42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for wrongful death and survival claims may begin after death when reasonable diligence could not reveal the injury or its cause earlier.

Powell v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1985-05-24(2)

It follows that for purposes of deciding the motions for summary judgment, the statute of limitations had not run during his lifetime, from which it further follows that his survivors and representatives were entitled to sue for his injuries and those suffered by his family until the expiration of a period of two years from “the time the cause of action accrued.”

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period bars an asbestos injury claim filed more than two years after the plaintiff knew of the injury and its cause.

Cianfrani v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1984-10-05(2)

There is no material issue of fact whether, in October, 1973, Mr. Cianfrani knew of his injury, the cause of his injury, and the relationship of his injury to his employment. The statute of limitations ran by October, 1975, two years before summary judgment was properly granted.

Section 5524’s two-year personal-injury limitation period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the cause of harm.

Braderman v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency · filed 1985-06-25

The statute will begin to run from the time the plaintiff has discovered or reasonably should have discovered the cause of harm. ... Plaintiff has therefore admitted that she discovered Ross’s involvement in her discharge on the same day she was fired, August 7, 1981. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run from that date and plaintiff’s discovery argument must be rejected.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period for a creeping-disease injury begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and that another person's conduct caused it.

Chandler v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-04-22(2)

The execution of the claim form on July 14, 1976, coupled with the appellant’s testimony on deposition conclusively established that by July 14, 1976, the appellant knew or should have known that he was injured and that the injury had been caused by someone else’s conduct. As suit was commenced more than two years after July 14, 1976, it was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limitation is subject to the discovery rule when reasonable diligence could not establish the date of injury.

Person v. Kieffer · filed 1986-05-14(7)

Nonetheless, the general rule governing all statutes of limitations questions is one of “reasonable diligence;” therefore, the discovery rule logically applies to all facets of the plaintiff’s timeliness in discovering a cause of action, including the determination of the date of injury.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury claim; for a creeping disease, the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

Morgan v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-06-10(2)

In this Commonwealth, actions to recover damages for personal injuries are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Thus, a plaintiff must commence an action within two years from the time he or she suffers an injury. For cases in which an injury is not readily detectable, our courts have developed the discovery rule to ameliorate the harsh results of the running of the statute of limitations before a plaintiff is aware of his or her injury. In Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa. Superior Ct. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984) (en banc), this *62Court held that in “creeping disease” cases the statute of limitations begins to run when “the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know: (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”1 Id., 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 136-37, 471 A.2d at 500 (footnote omitted). Under this test the statute of limitations begins to run even though the plaintiff lacks actual knowledge of an injury and its cause as long as he or she should have been so aware.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year limit bars a creeping-disease injury claim filed more than two years after the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and that another's conduct caused it.

Lucera v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-07-02(2)

We hold that because appellant knew that he had asbestosis in 1972 and reasonably should have known that another caused his injury that same year, his failure to commence the action until 1976, some two years past the time the statute of limitations ran out, bars his recovery in this case.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action; later discovery that a known injury is more severe does not toll the period.

Cardone v. PATHMARK SUPERMARKET · filed 1987-02-02(2)

The limitations period for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania is two years. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(2). ... Plaintiff urges the Court to deny the motion to dismiss essentially because plaintiff claims that she did not discover the severity of her injury until November 1984, nor could she have through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This proposition has never been accepted to toll the statute of limitations in Pennsylvania. To satisfy the requirement that plaintiff know, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of the injury, a plaintiff need only know of its existence.

Section 5524(2) requires personal injury actions to be filed within two years after the injury and its cause are known or reasonably knowable.

Owens v. Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. · filed 1987-03-18(2)

The statute of limitations began to run in July, 1981 when Attorney Finn and Mr. Owens had notice. This suit was not filed until January 9, 1984, more than two years after the statute began to run, so the claims asserted are time-barred.

Section 5524(2) requires wrongful death actions to be filed within two years of death and does not extend that period when the cause of death is discovered later; the two-year period for a survival action begins no later than death.

Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co. · filed 1987-05-27(2)

Thus, both statutes required the bringing of wrongful death actions within a specified period after a victim’s death, and neither incorporated any language indicating that the time of discovering the cause of death was of significance to the running of the statutory period. ... Thus, inasmuch as the instant survival and wrongful death actions were filed more than three years after the death of appellee’s husband, and the two-year statute of limitations was thereby exceeded, the actions are clearly barred.

