Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a government employee’s official-capacity plea to the jurisdiction, but not from a ruling on an individual-capacity plea based on personal immunity.

Cecil Adams and Maxine Adams v. Harris County and Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the First Court of Appeals · filed 2015-12-28(a)(8)

The court’s order granting the plea filed by Prine in his official capacity is appealable under section 51.014(a)(8). ... Therefore, the trial court’s ruling on the plea was not one that “grant[ed] or denie[d] a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit,” and the Adamses’ interlocutory appeal is not authorized by section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction only when the plea raises an issue that can be jurisdictional.

City of Rosenberg v. State · filed 2015-10-13(a)(8)

Thus, an interlocutory appeal cannot be taken from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction that does not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; an open-enrollment charter school operator qualifies as a governmental unit for this purpose.

Neighborhood Centers Inc. v. Doreatha Walker · filed 2015-07-30(a)(8)

Based on the supreme court’s precedent in C2 Construction, we hold that Neighborhood Centers is a governmental unit as that term is defined in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001 and that, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the express language of section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; an order allowing amended pleadings without ruling on the plea is not appealable.

Bexar Metropolitan Water District v. Ramos · filed 2009-05-27(a)(8)

In this case, all parties agree that the relevant statute is Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a), which allows an interlocutory appeal to be considered from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. ... Because the trial court's orders neither granted nor denied the pleas to the jurisdiction, we have no jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals; therefore, the appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits any party to appeal an order granting or denying a governmental entity’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Doane v. Cooke · filed 2008-11-14(a)(8)

The Board previously filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court overruled on the basis that any party may appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental entity’s plea to the jurisdiction, as Appellants have done in the present case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). For that same reason, we shall again decline the Board’s request to dismiss this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows any party to appeal an order granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction.

Mitz v. Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 2008-11-14(a)(8)

The Board previously filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court overruled on the basis that any party may appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction, as Appellants have done in the present case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). For that same reason, we shall again decline the Board's request to dismiss this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows any party to appeal an order granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction.

Mitz v. TEXAS STATE BD. OF VET. MED. EXAM. · filed 2009-02-18(a)(8)

The Board previously filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court overruled on the basis that any party may appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction, as Appellants have done in the present case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). For that same reason, we shall again decline the Board's request to dismiss this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, but not the denial of a motion for summary judgment, even when the motion asserts sovereign immunity.

Brazos Transit District v. Lozano · filed 2002-03-28(a)(8)

In section (8), the legislature expressly permitted appeal by a governmental unit from a particular procedural vehicle, and only that vehicle. The legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal by a governmental unit from the denial of any other order, irrespective of the grounds upon which it was sought.

Section 51.014(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction.

the City of Houston v. Sharon King, Carl Hughes · filed 2002-05-23(8)

Under section 51.014(8), interlocutory appeal is available only to challenge the granting or denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction.

Arthur Ware, Individually and as Potter County Judge v. Terry Miller, Potter County Constable, Precinct 2 · filed 2002-08-08(a)(8)

An interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Potter County's plea to the jurisdiction is clearly within the purview of subsection (a)(8) of section 51.014.

Section 51.014(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction, including one asserting immunity from suit, but does not cover an assertion of immunity from liability.

Baylor College of Medicine v. John David Tate, Jr. · filed 2002-05-23(8)

In section 51.014(8), the Legislature intended that interlocutory appeal be available only to challenge the granting or denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. Clearly, this section applies to, among other things, assertions of immunity from suit. It does not apply to assertions of immunity from liability.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Heart Hospital IV, L.P. and Texas Workforce Commission v. King · filed 2003-08-29(a)(8)

In any event, section 51.014 of the civil practice and remedies code allows a party to bring an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit ." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, in this interlocutory appeal, we will address the district court's order denying the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction only when the plea is by a governmental unit.

Mendoza v. Hensley · filed 2003-09-18(a)(8)

However, even if Appellant intended to bring this interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8), he cannot do so as neither Hensley nor Texas Western Municipal Gas Corporation is a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Heart Hospital IV, L.P. v. King · filed 2003-10-30(a)(8)

In any event, section 51.014 of the civil practice and remedies code allows a party to bring an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. " Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp.2003) (emphasis added). Thus, in this interlocutory appeal, we will address the district court's order denying the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction only for governmental agencies.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores · filed 2004-01-29(a)(8)

Because interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction is available by statute only to governmental agencies, [6] we agree with appellees' contention that we have no jurisdiction to review the probate court's denial of appellants' pleas to the jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a constable’s plea to the jurisdiction in a removal suit because the suit is against the constable in his official capacity and the county.

Leon " Bubba " Smith, Potter County Constable, Precinct 4 v. State · filed 2004-03-16(a)(8)

Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows one to appeal an interlocutory order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001" of the same code. ... There, we concluded that an attempt to remove a constable from office was a suit not only against the constable in his official capacity but also the county. ... To avoid inconsistency, we adopt the reasoning and result in Crawford and apply it to the case now before us.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit interlocutory appellate review of a ruling on a nonjurisdictional notice defense.

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Loutzenhiser · filed 2004-07-09(a)(8)

And having correctly concluded that the Medical Center’s notice argument was not jurisdictional, the court of appeals did not have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to affirm that portion of the trial court’s order.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction based on lack of notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

City of Houston v. Duncan · filed 2004-10-05(a)(8)

Consequently, a court of appeals has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction challenging notice and must dismiss the appeal. ... For this reason, we dismiss the City’s interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(8) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction based on lack of notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Salazar · filed 2004-11-04(8)

Moreover, the denial of a plea to the trial court’s jurisdiction based on lack of proper notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act may not serve as a basis for an interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction only for governmental agencies.

Phillip M. Krumnow, Jr. v. Krumnow · filed 2005-08-24(a)(8)

An interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction is available by statute only to governmental agencies.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental entity’s plea to the jurisdiction only when the plea raises an issue that can be jurisdictional.

