Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266

Section 18.2-266 does not treat a person standing outside a stopped truck with its engine off and ignition key removed as operating the truck, even if he possesses the key.

Overbee v. Commonwealth · filed 1984-04-27

Code § 18.2-266, the statute under which Overbee was convicted, makes it unlawful for anyone “to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcohol.” ... Overbee’s possession of the keys may have given him the means of effecting control over the truck, but he cannot be said to have been in actual physical control of the vehicle when he was standing in front of it on the highway. We hold that Over bee was not operating his truck when Trooper Lacey approached and arrested him.

Section 18.2-266 does not treat a person as operating a vehicle merely because the person is behind the wheel with a key in the ignition's off position; the vehicle's mechanical or electrical equipment must be engaged.

Stevenson v. City of Falls Church · filed 1992-04-17

Because the presence of the key in the ignition switch in the off position did not engage the mechanical or electrical equipment of Stevenson's car, Stevenson did not "drive or operate" the car within the meaning of the statutes that were incorporated by reference in the Falls Church ordinance.

Section 18.2-266 is violated when a person with the requisite blood alcohol content operates a vehicle; turning the key enough to engage its mechanical or electrical equipment constitutes operation even before the vehicle moves.

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain · filed 1992-09-16

The defendant in the instant case violated Code § 18.2-266 as soon as he “operated” the vehicle with the requisite blood alcohol content. Operation of the vehicle requires only the turn of a key in the ignition switch sufficient to engage the mechanical or the electrical equipment of the car.

Section 18.2-266 permits a finding that a person operated a motor vehicle while seated behind the wheel of a running car, even if the car did not move.

Commonwealth v. Perez · filed 1997-02-19

In this case, the defendant Perez put his hands on the steering wheel of the car when he was roused. ... The Court finds that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for it to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Perez was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 does not require the vehicle’s engine to be running or its ignition to be engaged; those are factors in deciding whether a person drove or operated it while intoxicated.

Propst v. Commonwealth · filed 1997-06-03

Neither case sets forth a bright line rule that in order for a defendant to be convicted under Code § 18.2-266, the vehicle's ignition switch must be engaged or its motor running. Instead, Stevenson and Williams merely suggest that these are factors which a trial court should consider.

Section 18.2-266 covers a person who remains in actual physical control of a running vehicle while standing beside it.

Leake v. Commonwealth · filed 1998-04-07

Under these circumstances, Leake's continued presence in and around the truck in the absence of any other person proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Leake was in actual physical control of the truck.

A vehicle can be operated under § 18.2-266 even when it cannot move from place to place.

Keesee v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-04-25

We construe this language to mean that a vehicle need not be functional in the sense of being able to move from place to place in order to be "operated."

Standing outside a vehicle while pumping gasoline is not operating it or exercising actual physical control of it under § 18.2-266.

Commonwealth v. Coakley · filed 2001-03-27

At the time the officer approached the Defendant, the Defendant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle and therefore was not “operating” the vehicle in the arresting officer’s presence.

Section 18.2-266’s definition of “motor vehicle” applies only to that section and does not define the term in § 18.2-272.

Archer v. Fink · filed 2002-02-07

Thus, the use ofthe term “section” indicates that Va. Code § 18.2-266’s definition of “motor vehicle” is applicable only to itself.

Section 18.2-266 covers an intoxicated passenger who forcibly takes control of a vehicle’s steering wheel, even briefly.

Dugger v. Commonwealth · filed 2003-05-20

In short, for purposes of the DUI and habitual offender statutes, appellant exercised sufficient control over the vehicle to support convictions under both statutes.

A DUI conviction under § 18.2-266 may rest on circumstantial evidence that the accused was the driver, even without an eyewitness to the driving.

Corbin v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-11-02

Charles McArthur Corbin, appellant, was convicted in a bench trial of driving under the influence, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. ... Thus, we conclude a reasonable fact finder could have rejected appellant’s hypothesis of innocence that James was the driver of the vehicle and could have found that the appellant was the driver.

