Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law; a disputed fact issue does not qualify for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Estate of James W. Fisher · filed 2014-01-15(d)

But Section 51.014(d)’s requirements, which are necessary to confer jurisdiction with this Court, have not been met. ... Here, we are convinced that this appeal involves a controlling fact issue, not a legal one.

Section 51.014(d) does not permit a permissive interlocutory appeal of legal questions the trial court has not substantively decided.

McCroskey v. Happy State Bank · filed 2014-02-28(d)

We join our sister courts in concluding that the Legislature did not intend the parties to use Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for such a purpose.

Section 51.014(d) requires a proposed permissive appeal to involve a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and to potentially advance the litigation.

Xenos Yuen, Trustee of Xenos Yuen Family Irrevocable Trust v. Waller County Appraisal District · filed 2014-05-06(d)

Here, appellant has not established that the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Accordingly, appellant’s petition for permissive appeal is denied.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantive trial court ruling on the controlling legal issue before a permissive interlocutory appeal is authorized.

Great American E&S Insurance Company v. Lapolla Industries, Inc. · filed 2014-06-24(d)

Here, because the trial court did not make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue, the order appellant is attempting to appeal does not involve a controlling question of law, and section 51.014(d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal in this case.

Section 51.014(d) allows a notice of interlocutory appeal to be treated as a petition for permission to appeal, but the appellant must establish entitlement to a permissive appeal.

Edom Corner, LLC and Earl A. Berry, Jr. v. It's the Berry's, LLC D/B/A Mary Ellen's · filed 2014-06-11(d)

We construe the notice as a petition for permission to appeal the trial court’s order relating to prior litigation between Appellants and It’s The Berry’s, LLC d/b/a Mary Ellen’s. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2013); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3 & cmt. Appellants have not established that they are entitled to a permissive appeal. Accordingly, we deny their petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal when there is substantial ground for difference of opinion even if the appellate court ultimately holds that the disputed contract is unambiguous.

Certain Underwriters at LLoyd's of London Subscribing to Policy Number: FINFR0901509 v. Cardtronics, Inc. · filed 2014-06-12(d)(1)

Indeed, there may be ground for disagreement as to what effect the law gives to a document, despite internal clarity as to what the document actually says. Thus, Texas courts considering such interlocutory appeals have nonetheless been able to hold that the contracts in question are unambiguous. ... The procedural posture of the case does not mandate that we hold that the contract is ambiguous.

Section 51.014(d)(1) requires a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for difference of opinion before a court may accept a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Jones v. Neil · filed 2014-07-21(d)(1)

We may accept an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 51.014(d) of the civil practice and remedies code if (1) the order being appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive appeal to involve a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and to potentially advance the end of the litigation.

Jefferson County, Texas v. April Swain · filed 2014-10-02(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must demonstrate that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court’s permission for a permissive interlocutory appeal to be stated in a written order.

Hebert v. JJT Construction · filed 2014-07-10(d)

The trial court’s permission must be stated in a written order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168. Because appellants have not shown that the trial court granted permission to appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d), there is no basis for an appeal under this statute, and we deny appellants’ petition for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(d)(1) requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling question of law before a permissive interlocutory appeal may proceed.

Target Corporation v. Ko · filed 2014-07-21(d)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude no substantial difference of opinion exists regarding the controlling question of law in this case, deny the petition, and dismiss the appeal.

Section 51.014 must be strictly construed when deciding whether to entertain a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Blakenergy, Ltd., a Texas Limited Partnership v. Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC · filed 2014-09-25

Given the requirement that we construe section 51.014 strictly, 2 we decline to entertain this appeal, and we hereby dismiss it.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order involves a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the end of the litigation.

Landmark American Insurance Co. v. Eagle Supply & Manufacturing L.P. · filed 2014-10-16(d)

We agree that the orders to be appealed involve controlling questions of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the orders may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

A permissive interlocutory appeal requires a controlling question of law on which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Phoenix Energy, Inc. and Joseph J. Ring, III v. Breitling Royalties Corporation · filed 2014-10-17(d)(1)

Because the order being appealed does not involve a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, we deny the petition and motion to stay and dismiss the appeal.

A permissive appeal under § 51.014(d) requires the trial court’s permission.

Wallace v. Hernandez · filed 2015-01-23(d)

Appellant filed a petition for permissive appeal in this court. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2014); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. However, the petition did not show the trial court’s permission for the appeal. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a). ... Consequently, Appellant has not satisfied the requirements for a permissive appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a) (requiring permission from trial court to appeal interlocutory order not otherwise appealable). Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and a showing that immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Gulf Coast Asphalt Company, L.L.C. v. Lloyd · filed 2015-02-02(d)

Given the limited nature of interlocutory appeals and the requirement we construe statutes authorizing such appeals strictly, we conclude Gulf Coast has not satisfied the statutory requirements of section 51.014(d). ... Specifically, Gulf Coast has failed to demonstrate that this case presents a controlling question of law about which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion or that the appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) requires a written trial court order permitting a permissive appeal.

Dwight and Deborah Bell v. Harris · filed 2015-01-28(d)

Section 51.014(d) concerns permissive appeals. The first prerequisite to having a permissive appeal, however, is a written order from the trial court permitting the appeal.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when its requirements are met; otherwise, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the permissive appeal.

Commerce and Industry Insurance Company v. American Jet International Corporation · filed 2015-05-12(d)

Here, CIIC has not established that the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Unless the section 51.014(d) requirements are met, we are without jurisdiction over the permissive appeal.

Section 51.014’s authorization of interlocutory appeals is strictly construed.

Arlington Surgicare Partners, Ltd. D/B/A Baylor Surgicare at Arlington v. CFLS Investments, LLC · filed 2015-05-18

Given the requirement that we strictly construe section 51.014, we decline to entertain the appeal filed by Plaintiff Petitioners, and we ... hereby dismiss it.

Section 51.014(d) requires a written trial court order permitting a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Grace Instrument Industries, LLC v. Melden Schmidt and OFI Testing Equipment, Inc. · filed 2015-05-28(d)

Appellant has not provided this court with a written order issued by the trial court permitting appellant’s appeal of the interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(a). Accordingly, we deny appellant’s petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) limits permissive interlocutory appeals to controlling legal questions; disputed facts do not qualify.

Undavia v. Avant Medical Group · filed 2015-06-04(d)

Fact issues are not within the scope of a permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) permits denial of a permissive appeal when the trial court’s order does not explain why an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Estate of Rebecca Quirin Marshall · filed 2015-09-09(d)

Here, the trial court’s order granting permission to appeal does not “state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; Gulf Coast Asphalt Co., L.L.C. v. Lloyd, 457 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). To the contrary, the order notes “the case should be prepared for trial since there are other issues that need to be developed for trial.” Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; Gulf Coast Asphalt, 457 S.W.3d at 545. Having considered the petition, we conclude it failed to meet the requirements for a permissive appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3; TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; Gulf Coast Asphalt, 457 S.W.3d at 545.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to present a controlling question of law and potentially advance the litigation; an appeal that may require deciding additional questions can fail those requirements.

