as to the real property. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4.) A mere violation of an unenforceable contract does not raise a constructive trust as to real property.

Section 1624(6) invalidates an oral agreement to leave property in compensation for services.

Banchero v. Coffis · filed 1950-03-29(6)

Under Civil Code, section 1624, subdivision 6, and Code of Civil Procedure, section 1973, subdivision 6, an oral contract such as that alleged is invalid.

Section 1624 requires a real property sale contract to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or by an agent whose authority is in writing.

Sackett v. Starr · filed 1949-12-15

Under section 1624 of the Civil Code a contract is void unless it is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent, where it is for the sale of real property, and if signed by an agent, the authority of the agent must be in writing subscribed by the party sought to be charged. ... The letter of August 5 does not bring plaintiff within the provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code.

Section 1624(4) requires a written memorandum signed by the party to be charged for an agreement concerning an interest in real property.

Anderson v. Stansbury · filed 1952-04-02(4)

Such agreement, if it existed,. is barred by the statute of frauds by reason of the absence of a “memorandum thereof . . . in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4.)

Section 1624 permits extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguous property description in a written land sale agreement when the evidence explains the writing without changing its terms.

United Truckmen, Inc. v. Lorentz · filed 1952-11-03

Our case comes within this rule. The court should have received evidence of the surrounding circumstances of the execution of the agreement which might lead to an understanding of the terms used and to an identification of the property.

Section 1624 is satisfied by a signed written land-sale agreement containing the essential terms; evidence may identify the subject matter and help interpret the parties’ expressed intentions without supplying or varying those terms.

Bettancourt v. Gilroy Theatre Co., Inc. · filed 1953-09-25

This writing satisfied the requirements of section 1624. It contains, as we have seen, the essential terms of the contract. The evidence considered above in relation to the parol evidence rule does not supply or vary any of those terms. It merely serves to identify the subject matter from the written description and assists in interpreting the expressed intentions of the parties in the light of circumstances at the time of execution of the contract.

Section 1624’s writing requirement can be satisfied by a signed memorandum stating the basic terms and incorporating the remaining terms by reference to a prior contract.

Skirball v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. · filed 1955-08-10

Irrespective of whether the contract herein is a kind of contract referred to in the statute of frauds, it appears that there was a sufficient memorandum of the contract within the provisions of the statute.

Section 1624’s statute of frauds is satisfied by a written real property exchange agreement containing all essential contract terms.

Schurz v. Gelber · filed 1953-05-07

The agreement in question was written upon the Standard Form of Exchange Agreement prepared by the California Real Estate Association, and contained all the essential terms of the contract.

Section 1624 requires a memorandum for a real property sale to describe the land so it can be identified with reasonable certainty.

Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining Co. · filed 1955-01-14

To satisfy the statute of frauds, the memorandum affecting the sale of real property must so describe the land that it can be identified with reasonable certainty.

Section 1624 treats a written memorandum as something less than a written contract.

Crowley v. Modern Faucet Manufacturing Co. · filed 1955-04-19

The very use of the word “memorandum” implies that it is something less than a contract, and it was apparently in that sense that the word was used in section 1624 of the Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 1624 requires a subscribed writing to state the material terms of a real property sale or lease longer than one year with sufficient certainty, including any material construction promise.

Ferrara v. Silver · filed 1956-01-23

The agreement to construct a banquet room building was an integral and material part of an “agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year” and “for the sale of real property,” a contract which is “invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent.” (Civ. Code, § 1624.) ... Plaintiffs then delivered these documents to defendant’s agent who in turn delivered them to defendant but there is no writing subscribed by either of the parties tending to show agreement to the terms, such as they are, exemplified by the plan, the sketch and the letter of estimate.

Section 1624(4) permits a real property sale agreement to be evidenced by a memorandum, including a telegram, that identifies the parties, property, price, and payment terms.

Fara v. Wells · filed 1957-12-20(4)

In King v. Stanley, 32 Cal.2d 584, 588 [197 P.2d 321], it was held that an agreement for the purchase or sale of real property does not have to be evidenced by a formal contract drawn with technical exactness in order to be binding; that a memorandum of the agreement (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) is sufficient, and that this may be found in one paper or in several documents, including an exchange of letters or telegrams or both, or in a letter from the vendor to the purchaser which is accepted and acted upon by the latter; that the material factors to be ascertained from the written contract ... are the seller, the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, and the property to be transferred, describing it so that it may be identified. The essential elements of a binding contract are present in the instant case and defendant Wells entered into a binding contract to sell the property involved to Dr. Fara for the sum of $27,500.

