Cal. Civ. Code § 1624

Section 1624 requires an antenuptial agreement to be in writing, but a complaint need not allege a writing because one is presumed at the pleading stage.

Freitas v. Freitas · filed 1916-06-28

The complaint states a cause of action notwithstanding the fact that the antenuptial agreement pleaded was not alleged to have been reduced to writing as required by section 1624 of the Civil Code, and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of pleading, the agreement was presumed to be in writing.

A party may be estopped from asserting Section 1624’s statute of frauds defense when doing so would amount to fraud after the other party relied on the agreement.

Rockhill v. Parker · filed 1913-06-19(1)

She invokes the Statute of frauds, insisting that the cross-complaint fails to state a cause of action because it appears therefrom that the oral contract alleged to have been made was invalid, in that it was one the terms of which were not to be performed within a year from the making thereof, as required by subdivision 1 of section 1624 of the Civil Code. It is well settled that a court of equity may hold one estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense where such assertion would amount to practicing a fraud. ... No demurrer was interposed to the cross-complaint and while the facts are inartificially pleaded, we entertain no doubt as to their sufficiency, if true, to constitute grounds for relief on the part of defendant.

Section 1624 makes covered contracts without the required writing invalid rather than void, and its protection may be waived.

Durbin v. Hillman · filed 1920-12-13

But those contracts that come under the provisions of the statute of frauds, other than those relating to transfers of interests or estates in real property, are only “invalid.” We are not called upon to attempt to define the very difficult word “invalid,” as used in section 1624 of the Civil Code, but it is sufficient for our purpose to say that it describes a condition that falls short of being void. Such contracts may be ratified and it is held that the benefit of the statute may be waived.

Section 1624’s written-authority requirement cannot be invoked by a principal who is estopped to deny his agent’s authority after accepting the benefit of the agent’s agreement.

Brenneman v. Lane · filed 1927-12-09

Defendant Lane cannot now maintain the unjust and unwarrantable defense, under the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624), that he did notin writing authorize Norman, his agent, to sign plaintiff’s authority.

Section 1624 does not cover an authorization to receive a real estate deposit and return it under specified conditions.

Coover v. Cox · filed 1928-11-16

An authorization to receipt for money and to agree to return the money on certain conditions is not within the provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code.

Section 1624(1) does not make an otherwise valid oral agreement void merely because it lacks a writing; the statute of frauds defense may be waived.

Producers Fruit Co. v. Goddard · filed 1925-12-23(1)

It is thoroughly settled that an agreement or contract within the provisions of the statute of frauds, if otherwise valid, is not, merely because it is not in writing, invalid in the sense that it is void.

Section 1624(5) does not permit a party who received the benefit of performance to repudiate an oral agreement for lack of a writing when doing so would be inequitable.

Angelus Leasing Co. v. Stephens · filed 1927-12-02(5)

“When it is clearly and unequivocally made to appear that there has been a performance by a party on his part of an oral agreement required by the statute ... to be in writing, under such circumstances as to make it inequitable to allow the other party receiving the benefit thereof to repudiate it on the ground that it was not in writing, he is estopped from doing so.”

Section 1624 does not apply to an executed oral agreement.

James v. Hall · filed 1928-01-23(4)

The statute of frauds has no application to an executed oral agreement.

Section 1624’s writing requirement cannot be invoked by a party whose assurances induced the other party to change position in reliance on an oral extension.

Wilson v. Bailey · filed 1937-02-27

It is, of course, well settled, under the provisions of section 1624 of the Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that certain contracts to be enforceable are required to be in writing, or that some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or his agent. It is also equally well settled that the facts of a particular case may give rise to an equitable estoppel against the party seeking to set up the statute of frauds and foreclose such party from relying thereon. ... The undisputed facts of the instant case present, in our opinion, a proper case for the application of the rule of equitable estoppel.

Section 1624 cannot be invoked to defeat an oral agreement when the other party relied on it and parted with value, making enforcement of the writing requirement unjust.

Grant v. Long · filed 1939-07-21

We must now consider the effect of the statute of frauds on the question of the validity of the implied contract we are considering. It is a fundamental rule that as the statute of frauds is designed to prevent fraud it cannot be invoked to perpetrate a fraud. ... We believe the instant case comes squarely within the rule thus announced in the Wilson case. The Hotel Company permitted its agents and officers to make representations to Mr. and Mrs. Grant and to perform the implied parol contract with them, and with Mrs. Grant for years. It permitted them to change their position by parting with the bonds which it still retains. It cannot deny the authority of its agents and refuse to be bound by the contract they made and still retain the benefits of such contract.

Section 1624 requires a writing for an agreement made in consideration of marriage, but the requirement does not apply after both parties fully perform the agreement.

McComsey v. Leaf · filed 1939-12-15

Therefore, while the oral contract averred by defendant is invalid under the statute (Civ. Code, sec. 1624) yet, after its mutual execution and consummation, it is vain to object for want of a writing.

Section 1624 does not bar enforcement of an oral agreement when the party seeking enforcement has fully performed.

Van Fossen v. Yager · filed 1944-08-29

However, regardless of which portion of section 1624 is relied upon it is well established that an agreement is taken out of the statute by performance.

Section 1624(1) does not bar enforcement of an oral agreement when performance is complete and only payment remains.

Dean v. Davis · filed 1946-02-20(1)

Defendants accepted the benefits of plaintiff’s services, and acknowledged by their actions that plaintiff performed his obligations under the agreement. The staute of frauds is not applicable herein.

An oral agreement covered by section 1624 may be evidenced by a later written memorandum, even after one party has performed.

Ayoob v. Ayoob · filed 1946-04-29

Under California law, an oral agreement may be taken out of the operation of the statute by a written memorandum executed subsequently, even though the agreement has already been performed by one party.