Section 18.2-266 covers an intoxicated person who engages a vehicle’s machinery even without intending to put the vehicle in motion.

Commonwealth v. McConnell · filed 2005-09-29

Because the statute and the case law clearly define “operate” as “engaging the machinery of the vehicle which alone, or in sequence, will activate the motive power of the vehicle” and the Defendant’s actions are unquestionably proscribed by that definition, the Court finds that the Defendant cannot claim Va. Code § 18.2-266 void for vagueness on those grounds. Further, because the text of § 18.2-266 and the precedent in both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals plainly do not require that the defendant operate the vehicle for the purpose of putting it in motion, the Defendant’s claim of unconstitutional vagueness on that ground must also fail.

Operating a motor vehicle under § 18.2-266 does not require a purpose to put it in motion.

Ngomondjami v. Commonwealth · filed 2009-06-30

Consistent with prior decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, it was not necessary that the jury find appellant acted “with the purpose of putting [a car] in motion” to find he “operated” a car within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.

Under § 18.2-266, turning the ignition key to the on or accessory position and activating the radio can constitute operating a motor vehicle.

Nelson v. Com. · filed 2011-01-13

While Nelson’s action in turning the key to the “on” or “accessory” position of the ignition did not alone activate the motive power, it was an action taken “in sequence” up to the point of activation, making him the operator of the vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 covers an intoxicated person who takes physical control of a vehicle on a highway while its engine is running, even if someone else drove it there.

Rix v. Com. · filed 2011-06-09

Code § 18.2-266 makes it unlawful to "drive or operate" a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that impairs one’s ability to drive safely. ... While the officer watched, she took actual physical control of a fully operational motor vehicle on a highway, with its ignition key in the "on" position and its engine running. She thus met the statutory definition of an "operator" of a motor vehicle.

An intoxicated passenger who briefly takes control of a moving vehicle by grabbing its steering wheel operates it under § 18.2-266.

Thomas James Synan, II v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2017-01-24

As such, we find the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to convict appellant of DUI. Just as the appellant in Dugger took brief but sufficient control of the vehicle by grabbing the steering wheel, so too did appellant in the present case.

A person can operate a vehicle under § 18.2-266 by intentionally taking the driver’s seat of a running vehicle, even without manipulating its controls.

Rix v. Commonwealth · filed 2010-08-17

In this case, Rix seized actual physical control of the vehicle when she switched seats with Stoilova in an effort to represent herself as the operator of the vehicle. By the time Officer Womble reached the vehicle, Rix was seated behind the steering wheel, the keys were in the ignition, and the engine was running. Although there is no evidence Rix placed her hands on the steering wheel, put the vehicle in motion, or otherwise engaged the machinery of the vehicle, she purposely moved into the driver’s seat and permitted the engine to continue to run. ... Accordingly, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude Rix was “operating” the vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 requires proof that an intoxicated person operated a vehicle, but does not require proof of intent to operate it.

Case v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2014-02-11

Bearing these concerns and the case law of this Commonwealth in mind, we conclude that there is no mens rea requirement in Code § 18.2-266. As long as the Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that an intoxicated individual “operated” his vehicle, regardless of intent, he is guilty of driving while under the influence.

Section 18.2-266 covers a person in actual physical control of a vehicle through a key fob, even when the engine is off.

Commonwealth v. Lopez · filed 2015-07-22

Therefore, the defendant was in “actual physical control” of the vehicle when he had the fob in his hand.

Section 18.2-266 permits a driving-under-the-influence conviction when the evidence as a whole supports intoxication, including a .11 percent blood alcohol test and other signs of drinking.

Wohlford v. Commonwealth · filed 1986-12-02

We find that the evidence taken as a whole shows, in addition to the .11 percent blood alcohol content, a consumption of at least four drinks, a moderate odor of alcohol, Wohlford’s misrepresentation of the amount he had to drink and parking his car in the middle of the road with the lights off. This evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol.