Section 1624(5) requires a land sale writing to identify the property with reasonable certainty; oral testimony cannot supply a missing description.

Burge v. Krug · filed 1958-05-07(5)

Recovery in this case may not be predicated upon parol evidence relating to the proper description which was omitted from the contract.

Section 1624(4) allows a signed receipt to satisfy the statute of frauds for a land sale when it sufficiently identifies the parties, property, and sale terms.

Dennis v. Overholtzer · filed 1960-03-10(4)

It is sufficient if the writing is subscribed by the parties to be charged (Civ. Code, §1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973), names the parties to the agreement and contains the price to be paid, the terms and manner of payment and a description of the property. ... We conclude that the memorandum of agreement which the parties signed on April 20, 1954, satisfied the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 requires an option to purchase real property to describe the land sufficiently to identify it; “the next contiguous thirty acres” does not do so.

Ganiats Construction, Inc. v. Hesse · filed 1960-04-27(4)

We must determine whether the description in the instrument is sufficiently definite to meet the test established under the statute of frauds. ... In view of these manifestations of ambiguity we cannot hold the court erred in holding the option unenforceable.

Section 1624(4) permits a land sale agreement whose description provides a key by which the property can be identified.

Hansen Pacific Corp. v. Buck Mountain Logging Co. · filed 1961-05-05(4)

We are of the opinion that the aforementioned description, although inadequate in itself, does provide a “key” so that the land can be properly identified. ... Therefore, the defendant’s contention that this contract violates the statute of frauds is without merit.

Section 1624 is satisfied when related written instruments state sufficiently certain terms, even if the exact parcel to be conveyed remains to be selected.

Ontario Downs, Inc. v. Lauppe · filed 1961-05-31

Applying these principles of law to the instant case, we feel that the parties expressed their intent to enter into a contract and that the terms and provisions of that contract are sufficiently certain to satisfy the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 bars enforcement of an oral agreement to convey land, but does not bar an obligation arising from a constructive trust.

Helfrich v. Kerley · filed 1961-06-02(4)

The agreement of the parties was oral. Thus enforcement of Kerley’s obligation to convey, if based solely upon his oral agreement, is barred by the statute of frauds (see Mazzera v. Wolf, 30 Cal.2d 531 [183 P.2d 649] ; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4). But if he took title as a constructive trustee, his obligation arises as a matter of law, and its enforcement is not barred (Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 [141 P.2d 732]).

Section 1624 requires a real property sale contract or a memorandum stating its terms to be signed by the party to be charged.

Howard v. Updike · filed 1962-04-18

Plaintiffs have cited a number of cases in which contracts were held to be sufficient, but in each of them there was a note or memorandum in writing which stated the terms of the contract and was signed by the party to be charged. Here there was no writing whatever signed by Mrs. Updike which stated the terms of an agreement to sell the property.

Section 1624(4) allows a deposit receipt to serve as the memorandum of a real property sale agreement when it sufficiently records the agreed terms.

Simmons v. Dryer · filed 1963-05-29(4)

In reaching the conclusion that the “deposit receipt” constitutes a sufficient memorandum of the agreement for the sale of the real property this court has considered and found to be without merit the contention that the provision with respect to the new loan of $13,000 is so incomplete, indefinite and uncertain that legal effect cannot be given to the agreement.

Section 1624 permits an agreement to sell real property to be evidenced by a memorandum in one document or several, including letters accepted and acted upon by the purchaser.

Yung v. Woods · filed 1963-07-22(4)

An agreement for the purchase or sale of real property does not have to be evidenced by a formal contract drawn with technical exactness in order to be binding. A memorandum of the agreement (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) is sufficient, and this may be found in one paper or in several documents, including an exchange of letters or telegrams or both, or in a letter from the vendor to the purchaser which is accepted and acted upon by the latter.

A signed deed can satisfy section 1624(4)'s memorandum requirement for an easement agreement when the signer knows how it is being used and does not withdraw it.

Karl v. JeBien · filed 1965-01-21(4)

In this situation, we hold her signature of the deed to be an adequate memorandum of the transaction.

A purchaser’s letter that the property owner did not sign is insufficient to establish a written option to purchase the property.

Pulse v. Hill · filed 1963-06-18(4)

This letter, being unsigned by Mrs. Cordry, was properly rejected by appellant as a written agreement obligating him as administrator to make a conveyance of the leased property to respondent.

Section 1624(4) makes a real property sale agreement unenforceable without a written memorandum signed by the party to be charged.