Section 1624 does not bar recovery in quantum meruit for services when an oral agreement is pleaded to show that the services were not gratuitous, rather than as the basis of liability.

Sappa v. Crestetto · filed 1947-03-04

Under the first point it is argued that the agreement pleaded was void because it was not in writing and was not to be performed within a year from the making thereof and within the lifetime of the promisor. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1973; Civ. Code, § 1624.) The argument assumes that the action was based upon the oral agreement. This is not the case. ... The pleading of the agreement merely served the purpose of enabling plaintiff to offer proof of conditions under which she would be entitled to recover the reasonable value of her services, at the time they were completed, and was not relied upon as the basis of defendant’s liability.

Section 1624 may be overcome by equitable estoppel when a buyer proves the agreement, reliance on the seller’s representations, and a change of position by a preponderance of the evidence.

Wilk v. Vencill · filed 1947-05-13

The doctrine of estoppel is not destructive of the statute of frauds. ... Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds. ... Plaintiff must still establish the truth of his allegations, and if he does ,not prove the contract, the reliance, and the change of position by a preponderance of the evidence, he cannot recover.

A party may be estopped from invoking Section 1624(5)'s writing requirement for a real estate broker's commission when the broker detrimentally relies on the party's oral promise.

Le Blond v. Wolfe · filed 1948-01-16(5)

The finding, supported by the evidence, that Bisno orally agreed to pay the $2,500; that in reliance thereon plaintiff irremediably changed his position to his detriment by releasing the owners of the property from any obligation to pay him a commission is sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that the statute of frauds was not available to Bisno.

A party may be estopped from invoking the statute of frauds when a contracting party changed position in reliance on an oral agreement and the other party accepted its benefits.

Ryan v. Welte · filed 1948-10-13(6)

While, as asserted by defendants, there was no allegation of a “change of position on the ... heirs” (emphasis added) it is the change of position of the contracting parties, and not the beneficiaries of the contract, that forms the estoppel to rely upon the statute of frauds.

A party may be estopped from invoking Section 1624 to defeat an oral contract when refusing enforcement would cause unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment, even without a representation about the statute’s writing requirement.

Monarco v. Lo Greco · filed 1950-08-01

The controlling question is whether plaintiff is estopped from relying upon the statute of frauds (Civ. Code § 1624; Code Civ. Proc. § 1973) to defeat the enforcement of the oral contract. ... In those cases, however, where either an unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment would result from refusal to enforce the contract, the doctrine of estoppel has been applied whether or not plaintiff relied upon representations going to the requirements of the statute itself. ... Plaintiff is thus estopped because of these facts just as were the wife’s heirs in the Notten case.

Section 1624(1) permits estoppel against the statute of frauds only when refusing to enforce the oral contract would cause unconscionable injury or unjustly enrich the other party.

Ruinello v. Murray · filed 1951-02-07(1)

There can be no estoppel unless plaintiff will suffer unconscionable injury or defendant will be unjustly enriched if the oral contract is not enforced.

Section 1624(4) does not bar a claim based on an oral trust when the party invoking the statute committed fraud.

Rahim v. Akbar · filed 1949-06-14(4)

The contention is based on the proposition that the alleged oral agreement between the parties involved an assignment of a lease to real property and was required by section 1624, subdivision (4) of the Civil Code, and section 1973, subdivision 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. Those code sections are not applicable to this case for the reason that an oral trust existed between the parties and appellants were found guilty of fraud.

Section 1624 applies to contract actions and does not bar an action for fraud.

MacK v. White · filed 1950-05-15(3)

The section of the statute of frauds relied on by defendant is applicable to actions ex contractu, while the present action is not founded upon a contract but is an action ex delicto to recover damages for fraud perpetrated by defendant.

A party invoking section 1624 to invalidate an agreement bears the burden of proving its invalidity.

Schuster v. Bowen · filed 1950-05-26

The contention is made that the $5,000 promised in case the plaintiff sold the farm is without consideration since the agreement to farm on a 50-50 basis in 1947 was not to be performed in one year and was therefore void under the provisions of Civil Code section 1624. Again, it must be remembered that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show the invalidity of defendant's agreement.

A defendant waives the statute of frauds defense by failing to demur to a complaint alleging an oral agreement or object to oral proof of the agreement at trial.

Coleman v. Satterfield · filed 1950-10-23(4)

The rule is established that where a complaint alleges facts showing that the agreement is within the statute of frauds and defendant neither demurs nor objects to the introduction of oral testimony to prove the agreement, he waives the defense of the statute of frauds and may not thereafter raise it on appeal.

Section 1624(1) does not bar enforcement of an oral agreement fully executed for the years at issue.

Roberts v. Wachter · filed 1951-05-17(1)

Since this court is of the opinion that the agreement here was fully executed for the year 1945 and prior years, the statute of frauds does not apply.

Full performance of an agreement takes it outside Section 1624(1)’s one-year statute of frauds.

Bergin v. Van Der Steen · filed 1951-10-23(1)

The answer to this contention is that Bergin has completely performed his promises under the 1940 contract, having assigned his rights under the original agreement and having thereafter refrained from bidding for concession privileges at the end of the 1941 season. Such agreement is thereby taken out of the operation of the statute.

Section 1624(5) requires a writing to enforce a broker’s commission agreement, but an oral brokerage arrangement may be proved to establish a fiduciary duty and a constructive trust for its breach.

Walter H. Leimert Co. v. Woodson · filed 1954-05-14(5)

Such agreements are not within the statute of frauds. ... A constructive trust is created by operation of law in such circumstances in order to avoid injustice. Such a trust need not be in writing.

Section 1624 does not require a writing to establish a constructive trust created by operation of law.

