Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a jury to find endangerment when imprisonment reflects a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child's emotional well-being.

Mincy v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-05-18(1)(E)

If the imprisonment of the parent displays a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, a jury may find that it qualifies as conduct that endangers the emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent pursued a course of conduct endangering the child; the evidence of this parent’s criminal conduct and incarceration was factually insufficient.

In the Interest of D.T. · filed 2000-11-16(1)(E)

On this record, we find that there is more than a scintilla of evidence of endangerment, but that the evidence is factually insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant pursued a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of D.T.

A parent’s imprisonment can support termination when the evidence shows a course of conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.N.R. · filed 1998-07-16(1)(E)

However, if all the evidence, including imprisonment shows a course of conduct that has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well being of the child, a finding under section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of criminal conduct endangers a child's emotional well-being and termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re JNR · filed 1998-08-31(1)(E)

We conclude that Jones' multiple arrests, jail time, and violation of his parole demonstrate a conscious course of conduct that supports the trial court's decision that Jones engaged in conduct that endangers the emotional well being of J.N.R. We further conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support such a finding as well as the finding that termination of Jones' parental rights was in the best interests of J.N.R.

Under Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E), a parent's drug use and resulting instability can endanger a child's physical or emotional well-being through both the child's surroundings and the parent's conduct.

In the Interest of S.D. · filed 1998-09-24(1)(D), (1)(E)

An environment which routinely subjects a child to the probability that she will be left alone because her parents are once again jailed, whether because of the continued violation of probationary conditions or because of a new offense growing out of a continued use of illegal drugs, or because the parents are once again committed to a rehabilitation program, endangers both the physical and emotional well-being of a child. Conduct that results in such disability, and conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability, endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a finding of endangerment based on a parent's course of conduct, including drug abuse and imprisonment.

In Re KC · filed 2000-08-17(1)(E)

A finding under Section 15.02(1)(E) (now Section 161.001(1)(E)) is supportable by evidence, including imprisonment, that shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct, including imprisonment, endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of K.C. · filed 2000-08-17(1)(E)

A finding under Section 15.02(1)(E) (now Section 161.001(1)(E)) is supportable by evidence, including imprisonment, that shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; imprisonment may be considered as part of that course.

in the Interest of S.F., a Child · filed 2000-09-29(1)(E)

If the evidence, including imprisonment, proves a course of conduct that has the effect of endangering the child, the requirement of 161.001(1)(E) is met.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow illegal drug use to support termination on endangerment grounds.

Johnette Langford and Joseph Langford v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-03-30(1)(D), (1)(E)

Illegal drug use will support a finding of termination under section 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Subsection (1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of a course of conduct that endangers the child; criminal conduct resulting in imprisonment alone is insufficient.

In Re DT · filed 2001-01-25(1)(E)

We do not read the supreme court's decision in Boyd as requiring us to accept TDPRS's argument that, merely because a parent voluntarily, willfully, and consciously engages in conduct that she knows may result in imprisonment, such conduct and resulting imprisonment are sufficient to support termination of her parental rights.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a finding of endangerment when a parent provides a controlled substance to a pregnant mother and the resulting prenatal exposure causes the child health problems.

In the Interest of U.P., a Child · filed 2003-04-17(1)(E)

We — like our sister court in M.J.M.L.— hold evidence that a parent provided a controlled substance to the mother while the child was in útero, resulting in health problems emanating solely from the presence of that substance in the child’s blood during gestation, is clear and convincing evidence of conduct endangering the physical well-being of a child under Family Code § 161.001(1)(E).

Drug use during pregnancy that exposes a child to drugs and causes medical problems can support an endangerment finding under Section 161.001(1)(D)-(E).

In the Interest of K.G.M. · filed 2005-07-27(1)(D)-(E)

Under this standard of review we have determined that the jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant endangered W.F.M.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s continued narcotics use endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Toliver v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2006-10-26(1)(E)

Based on the specific facts presented in this case, we conclude that a fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm conviction or belief that Toliver, through her continued use of narcotics, engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of her children. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E).

Continued narcotics use may constitute conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being under subsection (1)(E).

Zenobia Tolivar, Muntravian Martin, and Marcus Holloway v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-10-26(1)(E)

Based on the specific facts presented in this case, we conclude that a fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm conviction or belief that Toliver, through her continued use of narcotics, engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of her children. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E).

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent’s drug use and related conduct endanger a child’s surroundings or form a course of conduct that endangers the child.

in the Interest of T.N.S., Children · filed 2007-06-27(1)(D), (1)(E)

Applying the appropriate standard of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we find the evidence of Smith’s behavior supports the trial court’s findings that Smith violated . subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; sustained illegal drug use can constitute such conduct.

In the Interest of C.R. · filed 2008-05-07(1)(E)

A reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Davis’s long history of using illegal drugs, minimal motivation to quit using drugs, continued use of drugs after C.R. was removed, and allowing C.R. to be around Riddle when Riddle was under the influence of drugs was a course of conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of C.R. Applying the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding Davis’s parental rights should be terminated under section 161.001(1)(E).

Subsections (1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering conditions or conduct; a parent’s drug addiction and its effects on parenting may establish endangerment.

in the Interest of J.C., Jr. and A.C. · filed 2009-01-22(1)(D) and (E)

Drug addiction and its effect on a parent’s life and ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct. ... We hold, therefore, the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E).

A parent’s drug use before and during pregnancy, continued drug use during a termination suit, and children’s exposure to drugs can support findings of an endangering environment and endangering conduct.

in the Interest of J.W., a Child · filed 2009-03-26(1)(D), (1)(E)

Considering Lupe’s drug use before James was born, her drug use during her pregnancy with James, her continued drug use during the pendency of the case, and the evidence of her children’s exposure to drugs, the trial court was entitled to find that Lupe engaged in conduct or created an environment that endangered James’s physical and emotional well-being.

