Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-262

Section 8.01-262(1) permits venue where the defendant has his principal place of employment without requiring another connection to the forum.

Smith v. Williams · filed 1979-07-17(1)

Here the General Assémbly in Code § 8.01-262 has decided that proper venue may lie where the defendant has his principal place of employment, and it has not placed any nexus to the forum requirement upon it, and this Court has no jurisdiction to place any.

Section 8.01-262 treats residence, an agent for service, and regular business activity as separate grounds for venue; an agent or business activity does not alone establish residence.

Richardson v. Guffey · filed 1991-09-16(1)-(3)

Only if the General Assembly had in mind different meanings for the terms and phrases "resides," "has a registered office," "has appointed an agent . . ." and "regularly conducts affairs or business activities" is there any reason for specifying each in separate subsections. The court simply does not accept plaintiff’s argument that such other factors equate to "residence" under the venue statute.

Section 8.01-262(1) permits venue where the defendant resides or has a principal place of employment when the action begins.

Godsey v. Maitland · filed 1994-08-03(1)

The statute intends to allow a defendant to be sued in a familiar location, which should be where the defendant currently resides or works at the time the suit is brought.

Section 8.01-262 does not govern venue for a separate maintenance suit because domestic relations proceedings are excluded from the chapter containing it.

Rochelle v. Rochelle · filed 1983-04-29

The father argues that the only permissible venue for a suit for separate maintenance against him would have been in Arlington County, the place of his residence, citing Code § 8.01-262. That section, however, is contained in chapter 5 (“Venue”), Title 8.01, which constitutes a major revision of the former laws relating to the subject. ... Thus the venue of a suit for separate maintenance continues to be governed by the former law.

Section 8.01-262 does not make a city a proper venue merely because a defendant uses its transportation facilities for a relatively small percentage of its business.

Holland v. Davis · filed 1998-02-10(3)

Although Defendant GTL Transport Company does utilize the transportation facilities in the City of Norfolk for a relatively small percentage of its ongoing business, the Court does not deem this to be sufficient to render the City of Norfolk as a proper venue for the instant action.

Under former § 8.01-262(3), venue based on regular business activity depends on the defendant’s own activity; a corporation’s activity is not attributed to an individual shareholder unless the corporate form is disregarded.

Barnett v. Kite · filed 2006-01-13(3)

This statutory standard unambiguously refers to the affairs or business activity conducted by “the defendant,” not to the affairs or business activity conducted by a corporation in which the defendant is a majority shareholder.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity; regular but limited activity is insufficient.

Sandler v. Wintergreen Partners, Inc. · filed 2006-06-21(3)

The facts of this case show that Defendant Wintergreen regularly conducts business activity within Albemarle County. However, its activities do not rise to substantial business activity as required under Va. Code § 8.01-262(3).

Section 8.01-262(3)'s amended substantial-business-activity requirement applies to venue decisions made after the amendment took effect, even in an action filed earlier.

Spruill v. Jugs, Inc. · filed 2004-09-29(3)

I find that the 2004 amendment of the statute applies to this case and that venue in Norfolk is thus improper.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts employment-related or personal business; occasional business visits and purely personal travel do not qualify.

Meyer v. Brown · filed 1998-06-05(3)

In sum, defendant’s activity in the City was not so frequent as to be performed “regularly” within the meaning of § 8.01-262(3).

Section 8.01-262 does not establish venue based on advertising too indefinite or uncertain to show that a defendant regularly conducts business in the forum.

Cleere v. Petsmart, Inc. · filed 2004-06-17

Any telephone book, fliers, and media advertising, as related by Clements is so indefinite and uncertain that it cannot form a basis for venue here, i.e., regularly conducting business as set forth in Va. Code § 8.01-262.

Section 8.01-262(3) does not make a city a proper venue based on occasional, spontaneous visits there for shopping, meals, or recreation.

Morey v. McDonald · filed 1995-08-10(3)

However, the court cannot conclude that the defendants’ trips amount to “regularly conducting affairs” in the City of Richmond.

