42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524

For continuing misappropriation of a trade secret, each wrongful use starts a new two-year limitations period under subsection (7).

Harry Miller Corp. v. Mancuso Chemicals Limited · filed 2007-01-10(7)

Thus, each time Mancuso uses Miller’s allegedly stolen formula, the statute of limitations begins to run, giving Miller a new two year period in which to file suit.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a trade secret claim, measured from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its cause.

Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. PS International, Inc. · filed 2005-08-30(7)

A trade secret claim is subject to a two year statute of limitations, based upon 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(7) (Purdon’s 2005). ... Pennsylvania applies the discovery rule to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, which means that a plaintiff has two years to bring a claim from the date a plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the plaintiff has been injured and that this injury was caused by the conduct of the other party.

Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Title II ADA and Section 504 Rehabilitation Act claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2008-08-19

Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limitations applicable to claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the trial court sits. In this case, the applicable statute is 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524, which prescribes a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Braun v. Gonzales · filed 2014-01-30

Neither the ADA nor the RA includes an express limitations period, but, as we have explained previously, the applicable statute of limitations “is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the trial court sits.” Disabled in Action v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, for Braun’s case, the two-year limitations period of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 applies.

Section 5524(2) and (7) provide the two-year Pennsylvania personal-injury limitations period that courts borrow for Bivens and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Howard v. Mendez · filed 2004-02-09(2), (7)

In these circumstances, courts borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations, ... the two-year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania for a personal-injury action in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), (7).

Section 5524 gives a two-year limitations period for tortious interference with contractual relations, which begins when the last element of the claim is fulfilled.

Hyldahl v. Denlinger · filed 2016-09-07

The limitations period for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations is two years. ... Instead, the limitations period began to run in January 2012 when his employment was terminated and the last element of his tortious interference claim was fulfilled. Because Hyldahl filed suit more than two years later on February 25, 2014, his claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524 requires a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations to be brought within two years of the alleged tortious conduct.

SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC · filed 2022-04-12

Under Pennsylvania law, a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations must be brought within two years of the alleged tortious conduct.

Section 5524(7) gives tortious interference claims a two-year limitations period, but alleged delayed discovery of the interference can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds at the pleading stage.

FAUST v. THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2024-10-08(7)

Count V: Two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7); Gok v. Roman Catholic Church, 550 F. Supp. 3d 221, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (two-year statute of limitations for tortious interference claim). ... The same is true for the tortious interference claim because Dr. Faust alleges that she did not learn of the interference until she learned of the breach.

Section 5524(3) gives an action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship a two-year limitation period because the relationship is intangible personal property.

Home for Crippled Children v. Erie Insurance Exchange · filed 1982-04-23(3)

First, if given its ordinary meaning, the language of 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(3) encompasses an action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. A contractual relationship constitutes intangible personal property. Thus, an action for interference with a contractual relationship is an action for “injuring personal property” within the meaning of 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(3).

Section 5524’s two-year limitation applies to tort claims for wrongful discharge and tortious interference with contractual relations.

Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc. · filed 1982-06-30

As with the action for wrongful discharge, the applicable statute of limitations does not bar the action for tortious interference.

Section 5524(3) applies a two-year limitation period to claims for tortious interference with lease negotiations.

Bender v. McIlhatten · filed 1987-01-05(3)

Appellee and the trial court ... maintain, and we agree, the residual provision does not apply because this action comes under the two year limitation requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3).

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period does not apply to a tortious interference claim whose underlying wrong is defamation; the one-year defamation period governs.

Evans v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1991-12-31(7)

In a situation such as this, however, where the underlying wrong which the complaint alleges is defamation by publication of a libelous report, and the claim of injury set out in each count springs from the act of publication, the Appellants should not be able to circumvent the statute of limitations by merely terming the claim tortious interference when in essence it is one of defamation, subject to a one year limitation of action.

Section 5524(3) sets a two-year limitations period for tortious interference with business relations.

Dellape v. Murray · filed 1994-12-09(3)

The statute of limitations for tortious interference with business relations is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3).

Section 5524 sets a two-year limitations period for tortious interference with existing contractual relations claims.

Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 1996-11-25

Pennsylvania law limits a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations to a two-year statute of limitations time period. ... Having been presented with no evidence to the contrary, this Court agrees that plaintiff is bound by the two-year statute of limitations on its tortious interference with existing contractual relations claim.

Section 5524(3) gives a tortious interference claim two years from accrual, which occurs no earlier than the plaintiff’s actual legal damage.

CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Services Inc. · filed 2004-01-28(3)

Thus a tortious interference claim does not accrue until, at least, the plaintiff suffers injury (i.e., “actual legal damage”) as a result of the defendant’s conduct.

Section 5524(3) provides a two-year limitations period for interference with a contractual relationship.

Colonial Assurance Co. v. Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co. · filed 2003-12-10(3)

Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for interference with a contractual relationship is two years.

Section 5524(7) gives claims for interference with prospective contractual relations a two-year limitations period.

Smith v. IMG Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2006-06-07(7)

The Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claim of interference with prospective contractual relations with Kenyatta Walker because the claim is time-barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. C. S.A. § 5524(7) (2004).

Section 5524(3) gives tortious interference with contractual relations claims a two-year limitations period, which is tolled for a compulsory counterclaim when the plaintiff files suit.

P&I INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC v. RISK AVERSE INSURANCE, LLC · filed 2022-01-11(3)

Pennsylvania courts apply the two year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3) to tortious interference with contractual relations claims. ... Accordingly, Millison’s statute of limitations for compulsory counterclaims was tolled as of November 24, 2020, meaning that his tortious interference claim was indeed timely filed.

Section 5524(7) provides a two-year limitations period for interference with prospective economic advantage claims.

MIR v. BROD · filed 2022-11-02(7)

(3) Count V: Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage: two (2) years.

Section 5524(3) provides a two-year limitations period for tortious interference with contractual relations claims.

TRUST v. WENG · filed 2023-05-31(3)

Pennsylvania courts apply the two-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3) to tortious interference with contractual relations claims.

Section 5524(7) gives claims of tortious interference with contracts a two-year limitations period.

M.J. Ameer v. Pottsville Code Enforcement and D. Chescavage · filed 2023-11-17(7)

Not surprisingly, the law is well settled that claims of tortious interference with contracts are subject to the two-year tort statute of limitations.

Section 5524(7) provides a two-year limit for tortious interference claims, but a claim based on the same defamatory publication as a defamation claim is subject to the one-year defamation limit.

Dassault Systemes Deutchland GmbH v. Rajcevich · filed 2024-05-20(7)

As a formal matter, tortious interference is “a separate and distinct action from that of libel or slander,” with a longer (two year) statute of limitations. Evans v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 601 A.2d 330, 333 (Pa. Super. 1991); see 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(7). ... And so Rajcevich’s failure to plausibly allege defamatory communications within the one-year statute of limitations for that tort also bars his tortious interference counterclaim.

Section 5524(7) sets a two-year limitations period for tortious interference with contractual relations claims; dismissal on limitations grounds is unwarranted when untimeliness is not apparent from the complaint.