City of McAllen, Texas v. Zellers · filed 2007-03-01(a)(8)

We are authorized to consider an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). However, "an interlocutory appeal cannot be taken from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction that does not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional." ... Thus, the City did not raise an "issue that can be jurisdictional," and we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies a claim of no jurisdiction, even if that claim was raised by a summary judgment motion instead of a plea to the jurisdiction.

Montgomery County Precinct 1 v. Norman Frank Reed and Casey Albinus · filed 2006-12-28(a)(8)

Although Montgomery County filed a motion for summary judgment instead of a plea to the jurisdiction, the County is entitled to an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 51.014(a)(8) because the trial court denied the County's claim of no jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies a governmental unit's jurisdictional claim, regardless of whether the claim was raised by a plea to the jurisdiction, a summary judgment motion, or another means.

University of Texas Pan American v. Tony Aguilar and Kay Marie Aguilar · filed 2007-03-01(a)(8)

If a trial court denies the governmental unit's claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for summary judgment, or otherwise, the Legislature has provided that an interlocutory appeal may be brought.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows an interlocutory appeal from a county court at law’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction only when the appealing party is a governmental unit.

Debra Medina, Mallory Miller, Jr., Dustan Costine, Chad Creighton, Richard Wyatt and Kay Fisher v. Tina Benkiser and the · filed 2009-12-31(a)(8)

Moreover, a party, cannot appeal from an interlocutory order of a county court at law granting or denying a plea to jurisdiction unless that party is a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a transfer order that implicitly rejects a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Texas Board of Law Examiners v. Little · filed 2009-12-31(a)(8)

However, an interlocutory appeal may be taken on a transfer order that constitutes an "implicit rejection" of a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction. ... In light of our conclusion below that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case, we construe the trial court's order granting transfer as an "implicit rejection" of TBLE's plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction when claims against another party remain pending.

Brooks v. Burnet Central Appraisal District and Appraisal Review Board of Burnet County · filed 2010-02-26(a)(8)

Based on the actions of the parties and the language of the order, it appears that the trial court's order on the plea to the jurisdiction is in fact interlocutory, appealable under section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction only if the plea raises an issue that can be jurisdictional.

Sheriff Leo Samaniego, in His Individual and Official Capacity, and El Paso County, Texas v. Janet Keller, Antonio Escob · filed 2010-03-17(a)(8)

An interlocutory appeal cannot be taken from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction that does not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a governmental unit’s denied plea raises an issue implicating the trial court’s jurisdiction.

City of Crowley, Texas v. Doug Ray · filed 2010-03-18(a)(8)

Civil practice and remedies code section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order that denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. ... Accordingly, the City raised an issue implicating the trial court’s jurisdiction over Ray’s declaratory judgment action, and this court has jurisdiction to consider the City’s interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction when other parties or claims remain before the trial court.

Fox v. Joe Wardy, Mayor, Susan Austin, Jose A. Lozano, John F. Cook, Daniel S. Power, Paul J. Escobar, Vivian Rojas · filed 2010-06-30(a)(8)

For the plea to qualify as an interlocutory order, the granting or denying of the same by a governmental unit must leave other parties or claims at issue in the trial court.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not allow an interlocutory appeal of an order denying reconsideration of grounds previously raised in a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction, but allows review of a separate and distinct new ground.

City of Houston v. Estate of Jones · filed 2010-08-03(a)(8)

The portion of the 2009 plea repeating the issues in the 2006 plea was in effect a motion to reconsider those issues, and we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to reconsider. ... However, we do have jurisdiction to consider the new ground argued in the 2009 plea because it is a separate and distinct ground.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an individual government employee’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Kachikwu Illoh, M.D. v. Damita Carroll and Karen Butler, Individually and as Representatives of the Estate of James Carr · filed 2010-08-05(a)(8)

However, section 51.014(a)(8) is inapplicable because Dr. Illoh is not a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a county's plea to the jurisdiction.

the County of El Paso, Texas and Richard Wiles, in His Official Capacity as El Paso County Sheriff v. Richard… · filed 2011-03-09(a)(8)

Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code specifies that a person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that grants or denies a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction. ... However, because the County of El Paso is statutorily defined to be a governmental unit, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider its interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction when the plea raises an issue that does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.

El Paso Community College District v. Chase · filed 2011-05-04(a)(8)

Although Dr. Chase does not expressly request dismissal of the appeal, that is the correct disposition because EPCC has raised an issue in its plea to the jurisdiction that does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies a governmental entity's jurisdictional challenge raised through a motion to dismiss.

Texas Tech University Health Science Center v. Williams · filed 2011-05-27(a)(8)

Here, TTUHSC, challenged the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction by asserting its immunity from suit under the provisions of Sections 101.106(b) and (f), through the procedural vehicle of a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider TTUHSC's interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss wherein it challenged the trial court's jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(5) applies to an interlocutory appeal even when the City labels its pleading a plea to the jurisdiction.

City of Houston v. Rodriguez · filed 2011-11-03(a)(5)

The fact that the City entitled its pleading ―plea to the jurisdiction‖ does not affect the application of section 51.014(a)(5).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction; extending a temporary restraining order while leaving the plea unresolved does not qualify.

Fernandez v. Pimentel · filed 2012-01-11(a)(8)

An exception to this general rule is found in Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which allows an appeal from an interlocutory order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a government entity. ... As in Gray , the trial judge here continued the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction and did not make a ruling on it. As in Gray , we lack jurisdiction absent a ruling by the trial judge.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction only when a governmental unit made the plea.

City of Houston v. Proler · filed 2012-05-31(a)(8)

Under this provision, an interlocutory appeal is not available if the plea to the jurisdiction was not made by a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a summary-judgment motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction, even if the trial court did not rule on a plea to the jurisdiction.

Ted Lazarides, in His Official Capacity v. Farris · filed 2012-04-17(a)(8)

When the record does not contain an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction, but does include an order denying a motion for summary judgment in which the movant challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction, an interlocutory appeal may be taken under subsection (a)(8) irrespective of the selected procedural vehicle.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits a governmental unit to appeal the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction when the plea raises an issue that can be jurisdictional, even if other issues cannot.

the City of El Paso, Texas v. Caples Land Company, LLC and William D. Abraham · filed 2013-01-23(a)(4)

We are aware that an interlocutory appeal generally cannot be taken from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction that does not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional. Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004). In a case where a party raises such an issue, the correct disposition is to dismiss the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. In this case, however, the City has raised in Issue Three an argument which can be jurisdictional. Therefore, we have jurisdiction of the appeal from the order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits the appellate court to decide the merits of an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction even when the defendant has not established governmental immunity.

