Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Guess v. State · filed 2010-02-26(a)

As relevant to Appellant’s argument, the State was required to show that Appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). ... After considering all of the evidence, we hold that a rational jury could conclude that Appellant operated a motor vehicle that morning and that he was intoxicated when he did so. Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Thomas Leo Foster, Jr. v. State · filed 2010-05-27(a)

A person “commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).

Section 49.04 does not make refusal to take a breath test an element of DWI.

Flores v. State · filed 2010-12-02

The refusal to take a breath test, however, is not an element of the offense of DWI that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Foley v. State · filed 2010-12-21(a)

Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, Foley committed the offense of driving while intoxicated if he: (1) was intoxicated (2) while operating a motor vehicle (3) in a public place. ... However, viewing all of the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to determine that Foley was guilty of driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Bird v. State of Texas · filed 2011-06-02

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, the trial court could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(d) makes an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more an element of a separate Class A misdemeanor offense.

Navarro v. State · filed 2015-05-28(d)

A plain reading of that subsection reveals that its effect is to convert an offense from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor whenever a person charged with driving while intoxicated is shown to have “an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more.” ... It is instead an element of a separate offense because it represents a specific type of forbidden conduct—operating a motor vehicle while having an especially high concentration of alcohol in the body.

Section 49.04(d) makes a qualifying high alcohol concentration an element of a separate driving while intoxicated offense, rather than a punishment enhancement.

Navarro v. State · filed 2015-07-07(d)

It is instead an element of a separate offense because it represents a specific type of forbidden conduct — operating a motor vehicle while having an especially high concentration of alcohol in the body.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Rafael De Los Santos v. State · filed 2018-02-14(a)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that on February 28, 2013, Appellant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated with an open container.

Section 49.04 requires proof of intoxication but does not require proof of an accident resulting in damage.

Kutch v. State · filed 2018-07-20

DWI requires proof of intoxication but failure to stop and provide information does not. Failure to stop and provide information requires proof of an accident resulting in damage but DWI does not.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Kury v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-05-06(a)

To establish that Kury committed the offense of DWI, the State was required to prove that he was “intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” ... Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Kury was intoxicated at the time he operated his vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) makes driving while intoxicated a strict-liability offense that requires voluntary operation of a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, but no culpable mental state.

Farmer, Kody William · filed 2013-10-09(a)

The offense of driving while intoxicated is a strict liability crime meaning that it does not require a specific mental state (e.g., intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly intending to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated), only a person on a public roadway voluntarily operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 49.04 does not require a culpable mental state as an element of driving while intoxicated.

Reed v. State · filed 1996-05-08

Nevertheless, we find the referenced cases authoritative and determine that the addition and codification of the driving while intoxicated offense to the Code did not add a culpable mental state as an essential element of the driving while intoxicated offense.

Section 49.04(a) does not require a culpable mental state for DWI, so an indictment need not allege one.

State v. Sanchez · filed 1996-06-20(a)

The State contends that the requirement of a culpable mental state does not apply to the offense of DWI. We agree.

Section 49.04 did not require a culpable mental state for DWI after its 1993 codification in the Penal Code.

Chunn v. State · filed 1996-08-28

We do not believe that the legislature intended to require a culpable mental state for the offense of DWI when it moved the DWI statute from the revised civil statutes to the Penal Code in 1993.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person drove a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, without proof of a culpable mental state.

Burke v. State · filed 1996-08-29

Therefore, the state was only required to prove that appellant was driving a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated without proving a culpable mental state.

Section 49.04 did not require proof of a culpable mental state when the DWI offense was transferred to the Penal Code.

Aguirre v. State · filed 1996-08-29

We do not believe the legislature intended to subvert this purpose by engrafting a culpable mental state onto the statute when it was transferred to Section 49.04 of the Penal Code.

Section 49.04(a) does not require proof of a culpable mental state for driving while intoxicated.

Baugh v. State · filed 1996-09-11(a)

In a case arising under the statutory predecessor to section 49.04, it was held that the legislature did not intend to require proof of a culpable mental state in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated despite the enactment of section 6.02(b). Ex parte Ross , 522 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The holding in Ross is dispositive of appellant's contention.

Section 49.04 does not require a culpable mental state to be alleged or proved for driving while intoxicated.

Jessup v. State · filed 1996-12-05

The Legislature repealed the driving-while-intoxieated statute, and codified the provision in section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code. ... This court and several other courts have addressed this issue and held that a culpable mental state need not be alleged or proved in a driving while intoxicated charging instrument.

Section 49.04 does not require proof of a culpable mental state for a DWI conviction.

Sanders v. State · filed 1996-12-19

However, like our sister courts, we believe Ross to be dispositive and join them in holding that the DWI statute does not require proof of a culpable mental state.

Section 49.04 does not require the State to plead or prove a culpable mental state in a driving while intoxicated prosecution.

Hibdon v. State · filed 1997-01-09(a)

We recently held that the State is not required to plead or prove a culpable mental state in a prosecution under section 49.04.

Section 49.04 does not require proof of a culpable mental state for a DWI conviction.

Sanders v. State · filed 1997-03-26

However, like our sister courts, we believe Ross to be dispositive and join them in holding that the DWI statute does not require proof of a culpable mental state.

Section 49.04 does not require a charging information for driving while intoxicated to allege a culpable mental state.

Allgyer v. State · filed 1997-06-26

Appellant urged at trial, and contends on appeal, that the Penal Code requires the State in its information in driving while intoxicated prosecutions to allege a culpable mental state. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(b) (West 1994). Although appellant makes cogent arguments in his brief, precedent is squarely against him. ... Appellant's point of error is overruled.

