42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102

Section 7102(b) permits contribution when recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, but it does not override the workers’ compensation bar on joining an employer.

Schwarzl v. Philadelphia Gas Works · filed 1980-12-24(b)

The comparative negligence act is an act of general application covering all claims whether by employes or non-employes. It permits contribution where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant. ... Not only precedent and principles of statutory construction but also logic impels the conclusion that the employer should not be joined as a defendant.

Section 7102(b) excludes an immune employer’s negligence from apportionment because the employer is not a defendant against whom recovery is allowed.

Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1982-04-27(b)

He is not and cannot be a defendant against whom recovery is allowed. He is not a party whose negligence is to be included in the apportionment required by the Comparative Negligence Act.

Section 7102 does not permit apportionment of fault to an injured employee’s employer when workers’ compensation law bars recovery against the employer.

Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1983-09-15

As related statutes must be read in pari materia, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932, and the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that “[a]n employer is one against whom recovery can neither be ‘sought’ nor ‘allowed,’ ” 293 Pa.Super. at 480, 439 A.2d at 677, it is clear that in the Comparative Negligence Act “the legislature did not contemplate an apportionment of liability between one or more third party tortfeasors (against whom recovery may be had) and the plaintiff’s employer (against whom recovery may neither be sought nor allowed).” Id.

Section 7102(b) preserves the workers’ compensation bar to recovery against an employer even when the employer is assigned a percentage of negligence.

Schaeffer v. Didde-Glaser, Inc. · filed 1980-12-30(b)

The following language in the Comparative Negligence Act insulates an employer from any possible recovery under that Act once the percentages of responsibility are determined: ... This clause acts to incorporate the bar to recovery established by section 303, 77 P.S. § 481(b).

Section 7102 does not apply to an employer’s subrogation interest in an employee’s action against a third party.

Dyson v. Marshalltown Manufacturing Co. · filed 1981-08-04

The provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act, now 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7102, are inapposite. Section 1 of the act clearly refers to the comparative contributory negligence of a plaintiff, who has been injured or killed. Section 2 provides that contribution among defendant tortfeasors now shall be in proportion to their relative fault. The act is not applicable to the subrogation interests of the employer in this case.

Section 7102(b) limits apportionment to defendants against whom the plaintiff may recover, excluding an injured worker’s employer when workers’ compensation law bars recovery against it.

Fulmer v. Duquesne Light Co. · filed 1988-05-05(b)

The Comparative Negligence Law, at 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b), provides for the apportionment of damages among “all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.” In the instant case, recovery is not allowed by plaintiff against Rust Chimney, for Rust Chimney was plaintiffs employer and Rust Chimney’s liability to its employee is determined exclusively by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

Section 7102 does not permit an immune employer’s negligence to be included when apportioning liability in an employee’s suit against third parties.

Carcaise v. Cemex, Inc. · filed 2002-08-23

For in Carcaise, the fact-finder may not consider the alleged comparative negligence of the Employer in apportioning liability between the potential tortfeasors.

Subsection (a.2) excludes employers from apportionment of liability.

Timmonds, M. v. AGCO Corp. · filed 2021-04-12(a.2)

Subsection (a.2), while expanding the scope of persons to be submitted to the factfinder for apportionment of liability, specifically excluded employers from any such apportionment.

Section 7102(a.2) bars assigning a share of liability to an employer immune under the Workers’ Compensation Act but does not bar evidence of the employer’s conduct relevant to causation.

DONNELLY · filed 2025-10-31(a.2)

While a jury in this case may not assign Kiewit any apportionment of liability, this Court does not read anything more in the Comparative Negligence statute that would otherwise prevent introducing other evidence that would speak to the cause of Mr. Donnelly’s injuries.

Section 7102(a.2) excludes an immune employer from liability apportionment, but permits evidence of the employer’s negligence to show that a third party did not cause the employee’s injury.

R. Austin & K. Moser, h&w v. Lehigh & Northampton Transp. Auth. & C. Fenty ~ Appeal of: R. Austin · filed 2024-01-25(a.2)

However, it was permissible for LANTA to present evidence of Amato’s negligence in Austin’s suit to show that LANTA was not the cause of Austin’s injury.

Section 7102 permits fault to be apportioned only when the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff failed to exercise care for her own protection.

Carrender v. Fitterer · filed 1983-12-14(a)

For fault to be apportioned under the comparative negligence statute, there must be two negligent acts: a breach of duty by the defendant to the plaintiff and a failure by the plaintiff to exercise care for his own protection.

Section 7102(b) apportions negligence among defendants against whom recovery is allowed, excluding an injured employee’s employer when workers’ compensation law bars recovery against it.

Kelly v. Carborundum Co. · filed 1984-02-06(b)

Contrary to the premise for appellant's argument, this statute does not provide for apportionment among all tortfeasors causally responsible for an injury.

Section 7102 bars recovery when a plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendant’s, and a trial judge’s apportionment of negligence receives the same deference as a jury’s.

Burns v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1986-02-18

Under the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, where a plaintiff’s negligence is greater than that of the defendant, plaintiff is entitled to no recovery. ... Similarly, where the trial court is the trier of fact in a non-jury trial, its apportionment of negligence should be accorded the same deference as a jury’s determination.

Section 7102(a) bars a plaintiff’s recovery only when the plaintiff’s causal negligence exceeds the combined causal negligence of all defendants responsible for the injury.

Elder v. Orluck · filed 1985-04-10(a)

Accordingly, we hold that the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, will bar recovery by a plaintiff only when his causal negligence is greater than that of the combined or aggregate negligence of all the defendants guilty of causal negligence in connection with plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 7102(a) permits recovery when the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the combined negligence of all defendants, even if it exceeds one defendant's individual share.

Elder v. Orluck · filed 1986-09-25(a)

We hold, therefore, that under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, recovery by an injured plaintiff will be precluded only where plaintiff's negligence exceeds the combined negligence of all defendants.

Section 7102(a) leaves the apportionment of causal negligence to the jury when both parties may have caused the accident.

Garcia v. Bang · filed 1988-07-14(a)

Under these circumstances, the apportionment of causal negligence between Bang and Garcia was for the jury to determine pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Law.

Section 7102(a) generally leaves the allocation of causal negligence to the jury.