Taylor v. Lubbock Regional MHMR & JI Texas Risk Management and Texas Department of Insurance Division of Work · filed 2013-01-08(a)(8)

Our conclusion that JI Specialty Services, Inc. has not established its governmental immunity might lead one to the conclusion we lack jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of the grant of its plea to the jurisdiction, and should dismiss the appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012). We do not do so. See Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004) superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2012) (holding that proper course of action in such circumstances is to rule on merits of appeal rather than dismiss).

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit a new interlocutory appeal when a governmental unit repeats grounds from an earlier denied plea to the jurisdiction after the time to appeal that denial has passed.

the City of Houston v. Atser, L.P. · filed 2013-01-31(a)(8)

We conclude that because the City did not assert a new ground or basis for immunity in its Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, this motion was “substantively a motion to reconsider” the trial court’s earlier denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. Estate of Jones, 2012 WL 6634065, at *4. Because the City did not file a notice of interlocutory appeal within twenty days of the trial court’s order denying its original plea to the jurisdiction, we hold that we lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to consider any part of the merits of the City’s interlocutory appeal.2 Id.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Vallejo v. Cameron County · filed 2013-05-30(a)(8)

Section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code permits an interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits review of the entirety of a timely appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction when the plea raises new jurisdictional challenges alongside challenges raised in an earlier plea.

City of New Braunfels, Texas v. Carowest Land, Ltd. · filed 2014-04-30(a)(8)

To the extent Jones raises any doubts in that regard, we conclude we possess jurisdiction over the entirety of the City’s present appeal by virtue of its having perfected a timely appeal under section 51.014(a)(8) as to jurisdictional challenges not raised in its earlier plea and the rationale of Rusk State Hospital v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94-96 (Tex. 2012).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a summary judgment order resolving a governmental unit’s jurisdictional challenge based on immunity, even without a ruling on its plea to the jurisdiction.

Frank and Shelley Thornton v. Northeast Harris County MUD 1 · filed 2014-07-24(a)(8)

Despite the lack of a ruling on MUD’s plea, the Thorntons can appeal and this court has interlocutory jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order granting MUD summary judgment on immunity-based grounds.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction is denied, but denial of a no-evidence summary-judgment motion on jurisdictional grounds does not imply denial of the plea.

Waller County v. City of Hempstead · filed 2014-11-26(a)(8)

Accordingly, no denial of a jurisdictional plea can be inferred from the denial of a no-evidence summary judgment argued on jurisdictional grounds.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a governmental unit’s jurisdictional challenge only after the trial court grants or denies it.

West Travis County Public Utility Agency, on Behalf of Itself and Its Directors, Larry Fox, Michael Murphy, Ray Whisenan · filed 2017-01-04(a)(8)

Because the trial court has yet to enter an order that grants or denies the Agency’s jurisdictional challenge, we lack subject- matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal the denial of a motion that substantively challenges jurisdiction, even if the motion is labeled a motion for summary judgment.

City of Brownsville v. City of Port Isabel and Town of Laguna Vista · filed 2018-05-24(a)(8)

We note that the trial court’s order denying Brownsville’s MSJ is an appealable interlocutory order even if it was not labeled a “PTJ.” The reason is that a governmental unit, such as Brownsville, may appeal an interlocutory order that denies a PTJ; however, whether a motion is a PTJ depends not on its label but on its substance.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

in Re Nurses License of Nancy Nichols · filed 2017-11-17(a)(8)

Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the interlocutory orders granting the pleas to the jurisdiction of the Workforce Commission and the Board of Nursing.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction only when a governmental unit filed the plea.

in the Interest of I.C.D.N., a Minor Child · filed 2018-01-29(a)(8)

Because a governmental unit did not file the plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court’s order denying the plea is not subject to interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal an interlocutory order denying a plea to the jurisdiction; whether a motion qualifies depends on its substance, not its label.

City of Brownsville v. City of Port Isabel and Town of Laguna Vista · filed 2018-12-19(a)(8)

We note that the trial court’s order denying Brownsville’s MSJ is an appealable interlocutory order even if it was not labeled a “PTJ.” The reason is that a governmental unit, such as Brownsville, may appeal an interlocutory order that denies a PTJ; however, whether a motion is a PTJ depends not on its label but on its substance.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; a trial court’s failure to rule creates no appealable order.

San Jacinto River Authority v. Lewis · filed 2019-04-16(a)(8)

We conclude there exists no appealable order for this court to review under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental entity’s sovereign-immunity challenge, regardless of how the trial-court pleading is styled.

Phi, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile Justice Department F/K/A Texas Youth Commission · filed 2019-04-26(a)(8)

For purposes of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders, the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the denial of the combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, regardless of how the trial-court pleading was styled, because the substance of the pleading was to raise sovereign immunity, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction only when the plea raises an issue that can be jurisdictional.

Eastland County Appraisal District and Brown County Appraisal District v. Peninsula Pipelines (North Texas), LLC · filed 2019-06-13(a)(8)

Because Appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction did not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional, it is not a “plea to the jurisdiction” for purposes of an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; without a trial court ruling, there is no appealable order.

San Jacinto River Authority v. Allen · filed 2019-07-09(a)(8)

We conclude there exists no appealable order for this court to review under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(a)(8) requires an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; a trial court’s failure to rule does not create an appealable order.

San Jacinto River Authority v. Beasley · filed 2019-07-09(a)(8)

Because the trial court has not ruled on SJRA’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, no ruling exists over which this court may exercise its interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. ... We conclude there exists no appealable order for this court to review under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(a)(8) requires an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s jurisdictional plea; a trial court’s failure to rule does not create an appealable order.