A parent’s drug history and drug use during pregnancy and termination proceedings can support endangerment findings under subsections (1)(D) and (E), even when the parent offers medical reasons for taking the drugs.

in the Interest of V.R., a Child · filed 2009-07-30(1)(D), (1)(E)

Thus, S.P.’s drug history and her drug use before and during these proceedings (regardless of the medical reasons for which she claims she took the drugs) sufficiently supports the trial court’s endangerment findings under the evidentiary review standards described above.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's drug use during pregnancy exposes the child to loss or injury, even if the child suffers no actual physical harm.

in the Interest of A. J. R., a Child · filed 2009-08-20(1)(E)

Although A.J.R. did not suffer any actual physical harm, the evidence clearly shows that Mary F. exposed A.J.R. to loss or injury and jeopardized her well-being when she abused cocaine during her pregnancy with A.J.R. Therefore, Mary F. violated Section 161.001(1)(E) by endangering A.J.R.'s physical or emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct; drug use that ends when a parent learns of the pregnancy was insufficient here.

in the Interest of M.G.P., a Child · filed 2011-12-22(1)(E)

However, the evidence in this case concerning Mother’s alleged drug and alcohol use was limited to the time before she knew that she was pregnant; the fact that Mother quit using drugs when she learned that she was pregnant undermines the argument that she engaged in ―a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct‖ sufficient to support a termination finding under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(E) treats a parent’s drug use as endangering conduct when it exposes a child to the risk that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned.

in the Interest of D.J.W., a Child · filed 2012-08-16(1)(E)

This evidence further supported the conclusion that the mother’s drug use endangered the physical or emotional well-being of D.J.W., by exposing him to the risks that the mother would be impaired or imprisoned.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s continuing criminal conduct and resulting imprisonment endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.N.D., Minor Child · filed 2013-01-31(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of A.N.D.

Domestic violence witnessed by a child can establish endangerment under subsections (1)(D) and (E) by clear and convincing evidence.

in the Interest of A. B., D. B. and D. B., Children · filed 2014-01-30(1)(D), (1)(E)

We hold that this evidence of domestic violence constitutes clear and convincing evidence of endangerment under sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E).

Physical abuse of a child’s other parent can support an endangerment finding.

in the Interest of A.G.F., C.W.F. and J.C.F. · filed 2014-02-13(1)(E)

Physical abuse of the children’s other parent can support a finding of endangerment.

A parent’s illegal drug use during a pending termination case can support the endangering-conduct ground even without proof that the parent used drugs while the child was in the parent’s care.

E. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2014-05-30(1)(E)

However, evidence of drug use while the child is in the parent’s care is not required to support an endangerment finding, so long as the evidence shows that the parent had used illegal drugs while the case was ongoing.

The evidence legally and factually supported an endangerment finding under subsection (1)(E).

in the Interest of KCF, MLM, LMM and AGM, Minor Children · filed 2014-06-05(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the subsection (E) endangerment finding with respect to the termination of R.J.F.’s parental rights to her four children.

The evidence legally and factually supported a finding of controlled-substance use under subsection (1)(P).

in the Interest of R.M.R. and A.L.R., Children · filed 2014-10-09(1)(P)

Viewing the evidence with the appropriate standards for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we find that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for the trial court to have found that Miguel used a controlled substance.

The evidence legally and factually supported termination under subsections (1)(D) and (1)(E).

in the Interest of C.W., a Child · filed 2014-12-15(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under subsections 161.001(D) and (E).

Section 161.001’s endangerment grounds can be satisfied by a parent’s exposure of a child to family violence and illegal drug use.

in the Interest of A.P., Children · filed 2016-10-05(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

A parent’s exposure of a child to family violence and illegal drug use endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being and is sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate findings.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent’s course of conduct endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of K.L., a Child · filed 2016-11-04(b)(1)(E)

Based on all of the evidence presented to the trial court, we conclude that the court could readily have reached the necessary firm conviction or belief the mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered K.L.’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s repeated drug use endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including through the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned.

in the Interest of B.P.E and R.W.S.E., AKA R.W.S.E., Children · filed 2016-11-17(b)(1)(E)

Her continued drug use exposed B.P.E. and R.W.S.E. to the possibility that she may be impaired or imprisoned and evidenced a course of conduct which endangers the children’s physical and emotional well-being.

Subsection (b)(1)(E) allows termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including through illegal drug use during pregnancy.

D. G. and D. R., III v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2017-10-26(b)(1)(E)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights under subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination based on a parent’s course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; continuing drug abuse can qualify.

in the Interest of B.F., P.M.F. AKA P.F., Children · filed 2017-11-16(b)(1)(E)

The evidence shows Mother had a substance abuse problem and was in denial about it, both of which endangered Ben and Pia. Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the endangerment finding, we conclude the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in conduct described in subsection E.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination for an endangering course of conduct, and frequent illegal drug use can establish that ground.

in the Interest of J. S.- A. S AKA J. S., J. B. S., Jr., Children · filed 2017-12-05(b)(1)(E)

The evidence of father’s frequent use of illegal drugs during the pendency of this case is legally sufficient, standing alone, to support the trial court’s endangerment finding.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows a parent’s illegal drug use during a termination suit to support a finding of endangering conduct.

in the Interest of A. D. N., Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2018-08-31(b)(1)(E)

Because we have found that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate finding of endangerment under subsection (E), we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding under subsection (D).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; repeated criminal conduct that risks leaving children alone can satisfy that ground.

in the Interest of C.A.G., AKA C.G., J.P.G., AKA J.G., Children · filed 2018-10-02(b)(1)(E)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection E.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's continuing drug use constitutes a course of conduct that endangers a child.

in the Interest of N.J.H., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2018-11-20(b)(1)(E)

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father engaged in a course of conduct endangering N.J.H.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct, including repeated illegal drug use, endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.M., III, and M.M., Children · filed 2018-12-28(b)(1)(E)

Here, the evidence clearly shows that Shaw repeatedly used illegal drugs and engaged in criminal activity, plainly in violation of the trial court’s order. ... We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the termination of Shaw’s parental rights under ground (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent’s continuing drug use endangered the child.

in the Interest of C.G., B.G., G.G., Children v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-04-18(b)(1)(E)

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the endangerment finding, we conclude the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in conduct described in subsection E.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of conduct that endangers a child; a parent’s drug use alone may be insufficient when undisputed evidence shows protective conduct.

in the Interest of D. D. M., J. C. M. and J. D. M., Jr. Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-05-02(b)(1)(E)

In light of the constitutional concerns related to parental termination, clear instructions from the supreme court to strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe involuntary-termination statutes, and our obligation to consider undisputed evidence that is contrary to the verdict, we hold that when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record evidence precludes a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that Matthews engaged in conduct that endangered his children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows a finding of endangerment based on a parent’s illegal drug use, including use before the child’s birth.

A. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-06-06(b)(1)(E)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s finding, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient for the district court to have formed a firm belief or conviction that the father engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits a finding of endangering conduct based on repeated positive drug tests without expert testimony interpreting the results.

in the Interest of L.C.L. and M.E.M., Children · filed 2019-07-16(b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court reasonably could have relied on the drug test results in terminating Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(E) without accompanying expert witness testimony.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s repeated criminal conduct and resulting incarceration endanger the child’s well-being, if termination is also in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of S.K.L., Z.M.L. and M.R.M., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-06-20(b)(1)(E)

A reasonable trier of fact could reach a firm belief or conviction that these episodes of criminal conduct—which include assaultive acts, family violence, and repeated acts of illegal possession of a firearm—subjected Dante to incarceration and absence from Zoey’s life and endangered Zoey’s well-being. We conclude the trial court did not err in determining that factually and legally sufficient evidence supports termination of Dante’s parental rights under Subsection (E), so long as doing so was in Zoey’s best interest.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of endangering conduct, and subsection (Q) requires proof that an incarcerated parent cannot provide or arrange care for the child for the required period.

in the Interest of C.D L.R., C.D.L R., E.M., Children · filed 2019-06-26(b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(Q)

Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination under subsection (E). ... Therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of criminal conduct, including drug use that results in imprisonment, endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Interest of B v. a Child · filed 2019-07-17(b)(1)(E)

A parent’s criminal conduct may support termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) because it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be imprisoned. ... Here, William’s actions, before B.V.’s birth and during William’s lifetime, show an overall course of conduct involving illegal drug use resulting in imprisonment. Therefore, based on William’s testimony alone, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish a firm conviction or belief that William engaged in conduct that endangered B.V.’s physical or emotional well-being.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to endangering surroundings or engages in endangering conduct; parental drug use can support those grounds.

in the Interest of D.A.B., a Child · filed 2020-03-04(b)(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, after viewing all the evidence, including any disputed or contrary evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under subsections D and E as to L.G. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering surroundings or an endangering course of parental conduct; a parent’s drug use can support both grounds.

in the Interest of A.B.R., a Child · filed 2020-03-11(b)(1)(D), (E)

Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) require a connection between a parent’s drug use and endangerment; drug use alone is insufficient.

in the Interest of L.C.L. and M.E.M., Children · filed 2020-03-31(b)(1)(D), (E)

A plain language reading of the statute requires a causal connection between Mother’s drug use and the alleged endangerment.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent placed children in an endangering environment or engaged in conduct that endangered them.

in the Interest of M.K. and E.K., Children · filed 2020-08-14(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings in relation to subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination for endangering surroundings or parental conduct; repeated methamphetamine use and the children’s exposure can support findings under both grounds.

in the Interest of K.B. and Z.B., Children · filed 2020-12-29(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

After having considered the entire record, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under grounds D and E.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent exposed a child to endangering conditions or engaged in endangering conduct; repeated illegal drug use can support both findings.

in the Interest of T.R., T.R., and R.N.-R., Children · filed 2021-04-15(b)(1)(D), (E)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we hold that there is some evidence of an endangering environment on which a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother had knowingly placed or had knowingly allowed the Children to remain in conditions or surroundings that had endangered their emotional or physical well-being and that there is some evidence of endangering conduct on which a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother had engaged in conduct that had endangered the Children’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125–26.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits an endangerment finding based on a parent’s escalating crimes and lengthy incarceration when the resulting absence jeopardizes the child; incarceration alone is insufficient.

in the Interest of J.F.-g., a Child · filed 2021-05-21(b)(1)(E)

Although her father’s strides toward overcoming his past conduct are important in evaluating Julie’s best interests, his rehabilitation does not negate his past criminal conduct and incarceration such that a trial court could not consider them to have been endangering to Julie. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court reasonably could have formed the firm belief that Julie’s father engaged in endangering conduct under subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent’s persistent illegal drug use endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of D.S. · filed 2021-05-27(b)(1)(D), (E)

Given the evidence of Mother’s persistent and continued use of meth, we conclude the Department met its burden to prove that Mother knowingly engaged in a course of conduct by using and continuing to use an illegal substance that endangered Danielle’s physical or emotional well-being.

Methamphetamine use during pregnancy, positive drug tests for the newborn, and a later relapse together can provide sufficient evidence of a violation of subsection (b)(1)(E).

in the Interest of E.Z.G., a Child · filed 2021-10-20(b)(1)(E)

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant violated subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child; continued drug use after removal can support an endangerment finding.

in the Interest of C.L.-F., a Child · filed 2022-06-30(b)(1)(E)

By her own admission, Mother continued to use drugs after Caleb’s removal, which is conduct that jeopardized her parental rights and supports an endangerment finding. ... Based on our review of the record, the trial court could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved endangerment under Subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; a parent’s drug addiction can create that danger.

in the Interest of H.M.R.J · filed 2022-11-17(b)(1)(E)

We conclude the evidence allowed the trial court, acting reasonably, to form a firm conviction or belief that Mother’s drug addiction creates a condition that endangers Sara’s physical and emotional well-being.