Hreha v. Benscoter · filed 1989-01-24(a)

Under the Comparative Negligence Law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a), the allocation of causal negligence was a matter properly for the jury to determine.

Section 7102 requires a breach of duty by the defendant and a failure by the plaintiff to exercise care for his own protection.

Chiricos v. Forest Lakes Council Boy Scouts of America · filed 1990-03-20

... Pa.’s Comparative Negligence Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, which requires that there be two negligent acts: a breach of duty by the defendant to the plaintiff and failure by the plaintiff to exercise care for his own protection.

Section 7102(a) ties a contributorily negligent plaintiff’s share of fault to the defendants’ shares when fault is allocated.

Oblon v. Ludlow-Fourth Corp. · filed 1991-06-19(a)

Moreover, since the trial was not bifurcated, once Obion was determined to be contributorily negligent, the amount of his contributory negligence was dependent upon and ... intertwined with the percentages of the defendants’ negligence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a).

Section 7102 permits the jury to measure the plaintiff’s share of fault and reflect it in the liability award.

Bailey v. Pennsylvania Electric Co. · filed 1991-10-11

Following deliberations, the jury found that the pilot was 35% negligent. It was within the province of the jury to measure the pilot’s degree of fault against that of Penelec.

Section 7102(b) allocates damages among defendants according to each defendant’s share of causal negligence.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Royer Garden Center & Greenhouse, Inc. · filed 1991-10-17(b)

We dismiss this argument because substantial evidence of record indicates the trial court correctly molded the jury’s damage award to Bortz according to the percentage of liability found by the jury to be chargeable to the Township and Kohler, respectively, in compliance with Section 7102(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).

Section 7102(b) provides for apportioning liability among defendants against whom the plaintiff has recovered.

Kemper National P & C Companies v. Smith · filed 1992-10-20(b)

The principles enunciated in Embrey have, in effect, been incorporated into Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Statute, codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(b), which provides for the apportionment of liability among each of the defendants against whom a plaintiff has recovered.

Section 7102(a) requires the plaintiff’s causal negligence to be compared with that of all causally negligent defendants, even when the claims against them are tried separately.

Christiansen v. Silfies · filed 1995-10-11(a)

We hold that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to apportion negligence between the decedent and one defendant only, when the Comparative Negligence Act requires such apportionment to involve all defendants.

Section 7102(b) does not require submitting apportionment to the factfinder without sufficient evidence to support it.

Gross v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1991-12-11(b)

We do not read this to mean that the issue of apportionment must be submitted to the factfinder regardless of the sufficiency of evidence which would support such a determination.

Section 7102 apportions liability among defendants from whom the plaintiff can recover; manufacturers in bankruptcy under an automatic stay are excluded from the verdict sheet.

Ottavio v. Fibreboard Corp. · filed 1992-12-16

In Pennsylvania, the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102, directs that each tortfeasor shall be liable for a portion of the total damages, to be determined by the ratio between the amount of each party defendant’s causal fault and the total fault attributed to party defendants against whom ... the plaintiff is entitled to recover. ... The above authorities adequately support the trial court’s decision which refused to submit to the jury a verdict sheet including the bankrupt manufacturers of asbestos products.

Section 7102(b) permits apportionment of damages only among defendants against whom recovery is allowed.

Smith v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1998-02-13(b)

Nevertheless, the trial court should have granted the motion and molded the verdict to impose damages against the only responsible party, SEPTA. See Kelly v. Carborundum Co., 307 Pa.Super. 361, 453 A.2d 624 (1982), aff'd, 504 Pa. 238, 470 A.2d 969 (1984) (Section 7102(b) of Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b), as amended, provides for apportionment of damages only among defendants against whom recovery is allowed).

Section 7102(b) permits apportionment of liability only among defendants properly in the case against whom the plaintiff has recovered.

Morris v. Lenihan · filed 2000-05-02(b)

Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(b) codified the practice of apportioning liability among defendants against whom plaintiff has recovered. However, apportionment may only take place among parties that are properly in the case.

Section 7102(a) authorizes comparison of negligent conduct, but not comparison of one party’s negligence with another’s recklessness.

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2002-09-26(a)

Under the Comparative Negligence Act, the only conduct that is statutorily authorized to be compared is negligent conduct.

Section 7102 does not permit assigning fault to nonparties when deciding whether a plaintiff’s negligence bars recovery.

Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services · filed 2013-08-01

Pennsylvania does not permit assigning fault to nonparties for the purpose of contributory-negligence defenses.

Section 7102 permits a defendant discharged in bankruptcy to appear on a negligence verdict slip solely for apportionment if the evidence would support liability against him.

Adams, D. v. Rising Sun Med. Ctr. · filed 2020-12-29(a.1)(1)

However, in accordance with the Act, if the evidence at the new trial would be legally sufficient to support liability against Dr. Alexander, his name may appear on the verdict slip for purposes of apportioning negligence only.

Section 7102 requires per capita apportionment among the remaining tortfeasors in a strict liability asbestos case when one defendant is removed from the judgment.

Fisher, H. v. American International Industries · filed 2024-04-10

Instead, pursuant to Roverano, supra, the trial court should have simply removed Neslemur’s portion of liability and, in ... turn, apportioned liability on a per capita basis to the remaining three tortfeasors, AII, WCD and Colgate.

Section 7102 leaves disputed questions of a plaintiff’s fault for the jury to apportion.

SNAIR v. SPEEDWAY LLC · filed 2021-01-19

As such, genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Mr. Snair either failed to heed an obvious hazard or chose a dangerous route over a safe one, and the apportionment of fault, if any, should be left to a jury.

Section 7102(a.2) requires apportionment for released nonparties on a defendant’s request but does not limit apportionment to settled nonparties.

NVR, INC. v. MAJESTIC HILLS, L.L.C. · filed 2023-07-21(a.2)

NVR’s reliance on the Fair Share Act is misplaced. That law merely states that upon a defendant’s request, the jury must apportion liability for “certain nonparties,” namely those that have “entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party[.]” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7102(a.2). It does not say that a jury can only apportion liability for settled nonparties.

Section 7102(b) apportions liability among defendants against whom recovery is allowed and does not require joining every potentially responsible party.

Ryden v. Johns-Manville Products · filed 1981-07-17(b)

There is no suggestion in that statute that all possible tortfeasors be brought into court, and certainly no requirement that this be done to achieve the purposes of the act. The trier of fact is simply to apportion liability on a percentage basis among those defendants on the record against whom recovery is allowed.

