75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802

Section 3802(g) permits chemical test results obtained more than two hours after driving when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and proves the driver consumed no alcohol or controlled substances between arrest and testing.

Com. v. Shedden, Jr., J · filed 2024-10-17(g)

Under subsection (g)(1), the Commonwealth must prove good cause as to why the chemical testing did not occur within two hours of the last time the defendant drove the car. Subsection (g)(2) by contrast is only concerned with whether alcohol or controlled substances were consumed from the time of arrest through the time of the chemical test.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.16% within two hours after driving or operating the vehicle.

Com. v. McQuaid, M. · filed 2024-02-27(c)

To sustain a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c), the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant’s BAC was at least .16% or greater within two hours after the defendant last drove or operated the motor vehicle.

Circumstantial evidence of when a person drove can establish that a blood draw occurred within the two-hour period required by Section 3802(c).

Com. v. Morgain, M. · filed 2023-09-29(c)

In addition, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied suppression based upon its finding that Appellant’s blood draw occurred within the two-hour time constraint set forth in Section 3802(c). First, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Appellant drove her vehicle home on the morning in question, as both she and her friend admitted to Trooper Fuller. Second, the circumstantial evidence demonstrated that Appellant drove home sometime between 4:00 a.m. and 4:45 a.m.

Section 3802(c) requires a BAC of at least 0.16 percent within two hours after driving; it does not require proof of BAC at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Senzick · filed 2005-05-05(c)

As section 3802(c) only prohibits having a BAC of .16 percent or above at the time of testing within two hours after driving, the reasoning and analysis set forth in Barud and adopted by Senzick is no longer applicable.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that a person drove after drinking enough to reach a 0.16% blood alcohol concentration within two hours after driving.

Commonwealth v. Thur · filed 2006-08-04(c)

Pursuant to the words of the statute, and our preceding discussion, the elements are: (1) that a person drove, operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle; and (2) that such action was conducted after imbibing enough alcohol that the actor’s BAC reached 0.16% within two hours after driving. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c).

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the driver’s BAC was at least 0.16% within two hours of driving, including reasonably certain evidence of when driving ended and when the blood or breath sample was taken.

Commonwealth v. Segida · filed 2006-10-24(c)

This is critical as it was necessary, in order to convict under § 3802(c), for the Commonwealth to prove that Appellant’s BAC was .16% or greater sometime within two hours of driving. As indicated above, this requires establishing, with reasonable certainty, both the time Appellant last drove and when the blood was drawn or breath sample was taken.

Section 3802(c) looks to blood alcohol concentration within two hours after driving, rather than at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Spease · filed 2006-11-13(c)

We simply reiterate, “there is no constitutional, statutory or common law right to the consumption of any quantity of alcohol before driving” and also that the pertinent question under the new DUI law is not what an individual’s BAC is at the time of driving but rather, “what is the individual’s BAC as determined by a test taken within two hours of driving?” McCoy at 33, quoting Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 254, 470 A.2d 1339, 1344 (1983) (emphasis in original).

Section 3802(a)(2) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to reach the specified BAC range within two hours, regardless of the driver's BAC at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Duda · filed 2007-05-31(a)(2)

Hence, as noted, the actus reus is the act of driving after drinking a sufficient amount of alcohol, where a sufficient amount of alcohol, for present purposes, is that quantity which will cause the person's BAC level to reach the statutorily prohibited range within two hours after driving, regardless of the actor's BAC level at the actual time of driving.

Section 3802’s two-hour window is satisfied when blood is drawn within two hours of driving, regardless of when it is tested.

Commonwealth v. Fusco · filed 2008-01-29(c)

However, since the blood was drawn within a two-hour period of defendant’s accident, when the blood was tested is irrelevant.

Section 3802(g) allows a blood test taken more than two hours after driving to establish alcohol concentration when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and no alcohol consumption between arrest and testing.

Commonwealth v. McNair · filed 2009-04-23(g)

The court holds that even if the evidence of time remains questionable, there is an exception to the two-hour rule under section 3802(g), which the Commonwealth can present to the fact-finder at trial. ... The Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to meet this burden. First, the Commonwealth established good cause why the blood test occurred at 12:14 a.m. ... After McNair was arrested he remained in police custody and therefore, did not imbibe any alcohol or use any controlled substances during this time.

Section 3802(c) prohibits driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle when the person's blood or breath alcohol concentration is at least 0.16% within two hours.

Commonwealth v. Rakowski · filed 2010-01-14(c)

Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c), an individual may not drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, operated, or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.16% within two hours after driving; without admissible BAC results, a conviction cannot stand.

Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin · filed 2010-09-08(c)

Given that conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c) (highest rate) requires BAC results, the admission of which was an error of law in this case, the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction under that statute.

Section 3802’s two-hour window concerns criminal DUI prosecution and does not set a deadline for implied consent warnings in a civil license suspension proceeding.

Sitoski v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing · filed 2010-10-20(a)(2)

Thus, we conclude that the two-hour time window for submitting to a chemical test set forth in Section 3802 is related to a licensee’s criminal prosecution for DUI and has no bearing on whether the implied consent warnings were properly given to the licensee for the purposes of a license suspension under Section 1547(b).

Section 3802(c)’s two-hour alcohol-concentration requirement can be proved with circumstantial evidence of when the defendant drove and when blood was drawn.

Commonwealth v. Crespo · filed 2010-10-28(c)

This court, based on the testimony of Officer Perkins and the defendant, finds that the commonwealth can prove that the accident occurred shortly after the dispatch. As such, there is ample evidence to satisfy the critical time element and to sustain a conviction regarding the 3802(c) charge.

Section 3802(b) permits a court to rely on the defendant’s expert testimony to establish a lower blood alcohol level without shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Haight · filed 2012-07-23(b)

In sum, given these circumstances wherein Appellant sought to rebut the Commonwealth’s expert’s opinions with his own expert’s opinions, the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof in believing Appellant’s expert’s testimony, which established a lesser BAC, thus convicting Appellant of the cognate offense under Subsection 3802(b).

A conviction under § 3802(c) based on supernatant testing requires evidence of a conversion factor generally accepted in the scientific community to establish whole blood alcohol content.

Commonwealth v. Karns · filed 2012-07-27(c)

Our review of Ickes’ testimony leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of a conversion factor that is generally accepted in the scientific community.

Section 3802(a) does not require relation-back evidence as a matter of law to prove a driver's BAC at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Cruz · filed 2013-07-17(a)

Pennsylvania’s DUI law presently does not require relation-back evidence as a matter of law, nor does it specify the manner by which the Commonwealth must prove that the accused operated a vehicle while having a BAC over 0.08%.

For DUI charges based on blood alcohol level, Section 3802 requires reliable conversion evidence to infer whole-blood alcohol content from a supernatant test result.

Commonwealth v. Brugger · filed 2014-03-25

As the en banc trial court acknowledged in its Omnibus Opinion, while Pennsylvania law manifestly requires the use of a reliable conversion factor to infer the requisite whole-blood BAC from supernatant BAC results, the source, content, and rigor required of such testimony remain less than clear.

