Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001 requires a specific statutory ground for termination and a finding that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re TRR · filed 1998-11-12

Neither the Roths's original petition nor the court's judgment recite any of the statutory grounds for termination set out in section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code. ... Because the petition failed to state any statutory ground for the termination, and the decree failed to delineate any statutory basis for the termination, we find appellant established a prima facie meritorious defense.

Section 161.001 requires a finding of a listed ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest; the petition and decree must identify a statutory ground.

In the Interest of T.R.R. · filed 1998-11-12

Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code sets out the proof necessary for an involuntary termination of parental rights. First, there must be a finding that the parent has committed one or more of eighteen enumerated acts and second, that the termination is in the best interest of the child. ... Because the petition faded to state any statutory ground for the termination, and the decree failed to delineate any statutory basis for the termination, we find appellant established a prima facie meritorious defense.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct, including conduct before the child's birth, endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

Willis v. Misti Dawn Hendrix F/K/A Misti Dawn Willis and Joel Hendrix · filed 1999-07-15(1)(E)

We hold that the evidence, including the imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of J.P.W. The trial court's basis for termination under section 161.001(1)(E) is supported by the evidence.

Legally and factually sufficient evidence under both subsections (1)(D) and (E) supported termination.

In the Interest of Tidwell · filed 2000-11-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

We find both legally and factually sufficient evidence to justify the trial court’s action in terminating Tidwell’s parental rights pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Subsection (1)(D) permits termination for a single endangering act or omission, while (1)(E) requires a course of conduct.

In the Interest of R.G. · filed 2001-10-31(1)(D), (1)(E)

Subsection (D) permits termination based upon a single act or omission, while subsection (E) requires a “course of conduct.”

Section 161.001(D) concerns endangering conditions or surroundings, while subsection (E) concerns endangering conduct; at least ten jurors must agree on a ground for termination.

in the Interest of B.L.D. and B.R.D., Children · filed 2001-05-23(D), (E)

The statutory purpose for “D” and “E” focuses on different types of acts or omissions on which termination can be based. “D” relates to “conditions or surroundings,” while “E” relates to “conduct.” Otherwise, the subsections would be redundant and would not have been set forth separately. Evidence sufficient to prove one is not necessarily sufficient to prove another. We conclude that these two grounds are more like separate offenses in the criminal law than different means. To comport with due process, they cannot be submitted in the disjunctive, at least not without sufficient instructions to require the jury to agree by ten or more jurors which ground, if any, was committed by each parent with respect to each child.

Subsections (D) and (E) state distinct grounds for termination, and at least ten jurors must agree on a ground for each parent and child.

In Re BLD · filed 2001-08-08(D), (E)

The statutory purpose for "D" and "E" focuses on different types of acts or omissions on which termination can be based. "D" relates to "conditions or surroundings," while "E" relates to "conduct." Otherwise, the subsections would be redundant and would not have been set forth separately. Evidence sufficient to prove one is not necessarily sufficient to prove another. We conclude that these two grounds are more like separate offenses in the criminal law than different means. To comport with due process, they cannot be submitted in the disjunctive, at least not without sufficient instructions to require the jury to agree by ten or more jurors which ground, if any, was committed by each parent with respect to each child.

Subsections (D) and (E) establish distinct grounds for termination: one concerns endangering conditions or surroundings, and the other concerns endangering conduct.

In the Interest of B.L.D. · filed 2001-07-18(D), (E)

The statutory purpose for “D” and “E” focuses on different types of acts or omissions on which termination can be based; “D” relates to “conditions or surroundings,” while “E” relates to “conduct.” Otherwise, the subsections would be redundant and would not have been set forth separately. Evidence sufficient to prove one is not necessarily sufficient to prove another. We conclude that these two grounds are more like separate offenses in the criminal law than different means.

Under subsections (1)(D) and (E), a child’s injury alone does not establish that a parent knowingly exposed the child to danger when the evidence does not show who caused the injury or that the parent knew of it.

In Re DP · filed 2001-11-28(1)(D) and (E)

Resultantly, absent knowledge of who injured D.P., a finding that Cordell knowingly placed or allowed him to be subject to an unsafe environment or circumstances is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. After reviewing all the evidence and applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the evidence supporting termination of Cordell's parental rights has not been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence and is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.

When termination rests on knowingly placing a child in danger under subsections (1)(D) or (E), an unexplained injury does not establish the parent's knowledge by clear and convincing evidence.

in the Interest of Dekota Podzemny, a Child · filed 2001-11-28(1)(D) and (E)

We next consider the Department's remaining contentions that under section 161.001(1) (D) and (E), Cordell acted "knowingly," which resulted in endangerment to D.P. ... Resultantly, absent knowledge of who injured D.P., a finding that Cordell knowingly placed or allowed him to be subject to an unsafe environment or circumstances is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Under subsections (1)(D) and (E), endangering conduct need not be directed at a particular child to support termination of parental rights to that child.

Virginia Trevino and Juan Trevino v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-01-10(1)(D), (E)

Virginia's argument that there was no evidence to support termination of her relationship with K.T. fails because it is not necessary for the injuring conduct to be directed at K.T. to terminate the parent-child relationship.

Section 161.001 permits termination based on a parent's endangering conduct or knowingly allowing children to remain in endangering surroundings.

In the Interest of A.F. · filed 2002-10-30(D), (E)

The Department pled that Jack and Annette each (a) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being, and (b) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed each child with a person who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of that child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(D), (E) (Vernon 2002). The evidence shows that Jack sexually abused A.F. over a period of years and that Annette knew about it. This evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that Jack engaged in conduct which endangered the emotional well-being of all three children and that Annette allowed them to remain in surroundings which endangered their emotional well-being.

Under § 161.001(D) and (E), sexual abuse of one child can support a finding that the abuser endangered all the children and that a parent who knew of the abuse allowed them to remain in endangering surroundings.