Section 7102(a.1)(3) permits joint and several liability for intentional torts.

Lopez, N. v. Citywide Community · filed 2016-09-27(a.1)(3)

Joint and several liability is limited to claims associated with intentional misrepresentation, intentional torts, hazardous waste claims, dramshop actions, and parties with liability equal or greater than 60 percent. Here, Peguero and Citywide committed intentional torts; thus, joint and several liability was appropriate. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §7102(a. l )(3 ).

Section 7102 permits joint and several liability for intentional torts and lets a defendant who pays more than a proportionate share seek contribution from another defendant.

GARCIA v. DIAL · filed 2024-11-22(a.1)(3)(ii), (a.1)(4)

Under Pennsylvania’s “Fair Share” Act, joint and several liability exists for intentional state torts such as assault and battery. ... If Plaintiffs ultimately succeed on their intentional tort claims against Dial and Morris but only execute against Morris, Morris could seek contribution from Dial.

Section 7102(a.1) permits apportionment of liability and contribution between reckless and negligent co-defendants.

Straw, J. v. Fair, K. v. Pittsburgh Lubes · filed 2018-04-30(a.1)

We conclude that the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1) and the UCATA permits apportionment and contribution between reckless and negligent co-defendants.

Section 7102(a.1) permits apportionment and contribution between reckless and negligent co-defendants.

Straw, J. v. Fair, K. v. Pittsburgh Lubes · filed 2018-05-11(a.1)

We conclude that the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1) and the UCATA permits apportionment and contribution between reckless and negligent co-defendants.

Section 7102(a.1)(3)(iii) permits joint and several liability when a defendant’s own liability and vicariously imputed liability together exceed 60% of the total apportioned liability.

Spencer, K. v. Johnson C. · filed 2021-03-18(a.1)(3)(iii)

Therefore, we constrained to conclude the trial court erred in failing to grant Spencer’s motion to mold the verdict pursuant to the Fair Share Act, as the jury’s general verdict warranted a finding that PJB was vicariously liable for Tina’s negligence and therefore, the theory of joint and several liability applied. PJB’s and Tina’s combined liability exceeded the 60% liability threshold.

Section 7102 makes a defendant assigned at least 60% of total liability jointly and severally liable for the entire verdict.

Robinson, M. v. Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital · filed 2021-07-07(a.1)(3)(iii)

However, the statute provides for several exceptions to this general rule, including where the defendant has been held liable for not less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all parties. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1)(3)(iii). Because the Hospital was found to be 90% liable, it was joint and severally liable for the whole amount.

Section 7102 does not shield defendants from joint and several liability when they have not alleged or proved that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

Snyder, K. v. Hunt, A. · filed 2021-11-10

Because Mr. Burgher, Mr. Porter, Ms. Porter, Ms. Checo, and Ms. Curiel did not appear to allege, much less to prove, that Ms. Snyder was contributorily negligent, the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, does not shield them from the common law of joint and several liablity under Spencer.

Section 7102(a.1)(3)(iii) makes a defendant jointly and severally liable when it is assigned at least 60% of the total liability.

Packaging Corporation of America v. Northland Insurance Company · filed 2025-02-18(a.1)(3)(iii)

Thus, if the jury in the Plazio suit finds PCA to be at least 60% at fault, PCA will be jointly and severally liable for all damages, including those attributable to the tortious conduct of JA and Mr. Day.

Section 7102 does not apply when the plaintiff’s negligence is not at issue, so traditional joint and several liability controls.

ANDERSON v. MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2022-06-22

Thus, the Court predicts that because the decedent’s negligence is not at issue in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases such as this one, where the plaintiff’s negligence is not in issue, and, as a result, that the traditional principles of joint and several liability would control.

Section 7102(a.1)(3)(ii) makes defendants in an intentional tort action jointly and severally liable for the full damages award, even when a jury allocates responsibility for the harm among them.

The Bert Company v. Turk, Aplts. · filed 2023-07-19(a.1)(3)(ii)

Pursuant to Pennsylvania statute: “A defendant’s liability in [an intentional tort action] shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter a joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as damages[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a.1)(3)(ii). ... The fact that defendants are jointly and severally liable as a matter of law does not mean that a jury cannot allocate responsibility for the harm among those defendants.

Section 7102’s Fair Share Act provisions apply only when the plaintiff’s negligence is at issue.

Swank, M. v. Dermatopathology · filed 2025-12-15

Based on the Fair Share Act’s clear, unambiguous language, when giving effect to all its parts, particularly in light of its legislative history and purpose, our Court has concluded that for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.” Spencer, 249 A.3d at 559. It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s negligence was not an issue in this case. ... We therefore conclude the trial court erred in relying on the Fair Share Act to keep the Forefront Defendants in the case.

Section 7102(b) permits a defendant who pays more than its apportioned share to seek contribution, even when claims against another defendant have been severed.

Matthews v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1982-10-29(b)

But we see no reason why appellants will not be able to have the issue of Johns-Manville’s and Unarco’s joint and several liability decided as an element of any action for contribution that they may elect to bring after the stays imposed by the bankruptcy proceedings are lifted.

Section 7102 does not require a person released from liability to remain a party merely so the jury can determine that person's share of fault.

Seneca Trails, Inc. v. Snyder (In Re Seneca Trails, Inc.) · filed 1980-11-20

The defendants call attention to the provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act ... 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 ... but we agree with the analysis ... viz: ... Second, Milton Green need not be a party to this suit for the question of the extent of his negligence to be put before the jury and attributed to the Courtesy Bar.

Section 7102(b) changes joint tortfeasor liability from pro rata shares to shares based on comparative fault, but does not require a nonsettling defendant to pay its full share when a prior settlement has already covered part of the verdict.

Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets · filed 1985-01-30(b)

We conclude that this result is clearly more logical and just than that urged upon us by appellant and therefore conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the only change made by § 7102(b), in the context with which we concerned, was to change pro rata liability to proportionate liability.

Section 7102(b) uses each defendant’s percentage of causal negligence to determine that defendant’s share of liability; under a qualifying joint tortfeasor release, that percentage also determines the settling defendant’s share.