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation v. Coterra Energy · filed 2026-02-07(7)

The statute of limitations for a tortious interference with contractual relations claim is two years. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524 (7). Taking PPL’s allegations as true, PPL first received notice of a reason for withheld payments in June 2023, and Coterra’s questioning of the status of the Magnotti Matter on August 22, 2023. (Doc. 1-2, ¶¶ 28, 33). PPL filed its complaint on April 9, 2025. (Doc. 1-2, at 4). Therefore, there is nothing on the face of the complaint showing that PPL tortious interference claim is time barred and Wage’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations is DENIED. (Doc. 7).

Section 5524(3) gives tortious interference claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff suffers actual legal damage.

Lin v. Rohm & Haas Co. · filed 2012-03-26(3)

But, for purposes of her tortious-interference claim, Dr. Lin did not suffer an actual legal damage until there was a specific grant that Dr. Lin was unable to apply for. To the extent that Dr. Lin was precluded from applying for a grant within two years of the time she filed her complaint (May 13, 2011), her tortious-interference claim is timely.

Section 5524 gives tortious interference claims a two-year limitations period; dismissal is premature when the complaint does not show when that period began.

DIETRICH & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. October Three LLC · filed 2021-04-26

D&A filed its Complaint on October 9, 2020 (ECF 1), so its claims are barred if it is apparent on the face of the Complaint that they accrued before October 9, 2018. It is not; the Complaint does not reveal when the limitations period began to run.

Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for claims analogous to Bivens actions.

Kornafel v. United States Postal Service · filed 2019-11-20(2)

The most analogous state statute of limitations for claims like Kornafel’s is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Emps., or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1088 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[F]or Bivens actions, we must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations.”).

Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims governed by Pennsylvania law.

Johnson v. United States · filed 2021-04-27(2)

Lastly, to the extent that any of Johnson’s remaining claims survived these bars, such claims were brought well beyond the applicable two-year limitation period.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which governs Bivens claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Montalban v. Powell · filed 2020-04-01

Bivens claims are governed by a state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). Pennsylvania’s limitations period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.

Section 5524(2) allows two years to commence a personal injury action, and a timely filed complaint remains effective when the plaintiff makes a good faith effort to serve the defendant despite delayed proper service.

Ferraro, B. v. Patterson-Erie · filed 2022-05-27(2)

Plaintiff engaged in a good faith effort to properly serve [Appellant] with the Complaint in Civil Action within the applicable time period, provided actual notice to [Appellant] of the commencement of suit, and any delay in proper service or reinstatement of the Complaint was not an attempt to stall the judicial machinery. ... As the record supports the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions, we adopt its December 28, 2021, opinion in affirming the denial of Appellant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit bars a personal injury action when the plaintiff files a writ within the period but makes no good faith effort to serve it or give the defendant timely notice of the action.

Gorby, M. v. Hopkins, R. · filed 2019-06-07(2)

Because the undisputed evidence established that Plaintiffs made no good faith effort to give Defendant timely notice of this action after it was filed, the trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs’ May 12, 2017 praecipe for a writ of summons was ineffective to commence this action and that this action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Filing a complaint within Section 5524(7)’s two-year period does not preserve the action if the plaintiff fails to make a good-faith effort to serve notice.

PA Electric Co. v. Antoine's Timbering, Inc. · filed 2019-05-22(7)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings when it found that Penelec failed to make a good-faith effort to serve notice and that, therefore, its action violated the Statute of Limitations.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for a negligence action; when the second anniversary falls on a Sunday, a filing on the following Monday is timely.

Haas, M. v. Reinert, M. · filed 2016-06-17(2)

The second-year anniversary of the accident was Sunday, October 18, 2009. Thus, Appellant’s praecipe for summons, filed the following day, Monday, was timely under the two-year statute of limitations for a negligence action. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitation period for negligence actions.

Ronk, R. v. Israel, J. · filed 2017-03-17(2)

The applicable statute of limitations for actions to recover damages for negligence is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).

Section 5524’s two-year period is satisfied by timely commencement of an action and permits a bankruptcy trustee’s later substitution through relation back if the trustee acts reasonably diligently and defendants suffer no demonstrable prejudice.

Morrison Informatics, Inc. v. Members 1st Federal Credit Union · filed 2016-05-25(2), (7)

Moreover, in our considered judgment, permitting substitution of a bankruptcy trustee as the real party in interest does not offend either the terms of, or the policy underlying, the applicable statute of limitations. The operative statute, reposed in Section 5524 of the Judicial Code, merely indicates that a negligence action or proceeding “must be commenced” within a two-year period.

Section 5524’s two-year limitation for negligence actions is not extended by a timely writ when the plaintiff makes no good-faith effort to serve the defendant.

Moll, J. v. Reinhart and Rusk, Inc. · filed 2016-01-15

Plaintiff did not timely serve R & R after the statute of limitations had expired, and provided no good faith efforts to effect service during that time. As such, the matter is also dismissed as to R & R for failure to comply with the applicable two (2) year statute oflimitations period.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limitations period is not preserved by filing a writ when the plaintiff makes no good-faith effort to serve it or give actual notice of the action within that period.

Parsons, L. v. Rose Valley Partnership · filed 2015-05-12(7)

Indeed, since (a) Parsons did not establish that she had engaged in a good-faith effort to secure service upon the Defendants in a timely manner; (b) service was not accomplished within the statute of limitations; and (c) there was no actual notice of the commencement of litigation, it was unnecessary to consider whether the Defendants had suffered any prejudice.

Section 5524(2) permits filing on the next available court day when snow effectively closes the courthouse on the last day of the limitations period.

Petty v. Petratos · filed 1979-07-03(2)

Therefore, we hold that when the courthouse was effectively closed on that date because of snow plaintiffs were entitled to file their complaint on the following Monday.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit bars a personal injury claim when the plaintiff’s failure to deliver a timely filed complaint for service nullifies commencement of the action.

Pannill v. Seahorne · filed 1980-06-06(2)

Thus, we hold that plaintiffs’ failure to deliver their complaint to the sheriff by February 22, 1977, served to nullify the commencement of their action for personal injuries. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for personal injuries is barred by the two-year statute of limitations on such claims, ... and the lower court erred in not so holding.

Section 5524’s limitation is waivable and must be raised as new matter.

Jaillet v. Hill & Hill · filed 1980-07-15

Defendant’s supplemental brief suggests that the applicable period of limitation is found in either 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5524 (two years) or §5525 (four years). These statutes are waivable, compare Brown v. Hahn, supra, and must be raised under new matter.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit applies to a personal-injury counterclaim seeking affirmative relief.

Harmer v. Hulsey · filed 1983-11-04(2)

Here, however, appellant’s counterclaim must clearly be characterized as a set-off because it raises the possibility of affirmative relief for appellant. As such, it should have been raised before the end of the two-year statute of limitations period.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit for personal injury actions is an affirmative defense properly raised as New Matter in a responsive pleading, rather than by preliminary objection.

Bartanus v. Lis · filed 1984-07-27(2)

The statutory limitation is an affirmative defense that is properly raised by New Matter in a responsive pleading. ... Accordingly, appellees’ preliminary objections raising the statute of limitations did not warrant dismissal of the complaint in this case.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions; a plaintiff who files a praecipe for writ of summons must make a good-faith effort to give notice for the filing to toll that limit.

Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority · filed 1986-06-23(2)

In compliance with the two-year limitation on commencement of actions for personal injury, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2), plaintiffs’ counsel filed a praecipe for writ of summons with the Prothonotary of Beaver County on February 2, 1982, the last permissible *592day under the statute. ... Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action. ... In each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made.

Section 5524’s two-year period for negligence actions is tolled by a timely praecipe for a writ of summons when the plaintiff makes a good-faith effort to effect service.

Gould v. Nazareth Hospital · filed 1986-06-27

The failure to attempt service on appellee within the life of the writ lies with the sheriff’s office, and not the plaintiff. Hence, we find that the rule of Lamp is inapplicable, and the statute of limitations was tolled by the timely filing of the praecipe for writ of summons.

Section 5524’s two-year limitation period is not tolled by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons without a good faith effort to serve the writ.

Feher by Feher v. Altman · filed 1986-09-15

The applicable two year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524, required that the action be brought on or before October 7, 1983. ... The mere filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, without additional affirmative action to effect service of the writ, does not constitute a good faith effort to notify a defendant that he is being sued, and therefore is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and preserve a cause of action.

Section 5524’s two-year limit does not bar a timely filed complaint when the defendant waives defects in service.

Cinque v. Asare · filed 1990-12-17

The applicable statute was two years (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524). ... Given our finding that the defects in the initial service were waived, we must hold that the complaint against Neill and Chazin was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524’s two-year limit for personal injury actions is satisfied by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons within that period.

Bolyard v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1996-05-31(2), (7)

Because plaintiff filed a praecipe for a writ of summons on March 22, 1990, and thus commenced the action within the two year statute of limitations pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1007, summary judgment based on this contention is denied.

The two-year limitations period is not tolled by issuing a writ of summons when the plaintiff makes no effort to serve the defendant.

James v. Wasbers · filed 1996-08-19

However, case law instructs us that simple neglect and/or mistake are enough to implicate the Lamp rule and we are constrained to find that, under these facts, the statute of limitations was not tolled by the mere issuing of a writ of summons without service on the defendant.

Section 5524(2) gives a person two years to commence a personal injury action; mailing a praecipe before the deadline does not toll the period when it is filed afterward.

Booher v. Olczak · filed 2002-04-12(2)

The trial court correctly concluded that the Boohers did not comply with the statute of limitations. The accident in question occurred on March 6, 1998. Thus, the Boohers’ two-year period in which to file suit ended on Monday, March 6, 2000. Despite their allegation that counsel mailed a praecipe for a writ of summons on Friday, March 3, the document was not filed until March 10, 2000, the date stamped on the document by the Westmoreland County Prothonotary’s Office. The Boohers cite no authority for the proposition that the mailing of a praecipe for a writ of summons by counsel for a litigant who is not incarcerated tolls the statute of limitations on the day it is mailed, nor has our research revealed any such cases. This suit was filed after the statute of limitations period ran, and the Boohers’ claims are time barred.

Section 5524(3) gives a property damage claim two years to be commenced; a complaint filed within that period tolls it if the plaintiff makes a timely, good-faith effort to serve the defendant.

Ramsay v. Pierre · filed 2003-04-15(3)

Through Lamp v. Heyman, 469 Pa. 465, 366 A.2d 882 (1976), and its progeny, Pennsylvania has adopted a rule requiring a plaintiff to make a good-faith attempt to effect service of process in a timely manner where an action is commenced prior to the running of the statute of limitations but service does not occur until after the expiration of the statutory period. ... Appellee’s overall conduct unequivocally establishes his good-faith attempt to effect service.

Section 5524(2) requires a personal injury action based on negligence to be commenced within two years; a timely filed writ remains effective when the plaintiff makes a good faith effort at service.

Johnson v. Allgeier · filed 2004-06-16(2)

It specifically directs that an action to recover damages for injuries to a person caused by the wrongful or negligent act of another must be commenced within two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). ... Accordingly, the statutory provisions, rules and relevant case law do not require personal service to be achieved prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Rather they provide that such service of a timely filed writ must be undertaken in good faith to assure that a defendant is aware of the pending action.

Section 5524’s two-year limit for personal injury actions bars a claim filed within that period if the plaintiff fails to make a good faith effort to serve the defendant.

Miller v. Klink · filed 2005-04-01

Accordingly, Miller’s action against Klink, which was otherwise timely commenced by filing a Prae-cipe for a Writ of Summons within the statutory period, is barred by the statute of limitations, see Lamp; Johnson, and the trial court properly sustained Klink’s preliminary objections and dismissed Miller’s Amended Complaint as to Klink.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence-based personal injury action; filing within that period preserves the claim only if the plaintiff makes a good faith effort to serve the defendant promptly.

Hoberg v. Smith · filed 2005-05-26(2)

An action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of another must be commenced within two years of the date of the event giving rise to the claim. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2). ... Plaintiff’s failure to make a good faith effort to notify defendant of the pendency of her suit by promptly and properly serving him with a copy of the complaint served to stall the legal machinery she initiated. She has failed to comply with the legal requirements to toll the statute of limitations and preserve her cause of action, and defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor.

Section 5524(2) sets the limitations deadline for this death claim; filing by someone who had not qualified as personal representative did not commence the survival action within that period.

Cavoulas v. Singh · filed 2006-04-18(2)

Because the decedent died on March 2,2000, the statute of limitations would have expired on March 1,2002. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2). When suit was filed on February 20, 2002, by a person who had not qualified as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, it was as if no suit had been filed.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limit for negligence injury claims; a timely complaint may still be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to prove diligent efforts at timely service and the defendant lacked timely actual notice.

Gussom, R., Aplt. v. Teagle, M. · filed 2021-03-25(2)

More specifically, consistent with the Superior Court’s decision, we hold that a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to offer proof that she diligently attempted to serve process on a defendant in a timely manner and there is no evidence to indicate that the defendant had actual notice of the commencement of the action in the relevant time frame, regardless of whether the plaintiff acted or failed to act intentionally. ... Notably, Plaintiff filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2) (setting a two-year statute of limitations for an “action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another”).

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit for injury or death actions is not tolled by filing a writ of summons without a good-faith effort to serve it.

Sayers, W. v. Heritage Valley Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2021-03-15(2)

Therefore, Appellants failed to toll the statute of limitations upon the filing of a praecipe for writ of summons on April 18, 2017. Consequently, the record clearly demonstrates that the statute of limitations bars Appellants from bringing their present action for medical negligence, and Appellees were entitled to an order sustaining their preliminary objections and dismissing Appellants’ complaint.

A plaintiff who files a writ within Section 5524’s two-year period must make a good-faith effort to serve the defendants; sending the writ only to their insurer does not suffice.

Williams, J. v. Shannon, H. · filed 2021-05-21

Here, there is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations was two years. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. ... As such, Appellant has failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden of showing he acted in good faith and it does not matter whether his actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional, or otherwise.

Section 5524’s two-year filing deadline is satisfied by a timely unverified complaint that gives defendants notice, where the missing verification is a curable defect.