A highest-rate-of-alcohol DUI falls under subsection (c), not subsection (a)(1).

Commonwealth v. Thompson · filed 2014-01-17(a)(1), (c)

DUI with the highest rate of alcohol is not a violation of section 3802(a)(1). Instead, it is a violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802 (c).

Section 3802(c) requires a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.16% within two hours of driving; an unresolved testing margin of error that extends below that threshold can warrant a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Landis · filed 2014-04-08(c)

Moreover, since there was no direct or circumstantial evidence regarding the possible applications of the 10% margin of error, the trial evidence required the jury to speculate that Appellant’s actual blood alcohol content was .16% or higher within two hours of driving. Such speculation defies the requirement that the jury find all facts necessary for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802(b) prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours of driving; a properly calculated result in that range supports a high-rate DUI conviction.

Com. v. Rizzo, D. · filed 2014-09-17(b)

Based on a review of this testimony, we agree with the trial court that ... the statutory range of .10% and .16%. Accordingly, Issue II is without merit.

Section 3802(g) permits a blood test taken more than two hours after driving to establish blood alcohol concentration when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and proves the driver consumed no alcohol between arrest and testing.

Commonwealth v. Grimes · filed 2014-06-05(g)

Furthermore, the Commonwealth has shown good cause explaining why the chemical test could not be obtained within two hours and that defendant did not imbibe any alcohol between the time he was arrested and by the time the sample was obtained.

Section 3802(b) requires proof that the driver's blood or breath alcohol concentration was at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours of driving; the court found sufficient evidence of a 0.116% blood alcohol level.

Com. v. Yuhouse, D. · filed 2014-08-22(b)

Viewing this evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the ... blood alcohol level was .116 percent.

Section 3802(c) requires evidence supporting a conversion from supernatant test results to whole-blood alcohol content; the Commonwealth cannot establish a 1:1 ratio without expert testimony.

Com. v. Emigh, Jr., T. · filed 2014-08-26(c)

The court, however, erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to present evidence of a 1:1 conversion ratio to the jury without expert testimony and prevented Appellants from presenting expert testimony at trial.

Section 3802(b) requires the Commonwealth to establish that blood was drawn within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Ferrey, T. · filed 2014-10-16(b)

We find the Commonwealth sufficiently established that Ferrey’s blood was drawn within two hours of driving as required.

Section 3802(g)(1) permits a blood test taken after two hours when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay; it need not prove responders did everything possible to obtain the sample sooner.

Com. v. Dye, T., Jr. · filed 2015-02-20(g)(1)

With respect to Appellant’s sufficiency claim, we deny relief based on the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Gray, who presided over Appellant’s non-jury trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/14, at 2-8 (finding that sufficient evidence was presented to satisfy the exception to the two-hour rule set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(g)).

For a highest-rate DUI charge, a chemical sample must be obtained within two hours of driving unless the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay; without either condition, a late BAC result is inadmissible.

Com. v. Bradwell, S. · filed 2015-03-10(c), (g)(1)

However, those results have no evidentiary value in a prosecution for under subsection 3802(c) if the Commonwealth fails to satisfy either the timeliness requirements of that section or the exception provided in subsection 3802(g).

A serum blood alcohol test can support a conviction under § 3802(b) when its result is converted to a whole blood reading using a supported conversion factor.

Com. v. Keefer, R. · filed 2015-03-26(b)

The blood test used in this case was not a whole blood test, but rather was a serum test. “The general rule for alcohol-related DUI is that only tests performed on whole blood will sustain a conviction under 75 ... Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3802. Thus, evidence of blood serum, plasma[,] or supernatant testing, without conversion, will not suffice.” ... The lab technician testified that the conversion factor was placed into the machine in order to covert the blood serum reading into a whole blood reading. ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of DUI.

A challenge to a breath test’s margin of error under § 3802(b) concerns the weight of the evidence, rather than its sufficiency.

Com. v. Lawhorn, A. · filed 2015-04-13(b)

None of these arguments provides a basis for overlooking Sibley’s holding that margin of error evidence is relevant to the weight to be assigned to the result of a blood alcohol test. Under the binding authority of Sibley, Appellant’s failure to challenge the weight of the evidence is fatal to the argument he raises on appeal.

Section 3802(a)(2) permits a DUI conviction when a credited testing variance places the driver’s blood alcohol concentration below 0.10%, despite a test result of 0.103.

Com. v. Kemfort, J. · filed 2015-04-13(a)(2)

The blood test result showed Appellant’s BAC was .103. Id. at 50. However, the trial court credited the defense expert’s testimony that there is a 5-10% variance for the findings, which brought Appellant’s BAC to below .10. N.T., 5/16/2014, at 60-61. Based upon all of the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for DUI under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(2).

Section 3802(c) covers a person whose blood alcohol concentration is at least 0.16% within two hours of being in actual physical control of a vehicle.

Com. v. Geiss, T. · filed 2015-06-26(c)

Because the Code provides that a violation occurs while driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the vehicle, we will deem the evidence sufficient if it establishes that Appellant had a BAC of 0.16% or higher within two hours of having been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle and had a blood alcohol concentration greater than .16% within two hours of operating it.

Com. v. Wloczewski, P. · filed 2015-06-30(c)

In order to sustain a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was operating the vehicle and that his BAC was greater than .16% within 2 hours of operating the vehicle.

Section 3802(g) allows a blood test taken more than two hours after driving when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and proves the driver drank no alcohol between arrest and the test.

Commonwealth v. Eichler · filed 2016-02-02(g)

Eichler’s blood draw took place more than two hours after he drove, operated or was in actual physical control of his vehicle, but under section 3802(g), the blood test results still were admissible in Eichler’s section 3802(c) prosecution.

Section 3802(c)’s two-hour blood-alcohol requirement can be proved with circumstantial evidence establishing the approximate time of driving.

Com. v. McIntyre, C. · filed 2016-03-02(c)

In this case, although the Commonwealth did not present evidence that would establish the exact time of Appellant’s accident, sufficient circumstantial evidence established the approximate time within a few minutes. Thus, sufficient evidence established that Appellant’s blood alcohol level was 0.16 within two hours of his operation of a vehicle as set forth under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); See Rakowski, 987 A.2d at 1217.

Section 3802(b) requires a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours after driving.

Com. v. Jaroszynski, Z. · filed 2016-04-06(b)

Based on the plain language of the statute, this evidence was irrelevant for purposes of establishing a violation of section 3802(b) where the proper inquiry was whether Appellant had a BAC of “at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours after [he had] driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b).

Section 3802(g) allows a BAC test taken more than two hours after driving if the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and proves the driver did not drink between arrest and sample collection.