Section 49.04 did not require the State to allege or prove a culpable mental state, even before section 49.11 expressly removed that requirement.

Trotter v. State · filed 1997-12-11

We have previously decided this precise issue in Sanders v. State , 936 S.W.2d 436, (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. ref'd) (holding that the DWI statute did not require proof of a culpable mental state even before the enactment of section 49.11). ... We overrule appellant's point of error.

Section 49.04 requires no culpable mental state, so involuntary intoxication is not a defense to driving while intoxicated.

Smith v. State · filed 1998-06-11

The offense of driving while intoxicated does not include as an element a culpable mental state. ... Therefore, the defense of involuntary intoxication is not relevant to the offense of driving while intoxicated.

Involuntary intoxication is not a defense to driving while intoxicated under § 49.04.

Spence v. State · filed 2009-11-05

First, as involuntary intoxication is not a defense to DWI, and the trial court upheld Spence’s conviction, we cannot conclude that the trial court made a contrary finding of involuntary act based solely upon this statement.

Section 49.04 does not permit involuntary intoxication as a defense to driving while intoxicated.

Brown v. State · filed 2009-09-16

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing Brown's request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication because involuntary intoxication cannot be a defense to DWI; accordingly, we overrule Brown's sole issue.

Section 49.04 does not require a culpable mental state, so involuntary intoxication does not warrant a jury instruction in a driving while intoxicated case.

Rounsavall v. State · filed 2010-02-17

Conspicuously absent from the statute defining driving while intoxicated is a requirement for a culpable mental state. ... We agree with our sister courts and find the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's request for a jury charge on the issue of involuntary intoxication.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; blood alcohol results and observations of impairment can establish intoxication.

Marceaux v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-08-20(a)

A person commits the offense of DWI “if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Marceaux committed felony DWI, and, in the course and furtherance of the commission of felony DWI, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life when he collided his vehicle with a vehicle operated by Cole, causing Cole’s death.

Under § 49.04(a), video evidence and an officer’s testimony about a driver’s behavior can support a finding of intoxication even if the jury discounts field-sobriety tests.

Herod v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-09-25(a)

Even if the jury wholly discounted the field-sobriety tests, in this case, the video evidence and Trooper Estrada’s testimony regarding Herod’s presentation and behavior would have been legally sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude that Herod was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) permits a DWI conviction when the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol impaired the driver's normal mental or physical faculties while driving.

Stephens v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-10(a)

From the evidence detailed above, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time Stephens was operating his vehicle, he lacked “the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol.”

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element can be supported by observations of impairment and a blood alcohol test without retrograde extrapolation.

Goodrum Jr. v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-04(a)

Accordingly, given the other evidence of Goodrum’s intoxication, we cannot conclude that the lack of retrograde-extrapolation evidence would preclude a rational factfinder from determining that he committed the charged DWI offense.

The evidence considered in Watson was sufficient to support a conviction for driving while intoxicated under § 49.04(a).

Watson v. State · filed 2019-03-29(a)

The combination of these facts is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for DWI.

Section 49.04’s intoxication element is supported by evidence that alcohol impaired a driver’s normal use of mental or physical faculties.

Moss v. State · filed 2018-03-01

Based on the foregoing evidence of “the usual indicia of intoxication,” we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not have “the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol.”

Section 49.04(a) permits a finding of intoxication while driving based on the evidence considered by the factfinder.

Meadway v. State · filed 2018-11-29(a)

We hold that a rational factfinder could have found that Meadway was intoxicated at the time he was operating his truck on a public highway.

A blood alcohol test taken after driving can help prove intoxication under Section 49.04 without retrograde extrapolation testimony when accompanied by evidence of impairment.

Wyatt v. State · filed 2013-07-12

On the contrary, Wyatt’s BAC test result, which indicated a 0.10 BAC approximately ninety minutes after he drove, during which time he was not in a position to consume more alcohol, was probative evidence that his BAC level while he drove was in excess of 0.08, even absent expert retrograde extrapolation testimony—given the accompanying evidence of impairment already discussed.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; an officer’s observations and the person’s conduct can support a finding of intoxication.

Moore v. State · filed 2012-07-24(a)

To establish the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... The officer's observations, combined with his twice-stated opinion that appellant was intoxicated, sufficiently support the judge's finding appellant was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element can be supported by an officer's observations of impaired balance, slurred speech, the odor of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes.

Chavis Jr. v. State · filed 2012-02-23(a)

Here, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have found that Chavis was intoxicated. Officer Revia's testimony that Chavis fumbled with his driver's license, stumbled when he exited the vehicle, slurred his speech, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot, glassy eyes is all evidence the jury could have properly used to support its verdict.

Section 49.04(a) covers operating a motorcycle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence of lost normal mental or physical faculties from alcohol can establish intoxication.

Rollins v. State · filed 2011-11-09(a)

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and keeping in mind the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that Rollins did not have the “normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol” and was, thus, intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle—his motorcycle.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; an officer’s observations can provide sufficient evidence of intoxication.

Vera v. State · filed 2008-08-29

In order to convict appellant of driving while intoxicated, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. ... Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the aforementioned testimony of Officer Henry Cantu constitutes legally sufficient evidence of appellant's intoxication.

The intoxication element of section 49.04 can be supported by an officer’s observations and field sobriety evidence despite testimony offering other explanations for the driver’s behavior.

Barnett v. State · filed 2008-11-26

A jury found appellant Richard Barnett guilty of driving while intoxicated, third offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2003), § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008). ... Appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence only with respect to the question of his intoxication. ... Having considered all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the jury's verdict was not manifestly unjust.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; witness testimony can establish intoxication.