Section 5524(2) requires wrongful death and survival actions to be filed within two years after death; the discovery rule does not extend that period.

Symbula v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1987-05-27(2)

For the reasons set forth in our opinion filed this day in Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 526 A.2d 323 (1987), wherein we held that the discovery rule cannot be utilized to extend the time for filing wrongful death and survival actions beyond the statutory period, and that such actions *530cannot, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2), be filed more than two years after death, the Superior Court’s order reinstating the survival action must be reversed.

Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

Jones v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1987-07-17(2)

The law governing the time-bar of this action is the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2) (Pur-don Supp.1987). Deeisionally, however, the limitations period does not begin to run until “plaintiff knows or reasonably should know: (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.” ... Her exercise of due diligence and when she knew or reasonably should have known that her symptoms were IUD-related are issues of material fact.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period is not extended by the discovery rule when a patient could reasonably know the injury and its cause in time to investigate a malpractice claim.

Bickford v. Joson · filed 1987-10-15(2)

Under the facts, the only reasonable conclusion is that counsel should have been sought sooner, i.e., within two years of the date of the claimed malpractice. We think that the facts do not permit an extension of the statute beyond two years since the purpose of the limitation is precisely that — to provide a reasonable period of time so that an injured person may assess their legal rights, seek advice and pursue his claim — but at the same time protect adverse parties from stale claims.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period for wrongful death and survival actions is not extended by the discovery rule.

Molineux v. Reed · filed 1987-10-15(2)

Finally, this Court recently decided in Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Company, supra, that the discovery rule does not function so as to extend the periods for filing actions under the current statutes of limitations for wrongful death and survival actions in Pennsylvania. That decision is controlling here.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury claim; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff discovers the injury or should discover it through reasonable diligence.

Brownstein v. Dow Corning Wright · filed 1988-02-01(2)

In Pennsylvania, a cause of action to recover damages for injuries to the person caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another must be commenced within two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). In Pennsylvania, courts have ameliorated the harsh effect of the statute of limitations by adopting the “discovery rule.” When the rule is applied, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered his injury, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered his injury. ... The Court believes that here, where the plaintiff believed that her pain could have been related to her thyroid problem, that Drs. Cha and Noone were not certain as to the cause of the plaintiffs pain, and that surgery was bound to be painful, the factual determination with respect to the plaintiffs reasonable diligence is for the jury. Accordingly, the Court will deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts I and II.

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period bars a trespass claim once the plaintiff, exercising due diligence, should have known of the injury more than two years before filing.

Gallagher v. Upper Darby Township · filed 1988-03-17

Assuming that both contracts were in writing, we agree with the trial court that February 26, 1979 is the date when the applicable statute of limitations begins to run since that is when Appellant, by the exercise of due diligence, should have known of her injury by reason of her engaging another plumber. ... We further agree with the trial court that the 1985 action was time barred in its entirety and that the trespass part of the 1984 action is likewise time barred.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for professional-negligence claims is not tolled merely because the plaintiff later learns the extent of a known injury.

Sherman Industries, Inc. v. Goldhammer · filed 1988-04-01(7)

The record indicates that plaintiff did not initially appreciate the extent to which it had been harmed, but under Pennsylvania law such a lack of information has not been held to toll the statute of limitations on a claim of professional negligence. Plaintiff’s negligence count accordingly was barred as of February 29, 1986 at the latest, and was untimely when filed on March 12, 1986.

Section 5524’s two-year period does not begin until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and that another party’s conduct caused it.

Merry v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1988-04-29

Thus the two year statute of limitations does not run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know: 1) that he has been injured; and 2) that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

Citsay v. Reich · filed 1988-12-27(2)

The Plaintiff-Appellee delayed the filing of this action for more than two years beyond the date when she gained sufficient knowledge to trigger the beginning of the limitations period under the discovery rule. As a result of her failure to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing her claim, we conclude that it was error for the trial court to deny the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was based on the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for a personal injury claim begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the injury, its cause, and the causal relationship between them.

Ciferni v. Standard Oil Corp. · filed 1989-06-20(2)

I conclude that on this record there is no genuine factual issue as to Mr. Ciferni’s knowledge, by March 19, 1985, of his injury, of his exposure to glycol at Sohio’s refinery, and of the relationship of glycol to heart injury. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run by that date.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action, but the discovery rule tolls that period until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the injury.