Vennebush v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad · filed 1985-02-07(b)

Thus, Ehrlich is relieved from liability for contribution by discharging that portion of the verdict attributable to it. Since the portion of the verdict attributable to Ehrlich depends on the amount of causal negligence fixed by the jury, it is this percentage which must now constitute its “pro rata share.”

Section 7102(b) requires a nonsettling tortfeasor to pay its full proportionate share of a verdict even when another tortfeasor settles for more than its share.

Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets · filed 1987-02-20(b)

Contrary to the result urged by appellees, where a release has been executed, the verdict is reduced only by the proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor. The actual amount of the release, if it exceeds this sum, is of no consequence in the satisfaction of the judgment of the remaining defendants. ... The pertinent language of the comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, is unquestionably compatible with the result reached today.

Section 7102(a.2) does not apply to an absent person unless the plaintiff has entered into a release with that person.

LaCivita v. Town & Country Bar & Grill · filed 2015-06-11(a.2)

The Plaintiff rebuts that assertion by citing to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.2), which states “the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” That section is inapplicable to the current matter as the Plaintiff has failed to establish that she entered into a release with Mr. Karpik and Mr. Crawford.

Section 7102(a.2) permits a settling bankruptcy trust to be included on the verdict sheet when the requesting party proves the settlement and offers sufficient evidence of the trust’s liability; a trust the jury finds liable is counted in per capita apportionment.

Roverano, W., Aplts. v. Crane · filed 2020-02-19(a.2)

In short, settling bankruptcy trusts may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment, provided that the party seeking to do so supplies the court with proof of settlement and, separately, evidence of liability sufficient to establish a basis upon which a jury may conclude that such liability should attach. Should the jury reach that conclusion, the trust must be counted in dividing the verdict per capita.

Section 7102 reduces a negligent wrongful death beneficiary’s recovery in proportion to that beneficiary’s causal negligence instead of barring recovery.

Culbert v. Calderon · filed 1980-08-12

The act provides not that contributory negligence of the plaintiff will be a bar to recovery, but rather will only reduce plaintiff’s recovery proportionately: 2 Feldman, Pennsylvania Trial Guide §33.9. In applying the applicable aforecited propositions, plaintiff as a beneficiary was deemed 45 percent contributorily negligent and therefore it was proper to mold the verdict in accordance with the percentage of plaintiff’s negligence.

Section 7102(a) reduces an earnings loss award by the plaintiff’s share of causal negligence before no-fault work loss benefits are subtracted.

McCord v. Hanley · filed 1982-11-24(a)

Post verdict the trial judge molded the verdict as directed by 42 Pa. C.S.A. §7102 (a) by diminishing the earnings loss award by 49 percent to $15,300 and then subtracting from that amount the $ 15,000 in work loss benefits... plaintiff conceded at side bar that he had already received from his own primary insurance carrier. ... Under our method, plaintiff receives a total of $15,300 earnings loss from all sources both before and after no-fault.

Section 7102(a) bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendant’s causal negligence.

Goertel v. Muth · filed 1984-08-10(a)

Under the Comparative Negligence Statute, this constitutes a verdict for the defendant, since the jury determined plaintiff’s negligence to be greater than that of defendant: ninety per cent (90%).

Section 7102(a) combines the negligence of spouses seeking damages for property they own as tenants by the entireties.

Werner v. Quality Service Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1984-12-28(a)

Therefore, the negligent acts of the spouses must be combined for purposes of applying the Comparative Negligence Law. Here, the husband’s causative negligence was found to be 45%, and the wife’s causative negligence was 25%. In view of these findings there can be no recovery for damage or destruction of property owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties against a third person whose causative negligence was only 30%.

Section 7102 requires the parties’ causal negligence to be apportioned when a rescuer acts negligently while performing a rescue.

Pachesky v. Getz · filed 1986-05-29(a)

When a plaintiff performs a rescue in a reasonable manner, he/she is entitled to full recovery from the negligent defendant for all damages occasioned thereby. However, when a plaintiff acts unreasonably, that is, in a negligent fashion, in performing a rescue, the relative causal negligence of the parties should be apportioned in accordance with the provisions of section 7102.

Section 7102(a) allows a plaintiff whose negligence equals the defendant’s to recover damages reduced by the plaintiff’s share of negligence.

Lopa v. McGee · filed 1988-04-13(a)

Applying the plain wording of the statute, recovery is barred only when a plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant or defendants. Since Mr. Lopa was fifty percent negligent and Ms. McGee was fifty percent negligent, Mr. Lopa’s negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of Ms. McGee. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Lopa is entitled to recover fifty-percent of his damages.

Section 7102 reduces the verdict by the percentage of causal negligence attributed to the plaintiff.

Francart v. Smith · filed 1989-06-12

Defendant’s motion to mold the verdict by reducing the remaining $500,000 of the jury’s verdict by the 20 percent negligence attributed to plaintiffs’ decedent in accordance with the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102 is granted, and the total verdict awarded in this case is hereby reduced to $400,000.

Section 7102 bars an estate's recovery when the decedent's negligence was the primary cause of the accident and otherwise reduces recovery in proportion to the decedent's causal negligence.

Josey v. PennDOT · filed 1989-10-13

Under the Pennsylvania comparative negligence law (42 Pa.C.S. §7102), the negligence of the decedent operates to reduce or defeat the claims of the estate to the same extent as if the deceased were the plaintiff. Consequently, the wife cannot be solely liable to the estate because the estate is barred from recovery if the deceased’s negligence was the primary cause of the accident. Also, the wife cannot be jointly liable with the other driver and PennDOT because the estate’s claim against PennDOT and the other driver will be reduced in proportion to the amount of the deceased’s causal negligence where this negligence is not the primary cause of the accident.

Section 7102 bars wrongful death recovery when the decedent's negligence was the only causal negligence in the accident.

Commonwealth v. Hickey · filed 1990-11-19

With the adoption of Section 7102 of the Judicial Code, contributory negligence no longer operates as a complete bar to recovery on the part of the individual who is contributorily negligent. Nevertheless, that negligence had to be considered in accordance with the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 which provides: ... As Mr. Lloyd's actions were the only causal negligence involved in this accident, no recovery can be had by the decedent's minor child, or DPW suing in her behalf.

Section 7102 permits comparative negligence to reduce a guest’s damages when an innkeeper is found negligent, even if the innkeeper also has strict common law liability.

