Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206

Section 38.2-2206 measures underinsurance separately for each vehicle and does not offset coverage by the aggregate liability insurance on multiple vehicles.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Scott · filed 1988-01-15(A), (B)

If, as Nationwide contends, the General Assembly had intended the obligation under an underinsurance endorsement to be offset by the aggregate of obligations due a claimant under multiple liability policies insuring multiple vehicles, it would have included the plural as well as the singular form in its definition of the term “underinsured”.

Section 38.2-2206(B) allows coverage from separate policies to be combined when determining whether a motor vehicle is underinsured, even when one insurer issued all the policies.

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Miller · filed 1988-07-08(B)

The issue is whether uninsured/underinsured motorist coverages in three separate policies available to the plaintiff may be "stacked" or combined to determine whether the defendant in the accident was an "underinsured motorist" pursuant to Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 as amended. Under the facts of this case, I rule that stacking is allowed.

Under the version of § 38.2-2206(B) governing a 1987 accident, applicable liability coverage means the policy limit, even if no proceeds remain available for payment.

Williams v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. · filed 1990-08-17(B)

Thus, in the case before the court, the question is the amount of insurance "applicable" to the Shates vehicle as being Aetna’s policy limit ($100,000.00), or the actual amount of money remaining to be paid under the policy, which is zero dollars. The Court finds that the clear language of the statute means the amount of insurance applicable to the Shates vehicle, or $100,000.00.

Section 38.2-2206 requires stacking underinsured motorist coverage from separate policies under the circumstances of this case.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Horton · filed 1990-09-13(B)

This court holds that 8 38.2-2206 mandates inter-policy UIM stacking but restricts his finding to this particular factual case.

Section 38.2-2206 requires stacking underinsured motorist coverage from separate policies to determine the total coverage available.

Early Settlers Ins. v. Marshall · filed 1991-01-22

Disregarding for the moment the issues of primary underinsured coverage and credit against underinsured coverage for the amount paid by the tortfeasor’s liability carrier, the court concludes that stacking of the coverage amounts of the various policies is required. See Va. Code Section 38.2-2206, in effect June 30, 1988, providing that a motor vehicle is underinsured to the extent that the total amount of bodily injury coverage applicable to the operation of the underinsured vehicle is less than the total amount of underinsured coverage afforded to any person injured as a result of the operation of the underinsured vehicle.

Subsection (B) credits available liability coverage first against the underinsured motorist policy covering the vehicle occupied by the injured person.

Dairyland Insurance v. Sylva · filed 1991-09-20(B)

We find the language of Code § 38.2-2206(B) to be clear and unambiguous. Read literally, it makes Dairyland the primary uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier and requires that Rockstroh’s $25,000 liability coverage be credited against Dairyland’s and Allstate’s respective $25,000 underinsured motorist coverages “in the following order of priority: [first to] [t]he policy covering a motor vehicle occupied by the injured person . . . .”

Under the 1987 version of § 38.2-2206(B), carriers receive no credit for the tortfeasor’s liability coverage payment, and their policies determine payment priority.

Virginia Farm Bureau Insurance v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 1991-09-20(B)

The 1987 statute has no provision for any credit, and is silent as to which of the two underinsured motorist carriers has primary liability for underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, the “Other Insurance” provisions of the policies control and, as the primary underinsured motorist carrier, Farm Bureau would be liable under the 1987 statute to pay Hubble’s entire underinsured motorist claim.

Section 38.2-2206 includes underinsured motor vehicles within its definition of uninsured motor vehicles, so uninsured motorist coverage includes underinsurance coverage.

Hackett v. Arlington County · filed 1994-01-07(B)

We think that, in requiring a self-insurer to provide uninsured motorist insurance coverage, Code § 46.2-368(B), when read with Code § 38.2-2206, also requires a self-insurer to provide underinsurance coverage. Coverage against underinsured motorists is included in uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 38.2-2206(B)’s payment credit priority remains in effect when a self-insurer’s coverage becomes secondary under § 46.2-368(B).

Hollar v. Schroeder · filed 1994-04-15(B)

For each of the above reasons, this Court holds that § 46.2-368(B) does not modify the credit priority scheme of § 38.2-2206(B), and the County is entitled to the payment credit afforded by the Schroeder policy.

Section 38.2-2206 requires available UM coverage from multiple policies to be stacked before determining whether a vehicle is underinsured, including minimum-limits coverage when total UM coverage exceeds the statutory minimum.

USAA Casualty Insurance v. Alexander · filed 1994-06-10(A) and (B)

The clear and unambiguous language of Code § 38.2-2206(B) requires that all the UM coverage available to Sherman and Scott Alexander be aggregated, or stacked, before the total amount of this coverage is compared with the total amount of liability coverage available to Jackson. ... We therefore resolve the present ambiguity by holding that when, as here, an injured person has purchased only "minimum limits" UM coverage, but has a "total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded" that is greater than the statutory minimum, an insurer shall be deemed obligated to make payment "to the extent the vehicle is underinsured," as defined in Code § 38.2-2206(B).

Section 38.2-2206(B) includes the occupied vehicle’s UM/UIM coverage when calculating how much that vehicle is underinsured.

Driggers v. Colonial Ins. · filed 1994-12-06(B)

It is apparent from this language that the § 38.2-2206(B) formula requires the inclusion of the Todd UM/UIM policy limits in calculating the extent of the underinsurance of the Todd vehicle because Driggers was an “insured” ... under the Todd UM/UIM coverage and therefore was “afforded” the benefit of the Todd Policy UM/UIM coverage.

Section 38.2-2206 treats a vehicle as uninsured when its liability coverage is below Virginia’s statutory minimum, even if the vehicle has some coverage.

Omni Insurance v. Pannell · filed 1996-07-30(B)

The definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” is very precise. It is undisputed that Kendrick does not have coverage “in the amounts specified by § 46.2-472.” He is uninsured under Virginia law.

Section 38.2-2206(B) determines underinsurance by comparing the total available uninsured motorist coverage with the liability coverage available through each vehicle separately.

Brooks v. Steele · filed 1997-02-28(B)

Again, the total UM coverage available to Plaintiff is $150,000. The total of the liability coverage available through the Steele vehicle is $25,000. Therefore, the Steele vehicle is underinsured by $125,000. The Plaintiff is entitled to this figure, as well.

Section 38.2-2206(B) determines the coverage afforded under each policy before applying its payment priorities; those priorities do not themselves allow coverage to be stacked.

Quattlebaum v. All America Ins. · filed 1997-06-30(B)

This portion of § 38.2-2206(B) is not intended as a stacking formula, but rather as a payment formula. The coverage "afforded” is computed through the definitions. Once coverage has been determined, any judgment or settlement is paid in accordance with toe priorities set forth.

Section 38.2-2206(B) excludes the tortfeasor's UM/UIM coverage when calculating how underinsured the tortfeasor's vehicle is after a single-vehicle accident injures a passenger.

Trisvan v. Agway Insurance · filed 1997-10-31(B)

For these reasons, we hold that in applying § 38.2-2206(B), a passenger injured in a single vehicle accident is not entitled to include the UM/UIM coverage contained in the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance policy when determining the extent to which the tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured.