In Re AF · filed 2002-10-30(D), (E)

The evidence shows that Jack sexually abused A.F. over a period of years and that Annette knew about it. This evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that Jack engaged in conduct which endangered the emotional well-being of all three children and that Annette allowed them to remain in surroundings which endangered their emotional well-being.

Subsections (1)(D) and (1)(E) allow termination for endangering conditions or conduct; the conduct need not be directed at the children or cause actual injury.

In the Interest of N.K. and D.T.K., Children · filed 2003-02-05(1)(D), (1)(E)

In order for parental conduct to constitute endangerment of the children’s well-being, the conduct need not be directed at the children and the children need not actually suffer injury. Rather, endanger means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent's conduct endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re JITP · filed 2003-02-27(1)(E)

"Endanger," under section 161.001(1)(E), means to jeopardize or expose the child to loss or injury. ... After considering the entire record, we hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a finding that J.I.T.P.'s parents engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; domestic violence and self-harm risks may support an endangerment finding.

In the Interest of J.I.T.P. · filed 2003-02-27(1)(E)

“Endanger,” under section 161.001(1)(E), means to jeopardize or expose the child to loss or injury. ... After considering the entire record, we hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a finding that J.I.T.P.’s parents engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination for endangering conditions or surroundings, while subsection (E) permits termination for a parent's conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re NR · filed 2003-03-21(1)(D), (1)(E)

Specifically, under subsection (D), a fact-finder could readily have reached the necessary firm conviction or belief that N.R. was placed and allowed to remain in an environment that endangered both her physical and emotional well-being. Likewise, under subsection (E), a fact-finder could readily have reached the necessary firm conviction or belief that Rogers' conduct, including selling drugs and excessive physical abuse to N.R. and others, endangered N. R.'s physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers dangerous living conditions, while subsection (1)(E) covers a parent’s conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of N. R., a Child · filed 2003-03-21(1)(D), (E)

Specifically, under subsection (D), a fact-finder could readily have reached the necessary firm conviction or belief that N.R. was placed and allowed to remain in an environment that endangered both her physical and emotional well-being. Likewise, under subsection (E), a fact-finder could readily have reached the necessary firm conviction or belief that Rogers’ conduct, including selling drugs and excessive physical abuse to N.R. and others, endangered N. R.’s physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001’s endangerment grounds may be supported by evidence of conduct and living conditions that put children’s physical or emotional well-being at risk.

in the Interest of Stacy Ann Uvalle and Vannessa Uvalle Minor Children · filed 2003-03-25(1)(D), (1)(E)

Additionally, here the initial act that brought appellant to the attention of the Department was not the sole basis supporting a finding of endangerment. ... Under this record, the evidence is sufficient that the jury, as factfinder, could reasonably form a firm conclusion or belief about the truth of the Department’s allegations.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) provide endangerment grounds for termination when a parent knowingly leaves children in dangerous surroundings or engages in endangering conduct or knowingly places them with people who do.

in the Interest of W.J.H., Jr., J.J.H., D.D.H., and D.N.H., Children · filed 2003-06-19(1)(D), (E)

Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that ... Evelyn knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that Evelyn engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. The evidence is thus factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings on the conduct grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to dangerous surroundings, while (1)(E) covers the parent’s endangering conduct or knowing placement of the child with a person who endangers the child.

In re of D.J. · filed 2003-03-28(1)(D), (1)(E)

Subsection (D) allows termination where the parent knowingly places or knowingly allows the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical and emotional well-being of the child. ... Subsection (E) allows termination where the parent engages in conduct or knowingly places the child with persons who engage in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child. ... We conclude the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated under sections 161.001(D) or (E) of the family code.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination based on a parent's own endangering conduct or the parent's knowing exposure of a child to the other parent's endangering conduct.

In Re BLD · filed 2003-07-03(1)(D), (1)(E)

These allegations permitted termination based not only on each parent's own conduct endangering the children, but upon each parent's knowing exposure of the children to one another's endangering conduct.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires an environment that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, while subsection (1)(E) requires endangering parental conduct or knowingly placing the child with someone who engages in such conduct.

In the Interest of J.A. · filed 2003-07-09(1)(D), (1)(E)

To terminate parental rights under subsection D, the environment must endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Under subsection E, the parent must have engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering surroundings or conduct, and termination is in the child’s best interest.

In Re WJH · filed 2003-06-19(1)(D), (1)(E)

Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that "the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction" [51] that Evelyn knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that Evelyn engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow a parent’s knowing exposure of a child to the other parent’s endangering conduct to establish a ground for termination.

In the Interest of B.L.D. · filed 2003-07-03(1)(D), (E)

The petition alleged grounds of endangerment against each of the Dosseys. These allegations permitted termination based not only on each parent’s own conduct endangering the children, but upon each parent’s knowing exposure of the children to one another’s endangering conduct.

Section 161.001 permits termination when a parent knowingly places a child in endangering surroundings or engages in conduct that endangers the child, if termination is also in the child's best interest.

In Re JA · filed 2003-07-09(1)(D) & (E)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury findings that Mother engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of J.A. and N.A. and that Mother knowingly placed J.A. and N.A. in surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers knowingly allowing a child to remain in endangering living conditions, while (1)(E) covers endangering conduct, including a parent's failures to act.

In the Interest of J.W. · filed 2003-08-18(1)(D), (1)(E)

We conclude this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that David and Susan knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.W. and D.S.G. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.W. and D.S.G. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses a child’s endangering environment, while (1)(E) addresses a parent’s endangering conduct.

in the Interest of H. M. A., a Child · filed 2003-08-28(1)(D), (1)(E)

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's findings that appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination based on endangering conduct or knowingly exposing a child to endangering conditions or people.

Carr v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-01-08(1)(D), (E)

As for Carr’s second issue, we have held that sufficient evidence supports the termination of her parental rights to K.C. and D.B. based on findings under section 161.001(1)(D) or (E), that she either engaged in conduct or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children.