Sinks v. Merrill · filed 1963-11-12(4)

As shown by the affidavits the purported agreement which plaintiff attempts specifically to enforce is violative of the statute of frauds (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 4, and Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4).

Section 1624, subdivision 5, invalidates an oral agency agreement to sell real property.

Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi · filed 1964-02-18(5)

An oral agency agreement involving the sale of real property is specifically invalidated by Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 5, and its counterpart, Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 5.

Section 1624 requires a written agreement to sell real property; a wife’s oral assent to her husband’s agreement does not bind her without signed written authorization.

O'Banion v. Paradiso · filed 1964-07-16(4)

An agreement for the sale of real property is invalid unless it is in writing. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4.) Since authority to enter into a contract which is required to be in writing can be given only by an instrument in writing (Civ. Code, § 2309), any contract by a husband affecting the wife’s interest in land is unenforceable against her in the absence of a written authorization signed by the wife, there being no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 requires an option to purchase real property to be in writing.

Woods v. Bradford · filed 1967-09-20(4)

This interpretation would not improve Bess’ legal position, since it is basic that an option to purchase real property falls within the statute of frauds and therefore must be in writing.

Section 1624(4) requires an agent’s authority to convey real property to be in writing, including when the agent is a spouse; written ratification satisfies that requirement.

Cano v. Tyrrell · filed 1967-12-11(4)

But an oral agency is not enough; it is settled that Civil Code, section 1624, subdivision 4, and Civil Code, section 2309, requiring an agent’s authority to convey real property to be expressed in writing, apply to an agency between a husband and wife. ... By signing the escrow agreement, deed, and deed of trust, Mrs. Tyrrell ratified in writing the agreement which had been modified by her husband and the Canos.

Section 1624(4) requires an agent’s authority to sell a property interest to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

Wilson v. Eddy · filed 1969-12-15(4)

Such an assumption would indeed be a rash one absent any evidence showing compliance with the statute of frauds which invalidates any agreement for the sale of the present property interest “unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4.) Such evidence we cannot find.

Section 1624(4) requires a written agreement to enforce a promise to assign an interest in real property.

Ventura v. Colgrove · filed 1969-02-26(4)

Likewise, the findings and conclusions that plaintiffs’ causes of action, in light of the evidence, do not meet the requirements of Civil Code, sections 1624, subdivision 4, 852 and 172a, and Code of Civil Procedure, section 1971, are amply supported by the record herein.

Section 1624 requires a writing for an agreement to sell real property and written authority for an agent who signs for the party to be charged, subject to part performance or estoppel.

United Professional Planning, Inc. v. Superior Court · filed 1970-07-02(4)

Second, except where facts exist showing part performance or estoppel ... an agreement for sale of real property must be in writing (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4; Code Civ. Proc., § 1971), and, if a written contract is signed by an agent of the party to be charged, the agent’s authority must also be in writing (Civ. Code, § 1|624, subd. 4, supra). ... The legal propositions espoused by defendants constitute correct statements of the law. We have concluded, however, that the proof does not support the application of the first legal proposition; that the second legal proposition would apply, in any event, only to Joseph J. Goodman and not to James Goodman; and that as to Joseph Goodman, plaintiff’s knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of facts is insufficient to support a finding of plaintiff’s bad faith in the absence of proof that plaintiff also had knowledge of the applicable legal principles which would make the existence or nonexistence of these facts meaningful.

Section 1624(4) does not let a party invoke the statute of frauds based on a missing legal description in his own copy when the parties agreed to add the description later and the other party did so.

Robinson v. Thornton · filed 1969-04-10(4)

Plaintiff having paid the $5,000 and executed the written agreement of February 21, 1961, in reliance on the oral contract that later each could insert the legal description in his copy, and through his attorney the oral contract having been completely executed on his side, defendant cannot take advantage of his own failure to fill in the blanks in his copy by relying upon his incomplete copy to invoke the statute of frauds in this action for his breach of the written agreement.

Section 1624(4) requires written authority to convey real estate, with the agent designated.

Jay v. Dollarhide · filed 1970-01-28(4)

An authority to convey real estate must itself be in writing (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (4); Lyne v. Bonner, 129 Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [277 P.2d 941]), and the designation of the agent to convey is vital.

Section 1624’s written memorandum requirement is satisfied by a written offer and written acceptance when the offeror orally confirms that the offer remains open.

Santa Monica Unified School District v. Persh · filed 1970-03-25

Nevertheless, the original offer was in writing and, along with Mr. Persh’s letter of acceptance, provides a written memorandum of the agreement, which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 1624.

Section 1624 makes a land sale agreement unenforceable when a broker signs for the buyer without written authority.

Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc. · filed 1970-04-23

The opening statement revealed ... that defendants had no authority in writing to sign the buyer’s name thereto and the agreement was therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624); ... and that as a proximate result of this misconduct plaintiffs suffered, damages in attempting to avoid the sale.

Section 1624 permits a written memorandum stating the salient terms of a contract; it need not contain every term.

Kerner v. Hughes Tool Co. · filed 1976-04-01

The memoranda here satisfy the statute of frauds since they contain a statement of the salient terms of the bargain: plaintiff to provide the show and orchestra; defendant to pay $75,000 a week.

Section 1624 is satisfied when a signed writing states the essential terms of a requirements agreement, even without an express quantity term.

Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. · filed 1984-08-30

Moreover, although no express quantity term was set forth, none was necessary here. ... Thus, the letter contained all the "essential terms" of the contract, and is enforceable under Civil Code section 1624.

Section 1624's statute of frauds bars an oral modification of a land sale contract unless the party relying on the modification alleges facts establishing equitable estoppel.

Collins v. Marvel Land Co. · filed 1970-11-24

On the face of the pleadings this oral modification of the contract violates the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) and Civil Code section 1698 which states: “A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise.” Plaintiffs must therefore allege facts establishing an equitable estoppel against the party denying the oral modification.

Section 1624 requires a written memorandum signed by the party to be charged; a deed poll does not satisfy that requirement when the grantee is that party.

Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Committee · filed 1976-07-12(4)

We recognize that a deed poll such as used here and commonly throughout California does not satisfy the requirement of the statute of frauds that the written memorandum be subscribed by the party to be charged [when that party is the grantee.] (Civ. Code, § 1624; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, § 210.)

Section 1624(c) applies to settlement agreements for the sale of real property and requires a writing signed by the party to be charged.

Nicholson v. Barab · filed 1991-09-13(c)

Therefore, the settlement agreement was subject to the statute of frauds provisions of Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (c). We conclude that, based on defendants’ offer of proof at trial, the trial court properly determined, as a matter of law, that the settlement agreement was unenforceable.

A blank deed passes no title unless an agent completing it has signed written authority from the grantor.

Murray v. Murray · filed 1994-07-12(c)

Linda did not claim that Carol holds title subject to a constructive trust; rather, she claimed that Carol’s title was void, as a blank deed passes no title (unless subsequently filled in by an agent of the grantor who possesses signed written authority to do so).

Section 1624(c) requires an agreement to sell real property to be in writing, including when one joint venturer agrees to sell land to another.

Kaljian v. Menezes · filed 1995-07-05(c)

We conclude there is a reasonable probability that if the jury had been instructed on the statute of frauds defense, at least three of the jurors who found the existence of a contract would have also found it was one required to be in writing under Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (c) (agreements for the sale of real property), thus affecting the verdict.

Section 1624 does not bar enforcement of written subdivision restrictions merely because the buyers did not sign them.

Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson · filed 1995-12-29

“Notwithstanding the lack of complete congruity of common conveyancing practice in the creation of so-called negative easements to the requirements of the statute of frauds,” we did not require such subscription, although we did require a writing because of the policy considerations underlying the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(c) bars using a declaration to prove that a deed conveyed sole ownership when the deed expressly creates a joint tenancy.

United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village · filed 1997-07-22(c)

To the extent the declaration seeks to prove that the deed transferred sole ownership to Brian Degen, it violates the Statute of Frauds. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(c). The express language of a deed may not be contradicted by parol evidence.

Section 1624 requires a real estate purchase agreement to be in writing, but does not require a written agreement on terms that the purchase agreement makes a condition of closing.

Gaggero v. Yura · filed 2003-05-16(a)(3)

Nevertheless, it is the Purchase Agreement that must be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, not documents or agreements required by the Purchase Agreement to be executed.

Section 1624 permits later extrinsic evidence to identify property covered by a written real property option when the agreement supplies a means to identify it.

Alameda Belt Line v. City of Alameda · filed 2003-11-04

Extrinsic evidence may then be considered to show which lands were acquired, and their boundaries. This result is in accord with the general principle of California law that a “means or key” may be used to define the relevant land, so as to avoid invalidity under the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 does not bar enforcement of a written real property agreement that omits the time for performance when a reasonable time can be implied.

House of Prayer v. Evangelical Ass'n for India · filed 2003-11-05

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding time of performance was not an essential term of this agreement based on the agreement and its context. We imply a reasonable time for performance of the agreement, and with the implied term, the agreement is enforceable.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires an agreement to sell real property, or a memorandum of it, to be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or that party’s agent.