South v. Wishard · filed 1956-11-27(4)

Defendants’ contention that the cause of action pleaded is within the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) is untenable. The action is not based upon an agreement to hold property in trust for plaintiff nor upon an agreement to transfer it. As an action to establish a constructive trust it is not within the statute of frauds. No writing is required to establish a trust that is created by operation of law.

A Section 1624 statute of frauds defense is waived unless raised in the pleadings or at trial.

Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic · filed 1956-07-25(1)

Appellant contends finally that an oral agreement not to compete for an unlimited time is within the statute of frauds and therefore unenforceable. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 1.) This defense was raised for the first time on appeal. It is considered waived unless presented in the pleadings or during trial. (23 Cal.Jur.2d 444, § 153.)

Section 1624’s statute of frauds defense is waived when a defendant fails to demur to the complaint, object to testimony proving the oral agreement at trial, or move to strike that testimony.

Pao Ch'en Lee v. GREGORICU · filed 1958-06-06

They thus waived the right to urge on appeal error in the reception of the oral evidence, since it is settled that (1) a defendant waives his right to rely upon any provisions of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) by failing to (a) demur to the complaint, (b) object to the introduction of testimony to prove the oral agreement at the time of trial, or (c) make a motion to strike such testimony ... and (2) the admission of parol evidence to vary or add to a written instrument cannot be objected to for the first time in the appellate court ... 43 Cal.App. 507, 510 [3] [185 P. 476]).

Section 1624 requires a writing for a real property sale agreement, but equitable estoppel can prevent a party from invoking that requirement after inducing detrimental reliance on an oral agreement.

Pruitt v. Fontana · filed 1956-08-06

But conceding that the contract was within the statute of frauds and that the oral contract was invalid for want of a sufficient note or memorandum reflecting its material terms, defendant, under the circumstances of this case, is estopped to raise the bar of the statute.

Section 1624 does not apply to an executed contract.

Kirkpatrick v. Tapo Oil Co. · filed 1956-09-12

Section 1624 has no application to an executed contract.

Section 1624 does not bar an executed oral agreement to divide real property when one party has fully performed, the other has received fair compensation, and possession has been delivered.

Prince v. Varona · filed 1956-09-26

The court found the contract on sufficient evidence and that plaintiff fully performed his obligation thereon. It would, under the facts and circumstances of the case, be inequitable to allow the defendant, fully compensated under a fair agreement, to set up the bar of the statute of frauds.

A party may be estopped from invoking Section 1624 when another has changed position in reliance on an oral contract and refusal to enforce it would cause unconscionable injury and unjust enrichment.

Brunson v. Babb · filed 1956-10-22

As to appellants’ reliance upon the statute of frauds, we are satisfied that they are estopped from relying thereon. ... The instant case is replete with testimony that respondent changed his position in reliance upon, or in performance of, the contract, that if the contract were not enforced respondent would suffer unconscionable injury, while appellants would be unjustly enriched should they escape the obligations of such contract made by decedent.

A party is not estopped from invoking the statute of frauds based on reliance on a promise the party did not make.

Vavuris v. Pinelli · filed 1957-01-02(4)

Plaintiff’s third contention is that defendants are estopped to raise the statute of frauds as a defense. ... This argument fails for the obvious reason that the trial court found that the defendants had not made any such promise.

When section 1624(5) bars enforcement of an oral real estate agency agreement, a party may recover consideration given in reliance on a promised writing.

Doke v. Brockhurst · filed 1957-04-29(5)

It is because the statute of frauds prevented his enforcement of the promised agreement that he is entitled to recover the consideration given for it.

Section 1624 permits quantum meruit recovery for labor and services rendered under a contract void under the statute of frauds.

Polderman v. C. G. Hokanson Co. · filed 1958-01-21(1)

Assuming without conceding the applicability of the statute, the ready answer is that when labor and services are rendered under a contract void under the statute of frauds a recovery may be had on a quantum meruit.

Substantial improvements to land made in reliance on an oral declaration of trust can take the trust outside section 1624’s writing requirement.

Maddox v. Rainoldi · filed 1958-09-10(4), (6)

The making of the valuable improvements herein testified to running into an amount several times in excess of the original value of the property clearly satisfies the rule taking the oral declaration of trust out of the statute of frauds.

An oral agreement to sell real property may be enforced despite section 1624(4) if the buyer sufficiently part performs it; payment alone does not suffice.

Harrison v. Hanson · filed 1958-11-20(4)

Being clearly within the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) such an agreement could be taken out of the statute and enforced in equity only by reason of part performance thereof. ... Viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that the pleading fails to allege sufficient part performance during the five-week period involved to take the contract out of the statute of frauds.

A party waives reliance on Section 1624 by failing to object to evidence of a written agreement’s execution or contents.

Handley v. Guasco · filed 1958-12-05

The statute of frauds (Civ. Code, §1624) is not involved here. There is no oral agreement being considered. It is simply a question of proof as to whether the agreements which are sufficient to comply with the statute of frauds were signed. No objection was made to any of the evidence as to the execution of the agreements or their contents. Thereby defendants waived their right to rely upon any provision of the statute of frau.ds.

Section 1624 bars an oral promise to convey a life estate unless estoppel applies because denying enforcement would cause unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment.

Ward v. Wrixon · filed 1959-03-12

Since the contract in the instant case was oral, it was necessary for Mary Ward to prove and plead facts which would give rise to an estoppel for otherwise the contract is barred by the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973.) ... We think that the facts collectively were sufficient to warrant the trial court finding, as it did, that the services performed were of an extraordinary or exceptional nature, that they enriched the decedent’s estate, and that they were not compensable in money. These findings are sufficient to support the judgment.

An agent’s conduct alone cannot estop a principal from invoking the statute of frauds; estoppel requires reasonable reliance on the principal’s own conduct.

Monte Carlo Motors, Inc. v. Volkswagenwerk, G. M. B. H. · filed 1960-01-13(1)

Lange’s representation to plaintiff cannot standing alone estop the defendant to rely on the statute of frauds, since the agent by his conduct alone cannot estop his principal and the estoppel can only arise out of reasonable reliance upon some conduct of the principal himself.

Section 1624 makes an oral agreement to employ a real estate broker for a commission voidable, but a stranger to the agreement cannot invoke it as a defense to a claim for inducing its breach.

Zimmerman v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n · filed 1961-04-10(5)

We hold that the third party respondent, at least, cannot lay hold of the statute in the instant case.

Section 1624 requires the court to address a properly raised statute-of-frauds defense to an oral license agreement; failure to do so can require reversal.

Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia · filed 1960-05-09(1)

From the above, it is apparent that the issue of the statute of frauds was raised at least five times in the trial court. Whether the agreement of 1955 is enforceable is, of course, pivotal to other issues in the case. Failure to find on a material issue will ordinarily amount to reversible error. ... While the trial court’s memorandum states other reasons why it would not permit the defense of the statute of frauds, the initial statement that said defense was being raised for the first time leads to the inescapable conclusion that the trial court did not consider the defense. For the reasons stated, those portions of the judgment appealed from by appellant (Iaia) are reversed.

A party cannot raise Section 1624’s statute-of-frauds defense for the first time on appeal.

Berk v. Twenty-Nine Palms Ranchos, Inc. · filed 1962-03-20

The question of the application of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) to this transaction, i.e., that a corporation’s promise to answer for the debt of another must be in writing and the authority of its agent or employee to make a promise to answer for the debt of another must likewise be in writing, is raised for the first time on this appeal. This is not authorized.

Section 1624’s one-year writing requirement does not bar enforcement of an oral contract after one party has fully performed.

Nesson v. Moes · filed 1963-05-02(1)

California recognizes the view enunciated in section 198 of the Restatement, Contracts: ‘‘Where any of the promises in a bilateral contract cannot be fully performed within a year from the time of the formation of the contract, all promises in the contract are within Class Y of § 178, unless and until one party to such contract completely performs what he has promised. When there has been such complete performance, none of the promises in the contract is within Class Y.”

Section 1624 does not bar a promissory fraud claim based on a collateral oral promise made to induce a completed real property sale.

Kett v. Graeser · filed 1966-04-19

The action is not based on a contract which is required to be in writing by the statute of frauds. ... The action-is in tort based on alleged collateral oral promise made to induce appellants to buy, and made without intention to perform, a promissory fraud. ... The statute of frauds does not apply.

Section 1624 does not bar a constructive-trust claim against an agent who acquires land in breach of a fiduciary duty, even if the agent’s promise to buy it for the principal was oral.

Gerhardt v. Weiss · filed 1966-12-09(4), (5)

In our view the statute of frauds does not apply to the case. Essentially, this is a suit in equity to impress a trust on a faithless fiduciary and not an action at law to enforce a contract.

Section 1624 allows a property seller to raise the statute of frauds against an oral brokerage agreement, but strangers to the agreement cannot raise that defense in a tort action for interference with it.

Golden v. Anderson · filed 1967-12-06

Preliminarily, it is to be observed that although the brokerage agreement relied upon by plaintiff was oral, and thus subject to the defense of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) which could be asserted by the seller of the property to defeat any action by plaintiff on the contract, defendants, being strangers to such contract, may not interpose that defense in this action which is founded in tort.

A promise to put an oral agreement in writing, by itself, does not estop a party from asserting Section 1624.

Tomlins v. American Ins. Co. · filed 1968-02-01(1)

The use of the disjunctive “or” permitted the jury to find an estoppel on a mere promise to reduce the agreement to writing, without any element of unconscionable injury to plaintiff. The instruction was erroneous.

Section 1624’s writing requirement for a real estate broker’s commission agreement may be overcome by estoppel when the principal knowingly accepts the benefits of the broker’s completed work.

Higson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. · filed 1968-06-21(5)

We have concluded that the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the statute of frauds was supported by the principle of estoppel.

Section 1624 covers an agreement that cannot be fully performed within one year, but a party’s full performance takes an oral agreement outside the statute of frauds.

Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co. · filed 1968-05-29(1)

Since the contract could not be fully performed within one year it was violative of the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 1). ... However, the findings and their supporting evidence indicate that the agreement was fully performed by Dallman, Such a fully executed parol contract is not affected by the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(5) does not allow a purchaser who fraudulently induces a seller to break an oral brokerage agreement to invoke the statute of frauds against the broker’s tortious interference claim.

Friedman v. Jackson · filed 1968-10-15(5)

Her appeal presents the following narrow question: May a defendant whose fraudulent acts and misrepresentations have caused another to fail to perform in conformity with promises made to his promisee under an oral agreement assert the statute of frauds as a defense against an action for damages brought by the promisee alleging defendant’s tortious interference with a contractual relationship? We have concluded that this question must be answered in the negative.

A buyer’s serious change of position in reliance on an oral land sale agreement may estop the seller from invoking Section 1624’s statute of frauds.

Carlson v. Richardson · filed 1968-11-07(4)

But the purchase of nearby property for use as a temporary residence while a house was being built on the disputed property may have amounted to a serious change in position made in reliance on the contract. ... The issue of fact tendered by this allegation cannot be determined upon demurrer.

Section 1624 permits a defendant to assert the statute of frauds against an oral broker commission agreement when the broker gave up only another unenforceable oral promise to pay a commission.

Keely v. Price · filed 1972-08-15

Since it appears on the face of the complaint that plaintiff did not give up an enforceable right in reliance on defendant’s oral promise to pay, plaintiff has not brought himself within the exception of Le Blond, and defendant Price is not estopped from relying on the statute of frauds.

A party may be estopped from relying on section 1624, subdivision 4, when the other party’s reliance on an oral contract makes that defense unconscionable.

McGirr v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1974-08-21(4)

As far as Civil Code section 1624, subdivision 4, is concerned, we agree with plaintiff that defendants are estopped from relying on it.

Section 1624’s statute of frauds defense can be barred by estoppel when a party changes position in reliance on an oral agreement.

Whorton v. Dillingham · filed 1988-06-23(a), (c)

Whorton alleges he stopped his education earlier than planned to assist Dillingham in his business ventures in exchange for promises of support and sharing of accumulated property. These facts are sufficient to estop Dillingham from raising the statute of frauds by way of demurrer to bar enforcement of the contract.

Section 1624's statute of frauds cannot be applied to produce unjust enrichment, even if the agreement falls within its one-year writing requirement.

James G. Freeman & Associates, Inc. v. Tanner · filed 1976-03-04(1)

Even assuming that the agreement was required to be in writing as it was not to be performed within one year (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 1), the statute of frauds cannot be applied to result in unjust enrichment (Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal.3d 744, 752 [106 Cal.Rptr. 187, 505 P.2d 1027]).

Section 1624(f) does not bar an unjust enrichment claim that is neither an action on a contract nor a subterfuge for one.

First Nationwide Savings v. Perry · filed 1992-12-03(f)

Because this is not an action upon a contract, nor a subterfuge for one, the statute of frauds is not a bar to FNS’s recovery.

Section 1624(4) does not bar a fraud claim based on a seller’s representation that an existing driveway would remain available after the sale.

Southern California District Council v. Shepherd of Hills Evangelical Lutheran Church · filed 1978-02-24(4)

This, as we see it, is not an agreement for the sale of an interest in real property, but a statement concerning one of the benefits that would follow plaintiff’s acquisition of parcel 2, made as an inducement for the purpose of consummating the sale of that parcel.

Section 1624(4) bars enforcement of an unwritten real property sale agreement unless equitable estoppel applies; a down payment, lost opportunity to shop for other homes, and pregnancy did not establish sufficient reliance.

Oren Realty & Development Co. v. Superior Court · filed 1979-03-29(4)

Grounds for estoppel urged by RPIs are part performance through their transmittal of checks in down payment, loss of opportunity to find adjoining homesites and pregnancy of their respective wives. It is clear none of these is sufficient for the purpose.

A party may be equitably estopped from asserting Section 1624’s statute of frauds defense when its conduct induces the other party to rely on an unsigned contract and materially change position.

April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV · filed 1983-10-05

Despite the parties’ inability to produce a signed copy of the 1968 contract, however, on the allegations and facts properly before this court respondents’ statute of frauds defense would be barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Section 1624(d) bars a licensed real estate broker from using equitable estoppel to enforce an oral commission agreement unless the party to be charged committed actual fraud.

Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-10-29(d)

We hold that a licensed real estate broker or salesperson cannot assert equitable estoppel against a statute of frauds defense to an oral commission agreement that is subject to Civil Code section 1624(d) unless there is a showing of actual fraud by the party to be charged under the invalid oral agreement.

A statute of frauds defense must be raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal.

Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat · filed 1979-05-01

Equipment’s attempt to raise the statute of frauds defense for the first time on appeal need not be discussed in detail.

Section 1624 makes an oral contract within the statute of frauds voidable rather than void; it affects the remedy, not the contract’s validity.

Masin v. Drain · filed 1984-01-10

The fact that the option contract was oral does not invalidate the agreement. The statute of frauds, set forth in Civil Code section 1624, has not been interpreted as making such agreements null and void. It is the general rule that a contract falling within the operation of the statute, but made in contravention thereof, is not invalid in the sense that it is void. It is merely voidable. The statute is said to relate to the remedy only and not to affect the validity of the oral contract.

Section 1624(d) requires agreements to pay real estate commissions to be in writing, but it does not bar an action for fraudulent misrepresentation.

Ballou v. Master Properties No. 6 · filed 1987-02-05(d)

It is now well settled by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 28-31 [216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212], that the statute of frauds is no bar to an action predicated on fraudulent misrepresentation.

Statements acknowledging a real estate agreement in a proceeding against a third party do not waive the statute of frauds defense.

Isaac v. a & B LOAN CO. · filed 1988-05-17(c)

Statements made against a third party, Weil, that respondent had “an agreement” to sell the property to a “prospective buyer” cannot be treated the same as a solemn judicial admission in answer to a complaint alleging a contract within the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 does not bar fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims based on a developer's alleged false representations to neighboring homeowners about planned construction.

Lacher v. Superior Court · filed 1991-05-29

In addition, we reject claims by the real parties in interest that the amended complaint does not adequately allege justifiable reliance or proximate cause, and that the causes of action are barred by either the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.), the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.), or the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624).

Section 1624 applies to a broker’s claim for compensation or a commission, but does not bar an action to recover commissions or secret profits from a fiduciary.

Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. · filed 1991-07-09

Although Civil Code section 1624, the statute of frauds, is applicable to the collection of compensation or commission by the agent or broker, it does not apply to a cause of action to recover from fiduciary commissions or secret profits.

Section 1624 does not bar enforcement of an oral settlement stipulated to before the court following a judicially mandated and supervised settlement conference.

Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. · filed 1994-03-31(a)

We conclude the statute of frauds is inapplicable to an oral settlement agreement stipulated to by the parties before the court following a judicially mandated and supervised settlement conference.

Section 1624(c) covers real property sale contracts lacking a writing signed by the party to be charged, but estoppel can bar that party from asserting the statute when reliance on the oral contract causes unconscionable injury.

Kipperman v. Dixson (In re Diego's Inc.) · filed 1996-07-05(c)

The contract falls within the general scope of California’s statute of frauds because it includes the sale of real property and was not reduced to writing and signed by Dixson, the party to be charged. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(c). A party may be estopped, however, from relying on the statute of frauds. ... Because the Trustee seriously changed his position to his detriment in reliance on the oral contract with Dixson, the bankruptcy court was correct in holding that Dixson was estopped from relying on the statute of frauds as a defense in the Trustee’s breach of contract action.

Equitable estoppel can permit enforcement of an oral agreement to make a will despite former section 1624(6).

Housley v. Haywood · filed 1997-06-26(6)

Accordingly, equitable estoppel principles are available under either section 150 or Civil Code section 1624(6) to enforce the type of oral agreement Brian alleged in this case.

Section 1624(b)(3)(C) permits enforcement of an agreement subject to the one-year writing requirement when the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in court that the contract was made.

Pietrobon v. Libarle · filed 2006-03-21(b)(3)(C)

The statute of frauds does not render the agreement invalid, although it is clear that the settlement agreement “by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1).) However, the statute contains an exception stating that notwithstanding this provision, “[t]here is sufficient evidence that a contract has been made” when “[t]he party against whom enforcement is sought admits in its pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court that a contract was made” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (b)(3)(C), italics added.) That is precisely what occurred here.

Section 1624(a)(3) requires agreements to sell real property to be in writing, subject to an exception for a purchaser’s part performance.

Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. · filed 2009-03-18(a)(3)

Although the statute of frauds requires agreements for the sale of real property to be in writing (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3)), plaintiffs have alleged that they fully performed their obligations under their implied contracts.

Section 1624 does not apply to a real property transfer completed by a deed executed by the grantors and delivered to the grantee.

Ge Lee v. George Tong Lee · filed 2009-07-29(a)(3)

Here, it is undisputed that appellants executed the 2002 quitclaim deed and delivered it to Fue Sue with the intent to transfer their interest in Lot 5 to Fue Sue. Thus, the 2002 deed was an executed contract. Accordingly, the statute of frauds does not apply to this transfer.

Section 1624(a)(1) does not bar a breach of contract claim on demurrer when the complaint alleges that the contract was written.

Maxwell v. Dolezal · filed 2014-11-04(a)(1)

For purpose of a demurrer, the allegation that the contract was written also disposes of Dolezal’s argument that the contract violated the statute of frauds, Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(1).

Full performance by one party can take an oral contract outside the statute of frauds without a separate showing of estoppel.

Zakk v. Diesel · filed 2019-03-25(a)(1)

Defendants argue that full performance by itself is not sufficient to take the contract out of the statute and that Zakk also must allege facts showing such unusual and extraordinary circumstances that the equitable doctrine of estoppel applies to bar the assertion of the statute. They are mistaken.

Section 1624(a)(1) does not prevent a party that has fully performed an agreement from enforcing the other party’s promise.

Yellowcake, Inc. v. Morena Music, Inc. · filed 2021-03-02(a)(1)

YCH invokes Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(1), which applies to agreements that by their terms are not to be performed within one year of making the agreement. ... However, even if a contract cannot ... be completely performed within one year of execution, if the contract has been fully performed by one party, the remaining promise is taken out of the statute of frauds and may be enforced by the performing party. ... In the absence of any response from YCH, and because the applicability of the statute of frauds is not apparent from the face of the counterclaim, dismissal of any state law claim based on the potential application of the statue of frauds is inappropriate.

Section 1624(a)(1) does not bar enforcement by a party who fully performed an agreement that could not be completed within one year.

Yellowcake, Inc. v. Hyphy Music, Inc. · filed 2021-07-20(a)(1)

However, even if a contract cannot ... be completely performed within one year of execution, if the contract has been fully performed by ... one party, the remaining promise is taken out of the statute of frauds and may be enforced by the ... performing party.

Section 1624 does not require dismissal of a claim on an oral agreement lasting more than one year at the pleading stage when the plaintiff alleges full performance and the defendant does not dispute it.

Christianson v. Cox Communications, Inc. · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

Defendants do not respond to this argument in their reply brief. Instead, they state that “there are no factual disputes concerning … Abdala’s full performance of the alleged oral agreements.” ECF No. 49 at 6. The Court therefore declines to dismiss the contract claims based on the statute of frauds at the pleadings stage.

Section 1624(a)(3)'s writing requirement for real property transactions does not apply to a settlement of claims concerning investments in LLCs whose business involves real property.

J.B.B. Inv. Partners Ltd. v. Fair · filed 2019-06-04(a)(3)

The statute of frauds and its requirements are plainly inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.

Section 1624(a)(3) subjects agreements concerning interests in real property to the statute of frauds; a typewritten name may show intent to authenticate a proposed modification.

Habtemariam v. PNC Bank, National Assoc. · filed 2021-05-17(a)(3)

The 1099-C form modifies the SDoT, which is subject to the statute of frauds as an agreement for “an interest [in real property].” See Cal. Civ Code § 1624(a)(3). Thus, in order for the 1099-C form to modify the SDoT, the 1099-C form must meet the statute of frauds. ... This typewritten name is evidence of PNC’s intent to authenticate the writing as coming from PNC. ... Thus, failing to meet their burden on summary judgment to demonstrate no genuine dispute issue of material fact, Defendant PNC’s statute of frauds argument fails.

Section 1624(a)(4) may require a written lease for enforcement, but it does not make testimony about the lease irrelevant to who controlled the premises.

G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Flores · filed 2019-08-14(a)(4)

That a lease may be required for enforcement purposes under the statute of frauds, Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(4), does not render E. Flores’ testimony irrelevant or immaterial.

A party may be estopped from asserting Section 1624’s statute-of-frauds defense when the other party sufficiently pleads part performance and unconscionable injury.

Hogan v. Central Loan Administration and Reporting · filed 2022-04-26

Even assuming the oral agreement was covered by the statute of frauds, the FAC alleges sufficient facts to support plaintiffs’ claim that Cenlar is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. ... Here, plaintiffs sufficiently plead part performance and unconscionable injury.

Section 1624’s amended writing requirement does not invalidate an oral contract that was valid when made.

Keefe v. Keefe · filed 1912-06-20

Since this contract was made sections 1624 of the Civil Code and 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been amended so as to require contracts like this one to be in writing; ... The case was not within the sections as they read at the time this contract was made. ... And certain it is that the amendments should not have a retroactive effect, and operate to make void a contract valid at the time of its execution.

Amendments to Section 1624 concerning inheritance contracts do not apply when the promisee fully performed and his rights vested before their adoption.

Rogers v. Schlotterback · filed 1914-01-15

We are speaking, of course, without reference to the recent amendments of sections 1624 of the Civil Code, and 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to contracts of this character. Such amendments, adopted long after the alleged contract was fully executed on the part of James Taylor Rogers, and whatever rights he had thereunder were vested, constitute something more than a mere rule of evidence. As was held by the lower court, they can have no application to the case at bar.

Section 1624 requires an agreement not to revoke a will to be in writing.

Cazaurang v. Carrey · filed 1931-10-16(7)

An agreement not to revoke a will already made is just as much an agreement to make a provision for another by will as an agreement to make a will devising or bequeathing property to the promisee, and in our opinion the former is just as much within the statute as the latter.

Section 1624 requires an agreement to leave property by deed to be in writing; an oral agreement for services is unenforceable as such, though the provider may recover the value of the services.

Van Core v. Bodner · filed 1947-01-29

An agreement to leave property by deed is invalid unless in writing (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973.) An oral agreement to leave property by deed, in compensation for services rendered, or to be rendered, is not enforceable, as such, but the remedy is one in quantum meruit for the value of the services rendered.

Section 1624(6) does not require a writing when a contract could be fully performed during the promisor’s lifetime.

Roy v. Salisbury · filed 1942-11-02(6)

If the terms of a contract are such that it admits of performance during the lifetime of the promisor, it is not within the statutory provision here involved.

Section 1624(6) does not require a writing for a promise to share money after another person’s death when the promise is to be performed during the promisor’s lifetime.

Jarkieh v. Badagliacco · filed 1946-07-25(6)

Equally untenable is the contention that the alleged oral agreement violates the statute of frauds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6); Civ. Code, § 1624(6).) These sections provide that an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or to make any provision for any person by will must be in writing. These sections are not here applicable. No agreement to devise property is involved. The promisor is the daughter who, under the agreement found to exist, promised to share the money upon surviving her mother. Clearly, the promise was to be performed within her lifetime.

Section 1624(6) makes an agreement that by its terms will not be performed during the promisor’s lifetime unenforceable unless a signed writing or memorandum evidences it.

Tabata v. Murane · filed 1944-05-01(6)

Section 1624 of the Civil Code provides that “The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent: ... 6. An agreement which by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor . . .” Contracts which are invalid under the quoted law are unenforceable.

Section 1624 makes an oral promise to leave an estate at death in exchange for services unenforceable.

Luther v. Foster · filed 1957-05-08

Although respondent was forced to rely on quantum meruit (because the alleged oral contract to compensate respondent by leaving her the entire estate upon his death is unenforceable—Civ. Code, § 1624, Code Civ. Proc., § 1973), the matter, nevertheless, was sufficiently related to the transaction or matter upon which the action was brought, to justify the filing of the cross-complaint.

Subdivision 6 requires a writing for an agreement that cannot be fully performed during the promisor’s lifetime, including a promise to transfer a share of an estate after death.

Parker v. Solomon · filed 1959-06-04(6)

We conclude that the trial court was entirely correct in holding the pleaded agreement to be within the provisions of subdivision 6 of the statute of frauds.

Section 1624(6) measures lifetime performance by the promisor’s lifetime, even when the agreement calls for another person’s care and burial.

Kassianov v. Raissis · filed 1962-02-21(6)

However, the statute of frauds, in this regard (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 6), makes invalid an agreement which is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor, and in this ease the promisor was Raissis, not Kacee, who had done all he had agreed to do, and who was the promisee.

Section 1624 makes an oral promise to name someone as a beneficiary under a will unenforceable.

Shabrick v. Moore · filed 1961-08-21(6)

Respondent’s objection to the first count set forth in the complaint was that it was barred by the statute of frauds, since appellant had alleged an oral contract to make her a beneficiary under the decedent’s will. Oral contracts of this nature are unenforceable under California law.

Subdivision 3 requires an agreement made in consideration of marriage to be in writing; marriage and one spouse’s change of an insurance beneficiary are insufficient part performance to enforce the other spouse’s oral promise to do the same.

Stevenson v. Pantaleone · filed 1933-04-25(3)

From the foregoing review of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, it is clear that Edith M. Hendrickson did nothing that could be construed as an act of part performance of the oral antenuptial agreement; even the act of marriage did not constitute part performance. The only act performed by plaintiff which could be attributable to the said agreement was the change in the beneficiary in the policies of insurance issued on his life, and under the above-cited authorities, such act was insufficient to raise the bar of the statute.

An oral agreement made in contemplation of marriage can be effective when the spouses execute it after marriage; an agreement transmuting property needs no additional transfer of title or possession.

Woods v. Security-First National Bank · filed 1956-06-28(3)

This is a clear case of an executed agreement which transmuted the property. The court went on to find that no action was taken by decedent or plaintiff to transfer title, control or possession and the property continued to be treated as before, thus indicating it thought the law to be that some action in addition, to the agreement was necessary before the agreement was executed, but as later discussed that was not necessary.

Section 1624 does not bar enforcement of an oral adoption agreement when the child’s part performance takes the agreement outside the statute of frauds.

Pizzorno v. Herendeen · filed 1961-08-17

As it is well established that equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to adopt or a contract of inheritance and that part performance will take the contract out of the statute of frauds ... the case was properly submitted to the jury for a determination as to whether there had been such part performance by the respondent as to take the admittedly oral agreement out of the statute.

Section 1624 does not bar specific performance of an oral agreement when the party seeking relief has performed it.

Johnson v. Servaes · filed 1962-11-30

Here, plaintiff performed the agreement; in fact it was not until title was conveyed by the district to Oscar that the three defendants refused to perform. Under the circumstances the statute of frauds will not bar the equitable remedy of specific performance.

Section 1624 does not exclude testimony proving a fully performed oral antenuptial agreement.

Gejelian v. Dokoozlian · filed 1963-08-21

Such testimony may be received for the purpose of proving a fully performed oral antenuptial agreement and such a contract would not be excluded under Civil Code section 1624.

Section 1624 does not bar an oral agreement that creates an immediately effective partnership in a going business without transferring specific partnership assets.

Clarke v. Fiedler · filed 1941-05-16(1), (4)

We come now to a consideration of respondent’s claim that the judgment must be affirmed because the alleged agreement provides for the sale of goods and choses in action of the value of $500, as well as for the sale of an interest in real estate, and hence is within the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, subds. 1 and 4, secs. 1624, 1624a and 1724; Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1973 and 1973a). The agreement before us was for the creation of a present partnership in a going business, and not in a business to begin at some future time. The contract, creating as it did an immediate partnership, was a contract which was to be performed at once and without any delay. ... The agreement with which we are here concerned therefore cannot be said to contravene the provisions of the statute of frauds.

Section 1624 does not bar an oral agreement to pool resources and divide the profits of a joint enterprise.

Tobola v. Wholet · filed 1946-07-15

Appellant further contends that the oral agreement found to have been entered into by the parties was invalid under the statute of frauds, citing cases involving the performance of personal services in consideration for the promise to transfer real property, but no case is called to our attention which deals with a joint enterprise such as the one with which we are concerned herein. In such a situation, the authorities which our independent search discloses appear to be in accord to the effect that the statute of frauds is inapplicable.

Section 1624, subdivision 4, requires an assignment of a leasehold longer than one year to be in writing and signed by the transferring party, unless the assignment occurs by operation of law.

Ser-Bye Corp. v. C. P. & G. Markets, Inc. · filed 1947-04-07(4)

Further, the assignment of a leasehold for a longer term than one year, must be by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, unless such assignment be by operation of law. (Civ. Code, § 1091; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4; 12 Cal.Jur. 898, par. 58.) No facts showing this essential element have been pleaded nor are any alleged showing any assignment by operation of law.

Subdivision 4 prevents payment of money in part performance from making an oral real property lease enforceable at law, though equitable relief may be available.

Psihozios v. Humberg · filed 1947-06-06(4)

The first theory is a vain grasp for a right that is denied by the statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4). Part performance of an oral contract by the payment of money on the purchase or lease of real property does not defeat the operation of the statute except as it may be applied for purposes of relief in equity.

Section 1624(4) permits an oral one-year lease, but an oral agreement for annual renewals falls within the statute of frauds; a defendant waives that defense by failing to raise it below.

Aaker v. Smith · filed 1948-08-02(4)

Of course, an oral one-year lease is not within the statute. (Civ. Code, § 1624(4).) It is equally clear that an oral agreement for a one-year lease to be annually renewed for one-year terms at the desire of the tenant is violative of the statute. But defendants are in no legal position to raise the point. The complaint alleged that the agreement was oral. Defendants failed to demur, nor did they plead the statute of frauds in their answer. When the oral testimony was introduced they made no objection. They now seek to raise the defense of the statute of frauds for the first time on appeal. Under such circumstances they must be deemed to have waived the defense.

Section 1624(4) requires a signed writing or memorandum for a lease agreement lasting longer than one year.

Wolfsen v. Hathaway · filed 1948-09-28(4)

The alleged oral agreement to lease the land was invalid, under subdivision 4 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, for it purports to be "an agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year." It was claimed to have been made on December 15, 1945, and that it "was to expire on the 30th day of June, 1947." The statute provides that such an agreement is "invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent." No such memorandum was signed.

Section 1624(4) requires a lease of real property for more than one year to be in writing.

Salomon v. Cooper · filed 1950-07-24(4)

Since a lease of realty for a period longer than one year is not valid unless in writing, it follows that'one important consideration (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4) for the contract of sale has not been agreed upon.

Section 1624(4) requires the essential terms of a lease lasting more than one year to be written with sufficient certainty; parol evidence cannot supply missing material terms.

Ellis v. Klaff · filed 1950-03-15(4)

Under these principles the extrinsic evidence relied upon by plaintiffs to cure the deficiencies of the construction clause was inadmissible, since its purpose and effect were to add material terms to the lease as written, and thereby prove by parol that a contract existed which could be proven solely by a writing as required by the statute of frauds.

An oil lease that continues while oil or gas is produced is real property under section 1624’s writing requirement for broker agreements.

Keans, Springmann & Stipek, Inc. v. Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. · filed 1954-06-29(5)

The oil lease was real property within the meaning of the statute of frauds. The court also found that the allegations in the three affirmative defenses (regarding invalidity under the statute of frauds) were true. Those findings to the effect that the oral agreement was invalid under the provisions of the statute of frauds are supported by the evidence.

Section 1624(4) makes an oral agreement to renew or extend a lease or purchase option invalid unless estoppel applies.

Hagenbuch v. Kosky · filed 1956-06-15(4)

An oral agreement to renew or extend the lease or option is within the statute of frauds (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 4; Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4), and invalid unless appellant can establish an estoppel under subdivision 3 of section 1962 of the Code of Civil Procedure.