Reyes v. State · filed 2007-08-14(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... The testimony of the State's witnesses alone was sufficient to enable a jury to conclude that Appellant was intoxicated.

Section 49.04 prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; erratic driving, poor performance on sobriety tests, and slurred speech can support a finding of intoxication.

Jang You v. State · filed 2007-04-26

The jury was free to infer from the evidence, as discussed above, that Appellant's erratic driving, unsatisfactory performance on two out of three sobriety tests, and slurred speech were caused by intoxication.

The circumstances of a traffic stop do not determine whether the defendant was driving while intoxicated.

Benny Hinds v. State · filed 2000-06-22

The circumstances of the stop are irrelevant to the question whether appellant was driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) does not require a field sobriety test to prove driving while intoxicated; other evidence of intoxication must also be considered.

Turner v. State · filed 1999-09-29(a)

First, we note that performance of a field sobriety test is not an element of the offense. Second, if there is any other evidence of intoxication, it must be considered in addition to the evidence regarding the results of the field sobriety test.

Section 49.04’s intoxication element may be established by circumstantial evidence in a probation revocation proceeding, even without an officer’s express opinion that the driver was intoxicated.

Ken Lee Williamson v. State · filed 1996-05-22

We conclude that the element of intoxication was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence in the instant revocation proceeding.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof of actual intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Ex parte Gee · filed 1996-07-03(a)

Here, actual proof of intoxication is required.

A conviction under Section 49.04 may rest on the loss-of-faculties theory when failed field sobriety tests sufficiently establish intoxication, even if admission of breath-test results was erroneous.

Cuevas v. State · filed 1997-01-09

These failures are sufficient evidence of appellant's guilt under the loss of faculties theory. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the admission of the breath test results was harmless and overrule appellant's points of error.

A DWI conviction under § 49.04(a) may be supported by evidence of slurred speech, red eyes, alcohol odor, balance difficulties, and failure of an HGN test.

Reagan v. State · filed 1998-04-30(a)

Under Section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon Supp.1998). ... The evidence supporting the verdict consists of:(1) slurred speech; (2) red eyes; (3) odor of alcohol; (4) balance difficulties; and (5) inability to complete the HGN test. This constitutes some evidence to support the verdict; thus, the legal challenge must fail.

To prove intoxication under Section 49.04(a), the State need not establish the defendant's usual sober abilities.

Moss v. State · filed 1998-05-07(a)

The indictment, which follows the language in section 49.01(2)(A), alleges that appellant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. Appellant would have this Court interpret the allegation to read that appellant did not have his normal use of his faculties. The former allegation requires only that the State prove that it was appellant's mental and physical faculties, and not those of some other person, that were impaired; it does not require proof of appellant's normal abilities.

Section 49.04 does not require the State to establish a defendant’s usual abilities to prove that he lacked normal use of his mental or physical faculties.

Fogle v. State · filed 1999-03-11

We follow the Dallas and Texarkana courts of appeals by holding that the State does not have to establish what the defendant’s normal use of his faculties is in order to prove that he did not have normal use of his mental and physical faculties.

Section 49.04 permits a per se DWI conviction without extrapolation evidence when the jury can reasonably infer the required alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

O'NEAL v. State · filed 1999-06-28

Under section 49.04 of the Penal Code there are “two types of DWI offenses.” ... Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the State is not required to present extrapolation evidence to obtain a conviction for the “per se” type of DWI offense.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish intoxication at the time of an accident.

Fulgium v. State · filed 1999-10-27(a)

To be convicted of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove a person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Based on this evidence, we believe any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense, including that Fulgium was intoxicated at the time of the accident, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Intoxication under § 49.04(a) can be proved by erratic driving, physical signs of drinking, and officer testimony without a breath sample or completed field sobriety test.

Hogan v. State · filed 2000-06-22(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that it is sufficient to prove that Hogan was intoxicated when stopped by Officer Brannum.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; evidence connecting later signs of intoxication to the time of driving can support a conviction.

Stoutner v. State · filed 2001-02-01(a)

To establish the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... After reviewing the entirety of the evidence, and particularly in the absence of any defense evidence, we find the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient for the jury to find that appellant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; intoxication may be proved through loss of normal faculties when the driver refuses a breath test.

Melia Means Mayer v. State · filed 2001-04-26

We hold the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support Mayer's conviction. A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the evidence shows that the person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and failed field sobriety tests combined with other circumstances can prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rodriguez v. State · filed 2001-06-14(a)

The elements of driving while intoxicated include (1) a person; (2) is intoxicated; (3) while; (4) operating; (5) a motor vehicle; (6) in a public place. ... That, combined with other circumstances, leads us to conclude a rational jury could have found the element of intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt.

For a driving-while-intoxicated conviction, the State need not first establish the defendant's normal faculties and then prove a loss of their use.

O'Bryan v. State · filed 2001-06-29(b)

In accord with Fogle and the cases cited therein, we reject appellant's argument that the State first had to establish appellant's normal faculties and then establish whether he possessed normal use of his own faculties at the time in question.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; if the charge alleges both statutory ways to establish intoxication, the State need prove only one.

Eugene Perry, Jr. v. State · filed 2002-02-06(a)

To prove the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must present evidence establishing that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §49.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000). ... In sum, the State was not obligated to prove that appellant had a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more simply because the allegation was mentioned in the information.

Section 49.04 does not require retrograde extrapolation evidence to prove intoxication.

Ball v. State · filed 2002-08-30

The State did not offer retrograde extrapolation evidence nor was such evidence a predicate to prove intoxication as alleged.

To prove driving while intoxicated under section 49.04(a), the State need not establish the defendant's usual use of his mental and physical faculties.