BEHNIWAL v. Mix · filed 2005-09-30(a)(3)

The applicable statute of frauds for this case is set forth in Civil Code section 1624. Subdivision (a) sets forth the various kinds of contracts that “are invalid, unless they, or some ... note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or the party’s agent.” One of those kinds of contracts is “An agreement ... for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein.”

Section 1624 permits extrinsic evidence to clarify essential terms in a written memorandum when the evidence establishes those terms with reasonable certainty, but it cannot establish terms inconsistent with the writing.

Sterling v. Taylor · filed 2007-03-01(a)

We hold that if a memorandum includes the essential terms of the parties' agreement, but the meaning of those terms is unclear, the memorandum is sufficient under the statute of frauds if extrinsic evidence clarifies the terms with reasonable certainty and the evidence as a whole demonstrates that the parties intended to be bound.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires a real property sale agreement to be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought; a buyer suing the seller need not have signed it.

Ulloa v. McMillin Real Estate & Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2007-03-07(a)(3)

Under Civil Code section 1624, “party to be charged” means “the party to be charged in court with the performance of the obligation, i.e., the defendant in the action brought to enforce the contract.”

Section 1624(a)(3) requires written authorization for an agent to bind a nonsigning owner to a real property sale outside the ordinary course of a partnership’s business.

Elias Real Estate, LLC v. Tseng · filed 2007-10-25(a)(3)

However, Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(3) makes clear that any such authorization must be in writing in order to bind the nonsignatory sellers.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires a signed writing for a right of first refusal to purchase real property; emails that do not show an agreement and its essential terms do not satisfy that requirement.

Smyth v. Berman · filed 2019-01-10(a)(3)

The statute of frauds provides that any agreement for "the sale of real property, or of an interest therein" is invalid unless it is "in writing and subscribed to by the party to be charged." ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) ... The allegations set forth in the TAC do not satisfy these requirements.

Section 1624(a)’s requirement that an agreement be subscribed by a party can be satisfied by an attorney’s signature if the signature shows an intent to be bound.

Monster Energy Company v. Schechter · filed 2019-07-11(a)

Similarly lacking merit is defendants’ contention that the agreement violates the statute of frauds because it was not “subscribed by” Schechter as a party. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a).) As discussed, one may reasonably conclude that Schechter’s signature evinced his intent to be bound, thus rendering the agreement “subscribed by” him.

Section 1624(2) does not require a written promise to pay another’s debt when a benefit to the promisor makes the promise an original obligation under section 2794.

Doe v. Allen · filed 1905-09-11(2)

But we think that the facts of this case bring it within one of the exceptions to the general rule. The pertinent part of section 1624 is as follows: “The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his agent: ... 2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in section 2794 of this code.” ... Under such circumstances the obtaining possession of the coal discharged of the lien for freight money was a consideration beneficial to defendant, and brought his promise to pay the freight money within the exception of section 2794. It became an original obligation of the promisor.

Section 1624(2) does not require a writing when a promise to pay another’s debt is an original obligation supported by a benefit to the promisor.

Stover v. Stevens · filed 1913-02-19(2)

The facts here do not bring the case within the provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code (the statute of frauds), but within the exception mentioned in subdivision 2 of that section, to wit, the provisions of section 2794 of the same code: “A promise to answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation of the promisor, and need not be in writing: 1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; ... 3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; ... or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person.”

Section 1624(2) requires a promise to pay another person’s debt to appear as a direct and unequivocal assumption in a writing subscribed by the party to be charged.

Sherwood v. Lowell · filed 1917-07-27(2)

The statute plainly contemplates that, to charge a third party with liability for the debt of another, the writing so relied upon must not only contain a direct and unequivocal assumption of the obligation, but it must be subscribed by the party to be charged.

Section 1624(2) does not invalidate an oral promise made for the promisor’s own benefit on sufficient consideration when the promisor is the principal debtor.

Burr v. Cross · filed 1906-04-10(2)

The principal point urged by the appellant is, that the promise of the defendant—which was admittedly oral—was void under subdivision 2 of section 1624 of the Civil Code. But we are of the opinion that this contention cannot be sustained. The promise of the defendant was his own, made for his own benefit and upon a sufficient consideration moving to him, and he is therefore to be regarded as “the principal debtor.” (Civ. Code, secs. 1605, 2794, subd. 2.)

Section 1624(2) does not require a written guaranty when the promisor undertakes an original obligation as the sole debtor.