Nicholaides v. University Hotel Associates · filed 1990-01-03

In the case at bar, appellees were found to be negligent, separate and apart from their strict and absolute common law liability. Thus, the Comparative Negligence Act was properly applied to reduce the damages recoverable by the Nicholaides.

Section 7102(a) allows a negligent plaintiff to recover when the plaintiff’s causal negligence does not exceed the defendant’s, with damages reduced by the plaintiff’s share of fault.

Terwilliger v. Kitchen · filed 2001-07-25(a)

Applying comparative negligence rather than assumption of the risk, Stefancin’s estate is not barred from recovery since Stefancin’s causal negligence was found to be twenty percent (20%), which is less than appellant’s sixty percent (60%).

Section 7102 permits a tavern to raise an intoxicated adult patron’s comparative negligence as a defense, with the factfinder deciding whether that negligence bars recovery.

Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc. · filed 1997-10-21

It makes no sense to permit a defendant to raise the contributory or comparative neghgence of an intoxicated minor and yet prohibit a defendant from raising the contributory or comparative neghgence of an adult especially when minors are presumed by our legislature to be incompetent to handle alcohol.

Section 7102 bars recovery when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's negligence.

Von Der Heide v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation · filed 1998-10-01

Comparative negligence denotes the negligent conduct of the plaintiff which is concurrent with the defendant's negligent conduct. See Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102; Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 404, 515 A.2d 517, 517 (1986). Under the Comparative Negligence Act, if the jury determines that the injuries were due more to the plaintiff's negligence than to the defendant's then the defendant is relieved of any liability.

Section 7102 bars recovery only when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendants’ combined negligence; equal fault does not bar recovery.

Banohashim v. R.S. Enterprises, LLC · filed 2013-09-24

Again, Appellant’s proposed verdict slip (correctly) declares that Ms. Banohashim would be barred from recovery only if “[Ms. Banohashim’s] negligence is greater than 50%.”

Section 7102(a) permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover unless the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's causal negligence.

Rowles, S. & v. v. Horning, R. · filed 2018-03-21(a)

The plain language of § 7102(a) makes clear that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff does not bar recovery unless such negligence exceeds the causal negligence of the defendant against whom recovery is sought.

Section 7102(a) bars recovery when the plaintiff is more than 50% negligent.

Rekun v. Pelaez · filed 2009-06-22(a)

Thus, we find that the parties agreed that the finding of comparative negligence would apply to the entire award, which would then be capped at $100,000. Because Judge Raup found Neil Rekun to be 60% negligent, Rekun is barred from any recovery.

Section 7102 bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff is more than 50% negligent.

Remmert v. EDA Contractors, Inc. · filed 2013-07-19

A plaintiff whose negligence is found to be greater than 50% cannot recover from a defendant. ... Here, the jury’s finding that Remmert was more negligent than Diaz is against the weight of evidence. ... The verdict of the jury was therefore against the weight of the evidence and post-trial relief in the form a new trial was appropriate.

Section 7102(a) bars negligence recovery when the plaintiff is more than 50% negligent.

Bruzzese v. Bruzzese · filed 2014-08-29(a)

Second, the jury determination that Terri was 60% negligent barred her recovery for negligence. 42 Pa.C.S.§7102(a).

Section 7102(a) bars a plaintiff from recovering damages from a defendant when the plaintiff’s percentage of contributory negligence exceeds that defendant’s percentage of negligence.

Chaudhuri v. Capital Area Transit · filed 2016-01-07(a)

Under our comparative fault scheme, if a plaintiff’s percentage of contributory negligence is greater than a defendant’s percentage of negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover damages from the defendant. See Section 7102(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(a).

Section 7102(a) bars recovery when the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the defendant’s, and a clear disparity can support summary judgment.

Meerhoff, C. v. McCray, D. · filed 2017-09-29(a)

We agree. To the extent appellants could demonstrate a cause of action for negligence against Penelec, it was drastically exceeded by their own willful and wanton misconduct. There is no error here.

Section 7102(a) prevents a plaintiff’s contributory negligence under the Choice of Ways doctrine from automatically barring recovery.

Kweh, A. v. US Airways · filed 2017-10-27(a)

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Kweh was aware of the dangers posed by the baggage door, knew the pedestrian way was perfectly safe, and opted for the dangerous path, such contributory negligence, by statute, cannot act as an absolute bar to recovery.

Section 7102(a) permits a comparative negligence defense in a wrongful death and survival action despite a prior criminal conviction arising from the same events.

Martinez v. Uckele · filed 2013-12-09(a)

Rather, this court is compelled to view these allegations as an affirmative defense of comparative negligence, which defendants, as explained above, have the right to assert at this time.

Section 7102(a) permits a reduction for a plaintiff's culpable conduct when that conduct caused the plaintiff's injuries, loss, or damages.

STRINGFELLOW v. United States · filed 2020-06-10(a)

Moreover, with respect to the Thirteenth Affirmative Defense, the undisputed facts of record do not support a defense that Plaintiff's conduct caused her injuries, loss or damages, and therefore, Plaintiffs summary judgment will be granted with respect to this defense as well.

Section 7102(a) bars recovery on a negligence claim when the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the defendant’s; disputed relative fault is for the jury.

Zimmerman v. Alexander Andrew, Inc. · filed 2018-06-01(a)

Similarly, Mr. Zimmerman cannot recover on his negligence claim under the comparative negligence statute if his fault in causing his injuries was greater than that of FallTech. See Rekun v. Pelaez, 976 A.2d 578, 581 (Pa.Super. 2009); 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a).

Section 7102(a) does not permit a comparative negligence instruction when there is no evidence that the plaintiff was negligent.

N. Coffin & D. Coffin v. Carbon County Animal Shelter & Z. Thomas · filed 2025-07-22(a)

We hold that the trial court erred in giving the jury instruction on negligence by Noreen Coffin. “[W]hen there is no evidence of [the] plaintiff’s negligence,” no instruction to the jury on contributory or comparative negligence should be given.

Section 7102(a) requires a plaintiff’s damages to be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff’s share of negligence.

Showers, D. v. Sam's East, Inc. · filed 2018-11-06(a)

The jury returned a verdict finding Ms. Showers 50% comparatively negligent for her injuries. Thus, the jury was required to reduce Ms. Showers’ award by 50%.