Section 38.2-2206(B) sets the order for crediting available liability coverage against underinsured motorist policies, and a self-insurer's secondary payment status does not change that order.

Catron v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1998-01-09(B)

We hold that this language does not alter or reverse the credit priorities, as opposed to the payment priorities, set forth in § 38.2-2206(B).

Section 38.2-2206(B) does not allow a passenger injured in a single vehicle accident to count the tortfeasor’s UM/UIM coverage when determining whether the vehicle was underinsured.

Puckett v. Federated Mutual Ins. · filed 1998-04-08(B)

For reasons explained in its opinion, the Court held “that in applying § 38.2-2206(B), a passenger injured in a single vehicle accident is not entitled to include the UM/UIM coverage contained in the tortfeasor’s automobile liability policy when determining the extent to which the tortfeasor’s vehicle was underinsured.” ... This court will enter summary judgment in favor of Federated. In my view, Trisvan is binding precedent; the doctrine of stare decisis compels a decision in Federated’s favor.

Payments to other claimants reduce the liability coverage available to an injured person; underinsured motorist coverage applies when the remaining amount is less than that person’s uninsured motorist coverage.

Carrington v. McCarthy · filed 1999-01-20(B)

However, if $25,000 is not available to a plaintiff under McCarthy’s policy because of payments made to other plaintiffs under that policy, GRTC’s underinsured coverage is implicated. Specifically, GRTC must pay to each such plaintiff $25,000 or the amount of such plaintiff’s recovery, whichever is less, minus any payment received from McCarthy’s policy, since it is by that amount that McCarthy’s coverage is less than GRTC’s coverage.

Section 38.2-2206 treats liability coverage available to an injured person as reduced by payments to other claimants from the same accident when determining underinsured motorist coverage.

Royal Surplus Lines Ins. v. Nichols · filed 1999-07-07

If the court awards Nichols 2.56% (rounded) of the $350,000 available in these actions, she will receive $8,974, which would be the only amount of liability insurance coverage “available for payment” to her. However, since she has underinsured motorist coverage of $100,000, she will be able to collect the balance of her $100,000 claim — $91,026 — from Metropolitan.

Section 38.2-2206 does not allow passengers to recover under both the liability and underinsured motorist coverages of the tortfeasor’s policy.

Superior Insurance v. Hunter · filed 1999-09-17(A), (B)

Read together, subsection (A) and subsection (B) do not contemplate that, under the circumstances of this case, a claimant would be permitted to recover under both the liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist coverages of a single policy.

Section 38.2-2206(B) requires a tortfeasor’s vehicle to be insured, but inadequately so, for underinsured motorist coverage to apply.

Kramer v. Commonwealth · filed 2002-01-11(B)

Given the definitions applicable to this case, Kramer would have to have been killed by a tortfeasor who was insured, albeit inadequately so, in order to implicate underinsured motorist coverage under the Plan.

A vehicle is underinsured when its available liability coverage is less than the uninsured motorist coverage afforded to the injured person under a separate policy, even if that policy has paid its liability limit for a joint tortfeasor.

Dyer v. Dairyland Insurance Co. · filed 2004-04-23(B)

Under the plain terms of Code § 38.2-2206(B), the Roberts vehicle was underinsured because his policy’s bodily injury liability coverage was “less than the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage [under the Atkinson policy] afforded any person [Dyer] injured as a result of the operation or use of the vehicle.”

Section 38.2-2206(B) sets the priority of UIM policies and requires available liability coverage to be credited against them in that order.

Salzman v. Kanchev · filed 2010-02-04(B)

The liability coverage available to Salzman through defendant Kanchev’s Allstate policy affords him the first layer of insurance protection. This policy provides $50,000.00 in liability coverage. Therefore, plaintiffs Dairyland policy, which insured the plaintiffs motorcycle, would be entitled to a full credit, or offset, against its potential UIM exposure in the amount of $25,000.00.

When calculating underinsured motorist coverage for multiple injured people, payments from the responsible driver are deducted from each person’s individual coverage before applying the policy’s per accident cap.

Nationwide General Insurance v. Heresi · filed 2012-05-15(B)

In light of the remedial nature of the UM statute and the “legislative purpose ... to increase the total protection afforded by insurance to claimants injured or damaged by negligent motorists,” Scott, 234 Va. at 577, 363 S.E.2d 703, the Court finds that the statutory definition of “underinsured” requires any payment to a single insured from a tortfeasor to be deducted from the amount of that insured’s individual UIM coverage, not from the policy’s per accident cap.

A vehicle is underinsured only when its applicable liability coverage is less than the total UM/UIM coverage available to the injured person.

Westveer v. Garrison Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2013-03-22(B)

In this case, the at-fault vehicle is not underinsured within the meaning of the statute, because the non-stackable $100,000 per-person UIM limit under the Garrison policy does not exceed the liability limits of the at-fault driver’s insurance.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires an existing policy or contract for its uninsured motorist coverage requirement to apply.

Kerns v. Burke · filed 1988-12-20(A)

The operative language in this subsection is "policy or contract." There must be an existing "policy or contract" which contains the uninsured motorist provision for Section 38.2- 2206(A) to apply.

Section 38.2-2206 treats a vehicle as principally garaged or used in Virginia only if, unless exempt, it is registered there and subject to Virginia personal property taxation on the accident date.

Brant v. Parsio · filed 1992-04-14(A)

This court finds that for a vehicle to be “principally garaged or used” in Virginia, as that term is used in Code § 38.2-2206, the vehicle, unless otherwise exempted, must be registered in Virginia and subject to personal property taxation according to Virginia state and local law on the date of the accident which generates the UM Coverage claim.

Section 38.2-2206 requires uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles covered by a liability policy and voids policy terms that narrow that coverage.

Moody v. Federated Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-06-27

Because the automobile that Moody was driving at the time of the accident would have been covered under the liability portion of the Federated policy, the statute mandates that the policy provide uninsured motorist coverage as well. Since the limitation on uninsured motorist coverage in the policy conflicts with the statute, it is void.

Subsection (B) does not require uninsured motorist coverage for a person driving a non-owned vehicle merely because the policy covers its use under the liability provisions.

Stone v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-12-16(B)

Simply put, "the vehicle" referred to in subsection (B) ... includes only owned, not non-owned vehicles.

Subsection (B) does not cover an employee driving his own car under his employer’s policy because the employer cannot give the required consent to use a car it does not own.

Stone v. Liberty Mutual Ins · filed 1997-01-28(B)

Because Tidewater Pizza did not own Stone's automobile, it could not grant him permission to use his automobile for purposes of coverage under its policy with Liberty Mutual.

Section 38.2-2206 requires minimum uninsured motorist coverage for policies issued or delivered in Virginia or covering vehicles principally garaged or used there; it does not apply to out-of-state policies or vehicles.

Hovington v. Lara · filed 1997-02-04

Virginia law does require that if an insurance policy is issued or delivered in Virginia, or if a policy is issued or delivered on a vehicle principally garaged or used in Virginia, then that policy must contain uninsured motorist coverage in the minimum amount. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206 (Michie 1994). This Code provision applies only to Virginia policies or Virginia vehicles and does not apply to policies issued in other states or to cars principally garaged or used outside of Virginia.

Under subsection (B), a guest has uninsured motorist coverage only while in a vehicle to which the policy applies at the time of injury.