Stauffer v. Ebersole · filed 1989-06-28(2)

An action to recover damages for personal injuries is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Thus, a plaintiff must commence an action within two years from the time he or she suffers an injury. However, when an injury is not readily discernible, the discovery rule, as discussed below, applies. Where this judicial doctrine is applied, the statute of limitations is tolled and does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Section 5524’s two-year period may be extended by the discovery rule when the plaintiff could not, despite diligence, determine the injury or its cause; factual disputes about when the plaintiff knew or should have known those facts require trial.

Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc. · filed 1990-06-29(2) and (7)

Ordinarily, the two year statute would be a bar to this action; however, Mr. and Mrs. Mazur may be entitled to invoke the “discovery rule” in order to extend the period of limitations. ... The rule provides that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know: (1) that he has been injured, and (2) the injury has been caused by another party’s conduct. ... As to both questions, on the record before me, I conclude that genuine issues of material fact require resolution at trial.

Section 5524(2) gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury action; the discovery rule applies when the injury is not readily apparent.

MacCain v. Montgomery Hospital · filed 1990-08-15(2)

Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Generally, the two-year period begins to run on the date the injury is sustained. However, when an injury is not readily apparent, the discovery rule applies.

The discovery rule applies to the two-year limitations period for the common-law claims addressed under § 5524(7).

Denison v. Kelly · filed 1991-03-20(7)

The discovery rule would apply to these causes of action.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year period for wrongful death and survival actions; missing information supports fraudulent-concealment tolling only when it is directly germane to the delay in suing.

Kaskie v. Wright · filed 1991-02-13(2)

There is no dispute here that the action was commenced beyond the two year limitations period set by 42 Pa.S.C.A. 5524(2). ... Since, as Molineux makes clear, mere lack of information is not sufficient to make out a case for fraudulent concealment, the line between bare information and material facts must be drawn where the missing data is directly germane to the delay in advancing the claim.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims is tolled under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and that another’s conduct caused it.

Carns v. Yingling · filed 1991-07-09(2)

We agree with Mr. Caras that the discovery rule applies to this case. The negligence of defendants, if any, occurred prior to August 1986. The two-year period did not begin *285until Mr. Cams was aware of his injury and that it had been caused by another’s conduct. Nonetheless, MacCain dictates that the discovery rule toll the statute only until the proper diagnosis was made. At that point, the limitations period began to run.

The discovery rule applies to § 5524(7)’s two-year limit for latent residential construction defects; when the reasonableness of delayed discovery is disputed, it is for the jury.

Garvey v. Rosanelli · filed 1992-01-08(7)

The discovery rule applies to latent defects in residential construction. ... The facts stated in paragraph 14 of the amended complaint do not lead “unerringly” to the conclusion that the Garveys’ actions were unreasonable considering the circumstances. Although there exists a possibility that a determination may ultimately be made that their delay was unreasonable, such a determination is for the jury.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence claim, and later discovery of additional evidence does not toll the period when the plaintiff already knew of the injury.

Manning v. Maloney · filed 1992-02-26(7)

The two-year statute began to run on the date plaintiff became aware that he had suffered harm as a result of his purchase of the PSNH bonds. His injury was not hidden, so the discovery rule does not apply. The fact that what he deems a significant piece of evidence, i.e. that Thomson’s research department had in its files documents detailing the precarious financial situation of PSNH which it failed to disclose to plaintiff, does not operate to toll the statute.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period begins when the injury and its cause are reasonably discoverable, even if the plaintiff does not yet know the precise medical cause.

Kushmanich v. Czulada · filed 1992-06-25(2)

Focusing on the plaintiff’s awareness of the physical symptoms of her injury, we are disposed to hold, that the statute began to run from the time when discovery was reasonably possible on June 23, 1989, the day of the alleged injury or at the latest, July 5, 1989, when plaintiff was discharged from the hospital. The discharge summary stated that plaintiff had a possible compressed fracture of the lumbar spine. The fact that plaintiff did not pinpoint the precise medical cause until July 14,1989, does not prevent the triggering of the statute.

Section 5524 gives two years to bring this type of fraud action; the claim accrues when the fraud is discovered through due diligence.

Citizens Bank of Elizabethton v. Ken-Penn Amusement, Inc. · filed 1992-07-31

The FDIC and Sanders agree that under Pennsylvania law there is a two-year limitation for this type of action. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 (1982). It is also irrefutable that “[a] cause of action for fraud does not accrue until ‘the fraud has been discovered by the exercise of due diligence.’ ” Bhatla v. Resort Development Corp., 720 F.Supp. 501, 512 (W.D.Pa.1989), citing Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 264-65 n. 3, 469 A.2d 543 (1983). Therefore, Sanders — as the party movant on this issue, and as the party bearing the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial — has the burden of demonstrating by competent evidence that the FDIC knew about the fraudulent acts of which it complains more than two years before filing suit, or that the FDIC would have known about the fraud if it had exercised due diligence. This court rejects both scenarios.

Section 5524 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action; under the discovery rule, a medical malpractice claim accrues when the plaintiff learns of the injury and its cause.

Walsh v. Spinelli · filed 1992-09-30

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. §5524, provides that personal injury actions must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action, i.e., from the date the injury is sustained. ... Further, the court is not ruling, in violation of United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 353 (1979), that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when she realized negligence occurred but rather that her cause of action accrued when plaintiff learned of her injury and its cause.

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period is not tolled when a plaintiff knew the acts and who committed them but learned only later that the acts were wrongful or caused psychological harm.

E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia · filed 1993-04-07

As the Baily court correctly indicated, appellant need not have known that what was happening to him was “abuse,” i.e. was wrongful, or precisely what type of psychological or emotional harm he would suffer as a result. Once he knew what was happening and who was doing it, he had the duty to investigate these questions and to institute suit within the limitations period.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for a lung cancer claim does not begin when a separate, nonmalignant asbestos-related condition is discovered.

Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. · filed 1992-07-20(2)

Plaintiffs discovery of a nonmalignant, asbestos related lung pathology, whether or not accompanied by clinical symptoms of impaired pulmonary function, does not trigger the statute of limitations with respect to an action for a later, separately diagnosed, disease of lung cancer.

Section 5524(2) gives a person two years to sue for an injury once reasonable diligence would reveal the injury and its cause.

Ingenito v. AC & S, INC. · filed 1993-11-01(2)

Here, the undisputed facts lead unerringly to the conclusion that the decedent’s failure to discover promptly the possibility of a causal connection between his diagnosed condition and his industrial exposure to asbestos was unreasonable as a matter of law. More than two years passed after the necessary information became available to him without his asserting any cause of action therefor.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims is not tolled merely because a patient does not yet know the full consequences of an injury.

Bradley v. Ragheb · filed 1993-11-03(2)

Thus, the fact that appellant was unaware of the full consequences of Dr. Ragheb’s failure to diagnose her cancer earlier at the same time when she learned the lump to be malignant does not serve to toll the statutory period.

Section 5524’s two-year period for claims arising from HIV transmission begins when the injured person learns of the infection and its cause, even if AIDS symptoms develop later.

Murray v. Hamot Medical Center · filed 1993-11-04(1), (2)

Thus, the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations until the time that Mr. Murray learned that he was infected with HIV and knew of its cause. Once he learned that he was infected by the virus, in June 1987, and knew that the injury emanated from the blood transfusion, it was incumbent upon him to take legal action for his injury within two years from that date, by June, 1989.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period begins when a patient knows or reasonably should know of an injury and its connection to the dentist’s conduct, even without knowing whether the dentist was negligent.

Brooks v. Sagovia · filed 1994-02-15(2)

Thus, the fact that appellant did not acquire knowledge of Dr. Sagovia’s negligence, if any, did not prevent the running of the statute of limitations after she learned that the disease was present while she had been Dr. Sagovia’s patient.

Section 5524(2) requires wrongful death and survival actions to be filed within two years after death; the discovery rule does not extend that period.

Krevitz v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-09-14(2)

... such actions cannot, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), be filed more than two years after the death of the party on whose behalf the action may be maintained. Thus, the discovery rule is inapplicable here as a means to toll the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 5524 gives a person two years to sue for HIV infection after learning of the infection and its cause.

Smith v. American Red Cross · filed 1994-12-16

Although Sallie Smith was infected in December of 1984, under the discovery rule the statute of limitations was tolled until March 24, 1987, the day she learned both that she was HIV positive and the cause of her illness. As of that date, it was incumbent upon Sallie Smith to file suit within two years.

Section 5524(2) gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury claim; the discovery rule does not extend that period when reasonable inquiry would have revealed a possible cause of the injury.

Dreischalick v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1994-02-02(2)

Here, the undisputed facts lead unerringly to the conclusion that Mrs. Dreischalick’s failure, by the time of her 1981 surgery, to inquire regarding a possible causal connection to her prior use of the Daikon Shield was unreasonable as a matter of law. The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because more than two years passed after the necessary information was available to them without their asserting any cause of action.

The two-year limitation applies to legal malpractice claims sounding in tort; the discovery rule does not delay accrual once the client knows or should know of the injury and its cause.

D'Ambro v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young · filed 1996-02-08

Therefore plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on the date the seller notified him that he was in default and the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period bars a claim when a person who knows of an injury and suspects its cause fails to make a reasonably diligent inquiry and timely file suit.

Love v. Raymark Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-11-01(2)

In this action to recover damages for lung cancer allegedly caused by occupational exposure to asbestos products, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers because the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations enacted by the legislature at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). After careful review, we affirm. ... Under these circumstances, even if the physicians did not inform Love of the cause of his lung condition, it was unreasonable as a matter of law for Love not to make inquiry.

Section 5524(7) imposes a two-year limit on fraud and intentional interference claims; lack of knowledge alone does not delay the period under the discovery rule.

Hunter Group Inc. v. Roach Bros. · filed 1996-09-03(7)

Roach cites a two-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(7), in regard to the counts of fraud and intentional interference with prospective contracts. ... Hunter’s assertion that they did not become aware of the cause of action until 1991 is not sufficient to delay the running of the statute. ... Since the discovery rule does not apply in this case, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and Roach’s motion for partial summary judgment on the counts of fraud and intentional interference must be granted.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a claim for tortious injury to property, with the period beginning when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

Dombrowski v. Gould Electronics, Inc. · filed 1996-12-31(7)

Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, any action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional or otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in trespass must be commenced within two (2) years. ... Since this action was commenced more than two (2) years after this time, the Millers’ trespass and nuisance claims are time barred by Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(3)’s two-year period for conversion is not tolled by the discovery rule when reasonable diligence could have revealed the conversion within that period.

Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Mining Co. · filed 1997-02-21(3)

Therefore, as to Appellant’s first issue, the trial court correctly determined that the limitations period delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3) was not tolled by Appellant’s inability to discover the coal conversion.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions; a factual dispute about when plaintiffs reasonably should have discovered the defendant’s alleged involvement can prevent summary judgment on limitations.

Thomas v. Hartman · filed 1996-10-29(2)

The applicable statute of limitations for such an action to recover damages for “injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another” is two years. See 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2). ... Whereupon, we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when plaintiffs should have reasonably become *447aware that they had suffered an injury resulting from defendant’s allegedly negligent conduct.

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period is not extended by the recovery of repressed memories of an injury.

Dalrymple v. Brown · filed 1997-12-11

We thus conclude that summary judgment was proper as the recovery of repressed memory cannot extend statutory limitations.

Section 5524(6)’s two-year period does not begin until an injury can reasonably be discovered when the claimant could not reasonably learn of it earlier.

Highland Township v. County of Elk · filed 1999-10-26(6)

When the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party, and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year negligence period is not tolled when the plaintiff fails to show fraud or active concealment of the proper defendant.

Hubert v. Greenwald · filed 1999-12-23(2)

Because the record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that no fraud or active concealment existed in this case, we find Appellant’s final claim to be meritless.

Section 5524(7)'s two-year period begins when a plaintiff knows the injury and its physical cause, without waiting to learn of a manufacturing defect.

In Re Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation · filed 2001-03-08(7)

Rather, knowledge of an injury's physical cause — here, the gloves — triggers the limitations period.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for tort claims begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the injury and its physical cause; knowledge of a manufacturing defect is unnecessary.

Whitson v. Safeskin Corp. · filed 2001-03-08(7)

Rather, knowledge of an injury’s physical cause — here, the gloves — triggers the limitations period.

Section 5524's two-year period for tort claims is not tolled when a preliminary diagnosis triggers a duty to investigate and the plaintiff unreasonably delays follow-up.

In Re Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation · filed 2001-04-12

Plaintiff's tort-based[11] claims are subject to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. ... But in any event, the dermatologist's examination and preliminary diagnosis triggered her duty of inquiry; waiting for almost three years to consult an allergist was an unreasonable lack of follow-up as a matter of law.

The discovery rule tolls the two-year limitation for tort claims until the injury and its cause are reasonably discoverable; a preliminary diagnosis can trigger a duty to investigate further.

