Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated at the time of operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish that temporal link.

Warren v. State · filed 2011-09-08(a)

Based on the statutory requirements, the State was required to prove that appellant was intoxicated at the time he was operating the motor vehicle in a public place. ... Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant was intoxicated at the time he was driving in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; intoxication shown only at a later sobriety test is insufficient.

Nagle v. State · filed 2002-12-18(a)

Next, to convict one of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §49.04 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). ... Thus, at bar, the State had to prove not that appellant was intoxicated at the time the officer conducted the field sobriety tests but when he was driving on Crown Road.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Gerron v. State · filed 2003-08-20

The state’s burden was to prove that Gerron was operating his vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). ... Because the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding, we overrule this issue.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; testimony about a recent traffic stop, poor sobriety tests, and alcohol odor supported a finding that the driver committed the offense.

Balderrama v. State · filed 2003-10-30

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding.

Section 49.04(a) requires the State to prove intoxication while the defendant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place; a later breath test establishes intoxication at the time of the test.

State v. Mechler · filed 2003-11-25(a)

A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex Pen.Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). ... Once the State proves a BAC of .08, the defendant is deemed intoxicated at the moment the test is performed. The State must still prove the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle.

Evidence of intoxication observed about ninety minutes after an accident can be factually insufficient for a DWI conviction when nothing connects that condition to the time of driving.

State v. Boyle · filed 2004-07-15(a)

The evidence that Appellee was “operating” his vehicle while intoxicated, as defined by the penal code and the jury charge, was factually weak. ... Viewing all of this evidence in a neutral light, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence was factually insufficient to support Appellee’s conviction.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Pendley v. State · filed 2004-11-24

To establish the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove that Appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Thus, we hold that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while driving; a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit only at the time of testing does not itself establish the offense.

Stewart v. State · filed 2005-03-08(a)

We believe the State’s argument constitutes a misstatement of the law because a person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person had a BAC greater than 0.10 at the time of driving.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Vasquez v. State · filed 2005-08-24(a)

To establish the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place.

State v. Guzman · filed 2005-12-08

To convict Guzman of DWI, the State was required to prove that Guzman operated a motor vehicle in a public place. Such proof is not required by the instant indictment. As alleged, both offenses have a unique element, and the DWI offense is not included within the proof required to establish the child endangerment offense.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence surrounding a crash can establish intoxication at the time of driving.

Patterson v. State · filed 2006-07-12

In order to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the State must show that Appellant (1) drove or operated a motor vehicle (2) while intoxicated (3) in a public place. ... This evidence provides ample support for the State’s contention that Appellant was intoxicated at the time he was driving.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

McNulty v. State · filed 2007-03-14(a)

To support a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the evidence must show that the defendant is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Read v. State · filed 2007-03-29

Under this provision, a person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04 requires proof of intoxication while driving, which a jury may infer from the driver's conduct and intoxication shortly after an accident.

Boulch v. State · filed 2007-05-02

We hold that the evidence rationally supports the jury's determination beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was intoxicated as he drove home on the night of August 3, 2005.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Steele v. State · filed 2007-12-20(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). ... Williams unequivocally testified that appellant was driving the truck that struck his truck while on the public roadway.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish those elements.

Sheldon v. State · filed 2008-06-13

The offense of DWI requires the State to identify the defendant, it must show that the defendant was intoxicated, and it must prove that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place during that period of intoxication. ... The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to sustain Sheldon's conviction.

Section 49.04 does not require proof of the type of intoxicant to establish driving while intoxicated.

Taylor v. State · filed 2008-07-10

But the type of intoxicant is not an element of the offense.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Reese v. State · filed 2008-11-07(a)

A person commits the crime of DWI if he or she “is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a).

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Paschall v. State · filed 2009-04-02(a)

A person commits the crime of DWI if he "is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). The elements of that crime are (1) the defendant, (2) operated, (3) a motor vehicle, (4) while intoxicated, and (5) on or about the date alleged in the State's charging instrument.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle; a breath test above 0.08 alone does not establish when the intoxication occurred.

Shuler v. State · filed 2009-09-24(a)

The law does not require a jury to convict a defendant for DWI upon the showing of only intoxication through a properly recorded breath test exceeding 0.08; the State must also prove that the intoxication occurred at the time the defendant operated a vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; when officers did not observe the driving, independent evidence must establish when the vehicle was driven or how much time passed before officers arrived.