Alatrista, D. v. Diamond Club · filed 2021-12-07

The only question before us is whether Appellants’ original filing was sufficient to satisfy the two-year statute of limitations for commencement of an action. Given that the Rules of Procedure allow a simple writ of summons for that purpose, we answer in the affirmative.

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period requires an action to be commenced within that period; the defendant need not receive notice within it.

HOUSE v. SMITH · filed 2022-02-28

Additionally, there is no requirement that a plaintiff have notice of an action within the statute of limitations, only that the action be commenced within that period.

Section 5524(2) gives personal injury negligence claims a two-year limitations period; filing a timely writ does not preserve the claim without diligent, timely efforts to notify the defendant.

Senyk, N. v. Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy · filed 2023-01-09(2)

She secured representation to pursue negligence claims against the Archeparchy as the owner and operator of the cemetery, which were subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). ... These belated efforts are inadequate to satisfy Senyk’s “evidentiary burden” to prove that she made a “good-faith effort” to effectuate notice “in a timely manner.”

A timely writ does not toll Section 5524(7)’s two-year period when the plaintiff fails to make a diligent effort to serve the defendant.

Wimbs, D. v. Wolfson, M. · filed 2023-08-30(7)

Applying the foregoing precepts to the instant case, we agree with the trial court’s determination that Wimbs’ actions did not serve to toll the statute of limitations. Wimbs made only one attempt to serve Wolfson with the writ of summons after the statute of limitations period expired in December of 2020. When that attempt was unsuccessful and the sheriff’s office informed him of Wolfson’s Bloomfield area residence, there is no indication that he made a diligent effort to locate her then-current address to effectuate proper service.

Section 5524(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a conversion claim; filing a magisterial district judge complaint tolls that period until the plaintiff’s time to file a complaint expires after a properly served appeal.

Whittington, G. v. Daniels, J. · filed 2025-02-19(3)

We conclude the filing of a MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of that case. However, if a defendant perfects an appeal and properly serves the plaintiff with a praecipe to file a complaint, the statute of limitations begins to run again at the expiration of the twenty-day period in which the plaintiff is required to file a complaint.

Section 5524 gives assault claims a two-year limitations period; filing a timely writ does not toll that period without a good-faith effort to serve process.

Knapp, F. v. Knapp, D., Jr. · filed 2026-02-19(1) and (2)

The tort of assault is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(1) and (2). ... Hence, we conclude that Appellant’s first claim on appeal fails, as Appellant filed her complaint after the two-year statute of limitations expired and her lack of good faith in serving process on the Defendant did not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(6)’s two-year period for an Act 84 deduction claim begins with the first deduction.

K.A. Bundy v. J.E. Wetzel, Secretary, PA DOC · filed 2019-04-12(6)

The first deduction from Bundy’s account was made on June 6, 2013; therefore, his cause of action accrued on that date.

Section 5524(6) gives an inmate two years from the first account deduction to seek the return of deducted funds.

R. Young, Jr. v. PA DOC & Lancaster County Clerk of Courts · filed 2016-12-22(6)

We agree with the Department and the Clerk of Courts that based on Morgalo, Young’s “cause of action accrue[d] when the Department [made] the first deduction.” Morgalo, 134 A.3d at 1149 n.14. Young had two years from the date of the first deduction to file a claim. Young avers that the Department began making deductions in 2001. Petition, ¶1. Young had until 2003 to file a claim, and the statute of limitations had long expired by the time he filed the instant petition in 2015.

Section 5524(6) imposes a two-year limit on an inmate’s claim challenging deductions from an inmate account.

Reid v. DOC · filed 2017-07-17(6)

Recalling that Reid filed his administrative grievance in September 2014 and then filed this current action in June 2015, both actions were taken well beyond the two-year statute of limitations period in 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6).

Section 5524(6) applies a two-year limitations period to an action against a government officer for nondelivery of property in the officer’s possession, superseding the general six-month period.

Morgalo v. S. Gorniak (SCI Albion Accountant) v. Montgomery County Clerk of Courts · filed 2016-03-08(6)

Because Section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code applies specifically to a government unit officer’s non-delivery of property over which it has exercised dominion, Section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code’s two-year limitations period applies over Section 5522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code’s six-month time limit.

Section 5524(6)'s two-year limitation does not apply when government defendants did not acquire the funds by execution or similar process.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. Williamsport Sanitary Authority · filed 1980-11-20(6)

Consequently, the Court shall make final its determination that § 5524(6) is inapplicable because the funds in question were not in the possession of the counterclaim defendants by reason of execution or similar process.

Section 5524(6) applies a two-year limit to surcharge claims against county officers for wrongfully withheld funds, and the period does not begin until the officers file full and complete returns with the controller.

In re Controller's Subpoena Concerning the Professional Education Fund · filed 1981-09-25(6)

The surcharge is clearly a claim against a county officer for funds wrongfully withheld to which the two-year limitation period applies. ... Since the record discloses that to date the surcharged officers have not submitted full and complete returns as required by Section 1802 of the Second Class City Code, 16 P.S. §4802, we conclude that the two-year limitation period does not begin to run until full and complete returns are filed by the Coroners with the Controller.

Section 5524(6) gives a claimant two years to sue city pension officials for unpaid pension benefits held by the pension board.

Sebastionelli v. City of Bethlehem · filed 1984-06-11(6)

The pension board, comprised of city officials, is required by statute to make pension benefit disbursements to retired firefighters pursuant to 53 P.S. §39320, and plaintiff is suing over the non-payment of the proper amount of money presently in the board’s possession. Therefore, the two year statute applies to the present case.

Section 5524(6) imposes a two-year limit on an action against government officers for failing to pay money in their possession that is due to the claimant.

Simmons v. Cohen · filed 1987-11-24(6)

However, the gravamen of her central claim is that respondents, by adopting the SSI Fee Policy and applying it to deny her request for reimbursement of attorneys fees, did not pay money in their possession that was due to her. By this description, the action falls within the language of section 5524(6), and it should be governed by the two-year period of limitation.

Section 5524(6)’s two-year limit does not apply to a claim against auditors who neither possessed nor collected the funds at issue.

Borough of West Fairview v. Hess · filed 1989-12-28(6)

The language of this provision clearly does not involve the actions of the auditors at issue here, because the auditors did not have in their possession funds that they collected on behalf of the borough.

Section 5524(6)'s limitations period does not run against a county officer until the officer files a complete report.

York County v. Norris · filed 1996-09-13(6)

Norris also argues that the trial court should have applied a two-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(6) for actions against a county officer and thus should have barred recovery of any payments preceding June 1984, since this suit was instituted on June 3, 1986. ... We again agree with the trial court and hold that the statute of limitations does not run until the county officer files a complete report.

Section 5524(6) sets a two-year limitations period for specified actions against government officers but creates no independent cause of action.

Morales-Vasquez v. PA DOC · filed 2020-07-28(6)

Contrary to Vasquez’s assertions, section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code does not set forth any independent cause of action, but merely prescribes, as his pleading recognizes, the limitations period11 for an action against “any office of any government unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected upon [] execution or otherwise in his possession.” 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6).

Section 5524(6) applies a two-year limitations period to claims challenging Act 84 deductions; the period runs when the inmate knows of the loss.