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires evidence of conduct endangering the child; imprisonment and probation violations alone are insufficient.

in the Interest of S. Z. G., a Child · filed 2003-07-31(1)(E)

Because imprisonment, together with Kelly's deliberate acts resulting in violation of her probation, were the only grounds for terminating her parental rights, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding of termination based upon section 161.001(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses endangering living conditions, while (1)(E) addresses endangering conduct, including a parent's acts and failures to act.

In Re JW · filed 2003-08-18(1)(D), (1)(E)

We conclude this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that David and Susan knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.W. and D.S.G. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.W. and D.S.G. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed a child in endangering conditions or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

In Re SJG · filed 2003-12-11(1)(D), (E)

We hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant knowingly placed S.J.G. in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical and emotional well-being and that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered S.J.G.'s physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers knowingly leaving a child in endangering conditions, while subsection (E) covers conduct or placement with a person whose conduct endangers the child.

In Re NH · filed 2003-12-23(1)(D), (1)(E)

We further find, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence is such the trial court could reasonably have resolved that dispute in favor of its findings under Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. Hence, we find the evidence in support of the court's findings pursuant to those provisions of the Family Code both legally and factually sufficient.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering surroundings or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

in the Interest of S.J.G., a Child · filed 2003-10-09(1)(D), (1)(E)

We hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant knowingly placed S.J.G. in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical and emotional well-being and that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered SJ.G.’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) provide grounds for termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to an endangering environment or engages in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.T.G., H.N.M., Children · filed 2003-10-16(1)(D), (E)

Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that P.G. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes an enumerated ground, including endangering surroundings or conduct, and termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of J.T.G., H.N.M., M.D.M., B.M.L., Children · filed 2003-10-16(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, because we conclude there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings under family code section 161.001, subsections D and E, we need not address P.G.’s remaining points with respect to the jury’s findings under section 161.001, subsections 0 and P.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly allows children to remain in dangerous conditions or knowingly places them with someone whose conduct endangers their physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of N.H., B.H., J.H., P.H., E.C., and A.D.C., Minor Children · filed 2003-12-02(1)(D), (1)(E)

Nonetheless, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we find the evidence of a continued abusive environment in the home was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to form a firm belief or conviction that Pavla knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that she knowingly placed her children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being. We further find, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence is such the trial court could reasonably have resolved that dispute in favor of its findings under Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. Hence, we find the evidence in support of the court’s findings pursuant to those provisions of the Family Code both legally and factually sufficient.

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers endangering surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) covers a parent's deliberate course of endangering conduct.

In Re DC · filed 2004-01-29(1)(D), (E)

The record contains ample evidence to support the findings under subsection (D) (environmental endangerment) and subsection (E) (course of conduct endangerment of the physical or emotional well-being of the children). ... We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the first prong of the trial court's findings under family code section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses endangerment from a child’s surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) addresses endangerment from a parent’s course of conduct.

in the Interest of D.C., A.C. and H.M. · filed 2004-01-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the first prong of the trial court’s findings under family code section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering conditions or engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s well-being.

in the Interest of K.A.S., J.G.S. and W.S., II · filed 2004-02-05(1)(D), (1)(E)

Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that both Father and Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that they also engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when sufficient evidence shows that a parent endangered a child through the parent's conduct or by knowingly allowing the child to remain in endangering conditions or with endangering persons.

Carr v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-03-04(1)(D), (1)(E)

As for Carr’s second issue, we have held that sufficient evidence supports the termination of her parental rights to K.C. and D.B. based on findings under section 161.001(1)(D) or (E), that she either engaged in conduct or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination based on a single act or omission involving endangering conditions or surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) requires a course of endangering conduct.

In Re TH · filed 2004-03-09(1)(D), (1)(E)

Subsection (D) permits termination based on a single act or omission, while subsection (E) requires a "course of conduct."

Section 161.001 permits termination for knowingly placing a child in dangerous conditions or for a course of conduct that endangers the child, but those grounds require clear and convincing evidence.

In the Interest of T.H., a Child · filed 2004-03-09(1)(D), (1)(E)

There is legally insufficient evidence on which the trial court could have found John knowingly placed or allowed T.H. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being. ... There is legally insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that John either engaged in conduct or placed T.H. in the care of those whose conduct posed a danger to her well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in endangering surroundings or engages in conduct that endangers the child.

Asjes v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-04-15(1)(D), (E)

The summarized evidence is legally sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to form a firm belief or conviction that Christopher had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed M.A. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being, and that Christopher had engaged in conduct or had knowingly placed M.A. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered M.A.'s physical or emotional well-being.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) provide grounds for termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that parents knowingly kept children in an endangering environment or engaged in endangering conduct.

In Re KAS · filed 2004-03-11(1)(D), (E)

Because we conclude there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings under family code section 161.001(1)(D) and (E), we need not address Father's and Mother's remaining points with respect to the trial court's finding under section 161.001(1)(O).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) do not require expert medical testimony to prove endangerment.

In Re KW · filed 2004-04-15(1)(D), (1)(E)

We decline to hold that expert medical testimony is mandatory in a suit seeking to terminate parental rights under section 161.001(1)(D) or (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) do not require expert medical testimony to prove endangerment.

in the Interest of K.W. · filed 2004-04-15(1)(D), (1)(E)

We decline to hold that expert medical testimony is mandatory in a suit seeking to terminate parental rights under section 161.001(1)(D) or (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when factually sufficient evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed children to endangering conditions or engaged in endangering conduct.

in the Interest of C.R.W., B.W., and A.N.W., Children · filed 2004-12-09(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, based on the appropriate standard of review, (footnote: 4) we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Sunshine knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 requires evidence of a termination ground, such as knowingly leaving a child in endangering surroundings, and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of A.M., a Child · filed 2004-07-08(1)(D), (2)

we hold that this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant knowingly placed or allowed A.M. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her emotional and physical well-being. ... We hold that this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in A.M.’s best interest.

Subsection (1)(E) permits termination for a parent's endangering conduct even if the conduct is not directed at the parent's child and the child suffers no actual injury.