San Jacinto River Authority v. Edmond I. Hewitt, Jr. and Mary Sue Hewitt · filed 2019-07-09(a)(8)

We conclude there exists no appealable order for this court to review under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, including a plea by an employee sued in an official capacity, but does not permit an appeal from a nonfinal dismissal of claims against an employee sued individually.

Johnson v. Mark Boehnke, Marilyn Wilson, Leslie Muller, and Richard Petree · filed 2019-09-18(a)(8)

Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes appeals of a trial court’s interlocutory order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” ... Accordingly, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction Johnson’s interlocutory appeal as it pertains to the portion of the trial court’s order granting the employees’ plea to the jurisdiction on the claims against them in their individual capacities.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies a governmental entity’s claim that it is immune from suit, even if the claim was raised in a motion for summary judgment.

Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson · filed 2019-12-13(a)(8)

And section 51.014(a)(8) allows an interlocutory appeal to be taken when “the trial court denies the governmental entity’s claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for summary judgment, or otherwise.” Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); see also Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that immunity from suit deprives the courts of jurisdiction over pending claims). Accordingly, the Town properly took an interlocutory appeal from the orders denying its assertion of immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a trial court reaches the merits and thereby implicitly denies a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. City of Hidalgo · filed 2020-03-12(a)(8)

Therefore, the trial court implicitly denied the Risk Pool’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not allow an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing claims against a party other than a governmental unit.

Harrison v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2020-01-09(a)(8)

And no statute allows an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing claims against a party other than a governmental unit. Cf. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal the denial of a Rule 91a motion that challenges the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

City of San Antonio v. Patrick Von Dohlen, Brian Greco, Kevin Jason Khattar, Michael Knuffke, and Daniel Petri · filed 2020-04-01(a)(8)

Because appellant’s rule 91a motion to dismiss challenged the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the trial court’s order denying the rule 91a motion.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction only if a governmental unit filed the plea.

in the Interest of C v. a Child · filed 2020-12-03(a)(8)

Because a governmental unit did not file the plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court’s order denying the plea is not subject to interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to quash service for curable service defects because that motion is not a plea to the jurisdiction.

Caldwell v. Texas Department of Public Safety · filed 2021-08-04(a)(8)

We therefore conclude that the Department’s motion to quash was not a “plea to the jurisdiction” for purposes of Section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal an interlocutory order denying its plea to the jurisdiction; an entity that is not a governmental unit cannot take that appeal.

152 Lakewest Community, LP and Supreme Development Corporation v. Ameristar Apartment Services, L.P. D/B/A Ameristar Scr · filed 2021-12-02(a)(8)

We, therefore, have jurisdiction over this appeal with respect to Lakewest and Supreme only if they are “governmental units.” ... Because Supreme is a “governmental unit” under Subsection (D), we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal as it relates to Supreme. ... On this record, we conclude Lakewest is not a “governmental unit” under Subsection (D), and we therefore do not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal as it relates to Lakewest.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order that does not implicitly rule on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Greg Abbott in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas Jaime Masters in Her Official Capacity of Commiss · filed 2022-03-09(a)(8)

Viewing the district court’s order in context, we conclude that it is not an implied ruling on the State Parties’ jurisdictional plea.

An order striking an intervention is not an appealable implicit denial of a plea to the jurisdiction under subsection (a)(8) when the trial court makes no merits ruling involving the intervenor.

the State of Texas v. Ximena Lopez, M.D. and Children's Medical Center at Dallas · filed 2022-09-23(a)(8)

In contrast, in striking the State’s intervention here, the trial court did not make any ruling on the merits that could be construed as an implicit denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a governmental unit’s motion functions as a plea to the jurisdiction, regardless of its title.

Port Freeport v. Henry Jones, Pamela Tilley, Ava Waddell, Lottie Jones Sanders, Demetria Jones, Angie Nicole Clark Johns · filed 2023-03-07(a)(8)

Looking at the substance of the issue raised in the Port’s motion, see Smedley, 533 S.W.3d at 299, we conclude the motion functioned as a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court’s order denying the Port’s plea to the jurisdiction was an appealable interlocutory order over which we have appellate jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by an entity that qualifies as a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act.

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, D/B/A Panda Power Funds · filed 2023-06-23(a)(8)

Because ERCOT is an “organ of government the status and authority of which are derived from” statute, it is a “governmental unit” entitled to take an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, including an appeal by an employee sued in an official capacity.

In Re Arlington Independent School District, Codi Van Duzee, Carl Lewis, Julie Anderson, Dr. Greg Cartwright, and Dr. Mi · filed 2023-12-14(a)(8)

Regarding the trial court’s order denying AISD and the District Employees’ plea to the jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order that either “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001 [of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). ... We thus conclude that we have jurisdiction over both AISD’s and the District Employees’ appeal from the order denying their plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction when the trial court has not ruled on that plea.

Oncor Electric Delivery Company Ntu, LLC v. Wilbarger County Appraisal District and Wilbarger County Appraisal Review Bo · filed 2024-06-21(a)(8)

Because our record contains no ruling from the trial court on Mills ARB’s plea to the jurisdiction or the extent to which the Tax Code waives its governmental immunity, Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not authorize Mills ARB’s interlocutory appeal of this issue.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from a docket control order that neither denies a governmental unit’s jurisdictional plea nor rules on the merits of a claim.

City of Hidalgo, Individually and City of Hidalgo, Texas Municipal Facilities Corporation D/B/A Payne Arena v. Sal · filed 2025-07-17(a)(8)

Therefore, we have no jurisdiction because the docket control order is not an appealable interlocutory order under § 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an immediate appeal from an order denying a governmental unit’s summary judgment motion based on immunity, including grounds of official immunity and the emergency exception.

City of Houston v. Martha Gladis Moran Michaca · filed 2025-12-11(a)(8)

We further disagree that an interlocutory order denying a governmental unit’s summary judgment motion based on an assertion of immunity is not immediately appealable. We therefore hold that we have appellate jurisdiction to consider both appellate issues raised by the City.

Section 51.014(a)(8) authorizes an immediate appeal from an order denying a Rule 91a motion that raises jurisdictional grounds when the movants are a governmental unit and an employee sued in his official capacity.