Johnson, A., Aplt. v. Wetzel, J. · filed 2020-10-01(6)

It may also be recognized that the harm alleged by Appellant – a loss of money from his account – constitutes an injury of which he admits he was aware as early as July 2013. See Johnson v. Wetzel, No. 497 MD 2018, First Petition for Review at ¶13 (Pa. Cmwlth.). As such, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Act 84 deductions, see generally Morgalo, 134 A.3d at 1147 (analyzing 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6)), had expired well before Appellant commenced this litigation in 2018, as the Department pointed out in its demurrer.

Section 5524(6) gives two years to bring an action against a government officer for nonpayment of money collected or held, including a claim to recover deductions from an inmate account.

Com. Ex. Rel Caine Pelzer v. Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas · filed 2023-11-16(6)

However, Section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code provides that “‘[a]n action against any officer of any government unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected upon on execution or otherwise in his possession’ must be commenced within two years.” 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6). Because the court costs of $854.63 were paid in full by April 2009, and Pelzer filed the instant petition for review in June 2022, his claim is time barred.

Section 5524(1) sets a two-year limitations period for malicious prosecution and false arrest claims.

LAWS v. BOROUGH OF LANSDALE · filed 2024-03-12(1)

The malicious prosecution and false arrest claims brought against Gribling (Count VI) are also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(1).

Section 5524(6) gives an inmate two years from the first Act 84 deduction to challenge deductions from an inmate account; recurring deductions do not toll that period.

W.E. Mitwalli v. PA DOC · filed 2024-09-03(6)

In Act 84 deduction cases, the relevant limitations period is two years.

Section 5524(6) gives inmates two years to seek refunds of Act 84 deductions; delayed initial notice and ignorance of the law do not toll the deadline when monthly account statements show the deductions.

O.S. Lewis v. L. Harry Super., DOC · filed 2024-12-10(6)

We are constrained to agree with the DOC that Inmate’s claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(6).

Section 5524(6) gives an inmate two years to challenge Act 84 deductions; when the inmate knows of the deductions, the claim accrues with the first deduction, and later deductions do not start a new period.

Cruz v. SCI-Huntingdon Facility Manager · filed 2024-12-19(6)

As for the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Act 84 deductions,7 it has expired and there is no applicable exception to the general rule set forth in Section 5502(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5502(a), that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the cause of action accrues. ... Each deduction does not constitute a new cause of action.

Section 5524(6) gives an inmate two years from the first Act 84 deduction to challenge the deductions; knowledge of the underlying court order is unnecessary for accrual.

M. Hill v. C. Mayernick (Inmate Accounts) · filed 2026-01-21(6)

In Act 84 deductions cases, the applicable limitations period is two years. ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the first Act 84 deduction occurs, and the record shows that Petitioner indisputably knew about the deductions, as evidenced by the grievances he filed. His knowledge of the injury, not his awareness of the underlying court order, triggers accrual.

Section 5524(3)’s two-year limitation does not govern a United States action for conversion of government property; the six-year federal limitation applies.

United States v. Chesley's Sales, Inc. · filed 1981-10-14(3)

Defendant seeks summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff’s action is time barred by the two-year limitation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3). However, an action by the United States for conversion of Government property is controlled by 28 U.S.C. ... § 2415(b), which provides a six-year limitation.

Section 5524(4) sets a two-year limit for real-property trespass claims, and determining whether blasting is a continuous tort requires consideration of the facts.

Donaldson, B. v. Amerikohl Mining · filed 2015-06-09(4)

We note the statute of limitations for “[a]n action for waste or trespass of real property” is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(4). ... In the case sub judice, the determination of whether the blasting was a continuous tort required the court to consider a variety of factors. ... Instantly, the trial court found that blasting was not a continuous tort as a matter of law, without any analysis of the facts of the case. Therefore, we find the court erred in granting summary judgment.

Section 5524(4)’s two-year limitation applies to actions alleging negligent damage to real property.

Crisante v. J. H. Beers, Inc. · filed 1982-04-02(4)

For the following reasons we adopt the latter position and therefore conclude that section 5524(4) governs causes of action alleging negligent infliction of damage to real property.

Section 5524(4)'s two-year limit does not bar an action for trespass when the alleged trespass continues to the present.

Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. Pennzoil Co. · filed 1982-10-25(4)

Furthermore, the court recognizes that a statute of limitation will not bar an action in trespass, even where the trespass is discovered by the injured party beyond the period of the statute, where the wrong continues to the present.

Section 5524(4)'s two-year period for real-property trespass runs from a permanent trespass even if the resulting harm continues.

County of Allegheny v. Merrit Construction Co. · filed 1982-12-23(4)

Accordingly, we find that the landslide resulted in a permanent trespass. The appellant’s cause of action accrued at the latest on January 27, 1978. Since the appellant did not commence suit by January 27, 1980, its cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(4) requires an action for trespass of real property to be commenced within two years.

Luden's, Inc. v. Irwin & Leighton, Inc. · filed 1983-07-12(4)

In particular, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5524(4) (Purdon 1981) requires that an action for *579trespass of real property be commenced within two years. Clearly, since plaintiffs action in assumpsit was barred because it was not brought within four years, plaintiffs claim in trespass must also be barred, since it was not brought within two years.

Section 5524(4)'s two-year limit applies to tort claims for damage to real property even when the defendant entered the land with permission.

Potter v. Otterson · filed 1987-06-30(4)

It is true that defendant was on plaintiffs’ land by permission but it is also true that the gravamen of the claim is an alleged tortious act which damaged real property. ... And now, this June 30, 1987, the court rules that the case is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(4) and refuses plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 5524(4) bars a trespass claim filed more than two years after dumping ends when the dumping permanently changes the land.

Beach Street Corp. v. A.P. Construction Co. · filed 1995-05-02(4)

After a bench trial, it ruled that the trespass was permanent, not continuing, since the dumping was completed by February of 1988 and had effected a permanent change to the condition of the land. Therefore, Beach Street had to file its trespass claim by February of 1990 to meet the two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(4). ... The trial court correctly rejected this spurious claim. While this action is thus time-barred, we think the more powerful rationale for dismissal is Beach Street’s lack of standing.

Section 5524(4) gives a plaintiff two years to seek monetary damages for trespass on real property; requests for equitable relief are governed by laches.

Olexa v. DeSales University · filed 2005-12-12(4)

Under the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(4), an action for trespass on real property must be commenced within two years after the trespass occurs. In this case the trespass occurred initially in August 1997, more than two years prior to the commencement of this action. However, the University’s reliance on the statute of limitations as a complete defense is misplaced. The statute of limitations bars any claim for monetary damages, but it does not apply to a request for equitable relief.

Section 5524 requires trespass and nuisance actions to be commenced within two years.

Ingros v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co. · filed 2006-12-15

Under 42 Pa.C.S. §5524, actions for trespass and nuisance must be commenced within two years.

Section 5524(4) and (7) impose a two-year limitations period on taking and trespass tort claims.

Williams v. Borough of Blakely · filed 2011-07-18(4), (7)

Because the Borough confiscated the fill in the mid-1990s, that claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to taking and trespass claims. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5524(4) and (7).

Section 5524(7) sets a two-year limitations period for nuisance claims; for a permanent nuisance, the period runs from its creation.