Klamath Lumber Co. v. Co-Operative Land & Trust Co. · filed 1914-11-05(2)

It is equally plain that, according full credit to the testimony of Mr. Routt, no question of guaranty could arise.

Section 1624 does not require a written promise to pay another’s antecedent debt when the consideration benefits the promisor, as provided in section 2794.

Fuller v. Towne · filed 1920-10-11

But section 1624 of the Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which constitute our statute of frauds as to contracts of this character, both except from their operation the cases provided for in section 2794 of the Civil Code. ... Just two elements are required by the code provision , one, that the promise be for an antecedent obligation, and two, that the consideration be for the benefit of the promisor. Both elements are present here. ... It follows that it was not necessary that the defendant’s promise be in writing.

Section 1624 requires a promise to answer for another person's debt to be in writing.

Quadro v. Widemann · filed 1925-04-30

Another counterclaim arose out of an alleged oral agreement of plaintiff to answer for the debt of a third person. Such a promise falls within the provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code and must be in writing.

Subdivision 2 does not bar a promise to pay another’s debt when the promise benefits the promisor and induces the creditor to complete its contract.

Behannesey v. Paton · filed 1928-02-25(2)

We think there is no ground upon which the appeal can be sustained by virtue of the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, or on the theory that Douglas Travers exceeded his authority in acknowledging the past indebtedness due under respondent’s contract. ... The respondent in this case was induced to complete his indivisible contract upon the promise of appellant that he would be treated as an original contractor, based upon a consideration that was beneficial to the promisor.

Section 1624’s writing requirement for a promise to answer for another’s debt does not cover an original obligation arising from an actual payment of money.

Miles v. McFarlane · filed 1930-03-17

The respondents assume that the payment of the $22,500 by the plaintiff was based upon a promise to answer for the debt of the Feather Forks Gold Gravel Company and that, under section 1624 of the Civil Code, it would be void unless some memorandum thereof were in writing. This payment, however, appears to constitute an original obligation.

Section 1624 makes an unwritten promise to answer for another person’s default void, leaving no obligation on which to base an account stated.

Swim v. Juhl · filed 1925-04-20

The absence of a writing to answer for the daughter’s default rendered the mother’s original agreement void so that there was no legal existing obligation upon which the account could be stated.

Section 1624 does not require a writing for a promise made to serve the promisor’s own interest when the promise is an original undertaking rather than a collateral promise to pay another’s debt.

Hammond Lumber Co. v. Cravens · filed 1927-05-03(2)

None of the promises was a conditional or collateral promise to answer for the debt of another. Each was a promise made directly to promote and subserve an interest of defendant himself, and became an original undertaking on his own part, based upon a beneficial consideration moving directly to himself from plaintiff. Hence these promises are excluded from the operation of section 1624 of the Civil Code and are made provable by oral evidence, and enforceable, under subdivisions 3 of section 2794 of the Civil Code.

Section 1624 requires an incoming partner’s promise to answer for an old partnership’s obligations to be in writing unless the assumption is part of the consideration for the new partnership agreement.

Wood v. Waterman · filed 1929-12-11(2)

It is the recognized rule that where an obligation of an incoming partner to be responsible for the debts of the old partnership is alleged, such obligation must be evidenced in writing under the statute of frauds, unless the assumption of liability grows out of and is part of the consideration of the new partnership agreement.

Section 1624 requires a promise to answer for another’s debt to be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or its agent, or supported by a note or memorandum of the promise.

Southern Glass Co. v. Consolidated Investment Corp. · filed 1934-10-20

Section 1624 of the Civil Code requires that “a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in section 2794”, must be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or agent, or that there be some note or memorandum thereof. ... If, as stated, it be assumed that the resolution was in fact intended as a binding obligation, its language failed so to state and it remained unsigned.

Section 1624 requires a promise to answer for another’s debt to be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or its agent.

Bates v. Daley's, Inc. · filed 1935-03-04

By section 1624 of the Civil Code it is provided that contracts to answer for the debt of another are invalid unless in writing subscribed by the party to be charged or his agent. In each cause of action herein plaintiffs allege that defendant Continental Chain Stores, Inc., agreed to pay all obligations of Daley’s, Incorporated. Under section 447 as it then stood, for the purpose of considering the pleading on demurrer, it must be presumed that such agreement was not in writing, and was therefore invalid and unenforceable.

Section 1624(2) does not cover a promise made to a debtor, rather than a creditor, to pay the debtor’s debt.