Martin v. National Car Rental System, Inc. · filed 1997-04-17(B)

As just pointed out, § 38.2-2206(B), as it now reads, requires a “guest” to be “in the motor vehicle to which the policy applies” in order for uninsured motorist coverage to exist. In order for such coverage to apply to the rental car here, the rental agreement, which for purposes of this case is “the policy,” must have been in effect at the time of the passengers’ injuries. It was not. When Dawn Taylor allowed Antonio Crews to drive the vehicle in clear violation of the rental agreement, all insurance provisions of the agreement, under the plain language of the agreement set out above, ceased. As a result, the rental vehicle was no longer a “motor vehicle to which the policy applie[d],” and no uninsured motorist coverage exists either under the rental agreement or under Ya. Code § 38.2-2206.

Section 38.2-2206 requires UM/UIM coverage for permissive users and occupants of the insured vehicle, but does not cover a person who was neither using nor occupying it.

Parnell v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. · filed 1998-07-23

Va. Code § 38.2-2206 also defines as insured, and mandates UM/UIM coverage to, permissive users and occupiers of “the motor vehicle to which the policy applies ... .” That vehicle is the 1986 Mazda. As noted above, Michael was injured in an accident not involving the 1986 Mazda pick-up. Since Michael was neither a permissive user nor occupier of that vehicle, UM/UIM coverage did not extend to him.

Section 38.2-2206 mandates uninsured motorist protection for guests in a covered vehicle, including when the insurer later denies liability coverage because the driver failed to cooperate.

Jones v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2000-01-10

Uninsured motorist coverage is mandated by § 38.2-2206. A reading of the statute makes clear that the General Assembly intended to provide for insurance protection to two classes of persons in automobile cases. The first class includes the named insured and others residing in the household including a spouse and relatives. The second class includes those who are guests in a vehicle to which the policy applies. ... There is nothing in § 38.2-2204 that leads the court to conclude that the statute’s protection is not extended to a situation where there was coverage in place at the instant the accident happens but later disclaimed by subsequent events involving the tortfeasor’s failure to cooperate. This, along with the legion of cases that hold that the uninsured motorist law is enacted to benefit injured persons who do not have coverage and should be liberally construed compel the result that plaintiffs motion for summaxy judgment should be granted.

Section 38.2-2206(B) does not treat a child as an insured’s foster child based solely on an informal parental relationship.

Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Gile · filed 2000-01-14(B)

We conclude, therefore, that the term “foster child,” as used in Code § 38.2-2206(B), does not encompass the type of relationship Charmayne has with Beavers. A contrary conclusion is unsupportable because the substance of this type of relationship can be determined only from a subjective assessment of its length and quality. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Charmayne was covered under the UM/UIM provisions of Beavers’ policy as his “foster child.”

Section 38.2-2206(B) treats a vehicle as uninsured when its insurer denies liability coverage because the insured failed to cooperate.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jones · filed 2001-04-20(B)

Once Allstate decided to deny coverage to its named insured, Robinson, because of lack of cooperation, the vehicle which Robinson was operating at the time of the accident met the statutorily prescribed definition of an uninsured motor vehicle. Code § 38.2-2206(B) expressly provides that an uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle for which there is insurance, "but the insurer writing the insurance denies coverage for any reason whatsoever, including failure or refusal of the insured to cooperate with the insurer."

Section 38.2-2206(B) provides uninsured motorist coverage to a guest in a vehicle to which the policy applies, even when the policy’s liability coverage does not apply to the driver.

Erie Ins. v. Goines · filed 2004-01-21(B)

Va. Code § 38.2-2206(B) defines an insured for purposes for uninsured motorist coverage as “a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy applies. ...” In the instant case, the policy applies to the vehicle in which Goines was riding and Travis Stevens was operating. ... Accordingly, Harleysville must afford uninsured motorist coverage to Goines.

Subsection (B) treats a motor vehicle as uninsured when its owner or operator is immune from negligence liability.

Griffin v. Brunswick County Public School Board · filed 2008-11-14(B)

As discussed above, the School Board is immune because there is no “valid and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained of. . . .” Va. Code § 22.1-194 (2006). Therefore, the bus is an “uninsured motor vehicle” under both the policy and the Uninsured Motorist Statute.

A second class insured is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage only when occupying a vehicle listed in the policy.

GuideOne Mutual Insurance v. Murray · filed 2010-09-03

Based on these facts and the decision made by the Virginia Supreme Court in the Stone case, the exclusion of Mr. Murray from coverage is not inconsistent with the uninsured motorist statute because he is a second class insured who is only entitled to underinsured motorist coverage if he is in “the” vehicle(s) listed in the policy.

Section 38.2-2206 requires uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for an insured of the second class only when that person is in a vehicle listed in the policy.

Schrock v. Lancer Insurance Company · filed 2012-02-16

After review of the record, we hold that the district court properly concluded that Lancer was not required by § 38.2-2206 to afford uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage to Dorothy, an insured of the second class under Virginia law who was present in a vehicle not listed in Lancer’s insurance policy.

Section 38.2-2206(B) permits a policy to limit uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to owned vehicles even when liability coverage extends to other vehicles.

Levine v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau · filed 2018-04-12(B)

Like the restaurant’s policy in Stone, the Policy here specifically limits UIM coverage to owned vehicles, while extending liability coverage to certain non-owned vehicles. The Plaintiffs seek to use the broad language in the endorsement to support UIM coverage despite this limitation, but the limitation is clearly permitted by Virginia state law, as Stone plainly held. The Plaintiffs therefore cannot use the broad language in the UIM endorsement to gain UIM coverage.

Section 38.2-2206 does not cover a child approaching a school bus as a person using it before she becomes a passenger.

Stern v. Cincinnati Ins Co · filed 1997-02-25

Furthermore, the court held that Elena was not "using" the bus for purposes of Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206, because she was not yet a passenger when the accident occurred. ... Because under Virginia law Elena Stern was not covered by the Graphic Arts policy, we affirm the district court's order granting sum- mary judgment for Appellees.

Section 38.2-2206(B) requires a causal relationship between the injury and use of the insured vehicle as a vehicle; landscaping near a parked truck did not qualify.

United States Fire Insurance v. Parker · filed 1995-11-03(B)

Code § 38.2-2206(B) defines the term "insured" as "any person who uses the motor vehicle to which the policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of the named insured."...Unlike the deceased in Cassell, the claimant in the present case was not engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the pickup truck when she was injured. In other words, she was not utilizing the truck as a vehicle at that time.

Section 38.2-2206 does not treat a child approaching a school bus as using the bus merely because its safety features protect her crossing.

Stern v. THE CINCINNATI INS. CO. · filed 1996-11-01

In the present case, under the narrow coverage afforded insureds of the second class, Elena clearly was not utilizing the ... bus as a vehicle because she was not yet a passenger of the school bus and, therefore, was not using the bus, within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206, when she was injured.

Section 38.2-2206(B) covers a person using the insured vehicle with the named insured’s consent, but walking toward a parked vehicle to retrieve a flashlight while helping another motorist is not such use.

