Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243

Subsection (A) supplies the two-year period for section 1983 claims, but federal filing rules determine when a federal action commences and tolls the borrowed period.

Lewis v. Richmond City Police Department, Director of Public Safety, City Manager · filed 1991-10-22(A)

Virginia has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the commencement of this suit for purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow subsection (A)’s two-year personal-injury period.

James Catron, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia State Court Clerks · filed 1992-09-30(A)

In this case, Virginia's two year statute of limitations for personal injury applies. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992).

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants are barred when filed outside subsection (A)’s two-year personal-injury period.

Lail v. Lou Ann White Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Virginia Department of Corrections, Court and Legal Section · filed 1992-10-23(A)

To the extent that Lail alleges a § 1983 claim against the individual defendants, it is time-barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992).

Section 1983 claims are subject to subsection (A)’s two-year period, while federal law determines when the civil-rights claim accrues.

Clay v. LaPorta · filed 1993-03-18(A)

The statute of limitations in Virginia for actions brought pursuant to § 1983 is two years. United Steel Workers v. Dalton, 544 F.Supp. 291, 296-97 (E.D.Va.1982). See also Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie Supp.1991). Accrual of a civil rights action, however, is a question of federal law.

Bivens claims borrow subsection (A)’s two-year limitations period.

Sakwa v. Joseph J. Aronica, Assistant United States Attorney Dennis Szybala, Assistant United States Attorney · filed 1993-05-18(A)

Claims filed pursuant to Bivens are subject to the analogous state statute of limitations. Blanck v. McKeen, 707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983). The applicable Virginia statute grants claimants a two year statute of limitations. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992).

Subsection (A)’s personal-injury period is not borrowed for a federal Rehabilitation Act claim when Virginia has a more closely analogous disability-rights statute with its own limitation period.

Wolsky v. Medical College · filed 1993-07-28(A)

Given that the Virginia Act is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act, the district court should have applied the statute of limitations found in the Virginia Act rather than the personal injury statute of limitations.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period applies to section 1983 claims alleging unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy.

Wood v. Commonwealth of VA · filed 1998-07-23(A)

Appellants' claims of unreasonable search and seizure and invasion of privacy brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are, as a matter of law, claims for personal injury and therefore subject to Virginia's two-year limitation period for personal injury claims. ... We agree with the district court that Appellants' claims accrued on August 30, 1993, the date when Wood was initially informed of the possibility that information from his confidential tax returns had been disclosed without his authority. ... Accordingly, we also find that the district court properly dismissed Appellants' claims as time-barred.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period applies to federal claims under sections 1983, 1985, and 1986.

Waytes v. City of Cville · filed 1998-08-04(A)

The applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired long before this lawsuit was filed in 1997. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985) (in § 1983 actions, state statute of limitations for personal injury applies); McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1991) (state statute of limitations for personal injury applies equally to actions under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986). It was therefore not in the interest of justice to transfer the matter to another district, where the case was subject to dismissal as time-barred.

Virginia's two-year personal-injury period applies to section 1983 claims, while federal law starts accrual when the plaintiff has enough facts for reasonable inquiry to reveal a colorable claim.

Estate of Knight v. Hoggard · filed 1999-06-15

Here, Virginia's two-year personal injury limitations period applies to the Estate's§ 1983 claim. See Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep't, 947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 1991); see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1993). ... We conclude that, as of March 16, 1990, the Estate had sufficient knowledge that a reasonable inquiry would have revealed its potential cause of action. Therefore, this claim accrued no later than that date, and the filing of the § 1983 claim was well past the two-year statute of limitations.

Virginia's two-year personal-injury period governs section 1983 actions arising in Virginia, while federal law governs accrual and computation of that borrowed period.

Cornett v. WEISENBURGER · filed 2006-09-21

The alleged attack on Cornett occurred in Bristol, Virginia. Therefore, Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury claims is applicable. See Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (2000 Repl.Vol.). ... To be considered timely filed, based on the Virginia time period for personal injury cases in conjunction with the federal rule on accrual of time periods, this action could have been timely filed up to and including November 8, 2005. Therefore, Cornett’s complaint was timely filed under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and the motion to dismiss this complaint will be denied.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period is borrowed for section 1983 claims, together with Virginia's coordinate tolling rules.

Evans v. Kuplinski · filed 2017-11-17(A)

Accordingly, Evans’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A), which may be tolled for any period during which Evans was incapacitated or a defendant directly or indirectly prevented him from filing suit, see id. §§ 8.01-229(A)(2)(b), 8.01-229(D).

Subsection (A)'s personal-injury limitations period applies to section 1983 claims, but federal equitable tolling suspends it during mandatory PLRA exhaustion.

William Battle, III v. Ledford · filed 2019-01-08(A)

This provision does not control Battle’s § 1983 action because the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that personal injury limitations periods apply to § 1983 claims. ... Battle’s limitations period must be tolled for the 83 days in which he exhausted his administrative remedies, as he was required to do before bringing suit. ... In sum, Battle’s § 1983 complaint is timely; it was filed within two years of the date he exhausted administrative remedies required by the PLRA.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period applies to both Title IX and section 1983 claims, while federal law determines when those claims accrue.

Graham v. City of Manassas Sch. Bd. · filed 2019-07-01(A)

Accordingly, the limitations period applicable to plaintiffs' Title IX and § 1983 claims is Virginia's two-year statute for personal injury actions. ... Because the applicable accrual principles establish that plaintiffs' Title IX and § 1983 claims are untimely, those claims must be dismissed.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period is borrowed for Bivens actions, subject to the continuing-violation doctrine for ongoing deliberate indifference.

Oden v. Wilson · filed 2019-11-27(A)

Virginia applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury claims. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (West 2019). Hence, Oden was required to have filed this action within two years from when the underlying claim accrued. ... Oden fails to identify any act of deliberate indifference by Defendants Laybourn or Wilson that occurred within two years of June 6, 2017, that resulted in an injury to Oden’s person. ... Accordingly, Claims 2(a) and 2(b) will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period governs Bivens claims arising in Virginia and can make transfer futile after the period expires.

Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons · filed 2020-04-10(A)

Transfer of any Bivens claims against Patterson and Wilson is not “in the interest of justice.” If the Court were to transfer these claims to the Eastern District of Virginia (where FCI Petersburg is located), that court would find them untimely, since it would apply Virginia’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... In short, the limitations period for any Bivens claims against these defendants expired no later than August 2016.

Subsection (A)'s two-year period applies to Bivens claims arising in Virginia, subject to equitable tolling during mandatory administrative exhaustion only when the prisoner diligently pursues his rights.

Garcia v. Bowles · filed 2022-09-06(A)

In Virginia, that state statute of limitations grants claimants two years from the date of accrual to file a Bivens action. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... Based on the record, I conclude that Garcia failed to file his Bivens action within the two-year statutory filing period. Furthermore, because he failed to diligently pursue his administrative remedies and his constitutional rights, he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period is borrowed for Bivens actions arising in Virginia.

Clark v. United States of America · filed 2024-03-08(A)

The statute of limitations for a Bivens action is borrowed from the two-year personal injury statute of limitation contained in Virginia Code § 8.01-243(A). ... Plaintiff's cause of action accrued no later than November 27, 2019, when he was back at FCC Petersburg after his surgery on September 18, 2019 and was aware of all the facts he has alleged in support of his claims. The complaint, however, was not filed until nearly four years later on September 6, 2023, almost two years past the longest statute of limitations that applies to his various theories of liability. All of the various claims Plaintiff has raised are, on the basis of the record, barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A Virginia prisoner has two years after becoming aware of an injury to file a section 1983 claim, with federal equitable tolling during mandatory PLRA exhaustion.