Section 18.2-266 permits a driving-under-the-influence conviction based on evidence of drinking, signs of impairment, field sobriety performance, and a breath test result.

Nash v. Commonwealth · filed 1991-05-21

Ample evidence supports Nash’s conviction. Nash smelled of beer, had bloodshot eyes, and admitted drinking five or six beers an hour before the accident. His performance during the field sobriety tests also suggested that he was under the influence of alcohol. Finally, Nash’s breath test disclosed a blood alcohol level of .15 percent by weight by volume. Combined with Nash’s driving record, which indicates he was convicted of driving while intoxicated during the previous five year period, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Nash’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol for the second time within a five year period.

A DUI conviction can be supported by erratic driving, signs of intoxication, failed field sobriety tests, an admission of drinking, and a .17 percent breath alcohol result.

James v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-08-02

Here, the Commonwealth’s evidence proved that appellant was driving his automobile erratically, weaving across the center line of the road several times. He was then observed tailgating another vehicle and driving sixty-eight miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone. After appellant was stopped, Trooper Dunlap noticed that appellant’s speech was “very slurred,” his eyes were bloodshot and he had a very strong odor of alcohol about his person. Appellant failed several field sobriety tests and he admitted to Trooper Dunlap that he had consumed five beers within three hours of being stopped. In addition, the results of appellant’s breath test indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .17 percent. Accordingly, we cannot say that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.

Section 18.2-266 permits a driving-under-the-influence conviction when credible testimony and blood test results prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Snider v. Commonwealth · filed 1998-03-03

Trooper Olinger's testimony was competent, was not inherently incredible, and, combined with the results of the blood alcohol test, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Snider was guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol.

Section 18.2-266 permits a driving under the influence conviction when alcohol visibly affects a driver’s manner, speech, movement, appearance, or behavior.

Farren v. Commonwealth · filed 1999-07-13

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant had drunk enough alcoholic beverage to so affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior as to be apparent to observation.

Section 18.2-266(i) supports a driving while intoxicated conviction when the evidence establishes a blood alcohol level over .08.

West v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-06-15(i)

The evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of driving while intoxicated under Code § 18.2-266(i).

Section 18.2-266 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol, which may be proved by admissions and observed impairment without a breath analysis.

Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth · filed 2006-04-04

This evidence, without the breath analysis, proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 18.2-266 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol, which can be established through testimony about driving, physical unsteadiness, and failed field sobriety tests.

United States v. Arias · filed 2007-01-12

The Government presented more than sufficient evidence to establish that Arias was driving under the influence of alcohol, including Griffith’s testimony regarding Arias’ “strange” driving and that he was unsteady on his feet, and Smoot’s testimony that Arias failed two field sobriety tests.

A conviction under § 18.2-266 can rest on the driver's condition, statements, field sobriety tests, and odor of alcohol even when breath-test results are excluded.

Commonwealth v. Wood · filed 2007-05-09

Notwithstanding the foregoing finding, given the totality of the circumstances, including the Defendant’s condition when approached by police, his statements, and performance on the field sobriety tests, and the strong odor of alcohol detected by the officer, the Court believes the evidence is sufficient to find him guilty of Driving While Intoxicated under the provisions of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266(ii), (iii), and (iv) allow intoxication to be proved without a blood test.

Stevens v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-10-19(ii), (iii), (iv)

A blood test is not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266, and, by extension, is, therefore, not required for prosecution under Code § 18.2-36.1.

Intoxication under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) can be proved without blood test results.

Stevens v. Commonwealth · filed 2005-08-09(ii), (iii), (iv)

Furthermore, blood test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266, and, by extension, therefore, are not required for prosecution under Code § 18.2-36.1.

Section 18.2-266 permits an intoxicated-driving conviction when evidence shows that alcohol visibly affected the driver’s speech, movement, appearance, or behavior.

United States v. Scott · filed 2006-07-06

With these principles in mind, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the district court’s findings that Scott was intoxicated and willfully injured United States property. As to the former, it is clear Scott’s alcohol consumption “so affect[ed] his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior as to be apparent to observation.”