Slade v. Collawn · filed 1997-01-06(B)

Thus, if Slade was “using” the Maxima when he was struck, within the meaning of the term “using” in § 38.2-2206(B), then MIC must provide coverage. Again, however, the court must hold that no coverage exists! ... In sum, this court must hold that Slade “was not engaged in a transaction essential to the use of’ the Maxima, just as the Supreme Court held that Parker was not engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the pickup track. 250 Va. at 378. MIC’s policy provides no underinsured coverage to Slade.

Section 38.2-2206 covers a permissive user injured while using an insured vehicle as an integral part of the user's work, including its specialized warning equipment.

Randall v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-01-09

Thus, we conclude that Downey qualified as an insured under § 38.2-2206 because he was using his employer's vehicle when he was struck and killed.

Section 38.2-2206(B) covers a person who uses an insured vehicle with the named insured’s consent; using its equipment to replace a tire before immediately driving it can qualify as use.

Edwards v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 1998-06-05(B)

In using the vehicle's equipment to accomplish his mission, with the immediate intent to drive the vehicle after replacing the tire, Edwards was using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as an integral part of his mission at the time of the accident.

A child crossing a road to board a school bus uses the bus under § 38.2-2206(B) when the child relies on its safety equipment and intends to become a passenger immediately.

Newman v. Erie Insurance Exchange · filed 1998-11-06(B)

We will enter final judgment declaring that Johnny was "using" the school bus at the time of the accident, within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206, and was entitled to coverage under the UM/UIM portion of the Erie policy.

Section 38.2-2206 provides UM/UIM coverage when an insured vehicle’s warning lights and position are integral to a permissive user’s roadside assistance mission.

Provencher v. Virginia Municipal Liability Pool · filed 1999-01-29(B)

Accordingly, the court is of the opinion diat the plaintiff was “using” the insured police cruiser at the time he was struck and thus is entitled to the UM/UIM coverage afforded by the defendant’s policy under § 38.2-2206.

Uninsured motorist coverage requires a causal connection between the injury and the uninsured person’s use of a vehicle; conduct as a pedestrian does not qualify.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Futrell · filed 2001-10-24

Here, Mr. Carter was not a motorist. He was not using a vehicle. He was a pedestrian, resisting arrest and running up and down 1-95.

Uninsured motorist coverage applies when the movement of an uninsured vehicle causally contributes to an injury through its use as a vehicle.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Smelser · filed 2002-06-07

Mrs. Smelser's injuries were causally related to the employment of the uninsured vehicle as a vehicle because the force from the vehicle's movement directly contributed to her injuries. Thus, we conclude that Mrs. Smelser's injuries arose out of the "use" of the uninsured motor vehicle under the UM/UIM provisions in the Nationwide policy.

Section 38.2-2206(B) can cover a person who directs an insured vehicle by hand signals as an integral part of his mission, even if he neither occupies the vehicle nor uses its safety equipment.

Slagle v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest · filed 2004-04-23(B)

For these reasons, we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, Slagle was using the tractor-trailer in a manner contemplated by Code § 38.2-2206(B) and, thus, was an insured entitled to the underinsured motorist coverage applicable to that vehicle.

Section 38.2-2206 provides uninsured motorist coverage when an uninsured vehicle’s door, used as designed, causes injury, even if the driver acted willfully.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Sleigh · filed 2004-04-23

It is clearly within the contemplation of the parties to an insurance contract that injury may sometimes be caused by the act of using a car door as designed, either negligently or willfully. Here, Gibson's use of her car door as designed was use of the uninsured vehicle "as a vehicle" and was causally related to Sleigh's injury.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires a person seeking underinsured motorist coverage to have used the insured vehicle as an integral part of their work.

Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bratton · filed 2014-04-08(A)

Mr. Slone was not using the pick-up truck within the meaning of Va. Code § 38.2-2206(A) or Selective’s UIM policy.

A worker uses a covered vehicle for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage when the employer employs it as a safety vehicle to protect the worker during the job.

Bratton v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. · filed 2015-09-17(B)

The General Assembly requires uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance to extend to the “use” of a covered vehicle. Code § 38.2-2206(A), (B). ... Most importantly, Draper Paving, through the activities of the jobsite supervisor and paving superintendent Harmon, had employed the pickup truck at the Route 419 jobsite with its warning lights on as a safety vehicle for the purpose of protecting Draper Paving employees such as Slone during the course of the Route 419 project. ... Thus, Slone was “occupying” the pickup truck, and Bratton is entitled to insurance proceeds under the Selective Insurance Policy’s coverage of the pickup truck as a “covered auto.”

A named insured cannot consent to another person’s use of a vehicle for uninsured motorist coverage after losing all interest in and control over it.

Fagg v. Progressive Gulf Insurance Company · filed 2020-01-08(B)

Finally, because Horton had no remaining interest in or control of the Suzuki, he had no authority to grant Fagg “express or implied consent” to use the vehicle.

Section 38.2-2206(B) treats a person who controls and prepares an insured vehicle for towing, with the owner's consent, as using the vehicle for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Moore v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-13(B)

Because Plaintiff Moore controlled the RV by attaching it to his wrecker, used the RV and its adopted equipment as a critical part of his mission to tow it, and entered and planned to reenter the vehicle, the Court finds that, when he was struck, he was using the RV within the meaning of Va. Code § 38.2-2206.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires uninsured motorist coverage that cannot be reduced by payments under the policy’s liability coverage.

Interstate Van Lines, Inc. v. Artis · filed 1991-06-05(A)

Accordingly, because the offset provision of the VanLiner UM endorsement violates the clear legislative intent of § 38.20-2206(A) of the Virginia Code that certain limits of UM coverage be provided on all liability insurance policies in Virginia, paragraph E2 of the VanLiner UM endorsement is held to be void and partial summary judgment in favor of the Administrators and Monica Wiley is granted on the offset issue.

Section 38.2-2206(A) ties uninsured motorist coverage limits to liability coverage limits unless the additional coverage is rejected; a self-insured entity with unlimited liability coverage that did not reject the additional coverage has unlimited uninsured motorist coverage.

Dale v. City of Newport News · filed 1992-01-10(A)

Code § 38.2-2206(A), in effect at the time of the accident, provided, in pertinent part, that uninsured motorist coverage "limits shall equal but not exceed the limits of the liability insurance provided by the policy, unless the insured rejects the additional uninsured motorist insurance coverage." In any event, however, such coverage was required to be "within limits not less than the requirements of [former Code] § 46.1-1(8)," former Code § 38.2-2206(A), i.e., a minimum coverage "in the amount of $25,000," former Code § 46.1-1(8). The record in the present case establishes that the City's liability coverage is unlimited. Further, the City, when it elected to be a self-insured entity, did not limit its uninsured motorist coverage by rejecting the additional coverage. Thus, viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that the City's uninsured motorist coverage, like its liability coverage, is without limits.

Section 38.2-2206(H) bars an insurer from requiring a physical examination outside court as a condition of uninsured motorist coverage.

St. Paul Guardian Ins. v. Fox · filed 1992-03-19(H)

Since that section prohibits an insurer from requiring anything other than establishing legal liability, St. Paul’s requirement of a physical examination here is void.

Section 38.2-2206(B) treats a vehicle as uninsured when its insurer denies required liability coverage for any reason; underinsured coverage depends on the amount of liability coverage available to pay the injured person’s claim.

Parker v. Aetna Insurance · filed 1993-02-19(B)

While a motor vehicle is uninsured under § 38.2-2206(B)(ii) if. the vehicle is insured as required by § 46.2-100 ... but coverage is denied for any reason whatsoever, a vehicle is under-insured only where the coverage available is less than the uninsured coverage afforded to the injured person.

Section 38.2-2206 permits limits on uninsured motorist payments but does not permit a policy set-off that eliminates those payments entirely.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Hill · filed 1994-01-07

We conclude that the reference to establishing limits on UM payments in Code § 38.2-2206 simply does not permit the imposition of the set-off provisions found in Nationwide's UM endorsement.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires every named insured on an automobile policy to reject higher uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in writing.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Weisman · filed 1994-02-25(A)

We think that Code § 38.2-2206(A) requires a written rejection by all named insureds in an automobile insurance policy.

Section 38.2-2206 does not require uninsured motorist coverage when the person causing the injury is a pedestrian with no connection to operating, maintaining, or using a vehicle.

Progressive Casualty Ins. v. LaCoss · filed 1994-03-25

Here, there is no “direct, causal connection” between the “operator,” the “accidental injury,” and “the maintenance or use of the vehicle” because there was no vehicle for Fletcher to operate, maintain, or use. ... He was not an uninsured motorist and, consequently, the uninsured motorist coverage in LaCoss’ insurance policy does not apply under these circumstances.

Section 38.2-2206(H) limits conditions insurers may place on uninsured motorist coverage but does not govern medical payments coverage.

Allstate Insurance v. Eaton · filed 1994-09-16(H)

Thus, we hold that the language contained in Code § 38.2-2206(H) applies only to UM coverage and has no relevance to medical payments coverage, which is the exclusive subject of the present motion for judgment.

Section 38.2-2206(K) does not discharge a liability insurer’s duty to defend its insured when it pays its full available coverage to the claimant.

Superior Insurance v. Cencewizki · filed 1995-01-27(K)

The court cannot read into the statute a termination or discharge of an insurer’s duty to defend when no such language appears in it, when at least one house of the legislature specifically struck language that spoke to that point and when such an interpretation would have a substantial impact on existing circumstances.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires UM/UIM coverage equal to liability limits unless the named insured selects lower limits.

Steele v. Prince · filed 1997-02-06(A)

Virginia law says when a contract of insurance is issued, the requirements of § 38.2-2206 of the Code (among other requirements) are incorporated into the contract. A “named insured” is the only entity permitted to waive the maximum limits.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires uninsured motorist coverage equal to bodily injury liability coverage unless the insured effectively chooses a lower amount; a waiver returned after a renewal form’s 20-day deadline can be effective when the insurer accepts it.

Government Employees Insurance v. Hall · filed 2000-09-15(A)

Both parties received what they bargained for: a reduced premium in exchange for reduced insurance coverage. Accordingly, we hold that the 1992 waiver was effective to reduce the amount of Palmer’s uninsured motorist insurance coverage from $300,000 to $30,000 per person/$60,000 per occurrence.

Section 38.2-2206(A) sets uninsured motorist coverage equal to the policy’s liability limits unless the insured rejects the additional coverage; an incomplete selection of lower limits is not a rejection.

Hester v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2001-12-03(A)

In conclusion, due to the fact that Sprint failed to complete option one by specifying the coverage it desired, it did not reject the liability limits as required by Code § 38.2-2206. That section requires that the liability limits apply unless the insured rejects the additional coverage. As a result, the uninsured motorist coverage must equal but not exceed the liability limits of $2,000,000.

One Virginia circuit court read § 38.2-2206 to require separate uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage when both kinds of tortfeasor caused one accident.

O'Neil v. United States Automobile Ass'n · filed 2002-01-08(A)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 mandates separate coverage for both underinsured motorists and uninsured motorists.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under one endorsement, with their combined coverage limited to the liability policy amount.

MacDougall v. Hartford Ins. Group · filed 2003-02-19(A)

From all of the above, I conclude that Va. Code § 38.2-2206(A) creates but one mandated endorsement or set of provisions in a Virginia auto liability policy, the UM Endorsement Requirement Sentence. I further conclude that the UM and UIM coverage mandated may not when aggregated exceed the liability policy amount by virtue of the UM Insurance Limitation Sentence.

Section 38.2-2206(A) makes one named insured’s rejection of higher UM/UIM limits binding on all insureds under the policy, including other named insureds.

Atkinson v. Penske Logistics, L.L.C. · filed 2003-02-19(A)

Under the provisions of this statute, rejection of the higher limits by one named insured is binding on all named insureds and all other insureds as defined in § 38.2-2206(B).

Section 38.2-2206(A) sets a combined limit for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that cannot exceed the policy’s liability coverage limit.

Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. v. Beach · filed 2003-12-05(A)

In accordance with the foregoing, this court determines that the provisions of Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(A) should be interpreted to mean that the limit of exposure of an insurance company for uninsured and/or underinsured coverage is a total equal to or less than the limit of liability coverage.

Section 38.2-2206 permits an insured that selected lower UM/UIM coverage in its initial policy year to renew on those terms despite a late initial waiver.

Price v. Zurich American Ins. · filed 2003-12-17

Based on the authorities cited, under the specific facts of this case, this Court finds that once the insured waived the maximum UM/UIM coverage in its initial year and chose lower coverage limits at lower prices, it could renew on those same terms under Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 and 38.2-2202(B) even if the waiver in the first year was sent more than twenty days after it has been received. Moreover, the waiver was not even required for renewal policies.

Section 38.2-2206(A) lets any one named insured reject higher uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for all insureds, including other named insureds.

Atkinson v. Penske Logistics, LLC · filed 2004-06-10(A)

We hold that the trial court did not err in its judgment that Code § 38.2-2206(A) permitted Penske Truck Leasing to waive higher UM/UIM coverage and bind another named insured, Penske Logistics, by its rejection of the higher coverage.

Section 38.2-2206(h) permits an insurer to condition uninsured motorist coverage on its consent to the insured’s settlement with a third party.

Woidyla v. GEICO Ins. · filed 2004-07-30(h)

In light of the Virginia Supreme Court’s rulings in Osborne and Gibson, the Court cannot agree with the Plaintiff that the consent-to-settlement provision violates § 38.2-2206(h).

Section 38.2-2206 requires UIM coverage equal to the liability limits of a policy as issued or delivered, regardless of whether liability coverage applies to a particular insured.

Harlow v. Nationwide Insurance · filed 2005-04-13

Under Va. Code § 38.2-2206, a policy of bodily injuiy or property damage liability insurance relating to the use of an automobile must contain a provision insuring against damages recoverable against an unknown or underinsured owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The policy provision must equal the limits of liability coverage. National argues that since plaintiff, as a customer, is not entitled to any liability coverage she is not entitled to any UIM coverage. This fails to account for the direction in § 3 8.2-2206 that these requirements be for policies as “issued or delivered,” not as applied to a specific insured in a given situation as National maintains here.

An insured’s valid rejection of higher uninsured motorist coverage limits remains effective when the policy is renewed; the insured need not reject them again.