City of Houston v. De La Cruz · filed 2025-12-18(a)(8)

Based on the allegations in the petition, we conclude that De La Cruz sued Flores in his official capacity. We therefore hold that section 51.014(a)(8) authorizes the interlocutory appeal of the order denying the City and Flores’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss raising jurisdictional grounds.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a party to appeal either the grant or denial of a plea to the jurisdiction filed by officials sued in their official capacities who invoke a governmental unit’s immunity.

Southern Montgomery County Municipal Utility District v. Grace Community Church-The Woodlands, Inc. · filed 2026-03-26(a)(8)

The Directors are invoking the governmental unit’s immunity, and we agree with the Church that section 51.014(a)(8) applies. See id. Under that provision, a party may appeal the grant or the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an implicit denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, but an order disqualifying counsel does not constitute such a denial when it does not reach the merits.

Ernie Alonzo, Michele Pena, Oscar Salinas, and Dr. Mario Salinas v. Paul Rocha, as Next Friend of N.R. · filed 2026-06-09(a)(8)

Further, the trial court’s ruling on the disqualification of counsel does not constitute a ruling on the merits of the case or on any claims which would be subject to appellants’ jurisdictional challenge. Therefore, the trial court’s orders do not serve as an implicit denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction filed by property owners rather than a governmental unit.

Kathleen Miller, Travis Richardson and Ronnie Richardson v. City of Mount Belvieu, Texas · filed 2026-06-23(a)(8)

But we do not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8) because the plea to the jurisdiction was filed by the property owners, not a governmental unit.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

Sarfo v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline · filed 2019-02-12(a)(8)

The trial court’s order denying his plea to the jurisdiction, however, is not among the types of orders subject to interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from order granting or denying plea to jurisdiction by governmental unit).

Section 51.014 permits a governmental unit to appeal an interlocutory order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and stays trial court proceedings during the appeal.

in Re Harris County Appraisal District · filed 2019-04-18(a)(8), (b)

On the other hand, if the trial court denies the plea to the jurisdiction, as a governmental entity, HCAD has the statutory right to an interlocutory appeal from that order, and all proceedings in the trial court will be stayed pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a government official sued in an official capacity to appeal the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, including when the plaintiff alleges ultra vires acts.

Marc Williams, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Department of Transportation; And Kyle Madsen · filed 2025-07-10(a)(8)

We necessarily have jurisdiction to consider that underlying contention as part of our jurisdiction, under Section 51.014(a)(8), to determine whether the TxDOT Officials are protected by sovereign immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(8) provides interlocutory review of rulings on pleas to the jurisdiction by governmental units; it does not apply to a plea by a private party.

In Re Dr. Robert Tafel · filed 2026-06-19(a)(8)

The Legislature has provided for interlocutory appellate review of trial court rulings on pleas to the jurisdiction by governmental units, but that statute does not apply here. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(f) allows a court to accept a permissive appeal filed no later than 15 days after the trial court signs the order being appealed.

Panagiotopoulos v. PI KAPPA PHI Fraternity and Josue Jimenez · filed 2025-08-13(f)

The petition is untimely. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(f) (providing that appellate court may accept permitted appeal filed “not later than the 15th day after the date the trial court signs the order to be appealed”).

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling question of law; disagreement solely between the parties does not satisfy that requirement.

Helena Chemical Company v. Philip Bales, Derek Dieringer, Wilber Dieringer, Michael Hoch, CMH Farms, Inc., MH Farms Serv · filed 2025-06-30(d)

Moreover, § 51.014(d)’s requirement of a substantial ground for difference of opinion is not satisfied where the disagreement is solely between the parties of the dispute itself.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling legal question before a permissive interlocutory appeal may proceed.

VCC, LLC v. Allied World Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2025-04-28(d)

We deny VCC’s request to grant permissive appeal because—assuming for these purposes that there are two controlling questions of law at issue—VCC has not established that substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist on either.

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to substantively rule on an identified controlling question of law before permitting an interlocutory appeal.

Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC and C. Megan Brenner v. DOH Oil Company · filed 2025-04-21(d)

We do not know from the trial court’s order if and how it ruled on the two legal issues raised in this appeal. Without a clear ruling, the order does not meet the requirement of involving a controlling issue of law raised on appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the controlling question of law; a question governed by an undisputed test and substantial authority does not qualify.

In the Estate of Bennie Hansson v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-27(d)

Therefore, whether the 1964 Will is contractual does not present an issue with a substantial ground for disagreement.

Section 51.014(f) gives a court of appeals discretion to accept or deny a properly certified permissive appeal.

Wanda Daniels, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carles B. Daniels v. Total Quality Logistics · filed 2025-01-09(f)

It is well-established that an appellate court’s decision to accept or deny a properly certified permissive appeal is discretionary.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court order to grant permission before a party may seek a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Channelview MHP, LLC v. Grace Hernandez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Mario Martinez · filed 2024-12-19(d)

Accordingly, the trial court’s October 24, 2024 order does not comply with the plain, mandatory language of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d) and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 which would permit Channelview to seek permission from this Court to appeal the order.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Culberson Midstream Equity, LLC, Moontower Resources Gathering, LLC and Culberson Midstream LLC v. Energy Transfer LP · filed 2024-06-26(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish, among other requirements, that the interlocutory order sought to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal.

Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2024-05-13(d)

Section 51.014(d), however, requires, among other conditions, that the trial court grant permission to appeal, see id., and the trial court here has not granted permission.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court order permitting an interlocutory appeal before the court of appeals can exercise jurisdiction over it.

Broussard v. Arnel · filed 2024-05-21(d)

The clerk’s record contains no order from the trial court permitting an appeal under section 51.014(d) and appellant has not supplemented the clerk’s record with an order. Therefore, appellant has not complied with the requirements for seeking a permissive appeal and this Court lacks jurisdiction over this attempted appeal from the interlocutory order signed on September 26, 2023.

Section 51.014(d)(2) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to materially advance the termination of litigation; an appeal that would prolong the litigation fails that requirement.