Scillitani v. State · filed 2009-09-30(a)

For there to be legally sufficient evidence that appellant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated, there must be independent evidence of (1) how recently the vehicle was driven or (2) how much time elapsed between the accident and the arrival of law enforcement authorities.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; apparent sobriety more than two hours later does not necessarily defeat evidence of intoxication while driving.

Petroski v. State · filed 2010-03-09(a)

A conviction under section 49.04 requires the State to prove that the accused was intoxicated “ while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (emphasis added); see Chaloupka , 20 S.W.3d at 175 (“The State had to prove not that Chaloupka was intoxicated when the state trooper arrived, but that he had been intoxicated while driving on a public roadway.”).

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant drove a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Esquivel v. State · filed 2010-04-22

As alleged in the indictment, the State was required to prove appellant drove a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and that he had two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated .

Section 49.04 requires a temporal link between driving and intoxication, which may be proved solely through circumstantial evidence.

Kuciemba v. State · filed 2010-05-26

As the court of appeals correctly noted, in order for the evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction for driving while intoxicated, there must be a temporal link between the a defendant's intoxication and his driving. But a conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence.

Section 49.04(a) requires evidence linking the defendant’s intoxication to the time of driving.

Hughes v. State · filed 2010-09-02(a)

However, the State must present evidence establishing “a temporal link between the defendant’s intoxication and his driving.” ... The evidence was sufficient to establish a temporal link between appellant’s driving and his intoxication.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; circumstantial evidence can establish a link between the driving and the intoxication.

Weems v. State · filed 2010-09-30(a)

To obtain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the State must prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). ... The evidence established a temporal link between appellant’s driving and his intoxication. We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support his conviction.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place, and evidence of when the driving occurred can establish the required link to intoxication.

Rios v. State · filed 2010-10-06(a)

Based on evidence that appellant operated her motor vehicle on a public road approximately twenty minutes prior to having been deemed intoxicated, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that appellant was intoxicated at the time she drove a motor vehicle in a public place and that the evidence of the same was not so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.

Section 49.04 requires a person to be intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish when the intoxication occurred.

Gilliland v. State · filed 2011-09-02

Rather than believing Gilliland’s testimony that he drank a bottle of whiskey at the scene and from a flask while in the ambulance, the trial court had the discretion to infer that Gilliland did not have “the means or opportunity of ingesting alcohol from the time he lost control of the [truck] until the officer found him,” suggesting that Gilliland was intoxicated while operating the vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish that the intoxication coincided with driving.

Alysha Smith v. State · filed 2011-09-28(a)

The jury could have reasonably inferred that Appellant drove from the accident scene to the 400 block of East Vinton, where her vehicle stalled, and that she was in a state of intoxication when she last operated the vehicle on the public road. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence in this case is legally sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 49.04(a) does not require proof that the driver caused an accident.

Ojeda v. State · filed 2012-07-18(a)

Although Ojeda argues there is no evidence showing he caused the accident, we note that Ojeda was not charged with a crime requiring him to have caused the accident. He was charged with driving while intoxicated, and we conclude there was sufficient evidence of intoxication before the jury to support its verdict.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Gomez v. State · filed 2012-08-23(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2010). ... After reviewing the evidence, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant drove while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish that intoxication and driving occurred at the same time.

Green v. State · filed 2012-11-21(a)

The Penal Code requires the State to prove that a defendant was intoxicated at the time he was operating the motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) does not require injury to a person or damage to property for driving while intoxicated to occur.

Hanna v. State · filed 2013-05-08(a)

We further note that the crime, as defined in the information and pertinent statute, required neither injury to anyone nor the destruction or loss of anyone’s property. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2012) (stating that a “person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place”).

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Villarreal v. State · filed 2013-07-30(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant committed this violation and revoking appellant’s community supervision.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Parr v. State · filed 2014-01-09

Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, a person is guilty of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and circumstantial evidence can establish that the driver was intoxicated while driving.

McCann v. State · filed 2014-03-25(a)

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict, we determine that the trial court could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant operated a vehicle in a public place while he was intoxicated.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating the vehicle; circumstances at the crash scene and a later high BAC can establish that link.

Hendrickson v. State · filed 2014-05-08

The issue before us, in light of Appellant’s admission that he was the driver of the Jeep, is whether the State established the necessary nexus between Appellant’s intoxication and his operating the vehicle. ... Considering all the evidence, and applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s DWI verdict.

Section 49.04 permits a jury to infer that a person drove while intoxicated from circumstantial evidence, including being found intoxicated behind the wheel of a running vehicle in a roadway.

Murphy v. State · filed 2014-08-22

Based on this evidence, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, while intoxicated, appellant drove to the place he was found.

Section 49.04(a) permits a DWI conviction when the evidence proves intoxication while operating a motor vehicle under the per se theory.

Thurman v. State · filed 2014-04-09(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the evidence is sufficient to prove that Thurman was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle under the “per se” theory of intoxication.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Winstead v. State · filed 2014-09-11(a)

To obtain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the State must prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. ... We hold that, viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found Appellant guilty of the offense of driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) makes driving while intoxicated a strict liability offense that requires no specific mental state.

Navarro v. State · filed 2014-09-15(a)

Driving while intoxicated is a strict liability crime—it does not require a specific mental state, only a person operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway while intoxicated.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Henderson, Mellannise · filed 2015-02-09(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) requires a temporal link between intoxication and operation of the vehicle.

Gay v. State · filed 2015-02-25(a)

However, the State must show a “temporal link” between the defendant’s intoxication and his operation of the vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place, so the evidence must link intoxication to the time of operation.

Sanchez v. State · filed 2015-05-20(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2014). ... We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant operated the vehicle and that there was a “temporal link” between his intoxication and operation of the vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Elizondo v. State · filed 2015-07-16(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... We conclude Telles’s testimony was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated, thus violating a condition of his community supervision.

Section 49.04(a) requires the State to prove that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Friend v. State · filed 2015-08-26(a)

To prove that Appellant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State had to prove that Appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Quintero v. State · filed 2015-08-27

Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, Quintero is guilty of driving while intoxicated if he was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

David Kent Thacker, Jr. v. State · filed 2015-11-06(a)

The Penal Code specifies that an individual commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he “is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code § 49.04(a).

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Richter v. State · filed 2015-12-22(a)

“A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2015). ... Here, Richter challenges whether the evidence was legally sufficient to demonstrate that she was intoxicated.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving.

Dalton v. State · filed 2016-01-12

However, the State must show a “temporal link” between the defendant’s intoxication and his operation of the vehicle—there must be proof from which the jury can conclude that, at the time of the driving in question, the defendant was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, including through impairment by drugs.

Clifton Crews Hoyt v. State · filed 2016-08-12(a)

Under the Penal Code, an individual commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he “is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place,” Tex. Penal Code § 49.04(a), and an individual is intoxicated if he does not have “the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body,” id. § 49.01(2). ... In light of all of the evidence previously summarized as well as the reasonable inferences that the district court could have made from that evidence and given our standard of review for legal-sufficiency challenges, we must conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the district court’s determination that Hoyt was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; circumstantial evidence can establish that the intoxication and operation occurred at the same time.

Palmer v. State · filed 2016-08-12(a)

Based on Palmer’s presence in the driver’s seat, the car’s position, the open containers, his behavior, and the high level of his inebriation, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Palmer was intoxicated at the time he drove the vehicle to where it was found, thereby establishing the necessary temporal link between Palmer’s intoxication and his operation of the vehicle.

Section 49.04(a)'s requirement that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Porter v. State · filed 2016-08-18(a)

After a review of the record, we hold that a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the operator of the car and that he had operated his car in a public place while he was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Trevino v. State · filed 2017-10-27(a)

The elements of the offense of driving while intoxicated are that the defendant was (1) operating a motor vehicle; (2) in a public place; (3) while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) permits circumstantial evidence to establish the required link between intoxication and driving.

Tedder v. State · filed 2016-12-29(a)

We conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence to establish a temporal link between appellant’s intoxication and his driving.

Section 49.04(a) requires a temporal link between intoxication and operating a motor vehicle, which a jury may infer from circumstantial evidence.

Pace v. State · filed 2017-01-23(a)

Thus, a rational jury could infer that appellant was intoxicated when he backed into the parked car between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. and there was a temporal link between appellant’s intoxication and his driving.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Jimenez v. State · filed 2018-07-26(a)

A person commits a DWI if that person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Larry Dell Carr v. State · filed 2019-05-16(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a).

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Martz v. State · filed 2019-06-12(a)

To establish that a person committed the offense of DWI, the State must prove that the person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Collins v. State · filed 2019-06-27(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he 1) is intoxicated while 2) operating a motor vehicle 3) in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a). ... The information contains all requisites of Article 21.21 and tracks the language of the Penal Code.

Section 49.04(a) defines the offense of driving while intoxicated.

Caballero v. State · filed 2019-10-10(a)

Additionally, the applicable statutory provisions for the offense of DWI include TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), the statutory provision that defines the offense of DWI. ... Accordingly, we modify the judgment in the DWI case to reflect that the “Statute for Offense” is “49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) Penal Code.”

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Ramirez v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-03-21(a)

The offense here was driving while intoxicated, which meant that the prosecution had the burden of proving the following essential elements: (1) appellant was operating a motor vehicle, (2) he was in a public place, and (3) he was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) permits a jury to infer intoxication at the time of driving from signs observed shortly after an accident and a later blood alcohol test.

Lampkin v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-07-25(a)

Lampkin exhibited signs of intoxication, the test showed that he had a blood-alcohol level of .159 three hours and twenty-three minutes after Cardona was dispatched, and the jury could reasonably infer that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish that intoxication coincided with operation.

Worthley v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-02-01(a)

Based upon this evidence and our prior opinion in Priego, we find there is legally sufficient evidence for the jury to “reasonably infer” from the facts in the record that Worthley was intoxicated while operating his vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Curiel v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-16(a)

The State was required to prove that Appellant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Burrows v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-17(a)

To prove that Burrows violated his probation by violating the laws of Texas, the State needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Burrows was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Burrows had violated his probation by committing DWI.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Burrows v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-10-07(a)

To prove that Burrows violated his probation by violating the laws of Texas, the State needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Burrows was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a).

Section 49.04 criminalizes driving while intoxicated.

Ajak v. State · filed 2014-08-06

The proper provisions criminalizing such conduct and enhancing the penalty for repeated conduct are Sections 49.04 and 49.09.

Section 49.04(a) does not require the State to prove who caused an accident or a victim’s death, so a DWI jury charge need not include a causation instruction.

Flores v. State · filed 2003-11-06(a)

The trial court properly denied appellant’s requested instruction on causation because causation was not an element of the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). In a DWI case, the State is not required to prove who caused an accident or caused any victim’s death.

Section 49.04(c) permits an open-container finding when the container is within the driver's reach and therefore in the driver's immediate possession.

Barton, Elaine Marie v. State · filed 2004-10-05(c)

For an open container finding to be supported, the State must prove “that at the time of the offense the person operating the motor vehicle had an open container of alcohol in the person’s immediate possession.” ... Based on this testimony, the jury could have rationally concluded the can was within appellant’s reach and therefore within her immediate possession.

Section 49.04(c)’s open container enhancement does not require the driver to own or have sole control of the vehicle.

Johnathan Hooper A/K/A Jonathan Justin Hooper v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-15(c)

Appellant argues that “Strahan did not know who[m] the vehicle that [appellant was] driving was registered to, whether it belonged to [appellant] or whether [appellant] ha[d] sole control over it.” Such considerations are not required elements of DWI, or the open container enhancement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), (c).

Section 49.04(a) permits a general DWI verdict without jurors agreeing on which intoxicant or combination of intoxicants caused the defendant’s intoxication.

Fulenwider v. State · filed 2005-05-04(a)

We conclude that because appellant was charged with a single offense of DWI, the trial court did not err by charging the jury disjunctively on the means of intoxication. ... Consequently, there was no requirement that the jury return a verdict indicating which intoxicant, or combination of intoxicants, caused appellant to be intoxicated.

Section 49.04 defines a single DWI offense; jurors need not agree whether intoxication was proved by an alcohol concentration of .08 or loss of normal faculties.

Farese v. State · filed 2014-02-19

Therefore, the jury need not be unanimous as to whether Farese had an alcohol concentration of .08 or the loss of the normal use of his faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body.

Felony DWI based on Section 49.04 is not a lesser-included offense of manslaughter and may serve as the underlying felony for felony murder.

Mendoza v. State · filed 2006-08-10(a)

Because the State is required to prove different elements for the offense of felony DWI than manslaughter, felony DWI is not a lesser-included offense of manslaughter.

A DWI charge under Section 49.04 gives adequate notice when it alleges the offense’s elements; it need not specify which definition of intoxication the State will prove.

State of Texas v. Barbernell, Stephen Gregory · filed 2008-07-02(a)

A charging instrument that pleads the offense of DWI provides adequate notice when it sets out the elements of the offense as provided in Section 49.04.

Section 49.04(a) does not require the State to prove which substance caused intoxication.

Brodrick Dechone Delane AKA Broderick Shun Delane AKA Shaun Scott v. State · filed 2012-02-02(a)

The substance that causes intoxication is not an element of the offense of driving while intoxicated that must be proved at trial.

Section 49.04(a) does not require the State to prove which substance caused the driver's intoxication.

Samuel Charles Van Ness IV A/K/A Samuel Charles Vanness Iv v. State · filed 2011-07-21(a)

First, we note that in Gray v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that "the substance that causes intoxication is not an element of the offense" of driving while intoxicated and therefore does not need to be proven because it is "not the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, or the negation of any exception to the offense." ... In light of Gray, we find Van Ness's argument unpersuasive.

Section 49.04(a) permits a DWI conviction when a dangerous drug, including carisoprodol, deprives a driver of normal mental or physical faculties.

Harkins v. State · filed 2008-08-29(a)

Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Harkins was intoxicated by not having the normal use of her mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of the dangerous drug carisoprodol into her body.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence linking impaired behavior to drug use can support a conviction.

Condarco v. State · filed 2013-08-27(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code § 49.04(a). ... Viewing the above evidence in its totality and in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Condarco was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) covers operating a motor vehicle in a public place while prescription medication deprives the driver of normal mental or physical faculties.

Vujovich v. State · filed 2015-04-10(a)

Thus, at the time he was operating a motor vehicle in a public place, Vujovich did not have the normal use of mental or physical faculties as a result of the side effects of his prescription medication. We find that the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to prove that Vujovich committed DWI.

Section 49.04(a) permits a driving while intoxicated conviction when circumstantial evidence shows that drugs deprived a driver of normal mental or physical faculties while operating a vehicle in a public place.

Trevino v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-10-31(a)

Here, a rational juror could have reasonably concluded that Trevino did not have the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of clonazepam and marihuana into her body while operating a vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) allows an automatism defense when the defendant did not voluntarily operate the vehicle.

Cox, Ronald Lynn v. State · filed 2013-08-27(a)

Conversely, involuntary action, or automatism, is a defense separate and distinct from involuntary intoxication, and is a defense to driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) covers intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; voluntarily taking intoxicating medication can satisfy the voluntary-act requirement even when its effects were unintended.

Linda Carol Wilcher AKA Linda Carol South v. State · filed 2016-12-28(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant voluntarily took her medicine, was intoxicated, and operated a motor vehicle in a public place on the day in question.

Section 49.04 requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle without intent to become intoxicated; a voluntary conduct defense may be available when a third party causes the intoxication.

Farmer v. State · filed 2011-04-28

In other words, ―I didn‘t mean to drive while intoxicated‖ cannot preclude a conviction because the statute merely requires that the accused be found to be intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle, without reference to any intent of his part to become intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003), § 49.11(a). On the other hand, if a third person causes the accused to become intoxicated, such as by slipping a ―mickie‖ in his drink or forcing him to take an intoxicant and get behind the wheel, then the voluntary conduct defense is available.

Section 49.04(d) makes driving while intoxicated a class A misdemeanor when the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 or above.

Dromgoole v. State · filed 2015-07-23(d)

Without such a finding, Appellant’s sentence would be outside of the permissible punishment range. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class A misdemeanors at one year), § 12.22 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class B misdemeanors at 180 days), § 49.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 2014) (setting level of punishment for driving while intoxicated as class A misdemeanor when defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is at 0.15 or above).

Section 49.04(d) makes driving while intoxicated a class A misdemeanor when the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 or above.

Dromgoole v. State · filed 2015-08-25(d)

Without such a finding, Appellant’s sentence would be outside of the permissible punishment range. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class A misdemeanors at one year), § 12.22 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class B misdemeanors at 180 days), § 49.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 2014) (setting level of punishment for driving while intoxicated as class A misdemeanor when defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is at 0.15 or above). Accordingly we will modify the judgment to correctly reflect the trial court’s finding.

Section 49.04(d) makes driving while intoxicated a Class A misdemeanor when the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 or above.

Dromgoole, Melissa · filed 2015-10-20(d)

Without such a finding, Appellant’s sentence would be outside of the permissible punishment range. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class A misdemeanors at one year), § 12.22 (Vernon 2011) (setting maximum punishment range for class B misdemeanors at 180 days), § 49.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 2014) (setting level of punishment for driving while intoxicated as class A misdemeanor when defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is at 0.15 or above). Accordingly we will modify the judgment to correctly reflect the trial court’s finding.

Section 49.04(d) makes driving while intoxicated a Class A misdemeanor when the driver's alcohol concentration is at least 0.15 at the time of the analysis; it does not require that concentration at the time of driving.

Ramjattansingh v. State · filed 2018-06-06(d)

If a jury instruction includes the elements of the charged crime but incorrectly adds an extra, made-up element, a sufficiency challenge is still assessed against the elements of the charged crime, regardless of the source of the extra element. ... See Tex. Pen. Code § 49.04(a), (d) (converting Class B misdemeanor DWI to a Class A misdemeanor whenever a person driving while intoxicated is shown to have had an "alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed").

Section 49.04(d) requires proof of a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more for Class A DWI.

Miorales v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-04(d)

For Class A misdemeanor DWI, the State also needed to prove a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more. Id. § 49.04(d). The jury found Appellant guilty only of Class B misdemeanor DWI, implicitly rejecting the higher concentration element.

Section 49.04(d)’s 0.15 allegation is proven by a valid specimen analysis showing that concentration when the analysis was performed; observations that the defendant did not seem highly intoxicated do not controvert the test results.

Do, Phi Van · filed 2021-09-29(d)

Observational evidence that the defendant’s speech and mannerisms seemed inconsistent with being highly intoxicated is simply not controverting evidence with respect to the test results.

Section 49.04 requires proof of intoxication while driving; subsection (d) makes the offense a Class A misdemeanor when specimen analysis shows an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more.

Ziegler v. State · filed 2020-09-03(a), (d)

Thus, the State must prove both Section 49.04(a) (intoxicated while driving) and Section 49.04(d) (alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more when analyzed). Proving only Section 49.04(d) is not enough.

Section 49.04(a) and (d) require proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and had an alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 when the analysis was performed for a Class A misdemeanor conviction.

Pacheco v. State · filed 2020-04-23(a), (d)

For a jury to render a guilty verdict for the offense charged in the information, the State must prove that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place, and he had an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed.

Section 49.04(d) makes DWI a Class A misdemeanor when the defendant’s alcohol concentration is at least 0.15 when the analysis is performed; the State need not prove that level existed while the defendant was driving.

Gandee Jr. v. State · filed 2019-10-31(d)

A Class A misdemeanor DWI offense requires additional proof that the defendant had an alcohol concentration level of at least 0.15 at the time the analysis was performed. ... The State, however, is not required to prove an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 at the time of the commission of the offense. ... This evidence was sufficient to establish the aggravating element for a Class A misdemeanor DWI.

Section 49.04(d) makes an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more an element of Class A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.

Ex Parte: Bradrick J. Collins · filed 2019-06-28(d)

The allegation that the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 or more is an element of the offense for Class A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(d) does not make a defendant punishable for Class A DWI when the defendant pleads guilty to Class B DWI under a charge bargain, even if the plea agreement notes an alcohol concentration above 0.15.

State v. S.M. · filed 2019-03-14(d)

Because S.M. pleaded guilty to Class B misdemeanor DWI and was admonished as such, S.M. was not punishable under section 49.04(d) at the time he pleaded guilty and was subject to punishment.

Section 49.04(d) makes DWI a Class A misdemeanor when a blood, breath, or urine test shows an alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 at the time of analysis; it does not require proof of that concentration while driving.

Danilo De Jesus Meza v. State · filed 2016-06-30(d)

In other words, the statute never requires retrograde extrapolation for a Class A misdemeanor DWI conviction. It was the jury charge that the State requested in this case that imposed that requirement in this particular case.

Section 49.04(d) makes driving while intoxicated a Class A misdemeanor when an analysis shows an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of analysis.

Russell Singleton Leonard v. State · filed 2016-09-22(d)

To establish a Class A misdemeanor, as here, the State must also prove the defendant had an alcohol concentration of over 0.15, determined at the time of the analysis rather than at the time of driving.

Section 49.04(d) makes an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more an element of class A misdemeanor DWI that the State must prove during the guilt/innocence stage.

Castellanos v. State · filed 2016-10-27(d)

Therefore, we hold, as did our sister court in Navarro, that subsection (d) describes an element of a class A misdemeanor DWI, which the State has the burden to prove at the guilt/innocence stage of a defendant’s trial.

Section 49.04(d) makes an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of analysis an element of Class A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.

Madrid v. State · filed 2017-05-02(d)

Whether a defendant’s alcohol concentration was greater than 0.15 at the time of analysis is an element of the Class A misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(d) elevates driving while intoxicated to a Class A misdemeanor when alcohol concentration is at least .15 at the time of analysis; if the State also alleges that concentration at or near the time of driving, it must prove the added allegation.

Ramjattansingh v. State · filed 2017-08-10(d)

If the proof shows that, he had an alcohol concentration of .15 or more at the time the analysis was performed, however, the offense is elevated to a Class A misdemeanor. ... The State’s deliberate decision to increase its burden at trial forecloses it from insisting on appeal that the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured under a hypothetically correct jury charge with a lesser burden.

Section 49.04(d) requires evidence of an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more for a Class A driving while intoxicated conviction.

Diamond v. State · filed 2018-09-11(d)

However, because appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor, evidence was required to establish a BAC of 0.15 or more. See id. § 49.04(d).

Section 49.04(d) requires proof of an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more for a Class A misdemeanor conviction.

Diamond v. State · filed 2018-10-23(d)

However, because appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor, evidence was required to establish a BAC of 0.15 or more. See id. § 49.04(d).

Section 49.04(d) makes driving with an alcohol concentration above .15 a class A misdemeanor without requiring a prior DWI conviction.

Taylor v. State · filed 2019-04-09(d)

But under section 49.04(d), driving with an alcohol concentration of more than .15 is also a class A misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code § 49.04(d). The jury found that appellant drove with an alcohol concentration of more than .15. It was not required to find that appellant had a prior DWI conviction to find appellant guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Section 49.04(d) makes an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more an element of Class A misdemeanor DWI that the jury must decide during the guilt phase.

Phi Van Do v. State · filed 2020-04-02(d)

The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to one-year county-jail confinement, after considering the 0.15 element as an enhancement during the punishment phase, without allowing the jury to consider the 0.15 element during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.

Section 49.04(d) makes a DWI offense a Class A misdemeanor when an alcohol concentration analysis shows a level of 0.15 or more.

Warren v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-08-14(d)

Moreover, Appellant’s claim of prejudice on this point fails because the DWI offense as originally charged, like the enhanced offense, is a Class A misdemeanor—the original information alleged that an analysis of Appellant’s alcohol concentration revealed a level of 0.15 or more. PENAL § 49.04(d).

Section 49.04 does not exclude the necessity defense; a defendant is entitled to a necessity instruction when the evidence raises that defense.

Coolbaugh v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-07-27

No such exclusion appears in the DWI statute.

A defendant charged under Section 49.04 may raise the necessity defense when the evidence supports it, even though DWI requires no mental state.

Coolbaugh v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-10-20(a)

It does not mean that the legislature intended that the necessity defense be inapplicable as a matter of law to the act of driving while intoxicated.

When the evidence and jury charge support only ordinary DWI, the conviction is for the Class B offense under subsections (a) and (b), and the judgment must omit a Class A alcohol-concentration designation.

Shannon v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-28(a), (b)

We therefore reform the trial court’s judgment to delete all references to “DWI w/ BAC 0.15 or higher” and to reflect a conviction for DWI under section 49.04(a) and (b).

Section 49.04(b) makes unenhanced driving while intoxicated a class B misdemeanor.

Campos v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-01(b)

Because the record shows that Campos was convicted and sentenced for a class B misdemeanor, and because Campos does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence as to the unenhanced DWI, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete all references to “DWI W/BAC 0.15 OR HIGHER” and to reflect a conviction for DWI under Texas Penal Code § 49.04(b).

Section 49.04(a) defines a DWI offense as being intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; an earlier DWI conviction does not move the current offense’s date back to the earlier offense.

Sutton v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-08(a)

Instead, the felony-DWI statute discusses the offense level for “an offense under [s]ection 49.04,” id. § 49.09(a), which specifies that an offense occurs when “the person is ... intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place,” id. § 49.04(a). Under their plain language, the applicable statutes are not amenable to the construction offered by Sutton.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; the DWI offense does not continue after the driving ends merely because the person remains intoxicated.

BARBER, GRADY JACK v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-16(a)

Even if it did, a defendant’s continued intoxication does not cause the offenses of DWI and intoxication manslaughter to continue after the defendant’s impermissible conduct during intoxication has ceased.