Canal Insurance v. Lebanon Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2008-04-13(A)

Virginia Code section 38.2-2206 provides that an insured must reject higher limits of UM coverage by notifying the insurance company “as provided in subsection B of § 38.2-2202.” That section in turn limits its application to new policies of insurance. ... Because Trucking had already validly rejected the higher limits of coverage when it first obtained the Policy, and because Canal was not issuing a new policy of insurance, there was no requirement under section 38.2-2202(B) that Trucking again affirmatively reject such coverage.

Section 38.2-2206(A) requires uninsured motorist coverage to match liability coverage, including on renewal, unless a named insured rejects matching coverage and elects a lesser amount.

Santens v. Progressive Gulf Insurance · filed 2014-07-11(A)

The plain language of Section 2206(A) compels UM coverage that matches liability coverage unless a named insured rejects matching coverage and elects a lesser amount.

Section 38.2-2206(A) sets the default underinsured motorist coverage limit equal to the uninsured motorist coverage limit, including when the insured has validly lowered that limit.

Khattab v. Berkley Regional Insurance Company · filed 2023-10-19(A)

But Appellant overlooks that the statutory default sets underinsured motorist coverage equal to uninsured motorist coverage, not the policy’s general liability limit.

Section 38.2-2206 does not require physical contact with an unknown motorist’s vehicle to maintain a John Doe uninsured motorist action.

Buchanan v. Doe · filed 1993-06-11

Physical contact with the John Doe vehicle is not required to maintain this action under Buchanan's policy or Code § 38.2-2206.

Section 38.2-2206(D) requires prompt reporting of a no-contact accident involving an unknown motorist, with promptness judged in light of the circumstances.

Cralle v. Progressive Casualty Insurance · filed 1994-02-10(D)

By amending the statute to provide for “prompt” reporting, the legislature has infused a degree of flexibility so that the question of whether notice was given “promptly” must be judged against the circumstances of each particular case.

Section 38.2-2206(G) permits suit against a later-identified John Doe motorist during or after the John Doe action, but it does not toll or extend the limitations period for suing an insured motorist.

Rivera v. Witt · filed 1999-02-26(G)

An insured motorist may be affected by the provisions in subsection G of the statute allowing suit to be filed against a subsequently identified John Doe motorist during or after the conclusion of the John Doe personal injury action; however, the statute neither tolls nor extends the limitations period for bringing subsequent suits. We conclude that there is nothing in the uninsured motorist statute which suggests that, under the facts of this case, Doe and Witt should be treated as the same entity; therefore, the statute of limitations applies to each of them individually.

Subsection (G)'s 1999 tolling amendment applies to a pending John Doe action when the ordinary limitations period had not expired before the amendment took effect.

Page v. Doe · filed 2000-08-03(G)

This consideration brings us to the real issue: whether or not Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(G) applies retroactively to this case and, if so, in some way tolls the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. ... The clear language of this version of the statute, in my opinion, would toll the application of the statute of limitations against Bryant (the amended motion being filed within the additional three-year period). ... As the court has noted above, the applicable statute of limitations ran on December 20,1999. The legislature amended the tolling statute effective July 1, 1999. Under the rule of Johnston v. Gill, supra, and Starnes v. Cayouette, supra, the legislative amendment did not do away with any vested substantive rights of Bryant that are otherwise protected by the Ferguson rule. The plea of statute of limitations filed by Bryant is denied.

Section 38.2-2206(G) tolls the limitations period for a claim against an unknown operator while the operator’s identity remains unknown to the plaintiff.

Porter v. Boiteau · filed 2006-02-03(G)

At this point, the identity of the “operator who caused the injury or damages” appears to be unknown to Plaintiff. Therefore, the tolling provision of § 38.2-2206(G) applies to the filings beginning February 12, 2003.

Subsection (F) requires an insured seeking uninsured motorist coverage to serve process on the insurer, but sets no deadline for that service.

Glens Falls Insurance v. Stephenson · filed 1988-04-22(F)

Therefore, we sustain the result on the ground that neither the statute nor the policy required service upon the insurer within a specified time.

Section 38.2-2206(E) allows service on an uninsured motorist carrier as if it were a defendant, but does not make the carrier a defendant for venue purposes.

Lee v. Doe · filed 1989-01-30(E)

Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(E). The legislature makes a distinction between how a carrier is served (as if it were a defendant) and how it otherwise participates (in the name of John Doe). It does not contemplate that the carrier be treated for all purposes as the defendant. Consequently, the carrier is not a defendant, and § 8.01-262(3) is inapplicable.

Subsection (E) provides for service on the uninsured motorist carrier as if it were a defendant, but the carrier otherwise participates in John Doe’s name and is not a defendant for venue purposes.

Brown v. Doe · filed 1991-04-25(E)

Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(E). The legislature makes a distinction between how a carrier is served (as if it were a defendant) and how it otherwise participates (in the name of John Doe). It does not contemplate that the carrier be treated for all purposes as the defendant. Consequently, the carrier is not a defendant, and § 8.01-262(3) is inapplicable. ... Because I concur with the holdings of Smith and Lee, defendant’s objection to venue in the instant case will be sustained.

Section 38.2-2206(F) requires a plaintiff seeking uninsured motorist coverage to serve the insurer with process before recovering from it.

Pettis v. Spencer · filed 1991-07-18(F)

Unless the uninsured coverage carrier is served with process, plaintiff cannot recover from the carrier, regardless of his or her success against the tortfeasor.

Section 38.2-2206(F) lets both the uninsured motorist and the insurer participate in the defense and control their own actions, even when their positions conflict.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Cuffee · filed 1994-06-10(F)

Accordingly, the two sentences must be applied as written, with the result that, in an appropriate case, both the uninsured motorist and the insurer may, for example, employ counsel, file pleadings, participate in discovery, make and argue motions, examine and cross-examine witnesses, engage in argument at trial, admit liability, or pursue appeals. And each is entitled to control his or its own actions but not the actions of the other.

Section 38.2-2206(F) allows an underinsured motorist carrier to present its defenses even when the tortfeasor confesses judgment.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Beng · filed 1995-03-03(F)

We think that, with the addition of confession of judgment to the list of actions permissible under Code § 38.2-2206(F), this is an appropriate case to require that the insurer be allowed to present its defenses against the plaintiffs claim.

Section 38.2-2206(f) gives an uninsured motorist carrier an independent right to defend a claim; when the defendant has filed a responsive pleading, the carrier need not file another.

Allison v. Davis · filed 1996-08-13(f)

To require that Integon file another responsive pleading for the defendant would be to compel a needless and superfluous act. To require Integon to file a responsive pleading in its own name would violate the letter and spirit of § 38.2-2206(f).

Section 38.2-2206(F) lets an insurer file a defense in its own name or the motorist’s name, and the motorist’s default does not prevent the insurer from defending the claim.

Hodges v. Perry · filed 1997-09-15(F)

In this case, the legislature was clear in its language. State Farm had the election of filing grounds of defense in its own name or on behalf of the defendant. ... Therefore, under Me Cuffee/Beng rule, State Farm must be permitted to present its defenses to Me plaintiffs claims wiMout regard to Me defendant’s default.

An underinsured motorist insurer served before final judgment waives a claim of prejudice from delayed service if it fails to appear and assert its defense.