Mitchell "Pat" Murphy D/B/A Pat Murphy Construction & Murphy Commercial/Residential v. Larry Harris and Phyllis Harris · filed 2024-04-18(d)(2)

We hold that Murphy has not met the second requirement of Section 51.014(d) and that even if he had, we would deny his petition due to laches.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to materially advance the ultimate resolution of the case; that requirement is unmet when further litigation will be needed regardless of the appeal’s outcome.

Singh v. RateGain Travel Technologies, Limited and RateGain Technologies, Inc. · filed 2023-12-14(d)

Under these circumstances, we conclude allowing a permissive appeal in this case would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court to permit the interlocutory appeal, identify a controlling question of law on which there is substantial disagreement, and explain how an immediate appeal may advance the litigation.

Harris v. Larry E. Covey D/B/A American Pride Roofing · filed 2023-12-12(d)

In that order, the trial court denied Harris’s motion, but did not grant her permission to appeal, did not identify the controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground for disagreement and did not state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the outcome of the litigation. Because the complained-of order does not satisfy the requirements of section 51.014(d), we deny the petition for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement; a fact-intensive issue generally does not qualify.

Hartline Barger LLP v. Denson Walker Properties, LLC D/B/A Hilton Garden Inn Denison/Sherman · filed 2023-12-11(d)

A permissive appeal is appropriate when, among other requirements, the otherwise unappealable interlocutory order sought to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d). ... The determination of these questions, however, is constrained by the facts. Although the possibility exists that a controlling legal question as to which a substantial ground for disagreement exists might arise in determining whether a fact issue exists in the context of a summary judgment, it is rare, and this fact-intensive case is not that rare occurrence.

Section 51.014(d) requires an immediate interlocutory appeal to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation; factual and procedural circumstances can weigh against finding that it would.

KBCB Investments, LLC v. Black · filed 2023-08-03(d)

Given the procedural and factual circumstances of the case, including the parties’ evidence before the trial court when it ruled on KBCB’s motion for traditional partial summary judgment, we cannot conclude that an immediate appeal from the order would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the petitioner identifies an eligible controlling question of law and shows that immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

JETX Energy, LLC v. Lonestar Operating, LLC Eagleford Gas 5, LLC And Lonestar Resources US Inc. · filed 2023-05-10(d)

But examination of those arguments reveals that the trial court could have granted each motion based on one or more conclusions of law. Thus, we cannot discern an eligible controlling question of law with any specificity. ... After reviewing the petition and the record before this Court, we conclude JETX Energy has not met its burden to show eligibility for permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with a substantial ground for disagreement before a trial court may permit an interlocutory appeal.

Ramon Reyna, Jr. v. Garcia · filed 2023-07-13(d)

First, we find no “substantial” ground for difference of opinion on controlling questions of law.

Section 51.014(f) requires a timely application for a permissive interlocutory appeal; an untimely petition does not invoke the court of appeals’ jurisdiction.

Alonzo v. Ernestina Lerma Cabello, Individually and as Next Friend of Tommy Cabello, Jr. · filed 2023-05-04(f)

An untimely petition cannot invoke this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to substantively rule on the controlling legal issue presented for permissive interlocutory appeal.

Kenneth H. Archibald and Archibald & Associates, Inc. v. El Paso Orthopedic Surgery Group, P.A., Brett Henderson, M.D. a · filed 2023-02-24(d)

Specifically, the trial court did not satisfy the first requirement of section 51.014(d) by substantively ruling on the legal issues presented on appeal.

Section 51.014(d)(2) requires a trial court permitting an interlocutory appeal to explain why immediate appeal may materially advance the end of the litigation; reciting the requirement is insufficient.

Robert R. Ochoa, M.D. v. Elvira Avila as Permanent Guardian of the Person and as Next Friend for Leticia Avila · filed 2023-02-14(d)(2)

Though the trial court’s order recites the statutory requirement—i.e., “an immediate appeal from this Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”—it does not explain why. Interpreting section 51.014(d) strictly, as we must, we conclude its second condition requires more from the trial court’s order than is present before us.

Former § 51.014(d) permits an agreed interlocutory appeal only when the order involves a controlling question of law on which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists.

Double Diamond, Inc., Double Diamond-Delaware, Inc., White Bluff Club Corp., National Resort Management Group, and White · filed 2023-01-27(d)

Because an agreed interlocutory appeal is not permitted unless the order sought to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which a ... substantial ground for difference of opinion exists, and the controlling questions of law identified in the summary judgment order here are not questions as to which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(d)(1) does not treat a hypothetical legal question as a controlling question of law for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Texas Health Harris Methodist Hospital Alliance, Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Allen, Texas Health Arlington Memori · filed 2022-08-08(d)(1)

A hypothetical legal question in a case is not a “controlling question of law.”

Section 51.014(f) gives courts of appeals discretion to reject a permissive interlocutory appeal even when the requirements of subsection (d) are met.

Industrial Specialists, Llc v. Blanchard Refining Company LLC and Marathon Petroleum Company Lp · filed 2022-06-10(f)

We hold that section 51.014(f) permits Texas courts of appeals to accept a permissive interlocutory appeal when the two requirements of section 51.014(d) are met, but it grants the courts discretion to reject the appeal even when the requirements are met.

Section 51.014(f) requires a petition for permissive appeal within 15 days after the trial court signs the order being appealed; a separate order granting permission to appeal does not restart that period.

Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company v. Margie Dowdy · filed 2022-05-19(f)

Because the order denying summary judgment was not amended, the 15-day timeline ran from September 16, 2020, the date the order was signed, and was not extended by the separate order denying reconsideration and granting interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court order that includes the order to be appealed and written permission to appeal it.

Angelena Dentis Baize v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-03-09(d)

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court order that includes both the order to be appealed and written permission to appeal the order. ... No such order has been provided to this Court.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law for a permissive appeal; a question whose resolution depends on disputed facts does not qualify.

Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company v. Wade · filed 2022-02-10(d)

Under Subsection 51.014(d), a petitioner may seek a permissive appeal from a court of appeals if there exists a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ... In the record before us, however, the parties presented conflicting evidence to the trial court regarding the ownership and self-insured status of the vehicle driven by Stovall. The “viability of the claim” therefore turns not only on a legal issue of contractual interpretation, but also on the determination of fact issues. ... Accordingly, resolution of the issue in the summary judgment does not rest on a controlling legal issue.