Roe v. Fowlkes Tucker · filed 2025-01-07(A)

Virginia applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury claims. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... Thus, a Virginia prisoner proceeding under § 1983 is required to file suit within two years of becoming aware of her injury. ... The Court agrees that Battle imposes equitable tolling on this case and finds that Roe pursued her rights diligently. Thus, the instant action is timely.

Section 8.01-243(A) gives personal injury actions a two-year limitations period, but that period does not bar a later claim for contribution.

Gemco-Ware, Inc. v. Rongene Mold & Plastics Corp. · filed 1987-09-04(A)

In addition, the foregoing rule is buttressed by the fact that the legislature has recognized, in the field of personal-injury litigation, the distinction between the main action and the derivative claim for contribution. The General Assembly has provided a two-year statute of limitations for every action for personal injuries, Code § 8.01-243(A), and a three-year limitations period for contribution actions, actions based upon implied contracts, Code § 8.01-246(4).

Section 8.01-243's two-year period does not govern Dalkon Shield claims submitted to arbitration under the Claims Resolution Facility rules, which prescribe a special three-year period.

Schwalm v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1998-03-18

Just as Ms. Schwalm’s reference to Oregon law is misplaced, Arbitrator Braverman’s reference to the Virginia statute of limitations was not correct. Arbitration Rule 33 does require arbitrators to apply the substantive law of Virginia, but Arbitration Rule 40 establishes a special limitations period for Daikon Shield Claims in arbitration.

Subsection (a)'s borrowed state personal-injury period does not govern section 1981 claims made possible by a post-1990 federal enactment; the federal four-year period applies.

James v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-06-04(a)

In light of this conclusion, the four-year statute of limitations, rather than the shorter period drawn from state law, applies to the claims at issue here, and the district court did not err in applying it.

Virginia's borrowed two-year personal-injury period does not govern a section 1981 post-formation discrimination claim made possible by the 1991 amendments, even when section 1983 supplies the vehicle against a state actor; the federal four-year period applies.

Mveng-Whitted v. Virginia State University · filed 2013-02-21

To put it simply, what matters is not whether a plaintiff formally styles her claim under § 1981 or § 1983; either way, Jett requires the plaintiff to use § 1983 as a vehicle to assert a claim against a state actor. Instead, what matters is the substance of the plaintiffs claim — whether it deals with discrimination in contract formation or, alternatively, in post-formation conduct. … Since Mveng-Whitted’s claim arises under the 1991 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Court has no hesitation concluding, based on the foregoing discussion, that a four-year statute of limitations should apply to the plaintiffs claim against Thomas LaRose. … Section 1983 actually contains no statute of limitations. Rather, it “borrows” Virginia’s two-year limitation on personal injury suits.

Subsection (A)'s two-year borrowed period does not govern section 1981(b) claims based on conduct after contract formation; those claims receive the federal four-year period.

Stewart v. University of North Carolina System · filed 2016-12-12(A)

The district court applied this general rule and found Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations applicable. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (2015). However, if a claim is based on § 1981(b), which covers “claims based on conduct occurring after the formation of the contractual relationship,” then the federal four-year statute of limitations applies. ... We conclude that Stewart’s claims in Counts 2 and 3 are based on postformation conduct, and thus the four-year statute of limitations applies. ... Because these claims concern events that occurred in 2012 and Stewart filed his complaint in October 2015, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing these claims as time-barred.

Subsection (A)'s borrowed two-year period does not govern False Claims Act retaliation claims after Congress supplied those claims with a federal three-year period in 2010.

Chapins v. Northwestern Community Services Board · filed 2017-03-20(A)

Northwestern claims that “[t]he FCA does not provide a specific limitations period for claims of retaliation.” … Instead, Northwestern ... argues that "the most closely analogous state statute of limitations is to be used—in this case, the two year period provided by Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243(A) and 8.01-248.” … But, Graham and Herndon were decided before Congress amended the FCA retaliation provision in 2010 to provide for a three-year limitations period.

Section 8.01-243(B) requires property injury actions to be brought within five years after accrual, with each intermittent injury beginning a separate limitations period.

Hampton Roads Sanitation District v. McDonnell · filed 1987-10-09(B)

Hampton Roads also contends that McDonnell’s claim is barred by Code § 8.01-243(B), which provides that “[e]very action for injury to property . . . shall be brought within five years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.” ... Adopting McDonnell’s contention, the trial court ruled that “each discharge was a separate actionable event” for which McDonnell was entitled to seek recovery “during the 5 years preceding the filing of suit.” We agree. ... In the present case, the original discharge of sewage in 1969 did not produce all the damage to the property. The discharges were not continuous; instead, they occurred only at intervals. Thus, each discharge inflicted a new injury for which McDonnell had a separate cause of action. Accordingly, McDonnell’s claim for damages during the five-year period immediately preceding the filing of his suit was not time-barred.

Section 8.01-243(A) does not supply the limitations period for a statutory false advertising claim under § 18.2-216; § 8.01-248 applies.

Parker-Smith v. STO Corp. · filed 1999-10-26(A)

The issue is whether Va. Code § 18.2- 216 is controlled by the limitation period set forth for general personal actions (Va. Code § 8.01-248) or for damages resulting from fraud (Va. Code § 8.01-243(A)). After considering the issue the Court rules that Va. Code § 8.01-248 applies and Defendant’s Plea in Bar is granted.

Section 8.01-243(A)’s limitation period for fraud does not apply to statutory false advertising claims.

Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp. · filed 2001-09-14(A)

Because of these notable differences, we conclude that the statutory cause of action for false advertising is not properly analogized to a common law cause of action for fraud. Therefore, a false advertising claim is not subject to the limitation period in Code § 8.01-243(A) and the time of accrual in Code § 8.01-249(1), both of which pertain to an action for fraud.

Section 8.01-243(B)'s five-year period for injury to property does not apply to inverse condemnation actions, even when compensation is measured by a decline in property value.

Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond · filed 2004-04-23(B)

The mere fact that the measurement of that compensation may be based on a decline in the value of the subject property does not make the action one for injury to property.

Section 8.01-243(A)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to a claim brought under the Virginia Tort Claims Act.

Gillikin v. Department of Corrections · filed 2009-01-30(A)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s case is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries relating to medical malpractice. See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A) (2007 & Supp. 2008). However, as Plaintiff claims injury under the VTCA, the normal statute of limitations for medical malpractice is inapplicable.

Section 8.01-243 requires actions for personal injuries and damages resulting from fraud to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

McHenry v. Adams · filed 1993-01-12

Pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-243, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, and every action for damages resulting from fraud, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Subsection (A)’s two-year personal-injury period applies to cases filed before the Fourth Circuit recognized admiralty jurisdiction, while the later asbestos-accrual statute applies only after its effective date.

Saunders v. HK PORTER CO., INC. · filed 1986-07-31(A)

The Court, therefore, HOLDS that Virginia’s two-year personal injury statute of ... limitations, Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A), applies retroactively to cases filed prior to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Oman, and that § 8.01-249 of the Virginia Code only applies to cases filed after its effective date, July 1, 1985.

Subsection (A) requires a medical-device personal-injury claim to be filed within two years after implantation regardless of recovery theory, and a later statutory discovery rule cannot revive a claim already barred.

Bailey v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2021-06-08(A)

As to the non-fraud claims, Bailey is barred from recovery because the two-year personal injury statute of limitations ran two years after her surgery, in 2010. Virginia law requires personal injury claims be filed “within two years after cause of action accrues” regardless of the theory of recovery. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.A; ... Because the statute of limitations for Bailey’s claims had run before the General Assembly in 2016 changed the accrual date for medical device cases to include a discovery rule, the later amended accrual statute does not apply to Bailey’s claims as a matter of due process. Accordingly, summary judgment is required as to Bailey’s non-fraud claims.