Johnson v. Denise Walters, Independent of the Estate of Inga J.Johnson · filed 2015-11-17(d)

Based on parties’ filings and arguments in the trial court and this court, it appears that an interlocutory appeal of the summary judgment orders at issue may require this court to consider and decide more questions than just a single “controlling question of law.” Given the limited nature of interlocutory appeals and the requirement we construe statutes authorizing such appeals strictly, we conclude Dale Johnson has not satisfied the statutory requirements of section 51.014(d).

A permissive interlocutory appeal under subsection (d) requires the trial court to make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue first.

De La Torre v. AAG Properties, Inc. · filed 2015-12-22(d)

The trial court must first make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue being appealed.

Subsection (f) allows an appellate court to accept a permissive interlocutory appeal only after the trial court has permitted it under subsection (d).

$30,459.00 in U.S. Currency v. State · filed 2016-04-28(f)

Subsection 51.014(f) then authorizes an appellate court to accept an appeal that the trial court has permitted under subsection 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(d) requires an interlocutory appeal to involve the trial court’s substantive ruling on a controlling question of law.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Seagoville Partners · filed 2016-06-09(d)

Inherent within section 51.014(d)’s jurisdictional requirements is that the appeal involve the trial court’s substantive ruling on the controlling question of law we are being asked to resolve.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantive trial-court ruling on the legal issue presented for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Eagle Gun Range, Inc., David L. Prince, Justin Pollard, Mark Sliger, Jeffrey D. Saupp, and Bill Scott v. Bancalari · filed 2016-06-22(d)

Without any indication in the order or otherwise in the appellate record of the trial court’s substantive ruling on the specific legal issues presented for our determination, this permissive appeal does not meet the strict jurisdictional requirements of section 51.014(d).

Subsection (d) requires a petitioner to show that the order involves a controlling issue of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation’s termination.

Southwestern Energy Company v. Harris County Appraisal District · filed 2016-11-08(d)

After reviewing the petition, the response, and the record, we conclude that Southwestern Energy has not shown that (1) the September 2, 2016 order involves a controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014 permits an interlocutory appeal when an order involves a controlling legal question with substantial ground for disagreement and immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bryan Goertz and Debbie Goertz · filed 2016-12-01(d), (f)

We conclude that the order Asplundh seeks to appeal involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d), (f). We grant Asplundh’s petition for permissive appeal of the trial court’s order dated October 28, 2016.

Section 51.014(d) requires an applicant for a permissive appeal to establish a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and show that an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

GTE Southwest Incorporated D/B/A Verizon Southwest Now D/B/A Frontier Communications v. Allstate Insurance Company Encom · filed 2016-12-08(d)

Having considered Verizon’s application, Respondents’ response, and Verizon’s reply, we conclude that Verizon’s application for permissive appeal fails to establish that the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014 allows a court of appeals to accept a permissive interlocutory appeal when the appeal meets subsection (d)’s requirements.

Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana v. Logan Moss · filed 2017-02-03(d), (f)

We agree that the appeal of the interlocutory order is warranted under Section 51.014(d) and accept the appeal.2 See id. § 51.014(f).

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to rule on the controlling legal issue before a permissive interlocutory appeal can proceed.

Isaac v. Burnside · filed 2016-10-27(d)

Section 51.014(d) is not intended to relieve the trial court of its role in deciding substantive issues of law properly presented to it. ... The trial court first must make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue being appealed.

Section 51.014(d) does not permit an interlocutory appeal over disputes among plaintiffs about control of litigation and division of damages when resolving those disputes would not advance the underlying claims.

in Re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litigation: Texas Clean Air Act Enforcement Actions · filed 2016-11-04(d)

While these issues may be important to the Plaintiffs’ strategy and division of damages, if any, they do not dispose of controlling questions of law in the litigation because they do not implicate or advance the determination of liability, damages, or the viability of the underlying claims against Volkswagen for its alleged violations of the Clean Air Act.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when an order presents a controlling legal question open to substantial disagreement and immediate review will materially advance the litigation; the question can be broader than the specific cases named in the order.

BNSF Railway Company (Individually and as Successor-In-Interest to the Burlington Northern, Inc., Burlington Northern & · filed 2018-03-29(d)

Under that exception, we may permit an appeal from an interlocutory order that otherwise would not be immediately appealable if (1) the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and (2) an immediate appeal from the order will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ... Thus, when all of the pertinent language in the trial court’s order is given effect, it is clear that the controlling question of law on which the trial court ruled is broader than the narrow question only of whether Robinson and Havner apply in a FELA case.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling legal issue with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal that may materially advance the litigation.

R. Borden Wilson, M.D v. Mishka Bouldwin (Individually and as Next Friend of Chole Anderson) and UT Physicians - General · filed 2018-05-15(d)

After reviewing the petition, the response, the reply, and the record, we conclude that Wilson has not shown that (1) the March 6, 2018 order involves a controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) requires a party seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal to establish a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and show that an immediate appeal may advance the end of the litigation.

William G. Martin, Jr. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Future Telecom, LLC, a Texas Limited · filed 2018-06-12(d)

The petition fails to establish that the challenged order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Accordingly, we deny the petition and dismiss the appeal.

Section 51.014(d) does not authorize a court of appeals to decide a controlling question of law in the first instance.

Orion Marine Construction, Inc. v. Cepeda · filed 2018-06-21(d)

The courts of appeals are not statutorily authorized to decide controlling questions of law in the first instance.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order involves a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may advance the litigation’s termination.

Dr. Hadley and Texas Children's Hospital Pavilion for Women, and Baylor College of Medicine v. Cindi C. Davis and John D · filed 2018-11-06(d)

The petitions fail to establish that the challenged orders involve a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order presents a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may advance the litigation’s termination.

Stefan Johnny Ygdevik and Stingray Industrial Rentals, LLC v. Greentex Equipment Corp. D/B/A Tri-Star Equipment · filed 2018-11-29(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must establish that the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and allowing an immediate appeal “may advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d); see also Tex. R. App. P. 28.3. Appellants have not established that they are entitled to a permissive appeal.

Section 51.014 allows a trial court to permit an interlocutory appeal, but leaves the court of appeals discretion to accept or deny it.