Thompson v. Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. · filed 1999-09-14(F)

The Court further finds that the failure of the insurance carrier to file an answer asserting a defense, after being served process prior to a final adjudication of the case, waived any claim of prejudice.

Subsection (F) lets an insurer participate in a tort action against an uninsured or underinsured motorist, but does not permit a judgment against the insurer in that action.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Hylton · filed 2000-06-09(F)

Even though Code § 38.2-2206(F) gave Nationwide the right to file pleadings and take any other action allowable by law in the name of the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or in its own name, this statute does not permit Hylton to obtain a judgment in this tort proceeding against Nationwide.

Section 38.2-2206(F) permits a served uninsured motorist carrier to assert any good faith defense otherwise available to the defendant.

Fleming v. Heinzelman · filed 2001-01-16(F)

As a served uninsured motorist carrier, it is free to assert any good faith defense to these claims, which would have otherwise been available to the defendant. See § 38.2-2206(F) of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended.

Subsection (F) allows an uninsured motorist carrier to appear in its own name, but does not permit it to disclose its role and potential liability for punitive damages to the jury when doing so could prejudice the plaintiffs.

Allstate Insurance v. Wade · filed 2003-04-17(F)

In summary, applying the principles established in Lipscombe, Lobello, and Code § 38.2-227, we conclude that the trial court correctly refused Allstate's request to inject insurance into this case because of the potential for prejudice to the plaintiffs and that the trial court's ruling was consistent with the public policy of the Commonwealth.

An uninsured motorist carrier served under subsection (F) may challenge service on the named defendant and seek to set aside a default judgment even if it did not file responsive pleadings within twenty-one days.

Long v. Thompson · filed 2004-08-24(F)

In sum, there are many statutes that cannot be read literally in cases involving insurers served under § 38.2-2206(F). If they were, insurers would not be allowed to participate as provided for in the statute. The court believes that § 8.01-428(A) is one of those statutes. ... The court holds that Allstate has standing to challenge the service of process on the named defendant and that such service was defective.

Section 38.2-2206 allows an uninsured motorist carrier to file responsive pleadings on its own behalf or on behalf of the uninsured defendant; its filing is not automatically a filing for the defendant.

Paden v. Luna · filed 2005-04-28

However, the Virginia uninsured motorist statute affords an uninsured motorist carrier the right to file either in its own behalf and on behalf of the uninsured defendant. Woolwine’s interpretation of Va. Code § 38.2-2206 that responsive pleadings filed by an uninsured motorist carrier were ipso facto filed on behalf of the uninsured motorist would seem to render that option meaningless, the very rule of statutory construction otherwise relied upon in Woolwine.

Subsection (F) prevents an uninsured motorist insurer from being bound by a judgment entered without its participation or an opportunity to protect its interests.

Riggins v. Andrews · filed 2009-09-29(F)

Further, it would violate the provisions of § 3 8.2-2206(F) to bind USAA to a judgment that it was not a party to, nor had any opportunity to participate in to safeguard its interests.

Subsection (F) protects a served uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier’s right to defend against a claim, even when the motorist fails to respond.

Moran v. Leach · filed 2011-06-30(F)

Entering default judgment against Mr. Leach would deny State Farm the rights guaranteed it by Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(F). For that reason, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is denied.

Section 38.2-2206(F) lets an underinsured motorist insurer file pleadings and take lawful action, but does not let it avoid summary judgment after leaving its defenses to parties who admitted liability.

Womack v. Yeoman · filed 2011-10-03(F)

Section 38.2-2206(F) allows the insurer to “file pleadings and take other action allowable by law.” This Court is not aware of any law that would allow an insurer, who conceded pleading and proof of defenses to parties who admitted liability, to avoid entry of summary judgment against the named defendant in this case.

Section 38.2-2206(G) limits an uninsured motorist carrier’s subrogation recovery to amounts paid to its insured and does not provide for attorneys’ fees.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Scott · filed 1988-09-23(G)

Thus, as Scott’s subrogee, Royal was entitled to recover only such sum as it had paid to Scott. Former Code § 38.1-381 (f) makes no provision for attorneys’ fees.

Section 38.2-2206(G) gives a UM carrier that pays a claim subrogation rights against the person causing the injury and that person’s insurer, but not against the Virginia Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association.

Northland Insurance v. Virginia Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 1990-06-08(G)

This statute expressly grants a UM provider a right of subrogation “against the person causing the injury, death, or damage and that person’s insurer” when a provider pays an injured party’s UM claim. Code § 38.2-2206(G) (emphasis added). ... Therefore, because the Association is not Daniel’s “insurer,” Northland has no subrogation rights against the Association under the UM statute.

Section 38.2-2206(G) gives an uninsured motorist carrier subrogation rights against the tortfeasor’s insurer only when that insurer’s policy covers the claim.

Liberty Mutual Ins. v. Travelers Ins. · filed 1991-04-12(G)

The language in § 38.2-2206(G) to the effect that an insurer paying a claim under its uninsured motorist provisions is subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom the claim was paid against the tortfeasor’s insurer, "notwithstanding that [the insurer] may deny coverage for any reason," does not mean that the uninsured motorist carrier has the right to subrogation regardless of whether the tortfeasor actually has insurance coverage, but only that if the tortfeasor’s insurer is contractually obligated to pay the claim against him by virtue of the contract of insurance, the uninsured motorist carrier is subrogated to the injured person’s right to claim the benefit of that contract as a third-party beneficiary.

Section 38.2-2206(G) provides an uninsured motorist carrier with a subrogation claim to recover payments made to its insured.

Carr v. Home Insurance · filed 1995-11-03(G)

Under the circumstances of this case, the only cognizable cause of action available to Home was that of subrogation as provided in Code § 38.2-2206(G).

Section 38.2-2206(G) gives an uninsured motorist insurer a right of subrogation only after the injured insured has received full compensation of a judgment.

Thomas v. Government Employees Ins. · filed 1999-11-05(G)

Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(G) provides subrogation to insurance companies who have paid benefits to their policy holders under an uninsured motorist provision. ... The right of subrogation does not arise until an injured party has received full compensation of a judgment.

Section 38.2-2206(H) does not limit an insured’s duties to effect subrogation under subsection (G); an insurance policy and settlement agreement may specify those duties.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Robeson · filed 2000-10-02(G), (H)

This court concludes that the above-quoted portion of Code § 38.2-2206(H) does not limit the responsibilities of an insured to effect subrogation to those set forth in Code § 38.2-2206(G) and that the provisions of both the Erie policy and the Release and Settlement Agreement do no more than specify those actions required of an insured to effect subrogation. Accordingly, they are not void as in conflict with the provisions of Code § 38.2-2206.

Section 38.2-2206(I) allows an employer that self-insures its vehicles to offset an employee’s workers’ compensation payments against uninsured motorist payments owed to the employee.

William v. City of Newport News · filed 1990-11-09(I)

This provision allows the employer who self-insures his motor vehicles to set off an employee's workers' compensation payments against payments due for uninsured motorist protection.

Section 38.2-2206’s uninsured motorist coverage requirements apply to a governmental self-insurance pool only if its governing authority elects by resolution to provide that coverage.

Virginia Municipal Liability Pool v. Kennon · filed 1994-02-25

In the absence of a resolution adopted by VMLP, as required by Code § 15.1-503.4:4, the trial court erred in holding that the UM coverage offered by VMLP was subject to the provisions of § 38.2-2206.