Section 8.01-243(C) applies retroactively to causes of action that were not time-barred when the amendment took effect.

Clokey v. Austin · filed 1993-12-27(C)

The statute in question, § 8.01-243, limits the remedy available for a common law tort action and is purely procedural. The rule in Ferguson is therefore inapplicable. Section 8.01-243(C) applies retroactively to all causes of action not time-barred as of the effective date of the modification.

Section 8.01-243(E)’s five-year limit does not apply retroactively to Commonwealth claims that accrued before the provision took effect.

Commonwealth v. Deangelo · filed 2015-04-17(E)

Moreover, in keeping with Phipps and Duffy, the language of Va. Code § 8.01-243(E) does not evidence a clear enough legislative intent to apply retroactively. Therefore, the Court finds that it should not apply retroactively.

Subsection (B) supplies a five-year period for unfair-competition claims, with a separate claim accruing upon each distinct occurrence.

Hoey v. Dexel Systems Corp. · filed 1989-07-31(B)

In this case that is Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B) (1988), which establishes a five year statute of limitation running from accrual. Under Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-230 (1988), accrual occurs when the breach of contract or duty occurs. Therefore, like copyright infringement claims, unfair competition claims can be comprised of a multitude of separate and distinct claims, where “each occurrence inflicts a new injury and gives rise to a separate cause of action, [citations omitted.]”

Section 8.01-243(B) extends the limitations period to five years when parents bring a personal injury claim on behalf of a minor.

Czimmer v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2015-08-20(B)

Pennsylvania has a two-year statute of limitations for a claim brought on behalf of an unemancipated minor to recover future health care expenses incurred until the minor reaches majority, while Virginia has a tolling provision that expands the limitations period to five years for such claims.

Personal-injury claims are subject to a two-year period from accrual, with the period tolled during infancy until the claimant turns eighteen.

McConville v. Rhoads · filed 2005-06-08

The statute of limitations for personal injuries, regardless of the theory of recovery, is two years from the time when the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243. The two-year statute of limitations was tolled under Virginia Code § 8.01-229 until Plaintiff reached the age of eighteen on April 8, 1977.

Subsection (B) provides a five-year limitations period for injury to property, including a parent's claim for an infant's treatment expenses or loss of the infant's services.

Cocoli v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc. · filed 1994-12-28(B)

Cynthia Cocoli’s remedy lies in Virginia Code § 8.01-243(B).

Subsection B requires actions for injury to property to be filed within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Cherokee Corp. of Linden, Virginia, Inc. v. Richardson · filed 1996-06-05(B)

Count C: Negligence, Gross Negligence, Recklessness. The Plea of the Statute of Limitation is overruled to the extent that such right of action is based on incidents after November 30, 1992 (Virginia Code § 8.01-243(B) five year statute of limitations).

Virginia common-law fraud claims are subject to a two-year limitations period, accruing when the fraud is or reasonably should be discovered.

Hirschler v. GMD Investments Ltd. Partnership · filed 1992-08-07

A two year statute of limitations also applies to Plaintiffs' state-law action for common law fraud. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1991). Virginia law regarding when the limitations period begins to run is similar to that governing federal actions. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 (Michie 1991) (cause of action for fraud accrues when fraud is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered).

A fraud action is subject to subsection (A)’s two-year period and accrues when the fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered through due diligence.

Palo v. Liebig International, Incorporated Heinrich Liebig · filed 1992-09-16(A)

The district court properly dismissed Count Two of Palo's Complaint for failing to file within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for fraud. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.A (Michie Supp. 1991). A cause of action for fraud is deemed to have accrued when the fraud "is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249.1 (Michie Supp. 1991).

A Virginia common-law fraud claim has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff is placed on inquiry notice of the fraud.

Byelick v. Vivadelli · filed 1999-12-20

In Virginia, common law fraud claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations, counted from the time the plaintiff is placed on inquiry notice. See Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243, -249 (1999). ... those events placed Byelick on inquiry notice by September 13, 1996. Therefore, Vivadelli is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period begins when the fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered through due diligence, which ordinarily presents a fact question unsuitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

Jones v. Shooshan · filed 2012-02-29(A)

As to Demás, defendants argue that the fraud claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for fraud under Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 provides, in pertinent part, that a cause of action for fraud accrues when the “fraud ... is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered.” ... Whether these records were reasonably accessible to plaintiff at the time, and whether he acted with the requisite diligence in monitoring the WMATA project, are factual questions that cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. Accordingly, defendants’ motion will be denied as to the fraud claims against Demás but granted as to all other defendants.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period begins when a reasonably prudent person should discover the alleged fraud, including from the terms of documents the person signed.

Sun Hotel, Inc. v. SummitBridge Credit Investments III, L.L.C. · filed 2013-01-23(A)

The fraud claim is also time barred. Fraud claims in Virginia are subject to a two year statute of limitations, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A), and the two year statute of limitations began to run at the latest in January 2006 when the Swap Agreement was signed. ... A reasonably prudent person would have read the Loan documents he signed and recognized that the Guarantees remained in full force and effect in January of2006. ... The claim for fraud filed in 2012 comes too late.

Subsection (A)'s two-year period governs Virginia fraudulent-misrepresentation claims and runs from accrual of the fraud claim.

Cruz v. Maypa · filed 2013-10-04(A)

Count V alleges Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Ms. Maypa. Under Virginia law, an action for damages resulting from fraud must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. See Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Plaintiffs cause of action accrued no later than January 17, 2008, the date of her escape from Defendants’ residence. Plaintiff failed to bring her fraud claim until more than five years after January 17, 2008; therefore, her claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period runs from discovery or when due diligence reasonably should have discovered the fraud, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing timely discovery despite due diligence.

Dunlap v. Texas Guaranteed · filed 2015-01-16(A)

Virginia imposes a two-year statute of limitations on fraud claims. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (West 2014). ... Furthermore, the plaintiff bears the burden “to prove that, despite the exercise of due diligence, he could not have discovered the alleged fraud [except] within the two-year period before he commenced the action[.]” ... Dunlap has not presented sufficient evidence to show that, had he exercised due diligence, he would not have discovered the Appellees’ allegedly fraudulent conduct until less than two years before the date he filed his complaint.

Common-law fraud claims have a two-year period that begins when fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered through due diligence.

Alfred Snapp, Jr. v. Lincoln Financial Securities · filed 2019-04-16(A)

Those claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A), which begins to run under Virginia’s discovery rule when the “fraud . . . is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered,” id. § 8.01-249(1). ... Having carefully considered the controlling law and the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, we affirm on the sound reasoning of the district court.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period runs from discovery or when due diligence should have discovered the fraud.

Johnson v. Equity Experts, LLC · filed 2020-09-17(A)

Similarly, Equity Experts says that Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations bars Johnson’s state law fraud claims. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (2020). ... The Court has no reason to find the exercise of due diligence should have led Johnson to discover the alleged fraud sooner. Because Johnson sued within one year of learning of the alleged fraud, the statute of limitations does not bar his state law fraud claims.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period bars a claim when ordinary prudence and due diligence would have disclosed the possible fraud more than two years before filing.

Nichols v. Professional Foreclosure Corp · filed 2021-04-23(A)

A person of ordinary prudence exercising due diligence would have known in 2006 that some fraud may have occurred. Thus, Nichols’ complaint, filed in 2018, is barred by Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (A)'s two-year fraud period begins when the fraud is discovered or reasonably should be discovered through due diligence.

Racklin v. Zeta Global Corp. · filed 2023-08-11(A)

The statute of limitations for fraud actions in Virginia is “two years after the cause of action accrues.” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). The cause of action does not accrue until such fraud is discovered “or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered.” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(1). … The district court correctly found that this claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Subsection (A) requires a fraud-damages action within two years after discovery or when due diligence should have discovered the fraud.