CASSEL-HESS v. Hoffer · filed 2012-05-07(7)

As the lake has (allegedly) been a permanent nuisance since 2005, the statute of limitations began to run at the time the nuisance was created. ... Given that the statute of limitations for nuisance is two-years, the claim became time-barred in 2007. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7).

Section 5524(4) gives a plaintiff two years from the date of a permanent trespass to bring a trespass claim.

Cronlund v. Leavitt · filed 2013-04-10(4)

The two-year statute of limitations will run from the date of the permanent harm.

Section 5524 does not revive a cause of action that was fully barred before it took effect.

Gravinese v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1984-01-20

The new statute of limitations codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524 can therefore have no applicability to the instant action.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limitations period does not apply to a fraud claim that accrued before its February 18, 1983 effective date.

Waldo v. North American Van Lines, Inc. · filed 1987-09-04(7)

Because plaintiff’s cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of § 5524(7), which was February 18, 1983, the applicable limitations period is six years pursuant to § 5527(6).

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limit for fraud and deceit applies only to causes of action accruing after its February 1983 effective date.

Gabriel v. O'HARA · filed 1987-11-30(7)

This amendment applies only to causes of action accruing after its effective date in February, 1983.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period does not govern a common law fraud claim that accrued before February 1983; the six-year period applies.

Keystone Insurance v. Houghton · filed 1988-04-19(7)

Pennsylvania’s six year statute of limitations controls for the present common law fraud claim as the claim accrued before February, 1983.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitation period for wrongful-discharge actions.

Neal v. Altoona Hospital · filed 1985-06-10(2)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action for wrongful discharge is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

Section 5524(3) applies a two-year limitations period to wrongful discharge claims analogous to tortious interference with contract.

Monkelis v. Scientific Systems Services · filed 1987-02-03(3)

In sum, the weight of authority leads us to the conclusion that subparagraph (3) of section 5524 applies to Count V of plaintiff’s complaint. ... Actions for wrongful discharge and tortious interference with contract are sufficiently similar to be be governed by the same statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) gives a wrongful discharge claim a two-year limitations period.

Owens, B. v. Lehigh Valley Hospital · filed 2016-10-05(2)

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a wrongful discharge claim is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Appellant’s claim is facially time barred, as her employment with LVH was terminated on March 9, 2011 and she did not file suit until July 8, 2013, approximately four months after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(7)'s limitations period cannot support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the time bar is clear from the complaint.

KREIDER v. GREEN ROBIN HOMES, LLC · filed 2025-06-04(7)

This affirmative defense has not been established by the individual defendants, who reserved the heft of their argument for the reply brief. ... If the limitations issue is not clear from the face of the complaint, it will not serve as the basis for a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in this Circuit.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year limitation cannot preclude recovery before the defendant raises it as a defense.

Dash v. Wilap Corp. · filed 1985-07-05(2)

As in Sykes, we hold that the trial court here acted prematurely in ruling in advance of the action sought to be taken that the statute of limitations would preclude recovery even if an award in favor of the plaintiffs and against Rightly were entered after a trial.

Section 5524(3)’s two-year limitations defense is waived if it is not pleaded in the answer.

Frascatore v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Development (In Re Frascatore) · filed 1989-04-13(3)

On the strength of these authorities, we agree that HUD has waived the application of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3) by failing to plead the statute in its Answer.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limitation period for a personal injury action is subject to waiver.

Roytman, M. v. Cesarone, K. · filed 2017-02-14(2)

The two-year limitation period established through the general Pennsylvania statute of limitations that is applicable to this action, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), is subject to waiver.

Section 5524(3)'s two-year limit for trespass actions does not apply to a bank customer's claim for payments on forged checks when the customer has no trespass cause of action under Pennsylvania law.

Monaghan v. Provident National Bank · filed 1985-09-27(3)

Plaintiffs action is not subject to the two-year statute of limitations for trespass actions in section 5524(3), because plaintiff has no cause of action for trespass under Pennsylvania law.

Section 5524(4) sets a two-year limitations period for trespass claims, whether the trespass is continuing or permanent.

Sampathkumar, P. v. Chase Home Finance · filed 2020-10-19(4)

Upon raising a claim “sounding in trespass, whether continuing or permanent,” the statute of limitations is two years. See Kowalski v. TOA PA V, L.P., 206 A.3d 1148, 1160 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(4)).

Section 5524’s two-year period does not bar later claims for continuing trespass or nuisance caused by growing trees merely because the encroachment began more than two years earlier.

Long, E. v. Estate of: McFarland, D. · filed 2020-11-25(4), (7)

As this Court explained in Jones, unless the trees are removed, the branches and roots will continue to grow and are likely to cause repeated damage to Appellants’ property or to Appellants themselves, rendering the calculation of future damages speculative at best. Appellants’ causes of action for trespass and nuisance are continuing in nature.

Section 5524(4) sets a two-year limit for trespass claims; allegations of a continuing trespass can affect when that limit bars a claim.

Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production, Co. · filed 2024-01-03(4)

The applicable statute of limitations for trespass is two years. ... The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a continuing trespass.

Section 5524(4)'s two-year limit does not bar claims for recurring trespass damage that occurred within two years before the complaint was filed.

Sachs, D. v. Wilkinsburg-Penn Joint Water · filed 2026-02-13(4)

For such alleged damages sustained on or after June 21, 2024, the statute of limitations would obviously not bar relief, as Appellants filed their complaint well within two years of those events, on October 9, 2024.

Section 5524(5) requires a civil forfeiture action to be commenced within two years, but does not require a forfeiture hearing within that period.

Com. v. $182.00 Cash, et seq. ~ Appeal of: M. Wisotzkey · filed 2018-09-12(5)

Section 5524(5) of the Judicial Code provides that “[a]n action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture shall be commenced within two years.” ... Wisotzkey has cited no legal authority, nor have we found any, requiring that a forfeiture hearing must take place within the two-year period for commencing a forfeiture action.

Section 5524(5) requires the Commonwealth to file a forfeiture petition within two years after police confiscate the property.

Com. v. T. Cash · filed 2015-10-15(5)

To that end, the Commonwealth was required to file its petition for forfeiture within two years of when police confiscated the items from Cash.

Section 5524(5) gives the Commonwealth two years to commence an action for statutory forfeiture.

D.M. Barren v. PSP, Trooper Wesley Berkebile · filed 2016-09-27(5)

Section 5524(5) of the Judicial Code provides that “[a]n action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture” shall be filed within two years. 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(5). However, the two-year statute of limitations applies to forfeiture actions commenced by the Commonwealth.

Section 5524(5) gives the Commonwealth two years from seizure to file a forfeiture action.

Com. v. 2002 Honda Accord, $26,612.00 in U.S. Currency ~ Appeal of: G.P. Keuhner · filed 2017-02-07(5)

The statute of limitations for a forfeiture action is two years from the date the property is seized. Commonwealth v. Allen, 59 A.3d 677, 680 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), aff’d 107 A.3d 709 (Pa. 2014) (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(5)). Here, the Commonwealth filed its forfeiture motion on September 3, 2013, well within two years of July 5, 2012, when Kuehner’s property was seized.

Section 5524(5) gives two years to bring a statutory civil penalty action and applies to an entire claim for willful overcharges under the ESA.