Section 7102 permits a defendant to seek a reduction in damages proportional to the plaintiff’s comparative negligence.

Burns, J. v. McCarroll, C. · filed 2019-10-28(a)

Mr. McCarroll had a right, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, to move for the trial court to cut the verdict in half — i.e., to reduce it to $5,000.

Section 7102 permits a plaintiff whose negligence is no greater than the defendant’s to recover damages reduced in proportion to the plaintiff’s negligence; a genuine factual dispute about contributory negligence can preclude summary judgment.

Logue v. Patient First Corporation · filed 2019-11-18

The Court has considered the evidence of record and concludes Defendants have presented persuasive evidence in their favor on the questions of whether they violated applicable standards of care, whether other Defendants’ actions superseded particular Defendants’ claimed negligence, whether Mrs. Logue was contributorily negligent, and whether any particular party’s actions were a substantial factor, i¢., the proximate cause, in bringing about Mrs. Logue’s death. However, that evidence, albeit weighty, is not dispositive of the relevant issues, and genuine issues of material fact remain throughout.

Section 7102 permits recovery when a plaintiff’s negligence is no greater than the defendants’ causal negligence; disputed comparative negligence generally cannot bar recovery as a matter of law.

BENNETT v. DOLLAR GENERAL, INC. · filed 2020-07-13(a)

Here, the facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiff’s negligence is so clearly greater than Defendant’s that comparative negligence can be decided as a matter of law.

Section 7102 bars a plaintiff from recovering damages when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds fifty percent of the cause of the accident.

SPILLER v. United States · filed 2020-06-01

Under Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff whose negligence is more than fifty percent the cause of a particular accident may not recover damages for injuries suffered in that accident from a defendant whose negligence was also a contributing factor.

Section 7102(a) reduces liability for a plaintiff’s comparative negligence and provides a complete defense if the plaintiff’s causal negligence exceeds the defendant’s.

Dailey, G. v. Smith, R. · filed 2024-10-10(a)

Smith’s comparative negligence is a defense to liability, both as a reduction of liability and a complete defense, if the jury were to find that Smith’s causal negligence was greater than Vai’s causal negligence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a). A new trial on liability is therefore necessary.

Section 7102(a) bars recovery when the plaintiff’s causal negligence is greater than the defendant’s.

Musser v. SEPTA · filed 2026-02-27(a)

Here, because the jury apportioned a greater share of causal negligence to Musser than to SEPTA, the comparative negligence statute barred Musser from recovery of any damages.

Section 7102(a) permits jurors to be informed of the consequence of their apportionment of negligence.

Peair v. Home Ass'n of Enola Legion No. 751 · filed 1981-05-22(a)

We have concluded that the jury should be informed of the consequence of its apportionment of negligence.

Section 7102 applies the narrow standards for granting a new trial to a jury's apportionment of negligence.

Thompson v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1983-09-02

These same narrow standards for new trial apply in reviewing a jury's apportionment of negligence under the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102.

Section 7102 generally leaves the comparison of the parties’ causal negligence to the jury; only in rare cases may a court decide that comparison as a matter of law.

Beary v. Pennsylvania Electric Co. · filed 1983-11-18(a)

We also said in Peair that the totality of causal negligence is a matter properly determined by the jury, and ... only in rare cases should a court hold as a matter of law that the negligence of one party is equal to or greater than that of the other. ... We have no difficulty in concluding that the present case is not such a rare case.

Section 7102 leaves the effect of a minor guest's negligence on recovery against a negligent social host to the fact finder.

Congini by Congini v. PORTERSVILLE ETC. · filed 1983-12-30

Thus, although we recognize that an eighteen year old minor may state a cause of action against an adult social host who has knowingly served him intoxicants, the social host in turn may assert as a defense the minor's "contributory" negligence. Thereafter, under our Comparative Negligence Act [6] 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 it will remain for the fact finder to resolve whether the defendant's negligence was such as to allow recovery.

Section 7102 does not require a plaintiff to disprove their own contributory negligence.

Seewagen v. Vanderkluet · filed 1985-02-06(a)

The plaintiff does not have the burden of disproving his own contributory negligence as appellant’s would suggest. To impose such a burden would defeat the purpose of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 (“statute”).

Section 7102 does not warrant a comparative negligence instruction when there is no evidence that the plaintiff contributed to the accident.

Howard v. Commonwealth · filed 1986-07-26

We did not charge under the Comparative Negligence Doctrine (42 Pa.C.S. §7102) that the jury could consider in diminution of damages the contributory negligence of plaintiff. This-charge was requested and refused simply because the court and the jury heard no evidence from which it could be concluded that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in causing the accident.

Section 7102's comparative negligence rule does not eliminate the presumption of due care or the need to instruct the jury on it when an injured plaintiff cannot recall the accident.

Waddle v. Nelkin · filed 1986-10-08

Comparative negligence only altered how an injury is evaluated not how it is established. Therefore, the adoption of comparative negligence has no effect on the use of the presumption of due care.

Section 7102 does not prohibit compromise verdicts when liability is contested and testimony conflicts.

Dawson v. Fowler · filed 1989-04-03

We note that neither the comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, nor its interpretive case law, prohibit compromise verdicts and we decline to create such a prohibition.

Section 7102(a) allows a jury to consider a plaintiff’s comparative negligence even when the defendant is negligent per se.

Gravlin v. Fredavid Builders & Developers · filed 1996-06-07(a)

Consideration of appellant’s own responsibility for the accident would not have been removed by the finding of liability per se on appellee’s part.

Section 7102 does not apply to every negligence claim; contributory negligence can govern instead.

Fasig v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. · filed 1999-03-08

Regarding the final issue of the plaintiff’s negligent conduct, the court finds that the comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102, is not applicable. Instead, the doctrine of contributory negligence is applicable.

Section 7102(a) reduces damages in proportion to a plaintiff’s negligence; a comparative negligence instruction is unwarranted when the plaintiff committed no negligence.

Morder v. Professional Aerials Inc. · filed 2006-05-18(a)

The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence statute states, “any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.” 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(a). We did not permit the jury to determine an amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff (Mr. Morder) because we ruled, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff committed no negligence in the case at bar.

Section 7102(a) requires judgment for the defendant when a plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault, and the jury must be instructed about that consequence.

Ronald J. Srein and R.J. Srein Corp. v. Frankford Trust Company, N/k/a Key Trust Company · filed 2003-03-13(a)

Under the governing Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, a verdict that a plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault requires the trial court to enter a judgment for the defendant. Pennsylvania courts have modulated the rule to the extent of requiring a judge trying a case governed by Pennsylvania's law to include in a jury charge information to that effect.

Section 7102(a) leaves a disputed comparison of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s negligence to the factfinder at trial.

Thornton v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2010-09-23(a)

Whether Nance’s own negligence exceeded the negligence of the PHA is also a question for the finder of fact at trial and not one properly considered at the summary judgment stage.

Section 7102(a) makes comparative negligence irrelevant once the jury finds that the defendant was not negligent; an erroneous verdict question about comparative negligence then does not warrant a new trial.

Boyle v. Independent Lift Truck, Inc. · filed 2010-09-29(a)

Based upon the clear precedent set forth above, we reaffirm our prior case law and hold that, where a jury, through a special verdict sheet, finds no negligence on the part of a defendant, any issue of comparative negligence no longer remains in the case, and any purported error regarding a question on comparative negligence is nonprejudicial, and does not serve as a basis for a new trial.

Section 7102(a) allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover when the plaintiff’s negligence is no greater than the defendants’ causal negligence.

Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. · filed 2011-06-17(a)

Pennsylvania law also employs a comparative negligence regime whereby a plaintiff is not barred from recovery based on his or her own contributory negligence “where such negligence is not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a).

The extent of a plaintiff’s comparative negligence is for the fact finder when the evidence could support a finding that the plaintiff acted reasonably.

Alloway, C. v. The Franklin Institute · filed 2017-09-08(a)

Once again, we conclude that the extent of Alloway’s potential comparative negligence is an issue for a fact finder.

A defendant asserting comparative negligence is not required to present its own expert testimony to establish causation.

Lamarr, D. v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp. · filed 2023-12-20(a)

Turning to the matter sub judice, Appellants present no case law that states a defendant is required to present its own expert testimony for the causation element of an affirmative defense.

Section 7102 permits a contributory negligence defense in a medical malpractice case, with a jury instruction if the defendant presents evidence of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.

Hunter v. Kennedy · filed 2020-07-14

Plaintiff’s motion in limine will be denied as the law clearly supports Defendants’ position. Moreover, the comparative/ contributory negligence issues do not cleanly fit into the motion in limine procedure. This issue is mainly one to be decided after trial. If Defendants present evidence of contributory negligence, then the jury should be instructed on it; if not, then such an instruction would be inappropriate.

Section 7102(b) does not permit a jury charge apportioning liability by relative causal fault when the evidence cannot support that determination.

Ball v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1993-04-20(b)

Under such circumstances, clearly no apportionment charge can be given since, as a matter of law, there is insufficient evidence to support a jury determination of the relative causal fault of the tortfeasors.

Section 7102 preserves assumption of risk as a separate defense, while conduct traditionally assessed as contributory negligence is assessed under comparative negligence.

Fish v. Gosnell · filed 1983-07-01

We are satisfied that in enacting the comparative negligence statute our legislature did not intend to wholly abolish the assumption of risk defense. ... However, neither did it intend to extend application of the assumption of risk defense in cases that have been traditionally, evaluated primarily according to contributory negligence principles.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk in downhill skiing cases, allowing a resort to avoid liability when a skier knowingly and voluntarily encounters a risk of injury.

Missar v. Camelback Ski Resort · filed 1984-08-03(c)

Subsection (c) is directly applicable to the instant accident, which occurred on February 6, 1982. ... On the authority of Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., supra, we conclude that plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury when he sustained and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted.

Section 7102 does not displace assumption of risk when the plaintiff's encounter with a known and avoidable danger relieves the defendant of a duty of care.

Malinder v. Jenkins Elevator & MacHine Co. · filed 1988-01-27

Because we have concluded that the legal consequence of Malinder's actions are the same as those of Mrs. Carrender, here too the Comparative Negligence Act has no effect on the application of the doctrine of assumption of the risk, and assumption of the risk is still a viable defense.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk as a complete defense to downhill skiing injury actions.

Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp. · filed 1992-02-27(c)

In recognition of the hazardous nature of such activity, the legislature has expressly provided that assumption of the risk shall be a complete defense to actions for downhill skiing injuries. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c).

Section 7102(a) reduces recovery according to the plaintiff’s share of negligence when it does not exceed the defendant’s; negligently assuming a risk does not by itself bar recovery.

Howell v. Clyde · filed 1993-02-17(a)

One's recovery, under the comparative negligence act, is to be reduced by the amount of his own negligence so long as it does not exceed that of the defendant; it is not to be barred, as in assumption of risk type 4, by the mere existence of any amount of negligence. Assumption of risk type 4, therefore, should be abolished.

Section 7102 permits a plaintiff who is 50 percent causally negligent to recover damages reduced by that percentage when the plaintiff has not assumed the risk.

Beizer v. Graduate Hospital Inc. · filed 1996-10-10

Plaintiff’s conduct was properly analyzed by this court under the concept of negligence. The court found that Dr. Beizer made in a matter of seconds a decision and did not “acquiesce to a known danger.” ... Under the circumstances the court properly applied comparative negligence principles.

Section 7102’s comparative fault system generally supplants assumption of risk, allowing a jury to consider a plaintiff’s negligence instead of barring recovery as a matter of law.

Emerick v. Fox Raceway · filed 2004-07-21(a)-(b)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently reiterated that “[a]s a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, with its attendant ‘complexities’ and ‘difficulties,’ see generally, Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107 (1993). . . has been supplanted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(a)-(b).” ... For all these reasons, we find that minor plaintiff did not either expressly or impliedly assume the risk of injury while racing, and as such, is not barred from recovery. Although it cannot be said that a 16-year-old bears no responsibility for his actions, we find it much more appropriate to submit the issue of the parties’ comparative negligence to the jury than to bar recovery against defendants as a matter of law.

Section 7102(c)(2) preserves voluntary assumption of risk as a defense to claims arising from downhill skiing injuries.