Section 51.014(d) requires a party seeking a permissive appeal to identify a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and explain how immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Baladez v. Twin Pines Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC · filed 2022-02-10(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must (1) identify a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) state why allowing immediate appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to involve a controlling question of law with substantial ground for disagreement and to potentially advance the litigation’s ultimate termination.

Zetah Louis, as Next Friend of Khaseen Israel-Barney and Abcde "Jolie" Peterson, Minor Children v. Williams · filed 2022-04-19(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168.

Section 51.014(d) permits an appeal from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order when the trial court grants permission and the order involves a controlling legal question on which substantial grounds for disagreement exist.

Krause v. Chen · filed 2021-11-10(d)

51.014(d) which provides for an appeal from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order when the trial court grants permission and the order involves, in part, a controlling question of law as to which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists. ... Because the record before us did not reflect the trial court had granted permission,2 we questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal and directed appellant to file a letter brief addressing our concern no later than October 11, 2021.

Section 51.014(d) requires the order offered for permissive appeal to decide a controlling question of law; an issue decided in an earlier order does not satisfy that requirement.

Fry Sons Ranch, Inc. and James Andy Fry v. Joseph Nathan Fry, Press Allen Fry, and Edward Heath Fry · filed 2021-08-20(d)

Consequently, we cannot conclude that the issue of the Three Brothers’ ownership interest in the ranch property constitutes a “controlling question of law” that the trial court decided when it adopted the commissioners’ proposed partition in its June 2021 order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(f) does not allow a permissive appeal when the proposed issue is a fact question rather than a controlling question of law.

Siegfried Pueblitz, M.D. v. Lemen · filed 2021-12-21(f)

A permissive appeal to a denial of summary judgment on that issue would be inappropriate because whether Lemen used due diligence and brought his suit within reasonable time is a fact question.

Section 51.014(f) requires a trial court order granting permission before an appellate court may accept a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Richard Witt Duncan// Cross-Appellants,Prewett Rentals Series 2 752 Military, LLC Tami Jan, Ward Galbreath, Sumit Kapoor · filed 2021-07-22(f)

The trial court did not sign an order granting permission to the Prewett Defendants to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal of an implied order on their motion for sanctions; therefore, we may not accept a permissive interlocutory appeal from the implied order.

Section 51.014 permits an interlocutory appeal only if an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

John Bird, Individually: John Bird, as De Facto Trustee of the Carl C. Anderson, Sr. and Marie Jo Anderson Charitable Re · filed 2021-06-24(d)(2), (f)

Because we conclude that John has not demonstrated “how an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” we deny his petition.

Section 51.014(f) gives appellate courts discretion to accept or refuse a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Gwendolyn Bush O'Brien Marsh, as of the Estate of Stanley Marsh 3 v. Coldiron · filed 2016-08-29(f)

Appellate courts have discretion to accept or refuse to hear a permissive appeal.

Section 51.014(d) provides a way to appeal an interlocutory order that would otherwise be unappealable; permission is unnecessary when another provision authorizes the appeal.

Swearingen v. William L. Swearingen, II · filed 2015-11-30(d)

Section 51.014(d) and rule 28.3 afford parties an opportunity to appeal an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable. ... Accordingly, permission is unnecessary.

Section 51.014(d) does not permit a permissive interlocutory appeal on well-settled questions because they present no substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Jeff Sill and Newport Construction Services, Inc. v. Lynn Forner F/K/A Lynn Beall · filed 2015-10-05(d)

Well-settled questions are not proper for a permissive appeal because they are not subject to “a substantial ground for difference of opinion.”

Section 51.014(d) does not permit a permissive appeal of a contract ambiguity ruling that does not resolve a controlling question of law.

Austin Commercial, L.P. v. Texas Tech University · filed 2015-08-11(d)

While the issue of ambiguity is an important question of law affecting the presentation of evidence during any ultimate trial of this dispute, it is not a “controlling question of law” as contemplated by section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Rule 28.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because it does not dispose of a controlling question in the case.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the order presents a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and an immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation.

Katherine R. Warren as Next Friend of M. H. W., a Minor Beneficiary of the M.H.W. 2000 Trust v. Andy I. Weiner, Trustee · filed 2015-08-04(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. The petition fails to establish that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion.

Section 51.014(d) does not authorize a permissive interlocutory appeal from an unexplained denial of summary judgment because the order does not decide a controlling question of law.

Vestalia, LTD v. Adonis F. Taylor-Watson and Larry J. Watson, Jr. · filed 2015-06-18(d)

Thus, the order does not involve a controlling question of law, and section 51.014(d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires the record to show that the trial court substantively ruled on the specific controlling legal issue presented for interlocutory appeal.

Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. Vantage Bank Texas, Successor by Merger to D'Hanis State Bank, and Banprop, L.L.C. · filed 2015-05-06(d)

Because the trial court did not state the basis for its ruling on the competing motions for summary judgment, and because the record does not reflect the trial court’s determination of the substantive legal issue presented to this court for determination, Stewart Title’s petition does not meet the strict requirements of Section 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(d) requires an application for permission to appeal only when the interlocutory order is not otherwise appealable under the section.

Priscilla Flores and Reggie Flores v. Temple Independent School District · filed 2002-09-24(d)

Application for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order is necessary and proper only when a party attempts to appeal an order "not otherwise appealable under this section." See id. § 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court to issue an order authorizing an interlocutory appeal; signing the interlocutory order alone is insufficient.

Hines v. Flores · filed 2003-04-10(d)

To pursue an appeal under that subsection, the trial court must issue an order for an interlocutory appeal, not just sign an interlocutory order as is the case here.

A party seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal must explain why the proposed issue involves a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion; merely identifying the issue is insufficient.