King v. Smith · filed 1948-11-16(2)

Plaintiff had known Smith previous to the pertinent dealings, but Cawog was a stranger to him and it is deducible from the evidence that his agreement to furnish $3,000 was primarily, if not wholly, addressed to Smith rather than Cawog, and in that connection it has been stated, that there is not a contract to answer for the debt of another within the statute of frauds where the alleged guarantor promises the debtor, rather than the creditor to pay the former’s debt.

Section 1624(2) does not require a writing when the promisor undertakes an original obligation rather than promising to answer for another person’s debt.

Schumm v. Berg · filed 1951-05-11(2)

Second, the contract is within the provision requiring a writing for “a special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in section 2794 of the Civil Code” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(2); Civ. Code, § 1624(2)). ... The promise was to Gloria and obviously from the terms of the contract it was not to answer for any default of Schumm’s, but was an original promise to Gloria.

Section 1624 requires a written agreement to answer for another person’s debt or default.

Buchholz v. Denison · filed 1953-03-05(2)

There is ample evidence to support this finding and it is sufficient alone to sustain the judgment because if the respondent did not agree to answer for the debt or default of the purchaser (an agreément which must be in writing [Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 2]), and was not the primary obligor, as all the evidence demonstrates, there is no legal liability on her part to meet her son’s obligation.

Section 1624 does not require a written promise to pay another’s existing debt when the circumstances make the promisor a principal debtor.

Parrish v. Greco · filed 1953-06-18(2)

Where, however, the debt of the other continues to exist, a new promise by a third party to pay it has, from the beginning, been considered outside of the statute where made under such circumstances as to render the new promisor himself a debtor.

Section 1624(2) requires a writing for a promise to pay another person’s debt, but does not bar liability for a debt owed by an undisclosed principal.

Anglin v. Conway · filed 1953-11-13(2)

Under these circumstances appellant’s cited authorities involving the requirement of the statute of frauds that a. third person’s agreement to pay the debts of another must be in writing (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 2; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 2; McClenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574 [206 P. 454] ; Swim v. Juhl; 72 Cal.App. 363 [237 P. 552]) are not in point.

Section 1624 does not require a written promise to pay another's debt when beneficial consideration makes the promise an original obligation under section 2794.

Raboff v. Albertson · filed 1954-01-18(2)

It could be inferred from the evidence herein that the promise of defendant to pay the said debt was upon a consideration beneficial to the defendant and was an original obligation of defendant.

Section 1624, subdivision 2, requires a writing for a promise to pay another's debt, but an original obligation supported by consideration need not be in writing.

Freeman v. Jergins · filed 1954-05-27(2)

A promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another is invalid unless it is in writing (Civ. Code, 1624, subd. 2), but it is deemed an original obligation and need not be in writing "Where the promise is upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person." (Civ. Code, 2794.) The stockholders, other than defendants, made no promise to plaintiff and had no obligation to him. Defendants did not agree to pay any debt owed to plaintiff by others. It is not questioned that if there was an agreement it was that defendants would compensate plaintiff on the basis of stock they owned and also the stock sold by the several groups which they represented. It was necessary to deliver a controlling stock interest in order to make a sale. Defendants' promise was not without consideration. The court found it to be an original obligation. The finding has ample support in the evidence.

Section 1624(2) does not require a writing when a promise to pay another’s obligation is an original undertaking supported by fresh consideration beneficial to the promisor.

Regus v. Schartkoff · filed 1957-12-27(2)

The promise alleged was made on “a fresh consideration beneficial to the promisor”—Wagoner and Allstate. The leading and main object of Wagoner was not to become surety or guarantor for the Schartkoffs but to subserve the purpose and interest of Allstate. Therefore, the promise was an original one and valid, though oral. Wagoner’s promise is not within the statute of frauds although the effect may have been to discharge the obligation of the Schartkoffs.

Section 1624 does not require a writing for an original promise to pay for services, even when the services benefit someone else.

Williams v. Dougan · filed 1959-11-18(2)

The distinction must be made between an undertaking to answer for the debt of another and an agreement which constitutes an original promise to pay for services to be rendered. Here, there was involved no agreement by defendant to pay for services rendered in case some person primarily liable therefor failed to meet the obligation, but there was an original request by defendant that plaintiff accept and care for animals delivered by defendant and animals for which defendant asserted she would stand responsible. Under such circumstances the agreement constitutes an original promise and may be enforced although oral or implied by law.

Section 1624(2) bars an oral promise to answer for another’s debt when the promise is collateral, but does not bar an original promise.

M & M House Moving Co. v. Janis · filed 1962-10-08(2)

But that oral undertaking was of no legal effect because of the statute of frauds. ... Under the evidence the trial court was warranted in determining that the promise of Zeff was original and not collateral in nature, and with that finding of fact this court is not free to interfere.