Sabre Travel International, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Ag, Austrian Airlines Ag, Brussels Airlines, nv/sa, and Swiss Int · filed 2019-02-01(d), (f)

We agree that Texas courts of appeals have discretion to accept or deny permissive interlocutory appeals certified under section 51.014(d), just as federal circuit courts do.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order involves a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. and Mosaic Baybrook Two, L.P. v. Simien · filed 2019-02-12(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168.

Section 51.014(a)(6) permits a subsequent interlocutory appeal when the second summary judgment motion raises new and distinct grounds rather than merely seeking reconsideration.

Scripps Np Operating, LLC, a Wisconsin Limited Liability Company, Successor in Interest to Scripps Texas Newspapers, Lp · filed 2019-05-24(a)(6)

Even though the interlocutory appeals in this case are under subsection 51.014(a)(6), the same analysis applies—a court has jurisdiction over a subsequent appeal if the second motion is a new and distinct motion and not a mere motion to reconsider previous grounds for summary judgment.

Section 51.014(d) requires a party seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal to show a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the end of the litigation.

Thien Nguyen, D.O. v. Garza · filed 2019-05-02(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3; TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; see also Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Cepeda, No. 01-18-00323-CV, 2018 WL 3059756, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because a permissive interlocutory appeal is not the norm, we strictly construe Section 51.014(d)’s requirements.”).

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to rule on the controlling legal question before a court of appeals may grant a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Garcia v. Garcia · filed 2019-06-11(d)

Because the record does not show that the trial court ruled on a controlling question of law, we cannot grant Oscar’s petition for permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014 permits an interlocutory appeal only when the order presents a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Durairaj v. Govindasamy Durairaj, Individually Govindasamy Durairaj, as Trustee of the G. Durairaj Children's Trus · filed 2019-08-21(d), (f)

This court has jurisdiction to accept a permissive appeal only when (1) the interlocutory order being appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists, and (2) an immediate appeal of the interlocutory order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ... However, after carefully considering the petition and the response, we conclude the petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for a permissive appeal.

Section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal when the certified question determines only which court hears the claims and does not affect their viability.

M.B., Individually and as Next Friend of I.C. v. S.C. and Spirit of St. Louis Outlets, GP, LLC · filed 2019-06-27(d), (f)

Accordingly, because Mother has not shown that the viability of any of the claims the District Court dismissed rests on its determination of the legal questions it certified for permissive review, those questions are not controlling questions of law. ... Given the limited nature of interlocutory appeals and the requirement that we strictly construe statutes authorizing such appeals, we conclude that Mother’s attempted permissive appeal does not satisfy the requirements of section 51.014(d) or rule 28.3(e)(4).

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive appeal petitioner to show both a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

by the Sea Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v. Texas Windstorm Insurance Association · filed 2019-07-23(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order not otherwise appealable, the petitioner must establish that (1) the order appealed involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (2) immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” ... Because we conclude that the petition fails to establish both requirements, we deny the petition for permissive appeal.

Sections 51.014(d) and (f) require a written trial-court order permitting an otherwise unavailable appeal before a party may petition the court of appeals.

Bobbi Battishia White v. Rogers · filed 2019-07-25(d), (f)

As an initial matter, Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections 51.014(d) and (f) and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3 require a party to obtain a written order from the trial court permitting an appeal of an order that is not otherwise appealable before that party may petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires trial court permission before a court of appeals can consider a permissive appeal from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order.

Robert K. Hudnall and Sharon E. Hudnall v. Smith and Ramirez Restoration, LLC · filed 2019-09-25(d)

Because there is no statutory authorization allowing us to review the interlocutory orders the Hudnalls wish to challenge, and because the trial court did not grant the Hudnalls permission to appeal the orders under Section 51.014(d), we must dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction.

A permissive appeal under § 51.014(d) requires a controlling legal issue that can be resolved without deciding disputed facts.

El Paso Tool & Die Co., Inc. v. Mendez · filed 2019-12-04(d)

And because permissive appeals should be limited to those cases where we can resolve controlling legal issues necessary to the resolution of the case, Handsel, 142 S.W.3d at 494, we exercise our discretion to decide the permission to appeal was improvidently granted.

Section 51.014(d) requires written permission from the trial court to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Ken Paxton, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas v. William McManus, in His Official Capacity as Chief · filed 2019-10-04(d)

Because the appellant did not obtain the trial court’s written permission to appeal, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the order presents a controlling legal issue with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation’s termination.

Juan C. Rozo, M.D. and East Houston Specialists, PLLC D/B/A Cardiology Specilsits of Houston v. Carter-Faughtenbe · filed 2020-01-07(d)

After reviewing the petition and the record, we conclude that appellants have not shown that (1) the November 1, 2019 amended order involves a controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See id.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive appeal request to present a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and show that immediate appeal may advance the litigation.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC D/B/A Mr. Cooper v. Stephen S. L. Earley and Dorothy Ann Earley · filed 2020-01-16(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must establish to the trial court that (1) the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) allowing an immediate appeal “may advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. ... Having reviewed appellant’s petition, the record documents attached thereto, and appellees’ response, this Court is of the opinion that appellant has not shown its entitlement to permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) permits an appeal from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order when the order presents a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Sealy Emergency Room, LLC and Chaethana Yalamanchili, M.D. v. Susan Brown Leschper, as Joint Managing Conservator of Chr · filed 2020-02-04(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. Because we conclude that the petition fails to establish each requirement of Rule 28.3(3)(e)(4), we deny the petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(f) allows an appellate court to accept a permissive interlocutory appeal when it concludes that the appeal is warranted.

Katrina J. ("Nina") Morris v. Maansi Piparia, M.D. April Schiemenz, M.D. And Christina Sebestyen, M.D., P.A. D/B/A ObGyn · filed 2020-09-03(f)

We conclude that the appeal is warranted, and we accept it. See id. § 51.014(f).

Section 51.014(d) requires a petitioner seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal to establish both a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and that immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Nutrien Ag Solutions, Inc. F/K/A Crop Production Services, Inc. and Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Peter Balderas and · filed 2020-09-14(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order not otherwise appealable, the petitioner must establish that (1) the order appealed involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2019); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4). Because the petition fails to establish each of these requirements, we deny the petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014 limits a permissive appeal to the order or part of the order the trial court permitted the party to appeal.

Lorraine Kenyon, Individually and as of the Estate of Theodore Kenyon v. Elephant Insurance Company, LLC · filed 2020-04-01(d), (f)

First, our jurisdiction is limited to the order or part of the order the trial court granted permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive appeal petition to establish a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and show that immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Allen Jr. v. Crown Pine Timber 1, LP · filed 2020-04-02(d)

To perfect a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the appellant, when in the trial court, must establish “(1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[,] and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

In a permissive appeal under Section 51.014, review is confined to the controlling question identified by the trial court.