Eunice Richardson and Bobby Richardson, Individually, and on Behalf of the Estate of Kent Richardson v. Robert F. Kays a · filed 2003-10-30(d)(1)

Regarding the parties’ request to appeal the issue of the Richardsons’ standing to proceed with their suit against State Farm Lloyds, other than reciting the proposed issue on appeal, the parties’ joint application for this permissive appeal does not mention, discuss, or analyze why the issue of the Richardsons’ standing to sue involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. ... Accordingly, we decline the parties’ request that this court permit an appeal to be taken from the granting of State Farm Lloyds’ plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(d)(1) does not permit an interlocutory appeal when resolving the issue requires case-specific fact findings rather than a controlling question of law.

Dimock v. Dimock · filed 2004-05-06(d)(1)

The case-by-case resolution of the enforceability of a particular postnuptial partition agreement does not involve a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d)(1).

Section 51.014(8) permits a timely interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit's second plea to the jurisdiction.

City of Houston v. Harris · filed 2006-04-13(8)

Accordingly, although we do not approve of the City's successive interlocutory appeals, under section 51.014(8), we must review the trial court's denial of the City's second plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a) permits an interlocutory appeal but does not require one; failing to take it does not waive a later challenge to the order.

Burkhart v. Sedgwick Claim Management Services · filed 2009-08-31(a)

The statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is permissive, not mandatory.

Section 51.014(d) does not relieve a trial court of its duty to decide a substantive legal issue before certifying an agreed interlocutory appeal.

Dora Gulley (Appellant/Cross Appellee) v. State Farm Lloyds (Appellee/Cross Appellant) · filed 2011-05-11(d)

Section 51.014(d) is not intended to relieve the trial court of its role in deciding substantive issues of law properly presented to it.

Former § 51.014(d) permits an agreed interlocutory appeal on a controlling question of law, including the proper measure of damages when damages are the only issue left in the case.

State of Texas and Tarrant County, Texas v. Ledrec, Inc. · filed 2012-04-12(d)

Here, whether Maibach’s expert opinion that a willing buyer would not assign any future income value to the front two buildings on the property (because of the threat of future annexation and resulting nonconforming use) utilizes a proper measure of damages is a controlling question of law––as presented in the parties’ competing summary judgment motions––because the damages to be assessed for the effect of the taking on the remainder property is the sole issue left in the case. Thus, we will review the parties’ agreed issue.

A permissive appeal under § 51.014(d) requires a trial-court order identifying the controlling question of law, as Rule 168 requires.

Long v. State of Texas · filed 2012-07-25(d)

In the present case, although the challenged order expressly grants permission to appeal the order, it does not identify the controlling question of law at issue. ... The trial court’s order granting permission to appeal does not comply with rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ... For these reasons, we deny the petition seeking permission to appeal the interlocutory order.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive appeal to involve a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and to potentially advance the end of the litigation.

Texas Farmers Insurance Company v. Minjarez · filed 2012-10-31(d)

To be entitled to a permissive appeal, a party must establish that: (1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ... Accordingly, Texas Farmers has failed to establish that there is a substantial difference of opinion regarding the controlling question of law in this case.

Section 51.014(d) requires trial court permission for an interlocutory appeal.

Pratt Jr. v. Wayne · filed 2013-03-21(d)

The record before the Court fails to reflect that the trial court granted permission to appeal, so section 51.014(d) does not provide us with jurisdiction over this appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court’s order to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal; without that permission, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction.

Rig Tools, Inc. v. Leamer · filed 2013-01-17(d)

In the instant case, the challenged order fails to grant permission to appeal. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 51.014(d) does not permit an interlocutory appeal of a summary judgment when the facts are disputed.

King-A Corporation D/B/A McDonald's, Robstown v. Wehling · filed 2013-03-14(d)

The scope of a permissive appeal does not include an appeal of a summary judgment when the facts are disputed.

For a permissive interlocutory appeal, section 51.014(d)–(f) requires a trial court order with written permission, a timely petition filed after that order, and permission from the appellate court.

Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Helix Energy Solutions Group · filed 2013-05-09(d)–(f)

Following the amendments to section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code in 2011 and the related amendments to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3, in cases filed after September 1, 2011, the following must occur in order for a permissive appeal to properly be before this Court: the trial court must issue a written order encompassing both the order to be appealed and the written permission required by Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d), the appellant must timely file a petition for permission to appeal with this Court subsequent to the signing of the trial court’s order, and this Court must grant the petition for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(f) requires trial court permission and a timely petition to the court of appeals for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Bosch v. State of Texas County of Harris · filed 2013-10-01(f)

Appellant has not complied with the requirements for a permissive appeal by obtaining an order granting permission to appeal from the trial court and filing a timely petition seeking permission from this court. Accordingly, appellant may not appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to Section 51.014(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(d) requires written trial court permission to appeal an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order.

Shannon v. William Edwin Hall and Ethan M. Erenberg · filed 2013-08-22(d)

We conclude that (1) the order is not a final judgment and (2) there is no written order granting appellant permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal, as required by section 51.014(d) and related rules of procedure.

Former subsection (d) requires the trial court to make a substantive ruling on the specific legal question presented for an agreed interlocutory appeal.

Double Diamond Delaware, Inc. v. John and Cathy Walkinshaw · filed 2013-10-07(d)

Inherent in these jurisdictional requirements is that the trial court make a substantive ruling on the specific legal question presented on appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a permissive interlocutory appeal to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation; anticipated additional discovery did not satisfy that requirement here.

Autobuses Ejecutivos, LLC v. Cuevas · filed 2013-12-04(d)

Although petitioners claim that without a decision from this Court on the choice of law issue they will have to do additional discovery, we conclude that this issue will not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the trial court has substantively ruled on the controlling legal issue in the order being appealed.

Borowski v. Ayers · filed 2013-12-05(d)

Therefore, the order to be appealed does not involve a controlling question of law, and section 51.014(d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a substantive trial court ruling on a controlling question of law for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Doe · filed 2013-10-10(d)

Without a substantive ruling by the trial court as to why it denied the Church’s motion, no controlling question of law has been presented for our analysis. ... Given the limited nature of interlocutory appeals and the requirement that we construe statutes authorizing such appeals strictly, we conclude that the Church has not satisfied the statutory requirements of section 51.014(d).