In Re SF · filed 2004-07-23(1)(E)

"Endangerment," as used in subparagraph (1)(E) of Section 161.001, means exposure to loss or injury. It is not a requirement that the conduct be directed at the parent's child, or that the child actually suffer injury.

Under § 161.001, evidence of a parent's conduct endangering her children can support termination when the factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief in the allegations.

in Re Ashley Gutierrez by and Through Her Next Friend, Michelle Cordova, Relator · filed 2004-09-08(1)(D), (1)(E)

Termination requires the Department to establish one of the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. ... Under this record, the evidence is sufficient that the jury, as factfinder, could reasonably form a firm conclusion or belief about the truth of the Department's allegations.

Section 161.001 requires proof of only one predicate ground for termination, along with a finding that termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of B.L.D. and B.R.D., Children · filed 2004-09-15(1)(D), (1)(E)

The grounds for termination are listed in section 161.001 of the Family Code. ... After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, although a finding on only one predicate act is necessary, we find that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury = s finding that Jimmy and Spring committed both predicate acts as alleged.

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a court to consider a parent’s conduct both before and after a child’s birth when deciding whether the parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of S.M.L.D., a Child · filed 2004-09-23(1)(E)

In determining whether a parent has engaged in a course of conduct endangering a child, we may look at the conduct both before and after the child’s birth.

Evidence of unsafe living conditions and a course of parental conduct that endangers a child can support termination under subsections (1)(D) and (E).

Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2004-09-30(1)(D), (1)(E)

We find that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient, under the standards that we have outlined, to support the termination of Charley’s parent-child relationship under Section 161.001(1)(D) & (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination based on endangering surroundings or conduct, including knowingly leaving children with a person whose conduct endangers them.

in the Interest of P.A. and C.A., Children · filed 2004-10-21(1)(D), (1)(E)

After a review of the entire record, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support a finding that appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed her children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) make knowingly exposing a child to dangerous conditions or conduct grounds for termination when supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re JL · filed 2005-04-08(1)(D), (E)

Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and recognizing that the jury is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Bettina (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.L. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered J.L.'s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows an endangerment finding based on a parent's acts or omissions, including neglect.

In Re BT · filed 2004-12-16(1)(E)

Endangerment can occur through both the acts and omissions of a parent, and parental neglect can be as dangerous to a child's well-being as direct abuse.

Section 161.001(1)(E) covers endangerment through a parent’s acts or omissions, including neglect that jeopardizes a child’s well-being.

in the Interest of B.T., M.J.R.B., T.B., and M.T., Children · filed 2004-12-16(1)(E)

Endangerment can occur through both the acts and omissions of a parent, and parental neglect can be as dangerous to a child’s well-being as direct abuse. ... We have reviewed the record extensively, and under the applicable standard of review, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re JW · filed 2005-01-13(1)(E)

Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, both in favor of and contrary to the trial court's judgment, we conclude that there is factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Smith engaged in a course of conduct endangering J.W.'s physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed children in endangering surroundings or engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Hernandez v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2005-03-10(1)(D), (1)(E)

The evidence in this case constitutes clear and convincing proof that Hernandez knowingly placed his children in harmful circumstances and engaged in conduct that endangered their physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers knowingly placing a child in endangering surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) covers a deliberate course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of J.I., a Child · filed 2005-05-05(1)(D), (1)(E)

Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that C.I. knowingly placed J.I. in harmful circumstances and engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

A parent's repeated criminal acts and physical abuse may establish endangering conduct under subsection (1)(E), although imprisonment alone does not.

Arnell Ronald Manning, Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2005-05-12(1)(E)

Under subsection E, the Department had to prove that Manning (1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.M. with persons who engaged in conduct (2) which endangered her physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). ... The jury could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that Manning's actions constituted endangerment.

Section 161.001(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in endangering surroundings, while subsection (E) requires an endangering course of parental conduct.

In Re SML · filed 2005-07-26(D), (E)

He went to jail and did nothing to prevent S.M.L. from remaining alone in an unfit home environment with a mentally unstable mother who was unable to care for her, thus supporting termination under subsection D. ... After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in a course of conduct that endangered S.M.L.'s physical or emotional well-being, thus supporting termination under subsection E.

Subsection (D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in an endangering environment; subsection (E) permits termination for a parent's course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of S.M.L. · filed 2005-07-26(D), (E)

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and disregarding all evidence a reasonable factfin-der could have disbelieved and also reviewing the disputed evidence in light of the entire record, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant knowingly allowed S.M.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being. ... After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in a course of conduct that endangered S.M.L.’s physical or emotional well-being, thus supporting termination under subsection E.

Subsection (1)(E) permits consideration of a parent’s conduct toward other children before the child’s birth when evaluating endangerment.

In the Interest of S.A.P. · filed 2005-06-22(1)(E)

As outlined above, Texas case law holds that pre-birth conduct toward other children is relevant under subsection 161.001(1)(E). We thus reject Scott’s request to contravene this body of law, to ignore all pre-birth conduct toward other children, and to sustain his no-evidence issue on this basis.

Section 161.001(1)(D)-(E) permits an endangerment finding based on a parent's drug use, including drug use during pregnancy that harms the child.

In Re KGM · filed 2005-07-27(1)(D)-(E)

Appellant used cocaine and marijuana while pregnant with W.F.M. and one of her other children, not the subject of the suit, so that W.F.M. had cocaine and marijuana in his body at birth. W.F.M. had medical problems, including breathing problems, as a result of Appellant's drug use during pregnancy. ... Under this standard of review we have determined that the jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant endangered W.F.M. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. §§ 101.007, 161.001(1)(D)-(E); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) require proof of past endangerment through the child's surroundings or the parent's conduct; possible future endangerment alone is insufficient.

In Re JR · filed 2005-07-28(1)(D) and (E)

The unambiguous language of subsection 161.001(1)(D) requires proof of Crystal's knowing exposure of the children to an endangering environment in the past. ... In any event, the unambiguous language of subsection 161.001(1)(E) requires proof of endangerment by Crystal's past conduct, not by possible future conduct.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) require clear and convincing evidence of past endangerment through the child’s environment or the parent’s conduct; possible future harm alone is insufficient.

In the Interest of J.R. and B.R. · filed 2005-07-28(1)(D) and (E)

But the trial court cannot break the ties between a parent and child without clear and convincing evidence supporting one of the grounds listed in subsection 161.001(1). ... On this record, we conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E), and we sustain Crystal’s first issue.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in endangering surroundings or engages in conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of M v. a Child · filed 2005-08-04(1)(D), (1)(E)

Based on the evidence before us and the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally (footnote: 5) and factually (footnote: 6) sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Adrienne knowingly placed or knowingly allowed M.V. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being and that Adrienne engaged in conduct or knowingly placed M.V. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) provide grounds for termination when a parent knowingly exposes children to endangering conditions or engages in conduct that endangers them.

in the Interest of E v. and I.S v. Jr., Children · filed 2005-08-25(1)(D), (E)

Based on the evidence before us and the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally (footnote: 6) and factually (footnote: 7) sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Sarah knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that Sarah engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being through the child's surroundings or the parent's conduct.

In Re Dn · filed 2005-08-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

As is evident from the nature of appellants' points, the Texas Family Code provides that a parent's rights may be terminated if they are guilty of the type of conduct described in their points. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(D) & (E) (Vernon 2002). ... After reviewing the evidence considered by the judge, we are satisfied it is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trial judge a firm belief or conviction sufficient to justify his findings supporting his termination of appellants' parental rights. Otherwise stated, the evidence before the judge was clear and convincing.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes endangerment through the child’s surroundings or the parent’s conduct and shows termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of D.N., K.N. and C.N., Children · filed 2005-08-29(D), (E)

As is evident from the nature of appellants’ points, the Texas Family Code provides that a parent’s rights may be terminated if they are guilty of the type of conduct described in their points. ... After reviewing the evidence considered by the judge, we are satisfied it is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trial judge a firm belief or conviction sufficient to justify his findings supporting his termination of appellants’ parental rights.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed children with people whose conduct endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of T.J.R. and S.R. · filed 2005-08-31(1)(E)

Accordingly, we find the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Riggins engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to endangering conditions or engages in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being, if termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of W.D.W. · filed 2005-09-22(1)(D), (1)(E)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Mother and Father engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child or knowingly placed the child in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) support termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in dangerous surroundings or knowingly places the child with someone whose conduct endangers the child.

in the Interest of C.T.S., a Child · filed 2006-02-08(1)(D), (E)

From this evidence, we hold that a “reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” that Robbins knowingly placed or allowed C.T.S. to remain in dangerous conditions or surroundings and that Robbins engaged in conduct or knowingly placed C.T.S. with someone who engaged in conduct which endangered C.T.S.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination based on a parent's own endangering conduct or knowing exposure of the child to the other parent's endangering conduct.

In Re KMH · filed 2005-12-08(1)(E)

The allegations permitted termination based not only on each parent's own conduct endangering K.M.H., but upon each parent's knowing exposure of K.M.H. to the other parent's endangering conduct. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002). Consequently, evidence regarding Hoback's conduct could tend to prove the grounds supporting Kite's termination, and vice versa.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, even if the conduct was directed at someone else.

Cyphers v. State · filed 2005-12-30(1)(E)

Rather, if the evidence shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the emotional well-being of the child, a finding under section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) require endangerment to a child’s well-being, but do not require proof that the child was actually injured.

in the Interest of T.D.L., T.L.C., T.D.L., and Z.D.L., Children · filed 2006-02-09(1)(D), (1)(E)

Subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) only require endangerment to the children’s physical and emotional well-being, which may be inferred from Wytasha’s misconduct standing alone.

Subsection (1)(D) covers knowingly placing children in endangering conditions, while subsection (1)(E) covers a deliberate course of parental conduct that endangers them.

in the Interest of T.J., D.J., and M.J., Children · filed 2006-03-30(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings on endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses danger from a child’s environment, while (1)(E) addresses danger from a person’s conduct.

Fox v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-03-30(1)(D)-(E)

Under subsection (D), the danger to the child results from the child’s environment, while under subsection (E), a person’s conduct is the source of the danger to the child. ... The evidence is thus legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings regarding child endangerment.

Sexual abuse of another child living in the home can be legally sufficient evidence of endangerment under § 161.001(1)(E).

In Re EAK · filed 2006-04-06(1)(E)

This properly considered evidence supports the conclusion that Mustofa molested J.J. while she was living in his home and under his care and while E.A.K. was also present in the home. Consequently, we find that it constituted legally sufficient evidence of endangerment to E.A.K. to support the jury's finding of termination.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof of endangering conditions or surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct.

Ruiz v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-11-02(1)(D)–(E)

We further hold that the trial court erred in terminating Ruiz’s parental rights on the ground that she violated section 161.001(1)(D). ... The evidence of Ruiz’s narcotics use, together with the other evidence cited by DFPS, simply does not establish “a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct” sufficient to support a termination finding under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly placed or left a child in living conditions that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re SK · filed 2006-08-15(1)(D)

After reviewing all the evidence under both the legal and factual sufficiency standards, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in conduct and Father knowingly placed the children with a person who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of Sh. and Sa. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination based on endangering surroundings or conduct when the evidence supports the ground and termination is in the child’s best interest.

Willie A. Milton, 561014 v. Doug Dretke, Director, TDCJ-CID · filed 2006-09-28(1)(D)-(E)

we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that McHorse engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes endangerment under subsection (1)(D) or (E) and shows that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of S.W., a Child · filed 2006-10-19(1)(D), (1)(E)

After carefully reviewing the entire record, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and giving due consideration to the evidence that the trial court, as factfinder, could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that the court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Regina knowingly placed S.W. in conditions and engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) require legally sufficient evidence that the parent knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions or engaged in endangering conduct.

Walker v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2006-12-21(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally insufficient for a reasonable fact finder to form a "firm belief or conviction" that Walker either (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. We further hold that the trial court erred in terminating Walker's parental rights on the ground that he violated section 161.001(1)(D), (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of endangering conduct.

Ruiz v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2007-02-06(1)(D), (1)(E)

We further hold that the trial court erred in terminating Ruiz’s parental rights on the ground that she violated section 161.001(1)(D). ... We further hold that the trial court erred in terminating Ruiz’s parental rights on the grounds that she violated section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof of dangerous conditions or surroundings, while (1)(E) addresses a parent's endangering conduct or knowing placement of a child with someone who endangers the child.

In Re JAJ · filed 2007-05-10(1)(D), (1)(E)

Under this subsection, the inquiry focuses on dangerous surroundings or circumstances in which the parent knowingly places or allows her child to remain. ... We find the evidence legally insufficient to support the termination of appellant's parental rights under section 161.001(1)(D) of the Family Code. ... Subsection (E) permits termination of parental rights where the parent has either: (1) personally engaged in conduct which endangers the child; or (2) knowingly placed the child with another person who engaged in dangerous conduct. ... Utilizing the standards heretofore articulated, we find the evidence both legally and factually insufficient to support a termination of parental rights under section 161.001(1)(E) of the Family Code.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) permit termination for knowingly placing a child in endangering conditions or engaging in a sustained course of endangering conduct.

in the Interest of S.A., Z.A., and S.A., Children · filed 2007-05-17(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding on environmental endangerment and course of conduct endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent endangers a child through the child's surroundings or through a deliberate course of conduct; prolonged drug use and related instability can support those findings.

In Re TNS · filed 2007-06-27(1)(D), (E)

Applying the appropriate standard of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we find the evidence of Smith's behavior supports the trial court's findings that Smith violated subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent endangers a child through the child's surroundings or through the parent's conduct.

In Re MR · filed 2007-12-13(1)(D), (E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Mother (1) engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of M.R. and W.M. and (2) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings under section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) require factually sufficient evidence of endangering conditions or parental conduct to support termination.

in the Interest of J.P., Minor Child · filed 2008-02-04(1)(D), (E)

Having determined that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the judge’s findings under family code section 161.001(1)(D) and (E), we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

Section 161.001(E) covers parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.K.H., a Child · filed 2007-12-13(E)

Adopting the analysis we have previously provided regarding chronic drug use and endangerment, (footnote: 2) and applying the appropriate standards of review, (footnote: 3) we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent exposes a child to dangerous surroundings or engages in an endangering course of conduct.

in the Interest of M.Y., a Child · filed 2008-01-24(1)(D), (1)(E)

Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Mother (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed M.Y. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed M.Y. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly places children in endangering surroundings or engages in an endangering course of conduct.

in the Interest of K.W. and M.A. · filed 2008-02-28(1)(D), (E)

Giving due consideration to evidence that the fact-finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Natasha knowingly placed K.W. and M.A. in conditions and engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering surroundings or engaged in endangering conduct.

In Re MCT · filed 2008-03-06(1)(D), (E)

The evidence is thus legally sufficient to support the trial court's termination findings under subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) of the family code.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering conditions or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

in the Interest of M.C.T., a Child · filed 2008-03-06(1)(D), (1)(E)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a fact-finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed M.C.T. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being and that Appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed M.C.T. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered M.C.T.’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or leaves a child in endangering surroundings; subsection (1)(E) permits termination for a parent’s endangering conduct.

in the Interest of L.A., A.R., S.A.H., and D.S.L.H., Children · filed 2008-05-22(1)(D), (1)(E)

Paragraph (D) of family code section 161.001(1) authorizes termination if a parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being, and paragraph (E) authorizes termination if a parent engaged in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in endangering conditions or engages in, or knowingly exposes the child to, endangering conduct.

in the Interest of O.L.A., K.B., and P.B., III · filed 2008-03-13(1)(D), (E)

Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing , we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, and that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) establish endangerment grounds that may be proved by a parent’s repeated drug use, criminal activity, and instability.

in the Interest of A.L.W., Minor Child · filed 2008-04-17(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent endangers a child through unsafe surroundings or a deliberate course of conduct.

in the Interest of B.L.M., S.B.M., R.A.M., J.W.M.M., J.P.B.R., and L.S.S.R. · filed 2008-04-24(1)(D), (E)

Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Bobbie violated family code sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E). We further hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the findings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow endangerment to be shown through actions or failures to act.

Derrick Lumpkin, Sr. and Geneva Herrera v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-06-12(1)(D), (E)

We note that endangerment can be exhibited by both actions and failures to act. ... Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Lumpkin’s and Herrera’s legal and factual sufficiency issues, and hence the appeals, to be frivolous.

Subsections (1)(D) and (1)(E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows endangerment arising from a child’s surroundings or a parent’s conduct, respectively.

in the Interest of M.C. and D.K., Children · filed 2008-06-12(1)(D), (1)(E)

The evidence is thus legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s family code section 161.001(1)(D) or (E) findings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly leaves children in an endangering environment or engages in conduct that endangers their well-being.

in the Interest of R.L. and A.L., Children · filed 2008-07-31(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, because the evidence at trial was legally and factually sufficient to support the termination of Appellant’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E), we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for knowingly placing a child in dangerous surroundings or engaging in an endangering course of conduct, when termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of D.B. · filed 2008-06-26(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding on environmental endangerment and course of conduct endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination on endangerment grounds when a parent exposes a child to unsafe surroundings or engages in a course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of H.H. and H.H., Children · filed 2008-07-24(1)(D), (1)(E)

The evidence established that Hollie allowed Jane to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered her physical and emotional well-being and that her continuous drug use constituted conduct that endangered both Jane’s and Mary’s physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to an endangering environment or engages in a course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of T.H. and R.R.H., Children · filed 2008-11-06(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) findings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent's conduct and the child's environment endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.L.W. · filed 2008-11-20(1)(D), (1)(E)

Reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment, and assuming that the trial court resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if it could have reasonably done so, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that both Mother’s conduct and her environment endangered J.L.W.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly keeps children in endangering surroundings or engages in conduct that endangers them.

in the Interest of J.W. and N.W., Children · filed 2008-11-26(1)(D), (1)(E)

Based on the foregoing evidence before the court and under the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to sustain the court’s findings that Teresa knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.W. and N.W. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that Teresa engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.W. and N.W. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves children in endangering surroundings or engages in a course of conduct that endangers their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.M., M.M., and M.M., Children · filed 2008-12-11(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding on environmental endangerment and course of conduct endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) provide termination grounds for knowingly exposing children to endangering conditions or engaging in an endangering course of conduct.

in the Interest of M.M.F., J.J.F., and E.F. · filed 2008-12-18(1)(D), (1)(E)

Giving due deference to the trial court’s findings , we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Michael knowingly placed Matt, John, and Eric in conditions and engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering conditions or conduct.

in the Interest of C.W., a Child · filed 2009-01-22(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, the evidence, under a clear and convincing standard, is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that M.H. endangered C.W. under section 161.001(1)(D), and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent exposes children to endangering conditions or people or engages in conduct that endangers their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.F., J.J., and J.J., Children · filed 2009-03-26(1)(D), (1)(E)

Having carefully reviewed the entire record, giving due deference to the factfinder, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Brandy knowingly placed John, Julie, and Jennifer in conditions, or engaged in conduct, that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being and also knowingly placed the children with a person whose conduct endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves children in endangering surroundings or engages in endangering conduct, if termination is also in their best interest.

in the Interest E.J.C. and R.A.C., the Children · filed 2009-04-02(1)(D), (1)(E)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we hold that the jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Andrew placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings and engaged in endangering conduct or knowingly left the children with persons who engaged in endangering conduct.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed children to endangering conditions or engaged in an endangering course of conduct.

in the Interest of B.B. and B.B., Children · filed 2009-05-07(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings on environmental endangerment and course of conduct endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering conditions or conduct when supported by clear and convincing evidence.

in the Interest of A.O., a Child · filed 2009-06-25(1)(D), (E)

In light of the above evidence, we hold that the trial court was entitled to make its family code subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) findings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to endangering surroundings or follows a deliberate course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of D.R.J., a Child · filed 2009-07-08(1)(D) and (E)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of T.W.’s parental rights to D.R.J. under section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses endangering surroundings, while subsection (1)(E) addresses a parent’s voluntary, deliberate course of endangering conduct.

in the Interest of A.D., a Child · filed 2009-09-10(1)(D), (1)(E)

Because the evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) is interrelated, we conduct a consolidated review. (footnote: 6) Applying the appropriate standard of review, (footnote: 7) we hold that, based upon our review of the record, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings regarding Mother under subsections (D) and (E). Also applying the appropriate standard of review, (footnote: 8) we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support those findings.

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a deliberate course of crime, imprisonment, drug use, and family violence to support an endangerment finding.

Walker v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2009-10-09(1)(E)

The evidence presented with respect to Walker’s pattern of crime, imprisonment, drug use, and violence against family members demonstrates a deliberate course of conduct from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Walker endangered WJ.W.’s emotional and physical well-being. When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Walker engaged in a deliberate course of conduct that endangered W.J.W. under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of B. W. B., a Child · filed 2009-10-29(1)(E)

Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, however, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief that the father engaged in a course of conduct that endangered B.W.B.’s physical or emotional well-being, thus supporting termination under subsection E.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of E.I.T. · filed 2009-11-05(1)(E)

Based on the evidence before it, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Mother had engaged in conduct that endangered Son’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows endangering surroundings or an endangering course of parental conduct.

in the Interest of M.F., a Child · filed 2009-12-31(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s environmental endangerment and course of conduct endangerment findings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in endangering conditions or engages in conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of J.M. · filed 2009-12-31(1)(D), (E)

Applying the applicable standards of review, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for a factfinder to reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent violated section 161.001(1)(D), (E) by knowingly placing or knowingly allowing the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child and engaging in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001 permits termination based on endangering conduct or knowingly allowing a child to remain in an endangering environment when termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of K.W., a Child · filed 2010-01-14(1)(D), (1)(E)

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment, and assuming the trial court resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if it could have reasonably done so, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant’s conduct endangered K.W. and that Appellant knowingly allowed K.W. to remain in an endangering environment by ignoring Mother’s drug use both before and after K.W.’s birth.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent endangers children through their surroundings or a course of conduct, including sustained drug use, drug dealing, and leaving them with a parent who uses drugs.

in the Interest of E.H., E.W., and E.H. · filed 2010-02-11(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s endangerment findings.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly places the child, endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Melton v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-02-25(1)(E)

Despite Melton’s denials, we conclude that a jury considering the accumulated evidence could reasonably form a firm belief that Melton engaged in conduct or knowingly placed E.M. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered E.M.’s physical and emotional well-being. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support an affirmative finding under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered a child through the child's surroundings or the parent's conduct.

in the Interest of Z.J.L. and X.T.L., Children · filed 2010-07-01(1)(D), (E)

Applying the appropriate standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, (footnote: 5) we hold that, based upon our review of the record, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings regarding Appellant under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed children to dangerous conditions or engaged in a course of conduct that endangered them.

in the Interest of T.S., B.S., B.S., and T.S., Children · filed 2010-11-10(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is both factually and legally sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under subsections 161.001(D) and (E) as to both parents.

Section 161.001(1)(D) addresses an environment that endangers a child, while subsection (E) addresses endangering parental conduct, including a failure to act.

State v. Smith · filed 2010-12-23(1)(D), (E)

Moreover, a reasonable factfinder could have resolved all disputed evidence in the Department’s favor and could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that statutory grounds for termination existed under sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) of the family code. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence as to both of these statutory grounds for termination.

Section 161.001(1) requires only one predicate ground to support termination of parental rights.

in the Interest of D.S., N.S., Children · filed 2011-01-25(1)

If multiple predicate grounds are found by the trial court, we will affirm based on any one ground because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights.

Section 161.001(1) requires only one predicate ground for termination when termination is also found to be in the child's best interest.

In Re KW · filed 2011-02-18(1)

Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest.

Under subsections (1)(D) and (E), endangerment does not require conduct directed at the child or actual injury to the child.

In the Interest of M.V. · filed 2011-06-03(1)(D), (E)

“Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize; it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. ... Applying the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother engaged in the conduct enumerated in section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination for endangering living conditions or an endangering course of parental conduct when the evidence is legally and factually sufficient.

in the Interest of Z.A.S., a Child · filed 2011-08-25(1)(D), (1)(E)

We thus hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to Z.A.S. under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) concern endangering conditions or conduct; a prior termination based on a parent’s inability to understand basic parenting skills does not establish either ground.

Stonewall Financial Services Corporation, Douglas W. Brady and the Law Offices of Douglas W. Brady, PC, D/B/A Brady & Co · filed 2012-02-08(1)(D), (E)

Because the stated reasons for the prior termination do not fit within subsections (D) and (E) of Section 161.001, there is no proof of ―aggravated circumstances‖ relating to the prior termination.

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes an endangering environment or a parent's endangering conduct.

in the Interest of D. G., N. K., and C. K., Children · filed 2012-03-01(1)(D), (1)(E)

Based upon the evidence, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant knowingly placed or allowed the children to be placed in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, or that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with a person who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent exposed a child to endangering surroundings or engaged in endangering conduct.

in Re M.T.W., A.N.W., and S.M.W., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2011-12-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

Thus, considering the entire record, including evidence both for and against the termination finding, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that J.L.C. committed the acts or omissions listed in Family Code section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) address an environment that endangers a child and a parent’s endangering course of conduct, respectively.

in the Interest of N.B.B.C. and J.A.A.J., Children · filed 2012-01-12(1)(D), (1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under subsections 161.001(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination based on endangering living conditions or a parent’s endangering course of conduct when the evidence meets the clear and convincing standard.

in the Interest of H.N.H. J.L.H., Jr. And J.N.H., the Children · filed 2012-01-12(1)(D), (E)

We thus hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to H.N.H.; J.L.H., Jr.; and J.N.H. under subsections (D) and (E).

Subsections (D) and (E) cover endangering conditions or conduct; findings about a parent's poor understanding of parenting skills do not establish either ground.

In Re Allen · filed 2012-02-08(1)(D), (E)

Because the stated reasons for the prior termination do not fit within subsections (D) and (E) of Section 161.001, there is no proof of “aggravated circumstances” relating to the prior termination.

Under § 161.001(1)(D) and (E), repeated domestic violence, resulting deportation, and failure to contact or support children can support findings of endangering conditions and an endangering course of conduct.

G.L.C. and R.R. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-03-01(1)(D), (1)(E)

Viewing the evidence of repeated acts of domestic violence, resulting in convictions and, ultimately, deportation, along with evidence of failure to contact or support the children, in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Raymond engaged in a course of conduct and placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly placed the child, endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S.I.H., a Child · filed 2012-03-15(1)(E)

Despite the conflicting evidence, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Steven with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for conduct that endangers a child’s emotional well-being even if the conduct is not directed at the child and causes no physical harm.

Maxwell v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-03-23(1)(E)

The statute does not require that the endangering conduct be directed at the child or cause physical harm; rather, it is sufficient if the conduct endangers the child’s emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permits endangerment findings based on a parent’s drug use, criminal activity, and domestic violence; temporary incarceration alone is insufficient.

in the Interest of A.C.H. and C.L.W., Children · filed 2012-04-19(1)(D), (E)

Thus, the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E) of section 161.001 are not based solely on Father’s temporary incarceration but are supported by his history of drug use, criminal activity, and domestic violence.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including when impaired memory leads to improper administration of needed medication.

E. J. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-05-03(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support termination of appellant’s parental rights under section 161.001(1 )( E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent endangers a child through the child's surroundings, the parent's conduct, or the conduct of people with whom the parent knowingly places the child.

Mason v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-05-17(1)(D), (1)(E)

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's finding and assuming that the jury resolved disputed facts in favor of that finding, we conclude that the above evidence is legally sufficient to support the termination of Mason's parental rights under either subsection (D) or (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow endangerment findings when the evidence permits a firm conviction or belief that a parent exposed children to endangering surroundings or engaged in endangering conduct.

in the Interest of D.A.T., K.J.T., T.D.T., and S.S.T., Children · filed 2012-05-31(1)(D), (1)(E)

After reviewing the entire record, we hold that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that Father had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who had engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children or that Father had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when evidence of drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, incarceration, and an unstable caretaker supports findings of an endangering environment and endangering conduct.

in the Interest of A.P.S., J.D.R., J.C.H., Children · filed 2012-05-21(1)(D), (1)(E)

Considering the patterns of drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, Barbara's suicidal tendencies, John's extended incarceration, and the unstable environment the convergence of all these factors created, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's findings on the grounds for termination set forth in both subsections (D) and (E) of Section 161.001(1).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination for endangering a child through the child's surroundings or a parent's conduct; proof of either ground is sufficient.

in the Interest of W.B.W., a Child · filed 2012-07-12(1)(D), (E)

Although the Department had to establish only one ground for termination, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under either ... subsection (D) or (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(1).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when evidence supports findings that a parent knowingly exposed children to endangering surroundings or conduct.

in the Interest of M.N.M. and W.J.M., Children · filed 2012-06-21(1)(D), (1)(E)

The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that T.M. (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when evidence supports endangering surroundings and endangering conduct findings.

in the Interest of L.L.F., T. L.F., K.D.B., II, A.A.H., and N.C.H., Children · filed 2012-07-19(1)(D), (E)

Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who had engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children and knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.