M.B., Individually and as Next Friend of I.C. v. S.C. · filed 2020-04-09(f)

Therefore, although we granted the petition, we will confine ourselves to a determination of jurisdiction over Wife’s partition claim, as identified by the district court.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal that may materially advance the litigation before permission to appeal may be granted.

R&T Ellis Excavating, Inc. and Principal Services, Ltd. v. Floyd Page and Gale Page · filed 2020-04-02(d)

Because the companies have not shown they met the dual prongs required to grant permission to appeal from the orders denying their pleas, we deny their request for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(f) requires a timely application to the court of appeals after the trial court permits an interlocutory appeal; a request made before that permission is premature.

in Re James Weeks, Relator · filed 2020-04-07(f)

Relator’s request in this Court is premature. Should the trial court permit an appeal of the interlocutory order it will remain for Relator to make proper, timely application for interlocutory appeal to this Court. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(f).

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the order identifies a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and explains why immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Connor v. Douglas Hooks and Elizabeth Hooks · filed 2020-08-27(d)

Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes a trial court to permit an appeal of an order “not otherwise appealable” if “the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and if “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Subsection (d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order presents a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Segundo Navarro Drilling, Ltd., Lewis Petro Properties, Inc. and BP America Production Company v. Juan Salinas Ranch, Lt · filed 2020-11-17(d)

We conclude that the order to be appealed (1) involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, to wit: “whether the Lease is perpetuated through production in paying quantities as a matter of law irrespective of whether a breach of Article VI of the Lease occurred,” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. Accordingly, we GRANT appellants’ petition for permission to appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory order signed on July 21, 2020 with respect to the designated question of law.

Section 51.014(d)(2) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Harden Healthcare, LLC v. OLP Wyoming Springs, LLC · filed 2020-11-20(d)(2)

Having carefully reviewed the petition, the response, and the reply, we conclude that HH did not establish the statutory requirements for a permissive appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d)(2), (f). Accordingly, we deny HH’s petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantive trial court ruling on the controlling legal issue before a permissive appeal may proceed.

International Business MacHines Corporation v. Lufkin Industries, Inc. · filed 2020-11-18(d)

Absent any indication in the order or otherwise in the appellate record of the trial court’s substantive rulings on the three issues presented for this Court’s review, this permissive appeal does not meet Section 51.014(d)’s strict jurisdictional requirements.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Michael C. Howard and Virginia D. Hamilton v. Matterhorn Energy, LLC, and Mike Cherry · filed 2020-12-29(d)

Because we conclude that an immediate appeal will not advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the permissive appeal is improper.

Section 51.014(f) requires a petition for permissive appeal to be filed within 15 days after the trial court signs the order being appealed; an untimely petition cannot invoke appellate jurisdiction.

Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company v. McCormack · filed 2021-01-20(f)

Even if the petition met the other permissive appeal requirements, an untimely petition cannot invoke this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 51.014 requires a party seeking a permissive appeal to follow the prescribed procedures, including filing a petition and obtaining trial-court permission.

Hale v. Rising S Company, LLC, Clyde Wayne Scott, Gary Lynch · filed 2021-04-05(d), (f)

Additionally, as appellees point out in their jurisdictional brief, the procedures for a permissive appeal, including filing a petition and obtaining permission from the trial court to appeal the otherwise unappealable order, have not been followed.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the trial court grants permission, identifies a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion, and explains why immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

William Scott Feagan, as Independent of the Estate of Patty Lou Feagan v. Patricia Dianne Wilson and Stephen Wynne Feaga · filed 2021-05-13(d)

We conclude, however, that Appellants have met the requirements for a permissive appeal under Section 51.014(d) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Rule 28.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the trial court granted permission for the appeal of the interlocutory order, identified a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and explained why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order involves a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Triple P.G. Sand Development, LLC v. Del Pino · filed 2021-05-11(d)

To be entitled to a permissive interlocutory ... appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the petitioner must establish that (1) the order appealed involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (2) immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” ... The petition is granted.

Section 51.014(d) requires a party seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal to show a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and that an immediate appeal may advance the end of the litigation.

Valero Refinery-Texas, LP v. Vela · filed 2021-08-05(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must establish to the trial court that (1) the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) allowing an immediate appeal “may advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” ... Having reviewed Valero’s petition, the record documents attached thereto, and Vela’s response, this Court is of the opinion that Valero has not shown its entitlement to permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a party seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal to show a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Corley v. Timothy Corley,Jason Corley and Century Oaks Land LLC · filed 2021-06-30(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” ... and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Section 51.014(d) permits a trial court to authorize an interlocutory appeal when the order presents a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation’s end.

in Re American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2021-10-22(d)

Under that statute, the trial court may authorize an interlocutory appeal if (1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which a substantial ground exists for difference of opinion, and (2) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d). Neither element is satisfied here.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit’s jurisdictional challenge, but a later challenge must be new and distinct to restart the time to appeal.

Texas Department of Public Safety and Steven McCraw in His Official Capacity as Director of the Texas Department of Publ · filed 2022-02-03(a)(8)

To reset the appellate clock, any subsequent jurisdictional challenge must be “new and distinct.”

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order grants permission, identifies a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement, and explains why immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Rockwall Ranch Property Owners Association v. Joseph Gonzales, Daniel Estrada, and Jerry Werlla · filed 2022-03-11(d)

The interlocutory order the Association seeks to appeal satisfies Subsection 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 by expressly granting permission to appeal, identifying two controlling questions of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and stating why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Subsection (d) permits an interlocutory appeal when the order grants permission, identifies a controlling legal question with substantial grounds for disagreement, and explains how an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

NuStar Energy, L.P v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Ken Paxton, Attorney General · filed 2022-04-20(d)

The interlocutory order that NuStar seeks to appeal satisfies Subsection 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 by expressly granting permission to appeal, identifying a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and stating why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and an immediate appeal that may materially advance the end of the litigation.

GSM Wings IV, LLC, Serc, Inc., Robert Pina and GSM Wings II, LLC v. Eqyinvest Owner II, Ltd., LLP · filed 2022-06-14(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d); see also Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(a), (e)(4); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168. After reviewing the petition, the record, appellee’s response, and appellants’ reply, we conclude that the petition does not meet the requirements for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a written trial court order permitting a permissive interlocutory appeal, and its filing requirements are strictly construed.

Congious v. Whataburger Restaurants, LLC · filed 2022-06-30(d)

As the requirements for filing a permissive appeal are strictly construed and not satisfied in the absence of a written order permitting the appeal, we decline appellant’s request.

A permissive interlocutory appeal requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling question of law.

KFW Management, LLC D/B/A KFW Engineers and KFW Surveying, LLC v. SI-Creekside, Ltd D/B/A Sea Island Shrimp House · filed 2022-07-01(d)

Based on the briefing and record before us, a substantial ground for difference of opinion does not exist on this controlling question of law.

Section 51.014 permits a court of appeals to deny a permissive interlocutory appeal when factual disputes remain on the proposed controlling question of law.

Spitzer Industries, Inc., Curtis Kelly, Inc., and Luis Galeano v. Jesus Mendoza Cabrera, as Representative of the Estate · filed 2022-07-07(d), (f)

Having reviewed appellants’ petition, the record documents attached thereto, and the response, this Court is of the opinion that appellants have not shown their entitlement to permissive interlocutory appeal because fact issues remain on what appellants and the trial court have identified as a controlling question of law.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only after the trial court rules on a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Sanchez v. Spiral Diner & Bakery, John Doe, Jane Doe, and Manager Jane Doe · filed 2022-07-14(d)

Further, a permissive interlocutory appeal is authorized by statute only after the trial court has made a ruling on a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(c)(4). The order from which Sanchez appeals does not satisfy that requirement.

Section 51.014 permits denial of a permissive interlocutory appeal when fact issues remain on the purported controlling question of law.

Renaissance Medical Foundation v. Rebecca Lugo, Individually and as Next Friend of XXXXX XXXXX, a Minor · filed 2022-09-22(d), (f)

Having reviewed appellants’ petition, the record documents attached thereto, and the response, this Court is of the opinion that appellant has not shown its entitlement to permissive interlocutory appeal because fact issues remain on what the trial court identified as a controlling question of law.

A permissive interlocutory appeal requires trial-court permission and a timely petition before the appellate court has jurisdiction.

Johns v. the Fox Hall, Ltd AKA Fox Hall Apartments, Fox Hall Apartments, LLC and Fox Hall, Ltd · filed 2022-11-08(d), (f)

However, because the procedures for a permissive appeal—including filing a timely petition and obtaining permission from the trial court to appeal the otherwise unappealable order—have not been followed, we have no jurisdiction to determine the motion.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only if an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, among other requirements.

City of McKinney, Texas Board of Adjustment for City of McKinney v. Cowtown Redi Mix, Inc, Issam Al-Shmaisani · filed 2022-11-22(d)

Based on our review of the petitions and the record before us, we conclude that the parties have failed to establish that an immediate appeal might immediately advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) allows a court of appeals to deny a petition for permissive interlocutory appeal in its discretion.

William Clayborn Lorenz, Individually, and as Independent of the Estate of Tyson Desmer Lambeck, and Carmen Carter-Faugh · filed 2023-02-01(d)

Having fully considered the joint petition for permissive appeal, response, and reply, we deny the joint petition for permissive appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3; Sabre Travel Int’l v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex. 2019) (“Texas courts have discretion to accept or deny permissive interlocutory appeals . . . .”).

Section 51.014(d) permits an appeal from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order when the order presents a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Badger Tavern LP, 1676 Regal JV, and 1676 Regal Row, Dallas, Texas, IN REM v. City of Dallas · filed 2023-05-08(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. Because we conclude that the petition fails to establish each requirement of Rule 28.3(e)(4), we deny the petition for permissive appeal and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(e)(4); 42.3(a).

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal that may materially advance the end of the litigation.

The Hanover Insurance Company v. the City of Buda and the Barr Co., AIA · filed 2023-05-31(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d); see Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(e)(4); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168.

Section 51.014(d) requires trial court permission for a permissive appeal of an otherwise unappealable order.

McDaniel v. Clive Ryan and LaFree Ryan · filed 2023-07-27(d)

However, McDaniel did not follow the procedures for a permissive appeal, including filing a timely petition for permissive appeal within fifteen days after the order to be appealed was signed and obtaining permission from the trial court to appeal the otherwise unappealable order. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(a), (c), (e); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d), (f).

Section 51.014(d) requires a proposed permissive interlocutory appeal to present a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and to potentially advance the end of the litigation.

Cindy Nichole Kroth and Benjamin J. Corbin v. the Commons of Lake Houston Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2023-08-17(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits successive interlocutory appeals from rulings on a governmental unit’s pleas to the jurisdiction only when a later plea raises new and distinct grounds.

Glenn Allen Hegar, Jr., Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Alcorta · filed 2023-08-18(a)(8)

Although Section 51.014(a)(8) does not expressly limit a party to one interlocutory appeal, the right to successive interlocutory appeals is not without limits.

Section 51.014(d) requires a proposed permissive appeal to present a controlling question of law and to be capable of materially advancing the end of the litigation.

Mellon Real Estate, Inc. v. Gomez · filed 2023-11-30(d)

Thus, although the trial court denied summary judgment and ruled on seven issues labeled as “controlling,” Mellon has not established that the viability of Gomez’s negligence per se claim rests on the trial court’s rulings on the seven questions of law, and thus, has not established that the seven issues are controlling in this case. Moreover, Mellon has also not established that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) and (f) permit an interlocutory appeal when it may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and require the petition to explain why an appeal is warranted.

Wholesale, Inc. v. Houston Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2024-01-23(d), (f)

Here, the trial court’s order does not comply with the plain, mandatory language of section 51.014(d) and rule 168. ... Wholesale’s petition likewise does not comply with the plain, mandatory language of appellate rule 28.3(e)(4) and section 51.014(f).

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law that can be resolved without disputed factual issues for a permissive appeal.

Nathaniel MacK III D/B/A MacK Injury Attorneys and the Hall Law Group, PLLC v. Pittard · filed 2024-06-05(d)

Accordingly, we cannot say that this case involves a controlling question of law unconstrained by factual issues. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d); Mendez, 593 S.W.3d at 805.

Section 51.014(d) requires trial court permission for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Edgar Sifuentes, Charlotte Garate, and Lenk Transportation, Inc. v. Maka Logistics, LLC · filed 2024-06-27(d)

Specifically, the record before the Court fails to reflect that the trial court granted permission to appeal, so § 51.014(d) does not provide us with jurisdiction over this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a second interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental entity’s plea to the jurisdiction when the second ruling rests on different pleadings and evidence.

Augustin Rivera, Jr., Teresa Ereon Giltner, Harold Odom, Barbara Ellis, Anna M. McKim, Cynthia Eva Hujar Orr, C. Alfred · filed 2025-01-23(a)(8)

But in this case, the Board timely and successfully pursued the first appeal, Sonnenschein was ordered to supplement her response on remand, and the Board timely filed this appeal arguing her supplementary pleadings and evidence are insufficient. We have jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred a second time on a different record based on different pleadings and evidence.

Section 51.014(d) requires written trial-court permission for a permissive interlocutory appeal, a controlling legal question with substantial ground for disagreement, and an immediate appeal that may materially advance the litigation.