William Hue Moore, Jr. v. State · filed 2003-03-27(a)

The State, however, does not have to establish what the defendant's normal use of his faculties is in order to prove that he did not have normal use of his mental and physical faculties.

Section 49.04 defines driving while intoxicated as one offense; impairment and alcohol concentration are alternative ways to prove intoxication.

Bagheri v. State · filed 2003-11-05

We will go further, and say that the definitions contained in § 49.01 set forth alternate means by which the State may prove intoxication, rather than alternate means of committing the offense. The conduct proscribed by the Penal Code is the act of driving while in a state of intoxication. That does not change whether the State uses the per se definition or the impairment definition to prove the offense.

Section 49.04 requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; intoxication may be proved under either the impairment or per se theory.

Owens v. State · filed 2004-04-22

To establish the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Accordingly, after reviewing all of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt appellant was intoxicated, under either the “impairment” or “per se” theory.

Section 49.04 permits intoxication through loss of normal mental or physical faculties to be proved without a breath test or retrograde extrapolation evidence.

Letner v. State · filed 2004-06-09

Unlike blood alcohol content, use of mental and physical faculties is patently observable and does not absolutely require scientific testing in order to be established.

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element can be proved by the arresting officer’s opinion testimony alone.

Morgan v. State · filed 2005-02-10(a)

Opinion testimony by the arresting officer is, without more, sufficient to prove appellant’s intoxication.

An officer’s opinion can be sufficient to prove the intoxication element of driving while intoxicated under § 49.04(a).

Mitchell v. State · filed 2005-04-28(a)

Appellant challenges only the intoxication element, and the opinion of Rouen alone is sufficient to prove that element.

Section 49.04 permits a DWI conviction without evidence of a blood-alcohol level when other evidence proves the driver was intoxicated.

Spradling v. State · filed 2004-11-04

A person commits the offense of DWI if he or she operates a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. ... Though there is no evidence of Spradling's blood-alcohol level either at the time of the offense or shortly thereafter, we believe a rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Spradling was intoxicated at the time he was driving.

To prove intoxication under § 49.04, the State need not establish the defendant’s usual level of mental or physical functioning.

McKenzie v. State · filed 2006-02-23

The State, however, is not required to show what McKenzie’s normal mental or physical faculties are.

Section 49.04’s intoxication element can be proved through witness accounts of erratic driving and signs of impairment.

Dudley v. State · filed 2006-09-06

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol.

Evidence of alcohol odor, slurred speech, trouble balancing, refusal of sobriety testing, and combative behavior can support the intoxication element of § 49.04(a).

George Allan Shackelford A/K/A George Allan Shackleford v. State · filed 2005-10-19(a)

Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, and that the evidence contrary to the verdict is not so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. The evidence was factually sufficient.

Section 49.04(a) makes operating a vehicle in a public place while intoxicated a DWI offense; evidence of impaired balance, slurred speech, alcohol odor, and refusal of sobriety testing can support a conviction.

McCown v. State · filed 2006-03-02(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he operates a vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. ... Officer Darren Vercruysse, the arresting officer, testified that McCown had a difficult time maintaining his balance. He also observed that McCown's eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred and delayed, and he smelled of alcohol. Additionally, Vercruysse stated that McCown refused to perform a field sobriety test or to provide a breath specimen for testing. Viewing the foregoing evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party and giving due deference to the fact finder's determinations, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support McCown's conviction for driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04’s intoxication element may be supported by field sobriety test results, admissions of drinking, and refusal of a breath test.

Winslow v. State · filed 2006-05-11

Additionally, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Appellant’s own words support the finding of intoxication. Appellant told Sergeant Williamson that he had had “a couple of beers” and testified that he had had two to four beers at a club that evening and had refused the breath test because he was afraid that he would fail it. Consequently, based on the applicable standards of review, (footnote: 5) we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction, overrule his two points, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof of intoxication for a driving while intoxicated conviction.

Bagby v. State · filed 2007-03-08(a)

Conversely, the State was required to prove Bagby was intoxicated to convict her of DWI.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a vehicle in a public place; an experienced officer’s testimony can establish intoxication.

Moreno v. State · filed 2008-02-07

Here, the State was required to show that appellant was intoxicated while operating a vehicle in a public place. ... The testimony of an experienced officer is sufficient, however, to establish the element of intoxication.

Section 49.04(a) does not require evidence of impaired driving; observations after a traffic stop can support a DWI conviction.

Conger v. State · filed 2008-08-01(a)

There is no requirement that the officer must observe signs of intoxication while Conger was driving his vehicle. The traffic offense that serves as a predicate for the initial detention need not show impairment in order for Conger to be arrested and convicted of DWI.

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element can be proved by evidence that the driver lacked the normal use of mental or physical faculties.

Myers v. State · filed 2008-10-28(a)

We find the evidence factually sufficient to support the element of intoxication on the theory appellant did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element may be proved by evidence of alcohol use despite evidence that the driver also took medication.

Gordon v. State · filed 2009-04-28(a)

The suggestion that these drugs caused appellant's intoxication does not predominate over the evidence of his alcohol use. The jury's determination that appellant was intoxicated by alcohol was not manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person drove or operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a public place; circumstantial evidence can establish who drove.

Villa v. State · filed 2009-05-29(a)

To sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, the State must show that appellant (1) drove or operated a motor vehicle; (2) while intoxicated; (3) in a public place. ... Although there is no direct evidence that appellant was the person who drove the Taurus to its resting place in the apartment complex’s landscaping, we find the circumstantial evidence both legally and factually sufficient to allow the jury to infer that fact.

A DWI conviction under § 49.04 may be supported by factually sufficient evidence of intoxication even without HGN test results.

Montgomery v. State · filed 2009-07-31

Furthermore, even without the HGN test results, the jury was provided with factually sufficient evidence to support Montgomery's DWI conviction.

The intoxication element of a D.W.I. offense under § 49.04(a) may be proved through the combined evidence of officer observations, sobriety tests, breath readings, and the driver's admissions.

Wiley v. State · filed 2009-08-13(a)

In the present case, significant evidence indicates Wiley's intoxication: Trooper Zarate's observations, Wiley's admission of drinking four beers, the videotape wherein Wiley fails all three sobriety tests, the on-site breathalyzer reading of 0.09, the results of 0.069 and 0.065 at the jail, and the retrograde extrapolation explanation provided by the expert witness. ... Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could have found the element of intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element may be supported by reckless driving, impaired speech and balance, bloodshot eyes, and alcohol in the vehicle, even without a noticeable odor of alcohol.

Brice v. State · filed 2009-12-17(a)

the previously-discussed affirmative evidence of intoxication, namely Brice's reckless driving, unsteadiness, slurred speech, slow response time, glassy, bloodshot eyes, and the presence of a cold, partially-empty bottle of alcohol in Brice's car. ... In sum, we conclude that the evidence of Brice's intoxication was not so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, nor was the jury's verdict against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.

Evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, and failed sobriety tests can support intoxication under § 49.04 despite a claimed sleep disorder.

Lindley v. State · filed 2010-02-03

A witness observed Lindley driving for a significant distance with his right turn signal on. ... Lindley then began to swerve on and off the road, varied speeds significantly, and was driving so erratically that the witness signaled other drivers to warn them away and called the police. ... Viewing all of the evidence neutrally, we cannot say that the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to render the verdict manifestly unjust.

An arresting officer’s observations and opinion can provide sufficient evidence of intoxication under § 49.04.

Garza v. State · filed 2010-05-12

To support a DWI conviction, the evidence must show that Garza drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a public road, street, highway, or alley. ... The testimony of Officer Bishop, outlined above, regarding his opinion that Garza was intoxicated is sufficient to establish intoxication.

Section 49.04(a) does not require the State to prove which substance caused the driver’s intoxication.

Ouellette v. State · filed 2010-05-20(a)

The substance that causes intoxication is not an element of driving while intoxicated, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a), and thus, the State can prove intoxication without proof of the type of intoxicant, see Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Section 49.04(a) supports a driving while intoxicated conviction when evidence shows that alcohol, drugs, or their combination impaired the driver's normal mental or physical faculties.

Hennings III v. State · filed 2010-06-23(a)

Based on this evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a combination thereof into his body, and thus was intoxicated. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). The evidence is therefore legally sufficient.

An arresting officer’s testimony alone can prove intoxication under § 49.04(a).

Rowland v. State · filed 2010-06-29(a)

Thus, Officer Rhodes's testimony alone is sufficient evidence for the State to satisfy its burden of proof.

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element was supported by the officer’s observations, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission that he had been drinking.

Thrasher v. State · filed 2010-06-30(a)

Appellant failed three field sobriety tests. Appellant refused a breath test. It was Hartman’s opinion that Appellant was intoxicated. ... Measured against the appropriate standards of review, the evidence is clearly both legally and factually sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.

Signs of impairment and poor field sobriety performance can support intoxication under § 49.04(a) despite evidence of physical conditions affecting the tests.

Riquelmy v. State · filed 2010-08-04(a)

Viewing the entire record in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Riquelmy was intoxicated. Even considering the evidence that, several years earlier, Riquelmy had been treated for a cervical neck strain, that he had sustained an ankle/foot injury the year before, and that, some months after the incident, Riquelmy was diagnosed with polyarthritis, the jury was free to—and did—conclude that Riquelmy’s poor performance on the field sobriety tests was the result of intoxication, not any underlying physical condition.

Intoxication in a driving while intoxicated prosecution may be established through field sobriety tests and breath alcohol results above 0.08.

Bolen v. State · filed 2010-08-24

Further, his performance on the FSTs indicated that he was impaired. And the Intoxilyzer results showed that he had a breath alcohol concentration above the legal limit of 0.08. Based on such evidence, the jury could have rationally concluded that appellant was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) does not require the State to prove which substance caused intoxication.

Ouellette v. State · filed 2010-08-27(a)

The substance that causes intoxication is not an element of driving while intoxicated, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a), and thus, the State can prove intoxication without proof of the type of intoxicant, see Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Officer observations and field sobriety tests can support intoxication under § 49.04 without a blood alcohol test.

Lopez v. State · filed 2010-08-27(a)

Based on his observations and the results of the field sobriety tests he conducted, Sotello concluded that appellant was intoxicated. Appellant's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is also relevant as evidence of intoxication. (18) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that appellant was driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) does not require testimony expressly stating that the driver lacked the normal use of mental or physical faculties to prove intoxication.

Peltier v. State · filed 2010-12-09(a)

There is no requirement that the State elicit specific testimony that a defendant “did not have the normal use of his [or her] mental or physical faculties” in order to prove intoxication.

Section 49.04 permits a DWI conviction when evidence of drug use and impaired behavior supports a finding that the driver was intoxicated.

Denson v. State · filed 2011-03-24

Because we cannot reevaluate and weigh the credibility of the evidence, we hold that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Smith‘s version of events, when coupled with Dr. Springfield‘s testimony about the effects of Alprazolam and Officer Gilbert‘s testimony about Denson‘s demeanor, are legally sufficient to support the trial court‘s intoxication finding and Denson‘s DWI conviction.

Section 49.04(a) allows intoxication to be proved by loss of normal mental or physical faculties due to alcohol; proof of a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more is not required under that theory.

Jones v. State · filed 2011-12-02(a)

But here, the indictment required that the State prove that Jones did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of introduction of a substance, not that his BAL was 0.08 or more.

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element can be proved through observations of impairment, field sobriety tests, and breath tests showing alcohol above the legal limit.

Moreno v. State · filed 2013-10-09(a)

When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to prove Moreno was intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; officer observations can establish intoxication without field sobriety tests.

Brister v. State · filed 2013-10-16(a)

To prove that a person is guilty of driving while intoxicated, the State must prove that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2012). ... Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the jury’s finding that Brister was driving his car in a public place while intoxicated is supported by legally sufficient evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.01(2)(A), 49.04(a).

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence of impaired behavior and drinking can support a finding of intoxication.

Cardenas v. State · filed 2014-08-06(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if she: (1) is intoxicated, (2) while operating a motor vehicle, (3) in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a)(West 2011). ... Taken as a whole, this evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant was intoxicated.

Section 49.04 permits a DWI conviction when sufficient evidence establishes that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Perkins v. State · filed 2014-11-07

Under the Penal Code, an individual commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he operates “a motor vehicle in a public place” while he is intoxicated. ... we cannot conclude that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that Perkins was intoxicated.

A § 49.04(a) conviction may rest on proof of impairment even if the evidence does not establish per se intoxication.

Lerma v. State · filed 2015-04-23(a)

Accordingly, even if the evidence was insufficient to establish “per se” intoxication, the conviction was nevertheless supported by sufficient evidence.

Circumstantial evidence can prove intoxication under § 49.04(a).

Hoyt, Clifton Crews · filed 2015-08-06(a)

In light of all of the evidence previously summarized as well as the reasonable inferences that the district court could have made from that evidence and given our standard of review for legal-sufficiency challenges, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the district court’s determination that Hoyt was intoxicated.

Evidence of intoxication at the time of operation supported a DWI conviction under § 49.04(a).

Uy v. State · filed 2015-06-30(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he or she is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... We conclude the record contains more than sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; failed field sobriety tests and a breath alcohol concentration above 0.08 can support a finding of intoxication.

Elizondo v. State · filed 2015-10-29(a)

Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the State, we conclude that a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Elizondo was intoxicated while driving because he failed the field sobriety tests and because his blood alcohol concentration was well above the legal limit of 0.08.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and evidence independent of the defendant’s admissions can establish intoxication.

Hoff v. State · filed 2016-10-19(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence independent of Hoff’s extrajudicial statements or admissions that supports the jury’s finding that Hoff was intoxicated.

Section 49.04 allows the State to prove driving while intoxicated through either an elevated alcohol concentration or impairment; it need not prove the driver’s exact BAC if other evidence establishes intoxication.

White v. State · filed 2016-10-27

However, the State did not need to prove appellant’s BAC; it could prove intoxication under either theory.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle, and circumstantial evidence can establish that the intoxication coincided with the driving.

Paciga v. State · filed 2016-11-02(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have concluded that Paciga was intoxicated at the time she was driving and that her intoxication caused the Toyota’s collision with the chain link fence.

Intoxication for driving while intoxicated may be proved through circumstantial evidence of impaired driving and behavior together with evidence of a controlled substance in the driver’s blood, without expert testimony about the substance’s effects.

Carrasco v. State · filed 2018-01-04(a)

The jury, as the factfinder, could have reasonably inferred Carrasco’s loss of the normal use of his mental and physical faculties—as demonstrated by his erratic driving, his physical appearance, and his answers to Officer Gordon’s questions—was due to the methamphetamine in his system because the lab results showed that the illegal form of methamphetamine was the only controlled substance in Carrasco’s blood. ... Expert testimony was thus not necessary.

A driving while intoxicated conviction under § 49.04(a) can rest on circumstantial evidence without field sobriety testing or a blood or breath test.

Cervantes v. State · filed 2018-03-21(a)

First, we disagree that field sobriety testing or the results of a blood or breath test are required to be admitted in a trial involving a charge of driving while intoxicated before a jury is authorized by the evidence to find a defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a) does not require proof of the particular substance that caused the driver's intoxication.

Darrell Hardy Lacy v. State · filed 2019-01-16(a)

But, as we have noted above, the State can prove intoxication without proof of an intoxicant.

A DWI conviction under the impairment theory does not require scientific evidence of intoxication.

Buck v. State · filed 2019-07-10(a)

While Buck argues the State failed to obtain a sample and test her blood when investigating her offense, the State is not required to introduce scientific evidence in a DWI case when using the impairment theory of intoxication in the defendant’s trial.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element may be proved through impairment from alcohol without evidence of blood-alcohol content.

Carpenter v. State · filed 2019-08-08(a)

The record before us contains sufficient evidence to support a finding of intoxication under that theory.

Section 49.04(a) permits a DWI conviction based on impaired mental or physical faculties even when a later breath test measures below 0.08.

Coffey v. State · filed 2019-08-21(a)

He may not have been at the presumptive statutory level of .08, but his appearance, his smell of alcohol, his performance on the field sobriety tests, the force with which he struck another car at an intersection and his having a breath alcohol concentration of .073 was enough to show he lacked the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol.

Section 49.04(a) permits proof of intoxication through an experienced officer’s observations without blood alcohol concentration or field sobriety test evidence.

Longoria-Leal v. State · filed 2019-11-20(a)

We hold the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the verdict. “Evidence of blood alcohol concentration or field sobriety tests is not necessary to sustain a conviction for DWI.”

Section 49.04(a) does not require blood or breath testing to prove intoxication.

Stroud v. State · filed 2020-02-21(a)

Although Stroud correctly points out that no alcohol testing was performed in this case, that type of testing is not required to prove intoxication. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.04.

Section 49.04(a) allows intoxication to be proved through impairment evidence, including lay testimony, without a toxicology report or video recording.

Ex Parte Michael Anthony Anderson v. State · filed 2021-02-11(a)

Still yet, intoxication under the impairment theory may be established through a lay witness’s testimony. ... A toxicology report or a videotaped recording of the alleged DWI offense is not required.

Breath test results may support an inference of intoxication when driving under § 49.04(a) even without retrograde extrapolation.

Ortiz v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-07-28(a)

Thus, despite the absence of any retrograde extrapolation, Appellant’s breathalyzer results tend to make it more probable than not that he was intoxicated at the time he drove under either definition of intoxication because the test results provided evidence that he had consumed alcohol.

Section 49.04(a) does not require retrograde extrapolation evidence to prove intoxication; the evidence as a whole may establish that the defendant was intoxicated when he operated a car.

Terrance Odel Cruder, Jr. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-05(a)

Further, nothing in the DWI statutory framework specifically mandates extrapolation evidence. ... Although Cruder contends that additional or different evidence was needed to properly support his conviction, we conclude, given our standard of review and the inferences that the trial court was free to make from the evidence, that the evidence presented and summarized above was sufficient to establish that he was intoxicated at the time he operated his car.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that alcohol, drugs, or another substance caused the driver to lack the normal use of mental or physical faculties.

United States v. Hambright · filed 2019-12-09(a)

Furthermore, contrary to Hambright’s assertions, the record shows that the magistrate judge held the Government to its burden of proving that Hambright lacked “the normal use of her mental or physical faculties” by reason of having used “alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance.”

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence of alcohol use, impaired behavior, and failed sobriety tests can support a conviction.

Ernesto Munoz, Jr. v. State · filed 1997-02-27

A person who drives and operates a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated commits the offense of driving while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 1994). ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold it is legally sufficient to support finding Munoz guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Ernesto Munoz, Jr. v. State · filed 1997-07-03

A person who drives and operates a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated commits the offense of driving while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 1994). ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold it is legally sufficient to support finding Munoz guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a) permits a DWI conviction based on evidence such as erratic driving, slurred speech, alcohol odor, balance difficulties, and empty beer containers.

Sneed v. State · filed 1998-03-11(a)

Under Section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” ... We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict: (1) the accident itself, where Sneed runs into, a car parked in the owner’s driveway and then accuses the owner of causing the accident; (2) slurred speech; (3) red eyes; (4) odor of alcohol; (5) balance difficulties; and (6) empty containers of alcohol in the truck. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict.

Section 49.04(a) permits a driving-while-intoxicated conviction when corroborated admissions and evidence from the accident scene allow a rational factfinder to find the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Purvis v. State · filed 1999-10-27(a)

Purvis’ admissions were corroborated by evidence that Purvis was found alone and passed out in her pickup, with the lights on and the doors shut, after it appeared that the pickup had gone off the road and through a pipe fence. ... When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that from this record, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04 prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and evidence of impaired driving and physical condition can support a conviction.

Unwin v. State of Texas · filed 2000-04-13

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of guilt, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; weaving, alcohol odor, and failed sobriety tests can support a conviction despite evidence of medical conditions affecting the tests.

Hale v. State · filed 2003-04-17

Viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we have determined that sufficient evidence exists supporting each element of the offense of DWI and that manifest injustice has not occurred.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Joshua James Carl Jamieson A/K/A Joshua Jamieson v. State · filed 2003-04-17(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... From the evidence presented, we conclude the jury could have found the necessary elements of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public area while intoxicated.

Weast v. State · filed 2003-06-19(a)

A person commits the offense of DWI if the person operates a motor vehicle in a public area while intoxicated. ... After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for DWI.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence that the driver was intoxicated at the time of driving can support a conviction.

Landers v. State · filed 2003-06-26(a)

Based on appellant’s own admission to Dr. Nguyen that she took 15 tablets of Propacet at about 7 p.m. that night, and the observations of the independent eyewitnesses — Baxter, the three peace officers, and Dr. Nguyen — we conclude the evidence was factually sufficient to support the finding that she was intoxicated while operating her vehicle at the time of the accident.

Section 49.04 makes it an offense to operate a vehicle while intoxicated in a public place.

Ford v. State · filed 2003-11-05

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he operates a vehicle while intoxicated in a public place. Tex. PeN.Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon Supp. 2003). ... Thus, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 49.04(a) requires intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; witness observations shortly after driving can support a finding that the driver was intoxicated while driving.

Summers v. State · filed 2004-06-02(a)

Based on the testimony presented by Gregus and the tattoo shop owner, the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant was operating the car while intoxicated at the time of the accident.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

High v. State · filed 2004-06-24

To prove that appellant committed the offense of DWI, the State had to show that appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for DWI.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; observations of driving and intoxication can support a finding that the driver was intoxicated while driving.

Dunn v. State · filed 2004-08-19(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the proof of Appellant’s guilt is not so obviously weak as to undermine our confidence in the jury’s determination and that the evidence is factually sufficient to show Appellant’s identity as the driver and that he was intoxicated both at the time of the accident and when apprehended.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Vasquez v. State · filed 2005-05-18(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... After reviewing all the record evidence under Johnson , 23 S.W.3d at 11, and without substituting our own judgment, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

Section 49.04(a) makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Aguilera v. State · filed 2005-05-31(a)

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Having found the evidence sufficient, we overrule Point of Error Two.

Evidence of unsafe driving, alcohol odor, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and inability to complete field sobriety tasks can support a conviction under § 49.04(a).

Rios v. State · filed 2005-10-19(a)

Day testified that he stopped appellant after he witnessed appellant perform an unsafe and illegal U-turn. While talking to appellant, Day testified that he smelled alcohol on appellant's breath and saw that appellant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. These factors led Day to conduct three field sobriety tasks on appellant. Appellant refused or was unable to complete any of these tasks. Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that it was legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; evidence of drinking before driving and impairment shortly afterward can establish intoxication at the time of driving.

Farnen v. State · filed 2006-04-27(a)

The evidence is legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was intoxicated at the time she drove her vehicle.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.

Harris v. State · filed 2006-08-17(a)

To support appellant’s conviction for felony DWI, the State was required to prove appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and he had two prior convictions for DWI. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2). ... As the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

Evidence of alcohol use, impaired behavior, failed sobriety tests, and a breath test above 0.08 can support a driving while intoxicated conviction when no evidence shows that medication affected the tests.

Fields v. State · filed 2006-11-28(a)

The evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State presented evidence that Fields smelled of alcohol very soon after the accident, that Fields admitted to having consumed alcohol, and that field sobriety tests indicated that Fields was intoxicated. The Intoxilyzer test revealed her blood alcohol content was in excess of .08.

Section 49.04 makes it DWI to operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence of impaired driving and alcohol use can support a conviction even when field sobriety tests are disputed.

Fried v. State · filed 2007-03-01

A person commits the crime of DWI if he operates a motor vehicle in a public place while not having the normal use of his mental and/or physical faculties because he has ingested alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or any combination of those items. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2) (Vernon 2003) (defining "intoxication"), § 49.04. ... Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

Section 49.04(a) prohibits operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and evidence of failed sobriety tests and an alcohol concentration above 0.08 can support a conviction.

Perez v. State · filed 2007-05-16(a)

Accordingly, we find that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that Perez was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person drove or operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a public place; officer observations and field sobriety tests can support a finding of intoxication.

Charalambopoulos v. State · filed 2007-05-31(a)

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant drove or operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 49.04 requires proof that a person operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; evidence that alcohol deprived the driver of normal mental or physical faculties can support a conviction.

Ward v. State · filed 2007-05-31

Based on the above evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of introduction of alcohol into his body, and thus was intoxicated. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for driving while intoxicated.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element can be supported by evidence that a driver lost the normal use of mental or physical faculties because of alcohol or marihuana.

Bowen v. State · filed 2007-06-14(a)

After reviewing all the evidence both supporting and contradicting the jury's verdict, we cannot say the great weight of the evidence is against the jury's finding that, at 8:49 a.m. on February 10, 2004, when he was stopped for the traffic violation, Bowen had lost the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol and/or marihuana into his system.

Evidence of impaired driving, alcohol use, poor sobriety tests, and admissions can establish intoxication under § 49.04(a) despite an unsupported medication explanation.

Latshaw v. State · filed 2007-07-26(a)

A person commits the offense of DWI if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. ... Giving due deference to the fact-finder’s determination that appellant was intoxicated, and after considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence was factually sufficient to uphold this finding.

Section 49.04(a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

Garcia v. State · filed 2007-08-28(a)

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). ... After objectively reviewing all of the evidence presented in this case, and applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the verdict of guilt.

Evidence of poor field sobriety performance, alcohol odor, flushed appearance, and slurred speech can support a finding of intoxication under Section 49.04.

Lidge Henry Tidwell, Jr. v. State · filed 2007-10-10

The evidence is legally sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tidwell was intoxicated and, thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

Section 49.04 prohibits operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; observations of impairment, field-sobriety performance, and refusal to provide a breath sample can support a conviction.

Ferguson v. State · filed 2007-10-18

Thus, there is evidence to support the jury's verdict that Ferguson operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

A DWI conviction under Section 49.04 can rest on evidence that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a public place after drinking enough alcohol to lose the normal use of mental or physical faculties.

Roberts v. State · filed 2007-11-21

Viewing the State's evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury had before it evidence that suggested Roberts (1) had operated a motor vehicle, (2) in a public place, (3) at a time period when he had lost the normal use of his mental and/or physical faculties, (4) because he had consumed one or more alcoholic beverages. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04. Such evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case.

Evidence can support a conviction under Section 49.04 even when the driver performs some parts of field-sobriety tests correctly.

Martin Booker, Jr. v. State · filed 2008-02-28

In this case, there is evidence from the arresting officer that, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to support the finding of guilt. The fact that there is also evidence that Booker did not fail the tests in all respects shows only that there was a question for the jury to decide.

Section 49.04(a)’s intoxication element can be supported by the combined evidence of erratic behavior, physical signs of alcohol use, failed sobriety tests, and other circumstances.

Dukes v. State · filed 2008-04-03(a)

Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 49.04(a)'s intoxication element may be proved by an arresting officer's testimony about the driver's observed signs of intoxication.

Rhodes v. State · filed 2008-06-26(a)

The arresting officer's testimony was sufficient to establish the element of intoxication.

Failed field sobriety tests and officers' observations can support a conviction for driving while intoxicated under § 49.04(a) without a breathalyzer result.

Hall v. State · filed 2008-07-16(a)

A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). ... The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict.

Evidence of erratic driving, signs of alcohol use, swaying, and refusal of sobriety tests can support a conviction under § 49.04.

McDonald v. State · filed 2008-08-27

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). ... Therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and overrule McDonald’s sole point.