Section 8.01-262 does not treat spontaneous visits to siblings two or three times a month as regularly conducting affairs for venue purposes.

Hooker v. Brown · filed 1997-01-30

The parties have stipulated that defendant “has a pattern of coming to Richmond two or three times a month to visit his siblings,” and the sole question is whether such a “pattern” constitutes “regularly conducting] affairs” within the meaning of Va. Code § 8.01-262. The court holds that it does not.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts affairs or business activity that is usual and customary.

Hawthorne v. Lavinder · filed 2006-06-29(3)

The Defendant’s activities, while substantial, are not “usual and customary” so as to satisfy Virginia Code § 8.01-262(3).

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity, but business producing less than 1% of its total revenue in a forum may fall short of that standard.

Garland v. Shoosmith Bros. · filed 2007-08-13(3)

Similarly, Shoosmith’s business activities in the forum of Hopewell do not rise to the level of regularly conducting substantial business activity, as less than 1% of total revenues derived from business in Hopewell. Therefore, it is ordered that defendant’s Motion for Change of Venue is granted, and that this cause is transferred to Chesterfield County.

Traveling through a city on a highway while hauling goods elsewhere does not establish venue there based on conducting business.

McNeill v. Rojas · filed 2007-08-16(3)

The law does not envision that a party should avoid use of a highway to preclude a venue for a suit against him. Highways are where they are for use by the public. Venue under these facts based on “conducting ... business” does not lie in Richmond.

Venue under § 8.01-262(3) depends on whether the defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity in the forum when the action is filed; visits as needed do not establish regular activity.

Duncan v. Brannock · filed 2009-03-10(3)

In this case, where the defendant law firm and defendant lawyer member have objected to venue, the parties agree that resolution of the issue is confined to whether the defendants or one of them “regularly conducts substantial business activity in Richmond” pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-262(3). ... In those instances, as here, where the statute speaks in the present tense, i.e. “conducts ... business activity,” venue revolves ultimately around the filing date. ... Here, the evidence does not support that the defendants conduct business here regularly. It appears that the firm and its members come here as needed. Regularly means doing business in a steady, methodical, uniform way.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity, including through its management role as general partner of a local facility.

Gibson v. Medical Facilities of America, Inc. · filed 2009-09-25(3)

Permissive venue is where “the defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity.” Va. Code § 8.01-262(3). Medical Facilities of America regularly conducts substantial business in Norfolk, Virginia, making venue there proper. Medical Facilities of America is the sole general partner in the limited liability partnership that owns the Norfolk Healthcare Center in the City of Norfolk. As the sole general partner, they play a key management role in Norfolk Healthcare Center. This management role is sufficient to make the City of Norfolk a permissive venue for any case in which the Medical Facilities of America is a named defendant.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity, including a city where it manages a healthcare facility as the facility owner's general partner.

Gibson v. Medical Facilities of America, Inc. · filed 2010-01-22(3)

Permissive venue is where “the defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity.” Va. Code § 8.01-262(3). Medical Facilities of America regularly conducts substantial business in Norfolk, Virginia, making venue there proper. ... This management role is sufficient to make the City of Norfolk a permissive venue for any case in which the Medical Facilities of America is a named defendant.

Section 8.01-262(3) permits venue where a defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity, and a defendant seeking transfer must prove that the chosen venue is improper.

Hernandez v. East Coast Barge & Boat Co. · filed 2012-06-25(3)

ECBBC’s argument that 6% should not be considered substantial business activities is persuasive given the precedent, but it has the burden to prove that its activities in Norfolk accounted for 6% of its total work; otherwise, the plaintiff’s choice of venue is still to be presumed correct.

Section 8.01-262 permits venue where a corporate defendant regularly conducted substantial business even after it ceases operations.