Cobb v. the Estate of Jesse Derwood Cobb · filed 2025-02-27(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable in a civil action, the requesting party must establish that the trial court, by written order, permitted the appeal and: (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Section 51.014 permits a permissive interlocutory appeal only when the controlling question is one of law unconstrained by factual disputes.

Aris Water Solutions, Inc., Solaris Water Midstream, LLC, Solaris Midstream DB-TX, LLC, Devon Energy Corporation, Devon · filed 2025-04-25(d)

Permissive appeals are governed by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(d)–(h), Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3. ... The controlling question must be solely a question of law unconstrained by procedural or factual issues. ... Because there are unresolved questions of material fact, we deny Aris’s petition for interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(f) provides that a granted permissive interlocutory appeal follows the rules for accelerated appeals.

City of Colleyville, Texas v. Mart, Inc. · filed 2025-07-01(f)

The appeal will be governed by the rules for accelerated appeals. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(f); Tex. R. App. P. 28.1, 28.3(k).

Section 51.014(d) requires written trial court permission for a permissive appeal and a controlling question of law whose immediate review may materially advance the litigation.

In the Estate of Alice C. Hartong v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-02(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must establish that the trial court, by written order, granted permission to appeal and that: (1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law on which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) permits an appeal of an interlocutory order to address subsidiary and ancillary issues pertinent to the controlling legal issue.

San Miguel Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Lee Franklin Lively, Arthur Wayne Swaim, Robert Murray Swaim, Bobbie Swaim, Rod · filed 2025-10-22(d)

As such, upon accepting a permissive appeal, appellate courts should address “all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to resolving the controlling legal issue” within the order.

Section 51.014(d)’s requirements for a permissive appeal are not satisfied when the certified question is unripe for review.

Westview Drive Investments v. Harris Central Appraisal District F/K/A Harris County Appraisal District · filed 2025-11-25(d)

Because the issue presented by the question is not ripe for review, we conclude that, as explained below, Section 51.014(d)’s two requirements are not satisfied.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling question of law before a permissive appeal may proceed.

Jones Jr. v. Richard Davison and Payton Lafleur · filed 2025-09-25(d)

Jones has not met the requirements for a permissive appeal, because he has not shown there to be a substantial ground for difference of opinion about the law supporting the trial court’s order.

Section 51.014(d)(2) permits an interlocutory appeal when it may materially advance the end of litigation; the appeal need not resolve every issue.

Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC and Jim Hall v. DOH Oil Company · filed 2025-09-30(d)(2)

But permissive appeals only require that an appeal may advance the termination of litigation; it does not require that the appeal resolve all issues and end litigation.

Subsection (d) requires the trial court to have substantively decided the specific controlling legal issue presented for permissive appeal.

KamKane Enterprises, LLC v. City of Gholson, Eddie Oliver, Ric Maddox, Zach McFarland, Holley Herwig, Buck McAdams II, a · filed 2026-04-02(d)

Thus, no controlling question of law is presented for an appellate court’s analysis, as required by Section 51.014, unless the record reflects the trial court’s determination of the specific legal issue presented for the appellate court to decide.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal with the trial court’s permission when the order presents a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Stellar Virtual Texas v. Aguilar · filed 2026-05-14(d)

Pursuant to Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a trial court “may . . . permit an appeal from an order that is not otherwise appealable” when (1) the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (2) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d). “Such an appeal is authorized only with the trial court’s permission . . . .” Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 146 (Tex. 2022). Stellar has not requested permission to file a permissive interlocutory appeal in this case.

Section 51.014(d)(2) requires an interlocutory appeal to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Sun Metals Group v. Yu · filed 2026-01-06(d)(2)

Separately, an interlocutory appeal would not “materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d)(2).

Section 51.014(d) allows a controlling question of law to arise from a procedural ruling or the application of law to facts.

Motiva Enterprises, LLC v. Whitmire · filed 2026-03-26(d)

Nor does the text of the statute prevent us from reviewing questions of law that arise from a trial court’s procedural rulings or application of legal principles to the facts of the case.

Section 51.014(d)(1)’s substantial-ground requirement is satisfied when a trial court permits an appeal after recognizing that its ruling may conflict with binding precedent.

Helena Chemical Company v. Phillip Bales, Derek Dieringer, Wilbert Dieringer, Michael Hoch, Cmh Farms, Inc., Mh Farms Se · filed 2026-05-15(d)(1)

But when a trial court denies a motion and its grant of permission to appeal recognizes that the denial may be at odds with controlling precedent, the daylight between the two courts is enough to establish the difference of opinion that Section 51.014(d)(1) requires.

Section 51.014 allows a court of appeals to permit an interlocutory appeal when the order involves a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

C.R. Devine, Frances Louise Devine, and C.R. Devine, Inc. v. Doh Oil Company · filed 2020-03-11(d), (f)

We have discretion to permit an interlocutory appeal from an order “involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” when “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d), (f); see Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 730–33 (Tex. 2019).

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order compelling arbitration.

Everyone's Debit Card, Inc. v. FSV Payment Systems, Ltd. · filed 2002-10-03

The Texas statute permitting appeal of certain interlocutory orders does not condone appeals of orders compelling arbitration. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon 1999).

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration under the Texas General Arbitration Act.

in Re: Kebret I. Mohamed · filed 2002-10-31(a)

We agree with the parties that no interlocutory appeal lies from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration under the TAA.

Section 51.014(a)(4) does not permit an interlocutory appeal when the requested temporary injunction merely seeks to prohibit arbitration.

Neutral Posture Inc. and Rebecca Boenigk v. Bodybilt, Inc. Ergobilt, Inc. and American Arbitration Association · filed 2002-10-17(a)(4)

However, when the injunctive relief sought is nothing more than a request to prohibit arbitration, no interlocutory appeal lies.

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Brooks, Melvin C. v. Pep Boys Automotive Supercenters, AKA Pep Boys Mannie, Moe & Jack of California · filed 2003-03-13(a)

An order compelling arbitration under the FAA is neither a final disposition, nor expressly authorized by any of the provisions of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code that permit interlocutory appeals.

Section 51.014(a)(4) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order that stays arbitration.

in Re BHP Billiton Petroleum (Americas) Inc. · filed 2009-12-04(a)(4)

Although both parties agree that we have dual bases for jurisdiction to review the trial court’s express order enjoining BHP from pursuing the AAA arbitration and staying that arbitration, we conclude that the actual order issued by the trial court is one staying the AAA arbitration. ... Therefore, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction BHP’s interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order prohibiting it from pursuing the AAA arbitration and staying that arbitration, and we proceed to determine whether BHP is entitled to mandamus relief from the trial court’s order staying the AAA arbitration.