Galisson v. Shawnee Mountain Ski Area · filed 1996-05-16(c)(2)

Our legislature has expressly preserved assumption of the risk as a defense to actions for downhill skiing injuries at 42 Pa.C.S. §7102 which provides: ... “(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified.” ... Since Pennsylvania considers downhill skiing to merit special attention, we do not find that this falls into the “garden variety” consumer transaction contemplated by Keystone.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing injuries; whether an injured person was downhill skiing may be a jury question.

Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc. · filed 1999-02-25(c)

Although Pennsylvania has generally abolished the defense of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence in 42 Pa.C.S.A. (a) and (b), it has by exception preserved assumption of the risk in relation to downhill skiing in the Pennsylvania Skier’s Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(c). ... The Act covers “downhill skiing” and notes that there are inherent risks in the sport of “downhill skiing.” Appellant claims she was not engaged in downhill skiing while she was injured. If the jury accepts this position, that Appellant was not “downhill skiing” at the time of the accident, then the Act would not apply.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing, including skiing toward a lift, and treats collisions with other skiers as an inherent risk.

Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc. · filed 2000-12-05(c)

Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellee show that she was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing at the time of the collision and, thus, the Act, which preserves the doctrine of assumption of the risk, applies. ... The possibility that one skier may collide with another in this common area at the base of the slope is one of the common risks of the sport of downhill skiing. As such, we hold, appellant had no duty to protect appellee against this inherent risk.

Section 7102(c)(2) preserves voluntary assumption of risk in downhill skiing injury claims against ski area operators and other potentially responsible parties.

Cruz v. Gloss · filed 2002-05-01(c)(2)

Contrary to Cruz’ position, the language of the Skier’s Responsibility Act is not limited to claims for skiing injuries or damages caused by ski areas alone. The Act states in unambiguous, unqualified, and broad language that the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk “as it applies to downhill ski injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (b).” 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(c)(2).

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for injuries caused by inherent risks of downhill skiing; a collision with an underage drinker on a snowboard is not such a risk.

Crews v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort · filed 2005-04-18(c)

We are persuaded, for purposes of both the Pennsylvania's Skier's Responsibility Act and the exculpatory language of Appellee's lift ticket, that an "inherent risk" is one that cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature of skiing. The risk allegedly encountered instantly by Appellant is not one inherent to skiing.

Section 7102(c) treats a collision with a snowmaking pole as an inherent risk assumed by a downhill skier.

Glasser v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort · filed 2008-11-07(c)

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Skier’s Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(c), plaintiff assumed the risk of losing control while he was skiing and consequently colliding with a snowmaking pole. Expressly, the possibility of a collision with a snowmaking pole is a risk inherent to the sport of downhill skiing.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of the risk for downhill skiing, including risks inherent in competitive ski racing.

Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP · filed 2008-12-16(c)

The cognizable risks inherent in ski racing are legion. They certainly would include a failure by staff of a ski resort to (1) set netting in all spots where it might prove necessary, and (2) fix a race course in a way that minimizes the potential for the competitors to lose control. To decide otherwise would nullify 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(c) in the context of competitive skiing and replace it with a negligence standard.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing and bars negligence claims arising from inherent risks, including falling from a ski lift.

Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P. · filed 2010-06-21(c)

We hold instead that appellees' action for damages arises out of the "general risk" of falling from a ski lift, which is an inherent risk of skiing from which Hidden Valley owed no duty of protection, and thus is barred by the Act.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing; ski resorts owe no duty to warn of ice, protective fencing, or its support poles when those hazards are inherent in the sport.

Smith-Wille v. Ski Shawne, Inc. · filed 2014-01-06(c)

Logically, then, this court must also find that ice and icy conditions are an “inherent risk” of downhill skiing. ... Since ice is an inherent risk of skiing, there is no duty to warn of icy conditions.

Section 7102(c) bars a downhill skier’s injury claim when the injury arises from an inherent risk of skiing, including falling from a chairlift.

Mankowski, W. v. Seven Springs · filed 2017-08-07(c)

Therefore, in order for a suit to be barred by the Act (1) the injury must have occurred while engaged in the sport of downhill skiing and (2) the injury must have arisen out of a risk inherent in the sport of downhill skiing. ... In this case, Mr. Mankowski was injured when he fell from a chairlift. As this risk is inherent in the sport of downhill skiing, Appellants’ suit is barred by the Act.

Section 7102(c)(2) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing injuries and can bar negligence claims between ski area patrons.

Bell v. Dean · filed 2010-08-16(c)(2)

The Act and the “no duty” common law doctrine of assumption of the risk, which it preserves, therefore, apply equally as a potential bar to negligence actions between patrons and ski resorts and between two or more patrons of a ski resort.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing injuries but does not bar a spectator’s negligence claim when a skier collides with her.

Barillari v. SKI Shawnee, Inc. · filed 2013-11-12(c)

Consequently, the Court finds that the assumption of the risk doctrine, as articulated in the statute and interpreted by courts, does not apply to bar Mrs. Barillari’s claim, because she was not “engaged in the sport of downhill skiing” at the time of her accident.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing, but a negligence claim cannot be dismissed on preliminary objections when the complaint leaves unclear whether the injury arose from a risk inherent in the sport.

Balkovec, C. v. Hidden Valley Four Seasons · filed 2017-01-12(c)

As the foregoing indicates, the Act explicitly preserved the common law assumption of risk defense as applied to injuries suffered while engaged in downhill skiing. ... Our decision today holds only that it cannot be determined with any certainty on preliminary objections that Balkovec’s cause of action is barred by the assumption of risk doctrine as applied to downhill skiing.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing, including the risk of colliding with another skier even when the skiers know each other or agree to ski together.

Kisiel, W. v. Wiszynski, Z. · filed 2017-08-14(c)

Thus, by engaging in downhill skiing, Kisiel has, by law, assumed the risk of collision, and Wiszynski owed no duty to protect Kisiel.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing; a ski area operator owes no duty to protect skiers from inherent risks, including skiing off trail into a change in elevation.

Vu v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp. · filed 2018-03-26(c)

The Pennsylvania General Assembly expressly preserved the doctrine of assumption of the risk as a defense in downhill skiing cases in the Skier's Responsibility Act, recognizing that "there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing." 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(c). ... We hold that the risk of skiing off trail and suffering from the change of elevation between the trail and surrounding terrain is an inherent risk of downhill skiing.