Com. v. McBride, D. · filed 2016-07-08(g)(1)-(2)

However, evidence of BAC obtained more than two hours after the defendant has driven is sufficient to establish that element of the offense where (1) good cause is shown, and (2) the Commonwealth establishes that the defendant did not imbibe alcohol between the time he was arrested and the time the sample was obtained.

Section 3802(g)(2)’s exception to the two-hour rule requires the Commonwealth to show that the person did not drink alcohol between arrest and collection of the test sample.

Com. v. Buterbaugh, M. · filed 2016-08-25(g)(2)

Appellant’s argument is misplaced, as the good cause exception requires the Commonwealth to establish that “the individual did not imbibe any alcohol or utilize a controlled substance between the time the individual was arrested and the time the sample was obtained.”

Section 3802(c) requires a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.16% for a highest-rate-of-alcohol DUI conviction.

Com. v. Morris, S. · filed 2016-11-07(c)

To be convicted of DUI — highest rate of alcohol, an individual's BAC ... must be 0.16% or higher. ... As a result, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Section 3802(a)(2) requires proof that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours of driving; proof of inability to drive safely is unnecessary.

Com. v. Schwartzer, J. · filed 2016-12-19(a)(2)

At trial, the Commonwealth did not have to demonstrate that Schwartzer was incapable of safe driving. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(2). Instead, the Commonwealth had to prove that Schwartzer’s BAC was between .08% and .10%, within two hours of driving or operating his vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require blood alcohol testing to support a DUI conviction.

Com. v. Kohli, H. · filed 2017-02-14(a)(1)

We note that Kohli’s claim regarding the failure to conduct blood alcohol testing does not render the evidence insufficient to support his DUI conviction under section 3802(a)(1).

Flight from an accident scene and the resulting delay in finding the driver can establish good cause for obtaining a blood sample more than two hours after driving.

Com. v. Shakespeare, C. · filed 2016-12-21(g)(1)

This flight, and the consequential delay in finding Appellant, provides good cause for the Commonwealth’s delay under Section 3802(g)(1).

Section 3802(a)(2)’s two-hour window concerns alcohol concentration after driving; it does not set a deadline for a second breath test in a civil license-suspension case.

Mushinsky v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing · filed 2017-02-21(a)(2)

Licensee also argues that the Department has not established that the second breath test was taken within a two-hour time limit beginning with her arrest, as set forth in the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(a)(2). This argument is completely without merit. Section 3802(a)(2) relates to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance-general impairment and provides: “An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.”

Section 3802(c) requires proof that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.16% within two hours of operating the vehicle.

Com. v. Lloyd, M. · filed 2017-03-20(c)

To establish the elements of this offense, the Commonwealth must offer proof that the accused’s blood alcohol content was 0.16% or higher within two hours of operation of the vehicle. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence was sufficient to establish that the blood test occurred within two hours of Appellant’s departure from the Brookside Inn and operation of his vehicle.

Section 3802(c) requires evidence that the defendant drove, operated, or controlled the vehicle within two hours of the blood test; without that evidence, the blood test must be suppressed for that charge.

Com. v. Alvarado, O. · filed 2017-04-28(c)

Based on the suppression of the statements, there is no circumstantial evidence or statements that Alvarado was driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle within two hours of the blood test as required by 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3802. ... Therefore the blood test must be suppressed for the charge under 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(c).

Section 3802(g) allows a test taken more than two hours after driving to establish a DUI concentration element when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and no alcohol or drug use between arrest and testing; those conditions are not additional offense elements.

Com. v. Newdeck, K. · filed 2017-09-27(g)

Section 3802(g) simply provides an exception to the normal two-hour requirement where the two delineated conditions are met. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the two conditions do not constitute additional elements, but instead reflect a legislative recognition that the Commonwealth cannot meet the two-hour time requirement in all DUI cases.

Section 3802(b) classifies a blood alcohol concentration between .10 and .16 as high rate of alcohol.

Com. v. Gratzinger, K. · filed 2018-05-01(b)

Appellant’s unchallenged, and thus properly-considered, blood test results revealed a BAC of .159%. He accordingly was convicted of violating subsection (b) of the DUI statute, and subjected to a mandatory sentence of ... not less than ninety days.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration reached the highest rate within two hours of driving; the timing may be established through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. King, R. · filed 2018-06-27(c)

From these circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that King’s blood alcohol concentration was above the highest rate of alcohol7 within two hours of operating his motorcycle.

Section 3802(g)(1)’s good-cause exception applies when a driver’s flight from an accident delays a blood test beyond two hours.

Com. v. Lee, D. · filed 2018-08-29(g)(1)

Thus, consistent with Eichler, the trial court did not err in concluding that the Commonwealth established good cause ... under Section 3802(g) for its failure to obtain the chemical test within two hours of the accident.

Section 3802(g)(1) treats a defendant’s removal to a hospital for proper treatment as good cause for a blood draw delayed beyond two hours.

Commonwealth v. Starry · filed 2018-09-24(g)(1)

We conclude that the removal of a defendant to a hospital so that she be provided proper treatment constitutes good cause for the delay in obtaining a blood sample within two hours.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant drove while incapable of safe driving, and subsection (c) requires proof that the defendant’s BAC reached 0.16% within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Anderson, M. · filed 2018-12-27(a)(1), (c)

Without admissions from Appellant, or testimony from the victim or an eyewitness establishing the time Appellant last drove his vehicle, the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant drove while he was incapable of safe driving. Thus, Appellant’s conviction of DUI-general impairment cannot stand. The dearth of evidence substantiating when Appellant last drove his vehicle is also fatal to the DUI-Highest Rate of Alcohol conviction. While the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Appellant’s BAC was at least 0.16% when he drove or operated a vehicle, it had to establish that his BAC met or exceeded that level within two hours of driving.

Section 3802(g) requires the Commonwealth to show good cause for testing more than two hours after driving and that the driver drank no alcohol after arrest; testing promptly after finding the driver alone does not establish good cause when the time of driving is unknown.

Com. v. Koger, C. · filed 2019-08-19(g)

Nevertheless, here, we disagree with the court’s determination that the evidence demonstrated “good cause for the delay in the blood draw” based solely on the fact that the troopers obtained the blood draw within an hour of encountering Koger at the scene.

Section 3802(c) permits a later blood test to prove alcohol concentration within the two-hour window; a sufficiently strong inference can go to a jury without expert testimony.

Commonwealth v. Starry, M., Aplt. · filed 2020-01-22(c)

Accordingly, in response to Appellant’s first question -- i.e., whether the rationale of Segida applies to Section 3802(c) -- we hold that it does. Particularly where there is evidence of an extraordinarily elevated blood test result and the time between the expiration of the two-hour window and testing is reasonably close, the Commonwealth may proceed to a jury determination without the necessity to adduce expert testimony.

Section 3802(g) allows a blood alcohol result obtained more than two hours after driving to establish the concentration element if the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and no intervening alcohol consumption.

Com. v. Benvenisti-Zarom, L. · filed 2020-02-11(g)

In this case, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution presented “good cause” to explain why officers failed to test Appellant’s blood within two hours of her accident.

Section 3802(g) assesses good cause for a blood test delayed beyond two hours case by case, considering factors such as medical needs, flight, travel, and investigation.

Com. v. Frey, T. · filed 2020-04-24(g)

The lesson we learn from this trio of decisions is that we should measure good cause under Section 3802(g) on a case-by-case basis, balancing the need for prompt blood testing against other factors warranting or causing delay, including but not limited to the defendant’s need for immediate medical treatment, the defendant’s flight from an accident scene, the time it takes for the police officer to travel to the accident scene or other relevant locations, ... and the officer’s need to investigate potential criminal activity at the accident scene or elsewhere.

Section 3802(a)(2) requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt when the blood was drawn to establish that the required alcohol concentration existed within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Hajdarevic, J. · filed 2020-07-28(a)(2)

The plain language of the statute at issue here reveals that the time of the blood draw is an element that must be proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.16% within two hours of driving; a test range extending below that threshold, without further evidence, is insufficient.

Com. v. Widel, M. · filed 2020-10-28(c)

The Commonwealth has not distinguished Landis, and we are bound to apply its reasoning here. We conclude the evidence was insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of DUI .16 ... and vacate that portion of her judgment of sentence.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant was impaired while driving; subsection (b) requires a qualifying blood-alcohol level within two hours after driving.

Com. v. Ream, D. · filed 2021-08-19(a)(1), (b)

Accordingly, the Commonwealth did not sufficiently prove that Mr. Ream drove or operated his motorcycle “within two hours” of the blood draw.3 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b). ... Thus, to convict a person of this offense requires proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was drunk while he drove on a highway of the Commonwealth.

Section 3802(b) requires proof that the defendant drank alcohol, drove or controlled a vehicle on a highway or trafficway, and had a BAC of at least .10 percent but less than .16 percent within two hours.

Com. v. Hoberek, C. · filed 2022-01-19(b)

To establish DUI (high rate) the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant: 1) imbibed alcohol; 2) was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle on highway or trafficway; and 3) within two hours after driving, operating or being in physical control of a vehicle, the defendant’s BAC was at least .10 percent but less than .16 percent.

Section 3802(c)’s highest-rate offense can be proved with circumstantial evidence that the driver’s alcohol concentration was at least 0.16% within two hours after driving.

Com. v. Dudley, J. · filed 2022-05-20(c)

In light of the foregoing, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and granting the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, Lynch, supra, the evidence—though entirely circumstantial—was sufficient to support Dudley’s conviction for DUI-highest rate.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the prohibited blood alcohol level was reached within two hours of driving; subsection (a)(1) requires impairment at the time of driving, which may be inferred without knowing the precise driving time.

Com. v. Blystone, T. · filed 2025-02-12(a)(1), (c)

However, in the absence of evidence establishing when 1) Appellant left the bar, 2) the 911 call was made, or 3) Officer Gilkinson was dispatched to the scene, we cannot conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant’s blood draw occurred within two hours of driving. ... Although the evidence does not disclose precisely when Appellant operated her vehicle, subsection 3802(a)(1) is an “at the time of driving” offense, and the trial court reasonably inferred that Appellant operated her vehicle after consuming an amount of alcohol sufficient to render her incapable of safely driving.

Section 3802(g)’s two-hour testing requirements do not apply to a per se DUI charge involving a controlled substance under subsection (d)(1).

Com. v. Archer, C. · filed 2025-02-25(g)

Consequently, there is no need to establish that a blood test for controlled substances, conducted more than two hours after the defendant drove, complied with the requirements of subsection 3802(g).

Section 3802(c) requires a BAC of at least 0.16% within two hours after driving, and drinking after driving is not a statutory defense.

Com. v. Lookhart, C. · filed 2025-05-30(c)

Under the current DUI statute, “drinking after driving” is not a statutory defense.

Under subsection (a)(1), blood alcohol results remain admissible to prove general impairment even when the blood was drawn more than two hours after driving.

Com. v. Sosnowski, V. · filed 2025-06-30(a)(1)

This Court has iterated that when a defendant faces charges for DUI-general impairment, evidence of the BAC is relevant to the Commonwealth’s prosecution, even if drawn more than two hours after operation of a vehicle.

Section 3802(b) requires evidence that the driver's blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours of driving, operating, or controlling the vehicle.

Com. v. Luberto, A. · filed 2025-08-22(b)

In the absence of any evidence—direct or circumstantial—that Luberto’s BAC was between 0.10% and 0.16% within two hours after he drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the vehicle, we are constrained to reverse Luberto’s conviction under section 3802(b).

Section 3802(g) permits a blood test taken more than two hours after driving when the Commonwealth shows good cause for the delay and no intervening alcohol consumption.

Com. v. Dougan, A. · filed 2026-04-30(g)

Upon our review of the record, including the suppression hearing transcript, we discern no legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding the two-hour exception set forth in section 3802(g) applicable and admitting evidence of Dougan’s blood-draw results at trial.

Section 3802(g) allows a blood test taken more than two hours after driving when the Commonwealth establishes good cause for the delay and shows that the driver consumed no alcohol between arrest and testing. An officer’s attempt to accommodate a requested breath test can establish good cause when the machine proves inoperable.

Com. v. Cerqueira, K. · filed 2019-04-09(g)

As the officer made every attempt to accommodate Defendant and ensure that the test was entirely of his own accord, resulting in a blood test that was performed shortly after the 2-hour mark, the Court determined that the Commonwealth sufficiently established good cause for the delay.

Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) do not violate medical marijuana patients’ equal protection or due process rights.

Com. v. Sanchez, B. · filed 2024-10-29(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii)

Therein, the Smith Court held that the DUI statutory scheme at Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 686-688; ... We find that the Smith decision is dispositive of the issues at hand, and based on the forgoing precedent, Appellant’s constitutional claims warrant no relief.

Section 3802(d)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally vague even though a person may need to estimate how long a controlled-substance metabolite remains in their blood.

Com. v. McCormick, E. · filed 2024-09-17(d)(1)(iii)

We also disagree with McCormick’s argument that the statute is insufficiently specific because a person might not be able to determine how long a metabolite of a controlled substance would remain in their system. Consistent with Thur and Mikulan, it does not offend the Constitution to require persons to estimate or predict whether they have a metabolite of a controlled substance in their blood. See Thur, 906 A.2d at 562-63. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

Section 3802(c) measures blood alcohol concentration within two hours after driving, does not presume that result was the driver's level while driving, and is constitutional.

Commonwealth v. Miller · filed 2005-06-29(c)

The Statute does not suggest that a BAC level obtained within two hours of driving is presumed to be a person’s BAC level while he or she was driving. Nor does the statute suggest that a defendant is precluded from entering evidence challenging the BAC level. The defendant is free to question the accuracy of the test or the testing device, attack the chain of custody of a blood sample, enter evidence of imbibing alcohol between the time of driving and the time of the test, or dispute the test results on any other relevant grounds. Given all of the above analyses, we find that section 3802(c) does not violate either the constitution of Pennsylvania or the United States Constitution.

Section 3802(a)(2), (b), and (c) withstand due process challenges based on overbreadth and vagueness.

Commonwealth v. Snow · filed 2006-03-28(a)(2), (b), and (c)

However, defendant’s constitutional challenge to 75 Pa.C.S. §§3802(a)(2), (b), and (c) is denied.

Section 3802 gives ordinary drivers notice that they may not drive after drinking enough to be incapable of driving safely, and it does not punish constitutionally protected conduct.

Commonwealth v. Semuta · filed 2006-06-30

When considering a constitutional challenge to Section 3802 on the basis that it is vague, overbroad, and allows for arbitrary enforcement in violation of substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, this Court recently concluded that this provision of the Vehicle Code is not vague or overbroad in that “[i]t gives a person of ordinary intelligence notice that he may not drive after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that he is incapable of driving safely.” ... As such, we find no merit in this claim.

Section 3802(a)-(c) gives drivers a reasonable standard for gauging their conduct and is not void for vagueness.

Commonwealth v. Beshore · filed 2007-01-18(a)-(c)

For all the foregoing reasons we conclude that Section 3802(a)-(c) provides a reasonable standard for drivers to gauge their conduct, and therefore, the statute is not void for vagueness.

Section 3802(a)(1) and (b) are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

Commonwealth v. Smith · filed 2007-01-23(a)(1), (b)

He first asserts that “Section 3802 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it penalizes protected conduct, and is drafted in such a way as to be ambiguous in meaning, leaving a reasonable person unsure as to what conduct is prohibited.” Appellant’s brief at 12. Smith is entitled to no relief on these grounds, as this exact argument was recently rejected by a panel of this Court in Semuta.

Section 3802(c)’s highest-rate DUI offense is not unconstitutionally overbroad and does not create a conclusive presumption merely because it uses a 0.16% BAC threshold measured within two hours after driving.

Commonwealth v. Finchio · filed 2007-07-18(c)

The difference in the statutory BAC threshold is immaterial to the analysis employed in Duda. That reasoning fatally undermines the trial court’s disposition in the present case. ... For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Common Pleas dated November 9, 2005, is reversed insofar as it ruled that Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code is unconstitutional, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Section 3802(c) is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad; it prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to reach a BAC of at least 0.16% within two hours.

Commonwealth v. Morrison · filed 2007-09-27(c)

We likewise reject Appellant’s claim that Section 3802(c) is unconstitutionally vague because subsection (c) does not specify that an individual’s BAC be above .16% at the time he was driving to be subject to the increased penalties thereunder, and because it does not specify when an individual may resume driving; as the Duda Court stated, “the prohibited conduct [under Section 3802] is drinking excessively and then driving.” Id. (emphasis added). ... Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Section 3802(c) on the basis that it is overbroad also fails.

Section 3802 is not unconstitutional.

Commonwealth v. Hobbs · filed 2007-11-21

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2007, the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Section 3802(b) is constitutional despite its different blood alcohol threshold.

Commonwealth v. Deasy · filed 2007-11-21(b)

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2007, the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. This Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 3802(a)(2) and 3802(c) in Commonwealth v. Duda, 592 Pa. 164, 923 A.2d 1138 (2007), and Commonwealth v. Finchio, 592 Pa. 577, 926 A.2d 968 (2007), respectively. Although Appellee was charged under Section 3802(b), this Court explained in Finchio that “[t]he difference in the statutory BAC threshold is immaterial to the analysis employed in Duda.” Finchio, 926 A.2d at 971.

Section 3802(b)'s different blood alcohol threshold does not change the constitutional analysis applied to the other Section 3802 offenses.

Commonwealth v. English · filed 2007-11-21(b)

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2007, the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. ... Although Appellee was charged under Section 3802(b), this Court explained in Finchio that “[t]he difference in the statutory BAC threshold is immaterial to the analysis employed in Duda.” Finchio, 926 A.2d at 971.

Section 3802(c) withstands the constitutional challenge addressed in this order.

Commonwealth v. Kennedy · filed 2008-02-29(c)

AND NOW, this 29th day of February, 2008, the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared Section 3802(c) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c), unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Section 3802(b) is constitutional; its different blood alcohol threshold does not change the constitutional analysis applied to other Section 3802 offenses.

Commonwealth v. Binney · filed 2008-03-18(b)

AND NOW, this 18th day of March, 2008, the order of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is reversed insofar as it declared Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, unconstitutional, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. ... Although Appellee was charged under Section 3802(b), this Court explained in Finchio that “[t]he difference in the statutory BAC threshold is immaterial to the analysis employed in Duda.” Finchio, 592 Pa. at 581, 926 A.2d at 971.

Section 3802(d) is not unconstitutionally overbroad merely because it prohibits driving with marijuana metabolites in the blood; an overbreadth challenge requires identification of constitutionally protected conduct that it punishes.

Com. v. Murphy, P. · filed 2020-07-24(d)

As Appellant has failed to identify a constitutionally-protected activity that is punished by § 3802(d), his overbreadth necessarily challenge fails.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to substantially impair the mental or physical faculties needed to drive safely.

Com. v. Stuart, M. · filed 2024-09-05(a)(1)

When viewed pursuant to the correct standard, the evidence was sufficient to prove that alcohol substantially impaired Stuart’s mental and physical faculties.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to become incapable of safely driving, and that incapacity may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Mazzagetti, D. · filed 2024-05-30(a)(1)

The Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mazzagetti was intoxicated to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving when he departed the nursing home. Hence, we agree with the trial court; the evidence sufficiently proved that Mazzagetti violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) as he drove from the nursing home.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits proof that alcohol rendered a driver incapable of safely driving through signs of impairment and field sobriety performance, even without evidence of erratic driving.

Com. v. McKinney, T. · filed 2023-07-27(a)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we discern no error in the court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s DUI conviction.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol substantially impaired a driver’s ability to drive safely; a crash, the odor of alcohol, and failed sobriety tests can support that finding.

Com. v. Brooks, R. · filed 2023-09-29(a)(1)

Based on the aforementioned, and applying our standard of review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s consumption of alcohol substantially impaired his ability to safely operate the vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a DUI conviction when circumstantial evidence proves the driver was impaired at the time of driving.

Com. v. Burress, P. · filed 2023-07-17(a)(1)

Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was intoxicated at the time she drove or operated her vehicle on June 9, 2021.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the driver was impaired while driving; circumstantial evidence can establish impairment even when the driver is found intoxicated later.

Com. v. Hayes, T. · filed 2023-10-13(a)(1)

This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, was sufficient to establish that Hayes drove to the Taco Bell parking lot while intoxicated and parked his vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that a person drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of a vehicle after drinking enough alcohol to be incapable of safe driving.

Com. v. Kandel, P. · filed 2023-04-04(a)(1)

To sustain a conviction for DUI—General Impairment, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant drove, operated, or was “in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a DUI conviction based on circumstantial evidence that alcohol made a driver incapable of driving safely.

Com. v. Hartranft, T. · filed 2023-04-04(a)(1)

On this record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Appellant guilty of DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) allows circumstantial evidence to establish that alcohol made a person incapable of driving safely at the time of driving.

Com. v. Brown, W. · filed 2022-11-04(a)(1)

We conclude the circumstantial evidence established that Appellant was incapable of driving safely due to the ingestion of alcohol at the time he was driving his vehicle on February 15, 2021.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after consuming enough alcohol to make a person incapable of driving safely; expert testimony about alcohol’s effect on the driver can support proof of impairment.

Com. v. Trumbull, R. · filed 2022-10-25(a)(1)

The record further belies Trumbull’s assertion that the Commonwealth failed to establish that alcohol did not impair his ability to drive safely at the time of the accident. The Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist testified that based on Trumbull’s blood-alcohol concentration, the amount of alcohol he consumed would have affected “his judgment, his clarity of intellect,” and ability to “evaluate [his] surrounding[,]” and, therefore, impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle safely at the time of the accident.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to be incapable of safely driving; unsafe driving and other signs of intoxication can prove that incapacity.

Commonwealth v. Smith · filed 2006-07-14(a)(1)

Appellant argues there is little evidence to support the conclusion that she was incapable of safe driving due to the consumption of alcohol. Based upon the following testimony presented at trial, we disagree. ... The testimony presented was sufficient to prove the elements of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant drove onto a grassy median, drove in the wrong lane of traffic, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on her feet, was combative, failed the field sobriety tests, and refused a blood alcohol test.

Section 3802(c)'s driving element may be established through circumstantial evidence without an eyewitness to the driving.

Commonwealth v. Young · filed 2006-07-26(c)

As such, the Commonwealth provided ample circumstantial evidence to establish Appellant was driving the vehicle when it struck the utility pole.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding that alcohol made a driver incapable of safe driving based on poor judgment, signs of intoxication, and refusal of a breath test.

Commonwealth v. Kerry · filed 2006-08-23(a)(1)

Appellant’s actions in illegally operating an ATV on a highway on snow covered roads evidenced a diminution or enfeeblement in his ability to exercise judgment. Furthermore, Patrolman Mores testified that Appellant had concealed on his person four cans of beer, exhibited signs of intoxication including bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an odor of alcohol. He also refused to submit to a breath test. From such evidence the trier of fact could reasonably infer that alcohol had substantially impaired Appellant’s normal mental and physical faculties required to operate the vehicle safely.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle while alcohol impaired him to the point that he could not drive safely.

Commonwealth v. Goldhaber · filed 2007-01-26(a)(1)

In order to sustain a verdict for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(a)(l), the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Goldhaber was the operator of a motor vehicle, and that while operating the vehicle, he was under the influence of alcohol to such a degree as to render him incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to be incapable of driving safely; officer observations and field sobriety tests can establish that incapacity.

Commonwealth v. Watson · filed 2008-08-13(a)(1)

Based on these testimonies, we find that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was intoxicated to the point that she was incapable of safely operating her vehicle.

Under § 3802(c), a BAC test result above 0.160% can support a conviction even when the testing instrument’s variation range extends below that level; the variation affects the evidence’s weight.

Commonwealth v. Sibley · filed 2009-05-05(c)

It was then for the court to weigh the evidence of the 0.162% BAC test result in light of the possibility that the actual BAC could have been anywhere within the variation range. ... Thus, the coefficient of variation in this case implicates the weight, not the sufficiency of-the evidence.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol made the driver incapable of driving safely at the time of driving.

Commonwealth v. Segida · filed 2009-12-29(a)(1)

Thus, in sum, we hold that subsection 3802(a)(1) is an "at the time of driving" offense, requiring that the Commonwealth prove the following elements: the accused was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.

Section 3802(d)(2) permits proof of impaired driving through failed field sobriety tests and officers’ observations of physical symptoms of intoxication.

Commonwealth v. Anthony · filed 2010-07-19(d)(2)

Anthony’s inability to complete multiple field sobriety tests, together with the troopers’ observation of his physical symptoms of intoxication is sufficient to establish his guilt under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2) (impairment of the individual’s ability to safely drive).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general impairment conviction when evidence of the driver’s conduct and physical condition shows that alcohol made the driver incapable of safe driving.

Commonwealth v. Ulrich · filed 2010-10-04(a)(1)

As such, the evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain the jury conviction of 3802 (a)(1).

Section 3802 allows circumstantial evidence to establish impairment at the time of driving and that a blood draw occurred within two hours of driving.

Commonwealth v. Teems · filed 2013-06-19(a)(1), (b)

Guided by Segida in the case sub judice, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence surrounding Appellant’s accident allowed for the inference necessary to support a conviction under Section 3802(a)(1). ... Accordingly, we conclude the evidence sufficed to allow the inference that Appellant’s blood draw occurred within two hours of the time of his accident.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol rendered the driver incapable of driving safely.

Com. v. Taylor-Dorsett, K. · filed 2014-08-27(a)(1)

To secure a conviction of DUI-general impairment, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving a vehicle “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving … the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). ... Our independent review of the transcript reveals ample support for the trial court’s findings.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require evidence of erratic driving; signs of alcohol impairment and an unsatisfactory field sobriety test can support a conviction.

Com. v. Cerritos, O. · filed 2015-01-16(a)(1)

Thus, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) allows evidence of drinking, physical signs of impairment, and a crash to establish that alcohol rendered a driver incapable of safe driving.

Com. v. Giampa, J. · filed 2014-10-30(a)(1)

Lastly, the record shows that Appellant drove off the road and into a tree. Thus, when taken as a whole, and viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant was incapable of safe driving due to her consumption of alcohol.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits proof of impaired driving through officers’ observations and field sobriety tests without a blood alcohol measurement.

Com. v. Kraynak, R. · filed 2014-11-14(a)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, this evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of DUI in violation of section 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a DUI conviction based on evidence of alcohol use, failed field sobriety tests, and refusal of a blood alcohol test without evidence of erratic driving.

Com. v. Houghton, C. · filed 2014-12-09(a)(1)

We conclude that all of this evidence was amply sufficient to support Houghton’s conviction of DUI, and the trial court therefore properly rejected Houghton’s sufficiency challenge.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding of general impairment when evidence of driving behavior and signs of alcohol consumption shows that the driver could not operate a vehicle safely.

Com. v. Fye, C. · filed 2014-12-24(a)(1)

Instantly, after careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, the certified record, and the decision of the Honorable Jonathan D. Grine, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s decision. See Trial Ct. Op. at 1-6 (holding ... and record was sufficient to establish Appellant’s guilt).