A parent's drug use alone can satisfy the endangerment ground without separate proof that the drug use caused danger to the child.

In the Interest of A v. a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-04-25(b)(1)(E)

In other words, our earliest precedent required no evidence illustrating that drug use somehow caused the child to be endangered. Proof of drug use alone sufficed. ... Thus, in applying the relevant standards of review, see, e.g., In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266–67 (Tex. 2002), we conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s affirmative finding of the § 161.001(b)(E) ground for termination.

Subsection (b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct, including illegal drug use, endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of R.A.B. Jr and M.M.G-B, Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-05-25(b)(1)(E)

Therefore, viewing the evidence with deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and indulging every reasonable inference, we hold there is legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that J.G. engaged in a course of conduct endangering to the children’s physical and emotional well-being under subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct, including continuing illegal drug use, endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

M. Y. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2023-05-31(b)(1)(E)

On this record, the evidence concerning Mother’s drug use is sufficient to support a finding of endangerment under Subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s drug use endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of E.M.-C., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-03(b)(1)(E)

From this evidence, the trial court was entitled to find that Mother’s drug use had an adverse effect on her ability to bond with and parent E.M.-C., thus jeopardizing her emotional and physical well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit endangerment findings based on a parent’s pattern of violent criminal conduct.

In the Interest of J.C. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-07-29(b)(1)(D), (E)

Accordingly, we conclude that this evidence of a pattern of violent criminal conduct supports the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent engages in conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; narcotics use and missed testing can support that finding.

In the Interest of A.D. AKA A v. AKA A.B v. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-12-11(b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that mother engaged, or knowingly placed A.D. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow a parent’s drug use and related dangers to support findings that the parent endangered the children through their environment and conduct.

In the Interest of J.P. and I.P., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-02-12(b)(1)(D), (E)

But considering these facts against the entire record, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that DFPS carried its burden under termination grounds (D) and (E).

Repeated drug relapses that expose children to an endangering environment and cause instability can support termination under subsections (D) and (E).

In the Interest of H.R.J., J.G.J., III, T.J.P., and L.P., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-15(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (D) and (E) findings.

Section 161.001 permits termination for endangerment when a parent neglects a child's physical needs, even without direct physical abuse.

In Re MC · filed 1996-03-07(1)(D) and (E)

Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services presented more than a scintilla of evidence that L.C. endangered her children's physical well-being. Although there is no evidence that L.C. inflicted direct physical abuse on her children, there is evidence that she neglected their physical needs, and neglect can be just as dangerous to the well-being of a child as direct physical abuse.

A parent’s neglect can constitute endangering conduct even without physical abuse.

Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2000-07-27(1)(E)

Physical abuse is not required where a parent’s omission — her neglect — has endangered the children.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent's neglect that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, even without physical abuse.

Fred G. Phillips and Yolanda Lopez v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-07-27(1)(E)

And while it is true that Lopez herself never actively abused her children, it was her failure to act that endangered her children. Physical abuse is not required where a parent's omission--her neglect--has endangered the children. See In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 85 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence adduced at trial was factually sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Lopez had engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination for endangerment when a parent neglects a child’s medical needs through a course of conduct.

In the Interest of S.R.W., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-03-08(b)(1)(E)

Neglect of a child’s medical needs endangers a child. ... Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually ... sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code.

Mental illness alone does not establish endangerment under section 161.001(1)(E), but a parent's mental state is relevant when it endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

Johns v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1996-12-05(1)(E)

While mental incompetence or mental illness alone is not grounds for termination of the parent-child relationship, when the parent's mental state endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child, that conduct has relevance in a termination proceeding.

Section 161.001 permits termination for conduct that endangers a child, and a parent's mental condition may be relevant to whether that conduct occurred.

Gonzales v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1997-04-10(1)(D), (1)(E)

While a parent's mental condition is expressly made relevant in section 161.003, this does not mean it is irrelevant as a matter of law in proceedings brought under sections 161.001(D) and (E). In those proceedings, the question of relevance is simply an open question determinable from the circumstances of the case.

Section 161.001 allows relevant evidence of a parent’s mental illness to support termination grounds involving endangerment, constructive abandonment, and failure to comply with a service plan.

in the Interest of J.J., a Child · filed 2020-12-23(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O)

We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Mother’s history of mental illness because it was relevant to the grounds of endangerment and abandonment and her failure to complete the service plan.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits consideration of a father's conduct before paternity is established if that conduct endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re MDS · filed 1999-07-29(1)(E)

Section 161.001(1)(E), therefore, requires only that the parent's conduct endanger the child. A father's conduct prior to the establishment of his paternity can be considered under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (F) cannot support termination based on a father's failure to protect or support a child before his paternity was adjudicated.

Djeto v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 1996-05-31(1)(D), (1)(F)

Next, the decree declaring Djeto to be the father of Luke was rendered in open court March 22, 1993. Djeto had no duty to support Luke until that date. Consequently, the Department, as a matter of law, cannot prove that Djeto failed to support Luke for a twelve month period ending within six months of the time the petition to terminate was filed on July 30, 1993, because the decree of paternity was rendered slightly more than four months earlier. ... Similarly, responsibility for Luke’s physical or mental well-being cannot be ascribed to Djeto prior to rendition of the order of paternity. Djeto’s acts or omissions regarding Luke prior to that time are not considered. ... At oral argument, the Department conceded what the record clearly shows: the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the finding on endangerment.

Section 161.001 permits termination of a presumed father's parental rights for failing to support or protect the child before a court formally adjudicates paternity.

R.W. v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 1997-03-27(1)(D), (E), (F)

And just like all other parents, these duties arose long before appellant filed his voluntary statement of paternity and without regard to any adjudication by a court establishing his parentage. The duty existed from the moment appellant, by his actions, recognized the child as his own. Thus, when appellant neglected his parental duties, the State properly relied on his failure to support and protect the child as grounds for terminating his parental rights.

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a court to consider a father’s conduct before paternity was established when deciding whether his conduct endangered the child.

In the Interest of M.D.S. · filed 1999-07-29(1)(E)

Section 161.001(1)(E), therefore, requires only that the parent’s conduct endanger the child. A father’s conduct prior to the establishment of his paternity can be considered under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits courts to consider a parent's conduct before and after a child's birth when deciding whether the parent endangered the child.

In Re MJML · filed 2000-09-27(1)(E)

Texas courts look to what the parent did both before and after the child's birth to determine whether a course of conduct endangering the child exists.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires a father to know the child is his before his conduct can support termination, while section 161.001(1)(E) has no such knowledge requirement.

In the Interest of Stevenson · filed 2000-08-18(1)(D), (1)(E)

We agree with this distinction; however, since termination in this case could have been based on section 161.001(1)(D), Grant was required to have knowledge that Kenya was his child in order for his rights to be terminated on that basis. We emphasize, however, that such knowledge is not required in order for parental rights to be terminated under section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a finding of endangering conduct even if a parent did not know he was the child's father.

in the Interest of K. S., a Child · filed 2012-07-19(1)(E)

Knowledge of paternity is not a prerequisite to a finding of course of conduct endangering a child under section 161.001(1)(E).

When an alleged father admits paternity, termination requires clear and convincing proof of a ground under section 161.001(1) and that termination is in the children’s best interest.

in the Interest of U.B. Children · filed 2013-02-06(1)

However, if the alleged father files an admission of paternity, his rights may only be terminated if the Department proves by clear and convincing evidence one of the grounds for termination in Section 161.001(1) and that termination is in the children’s best interest.

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a court to consider a parent’s endangering conduct before paternity is adjudicated.

in the Interest of A.R.M., a Child · filed 2014-04-08(1)(E)

While knowledge of paternity may be a prerequisite to a showing of knowing placement of a child in an endangering environment under subsection D, it is not a prerequisite to a showing of a course of conduct which endangers a child under subsection E. ... We find the evidence presented legally sufficient to support termination under Section 161.001(1)(E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) cannot support termination when the person is not the child’s father and has no parental rights to terminate.

in the Interest of J.E., a Child · filed 2019-05-15(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude the trial court erred in finding R.A. violated section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) of the Code and terminating his parental rights on this basis because the evidence supports the finding that R.A. is not J.E.’s father.

Section 161.001(b) requires proof of a parent-child relationship before parental rights may be terminated.

M. H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2020-01-08(b)

Termination of parental rights under Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code requires the existence of a “parent-child relationship.” ... Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the father was a parent of the child.

Section 161.001’s termination standards apply to an alleged father who admits paternity, even without a formal paternity adjudication.

in the Interest of Z.L. · filed 2020-12-10(b)

The provisions of section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code “also apply to an alleged father.”

Section 161.001 requires proof of a predicate ground and the child’s best interest when an alleged father sufficiently admits paternity.

In the Interest of J.C.O., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-08-20(b)(1), (b)(2)

Based on this evidence, we conclude ... that R.M. triggered his right to require the Department to prove one of the predicate grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1) and the (b)(2) best-interest ground.

An affidavit of voluntary relinquishment supports termination when the evidence establishes that the parent signed it voluntarily, without fraud, coercion, or duress.

In the Interest of R.C., a Baby Boy v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-30(b)(1)(K)

Considering the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude that the trial court could rationally form a firm belief or conviction that Father’s affidavit was voluntary and not procured by fraud, coercion, or duress.

Section 161.001(1) does not permit termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment invalid under the 48-hour waiting period.

Sims v. Adoption Alliance · filed 1996-03-20(1)

But the affidavit of relinquishment was invalid and the trial court erred in terminating the parental rights of Rena Sims on that basis. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (Vernon Supp.1996).

Section 161.001 permits termination when a parent executes an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment and termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of Kimberly Linda Briones, a Minor Child · filed 1999-04-28(1)(K), (2)

Briones' affidavit of relinquishment is sufficient grounds for termination if the record also reveals evidence that termination is in the best interest of K.B. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001 (1)(K), 161.001 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (court can order termination if parent executed unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment and relinquishment is in best interest of child). ... Based on this evidence, the trial court could properly conclude that termination was in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing proof of a qualifying affidavit of relinquishment to terminate parental rights on that ground.

Vela v. Marywood · filed 2000-04-27(1)(K)

We hold that Marywood was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Corina “executed before or after the suit [was] filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided in [section 161.103 of the Family Code].” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp.2000).

Section 161.001 permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment and the child's best interest; an involuntary affidavit is a complete defense.

In Re VRW · filed 2001-02-22(1)(K), (2)

Under the Texas Family Code, the trial court may terminate parental rights upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has "executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by this chapter," and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(K), (2) (Vernon Supp.2000); Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.1982). ... In view of the disputed facts surrounding A.W.'s signing of the affidavit, an issue of material fact exists and a directed verdict would not have been appropriate.

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to termination based on that affidavit.

In the Interest of V.R.W. · filed 2001-02-22(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to a termination decree.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment when the parent fails to prove that the affidavit was involuntarily procured.

Lumbis v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2002-02-22(1)(K)

Lumbis has not carried her burden of showing the affidavit was procured by fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, or the like, and we cannot hold that the district court erred in finding that Lumbis signed the affidavit voluntarily.

An irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment supports termination, and a properly executed affidavit may be set aside if the parent proves it was procured by coercion, duress, fraud, deception, undue influence, or overreaching.

Robin Cash Lumbis v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-01-25(1)(K)

Once it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the affidavit was properly executed, the affidavit may only be set aside upon a finding, by the preponderance of the evidence, that it was procured by coercion, duress, fraud, deception, undue influence, or overreaching. ... Lumbis has not carried her burden of showing the affidavit was procured by fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, or the like, and we cannot hold that the district court erred in finding that Lumbis signed the affidavit voluntarily.

Section 161.001(1)(K) does not permit termination based solely on a relinquishment affidavit that was involuntarily executed.

Jones v. TEX. DEPT OF PROTECT. & REG. SERV. · filed 2002-10-03(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit based solely on section 161.001(1)(K) of the family code.

Section 161.001(1)(K) does not support termination based solely on an involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment.

Jones v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-08-30(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit based solely on section 161.001(1)(K) of the family code.

Section 161.001 permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment only when clear and convincing evidence also shows that termination is in the child's best interest.

Yevette Heiser and Joe Heiser v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-10-03(1)(K), (2)

In cases involving irrevocable affidavits of relinquishment, a court may terminate parental rights only upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that the parent " executed before or after the suit [affecting the parent-child relationship] is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights," and that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Monroe v. Alternatives in Motion · filed 2007-02-22(1)(K), (2)

Family Code section 161.001 authorizes a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights and that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Termination based on a relinquishment affidavit requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent executed it voluntarily.

In Re RB · filed 2007-05-10(1)(K)

Implicit in the family code is the requirement that the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment be voluntarily executed. ... Based on this evidence, we hold that there is not only clear and convincing evidence that appellants executed the affidavits of relinquishment voluntarily, but there is no evidence that appellants' execution of the affidavits of relinquishment was the result of coercion, duress, fraud, or any other form of wrongdoing.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment that the parent executed voluntarily.

in the Interest of W.M. and A.L.M., Children · filed 2007-06-28(1)(K)

We hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that appellant executed the affidavit of relinquishment voluntarily, and there is no evidence that appellant’s execution of the affidavit of relinquishment was the result of coercion, duress, fraud, or any other form of wrongdoing.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment that the parent voluntarily executed.

in the Interest of R.B., J.B., S.B., T.B., A.B. and J.B., Children · filed 2007-05-10(1)(K)

Based on this evidence, we hold that there is not only clear and convincing evidence that appellants executed the affidavits of relinquishment voluntarily, but there is no evidence that appellants’ execution of the affidavits of relinquishment was the result of coercion, duress, fraud, or any other form of wrongdoing.

A voluntary relinquishment affidavit is a ground for involuntary termination, but it does not end the proceeding or prevent the court from considering other grounds.

Vallejo v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-04-18(1)(K)

Instead, the legislature included the execution of a voluntary relinquishment affidavit among the alternative grounds for involuntary termination with no hint that it excludes or preempts other grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on a voluntary relinquishment affidavit without a planned adoption when termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re AGC · filed 2009-02-19(1)(K)

However, nothing in the Family Code prohibits the use of an affidavit of relinquishment when one of two parents has voluntarily agreed to terminate his parental rights and the court has found that the termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(1)(K).

Section 161.001 permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment when clear and convincing evidence also shows that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of A.G.C., a Minor Child · filed 2009-02-19(1)(K), (2)

Section 161.001 provides that one ground upon which a court may order a parent-child relationship terminated is if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a parent has executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Chapter 161, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. ... Therefore, on these facts, the trial court did not err in finding that termination was in A.G.C.’s best interest.

Section 161.001 permits a court to consider other grounds for termination after a parent signs a relinquishment affidavit and requires the court to find that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Vallejo v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2009-03-27(1)(K), (2)

Neither statute prohibits the court from considering other bases for termination, and neither statute prohibits the court from making a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(K) makes an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment a possible ground for termination, but the affidavit alone does not terminate parental rights or end the termination proceeding.

Vallejo v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-03-27(1)(K)

The involuntary termination statute expressly states that the execution of an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment is one of several possible grounds supporting termination. Id . § 161.001(1)(K). Neither statute states that the execution of the affidavit is sufficient alone to support termination, and neither states that the execution of an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment immediately and automatically concludes a termination proceeding.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment. A parent challenging the affidavit’s voluntariness must present evidence of fraud, duress, or coercion.

Arnulfo DeLatorre AKA Arnulfo Amparan DeLatorre AKA Arnulf Amparan DeLatorre v. State · filed 2010-06-18(1)(K)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that N.S.’s challenge to statutory ground (K) was frivolous. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(K). Further, as N.S. appeals only on statutory grounds, and as only one statutory ground is required to support an order of termination, see id. § 161.001(1), we need not address N.S.’s remaining arguments.

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an unrevoked affidavit relinquishing parental rights when clear and convincing evidence also shows termination is in the child’s best interest.

J.O.M. and B.T. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2011-05-19(1)(K)

Family Code section 161.001 authorizes a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights and termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001(1)(K) allows an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment to serve as a ground for terminating parental rights.

In Re Mv · filed 2011-06-03(1)(K)

It is undisputed Mother executed an such an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment before suit was filed. The affidavit says, in part, "I freely, voluntarily, and permanently give and relinquish to the Department [of Family and Protective Services] all my parental rights and duties." There is no evidence Mother filed a motion to revoke the affidavit, or that it was revoked. Applying the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother engaged in the conduct enumerated in section 161.001(1)(K).

Section 161.001(1)(K) allows a voluntary relinquishment affidavit to serve as a ground for termination, but the affidavit does not itself terminate parental rights.

In Re Jlj · filed 2011-10-07(1)(K)

When a parent executes an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing their parental rights, the affidavit merely provides a basis for the trial court to enter a judgment of termination, it has no immediate effect on the parent-child relationship.

A voluntary relinquishment affidavit provides a basis for a termination judgment but does not itself terminate parental rights.

in the Interest of J. L. J., a Child · filed 2011-10-07(1)(K)

When a parent executes an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing their parental rights, the affidavit merely provides a basis for the trial court to enter a judgment of termination, it has no immediate effect on the parent-child relationship.

An affidavit supporting termination under section 161.001(1)(K) must be voluntarily executed.

in the Interest of C.E., C.E., and M.E., Children · filed 2014-08-07(1)(K)

But implicit in the family code is the requirement that the affidavit must be voluntarily executed.

Section 161.001(1)(K) requires a relinquishment affidavit to be voluntarily executed before it can support termination of parental rights.

in the Interest of K.M.L., a Child · filed 2014-08-29(1)(K)

Section 161.103 requires that the affidavit be for voluntary relinquishment, TEX . FAM . CODE § 161.103(a), and implicit in section 161.001(1)(K) is the requirement that the affidavit of parental rights be voluntarily executed.

Section 161.001(1)(K) requires an affidavit of relinquishment to be voluntarily executed before it can support termination of parental rights.

in the Interest of A. C, Z. C., J. C., S. C., and A. C., Minor Children · filed 2014-10-22(1)(K)

It is implicit in Section 161.001(1)(K) that the affidavit of parental rights be voluntarily executed.

The evidence legally and factually supported termination under subsection (1)(K).

in the Interest of A. C, Z. C., J. C., S. C., and A. C., Minor Children · filed 2014-11-07(1)(K)

Therefore, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Appellants‟ parental rights under Section 161.001(1)(K) of the family code.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of A.H., M.H., and J.H. · filed 2014-12-18(1)(K), (2)

A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by the Family Code and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(K), (2).

Section 161.001(1)(K) permits termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment when the Department proves the parent executed it voluntarily.

Interest of A.T., A.T., X.T., M.T., and F.T. · filed 2015-08-10(1)(K)

Because the record contains no evidence of any fraud, coercion or duress, and the record establishes Rebekah T. executed the affidavit at her own insistence, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that Rebekah T. voluntarily executed the affidavit.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) permits termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment only when the affidavit was voluntarily executed.

in the Interest of B.H., a Child · filed 2015-10-08(b)(1)(K)

We conclude that in light of the fact that the record contains no evidence of involuntariness, Mother’s caseworker’s testimony about Mother’s voluntariness and Mother’s statements in the affidavit reflecting on her voluntariness allowed the trial court to rationally form a firm belief or conviction that the affidavit was voluntary and was not procured by fraud, coercion, or duress.

Section 161.001(1)(K) allows termination based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment when the parent executed it voluntarily.

in the Interest of K.L.G., Jr., M.S.G. Jr., Z.G.K.G., A.E.S.G., Children · filed 2015-11-25(1)(K)

An unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment is one of the predicate grounds for termination set forth in section 161.001 and is the predicate ground cited in the trial court’s order. ... Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Conquita voluntarily executed the affidavit.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) permits termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment only if the parent executed it voluntarily.

in the Interest of G.S. and J. W., Children · filed 2015-12-16(b)(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to a termination suit based on Section 161.001(b)(1)(K).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) requires a relinquishment affidavit to be voluntarily executed before it can support termination of parental rights.

In the Interest of J.H. · filed 2016-03-16(b)(1)(K)

To support a termination order, an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment must be voluntarily executed. ... For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Mother’s duress argument and thus reject Mother’s first issue on appeal.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent signed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit relinquishing parental rights.

in the Interest of D.W., K.W., C.W., E.W., and E.W., Children · filed 2018-08-01(b)(1)(K)

The Family Code permits a trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has signed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) requires clear and convincing proof that a parent voluntarily executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment before the affidavit can support termination.

in the Interest of J. M., a Child · filed 2018-10-10(b)(1)(K)

It is implicit in Section 161.001(1)(K) that the affidavit of parental rights be voluntarily executed.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment only if the parent executed it voluntarily.

in the Interest of Z.M.R and Z.D.B., Children · filed 2018-11-01(b)(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit based on section 161.001(1)(K). ... We conclude Mother has not shown on appeal that her affidavit of relinquishment resulted from fraud, duress, or coercion.

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to termination based on that affidavit.

in the Interest of T.N.S., a Child · filed 2019-01-17(b)(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to a termination suit based on Section 161.001(b)(1)(K).

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(K).

in the Interest of T.N.S., a Child · filed 2019-02-14(b)(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to a termination suit based on Section 161.001(b)(1)(K).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) requires a relinquishment affidavit to be executed voluntarily; involuntary execution is a complete defense to termination on that ground.

in the Interest of M.S., a Child · filed 2019-04-22(b)(1)(K)

An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit based on section 161.001(b)(1)(K).

Subsection (b)(1)(K) permits termination based on an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment that the parent signed voluntarily.

in the Interest of G.C., a Child · filed 2021-05-07(b)(1)(K)

The record also does not support Mother’s assertion that her affidavit of relinquishment was involuntary.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) permits termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment that the parent executed voluntarily.

in the Interest of C. D., J. D. and T. D., Children · filed 2021-09-15(b)(1)(K)

Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of M.S.’s parental rights under subsection (K) of Section 161.001(b)(1).

Subsection (b)(1)(K) requires a voluntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment to support termination of parental rights.

in the Interest of O.H., a Child · filed 2021-09-16(b)(1)(K)

“An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit based on section 161.001[(b)](1)(K).” ... Because Mother has failed to carry her burden to show involuntariness, her challenge must fail.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) allows termination based on an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment when clear and convincing evidence also shows termination is in the child’s best interest.

Dinwiddie v. Margaret Danielle Pottin and Jennifer Ann Francis · filed 2022-04-15(b)(1)(K)

A trial court may order termination of a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest and that the parent has “executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by this chapter.” Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (2). ... However, there is no evidence that Pottin made any of those statements with an intent to mislead Dinwiddie or to fraudulently procure his signature on the affidavit. ... On its face, Dinwiddie’s affidavit of voluntary relinquishment satisfies the requirements of the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.103.

Section 161.001(b) requires evidence supporting at least one statutory predicate ground and a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of D.J., S.H.-J., and B.G., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-07(b)(1), (b)(2)

These events were just a fraction of the evidence presented to the trial court at the termination trial, and such evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support the vital portions of the trial court’s termination findings: its findings that termination of each parent’s rights was in the children’s best interest and that each parent satisfied at least one statutory predicate ground. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (b)(2). Evidentiary sufficiency challenges to these findings would not be meritorious.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence supports one listed act of parental misconduct and termination is in the child's best interest.

Anguiano v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1996-07-17(1), (2)

Hence, it is irrelevant that the matters were pleaded in the disjunctive and the findings were in the conjunctive because the statute requires only that one of the acts be committed and that only one such finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of an enumerated ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Maltos v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 1996-11-13

Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Family Code requires clear and convincing evidence that 1) the parent has engaged in any of the specific conduct enumerated in the Family Code as grounds for termination and 2) termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate parental rights.

Cooper v. Young · filed 1996-09-18

The party seeking to terminate must prove his case by "clear and convincing evidence."

Section 161.001 permits termination when one statutory ground and the child's best interest are proved; every alleged ground need not be proved.

Linda Tristan and Moris Aviles v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1996-11-20

A petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship may be granted if the court finds that the parent has engaged in any one of the statutorily enumerated acts and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Hence we conclude that it is irrelevant that the Department did not prove all of the alleged acts of misconduct with regard to both parents.

Section 161.001 does not require termination of parental rights merely because a statutory ground is established.

In the Interest of D.L.B. · filed 1997-04-02

We again point out that although Baker’s conviction can be considered endangering the physical or emotional well being of the child, a violation of Family Code section 161.001 does not mandate termination.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the children's best interest.

In Re DG · filed 1999-09-01

In order to terminate Garry's parental rights, TDPRS was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) one of the statutory grounds for termination; and (2) that termination is in the children's best interest. TEX. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1999). ... After reviewing all of the evidence presented and mindful of the fact that we may not reweigh that evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot conclude that a rational jury could have found only that is was highly probable that termination was in the best interest of the children.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of an enumerated ground for termination and that termination is in each child’s best interest.

In the Interest of A.M.C. · filed 1999-09-22(1)(D), (1)(E), (2)

From this evidence the jury could have reasonably found that Cabret engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children (sub-part (a) of the first prong) or that Cabret knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children (sub-part (b) of the first prong). Thus the first prong necessary for termination of Cabret’s parental rights to both children is satisfied. ... After consideration of these factors and the evidence before the jury, we find that the evidence as a whole supports the jury’s finding that the best interest of each child will be served by terminating Cabret’s parental rights.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of both a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of K.R. · filed 2000-06-08

To terminate a natural parent’s parental rights, the court must be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that both (1) a statutory ground for termination exists and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. ... After reviewing the evidence, we find that not only could the jury reasonably conclude that termination was probably in the best interest of K.R., we find the evidence sufficient to prove it is highly probable.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes an endangerment ground and shows that termination is in each child's best interest.

In Re AMC · filed 1999-09-22(1)(D), (1)(E), (2)

From this evidence the jury could have reasonably found that Cabret engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children (sub-part (a) of the first prong) or that Cabret knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children (sub-part (b) of the first prong). ... After consideration of these factors and the evidence before the jury, we find that the evidence as a whole supports the jury's finding that the best interest of each child will be served by terminating Cabret's parental rights.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes either endangering conduct or endangering surroundings and shows that termination is in the child's best interest.

Leal v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-07-27

Either of these grounds alone support termination when coupled with the finding that termination is in the children's best interest.

A finding under any one ground in subsection (1) establishes the conduct element for termination; termination must also be in the child’s best interest.

Green v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2000-01-27(1)

Because Appellant failed to challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence with regard to provision O, the first element of involuntary termination can be affirmed based on this provision.

Evidence supporting two pleaded grounds may sustain a section 161.001 termination judgment.

in the Interest of J.R.B.N., a Minor Child · filed 2000-06-29

There is ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding on grounds three and four. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (1),(2) (Vernon 1992) . We therefore overrule appellant's contention that the evidence used to prove the allegations in the termination petition was legally insufficient.

Section 161.001 does not require a finding that the Department made all reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their family before ordering termination.

Dunn v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-09-14

In her seventh point of error, Mrs. Dunn contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the Department made all reasonable efforts, consistent with time and circumstances, to reunite the children with the family. Although the record does contain evidence of these efforts, Section 161.001 does not require that the court make this finding before ordering termination.

Section 161.001 requires a finding of at least one listed act or omission and a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of R.C. · filed 2000-09-28(1), (2)

In addition to finding that one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under section 161.001(1) occurred, a verdict of termination also requires a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re TT · filed 2001-02-08(1)(D), (1)(E), (2)

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must make two findings. First, the parent must have committed one of the acts prohibited under section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. ... Second, termination of parental rights must be in the child's best interest.

Section 161.001 permits termination when evidence supports an endangerment ground and shows that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of T.T. · filed 2001-02-08(1)(D), (1)(E), (2)

The jury found subsections 161.001(1)(D), (E) and (2) of the Texas Family Code supported terminating Rebecca’s parental rights. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (2). The jury could have rationally reached these findings because evidence indicated Rebecca (1) knew Sean had abused T.T. even before K.T. was born; (2) continually denied Sean’s abusive tendencies; (3) was in the home when Sean endangered the children; (4) continued to allow Sean to be around the children after he abused them; (5) continued to live with Sean pending trial; and (6) could not adequately protect or provide financially for the children.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a specified ground for termination; written findings that satisfy those requirements control over an inconsistent oral announcement.

in the Interest of Cassidy, Adrian, Joshua Castellano, Nancy and Andrea Reyna, Children · filed 2001-03-14

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (stating that the court must find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a specified statutory ground before terminating the parent-child relationship). ... However, the written findings of fact and conclusions of law subsequently issued by the trial judge not only specified the statutory grounds for his decision but also stated that the existence of those grounds was established by clear and convincing evidence. The latter findings being written, they control over anything said or unsaid at trial. ... Thus, we cannot say that the trial court either applied a wrong standard of proof or failed to base its decision on the existence of a statutory ground for termination.