Carbone v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1985-11-15(5)

If this is “[a]n action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture,” it may be filed within two years; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(5), effective 60 days from enactment on December 20, 1982. ... But the statute of limitations for an action on a penalty applies and the claim is time-barred whether the statute runs from the date the discount was denied initially in February, 1979 or the date of last purchase in January, 1981.

Section 5524(5)'s two-year limit for civil penalties does not apply to a claim for the single amount of an ESA overcharge, even when treble damages may also be awarded.

Carbone v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1987-01-23(5)

The authority to award treble damages, if in the action for damages under Section 210 the overcharge is willful, does not change the compensatory nature of the basic federal statutory action for the single amount of the overcharge under Section 210 to an action for a civil penalty for the purposes of application of either of the Pennsylvania statutes of limi*1422tations.

Section 5524(5)'s two-year limit for statutory civil penalties does not apply to administrative penalties imposed by the Insurance Commissioner under the UIPA.

BG Balmer & Co. v. COM. OF PA., INS. COMM. · filed 1988-03-04(5)

Because the Commissioner was acting under his limited power to impose administrative penalties pursuant to Section 9 of the ... UIPA, ... we hold that Balmer s reliance on Section 5524(5) of the Judicial Code is misplaced.

Section 5524(5)'s two-year limit does not bar a Commonwealth civil divestment proceeding under the Corrupt Organizations Act when no express time limit applies to that proceeding.

Com. of Pa. v. SEYMOUR · filed 1988-10-17(5)

Although it would appear that this limitation period governing "forfeiture" actions "given to a government unit" applies here, we do not believe that Section 5524(5) precludes the Commonwealth from proceeding in this matter.

Section 5524(5)'s two-year limit for statutory civil penalties does not apply to administrative penalties imposed by the Insurance Commissioner under Section 9 of the UIPA.

McDermond v. Foster · filed 1989-07-03(5)

Petitioner correctly argues that Section 5524(5) provides a two-year limitation for actions upon a statute for civil penalty or forfeiture and that Section 11 of the UIPA authorizes only courts to impose civil penalties. The Insurance Commissioner herein, however, was acting pursuant to Section 9 of the UIPA which allows the agency to impose administrative penalties; thus Section 5524(5) is not applicable.

Section 5524(5)'s two-year limit does not apply to actions brought by the state or to administrative agency proceedings.

Sellars v. Commonwealth · filed 1989-07-27(5)

Because section 5524(5) of the Judicial Code does not expressly provide for its application to the state, the statute does not apply. ... Furthermore, section 5524(5) of the Judicial Code provides that the actions and proceedings referred to are actions at law and equity, court proceedings rather than administrative agency proceedings.

Section 5524(5)’s two-year limit does not bar a Commonwealth forfeiture action when the statute underlying the forfeiture sets no time limit against the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. $5,000 in U.S. Currency · filed 1990-10-17(5)

Because no period of limitations against the Commonwealth is set forth in the criminal solicitation statute, we find that the Commonwealth’s action is not time-barred under section 5524(5).

Section 5524(5)’s two-year period does not apply to liquidated damages under Section 8104(b) for failure to enter satisfaction of a judgment.

Pantuso Motors, Inc. v. Corestates Bank · filed 2002-06-19(5)

Accordingly, as the two- and four-year limitations periods do not attach to Pantuso’s cause of action under Section 8104(b), the six-year residual statute applies.

Section 5524(5) gives a mortgagor two years to bring a claim for the civil penalty for failure to satisfy a mortgage upon request.

Ortlieb v. Hudson Bank · filed 2004-04-05(5)

Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations, which governs actions for civil penalty or forfeiture, controls Plaintiffs claims under 21 P.S. § 682 for failure to satisfy a mortgage upon request.

Section 5524(5) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for the civil penalty available under the Prompt Pay Act for payments withheld in bad faith.

Cecil Township Municipal Authority v. North American Specialty Surety Co. · filed 2011-12-15(5)

Given the explicit use of the word “penalty” (as opposed to “damages” or “remedy,” for instance), and the fact that it is fixed in the statute as “equal to 1% per month of the amount that was withheld in bad faith,” we believe it would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature to view § 3935 as anything other than a civil penalty. Therefore, we find that the limitations period in which a claim under 62 Pa.C.S. § 3935 must be brought is two years.

Section 5524(5) imposes a two-year limit on claims for statutory civil penalties, including damages intended to punish and deter violations regardless of actual injury.

Cubler v. Trumark Financial Credit Union · filed 2013-04-04(5)

For the reasons that follow, this court determined that plaintiff’s claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations supplied by 42 Pa. C.S. §5524 for an action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture.

Section 5524(5)’s two-year limit for actions upon statutes imposing civil penalties or forfeitures does not apply to claims for statutory damages under UCC section 9625.

Cubler v. TruMark Financial Credit Union · filed 2013-12-20(5)

We hold that the relevant provisions of section 9625 are not “punitive” in nature, nor do they provide for a “civil penalty” or “forfeiture.” Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Cubler’s class action was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(5).

Section 5524(5)’s two-year limit does not apply to claims for penalties and attorney fees under CASPA or the Prompt Pay Act.

East Coast Paving & Sealcoating, Inc. v. North Allegheny School District · filed 2015-03-06(5)

We disagree that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(5) applies either to CASPA or to the Prompt Pay Act.

Section 5524(2) gives a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim a two-year filing period; an amendment filed after that period cannot add the claim as a new cause of action.

Boarts v. McCord · filed 1986-06-11(2)

The general rule is that an amendment will not be permitted after the Statute of Limitations has run, if it introduces a new cause of action. ... Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in their amended complaint is more than an amplification of an existing cause of action since now they are seeking to recover “in their own right” for their own injuries.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year limit bars an amendment adding new and distinct wrongful-death defendants after the period expires.

Gilbert v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 1986-06-20(2)

It is clear, in this respect, that “[a]n amendment of the complaint, after the statute of limitations has run to bring in a new and distinct party to the action cannot be permitted.”

Section 5524(3)'s two-year limit bars adding a distinct property-damage claim after the period expires when the original complaint sought only personal-injury damages.

Hodgen v. Summers · filed 1989-03-06(3)

A claim for property damage is different than a claim for personal injuries. It is different in nature than a claim for personal injuries, involves issues of ownership not present in a claim for personal injuries, and requires application of a different measure of damages. Most significantly, an amendment adding a property damage claim which is barred by the statute of limitations will prejudice the defendants by subjecting them to a claim which is outlawed by the lapse of time. It will do so without permitting them to raise as a defense the bar of the statute of limitations which would otherwise be available to them.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year personal injury limit prevents adding a distinct defendant after the period runs when the original naming error was not technical and the addition would prejudice that defendant.

Bainbridge v. Commonwealth · filed 1989-04-26(2)

Clearly the failure to name DOT as a party in this case is not a technical defect that may be remedied after the applicable statute of limitations has run. To permit DOT to be named as a party at this point in the litigation of this case would be prejudicial to DOT.

Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania § 1983 claims alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and due process violations.

Felker v. Christine · filed 1992-04-22

Pennsylvania would apply a two-year statute of limitations to the present action. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 (Purdon Supp.1989).