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol consumption rendered the driver incapable of safely driving; testimony about the driver’s drinking, physical signs of intoxication, and field sobriety tests can support a conviction.

Com. v. Little, S. · filed 2015-02-03(a)(1)

Upon review, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for driving under the influence.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require a breath test or blood alcohol evidence to prove general impairment.

Com. v. Neal, T. · filed 2015-04-06(a)(1)

However, a breath test, blood alcohol level, or BAC is neither needed nor necessary to prove general impairment under § 3802(a)(l).

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to become incapable of driving safely, and a violation may be proved through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Hess, M. · filed 2015-04-27(a)(1)

In light of our standard of review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that Hess had “imbibe[ed] a sufficient amount of alcohol such that [he was] rendered incapable of safely driving.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after consuming enough alcohol to render the driver incapable of safe driving; physical signs of impairment, a failed sobriety test, and erratic driving can support a conviction.

Com. v. Oldt, A. · filed 2015-06-02(a)(1)

Appellant’s physical appearance and inability to pass the field sobriety test, combined with the testimony of Dimovitz and Mosser regarding Appellant’s erratic driving, not to mention the fact that Appellant clearly demonstrated a diminution in his ability to exercise judgment when he ignored the cones and drove in the prohibited right-hand lane of a construction zone, all support the trial court’s finding that Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol to such a degree that it rendered him incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows the Commonwealth to prove impaired driving without BAC test results through evidence of the driver’s behavior and signs of intoxication.

Com. v. Brown, A. · filed 2015-06-19(a)(1)

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was guilty of DUI without consideration of BAC test results.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows the Commonwealth to prove alcohol-related inability to drive safely through the totality of the evidence, without a fixed checklist of facts.

Com. v. Brant, D. · filed 2015-09-09(a)(1)

As alluded to in Segida, there is no checklist of facts that the Commonwealth must complete to support a conviction for DUI—general impairment. Rather, we must assess the totality of the circumstances and the various points of proof that were in fact offered by the Commonwealth.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol rendered the driver incapable of driving safely; officer observations and failed field sobriety tests can establish that impairment.

Com. v. Wright, P. · filed 2015-11-06(a)(1)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude that the Commonwealth demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(d)(1) does not require proof of impairment when a driver has any amount of a controlled substance in the blood.

Com. v. Selvey, J. · filed 2015-11-06(d)(1)

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(iii). Thus, as the Commonwealth correctly states, (see Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4), a defendant does not need to be impaired to violate this statute, which prohibits driving when a defendant ... has any amount of a controlled substance in his blood.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits the Commonwealth to prove that alcohol made a driver incapable of safe driving through observations of the driver’s behavior, without chemical testing or evidence of erratic driving.

Com. v. Zeller, T. · filed 2016-04-07(a)(1)

With respect to the type, quantum, and quality of evidence required to prove a general impairment violation, section 3802(a)(1) is a general provision and provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require blood alcohol or field sobriety test evidence; evidence that alcohol made the driver unable to drive safely can support a conviction.

Com. v. Leber, C. · filed 2016-04-21(a)(1)

Unlike the other subsections of DUI, general impairment does not require proof that the accused had a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. ... What is necessary, however, is evidence that the accused was unable to drive safely due to the consumption of alcohol. ... Upon review of the parties’ briefs, the certified record, and our standard of review, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that sufficient evidence was produced at trial to support a finding of guilt of DUI, general impairment.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows observations of intoxication minutes after driving to establish that a driver was incapable of driving safely.

Com. v. Duong, T. · filed 2016-06-06(a)(1)

Based on Officer Flanagan’s observations of Duong minutes after the accident occurred, we conclude that the court properly found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Duong ... operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving in violation of section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code.

Section 3802(d)(2) requires proof that a drug or combination of drugs impaired the driver’s ability to drive safely at the time of the stop.

Com. v. McCall, D. · filed 2016-08-19(d)(2)

Under this section, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that an appellant was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs at the time he was stopped to such a degree that his ability to safely drive was ... impaired.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits proof of inability to drive safely through failed field sobriety tests, bloodshot eyes, and the odor of alcohol, even without slurred speech or erratic driving.

Com. v. Scott, L. · filed 2016-06-22(a)(1)

Despite the lack of other positive indicators of intoxication such as slurred speech or erratic driving, we find that Appellant’s failure of the field sobriety tests, combined with Appellant’s bloodshot eyes and the odor of alcohol on her person, was sufficient to establish she was incapable of safe driving due to the consumption of alcohol.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol consumption left a person incapable of safely driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle.

Com. v. Kennedy, J. · filed 2016-06-28(a)(1)

In order to obtain a conviction pursuant to Section 3801(a)(1), the Commonwealth must prove “the accused was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.” Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009). ... Based upon the testimony of both Hein and Trooper Sheakley, we find that the verdict is supported by evidence of record and does not—in any respect—shock one’s sense of justice.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after consuming enough alcohol to be incapable of safe driving, and circumstantial evidence can establish that impairment.

Com. v. Stanley, J. · filed 2016-06-29(a)(1)

Upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court there was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant operated his vehicle after consuming enough alcohol to render him incapable of safe driving.

Erratic driving, alcohol odor, bloodshot eyes, and field sobriety test results can support a finding of impairment under § 3802(a)(1).

Com. v. Delong, J. · filed 2016-07-15(a)(1)

Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant operated his vehicle after consuming enough alcohol to render him incapable of safe driving, and that he failed to drive on the right side of the roadway.

Section 3802(c) does not require the Commonwealth to prove that the driver was impaired.

Com. v. Rumble, M. · filed 2016-12-06(c)

In contrast to § 3802(a)(1), proof of the § 3802(c) offense does not require the Commonwealth to establish impairment.

Police officers’ testimony can establish DUI-general impairment without physical or video evidence.

Commonwealth v. Giron · filed 2017-01-31(a)(1)

There is no requirement that videotape or physical evidence be presented at trial. ... Instead, police officers’ testimony is sufficient to prove the elements of DUI-general impairment.

Section 3802 prohibits driving after consuming enough alcohol to meet its impairment or blood alcohol threshold.

Com. v. Orlowski, A. · filed 2016-10-24(a)(1), (c)

Thus, the prohibited conduct under the statute is drinking excessively and then driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol rendered a person incapable of safely driving or controlling a vehicle.

Com. v. Arroyo-O'Neill, J. · filed 2017-02-10(a)(1)

This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Arroyo-O’Neill was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and was intoxicated by alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to become incapable of safely driving; a conviction may stand when the record supports a finding of that impairment.

Com. v. Hissim, P. · filed 2017-02-27(a)(1)

DUI under Subsection 3802(a)(1) is defined as follows: ... (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. ... There is support in the record for the trial court’s ruling in which the law was properly applied, and we discern no partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that alcohol impaired the driver to the point that the driver could not safely operate a vehicle.

Com. v. Brown, O. · filed 2017-06-16(a)(1)

However, Appellant was not charged under the ‘legal limit’ portion of the DUI statute, i.e., 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(2); he was charged under the general impairment provision of section 3802, which requires evidence that Appellant was impaired to the point that he could not safely operate his car. From the evidence presented at trial, we simply cannot conclude that the Commonwealth established this element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require proof that intoxication caused an accident.

Com. v. Herrera, R. · filed 2017-05-09(a)(1)

Finally, Appellant argues that his accident resulted from the actions of another driver, and was not proven to be a result of his intoxication. ... Furthermore, Section 3802(a)(1) does not contain any elements requiring such a showing.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require evidence of erratic driving to prove DUI-general impairment.

Com. v. Love, B. · filed 2017-07-13(a)(1)

However, evidence of erratic driving is not necessary to a finding of guilt under the statute, it is only one factor that the factfinder may consider.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows a general impairment conviction when the evidence as a whole shows that alcohol left the driver unable to drive safely.

Com. v. Patel, K. · filed 2017-09-25(a)(1)

Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that these collective facts were sufficient to convict Appellant of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) focuses on whether alcohol made a person unable to drive safely, rather than on a particular blood alcohol level.

Com. v. Miranda, M. · filed 2017-12-11(a)(1)

We note that “the focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol─not on a particular blood alcohol level.” Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding of general impairment based on evidence of intoxication even when the officer did not observe erratic or unsafe driving.

Com. v. Monsuer, P. · filed 2018-03-08(a)(1)

Officer Homza did not observe Monsuer driving erratically or unsafely; however, he did observe Monsuer operating a motor vehicle and, in Officer Homza’s opinion, he was intoxicated while doing so.

Under Section 3802(a)(1), field sobriety test results, or their absence, are one factor in deciding whether a person operated a vehicle under the influence.

Com. v. Boyd, K. · filed 2018-03-14(a)(1)

The results of a field sobriety test or the lack thereof, are but one factor for a factfinder to consider in the determination of whether a defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to make the driver incapable of driving safely; driving behavior, alcohol odor, and field sobriety performance can bear on that determination.

Com. v. Palmer, C. · filed 2018-04-13(a)(1)

To be convicted of DUI-general impairment, “[a]n individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits circumstantial evidence to prove that a person operated a vehicle while too intoxicated to drive safely.

Com. v. Karangwa, H. · filed 2018-05-09(a)(1)

The only logical conclusion from this evidence is that Appellant was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle, crashed that vehicle, attempted to flee the area but only managed to travel 30 yards before collapsing onto the snow-covered ground.

Circumstantial evidence of driving after drinking, together with a qualifying blood alcohol result, can support a conviction under Section 3802(a)(2).

Commonwealth v. Gooseby-Byrd · filed 2018-05-23(a)(2)

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant drove a vehicle under the influence of alcohol as proscribed by Section 3802(a)(2).

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that a person drove or controlled a vehicle while alcohol rendered them incapable of doing so safely.

Com. v. Perry, M. · filed 2018-08-08(a)(1)

To support a conviction under Section 3802(a)(1), which is a “time of the driving” offense, the prosecution must prove “the accused was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.” Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009)).

Evidence of speeding, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, alcohol odor, and difficulty finding a license can establish that a driver was incapable of safely driving under § 3802(a)(1).

Com. v. Martin, A. · filed 2018-08-27(a)(1)

Viewing this evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, see Teems, 74 A.3d at 144-45, we deem this evidence sufficient to establish that Appellant was incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(d)(2) permits proof that marijuana impaired a person’s ability to drive safely through observable signs of intoxication.

Com. v. Lively, J. · filed 2018-09-12(d)(2)

We agree that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction under Section 3802(d)(2). The record reflects that Appellant’s physical condition at the time of his arrest was indicative of someone who was under the influence of marijuana to a degree that impaired his ability to safely operate his vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits an inference of alcohol impairment from slurred speech, red or glossy eyes, and poor balance.

Com. v. Wilkinson, A. · filed 2018-10-19(a)(1)

In particular, the evidence that the Commonwealth properly proffered to show that Appellant was impaired by alcohol included that Appellant had slurred speech, red, glossy eyes, and lacked an ability to balance. ... Accordingly, the Commonwealth satisfied the second element of DUI—general impairment such that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Section 3802(a)(1) does not require proof of erratic driving to establish that alcohol rendered a driver incapable of safe driving.

Com. v. Riley, D. · filed 2018-12-17(a)(1)

Notwithstanding the absence of such evidence, it needs to be emphasized that "[e]vidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a finding of gui 1 t under the relevant statute."

Section 3802(a)(1) and (d)(2) require proof that alcohol or drug use caused an inability to drive safely; the fact finder may infer causation from a trooper’s lay observations when the circumstances support it.

Com. v. Tyner, V. · filed 2019-01-14(a)(1), (d)(2)

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the fact finder was able to ascertain the causation element through reasonable inferences from Trooper Bradley’s lay testimony. ... From this, the trial court was able to conclude that Appellant’s alcohol consumption had caused him to be impaired to the point that he was unable to drive safely.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general impairment conviction based on observations of unsafe driving and intoxication without blood alcohol test results.

Com. v. Zamperini, B. · filed 2019-02-28(a)(1)

The record supports the PCRA court. As discussed above, the trial court was presented with ample admissible evidence – independent of Appellant’s BAC results – to convict Appellant of DUI, general impairment. Indeed, testimony presented at trial established that Appellant: drove at an excessive speed; smelled of alcohol; had slurred speech and glassy and bloodshot eyes; fumbled with items in her wallet; and demonstrated a level of impairment based upon her performance during standardized field sobriety tests.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to become incapable of safely driving; the Commonwealth may prove impairment at the time of driving through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Collins, T. · filed 2019-05-10(a)(1)

In order to prove Appellant was guilty of DUI - general impairment, the Commonwealth needed to prove that Appellant drove the blue SUV at a point in time when his alcohol use had rendered him incapable of safely driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general-impairment conviction based on observed signs of intoxication shortly before driving, without blood-test results.

Com. v. Shoemaker, L. · filed 2019-05-16(a)(1)

Upon review, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict-winner, was sufficient to support Shoemaker’s conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) covers a person whose alcohol impairment makes them incapable of safe driving while they are in actual physical control of a vehicle.

Com. v. Siclari, C. · filed 2019-09-12(a)(1)

The totality of this evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was incapable of safe driving due to the consumption of alcohol when he was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding that alcohol rendered a driver incapable of safe driving based on traffic violations and circumstantial evidence of impairment, even without weaving, speeding, or a collision.

Com. v. Sieminkewicz, P. · filed 2020-01-31(a)(1)

Although Appellant may not have weaved, sped, or struck any other vehicles, he committed three other Motor Vehicle Code violations, including failing to stop at a stop sign. Moreover, the other circumstantial evidence outlined by the trial court supra, such as Appellant’s appearance, failure to follow instructions, admission that he had drank too ... much, and stumbling, supports that Appellant was incapable of safely driving.