CM-Focus LLC v. Conviso LLC · filed 2025-06-05(A)

Under Virginia law, ‘every action for damages resulting from fraud shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.’ ... And “[a]n action for fraud accrues at the time the fraud is discovered, or when, by the exercise of due diligence, it ought to have been discovered.” ... CM-Focus was required to assert this claim by July 2021 at the latest. Accordingly, the court will dismiss its fraud claim with prejudice.

Subsection (A)'s two-year period for constructive fraud begins when due diligence would have discovered the alleged fraud, and diligent continued negotiations may delay discovery until the other party definitively ends them.

U.S. Mining, Inc. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Company · filed 2025-09-15(A)

Under Virginia law, the statute of limitations for constructive fraud claims is two years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). This two-year period begins when the alleged fraud “is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered.” ... Because a reasonable and prudent person using due diligence could not have found any of the alleged fraud until January 2024, the statute of limitations does not bar USM’s constructive fraud claim.

Section 8.01-243(A) requires a fraud claim to be brought within two years after it accrues.

Patterson v. Bob Wade Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. · filed 1999-04-20(A)

The legislature has prescribed a two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims in Virginia: “(EJvery action for damages resulting from fraud shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). ... The Court therefore overrules Defendants’ statute of limitations plea with respect to the fraud claim.

Section 8.01-243(A)’s fraud limitations period applies to misrepresentations made incident to a conveyance of real property.

Lake Holiday Country Club, Inc. v. Summit Golf Club, Inc. · filed 1999-04-05(A)

The statute of limitations for a fraud action applies where the misrepresentations are made incident to a conveyance of real property.

Section 8.01-243(C)(2) requires a fraud action to be brought within two years after the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Lake Holiday Country Club, Inc. v. Summit Golf Club, Inc. · filed 1999-09-17(C)(2)

Virginia Code § 8.01-243(C)(2) provides that a fraud action shall be brought within two years of the date of discoveiy of the fraud or within two years of the time that the fraud should have been discovered “by the exercise of due diligence.” ... Therefore, insofar as the statute of limitations for fraud is concerned, the right of action accrued and the clock began to run at the latest on December 3, 1987, and the present bill of complaint was not filed until February 27,1998, which is more than ten years later.

Section 8.01-243(C)(2) requires a fraud action to be brought within two years after the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Lake Holiday Country Club, Inc. v. Love · filed 2000-07-27(C)(2)

Moreover, it is too late to claim fraud in the inducement of the contract to purchase, because, Virginia Code § 8.01-243(C)(2) provides that a fraud action shall be brought within two years of the date of discovery of the fraud or within two years of the time that the fraud should have been discovered “by the exercise of due diligence.” ... In this case, the Defendant claims that the amenities promised to him by the Developer were to have been built in three to five years, which means that they would have been constructed at least by 1975, which is more than twenty-five years ago, and the statute of limitations has long since run on any claim that this Defendant would have based on the promises made to him when he purchased his lot in 1970.

Section 8.01-243(C)(2) requires a fraud action to be brought within two years after the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Lake Holiday Country Club, Inc. v. Teets · filed 2001-04-05(C)(2)

Moreover, it is too late to file any affirmative right of action based on fraud in the inducement of the contract to purchase, because, Virginia Code § 8.01-243(C)(2) provides that a fraud action shall be brought within two years of the date of discovery of the fraud or within two years of the time that the fraud should have been discovered “by the exercise of due diligence.”

Section 8.01-243(A)’s two-year period for damages resulting from fraud does not apply to a suit for rescission.

Parker v. Griffin · filed 2001-04-20(A)

I reject Griffin’s contention that the two-year limitations period under Virginia Code § 8.01-243(A) applies. By its very language, that subsection applies to actions “for damages resulting from fraud,” and this case is not one for damages but for rescission.

Section 8.01-243(A)’s two-year limit applies to a fraud claim even when the claimant seeks equitable remedies.

Orantes v. Pollo Ranchero, Inc. · filed 2006-03-09(A)

Fraud is a tort, actionable at law, and would be barred if brought for money damages at law. Accordingly, even though Orantes’ claim was brought on the chancery side of the Court, it still is barred by Va. Code § 8.01-243.

Section 8.01-243 sets a two-year limitations period for fraud, including misrepresentation, and a five-year period for conversion.

Morrissey v. Benjamin · filed 2004-04-06

In Virginia, the statute of limitations for fraud, which includes “misrepresentation,” is two years. Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). The statute of limitations for conversion is five years. Va. Code § 8.01-243(B). Since defendant’s last representation of Morrissey occurred on January 6, 1998, the limitations period for the fraud claim had already expired when Morrissey filed his first warrant in debt in July 2001. Although the limitations period for the conversion claim had not expired when the first warrant in debt was filed, it had expired when the present action was filed.

Settlement negotiations do not equitably estop a subsection (A) defense when the claimant was not lulled into delay, knew limitations might be asserted, and mistakenly relied on another state’s longer period.

Kathye E. Light v. Thomas Wright, III Thomas Wright, Jr. · filed 1993-05-04(A)

The fact that Mr. Hofler was apparently operating under the erroneous premise that the North Carolina statute of limitations applied to this action does not alter the fact that he was aware that USAA might plead the statute if he allowed it to run. Because all concerned were fully aware of a defense of the statute of limitations, there is no basis for equitably estopping defendants from pleading the Virginia statute of limitations as a bar.

Subsection (A)'s two-year personal-injury period governs section 1983 claims, and equitable estoppel requires conduct that actually prevented timely filing.

Alana v. Rose · filed 2020-06-08(A)

In Virginia, the limitation period for general personal injury claims is two years. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Thus, Alana had two years from the date when his § 1983 claims accrued to file them in a federal lawsuit. ... Accordingly, Alana cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel under Virginia law to render his claims about the 2015 incident timely filed. ... The court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims concerning the 2015 incident on the ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (A)’s two-year period bars an aiding-and-abetting-fraud claim accruing in Virginia when suit is filed more than two years later.

McNew v. People's Bank of Ewing, Jane Hayes · filed 1993-07-06(A)

Consequently, the aiding and abetting fraud claim is time-barred when Virginia's shorter statute of limitations is applied.

A personal-injury action arising in Virginia is subject to subsection (A)’s two-year period, and an involuntary forum-non-conveniens dismissal does not itself preserve an otherwise late refiling.

Kuiper v. Busch Entertainment Corporation · filed 1995-01-24(A)

Virginia has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases. ... Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims accruing after July 1, 1987, are subject to subsection (A)’s two-year limitation period.

Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc. · filed 1996-02-08(A)

Plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are barred by Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... Plaintiff filed its Motion for Judgment in March, 1993. Therefore, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are barred by Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A).

A personal-injury claim accrues when the injury occurs and the two-year period expires two years later, although a later amendment adding a defendant may proceed if it relates back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

Phillips v. United Fixtures Co. · filed 1996-08-29(A)

Under the lex loci doctrine, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued according to Virginia law on August 19,1992 when she was injured in the accident, and the statute of limitations ran on August 19, 1994, two years later. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243. ... Nevertheless, plaintiff may properly pursue her lawsuit against defendant Paltier if her amended complaint “relates back” to her original complaint filed in the Alabama court on August 12,1994. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Virginia's two-year personal-injury limitation bars an action filed in 1996 for an injury sustained in 1975.

Cartwright v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1997-05-02(A)

this personal injury action is barred by Virginia's two-year ... statute of limitations, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992). ... Cartwright's injury was sustained in 1975; she filed this action in 1996.

Subsection (A) requires personal-injury tort claims to be filed within two years after accrual unless a statutory tolling exception applies.

Williams v. City of Portsmouth · filed 1982-03-31(A)

Under Virginia law, actions for personal injury must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. ... Since plaintiff does not come within any exception to the statute of limitations, his action is time barred, and must be DISMISSED.

Fraud claims must be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Taylor v. Robinson · filed 2003-09-29

Claims of fraud must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 2000). ... Because the plaintiff commenced this action on April 3,2003, more than two years after discovering the alleged ... fraud, the plaintiffs allegation of actual fraud is time-barred.

Actual and constructive fraud claims are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Virginia Imports, Inc. v. Kirin Brewery of America, LLC · filed 2003-12-08

The Court holds that VI was on notice prior to June 2000 of Kirin’s alleged fraud or could have learned of it through the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, Vi’s cause of action is untimely. ... Virginia law sets a two-year limitations period for claims of fraud and constructive fraud.

Virginia gives actual and constructive fraud claims a two-year limitations period.

Parker v. Westat, Inc. · filed 2004-02-03

Virginia has a two-year statute of limitations for fraud. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 2003). ... Therefore, Parker is barred from bringing the fraud claims under Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for fraud.

A fraud claim filed within two years of the alleged admission was timely, and a later amendment related back where the proper defendant had timely notice.

Rapoca Energy Co., LLP v. Jl Mining Co. · filed 2005-05-06

The state action was brought within four years of the date of delivery of the rebuilt machines and within two years of the date that Rapoca claims that Long-Airdox admitted that it could not repair them. ... Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 2000) (action for damages for fraud must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues). Because the present action was filed within six months of the dismissal without prejudice of the state action, the statutes of limitations were ’tolled when the state action was filed.

Negligence claims based on fraud are subject to subsection (A)'s two-year limitations period.

Cox v. Eberle Associates · filed 2019-10-30(A)

Virginia applies a two-year statute of limitations to negligence claims based on fraud. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (West 2019). ... Any claim pertaining to Defendants’ alleged negligence with regard to entering into the contract with the Free Fletcher Cox Project is clearly untimely as that agreement was made in 2015.

Virginia fraud, negligence, and other personal-injury actions are subject to a two-year period after accrual.

Call v. Geico Advantage Insurance Company · filed 2023-08-09

Additionally, amendment to this claim would be futile because the Virginia statute of limitations for fraud and all other personal injury actions is two years after the cause of action accrues. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243. Here at least three years have passed. ... As with his fraud claim, amendment of his negligence claim would be futile because it too is time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as at least three years have elapsed.

Virginia common-law fraud actions have a two-year period from accrual, with discovery of the misrepresentation triggering accrual.

Pool Scouts Franchising, LLC v. Stuart Road Corporation · filed 2025-03-31(A)

Both the DTPA and Virginia fraud statutes of limitations provide that actions for fraud must be brought within two years of a claim’s accrual. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.565; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). ... Using even the latest possible date of October 2018, Berridge would have discovered the misrepresentation regarding discounted pricing by April 2019, meaning that a claim resting on these allegations expired no later than April 2023. ... Accordingly, Berridge’s claim regarding Pool Scouts’ misrepresentation of discounted pool supplies is barred under either of the three applicable statutes of limitations.

Section 8.01-243(A) gives personal actions for injury to the person a two-year statute of limitations.

Massie v. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. · filed 1987-12-02(A)

If the damages properly recoverable in any personal action are damage to reputation, pain, mental anguish and suffering, injury to credit and financial standing, and injury to reputation, then the action is a “personal action for injury to the person” and is governed by Va. Code § 8.01-243(A) (1984) (two years) and is not barred after one year under Va. Code § 8.01-248.

Section 8.01-243 requires fraud actions to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Vaught v. Toothman · filed 1992-03-13

Fraud rights of action must be filed *219within two years after the cause of action accrued. Va. Code § 8.01-243.

Section 8.01-243(A) requires fraud actions to be brought within two years after accrual.

Williams v. Chamer · filed 1993-03-25(A)

Throckmorton also raised the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff’s common law fraud count. He correctly stated that actions resulting from fraud must be brought within two years after accrual. ... Va. Code § 8.01-243(A).

Section 8.01-243 supplies the limitation period for fraud claims, which applies only after the claim's accrual date is established.

Curley v. Dahlgren Chrysler-Plymouth Dodge, Inc. · filed 1993-04-16

Furthermore, even if Count VI were a fraud claim, the record simply is insufficient to show when Curley discovered or should have discovered the fraud and thus establish the accrual date of the cause of action, Code § 8.01-249, which must precede application of the statutory limitation for claims based on fraud, Code § 8.01-243.

Section (A) requires actions for personal injuries to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Purcell v. Tidewater Construction Corp · filed 1994-05-24(A)

Va. Code § 8.01-243(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery ... shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” ... Virginia’s Supreme Court has consistently applied the two-year statute of limitations set forth in § 8.01-243(A) only to actions in which the damages sustained involved physical injuries.

Section 8.01-243(A) sets a two-year limitations period for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Hansen v. Stanley Martin Companies, Inc. · filed 2003-09-12(A)

Since both counts sound in fraud,4 the two-year statute of limitations of Code § 8.01-243(A) applies and begins to run from the date the fraud or negligent misrepresentation “is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered.” Code § 8.01-249(1).

Section 8.01-243 imposes a two-year limitations period on fraud claims.

Hoover & Strong, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. · filed 2004-08-27

For the above stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend filed on October 20,2003, was not timely and that Count II of the Amended Motion for Judgment is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for fraud.

Section 8.01-243 requires a fraud claim to be filed within two years after it accrues.

Parsch v. Massey · filed 2006-10-04(A)

In Virginia, claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within two years of the date when the cause of action accrued. ... Because Parsch demonstrated many times over that a cause of action for both torts accrued between November 2001 and March 2002, he clearly transgressed the statute of limitations by filing in December 2004.

Section 8.01-243's two-year limitations period bars a fraud claim when the plaintiff does not allege that the fraud could not have been discovered sooner than two years before filing.

Schur v. Sprenkle · filed 2012-04-11

Thus, there being no allegation that Plaintiff could not have discovered the fraud any sooner than the two-year allotted time immediately preceding the filing of the action, the claims are time-barred under the provisions of Va. Code §§ 8.01-243, 8.01-249.1.

Subsection (A)’s two-year period does not bar a challenge to a policy that continues to be applied within the limitations period.

Rehabilitation Ass'n of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowski · filed 1993-11-22(A)

Due to the continuing nature of the alleged harm, the Court will deny defendants’ motions on the statute of limitations bar.

A continuing failure to warn does not avoid subsection (A)’s two-year bar without evidence of a new or aggravated personal injury within the statutory period.

Smith v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1995-09-22(A)

Because the instant action was not commenced until April 15, 1993, any claim by Claveloux against Canon for failure to warn is time barred.

Subsection (B)'s five-year period governs nuisance and trespass claims, and a permanent recurring injury accrues when first sustained rather than anew with each recurrence.

Bell v. Westrock CP, LLC · filed 2019-09-18(B)

Under Virginia law, a five-year limitations period applies to nuisance and trespass claims. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B). ... The above precedent mandates the conclusion that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs’ claims. ... The plaintiffs cannot circumvent the statute of limitations simply by framing their injuries as temporary in their complaint.

Subsection (A)'s two-year period governs section 1983 claims, but continual unlawful acts within that period can make a continuing-violation claim timely.

Pin v. Clarke · filed 2020-02-19(A)

In Virginia, the limitations period for general personal injury claims is two years. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Thus, Pin had two years from the date when his § 1983 claim accrued to file a federal lawsuit. ... It is undisputed that during the two-year period preceding the commencement of his § 1983 action, VDOC staff continued to characterize Pin’s life sentences as parole-eligible and to withhold monies for his PTA account. Because Pin’s claim concerns alleged due process violations that occurred within the statutory limitations period and, by his own characterization, do not involve an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the court will deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Subsection (A)'s two-year period governs section 1983 claims, and the continuing effects of a discrete original violation do not restart that period.

Mueller v. Bennett · filed 2020-03-23(A)

Virginia applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury claims. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (West 2020). Therefore, Mueller was required to have filed his Complaint within two years from ... when the underlying claim accrued. ... Accordingly, the present action is untimely. ... Therefore, although Mueller disagrees with the “continual ill effects” from the original alleged violation (i.e., the imposition of the probation conditions when he was placed on probation), the fact that these conditions remained imposed on him for the duration of his probation does not constitute a continuing violation.

Subsection (A)'s borrowed two-year period for section 1983 claims runs from the parole decision the plaintiff learned of, and later adherence to the same parole-ineligibility determination does not create new injuries with separate periods.

Cain v. Chapman · filed 2022-05-13(A)

Virginia applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury claims. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (West 2022). Thus, Cain would have had two years from when he learned that he was ineligible for parole in 2008 or 2012 to file any claims pertaining to the determination that he was ineligible for parole. ... Each occasion thereafter that the Parole Board or the Defendants adhered to that parole ineligibility determination does not constitute separate and distinct injury that warrants separate statute of limitations calculations.

A section 1983 claim governed by subsection (A)'s two-year period is not extended by continuing ill effects of a discrete violation or by characterizing a prison disciplinary decision as void.

Whitten · filed 2026-03-16(A)

In Virginia, the personal injury statute of limitations is two years under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Therefore, Whitten’s claim must have been asserted within two years of its accrual; otherwise, it is time-barred, meaning the claim must be dismissed irrespective of the merits of the claim. ... Whitten tries to salvage his stale claims by referencing the ongoing effects of the actions, ... but the continuing violation theory only extends limitations periods when the violative acts themselves are ongoing as opposed to lingering effects of a discrete claimed violation.

Business-conspiracy claims under Virginia Code §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500 concern injury to property and therefore receive subsection (B)’s five-year limitation period.

Cherokee Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. · filed 1994-07-01(B)

all actions brought under §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500 concern injuries to property and are therefore governed by a five-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief is not time barred.

A Virginia statutory business-conspiracy claim has a five-year limitation that begins when the plaintiff first suffers any damage from acts furthering the conspiracy, even if the initial injury is slight.

Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc. · filed 1997-03-18(B)

The statute of limitations applicable to the conspiracy claim is five years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1995). ... Virginia law is clear that the statute of limitations begins to run, when any injury occurs, and thus, the district court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run in 1989, and consequently, the Trustees’ lawsuit filed in March, 1995 was time barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

A Virginia statutory business-conspiracy claim has a five-year limitation that begins when the plaintiff first suffers any damage from acts furthering the conspiracy, even if the initial injury is slight.

Detrick v. Panalpina · filed 1997-03-18(B)

The statute of limitations applicable to the conspiracy claim is five years. ... Virginia law is clear that the statute of limitations begins to run, when any injury occurs, and thus, the district court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run in 1989, and consequently, the Trustees' lawsuit filed in March, 1995 was time barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

A conspiracy claim based on trespass or conversion is an injury-to-property claim governed by subsection (B)'s five-year period, although adequately pleaded tolling or estoppel facts may prevent dismissal at the pleading stage.

Jovic v. L-3 Services, Inc. · filed 2014-09-24(B)

Under both Illinois and Virginia law, a conspiracy claim is governed by the statute of limitations for the underlying tort. … “well-established [under Virginia law] that actions for trespass or conversion constitute claims of injury to property” falling within the scope of the 5-year limitations period provided in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B)). … Having reviewed the Third Amended Complaint, the Court. concludes that Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that unequivocally demonstrate that their claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations, nor do their allegations conclusively demonstrate that the doctrines of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel would not apply. … For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law conspiracy claims based upon the statute of limitations.

Subsection (B)'s five-year property-injury period governs a Virginia business-conspiracy claim and begins when the plaintiff suffers injury from the conspiracy.

Steele v. Goodman · filed 2022-09-15(B)

A cause of action under Virginia Code §§ 18.2-499-500 accrues only once the plaintiff suffers an injury, L-3 Comms. Corp. v. Serco, Inc., 926 F.3d 85, 93 (4th Cir. 2019), and a five-year statute of limitations applies to such actions, Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 543 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243). ... Five years did not elapse between when the conspiracy began in June 2017 and when the plaintiffs re-filed their suit in Alexandria in September 2020. ... Thus, the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs’ business conspiracy claim has not expired.

A physician’s breach of confidentiality is a personal injury governed by subsection (A)’s two-year limitation period.

Bullion v. Gadaleto · filed 1995-01-06(A)

Since the breach of the duty of confidentiality is a personal injury and no other statute provides an alternate limitations period, such an action must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued.

Common-law battery is a personal injury subject to subsection (A)’s two-year limitation period.

Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp. · filed 1996-04-02(A)

In Virginia, “every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, ... shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” ... Clearly, the plaintiff may not rely upon these two alleged incidents to succeed on her claim of battery because the allegations are time-barred.

Subsection (B)’s five-year property-injury period does not apply to a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on dilution of a partnership or stock interest.

Singer v. Thomas F. Dungan Benjamin Flammey the Cambridge Institute, Incorporated · filed 1995-01-23(B)

Similarly in LaVay, we expressly rejected the contention that the five-year limitations period applied to a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on injury to a partnership interest. ... Precedent compels us to hold that a one-year-limitations period applies to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

For a failure-to-diagnose claim under subsection (A), untreated cancer causes injury as it destroys normal cells, so accrual need not await metastasis.

Kennedy v. Wheeler · filed 1995-03-28(A)

Every day that the tumor remained untreated because Commonwealth failed to properly diagnose it in August 1991 caused injury to the plaintiff. That is when die cause of action accrued.

The medical-malpractice continuing-treatment rule does not postpone accrual across a substantial interruption during which the patient receives treatment for the same condition from another physician.

Bennett v. Clark · filed 1999-10-05

Section 8.01-243 of the Virginia Code states that a plaintiff must file suit for personal injuries within two years after the claim accrues. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1998). ... This Court holds that Plaintiffs examination and treatment by Defendants ended in June 1996, when Dr. Rodd began to treat her lung-related problems. As such, the two-year statute of limitations expired in June 1998 and Plaintiffs suit is time-barred.

Subsection (C)(2)'s medical-malpractice extension applies only to actual fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation, not negligent misrepresentation or constructive fraud, and the plaintiff must prove the extension by clear and convincing evidence.

Dixon v. Messer · filed 2003-05-22(C)(2)

Paragraph (C)(2), however, only deals with “fraud, concealment, [and] intentional misrepresentation” and does not by its words provide an exception to the statute of limitations in cases in which “negligent’ misrepresentation or “constructive” fraud prevented discovery of the injury. ... The Court opines that, although the Defendant has the burden of proving that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the time is extended by the tolling provision. The Court further believes that the fraud required by the tolling provision must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order for the tolling provision to apply.

A personal-injury action must be brought within two years after accrual, and Virginia measures accrual from the injury rather than its discovery.

Castillo v. Emergency Medicine · filed 2004-06-17(A)

The applicable Virginia statute of limitations states that "every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery . . . shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 2003). ... For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when it found the action to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A negligence claim for injury to property has a five-year limitations period, and the period begins when the property injury occurs rather than when the injury is discovered.

Canal Insurance v. Lebanon Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2007-08-24(B)

In order to forestall any later assertion of this claim, I find that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... Here, the injury and the negligent act occurred simultaneously. When Lebanon Insurance failed to execute a proper rejection of the higher UM limits of the policy, Canal was injured because it was entitled to collect a higher premium to insure that risk. ... Therefore, even if Canal had properly pleaded a direct claim for injury to its property by Lebanon Insurance’s negligence in obtaining a rejection of the default coverage, such a claim is barred by the statute of limitations because Canal’s present action was not filed until 2007, while its injury occurred in 2001.

Subsection (A) bars a Virginia personal-injury action filed more than two years after the injury was sustained, regardless of when the plaintiff discovered the injury.

Chapman v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc. · filed 2011-01-18(A)

Having found Virginia law to be applicable, the Court finds further that Chapman’s claims fail as Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations bars Chapman’s action. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Under Virginia law, the cause of action accrues under tort law on the date that the injury is sustained. ... The date that the plaintiff discovers the injury is immaterial to the running of the statute. ... Chapman did not file suit until June 22, 2009. As a result, her claims are time barred.

A Virginia medical-malpractice claim has a two-year limitations period, and a void nonsuit order does not extend that period.

Branch v. Augusta Health Care, Inc. · filed 2015-08-21

September 28, 2012, was, therefore, the last day Branch could have brought a suit for this cause of action, rendering this present case, initiated March 21,2014, time barred. … The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.

Section 8.01-243(A)’s two-year limit for personal injury malpractice begins when a continuous, substantially uninterrupted course of negligent examination or treatment for a particular condition ends.

Farley v. Goode · filed 1979-03-02(A)

We hold under these facts that when malpractice is claimed to have occurred during a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination and treatment in which a particular illness or condition should have been diagnosed in the exercise of reasonable care, the date of injury occurs, the cause of action for that malpractice accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run when the improper course of examination, and treatment if any, for the particular malady terminates.

Section 8.01-243(A) requires personal injury actions to be brought within two years after the right to bring them accrues.

Fenton v. Danaceau · filed 1979-06-08(A)

Consequently, the date of injury occurred, the cause of action for that malpractice accrued and the statute of limitations commenced to run when the improper course of examination and treatment for the particular malady terminated on July 24,1972, a date which was within two years of the filing of this suit.

Section 8.01-243's limitations period is tolled for a named uninsured motorist when the plaintiff timely files an action against the unknown uninsured motorist.

Truman v. Spivey · filed 1983-04-29

For the reasons stated above, the statute of limitations was tolled as to the named uninsured motorist Spivey upon the timely filing of the action against the unknown uninsured motorist John Doe.

Section 8.01-243(A) requires a personal injury action to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Scarpa v. Melzig · filed 1989-04-21(A)

The applicable statute of limitations provides, as pertinent, that “every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery . . . shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Code § 8.01-243(A). ... For these reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly decided the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on August 5, 1980, the two-year statute of limitations ran from that date, and the 1986 action was untimely.

Section 8.01-243 gives a medical malpractice plaintiff two years to sue after continuous treatment for the condition ends.

Grubbs v. Rawls · filed 1988-06-10

Grubbs had the right under Farley-Fenton to wait until the doctors terminated their treatment before she was compelled to sue. Indeed, she had two years from that termination of services in which to sue.

Section 8.01-243 imposes a two-year limitation on personal injury actions, beginning when the tort is committed.

Luddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. · filed 1990-01-12

Count five claiming damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, an action for personal injury, is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Code § 8.01-243. Any such cause of action accrues and the time limitation begins to run when the tort is committed.

For personal injury actions, the two-year limitations period begins when the injury is sustained, which may require medical evidence when the wrongful act and resulting harm occur on different dates.

Renner v. Stafford · filed 1993-04-16(A)

In determining when the plaintiff’s “injury” was sustained, the crucial question in cases like this, when the date of the wrongful act possibly does not coincide with the date of the resulting harm to the plaintiff, is: When was the plaintiff hurt? The answer to this question must be found mainly in the medical evidence. ... The plaintiff is entitled to prove, if she can, that she sustained no “injury,” no “positive, physical or mental hurt,” in the language of Locke, 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904, until January 1989.

Section 8.01-243 sets a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions and extends it for certain foreign-object medical malpractice claims.

Hale v. Wilson · filed 1989-06-15(A), (C)(1)

It is, therefore, my further opinion that, while the plaintiff may proceed with this cause of action relating to the alleged negligence in having left a foreign object in plaintiff’s body, her other allegations with regard to the other acts of negligence were time barred when the suit was brought in March of 1988. The two year limitations period was applicable to these claims, and, thus, that part of the suit should have been brought on or before May of 1987.

Section 8.01-243(A) applies a two-year limitation to personal injury actions, which accrues when the plaintiff suffers even slight injury, regardless of later greater damage.

McHenry v. Adams · filed 1994-09-16(A)

For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that McHenry is correct in his argument that the two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies. ... That testimony establishes, as a matter of law, the accrual of his cause of action, at the latest, on July 22, 1988, or more than two years before he filed his initial motion for judgment on August 9, 1990. ... But a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is injured, Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981), and the injury need only be slight; it is immaterial that more substantial damage may occur at a later date, Caudill v. Wise Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 14-15, 168 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1969).

Section 8.01-243(A) requires personal injury actions to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Nunnally v. Artis · filed 1997-09-12(A)

Code § 8.01-243(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery . . . shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” ... Even though a legal wrong may have occurred in 1989 when the defendants performed the negligent sterilization procedure on Nunnally, we hold that no injury under the Locke accrual rule occurred at that time because Nunnally had suffered no “positive, physical or mental hurt” related to her alleged cause of action, wrongful conception.

A party asserting the statute of limitations must present evidence establishing when the personal injury cause of action accrued before the court can decide whether the limitations bar applies.

Mackaness v. Matini · filed 1996-06-26

Moreover, the burden of establishing facts sufficient to sustain the bar of the statute of limitations is on the party asserting that defense. Louisville & Nashville RR. Co. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 169 (1928). Evidence must be presented for this Court to determine when the cause of action actually accrued and whether the “continuing treatment” exception is applicable. Accordingly, INOVA’s presentation of its Plea of the Statute of Limitations is premature.

A wrongful-birth claim filed within two years after the parents learned of their children’s condition at birth satisfies § 8.01-243(A).

Santowasso v. Zedler · filed 1998-01-29(A)

The court finds that the cause of action accrued, and the damage developed, on the date that the plaintiffs became aware of their children’s disorders, the birth date of the defective child, September 15, 1994. ... As the Motion for Judgment was filed on September 12, 1996, this is within the two year statute of limitations. The defendants’ plea is rejected on the basis of Barnes.

Section 8.01-243 provides a two-year limit for medical malpractice claims; under the continuing treatment rule, the period begins when continuous treatment for the same condition ends.

Crossan v. Fairfax Ob-Gyn Associates, P.C. · filed 1998-03-03

In actions for medical malpractice against a health care provider, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Va Code § 8.01-243. ... Accordingly, so long as defendants continued to treat Crossan for the same condition over a continuous and substantially uninterrupted period of time, her cause of action for malpractice did not accrue until the end of such treatment.

For malpractice involving a foreign object left in a patient’s body, the discovery extension cannot shorten subsection (A)’s two-year filing period or start a new two-year period on discovery.

Bell v. Ayers & Stolte, P.C. · filed 1998-04-09(C)(1)

Subsection (C) cannot be utilized here to restrict the filing period to less than the two years guaranteed by subsection (A). More importantly, the discovery date of subsection (C) may not be synthesized with the two-year period of subsection (A).

Section 8.01-243(C)(2)'s discovery rule applies to actual fraud, not constructive fraud.

Johnson v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-02-09(C)(2)

Plaintiffs reliance upon the provisions of Code § 8.01-243(C)(2) in defense is misplaced. That subsection does constitute a “discovery rule” for “fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation preventing discovery.” But this subsection applies only to actual fraud, not constructive fraud.

The continuing care exception to § 8.01-243(A)'s limitation period applies to medical malpractice, battery, and informed consent claims, but not fraud claims.

Wallace v. Zoller · filed 2000-03-07(A)

The continuing care exception applies to the medical malpractice, batteiy, and informed consent rights of action, but it does not apply to the fraud action.

Section 8.01-243 gives a medical malpractice plaintiff two years after the claim accrues to sue; in a misdiagnosis case, the period begins when the undiagnosed condition causes a later injury.

Morton v. Gray · filed 2001-08-01

The applicable statute of limitations allows Plaintiff up to two years to file his Motion after “accrual” of the claim. ... When this harm occurs, the plaintiff has suffered an “injury” under the applicable statute, and the limitations period begins.

Section 8.01-243(A) requires a personal-injury medical-malpractice action to be brought within two years after accrual; a wrongful-death action has a separate limitations period.

Wright v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 2004-09-21(A)

As just reviewed, unlike a wrongful death action, an action for personal injuries/medical malpractice in Virginia is subject to the limitation imposed by Va. Code § 8.01-243, which requires that such actions be brought within two years after a cause of action accrues.

The one-year period for a foreign object begins when the patient discovers or reasonably should discover its presence, even if the patient does not know exactly what it is.

Painter v. Singh · filed 2006-11-13(C)(1)

Va. Code § 8.01 -243 (C)( 1) does not require that a patient discover the exact nature of the foreign object within her body, merely the presence of the object.

Section 8.01-243(C)(1) can extend the medical malpractice limitations period when the complaint sufficiently alleges that a substance left in the patient had no therapeutic or diagnostic effect.

Smith v. Berman · filed 2009-05-05(C)(1)

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have alleged enough to support a showing that the TRI-toxin had no therapeutic or diagnostic effect, and hence, the savings provision of Va. Code § 8.01 -243 (C)(1) for now, prevents the medical malpractice claims from being time barred.

Section 8.01-243(A) sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions; the continuous treatment rule does not extend that limit for separate radiology readings that end when the reports are sent to the referring physician.

Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond, Inc. · filed 2009-10-01(A)

The statute of limitation for personal injuries is two years and accrues when the plaintiff is injured. Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). Virginia holds the continuous treatment rule as an exception to the two-year limitation. ... In accord with Baker, the duties and responsibilities of a radiologist, in general and in this case, makes it such that the continuous treatment rule is inapplicable.

Section 8.01-243(A)’s two-year period for medical malpractice begins at the end of a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination and treatment for a particular condition.

Chalifoux v. RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES · filed 2011-04-21(A)

Under these facts, we find “a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination and treatment” existed between Chalifoux and Radiology Associates. Farley, 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599. We therefore hold that the circuit court erred in not applying the continuing treatment rule to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on October 24, 2005, the day the physician-patient relationship between Radiology Associates and Chalifoux ended.

Section 8.01-243(A) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action, with the continuing treatment rule postponing accrual until treatment for the particular condition ends.

Brown v. Tashman · filed 2016-05-02(A)

Therefore, Dr. Tashman’s testimony established that he provided continuous, uninterrupted treatment for Rh alloimmunization from the date of injury in March 2012 through, at the earliest, the date of Christian’s delivery; thus, tolling the date of accrual until, at least, July 26, 2012. Accordingly, Plaintiff timely filed the action within the prescribed two-year statute of limitations. See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A).

Subsection (B)’s five-year property-injury limitation does not apply to an equitable accounting, which is governed by laches.

Kline v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A. · filed 1995-05-18(B)

Because this would have been a suit in equity, the five year statute of limitations would not have applied.

Subsection (B)’s five-year period applies to conduct directed against property, not a claim that a defendant breached a fiduciary or contractual obligation owed to the plaintiff.

Tillman v. Fairfax Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1996-01-16(B)

The five-year statute is inapplicable as Count IV expressly states that the Bank breached an obligation to Tillman and Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B) has been applied consistently to one party’s actions directly against another party’s property.

Subsection (B)'s five-year period applies to actions for injury to property even when the claims sound in tort.

Sergent v. Early Street Properties · filed 2001-05-14(B)

This Court will deny all of those pleas. Every action for injury to property shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B). These actions are actions for injuries to property, even though they sound in tort, and, therefore, the five-year period applies.

Subsection (B) applies only when the alleged wrongdoing is aimed at property itself, not when property loss is merely consequential to a personal injury.

Ranney v. Nelson · filed 2006-04-19(B)

Section 8.01-243.B applies when the alleged wrongdoing was “aimed at the property” itself. Id. at 609. Ranney, however, seeks to recover based on Nelson’s alleged breach of duty to him individually; the resulting loss of property he alleges merely flows as a consequence of his alleged injury.

Subsection (8) gives personal actions involving property damage a five-year limitations period.

Roussell v. Clark · filed 1982-01-29(8)

Virginia Code § 8.01-243(8) provides a five-year limitation on personal actions involving property damage. ... Accordingly, I hold that the misrepresentation in this case was damage to the plaintiff's property or property interests and the five-year statute of limitations would be applicable.

Section 8.01-243(B) gives a five-year limitation period for every action for injury to property.

Pigott v. Moran · filed 1986-03-07(B)

Was this an action for “injury to property” within the meaning of § 8.01-243(B)? We hold it was not.

Section 8.01-243(B) provides a five-year limitation period for actions for injury to property.

Lavery v. Automation Management Consultants, Inc. · filed 1987-09-04(B)

Lavery counters, saying that his suit asserts a claim for injury to property and that a five year period of limitation applies. Code § 8.01-243(B). We agree with Lavery.

For a tort claim alleging injury to property, the section provides a five-year limitation period.

Central Fidelity Bank v. Goode · filed 1990-12-13(B)

In the captioned case, Central Fidelity Bank’s claim sounds in tort, and I stand by the Court’s previous ruling that its claim is for damage to property and that the five-year limitation applies.

Section 8.01-243(B) gives claims for injury to property a five-year limitation period.

Higginbotham v. Ken/Mar Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. · filed 1994-04-20(B)

The Court said, “Since [the defendant’s] alleged conduct was directed at [the plaintiff’s] property, and not at [the plaintiff] personally, it constitutes an injury to property .... Accordingly, the five-year limitation period of Code § 8.01-243(B) governs.” The Vines rationale controls this case; thus, the plea in bar to the conversion claim will be overruled.

Subsection (B) applies a five-year limitations period to tortious interference claims when the alleged injury is to property rights.

Handley v. Boy Scouts of America · filed 1992-10-16(B)

If the one year “catch all” limitation of § 8.01-248 applies, the Plaintiff is time barred. However, if the five-year statute of limitations of § 8.01-243(B) applies, the cause is not time barred. The decision turns on whether the injury is to the Plaintiff’s “property” or to his “person.” ... This court therefore finds, consistent with Worrie v. Boze, supra, that the applicable statute of limitations for a tortious interference action is five years. Therefore, the court denies the Defendants’ Plea of Statute of Limitations. However, to the extent that the Plaintiff has alleged damage to his reputation and diminished opportunity for other employment, both personal damages, the Plea will be sustained to those elements of damage.

Section 8.01-243(B) requires actions for injury to property to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Bader v. Central Fidelity Bank · filed 1993-02-26(B)

Accordingly, we hold that the five-year period of limitations under § 8.01-243(B) is applicable to Mrs. Bader’s conversion claim against Central Fidelity.