Section 51.014(4) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from an order refusing a temporary injunction when the injunction merely seeks to halt arbitration.

Zachary v. Sis-Tech Applications LLP Sis-Tech Solutions LP Sis-Tech Apps LLC and Sis-Tech Solutions GP Inc. · filed 2011-05-19(4)

We hold that a trial court’s order refusing a temporary injunction enjoining further prosecution of a demand for arbitration may not be challenged by interlocutory appeal because an order denying an application to stay arbitration is an interlocutory order with no legislatively authorized avenue for appeal before a final judgment.

Section 51.014(a)(7) authorizes an appeal from an order denying a special appearance, including an order entered after a final judgment.

Sarjak Container Lines Singapore PTE. Limited v. Semons · filed 2023-05-04(a)(7)

Most post-judgment orders are not appealable because no statute generally authorizes an appeal from post-judgment orders. ... However, section 51.014 does authorize an appeal from an order denying a special appearance.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appearance.

Noris G. Rogers v. Fia Card Services, N.A. F/K/A Mbna America Bank, N.a · filed 2009-10-08(a)(7)

The record reflects the order signed June 2, 2009, is not the denial of a special appearance and therefore not appealable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(7).

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal after the trial court rules on a special appearance.

in Re John and Nanci Lamar · filed 2008-07-03(a)(7)

Because interlocutory appeal will be available to the Lamars after the trial court rules on the special appearance, we find that an adequate remedy by appeal exists. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7).

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a Rule 120a special appearance; labeling a motion a special appearance does not establish that it raises a Rule 120a issue.

Cantu v. Gray & Becker · filed 2002-11-21(a)(7)

A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court that "grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a" except in particular situations that are not before us in these proceedings. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2003). Here, although the district court received a motion which contained in its title the words "special appearance," the court was not presented with a motion or any evidence that substantively invoked Rule 120a or involved in any way special appearance issues. We conclude that the district court's failure to stay proceedings to allow the appellants to pursue an interlocutory appeal did not affect the substantial rights of the appellants.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal when an order, read with the trial court’s findings and conclusions, denies a special appearance.

Silbaugh v. Arturo v. Ramirez · filed 2002-12-19(a)(7)

Accordingly, we conclude that the August 6, 2001 order, in conjunction with its findings of fact and conclusions of law, was a denial of Silbaugh’s special appearance that is subject to interlocutory appeal .

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from a judge's signed letter that unequivocally denies a special appearance.

Agostino Perna and Mobile Medical Training Unit, L.L.C. v. Tim Kennedy, Individually and as Representative of the Estate · filed 2004-10-07(a)(7)

Here, as in Dunn, the letter is an unequivocal act of the judge assigned to the case, and there is no indication in the record that the judge intended to sign a formal order. We conclude the letter is an order for purposes of appeal under Section 51.014.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a special appearance, but not from an order denying reconsideration of one.

Marco Digges, Michael Ponzica, W. Todd Rogers, and D. Eric WIlliams v. Andrew Dweyer, Individually, and Dort Cameron, In · filed 2004-11-18(a)(7)

An order granting a special appearance is an interlocutory, appealable order. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). ... Such motions, however, are not independently appealable. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.04(a)(7) (Vernon 2004) (including only orders granting or denying special appearances as appealable interlocutory orders).

Section 51.014(a)(7) excludes Texas Family Code cases from interlocutory appeals of orders denying special appearances.

in Re: Patricia Karin Bradford · filed 2007-02-15(a)(7)

We also point out that, while the Legislature, subsequent to Canadian Helicopters , provided for interlocutory appeal of denials of special appearances, that legislation specifically exempted cases brought under the Texas Family Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

Section 51.014(a)(7) allows an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a special appearance; the notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of the ruling.

Tom Matis and Gary Sorensen v. Mark Golden, Brian Kosoglow and Jonathan Deming · filed 2007-05-16(a)(7)

An appeal of an order granting or denying a special appearance is an interlocutory appeal which must be perfected by filing a notice of appeal within twenty days after the ruling. ... Matis’s attempted appeal from the denial of his special appearance is untimely, and we do not have jurisdiction to address it.

Section 51.014(a) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appearance; an appeal cannot proceed when the record shows no such denial.

Waggoner v. Lead Generation, LLC · filed 2012-12-21(a)

A party may appeal a district court’s interlocutory order that denies a special appearance. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2012); see BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002). However, the record does not show that the trial court considered or denied the special appearance.

Section 51.014(a)(7) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal when the trial court did not consider the merits of a special appearance.

Critter Control, Inc. and Kevin Clark v. Galt Strategis, LLC · filed 2015-10-05(a)(7)

Because the record before us does not reflect the trial court considered the merits of the special appearance, we cannot agree section 51.014(a)(7) of the civil practice and remedies code authorizes this appeal.

Section 51.014 permits review of a discovery ruling in an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a special appearance, but only insofar as the ruling bears on the special appearance.

Jennifer Deuel Stanton as Co-Independent of the Estate of Ardyce Deuel-Nash, and Individually v. Gloerson · filed 2016-11-30(a)(7)

Generally, the denial of a motion to compel discovery responses does not fall within the ambit of section 51.014. ... Accordingly, we will address Stanton’s arguments on the denial of the motion to compel, but only to the extent they can be construed as challenging the granting of the special appearance.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a Rule 120a special appearance, except in a suit brought under the Family Code.

in Re Federal Corporation · filed 2018-01-24(a)(7)

Under section 51.014(a)(7) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a party may appeal an interlocutory order that “grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except in a suit brought under the Family Code.” ... The challenged order denied relator’s special appearance under Rule 120a, and the underlying suit was not brought under the family code. See id. Accordingly, relator has not shown that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a Rule 120a motion; it does not make an order denying summary judgment appealable when no Rule 120a motion was filed.

Ajanaku v. Dadashev · filed 2019-09-26(a)(7)

Appellant did not file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA nor did he file a motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, the grant or denial of which is appealable as an interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7). Therefore, there is no statutory exception that allows appellant to appeal the interlocutory order denying summary judgment.

Section 51.014(a)(1) and (a)(2) permit interlocutory appeals from orders appointing a receiver or overruling a motion to vacate a receiver’s appointment.

Batton v. Batton · filed 2024-05-02(a)(1), (a)(2)

A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court that appoints a receiver or overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but an order modifying the receivership is not separately appealable under that provision.

In the Guardianship of Martha Atelia Clarkson v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-09-21(a)(1)

The August 2022 order modifying the receivership was not separately appealable under section 51.014(a)(1).

Section 51.014 permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but not from an order denying appointment.