Section 5524(2) gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury action; filing a petition for leave to amend a complaint to add defendants does not toll that period as to those defendants.

Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces · filed 1992-08-20(2)

In Pennsylvania, actions for personal injuries must be brought within two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). ... Plaintiffs nevertheless urge this court to adopt a new rule declaring that statutes of limitations are tolled by the filing of a petition for leave to amend in the trial court. We decline plaintiffs’ offer.

Section 5524(2) requires personal injury actions to be brought within two years; after that period expires, a plaintiff may not amend the action to add a new party.

Arnold v. Davis · filed 1996-04-03(2)

In Pennsylvania, actions for personal injuries must be brought within two years. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2). ... Since the statute of limitations had run, we stand by our decision to deny appellant’s motion to amend.

Section 5524’s two-year limit does not bar an amendment naming an existing estate’s administratrix when the action was timely filed in the estate’s name; the amendment corrects the party’s designation.

Estate of Gouse v. Miller & Norford Inc. · filed 1999-06-17

In the case sub judice, the more proper designation of the plaintiff in the caption of the amended complaint by reference to the administratrix of the estate, did not, in the court’s view, introduce a new party to the case, where the estate was in existence at the time of the filing of the praecipe for writ of summons. The amendment corrected the name of, but did not add or change, the party.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limitations period for tort claims; an amendment adding a new cause of action after that period expires is untimely.

Galloway v. Consolidated Natural Gas Co. · filed 2000-07-07

The statute of limitations for this tort case is two years, 42 Pa.C.S. §5524, and thus the amendment attempting to insert this new cause of action was properly stricken.

Section 5524’s two-year limitation bars an amended informed-consent claim that introduces a new cause of action after the limitation period expires.

Stalsitz v. Allentown Hospital · filed 2002-12-31

By. the time Appellants filed their third amended complaint, however, the two-year statute of limitations for civil actions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 had run, ... Because the statute of limitations had expired, a demurrer to that count was properly granted, and -a new trial was properly denied on this ground post-trial.

Section 5524’s two-year limitation bars a direct personal injury claim against a newly added defendant when the plaintiff knew of the injury and the limitations period has expired.

Heckman v. WE Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2004-03-08

This court has already referred to the fact that the statute of limitations, as a matter of law on the facts of this case, has barred the plaintiff from having any direct claim against the two additional defendants. That was the basis of this court denying the plaintiff’s petition to amend the complaint with prejudice.

Section 5524(7) bars amendment to add an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim after the limitations period expires.

Long v. Ostroff · filed 2004-06-23(7)

Patient has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion in the court’s acknowledgement that Patient is time-barred from raising his only potentially cognizable claim.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death and survival actions.

Cavoulas v. Singh · filed 2005-11-15(2)

The statute of limitations for both wrongful death and survival actions is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2).

Section 5524(2)'s two-year limitations period bars adding distinct medical negligence theories after the period expires.

Bitner, S. v. Sheehan, J., M.D. · filed 2019-03-12(2)

These theories differ from those the Plaintiffs’ complaints allege and, thus, were properly excluded on the day of trial after the statute of limitations had expired on their professional liability action.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit does not bar a later allegation that merely adds detail to a timely negligence claim without stating a new cause of action.

F.P. Polesky, Jr. and G. Polesky v. PennDOT and G.M. Smith · filed 2021-11-10(2)

Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, we conclude that the Poleskys’ slope easement claim does not constitute a new cause of action, but is merely an amplification of their original negligence claims against DOT. ... Therefore, we conclude that the Poleskys’ slope easement claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence action and bars a distinct negligence claim raised after that period.

Bostick, M. v. Post, C. and Post, D. · filed 2023-06-05(2)

Bostick cannot defeat the Posts’ summary judgment motion based on this new cause of action for “active negligence,” particularly where it was barred by the statute of limitations, and we discern no error by the trial court in choosing not to address it.

Section 5524’s two-year limit applies to the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission’s negligence action for property damage; the Commission cannot invoke the Commonwealth’s exemption from limitations.

Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Northeast Rental Corp. · filed 1988-05-08

Normally, in a negligence áction, such as this, alleging property damage, the applicable statute of limitations would be two years. (42 Pa.C.S. §5524). ... Because the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission cannot assert any aspects of sovereignty, the statute of limitations bars this action.

Section 5524(3)’s two-year limit does not bar the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission’s property-damage claim because the Commission may invoke nullum tempus as a Commonwealth party.

Smith v. Mognet · filed 1992-12-22(3)

Under the doctrine of nullum tempus, statutes of limitation do not apply to the Commonwealth unless the words of the statute *305specifically provide that they do. ... Therefore, because the Commission is a Commonwealth party for purposes of sovereign immunity, it may assert the doctrine of nullum tempus,6 Northampton.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limit does not apply to tort claims against government officers when §5522(b)(1) supplies a six-month limit.

Stoppie v. Johns · filed 1998-11-18(7)

However, §5524(7), by its terms, is not applicable to claims against a government officer based on negligence or tortious conduct because §5524(7), unlike §5524(l)-(6), provides limiting language which states that the two-year statute of limitations is applicable “except [in] an action or proceeding subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.” Thus, because §5522(b)(l) provides a different limitation period for actions against government officers, it is applicable.

Section 5524(7) imposes a two-year limit on breach of fiduciary duty claims, but that limit does not apply to the Commonwealth under nullum tempus.

Com. v. CITIZENS ALLIANCE · filed 2009-11-23(7)

Fumo is correct that a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Section 5524(7) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(7).[5] However, according to the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae, meaning "time does not run against the republic," the Commonwealth is exempt from statutes of limitations.

Section 5524(3)’s two-year limitations period applies to a negligence counterclaim seeking affirmative recovery for property damage.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ranger Nationwide, Inc. · filed 1988-09-16(3)

As in Harmer, defendant here has asserted a new cause of action in its counterclaim, charging plaintiff with negligence which caused defendant injury. Defendant seeks an affirmative judgment on the Counterclaim in the amount of the damages sustained as a result of plaintiff’s alleged negligence. In accord with Harmer, such a claim is subject to the 2 year limitations period and is therefore barred.

Section 5524(2) bars a sole-liability cross-claim filed after its two-year period expires; Rule 2252(d) does not suspend or toll that period.

Hileman v. Morelli · filed 1991-01-30(2)

The statute of limitations appearing in 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2) confers an absolute defense upon defendant Nason Hospital against actions brought after the two-year period. ... Consequently, Rule 2252(d) may not be read to suspend or toll the operation of 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2).

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period does not bar a fraud counterclaim that relates back to an answer filed within that period.

Perfect Plastics Industries, Inc. v. Cars & Concepts, Inc. · filed 1991-02-28

The fraud counterclaim, therefore, relates back to the filing of the Answer in June of 1989, and the two-year statute of limitations as provided by Pennsylvania Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, does not bar the counterclaim which is based upon activities that occurred in 1988.

Section 5524(3) requires a property damage counterclaim to be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

Continental Casualty Co. v. C.R. England Trucking Inc. · filed 2006-04-07(3)

The applicable statute of limitations is found in 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(3) where it states: “The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: ... (3) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof.” Counterclaim plaintiffs’ counterclaim was filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued.