Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336

Section 59.1-336 protects software used for demonstrations and marketing as a trade secret when its use has independent economic value and reasonable efforts maintain its secrecy.

Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer · filed 1992-11-04

The Court FINDS that the use of the .309 version of the Orbit Program as a demonstration and marketing device qualifies as a trade secret under the standard set out in .§ 59.1-336 of the Virginia Code. The .309 version as used by Avtec clearly possessed independent economic value since it was unavailable in the marketplace and was the subject of reasonable efforts by Avtec to maintain the secrecy of its use.

Section 59.1-336 excludes generally known information from the definition of a trade secret.

Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc. · filed 1993-08-25

Information that is generally known cannot qualify as a trade secret.

Whether information qualifies as a trade secret under § 59.1-336 depends on whether it was adequately safeguarded, and factual disputes over those issues preclude summary judgment.

Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. Mai Systems Corp. · filed 1994-02-03

Close scrutiny of the summary judgment record discloses that factual issues abound with respect to whether certain material constitutes trade secrets, whether these materials were appropriately safeguarded, and finally whether they were misappropriated under the Virginia Code. Because plaintiffs have successfully raised genuine issues of material fact, MAI’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of trade secret misappropriation must be denied.

At the preliminary injunction stage, information that has entered the public domain and the Internet is unlikely to qualify as a trade secret when the claimant cannot show that it is not generally known or that it provides a competitive economic advantage.

Religious Technology Center v. Lerma · filed 1995-08-30

Despite these efforts, the AT documents have escaped into the public domain and onto the Internet. Significantly, the record in this case indicates that defendant Lerma is not the only source of AT documents on the Internet. Accordingly, for the purposes of this motion, it would seem that plaintiff cannot establish that the AT documents are “not generally known.” Additionally, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the AT documents provide plaintiff with any economic advantage over any competitors.

Misappropriation includes improper acquisition of a trade secret even if the acquirer does not use it to compete with the owner.

Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc. · filed 1995-11-27

First, the VUTSA prohibits the improper acquisition of a trade secret, whether or not the secret is used in direct competition with the rightful owner.

Section 59.1-336 defines a trade secret as information with independent economic value from being neither generally known nor readily ascertainable by proper means, when reasonable efforts maintain its secrecy.

VMC Satellite, Inc. v. Stevens & Associates · filed 2005-05-19

A trade secret is defined as “information that derives independent economic value from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336.

Section 59.1-336 requires an alleged trade secret to have independent economic value, not be known or readily ascertainable by proper means, and be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.

Space Systems/Loral, LLC v. Orbital Atk, Inc. · filed 2018-02-02

Moreover, an alleged trade secret must "meet all the criteria listed in the statute: (1) independent economic value; (2) not known or readily ascertainable by proper means; and (3) subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy." Id. ; see also Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336 (West 2017).

Section 59.1-336 requires facts showing that alleged confidential business information has independent economic value from secrecy and is not readily ascertainable by proper means; a list of confidential materials alone does not plausibly plead a trade secret.

JTH Tax, Inc. v. Williams · filed 2018-05-04

Accordingly, based on the alleged facts contained in the Amended Complaint, presumed true, the court FINDS that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly established that the non-exclusive list at issue constitutes a trade secret, and thus, cannot survive Mr. Williams's Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Count Seven.

Section 59.1-336 defines trade secrets broadly, so the absence of prototypes alone does not show that a trade secret claim had no chance of success.

Akira Technologies, Inc. v. Conceptant, Inc. · filed 2019-05-08

Both the DTSA and VUTSA define trade secrets broadly, however, and thus Akira’s admission does not by itself establish that it had no chance of success. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (defining trade secrets to include “all forms and types of . . . information including patterns, plans . . . designs . . . methods, techniques, processes, [and] procedures” appropriately protected and valuable); Va. Code § 59.1-336 (defining trade secrets as “information, including but not limited to, a pattern . . . method, technique, or process” properly protected and valuable).

A plaintiff claiming protection for a trade secret under § 59.1-336 must plead specific facts describing the information and its economic value; merely labeling materials proprietary or confidential is insufficient.

Power Home Solar, LLC v. Sigora Solar, LLC · filed 2021-08-30

VUTSA defines a trade secret as: [I]nformation, including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: 1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336 (2020). ... PHS has included the words “proprietary” and “confidential” in these paragraphs, but never describes or explains what the information is and how the company derives economic value from it. ... Ultimately, the complaint contains conclusions, not facts. The court will accordingly dismiss Counts III and V without prejudice.

A recipe, specifications, and manufacturing process can qualify as trade-secret subject matter under § 59.1-336 when their economic value comes from being neither generally known nor readily ascertainable.

Monogram Snacks Martinsville, LLC v. Wilde Brands, Inc. · filed 2022-01-20

Wilde’s chicken chip recipe, specifications, and manufacturing process qualify as subject matter that “derives independent economic value” from not being “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” such that it is the type of information trade secret laws protect.

Section 59.1-336 requires facts showing that claimed trade secrets have a unique nature, are not readily ascertainable by others, and have been protected; generic labels for business information do not suffice.

360 Painting, LLC v. Misiph · filed 2023-07-13

So too here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual allegations that, taken as true, would establish the unique nature of its customer lists or marketing and business practices. Nor does the First Amended Complaint mention how the alleged trade secrets were developed and why they are not otherwise ascertainable by others in the market. Plaintiff also fails to include how the alleged trade secrets were ascertained and protected.

Section 59.1-336 permits technical and engineering information to qualify as a trade secret, and allegations identifying such information can satisfy the trade secret element at the pleading stage.

Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi A.S. v. Zenith Quest Corporation · filed 2023-08-07

The VUTSA includes a substantially similar definition for “trade secret.” See Va. Code Ann. § 59.1- 336 (2020). The Complaint satisfies the first element. The Complaint sufficiently pleads that the purported trade secrets contain both technical and engineering information.

Section 59.1-336 requires a claimant to identify information that gains independent economic value from secrecy and is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain that secrecy.

Labyrinth, Inc. v. Urich · filed 2024-01-25

Plaintiffs must identify the existence of Harbor information that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to . . . persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use . . . and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”

Section 59.1-336 permits a customer list and proprietary language to qualify as trade secrets when they have independent economic value, are not generally known or readily ascertainable, and are reasonably kept secret.

Tactical Rehabilitation Inc. v. Youssef · filed 2024-11-07

The court finds that Tactical has sufficiently described the trade secrets at issue to state a claim under both the DTSA and the VUTSA. Tactical’s customer list qualifies as a trade secret.

Section 59.1-336 requires facts plausibly showing that claimed information derives independent economic value from secrecy and is not readily ascertainable by proper means.

American Conservative Union v. Institute for Legislative Analysis · filed 2025-02-13

Thus, Plaintiffs’ failure to assert facts, which plausibly allege that their system “derives independent economic value” and is not “readily ascertainable” via publicly available information, means Plaintiffs have also failed to allege a VUTSA claim and it will be dismissed.

A plaintiff must identify information that qualifies as a trade secret; vague descriptions of employee knowledge and project documentation do not establish one.

U.S. Healthtek, Inc. v. Negosian · filed 2025-02-28

Because USHT cannot establish either that the information qualifies as a trade secret or that it was misappropriated, USHT has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits here. ... It is unclear from this description whether the documentation drafted by Breeden is a single document or multiple documents and what the documentation contains. ... Thus, USHT has failed to establish that it had a trade secret.

Section 59.1-336 can protect a pricing formula as a trade secret when it is sufficiently identified and plausibly alleged to have economic value from secrecy and reasonable measures to protect it.

Willett · filed 2026-03-02

Assuming the alleged facts are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Window Gang, the First Amended Counterclaims sufficiently allege that the pricing formula constituted a trade secret under VUTSA and DTSA.

A written vendor list can qualify as a trade secret when it has independent economic value because the information is not generally known or readily ascertainable and its owner keeps it secret.

Harmon v. McGee (In Re McGee) · filed 1993-08-19

The Bill of Materials was not generally known to or readily ascertainable by Contemporary, who would obtain economic value from its use. McGee purposefully kept this information secret. He concealed this information from his creditors and the trustee, only disclosing it upon the sale to Contemporary. It appears to this Court that the Bill of Materials would constitute a “trade secret” under Virginia law.

Section 59.1-336 requires acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret for misappropriation; falsely claiming to possess the information does not qualify.

Tao of Systems Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Services & Materials, Inc. · filed 2004-01-08

Under VUTSA, an act of misappropriation must involve either the acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret. Va.Code Ann. § 59.1-336. ... To falsely claim to have certain information does not constitute the acquisition, disclosure, or use of that information.

Incorporating another party’s trade secrets into patent applications can sufficiently allege misappropriation under § 59.1-336.

Informatics Applications Group, Inc. v. Shkolnikov · filed 2011-12-27

Here, TIAG alleges that Shkolnikov misappropriated its trade secrets by incorporating Company Developments and Proprietary Information in patent applications. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-42, 45.) These allegations sufficiently establish misappropriation.

Section 59.1-336 permits a customer list to qualify as a trade secret depending on its factual circumstances.

SanAir Technologies Laboratory, Inc. v. Burrington · filed 2015-09-25

However, the Court is mindful that, when examined in light of the factual circumstances of a particular case, a customer list may become a trade secret.

Section 59.1-336 permits a misappropriation claim when the plaintiff alleges economically valuable information protected through reasonable secrecy efforts and its disclosure without consent.

Tang v. Eastern Virginia Medical School · filed 2021-07-12

These elements are substantially similar to the elements under DTSA. Plaintiff alleges that she has information that derives economic value from not being generally known and is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12.) She contends that Defendant misappropriated her trade secrets by allowing the PhD student who stole her trade secrets to publish them on a poster and in a dissertation without her consent, as well as allowing or assisting the student in filing for patent protection. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.) At this time, the violations of VUSTA are sufficiently pled, and the Motion to Dismiss as to Count Eight will be denied.

Prospective client lists can qualify as trade secrets under § 59.1-336 when their secrecy gives them independent economic value.

12 Marketing, LLC v. White · filed 2025-08-07

Thus, I find that 12 Marketing’s prospective client list had independent economic value and is a trade secret.

Section 59.1-336’s reasonable-efforts requirement may be sufficiently pleaded despite a disclosure before a written confidentiality agreement when the plaintiff alleges an understanding that the information would be kept confidential and used only for a limited purpose.

Stone Castle Financial, Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co. · filed 2002-03-05

Therefore, contrary to FBR’s contention that the information was not “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy,” Va.Code Ann. § 59.1-336 (Michie 2001), Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that it had undertaken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its confidential business information, notwithstanding and in spite of Defendants’ July communication with iOwn.

A software compilation may qualify as a trade secret under § 59.1-336 if it has independent economic value, is not generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means, and is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.

Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Group, Inc. · filed 2009-02-12

In doing so, the district court should specifically address the relevant criteria for establishing the existence of a trade secret under Va. Code. § 59.1-336, namely, whether or not the compilation has independent economic value, is generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means, and is subject to reasonable efforts to main secrecy.

Section 59.1-336 excludes a contact list from trade-secret status when its information is readily ascertainable through proper means, even if compiled into one document.

Tryco, Inc. v. U.S. Medical Source, L.L.C. · filed 2010-08-03

The accessibility of the information in this case does not change simply because it has been compiled into one document. Therefore, the Court does not find this argument persuasive and concludes that the “Lackland Contacts” list is readily ascertainable through proper means and thus is not a trade secret.

A nonexclusive license to use copyrighted material does not supply the secrecy needed for the identical material to qualify as a trade secret.

Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer · filed 1994-04-06

We do not believe that a nonexclusive use license in copyrighted material can support the reasonable expectation or right of secrecy necessary to predicate a claim that the identical material is a trade secret protectible under Virginia law.

Section 59.1-336 does not require patent-law novelty for a trade secret; secrecy is the crucial characteristic.

Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc. · filed 1990-09-21

The crucial characteristic of a trade secret is secrecy rather than novelty.

Section 59.1-336(4) covers an economically valuable client account schedule whose owner has taken steps to keep it secret.

Alan J. Zuccari, Inc. v. Adams · filed 1997-04-10(4)

The Court finds that Adams’ knowledge of the Horizon deal cannot be construed as a trade secret misappropriated by Adams because it does not meet the definition laid out under § 59.1-336(4). In contrast, the Schedule of National Accounts does meet the definition; it is economically valuable property of Hamilton, and Hamilton has expended efforts to maintain its secrecy.

The non-patented aspects of a construction system must be proven to be a trade secret to receive trade secret protection.

Am-Cor.Com, Inc. v. Stevens · filed 2001-07-03

The Am-Cor system employs the Am-Cor patented ferro-cement panel, but it is not proven that the non-patented aspects of the Am-Cor system are a trade secret.

Section 59.1-336 defines a trade secret, and a claim under the Act must identify the alleged secret with enough specificity to satisfy that definition.

Cranor v. Homebuyers Inspections, Inc. · filed 2005-02-02

The Statute defines “trade secret” as: *12information, including but no limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential for not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Count IV lacks the specificity dictated by the meaning of “trade secret” to amount to a claim under the Statute. The demurrer to Count IV is sustained.

Section 59.1-336 requires facts showing that information is confidential and has economic value to qualify as a trade secret.

Rohrbaugh v. Kreidler · filed 2006-07-20

The Court sustains the Demurrers to Plaintiffs claim under the VUTSA because neither the meaning of the letters TM/R nor the issue of whether Mr. Rohrbaugh had agreed to join them is a “trade secret” within the meaning of the VUTSA. The facts alleged in the Complaint do not support the inference that this information was confidential nor does the information confer *304economic value upon Bonnie and Jerry Kreidler.

Section 59.1-336 defines a trade secret as information with independent economic value from being generally unknown and subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret.

Strategic Enterprise Solutions, Inc. v. Ikuma · filed 2008-10-07

The Virginia Code defines a trade secret as information that (1) derives independent economic value from not being generally known and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. ... SE Solutions has met the pleading requirements for a VUTSA Claim, and Mr. Ikuma’s demurrer as to this count is overruled.

Client lists may qualify as trade secrets when their economic value and confidential nature are sufficiently alleged.

Oyster v. Mercer · filed 1991-11-08

Addressing the latter contention first, I find that client lists may constitute trade secrets and that there are sufficient factors alleged in this Count to bring the client lists within the ambit contemplated by the Act Section 59.1-336 of the Virginia Code defines trade secret as "information . . . that (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."

Section 59.1-336’s definition of a trade secret can cover customer price lists that reveal customers, their needs, and their prices when reasonable efforts to keep the information secret are alleged.

International Paper Co. v. Gilliam · filed 2003-12-23

Under this definition, price lists of the kind alleged to have been misappropriated qualify as a trade secret. Lists of this kind might inform a competitor of who IPC’s customers were, how to reach them, and exactly what each customer demands at what price, as well as the system IPC developed to service its customers.

A claim that a former employee misappropriated customer artwork requires evidence that the employee took the artwork; missing customer files and a customer’s plan to contact the employee about new artwork did not establish that element.

Reynolds and Reynolds Co. v. Hardee · filed 1996-07-11

The only evidence in the record directly on point is defendant’s sworn statement that he did not take any customer’s artwork. His statement is uncontradieted by plaintiffs evidence. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to carry its burden under Rule 56 of designating specific facts which show a genuine issue for trial with respect to the misappropriation element.

Section 59.1-336 permits a misappropriation claim to be pleaded by alleging that trade secrets were obtained through a relationship carrying a duty of confidentiality and that later appropriators knew of that relationship.

H.E.R.C. Products, Inc. v. Turlington · filed 2003-09-17

Misappropriation of the alleged trade secrets is properly pleaded in that HERC alleges they were obtained by Turlington in the scope of a relationship with an attendant duty of confidentiality and that the defendants knew of this relationship when they appropriated the trade secrets.

Possession of a trade secret acquired without improper means is not misappropriation under § 59.1-336 unless the recipient discloses or uses it.

MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A. · filed 2004-08-06

Where the defendant did not utilize “improper means” to acquire a trade secret, the fact that it possessed a trade secret will not alone constitute misappropriation. Something more is required: disclosure or use.

Access to trade secrets and speculation that they were used do not establish misappropriation under § 59.1-336.

Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan · filed 2008-05-12

While Phelan and Martens did work for Othentec and thus did have access to trade secrets, Appellants were unable to produce any evidence, even after discovery, that EC4 USA was using such trade secrets.

Section 59.1-336 does not treat a lawful open-market purchase made to reverse engineer a product as acquisition by improper means.

DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc. · filed 1997-06-10

The evidence showed that the Litespan system was purchased lawfully by Pulsecom on the open market, in order to reverse engineer a POTS card. Pulsecom’s purchase of the Litespan system through Stubeda does not constitute improper means. No trade secrets were misappropriated by Pulsecom.

Section 59.1-336 treats inducing a party to breach a confidentiality agreement as improper means of misappropriating a trade secret.

Dsc Communications Corporation v. Pulse Communications, Inc., Defendant-Cross · filed 1999-03-11

Misappropriation requires the use of “improper means.” A jury could find that Pulsecom obtained that information by inducing BellSouth and NYNEX to breach their confidentiality agreements with DSC.

Section 59.1-336 treats acquisition of a trade secret through a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy as misappropriation by improper means.

Hussain · filed 2026-04-23

Both the DTSA and the VUTSA define “improper means” to include “breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(A); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336.

Section 59.1-336 treats acquisition of a trade secret as misappropriation only when the acquirer knew or had reason to know it was obtained by improper means; otherwise, liability requires disclosure or use of the secret.

Tao of Systems Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Services & Materials, Inc. · filed 2004-08-11

If, instead, the acquirer does not know or have reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means, acquisition alone is not sufficient, and the acquirer must disclose or use the trade secret to have committed misappropriation within the meaning of the statute.

Section 59.1-336 defines misappropriation to include acquiring a trade secret by improper means or disclosing or using it without consent; an employer’s release can establish consent.

Pais v. Automation Products, Inc. · filed 1995-04-17

In the testimony, there was no suggestion that Pais acquired his knowledge or information by improper means; in fact, he was given the information as a result of his Vice-Presidential sales status. Thus, part one of the test for misappropriation cannot be satisfied. The only issue then is whether Pais’ disclosure or use of any information was “without express or implied consent.” ... In other words, API not only expressly but also impliedly waived its previous contractual rights and consented to business competition from Pais. Therefore, API cannot now be heard to claim that Pais misappropriated any business information or knowledge gained during his employment with API.

Section 59.1-336 permits a misappropriation claim when a recipient allegedly uses a confidential agent list beyond its permitted scope to solicit the agents for separate employment.

Gigante v. Target, Inc. · filed 2000-04-13

The letter sent to each subagent leads to an inference that the information may have been misused. The letter not only notifies the subagents of the change in the parties’ relationship, but also invites the subagents to inquire into separate employment opportunities with Defendants. While the AMJ does not sufficiently allege that any subagent actually breached or terminated an agency contract with Plaintiffs, the AMJ does sufficiently allege that Defendants may have exceeded the scope of their permitted use of the information. The demurrer to Count V is overruled.

For a claim based on disclosure or use, § 59.1-336 requires proof that the defendant used or disclosed a trade secret without consent and knew or had reason to know of a duty to keep it secret or limit its use.

MicroStrategy Inc. v. Li · filed 2004-09-17

To prove a "misappropriation" of alleged trade secrets under the Act, based on its theory of the case, MicroStrategy was required to establish two factors: 1) that the defendants disclosed or used trade secrets developed by MicroStrategy without its express or implied consent; and 2) that the defendants knew or had reason to know that their knowledge of the trade secrets was either acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain their secrecy, or derived from or through a person who owed such a duty to MicroStrategy.

Section 59.1-336 does not require an accused misappropriator to use a trade secret to compete with its holder.

Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc. · filed 2012-01-13

Accordingly, the Trade Secrets Act does not require that one who is accused of misappropriating a trade secret use the allegedly misappropriated trade secret to compete with the holder of the trade secret.

Section 59.1-336's definition of misappropriation does not cover use of trade secrets authorized by a nondisclosure agreement.

Navar, Inc. v. Federal Business Council · filed 2016-04-28

Plaintiffs presented no evidence of a misappropriation within the meaning of Code § 59.1-336. ... Regarding Count VI, Navar did not disclose or use the trade secrets in violation of the Trade Secrets Act. At the time of the prime contract award to Navar, Navar was authorized to use the information by the NDA.

Section 59.1-336 defines improper means for trade secret misappropriation; a claim relying on breach of a duty to maintain secrecy must plead facts sufficient to establish that breach or its inducement.

BB&T Insurance Services, Inc. v. Thomas Rutherfoord, Inc. · filed 2010-02-09

VUTSA defines “improper means” as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach of duty or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Va, Code. § 59.1-336. ... Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the element of improper means, and therefore has failed to sufficiently state a claim for violations of the VUTSA.

Section 59.1-336 does not treat a valid contractual acquisition of a trade secret as acquisition by improper means.

Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc. · filed 2016-06-30

A valid contractual acquisition can hardly be characterized as “improper means,” which the VUTSA defines as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, use of a computer or computer network without authority, breach of a duty or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Code § 59.1-336.