Section 18.2-266(ii) permits a conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol when the evidence is sufficient to prove the offense.

United States v. Decker · filed 2012-04-02(ii)

Decker claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. We find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Section 18.2-266 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol, which may be proved through circumstantial evidence of drinking, erratic driving, and signs of intoxication.

Gregory Edward Leonard, II v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2016-04-26

Here, based on the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266 on March 26, 2012, and therefore, we affirm its finding.

Section 18.2-266(ii) prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol; unrebutted blood test results can establish that element.

Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2019-04-16(ii)

Accordingly, the Commonwealth proved that Taylor drove a “motor vehicle . . . (ii) while [he was] under the influence of alcohol.”

Section 18.2-266(i) treats a later chemical test result as rebuttable evidence of the driver's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

Davis v. Commonwealth · filed 1989-06-06(i)

For the reasons that follow, we hold that it is not; rather, we hold that the prescribed measurement is an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttable presumption that the measurement accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

Section 18.2-266(i) does not require consideration of a breathalyzer’s inherent margin of error, and proof of that margin alone does not rebut the presumption that the test reflects blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

Nelson v. Commonwealth · filed 1993-04-20(i)

However, Code § 18.2-266(i) on its face does not require a consideration of the margin of error inherent in breathalyzer tests.

A later breath test showing a prohibited blood alcohol level creates a rebuttable presumption that the driver had that level while driving.

Lemond v. Commonwealth · filed 1995-02-21(i)

It is undisputed that the appellant’s BAC was 0.11 percent at the time of testing. This brings into play the Davis presumption that the appellant’s BAC was also 0.11 percent at the time of driving.

Section 18.2-266(ii) treats a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent as a presumption that the driver was under the influence, not an element of the offense.

Commonwealth v. House · filed 1995-06-28(ii)

The Court finds that such an approach fails to address the fact that the blood alcohol content of ... 0.08 percent raises a presumption that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol but is not an element under Virginia Code § 18.2-266(ii).

For a prosecution under clause (i), a blood alcohol test result permits a rebuttable inference that it reflects the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Draper · filed 2006-09-25(i)

Applying this test, the court finds that the rebuttable presumptions in this case do not violate the due process rights of the defendant.

Section 18.2-266(i) permits a fact-finder to infer intoxication from a qualifying blood alcohol test, but the Commonwealth retains the burden of persuasion.

Commonwealth v. Stump · filed 2006-01-19(i)

Thus, Wilson instructs that Va. Code §§ 18.2-266(i) and 18.2-269(A)(3) should be given the saving interpretation of a permissive inference.

Section 18.2-266(i) permits the fact finder to infer that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration while driving matched a later test result, but the Commonwealth retains the burden of proof.

Yap v. Commonwealth · filed 2007-04-24(i)

We conclude that Code § 18.2-266 does not establish a mandatory presumption but allows only a permissive inference that the fact finder is free to reject.

Section 18.2-266(i) requires proof of at least 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath; an unexplained reading of “0.11” does not establish that threshold.

Grant v. Commonwealth · filed 2009-09-01(i)

The mere statement that Grant’s blood alcohol concentration was “0.11” was insufficient to establish that Grant’s blood alcohol content exceeded the per se prohibition of Code § 18.2-266(i) (0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath) or to invoke the legal presumption of intoxication provided by Code § 18.2-269.

Section 18.2-266(i) prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more without requiring proof of erratic driving or observable intoxication.

Davis v. Commonwealth · filed 2011-01-11(i)

Code § 18.2-266(i) requires no evidence of erratic driving, performance on sobriety tests, or any other evidence that the defendant is “intoxicated.”

Section 18.2-266 requires proof that the accused had a prohibited blood alcohol or drug concentration at the time of driving or operating for a per se DUI conviction.