Section 1624 does not require a written promise to pay another’s debt when the creditor cancels the earlier obligation and accepts the new promise in its place.

California Viking Sprinkler Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co. · filed 1963-03-13

This is clearly a promise on the part of defendant to take over the debt of another. However, Civil Code, section 2794, provides certain exceptions to this rule. ... Thus, the complaint does not fail to show an exception to the statute of frauds within section 2794 of the Civil Code.

Section 1624(2) does not require a written promise to pay another’s debt when the promisor’s main purpose is a personal pecuniary or business benefit.

Michael Distributing Co. v. Tobin · filed 1964-03-17(2)

A recognized exception to the statute occurs, however, when the oral promise is made for a consideration beneficial to the promisor, so that it appears that he gave the promise merely for his own pecuniary or business advantage. In such ease it is deemed an original obligation of the promisor and need not be in writing.

Section 1624 requires a writing for an agreement to answer for another person’s debt; a promise to continue doing business with that person is not such an agreement.

S. Cal. Thrift & Loan v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. · filed 1967-02-20(2)

In our opinion, Sylvania made no “representation” as to Pioneer’s ability to pay within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure, section 1974; nor did it agree to answer for Pioneer’s debts in the event of default. (See Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 2 requiring a writing in this situation.) Sylvania agreed, according to appellant’s complaint, to continue to do business with Pioneer for a reasonable time, to wit: 90 days, and Pacific says its release of $35,000 and its subsequent purchase of accounts was conditioned on this promise.

Section 1624(a)(2) requires a signed writing for a promise to pay another person’s debt unless a statutory exception applies; an alleged oral promise was insufficient where the pleading did not establish an exception.

Mitchell v. Taylor · filed 2021-09-22(a)(2)

California Civil Code Section 1624(a): “The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: . . . [a] special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in Section 2794.” ... However, although defendant cites to paragraph 15 of his Counterclaims, nowhere in this paragraph or anywhere else in his pleading does defendant allege that he cancelled or otherwise released Mr. Mitchell from his obligations. ... Thus, defendant has not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that a valid oral agreement existed between plaintiff and him for the repayment of defendant’s loans to Mr. Mitchell.

Section 1624(a)(2) requires a cosigner’s promise to pay another person’s debt, including a modification that retains the cosigner, to be in writing and signed to be enforceable.

Johnson v. Navient Corporation · filed 2024-10-15(a)(2)

Without a writing signed by the parties, the oral modification is invalid and unenforceable. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(2).

Section 1624(4) does not require a contract for services or employment to be in writing merely because the services are worth more than $200.

Hutchinson v. Reclamation District No. 1619 · filed 1924-05-26(4)

This is based upon the further contention that, under subdivision 4 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, the value of the services being more than $200 the agreement must be in writing. This contention is untenable. A contract for services or employment does not come under this section.

The 1931 Uniform Sales Act removed the former subdivision 4 language from section 1624, so a decision based on that language no longer governed a sale of lumber.

Hildebrand v. Delta Lumber & Box Co. · filed 1944-11-29

The case relied upon by defendants in this regard, Stowe v. Fay Fruit Co., 90 Cal.App. 421 [265 P. 1042], was decided upon subdivision 4 of section 1624 of the Civil Code as it existed prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in 1931 (Stats. 1931, ch. 1070), which act amended said section by deleting the language of subdivision 4 that formed the basis for the decision in that case.

Section 1624 does not bar a sale of goods when the seller has delivered them.

Kreling v. Walsh · filed 1947-01-29

Delivery of the stock in trade sold to respondents having been made by appellant, that portion of the agreement does not come within the purview of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, §§1624, 1624a; Code Civ. Proc., §§1973, 1973a).

A bare reference to Section 1624 in a plea in bar is insufficient to plead the statute of frauds and requires no finding.

Wolfskill v. Douglas · filed 1900-02-07

The reference in defendant’s plea in bar to section 1624 of the Civil Code (the statute of frauds), we think must be the result of a mistake, as we find no reference in appellant’s brief to such statute. But, if the reference was intentional, it is certainly insufficient as a plea of the statute of frauds, and no finding as to it was necessary.

Section 1624's statute of frauds did not permit a nonsigning defendant to oppose proof of the sale after the buyer paid part of the price at the sale and the balance later.

Mills v. Jackson · filed 1912-09-17

Since a part of the purchase money was paid at the time of the sale and afterward the balance, she is in no position to urge, in opposition to this view, the statute of frauds as prescribed in section 1624 of the Civil Code.