Noris Rogers v. Kingsbridge Community Association, Inc., John Pertgen, Robert Kelly, Jeffery Smith, Kimberly Robinson · filed 2023-08-22(a)(1)

Section 51.014 does not authorize Rogers’ interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying his request for appointment of a receiver or the trial court’s order.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but an order resolving a discrete phase of an existing receivership does not appoint a new receiver.

Natin Paul WC 1st and Trinity, LP WC 1st and Trinity, GP, LLC WC 3rd and Congress, LP And WC 3rd and Congress, GP, LLC v · filed 2023-02-08(a)(1)

As Mitte points out, an order that appoints a receiver is an appealable interlocutory order under Subsection 51.014(a)(1). ... The twenty-day deadline is not applicable here because the Supplemental Receivership Order did not “appoint a new receiver” but resolved a discrete phase of an ongoing receivership.

Section 51.014(a)(1) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a successor trustee.

Richard Urbanovsky, Individually and as Trustee of the Urbanovsky Family Trusts v. Frank Urbanovsky, Edith Vick, Mary L. · filed 2022-10-21(a)(1)

Section 51.014(a)(1) does not allow for interlocutory appeal of an order appointing successor trustees.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing an original trustee, but not a successor trustee.

Clark v. Steven Wayne Clark and Robert George Clark · filed 2021-12-14(a)(1)

Under this strict construction, Texas courts have consistently construed section 51.014(a)(1) and its statutory predecessors to provide for an interlocutory appeal from an order in which the trial court appoints an original trustee but not to provide for an interlocutory appeal from an order in which the trial court appoints a successor trustee.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but limits review to issues germane to the receivership.

Peek v. Mayfield · filed 2021-07-29(a)(1)

To the extent that the interlocutory order appoints a receiver, it is appealable; “[a] person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . appoints a receiver or trustee.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1). ... True to these holdings, we decline to consider the many issues briefed by the parties that are not germane to the propriety of the receivership.

Section 51.014(a)(1) allows an accelerated interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

in Re: John Jeffrey McCafferty · filed 2015-11-05(a)(1)

An appeal of an order appointing a receiver is an accelerated appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1) (West 2015).

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

Tugman v. Tugman · filed 2008-05-22(a)(1)

One exception to this rule is an interlocutory order "[appointing] a receiver or trustee." See id. § 51.014(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007). ... Because appellant challenges the appointment of a receiver, the trial court's order is appealable.

Section 51.014(a)(9) does not permit an interlocutory appeal challenging an order granting an extension to cure deficiencies in an expert report.

Efrain Rivera, M.D./Anita Loweree v. Anita Loweree/Efrain Rivera, M.D. · filed 2008-08-28(a)(9)

To the extent that Ms. Loweree's complaint is directed at the trial court's grant of her request for a 30-day extension to cure any deficiencies, which she plead only as alternative relief, she is not permitted to challenge that order by interlocutory appeal. See Tex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(9).

Section 51.014(a)(1) and (2) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver or trustee or overruling a motion to vacate that appointment; the right to appeal does not arise before an appointment.

in Re Winston C. Kenworthy, Kenworthy Tank Company, L.P., and Cherokee Rental, Inc. · filed 2004-02-18(a)(1), (a)(2)

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a party may bring an interlocutory appeal from an order that (1) appoints a receiver or trustee or (2) overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or trustee. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1)&(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Accordingly, it appears that relators will have an adequate remedy by appeal if the trial court appoints a receiver or trustee. We would note in this regard that, although the trial court has scheduled a hearing regarding the appointment of a trustee, it has not yet appointed one. Relators’ right to an interlocutory appeal will not exist unless and until the trial court appoints a receiver or trustee.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but does not make an unrelated monetary award in that order appealable.

in Re: Roy Edmonds · filed 2008-02-29(a)(1)

The monetary award neither depends upon, nor relates to, the appointment of a receiver. Therefore, the provision awarding $6,000 to Roy as reimbursement for maintenance of the property is not within the parameters of appointing a receiver. Because this award is not one of the interlocutory orders made appealable by section 51.014, mandamus is the proper avenue for review.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but does not authorize an appeal from an order changing the terms of the appointment.

Acting by and Through Torchlight Loan Services, LLC (f/K/A ING Clarion v. JRK- Villages at Meyerland · filed 2011-01-06(a)(1)

Section 51.014(a) does not address orders modifying or amending the terms of a receiver’s appointment.

Section 51.014(a)(1) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a successor trustee or receiver.

Haluska v. Haluska-Rausch · filed 2012-01-24(a)(1)

Because the order is interlocutory, not final and appealable, and because section 51.014(a)(1) does not permit us to exercise jurisdiction from interlocutory appeals of orders appointing successor trustees or receivers, we must dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order that functions as an appointment of a receiver, regardless of its title.

Chapa v. Chapa · filed 2012-12-28(a)(1)

Considering the substance and function of section 4 in the context of the record, we construe that portion of the order as appointing a receiver over Chapco’s assets and business. ... Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal challenging that portion of the August 8, 2012 order.

Section 51.014(a)(1) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

Greg Gibson and Christine Gibson v. Cuellar · filed 2013-09-05(a)(1)

Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly authorizes an appeal from certain “interlocutory orders” of the trial court, including orders appointing a receiver.

Section 51.014(a)(1) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

in the Matter of the Estate of Esther Abell Denton · filed 2014-11-07(a)(1)

We recognize that an appeal from an interlocutory order that appoints a receiver is expressly authorized by statute. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(1).

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

in Re David Iloani · filed 2019-06-20(a)(1)

Relator had a right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the March 26 order appointing the receiver. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1) (Supp.).

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver.

in Re Christopher Bran, CBMJ Investments & Development, LLC, Montrose Multifamily II Holdings, LLC, and UrbanOne Propert · filed 2022-07-12(a)(1)

Relators have an adequate remedy by appeal, and in fact have appealed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1) (providing for interlocutory appeal from order appointing receiver).

Section 51.014(a)(9) does not permit an immediate appeal when the trial court grants time to cure a deficient expert report.

Methodist Hospital D/B/A Houston Methodist Hospital, Hemangshu Podder, MD, and Okeckukwu Okidi, MD; Lifegift Organ Donat · filed 2025-04-24(a)(9)

We conclude that the trial court had discretion to grant an extension of time to allow Garner to cure the report’s deficiencies as to Dr. Podder, and the exercise of that discretion is not immediately reviewable by interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(9) bars an interlocutory appeal from an order granting an extension to amend a timely served expert report.

Shilpa Thakkra Pankaj and Peekaboo Pediatrics v. Eva Hernandez Individually and as Next Friend of J.H., a Minor Child · filed 2024-07-23(a)(9)

But that error is not reviewable in this accelerated interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(9) (providing jurisdiction to review interlocutory order denying motion to dismiss for failure to serve expert report required by Act but also specifying “that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension” to file amended expert report).