Freddie Beckham, III v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2017-05-30

The Virginia statute requires proof of driving or operating and that the accused did so “while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more” as indicated by a chemical test or “while such person has” a prohibited blood concentration of other enumerated controlled substances. Code § 18.2-266(i), (v) (emphasis added). The Commonwealth thus bears the burden of proving the requisite blood-alcohol concentration at the time of driving or operating.

Section 18.2-266 does not prohibit driving merely because a person habitually uses a controlled substance or knowingly allowing an impaired person to drive one’s vehicle.

Cox v. Commonwealth · filed 1991-11-26

We hold that the trial court erred in finding that a West Virginia ordinance substantially conforms to provisions of Code § 18.2-266 because it permits convictions for acts which could not be the basis for convictions under Code § 18.2-266.

Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol violates § 18.2-266, so an out-of-state conviction for that conduct can substantially conform to the section despite differences elsewhere in the other state's law.

Honaker v. Commonwealth · filed 1995-02-21

Upon review of West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2, we hold that the trial judge did not err in finding that the section under which Honaker was convicted substantially conformed to Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 requires operation of a motor vehicle, engine, or train; it does not cover every kind of vehicle.

Commonwealth v. Lowe · filed 1998-08-25

In order to be convicted of driving while intoxicated in Virginia, a person must have been found to have been operating a motor vehicle, engine, or train.

Section 18.2-266 prohibits operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a highway.

Sayler v. Commonwealth · filed 2006-07-10

The Notice permits the Court to conclude only that Petitioner was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a highway. Because 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2) is a prohibition against conduct that would violate Va. Code § 18.2-266, the Court finds that the conduct upon which Petitioner’s conviction is based is included within the prohibitions of Va. Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266(iii) prohibits driving under the influence of a narcotic drug only when the driver self-administered it.

Jackson v. Com. · filed 2007-11-02(iii)

We hold that the meaning of this phrase is clear: the narcotic drug that the operator of the motor vehicle is "under the influence of" must be self-administered.

Section 18.2-266 does not prohibit permitting an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle.

Doe v. Commonwealth · filed 2012-10-09

As noted, a salient difference is New Jersey will support a conviction on evidence of'permitting another person who is under the influence to operate a motor vehicle which is owned or under the custody of the violator. The aforementioned violation under the New Jersey statute is not prohibited under Va. Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 requires proof that a driver self-administered an intoxicating drug, and voluntarily receiving methadone through a treatment program can satisfy that requirement.

Lambert v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2019-03-12

Regardless of the procedure used to ingest the methadone, the evidence was sufficient to find that appellant self-administered the drugs found in his blood, as required by Jackson to prove a violation of Code § 18.2-266.

A prosecution under § 18.2-266 and an administrative license suspension require different elements, so the suspension does not bar the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds.

Commonwealth v. Dederer · filed 1995-07-06

The elements of a violation of § 18.2-266 are (1) operation of a motor vehicle; (2) while under the influence of alcohol or other self-administered intoxicants. ALS therefore requires proof of a refusal or a breath test result of 0.08 or above. Neither is an element of a violation of § 18.2-266. DWI requires proof that the defendant was under the influence while operating a motor vehicle, which is not an element of ALS. As each “offense” contains a necessary element which is not an element of the other “offense,” they cannot constitute the same offense under the Blockburger test.

Section 18.2-266 applies to driving on private property; except for mopeds, it does not require driving on a public highway.

Gray v. Commonwealth · filed 1996-11-05

Other than for the operation of a moped, the statute does not specify that the driving or operating that it criminalizes must occur on a public highway, and we decline the invitation to construe the statute to impose that requirement.

Section 18.2-266 applies to driving under the influence on private property; the Commonwealth need not prove public ownership of the property.

Mitchell v. Commonwealth · filed 1997-11-10

We, therefore, hold that public ownership of the property upon which the vehicle is driven or operated is not an element the Commonwealth must prove in a prosecution for driving in violation of Code § 18.2-266.

Section 18.2-266 applies to intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle on a private driveway and does not require an intent to drive.