In re Chinese Drywall Cases · filed 2010-01-22(3)

The Court does not attribute significance to the current out-of-business status of those two defendants or conclude that such status diminishes the basis by which their presence may support a venue determination. The statute includes no requirement that the defendant whose location supports venue must maintain operations in order to satisfy the standard. To the contrary, under subsections (2) and (3) of Va. Code § 8.01-262, permissible forums in the case of a defendant who has withdrawn from the Commonwealth include the jurisdiction where the defendant had its registered office or regularly conducted substantial business activity “at the time of such withdrawal.” If venue remains proper in that last location following a defendant’s withdrawal, it follows that venue remains equally proper in the case of a defendant that discontinued its business operations-altogether.

Section 8.01-262 permits venue where the defendant resides or where the cause of action, or any part of it, arose; witness convenience is not a venue ground under the section.

Booth v. Broudy · filed 1988-06-10(1), (4)

The ground assigned by the trial court for denying the defendant’s motion is not listed as a basis for venue in either the preferred venue statute, Code § 8.01-261, or the permissible venue statute, Code § 8.01-262. The county or city where the defendant resides is a permissible forum, Code § 8.01-262(1), as is the county or city where the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose, Code § 8.01-262(4).

Section 8.01-262(1), (3), and (4) provides Category B venue in Portsmouth for a suit against physicians who practice there and treated the patient at a Portsmouth hospital.

Verdolotti v. Chung · filed 2001-08-17(1), (3), and (4)

Clearly this court has Category B venue pursuant to Code § 8.01-262(1), (3), and (4).

Section 8.01-262 allows venue under its Category B criteria only when the forum has a listed connection to a defendant or the claim.

Xspedius Communications v. Cricket Technologies, L.L.C. · filed 2006-07-26

Analyzing the current case using Va. Code §§ 8.01-261 through 8.01-262, it is very clear that the City of Hopewell is not a proper venue. Both Cricket and Nexis have their principal offices and their registered agent in Fairfax County. Additionally, it seems that the causes of action occurred in either Fairfax or Loudoun Counties. Thus, Fairfax County or Loudoun County are more appropriate venues according to the statute.

Section 8.01-262(10) controls venue in John Doe motor vehicle accident actions.

Smith v. Doe · filed 1988-05-18(10)

Thus, it is the opinion of this court that since this statute was enacted in 1977 subsequent to the Hodgson case, Va. Code § 8.01-262(10) (1984 Repl. Vol.) controls the venue in John Doe motor vehicle accidents.

Section 8.01-262(10) permits venue where the plaintiff resides in a John Doe action against an unknown driver.

Brown v. Doe · filed 1991-04-25(10)

Section 8.01-262(10), set out supra, now gives a plaintiff a fair and convenient forum to prosecute his or her claim in a John Doe action, no matter where the accident occurred.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where any part of a cause of action arose, including where a confidential communication was received when receipt completed the alleged breach.

Dotson v. St. John's Hospital, Inc. · filed 1990-10-11(4)

Thus, the question is whether the fact that the party receiving the "breaching" information is located in Richmond means that the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose in Richmond. 1 believe that it does.

Section 8.01-262(4) makes venue proper where the cause of action arose.

Petersburg-Dinwiddie Aviation v. Thibault · filed 1993-11-12(4)

Virginia Code § 8.01-262(4) makes proper venue the situs wherein a cause of action arose.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where any part of the cause of action arose; when a contract does not specify where payment is due, nonpayment can give rise to a cause of action at the creditor’s place of business.

Dean Steel Erectors v. Virginia Steel Erectors · filed 1995-01-06(4)

Virginia Code § 8.01-262(4) provides that the jurisdiction “[wjherein the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose” is permissible venue. ... Under the “to pay” doctrine, such payment was to be made at the place of business of the plaintiff. Upon failure to pay the debt created under the contract, a cause of action arose. That cause of action, or at least a part of it, arose in Rockingham County.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue for a wrongful death action where the death occurred because that is where part of the cause of action arose.

Coward v. Family Physicians of Chester, P.C. · filed 1995-06-01(4)

Under a Death by Wrongful Act claim, one of the elements of the claim is, of course, death. If the decedent died in the City of Richmond, then a part of that cause of action arose in this jurisdiction and this is a proper forum; otherwise, it is not.

Section 8.01-262 permits venue where a cause of action, or any part of it, arose; in a wrongful death action, the place of death alone does not establish venue under that provision.

Hathaway v. Warner-Lambert, Inc. · filed 1998-11-24

Because death is not part of a cause of action for wrongful death and because no part of the cause of action in the case-at-bar arose in Richmond, plaintiff cannot rely on the “cause of action” provision of Va. Code § 8.01-262 to establish venue in Richmond.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where a cause of action arose at least in part, including the place where a defendant was obligated to pay a debt.

Village Auto Center v. Apple Auto Glass & Mirror, Inc. · filed 2000-04-06(4)

Applying the “to pay” doctrine in the case at hand, this Court finds that the Defendant was obligated to pay his debt to Plaintiff in Harrisonburg; therefore, the cause of action arose, at least in part, in Harrisonburg and venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-262(4).

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where any part of a cause of action arose, including where an actionable republication occurred.

Sponaugle v. Rutledge · filed 2001-05-30(4)

As the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose in Fairfax County, venue is permissible here pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-262(4).

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where any part of a defamation claim arose, including a county where the allegedly defamatory statements were published.

Kollman v. Jordan · filed 2002-10-29(4)

In this case, The Progress-Index is circulated in Chesterfield County; therefore, Defendant’s statements were published there. Chesterfield County is an appropriate venue under § 8.01-262.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where the cause of action arose; in a wrongful death case, the place of death alone does not establish venue.

Sarver v. Prud'homme · filed 2005-05-02(4)

Because Mr. Sarver’s death is not the cause of action in this case, it cannot serve as the basis for Category B venue pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-262(4).

Section 8.01-262(6) places venue for a defamation claim where the defamatory statement was received and the cause of action arose.

Rilee v. Rilee · filed 2007-07-26(6)

But while the court must agree, this does not answer the question of where the “cause of action” arose in the first instance under the words of Va. Code § 8.01-262(6) for venue purposes. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs cause of action “arose” in Alexandria. So Alexandria is a proper venue, Richmond is not.

Section 8.01-262(4) permits venue where any part of a cause of action arose, including where a corporate plaintiff suffered part of its injury from fraud.

Specialty Products, Inc. v. Demolition Services, Inc. · filed 2013-12-12(4)

That count alleges pre-contractual tortious misrepresentations that injured SPI at its principal place of business in Norfolk, and this is sufficient to support venue under § 8.01-262(4).

Section 8.01-262 permits a Virginia plaintiff to sue a nonresident in the Virginia county or city where the plaintiff resides.

Royster Co. v. Kinley · filed 1988-06-28

Our venue statute (Virginia Code § 8.01-262) permits a Virginia plaintiff to file a civil suit against a non-resident such as Kinley in the Virginia county or city where the plaintiff resides. Royster has so filed here and no valid reason has been suggested why it should not be allowed to proceed in the forum selected.

Section 8.01-262(6) permits venue against an estate administrator where the administrator qualified.

Jones v. Stokes · filed 2013-02-11(6)

Therefore, Va. Code § 8.01-262(6), in effect, provides that venue is proper where the decedent resided, i.e. where a defendant administrator is qualified.

Section 8.01-262(2) permits venue where the defendant’s agent is appointed by law when venue is determined, even if the agent was not appointed at the time of the accident.

Vega v. Matthews · filed 2009-03-10(2)

Accordingly, while it is necessary under Va. Code § 8.01-262(2) that the agent be appointed at the time venue is determined, it is not necessary that the agent be appointed at the time of the accident.

Section 8.01-262 determines venue from the defendant’s contacts when suit is filed; contacts at the time of the accident or acquired afterward do not establish venue.

Jones v. Rusteau · filed 1997-09-05

With regard to Fuller’s now being employed in Richmond, the statute is not quite as clear, hi fact, no provision of § 8.01-262 speaks to circumstances which might occur in the future or after suit is filed. Still, the court holds that such future events are also irrelevant.