Section 38.2-2206(1) gives a self-insured employer a set-off against continuing and future workers’ compensation liability after an uninsured motorist recovery.

Dale v. City of Newport News Public Utilities · filed 1994-08-23(1)

As such, we hold that Code § 38.2-2206(1) grants a self-insured employer a set-off against continuing and future workers’ compensation liability.

Section 38.2-2206’s priority credit scheme applies to self-insurers despite its references to “policy” and “policies.”

Uzzle v. Allstate Ins. · filed 1997-12-18(A) and (J)

By the very terms of § 46.2-368 the priority scheme for credit of liability coverage due to an uninsured motorist provided in § 38.2-2206 applies. In the court’s judgment, this defeats Allstate’s assertion that the General Assembly never intended a self-insurer to have the benefit of the priority credit scheme set out in the statute. The express terms set down by the legislature override the use of the words “policy” or “policies” in § 38.2-2206(A) and (J).

Section 38.2-2206(F) allows recovery from an uninsured motorist carrier when the tortfeasor is immune, but it does not override the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy.

Welch v. Miller & Long Co. · filed 1998-08-24(F)

In this case, the Court concludes that the Workers’ Compensation statutes take precedence over the provision in the insurance section of the Code that permits an injured party to collect against an uninsured motorist carrier when the tortfeasor is immune.

Workers’ compensation’s exclusive remedy provision does not make an employer or fellow servant “immune” under the uninsured motorist statute, so it does not permit recovery of uninsured motorist benefits against them.

Welch v. Meler & Long Co. of Maryland, Inc. · filed 1999-11-05(B)(v), (F)

In this context, the terms contemplate total exemption from tort liability, such as that generally enjoyed by state and local governments.

Section 38.2-2206’s reference to a “policy or contract” of insurance does not include a certificate of self-insurance.

Government Employees Insurance v. Northern Virginia Rent-A-Car, Inc. · filed 2000-11-29

... this Court finds that the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind its ruling in Yellow Cab, that “policies or contracts of insurance” are not equivalent to certificates of self-insurance, is still good law.

Section 38.2-2206 treats an operator who is immune from liability for ordinary negligence as an immune operator even if the operator can be liable for gross negligence.

Couplin v. Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority · filed 2007-07-19(B)(v)

I, therefore, conclude that an “immune” operator (or an operator with “immunity”) for purposes of the Virginia uninsured motorist scheme includes an operator of a vehicle like Payne, who is only partially exempt from liability for his ordinary negligence.

Section 38.2-2206(F) allows an immune locality to remain a named defendant so the plaintiff can obtain a judgment enforceable against its insurer.

Johnson v. Puckett · filed 2010-04-22(F)

Furthermore, the statute is clear that the action “shall proceed against the named defendant” despite the immunity of the defendant. There is no distinction in the statute between immune individuals and immune localities. Thus, the Court finds that the City should remain a party in this action for the sole purpose of obtaining a judgment that can be enforced against its insurers.

Section 38.2-2206(J) permits uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in umbrella policies but does not require it.

Dailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1991-06-19(J)

As can readily be seen, the clear, straightforward, and unambiguous language of the statute states that uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage is not required in umbrella policies such as the one at issue here.

Section 38.2-2206(J) does not exempt additional liability coverage that replaces the rental agreement’s basic coverage limits from the requirement to provide matching underinsured motorist coverage.

Millers Casualty Ins. v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. · filed 1996-08-08(J)

Thus I conclude the exception of Va. Code § 38.2-2206(J) does not apply and that the rental agreement’s additional liability insurance will, by Va. Code § 38.2-2206(A), also provide UIM coverage of $1,000,000.00 unless Green rejected die additional coverage as provided by Va. Code § 38.2-2202(B).

Section 38.2-2206(J) allows umbrella policies to omit uninsured motorist coverage, but an insurer that provides it must honor the purchased benefits.

Orr v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2022-02-15(J)

Although Virginia allows insurers to sell umbrella policies without UM coverage, Nationwide mistakes this for permission to withhold UM insurance benefits under umbrella policies that provide them. To be sure, Virginia allows insurers to sell umbrella policies without UM insurance. See Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(J). ... Neither Virginia’s UM statute nor Nationwide’s cited cases gives Nationwide the power to deny claims for the UM benefits its insureds have purchased.

Section 38.2-2206(A) allows excess uninsured motorist coverage to pay the unpaid portion of an insured’s judgment, up to the policy limit.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Binker · filed 1991-08-12(A)

Thus, the total amount available from plaintiff is $520,-160.59, considerably less than the judgment amount, and the excess coverage under the Travelers policy is triggered. Consistent with Virginia law, this interpretation does not limit or reduce Binker’s recovery on the judgment to below what she is legally entitled to within the limits of the two policies. See Va.Code Ann. § 38.2-2206 A (1950) (formerly § 38.1-381(b)).

Section 38.2-2206(B)(v)’s 1997 addition of vehicles whose operators are immune from negligence liability does not apply to an insurance policy in effect before the amendment.

Delk v. Stone · filed 2000-04-28(B)(v)

The aforesaid 1997 amendment to Section § 38.2-2206 would not be applicable to nor affect the insurance policy issued by USAA in effect on May 27,1994, the date of the accident which is the subject matter of the instant Motion for Judgment.

Section 38.2-2206(G)’s three-year limit does not apply to contract-based contribution claims.

Hernandez-Wells v. Wilson · filed 2012-01-19(G)

Due to the fact that the uninsured motorist statute deals with tort actions, its three-year statute of limitations does not encompass a contract-based contribution action.

Section 38.2-2206(F) requires an uninsured motorist suit involving an immune driver to proceed against a named defendant so that a judgment can be entered before the insured recovers from the insurer.

Frankel v. United States · filed 2020-04-14(F)

Further, the plain language of § 38.2-2206(F) provides that the suit “shall proceed against the named defendant.” But given that Feres bars Frankel’s suit against the Government—and the Westfall Act bars any suit against Davis—under the FTCA, there is no named defendant against whom judgment can be entered for purposes of § 38.2-2206(F). Therefore, Frankel’s uninsured motorist claim cannot clear this initial statutory hurdle.

For accidents before July 1, 2024, an insured must obtain a judgment against the uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor before the insurer is obligated to pay underinsured motorist benefits.

Johnson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2024-06-25(A)

That statute requires that “an insured must be ‘legally entitled to recover’ the damages [they are] seeking before a UM carrier’s obligation to pay arises.” Id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(A)). ... Johnson concedes that she did not obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor. And although she offers several arguments to distinguish Manu, we find them unavailing.

Section 38.2-2206(L)’s notice requirement does not, under these circumstances, prevent an injured person from pursuing UIM coverage when the underinsured motorist knew of that intent and the release preserved the claim.

Bishop v. Artel Logistics, Inc. · filed 2025-08-25(L)

Because this case is factually different from Dix and because of Virginia’s courts’ admonition to read this statute liberally to accomplish its intended purpose, see Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *5, the Court will not read into Va. Code 38.2-2206(L) that the requirement to give notice to the underinsured is the sine qua non for an injured party to pursue additional coverage under their UIM policy, especially under these facts.