Sarafin v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2013-10-08

Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires that a motor vehicle other than a moped be located on a public highway in order to constitute a violation of the statute proscribing operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Nor does the statute require that an individual intends to drive the vehicle.

Section 18.2-266 defines one DUI offense with four alternative ways to prove it.

Commonwealth v. Block · filed 1999-01-13

The Court finds that § 18.2-266 defines only a single offense, which is DUI. It then provides four different means of proving that offense.

Section 18.2-266 does not require proof of the elements of felony child abuse and neglect for a DUI conviction.

Wolfe v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-04-13

Second, Code § ... 18.2-270 does not include within its parameters the elements of the child abuse and neglect offense, and Code § 18.2-266 does not require proof of those elements for a conviction of DUI.

A charge alleging a general violation of § 18.2-266 can support conviction under any of its four clauses.

Cutright v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-08-17

Even if it had not done so, the Commonwealth could rely on any subsection of Code § 18.2-266 in support of a charge asserting a violation of the statute generally.

Section 18.2-266 makes driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated an offense that ends when driving or operation ceases.

Commonwealth v. Vick · filed 2001-01-29

Driving under the influence cannot be characterized as a continuing-violation offense. The DUI statute makes it unlawful to “drive or operate” a vehicle while intoxicated. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266. The statute speaks in the present tense.

Section 18.2-266 permits separate punishment for DUI and involuntary manslaughter under § 18.2-36.1 arising from the same incident.

Dalo v. Commonwealth · filed 2001-11-20(ii), (iii), and (iv)

Accordingly, as appellant concedes, a defendant who was convicted of DUI under Code § 18.2-266(i) clearly can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter in violation of Code § 18.2-36.1 without violating double jeopardy principles. We find no indication that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments when subsection (i) is violated, but not when subsections (ii), (iii), or (iv) are violated.

Section 18.2-266 permits a separate DUI punishment when the defendant is also convicted of aggravated involuntary manslaughter in the same trial.

Goodman v. Commonwealth · filed 2002-01-29

Here, we assume without deciding that DUI as proscribed by Code § 18.2-266(ii), (iii) or ... (iv) is lesser included in involuntary manslaughter as proscribed by Code § 18.2-36.1. Nevertheless, for the reasons set out in Dalo v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 156, 554 S.E.2d 705 (2001), we conclude the legislature intended to permit the imposition of multiple punishments for these offenses upon convictions obtained in a single trial.

Section 18.2-266 permits punishment for DUI alongside punishment for operating a vehicle while adjudicated a habitual offender, even when the DUI conduct supports both offenses.

Commonwealth v. Lloyd · filed 2003-01-28

It is clear, I believe, that the General Assembly has enhanced the punishment for the habitual offender offense and intends punishment for both that offense and the DUI.

Under § 18.2-266(i), a blood alcohol test result creates a rebuttable presumption about the driver’s alcohol level while driving; a prior conviction based solely on the level at testing does not qualify as a substantially similar offense.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2004-05-04(i)

That is because although a blood alcohol test result can conclusively prove a violation of § 21-902(a)(2), under the Virginia statute it can only create a presumption of guilt that may be rebutted by a showing that the defendant did not have an illegally high blood alcohol level when he was driving.

Section 18.2-266 covers intoxicated moped operation only on Virginia public highways.

Robertshaw v. Commonwealth · filed 2013-04-24

This language means that an individual driving a moped under the influence of alcohol would commit a violation of law on federal properly, whether or not it was a public highway, but would only commit a violation of state law if the moped driving occurred on a public highway.

Section 18.2-266(iii) covers driving while impaired by narcotic drugs, even without alcohol use.

Ratliff v. Commonwealth · filed 2009-02-24(iii)

Reading Code §§ 18.2-51.4 and 18.2-266(iii) together, as we must, their plain, obvious, and rational meaning is that a person violates Code § 18.2-51.4 when he or she recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person resulting in permanent and significant physical impairment to that person while operating a vehicle under the influence of any narcotic drug which impairs the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle in violation of Code § 18.2-266(iii).