Michigan State Civil Rights Complaint (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act)

COMPLAINT — MICHIGAN ELLIOTT-LARSEN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Caption
2. Introduction
3. Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue
4. Factual Allegations
5. Count I — ELCRA — Discrimination (MCL § 37.2202)
6. Count II — ELCRA — Hostile Work Environment / Harassment
7. Count III — ELCRA — Retaliation (MCL § 37.2701)
8. Count IV — PWDCRA — Disability Discrimination (MCL §§ 37.1102, 37.1202)
9. Count V — Federal Title VII / ADA / § 1981 (Parallel Counts)
10. Damages
11. Prayer for Relief
12. Demand for Trial by Jury
13. Reservation of Rights
14. Signature and Service Blocks
15. Verification
16. Certificate of Service
17. Michigan Practice Notes
18. Sources and References

1. CAPTION

STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF [COUNTY NAME]

CASE NO. [________________________________]

HON. [________________________________]

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

2. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.2101 et seq. ("ELCRA"), the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.1101 et seq. ("PWDCRA"), and parallel federal civil rights statutes, to redress unlawful discrimination, harassment, and retaliation suffered by Plaintiff at the hands of Defendant(s).

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, equitable and injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, costs, and reasonable attorney fees, all as authorized by MCL § 37.2801 and MCL § 37.1606.

3. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

3.1. Plaintiff [PLAINTIFF NAME] ("Plaintiff") is an adult resident of [COUNTY] County, Michigan, and was so at all times relevant to this Complaint.

3.2. Defendant [EMPLOYER / ENTITY NAME] ("Defendant" or "[SHORT NAME]") is a [corporation / limited liability company / partnership / public body] organized under the laws of [STATE] and authorized to conduct business in Michigan, with its principal place of business at [ADDRESS], [CITY], [COUNTY] County, Michigan.

3.3. At all relevant times, Defendant was an "employer" within the meaning of MCL § 37.2201(a), which defines that term to include any person "who has 1 or more employees."

3.4. [If applicable] Defendant [INDIVIDUAL NAME] is, on information and belief, an adult resident of [COUNTY] County, Michigan, and at all relevant times acted as [supervisor / manager / officer / agent] of Defendant [EMPLOYER] within the course and scope of that agency.

3.5. The amount in controversy exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees, vesting subject-matter jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to MCL § 600.605 and MCL § 600.8301.

3.6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to MCL § 600.1621 because the cause of action arose in [COUNTY] County, Michigan, and/or because Defendant resides, conducts business, or has its registered office in [COUNTY] County.

3.7. [If federal counts pleaded] This Court has concurrent jurisdiction over the federal counts pleaded herein under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000e-5(f)(3), and 12117(a). See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII).

4. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

4.1. Plaintiff began employment with Defendant on [DATE] as a [POSITION TITLE], earning approximately $[AMOUNT] per [hour / week / year] plus benefits.

4.2. Plaintiff is a member of one or more protected classes under ELCRA, including: [select all that apply — race / color / national origin / religion / sex / age (40+) / height / weight / familial status / marital status / sexual orientation / gender identity or expression].

4.3. [If disability claim] Plaintiff is a "person with a disability" within the meaning of MCL § 37.1103(d), in that [describe physical or mental impairment] substantially limits one or more major life activities, and Plaintiff is otherwise qualified to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.

4.4. Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff performed the essential functions of the position satisfactorily and met or exceeded Defendant's legitimate performance expectations, as reflected in [performance reviews / commendations / promotions / awards].

4.5. Beginning on or about [DATE], Defendant, by and through its agents and supervisors, subjected Plaintiff to adverse treatment because of Plaintiff's protected status, including but not limited to:

• [Describe specific incidents — e.g., disparaging comments, slurs, unequal terms and conditions, denial of promotion, denial of accommodation, scrutiny not applied to similarly situated employees outside the protected class, hostile remarks, stereotyped assignments, exclusion from meetings or training, etc.];
• [Specific date and content of discriminatory remarks made by [SPEAKER]];
• [Disparate disciplinary action — e.g., written warning issued [DATE] for conduct that comparators outside the protected class engaged in without consequence];
• [Specific denial of accommodation or denial of leave].

4.6. On or about [DATE], Plaintiff complained — orally and/or in writing — to [NAME / TITLE] about the discriminatory treatment described above. Plaintiff's complaint constituted protected opposition activity under MCL § 37.2701.

4.7. Following Plaintiff's protected complaint, Defendant subjected Plaintiff to a series of materially adverse actions, including [describe — e.g., increased scrutiny, demotion, transfer, schedule change, suspension, termination], culminating in Plaintiff's [termination / constructive discharge / demotion] on [DATE].

4.8. Similarly situated employees outside Plaintiff's protected class(es), including [NAMES OR DESCRIPTIONS OF COMPARATORS], were not subjected to the same treatment notwithstanding comparable or worse performance and/or conduct.

4.9. Defendant's stated reasons for the adverse actions are pretextual. The true reasons were Plaintiff's protected status and Plaintiff's protected opposition activity.

4.10. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, lost wages and benefits, loss of future earning capacity, emotional distress, humiliation, anxiety, loss of professional reputation, and other compensable injuries.

5. COUNT I — ELCRA — DISCRIMINATION (MCL § 37.2202)

5.1. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 3.1 through 4.10.

5.2. MCL § 37.2202(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, height, weight, familial status, or marital status."

5.3. Defendant subjected Plaintiff to adverse employment action — including [denial of promotion / unequal terms / discharge / etc.] — because of Plaintiff's [protected class], in violation of MCL § 37.2202(1)(a).

5.4. [If sexual orientation / gender identity claim arising on or after the 2024 effective date] Defendant's conduct violates ELCRA as amended by 2023 Public Act 6 (Senate Bill 4 of 2023), signed March 16, 2023, which expressly added "sexual orientation" and "gender identity or expression" to the protected classes enumerated at MCL § 37.2202.

5.5. [Alternative — for sex-based SO/GI claims arising before the 2024 effective date] Defendant's conduct independently violates ELCRA's pre-amendment prohibition on sex discrimination as construed by the Michigan Supreme Court in Rouch World, LLC v. Department of Civil Rights, 510 Mich. 398 (2022), which held that ELCRA's prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation.

5.6. Defendant's discriminatory conduct was intentional, willful, wanton, malicious, and/or made with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's protected rights, justifying the imposition of exemplary damages.

5.7. Plaintiff has suffered damages as set forth herein.

6. COUNT II — ELCRA — HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT / HARASSMENT

6.1. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 3.1 through 5.7.

6.2. ELCRA prohibits harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368 (1993); Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358 (1996).

6.3. Defendant, by and through its agents, subjected Plaintiff to severe or pervasive harassment based on Plaintiff's protected status, including but not limited to [describe conduct — e.g., slurs, derogatory remarks, displays, unwelcome physical conduct, threats, exclusion].

6.4. The harassment was unwelcome, was based on Plaintiff's protected status, and was sufficiently severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in Plaintiff's position would have found the work environment intimidating, hostile, or offensive.

6.5. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.

6.6. Defendant is liable for the harassment under both supervisor-liability and co-worker-liability principles articulated in Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 463 Mich. 297 (2000), and Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 472 Mich. 408 (2005).

7. COUNT III — ELCRA — RETALIATION (MCL § 37.2701)

7.1. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 3.1 through 6.6.

7.2. MCL § 37.2701(a) makes it unlawful to "[r]etaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act."

7.3. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by [describe — e.g., complaining internally to HR on [DATE]; filing an MDCR charge on [DATE]; participating in an investigation; opposing unlawful conduct].

7.4. Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's protected activity and thereafter took materially adverse action against Plaintiff, including [describe].

7.5. A causal connection exists between Plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action, as evidenced by [temporal proximity / direct evidence / pattern of conduct / shifting explanations].

7.6. Defendant's retaliatory conduct violates MCL § 37.2701.

8. COUNT IV — PWDCRA — DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION (MCL §§ 37.1102, 37.1202)

8.1. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 3.1 through 7.6.

8.2. The Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.1101 et seq., prohibits discrimination in employment, public accommodations, education, and housing on the basis of disability.

8.3. Plaintiff is a "person with a disability" under MCL § 37.1103(d) and is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of Plaintiff's position with or without reasonable accommodation.

8.4. MCL § 37.1202 prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of a disability that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of the particular job.

8.5. Defendant subjected Plaintiff to adverse employment action because of Plaintiff's disability and/or refused to provide a reasonable accommodation as required by MCL § 37.1102(2) and MCL § 37.1210.

8.6. Defendant's conduct violates the PWDCRA.

9. COUNT V — FEDERAL TITLE VII / ADA / § 1981 (PARALLEL COUNTS)

9.1. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 3.1 through 8.6.

9.2. [Title VII] Defendant's conduct violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) (Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity as forms of sex discrimination).

9.3. [ADA] Defendant's conduct violates Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

9.4. [§ 1981] Defendant's conduct violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibiting race-based interference with the right to make and enforce contracts.

9.5. Plaintiff has exhausted administrative prerequisites for the Title VII and ADA counts by [filing a timely EEOC charge on [DATE], Charge No. [#####], and receiving a Notice of Right to Sue dated [DATE], attached as Exhibit A].

10. DAMAGES

10.1. Economic damages. Lost back pay, front pay, lost benefits, lost retirement contributions, lost bonuses, and out-of-pocket expenses, in an amount to be proven at trial and exceeding $[AMOUNT].

10.2. Non-economic / general damages. Emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of professional reputation.

10.3. Exemplary / punitive damages. Defendant's conduct was intentional, willful, wanton, malicious, and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's protected rights, supporting an award of exemplary damages under Michigan law and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (federal counts) and § 1981.

10.4. Equitable relief. Reinstatement, front pay in lieu of reinstatement where appropriate, expungement of adverse employment records, and an order requiring Defendant to implement effective anti-discrimination policies, training, and reporting procedures.

10.5. Costs and attorney fees. Costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to MCL § 37.2802, MCL § 37.1606, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), 42 U.S.C. § 12205, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

10.6. Interest. Pre-judgment interest pursuant to MCL § 600.6013 and post-judgment interest pursuant to MCL § 600.6013 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

11. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant(s), jointly and severally, and award:

• A. Compensatory damages, both economic and non-economic, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact, in excess of $[JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD];
• B. Exemplary and/or punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant and deter similar conduct;
• C. Equitable relief including reinstatement, front pay where reinstatement is impracticable, expungement of personnel records, and injunctive relief;
• D. Declaratory judgment that Defendant's conduct violated ELCRA, PWDCRA, Title VII, the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
• E. Reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCL § 37.2802, MCL § 37.1606, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k), 12205, and 1981a;
• F. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as authorized by law;
• G. Such further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

12. DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right pursuant to Mich. Ct. R. 2.508 and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.

13. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to add additional claims, theories, or parties as discovery may reveal, in accordance with Mich. Ct. R. 2.118.

14. SIGNATURE AND SERVICE BLOCKS

Date: [DATE]

Respectfully submitted,

[LAW FIRM NAME]

By: [________________________________]

[ATTORNEY NAME] (P[#####])

Counsel for Plaintiff

[STREET ADDRESS]

[CITY, STATE ZIP]

Telephone: [NUMBER]

Email: [EMAIL]

15. VERIFICATION

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COUNTY OF [COUNTY]

I, [PLAINTIFF NAME], being first duly sworn, depose and state that I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned action; that I have read the foregoing Complaint; and that the matters alleged therein are true to my own knowledge except as to those matters stated upon information and belief, and as to those, I believe them to be true.

[________________________________]

[PLAINTIFF NAME]

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this [____] day of [_______________], 20[____].

[________________________________]

Notary Public, [COUNTY] County, Michigan

My Commission Expires: [_______________]

Acting in the County of: [_______________]

16. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on [DATE], I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL to be served upon the following parties by [method — personal service / certified mail / Michigan TrueFiling e-service / first-class U.S. mail]:

[NAME, ADDRESS OF DEFENDANT(S) OR THEIR REGISTERED AGENT]

[________________________________]

[ATTORNEY NAME] (P[#####])

17. MICHIGAN PRACTICE NOTES

• ELCRA employer threshold (1+ employees). ELCRA's "employer" definition at MCL § 37.2201(a) reaches any person who has one or more employees, in stark contrast to Title VII's 15-employee threshold and the ADA's 15-employee threshold. For small-employer cases, ELCRA is often the only viable theory. See Janer v. Dept. of Corrections (Mich. Ct. App.) for application.
• 2023 PA 6 expansion — sexual orientation and gender identity. Senate Bill 4 of 2023, signed by Governor Whitmer on March 16, 2023, amended MCL §§ 37.2102, 37.2202, 37.2301, 37.2401, 37.2501, and 37.2502 to expressly add "sexual orientation" and "gender identity or expression" as protected classes. The amendment took effect in early 2024 (sources variously cite February 13, 2024 and March 16/March 31, 2024; counsel should confirm the specific effective date for any claim arising near that period). The amendment codifies and extends Rouch World, LLC v. Dep't of Civil Rights, 510 Mich. 398 (2022).
• No administrative exhaustion required. ELCRA (MCL § 37.2801) and PWDCRA (MCL § 37.1606) both authorize direct civil actions without prior administrative filing. Compare federal Title VII, ADA, ADEA. A plaintiff may proceed directly to circuit court — or file an MDCR charge first — but cannot recover duplicative relief on the same conduct under both forums. See Marsh v. Dep't of Civil Rights, 277 Mich. App. 14 (2007).
• Statute of limitations — three years. ELCRA and PWDCRA civil actions are subject to Michigan's three-year personal-injury limitations period under MCL § 600.5805(2). Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108 (2005). The 180-day MDCR administrative filing deadline (MCL § 37.2602) is independent and does not affect the limitations period for a direct civil action.
• No statutory damages cap. Neither ELCRA nor PWDCRA contains a damages cap. Compensatory damages, exemplary damages, equitable relief, costs, and attorney fees are all available. See MCL § 37.2801; MCL § 37.1606. Michigan distinguishes "exemplary damages" (additional compensation for injury to feelings caused by malicious conduct) from punitive damages in the strict sense — the result is functionally similar in civil-rights cases.
• Individual supervisor liability. Under Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 472 Mich. 408 (2005), individual supervisors may be held personally liable under ELCRA. This is a significant departure from federal Title VII, which does not permit individual liability. Plead supervisors as named defendants where their personal conduct supports liability.
• Hostile-environment standard. Michigan applies the "severe or pervasive" standard under Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368 (1993), and Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358 (1996). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ELCRA disparate-treatment claims. See Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 464 Mich. 456 (2001).
• PWDCRA — "unrelated to ability." PWDCRA's definition of disability requires that the impairment be "unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job." Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 457 Mich. 593 (1998). This makes PWDCRA somewhat narrower than the ADA — always plead both where federal coverage applies.
• Whistleblower / WPA overlap. Where retaliation arises from reporting a violation of law to a public body, also consider the Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL § 15.361 et seq. (90-day filing deadline; separate cause of action).
• Concurrent jurisdiction. ELCRA and PWDCRA actions may be filed in state circuit court or, where federal counts and supplemental jurisdiction are pleaded, in U.S. District Court for the Eastern or Western District of Michigan. Choose forum strategically based on jury demographics, judicial assignment, and removal exposure.
• Damages-cap election. When pleading ELCRA/PWDCRA alongside Title VII/ADA, request the jury to allocate damages by count (or by claim) so that uncapped state-law damages are preserved if Title VII's 42 U.S.C. § 1981a cap applies. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (front pay not subject to cap).
• Mediation / facilitation. Many Michigan circuit courts require case-evaluation or facilitative-mediation referral under MCR 2.403 / 2.411 prior to trial. Build settlement leverage early through document preservation, EEOC/MDCR records, and damages calculations.

18. SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.2101 et seq. — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Act-453-of-1976
• MCL § 37.2202 (employment) — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-37-2202
• MCL § 37.2602 (MDCR complaint; 180 days) — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-37-2602
• MCL § 37.2801 (civil action; remedies) — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-37-2801
• Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.1101 et seq. — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Act-220-of-1976
• 2023 Senate Bill 4 / Public Act 6 of 2023 (ELCRA SO/GI amendment) — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Bills/Bill?ObjectName=2023-SB-0004
• Senate Fiscal Agency, S.B. 4 (Revised Analysis as Enacted) — https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2023-2024/billanalysis/Senate/htm/2023-SFA-0004-N.htm
• Michigan Court Rules — https://courts.michigan.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/rules/
• Michigan Department of Civil Rights — https://www.michigan.gov/mdcr
• Rouch World, LLC v. Dep't of Civil Rights, 510 Mich. 398 (2022) (sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation)
• Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368 (1993) (severe-or-pervasive standard)
• Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358 (1996) (hostile-environment burden-shifting)
• Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 463 Mich. 297 (2000) (employer liability for harassment)
• Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 472 Mich. 408 (2005) (individual supervisor liability under ELCRA)
• Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 464 Mich. 456 (2001) (McDonnell Douglas applied to ELCRA)
• Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108 (2005) (three-year limitations period)
• Marsh v. Dep't of Civil Rights, 277 Mich. App. 14 (2007) (election of remedies)
• Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 457 Mich. 593 (1998) (PWDCRA "unrelated to ability")
• Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) (Title VII SO/GI)

Disclaimer: This template is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. An attorney licensed in Michigan must review and customize this document before filing. Laws, citations, and court rules change frequently; verify all authorities before use, including the precise effective date of 2023 Public Act 6 (ELCRA SO/GI amendment).