Hughes v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp. · filed 2001-04-12

But in any event, the dermatologist’s examination and preliminary diagnosis triggered her duty of inquiry; waiting for almost three years to consult an allergist was an unreasonable lack of follow-up as a matter of law.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for fraud claims is tolled until the plaintiff learns or reasonably should learn through due diligence of the claim.

Roberson v. Cityscape Corp. (In Re Roberson) · filed 2001-05-01(7)

Since Plaintiffs cause of action sounds in fraud, the statute of limitations applicable to her claim was tolled “until she learned or reasonably should have learned through the exercise of due diligence of the existence of a claim.” Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain sufficient facts to make that determination. Accordingly, the issue of whether Plaintiffs claim in Count III is time-barred cannot be resolved at this stage of the litigation.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year negligence limitation is not tolled by silence about a defendant’s death; tolling for concealment requires an affirmative act on which the plaintiff justifiably relied.

Montanya v. McGonegal · filed 2000-08-01(2)

We conclude that Agnes’ mere silence as to the status of her husband is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. As this Court has held, the defendant must commit some affirmative independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiffs justifiably relied in order to toll the statute; mere silence or nondisclosure is insufficient.

Section 5524 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence-based personal injury claim; the discovery rule does not delay that period until the plaintiff learns the full extent of the injury.

Kennedy v. Rigotti · filed 2001-06-13

Under 42 Pa.C.S. §5524, any action to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent conduct must be commenced within two years. ... Such a delay, in light of the facts known to Kennedy, was unreasonable and outside the period of the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) gives medical malpractice claims a two-year limitations period; when reasonable minds could differ about when a diligent patient should have discovered the injury and its cause, a jury decides timeliness.

Lomeo v. Davis · filed 2001-07-24(2)

Since reasonable minds could differ as to when the injury and its operative cause should have been discovered by a reasonably diligent patient, the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims should be decided by a jury and the motions for summary judgment will therefore be denied.

Section 5524(2) gives plaintiffs two years to bring a medical malpractice action for personal injury; under the discovery rule, the period begins when discovery of the injury is reasonably possible.

Frisbie v. Wiseman · filed 2001-10-26(2)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, we conclude that the plaintiffs did not know of the existence of the cancer until June 30, 1999, and that they then timely initiated this action on April 25, 2000.

Section 5524(2) and (7) sets a two-year period for negligence injury claims; a factual dispute over when the plaintiff could reasonably discover the injury may require submission of tolling to the jury.

Wilder v. United States · filed 2002-11-06(2), (7)

Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2), (7), an action to recover damages for injuries under a theory of negligence must be commenced within two years from the date of the purportedly negligent act. ... This evidence, we believe, warrants submission of the issue of whether the statute of limitations was effectively tolled until March, 1998 when Ms. Wilder was informed by a physician at Pennsylvania Hospital that she did not have the virus which causes AIDS. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations is denied.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit on negligence claims may be extended through fraudulent concealment, but what a defendant should have known is insufficient; the doctrine requires an affirmative act of concealment.

Frost v. Perrigo Co. · filed 2003-01-21(2)

A finding as to what defendants should have known will not support the application of the concealment doctrine because a mistake or misunderstanding (i.e., a negligence standard) is not sufficient to trigger the concealment doctrine. The concealment doctrine requires a finding of an affirmative act of concealment which caused the plaintiff to relax his vigilance.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit on personal injury claims is not tolled by the discovery rule when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury and its cause.

Garber v. Ansell · filed 2003-06-25(2)

Applying Pennsylvania case law to the pending action, it is clear that even though the plaintiff might not have known the exact medical cause of her injury, she did possess the salient facts necessary to investigate and pursue her claim. Furthermore, it is of this court’s opinion that the plaintiff did not exercise the necessary reasonable diligence in ascertaining the cause of her injuries to invoke the “discovery rule” and to the statute of limitations. Therefore, the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for not complying with the two-year statute of limitations necessary to file a negligence claim.

Section 5524(2) requires negligence suits to be filed within two years of injury; a limited tort plaintiff’s later exhaustion of first-party medical benefits does not toll that period.

Haines v. Jones · filed 2003-07-30(2)

Unfortunately for Appellant, there is no statutory dictate or case law commanding injured limited tort plaintiffs to first exhaust their first party medical benefit before they are permitted to initiate lawsuits against their at-fault tortfeasors that would justify the extension of the discovery rule to toll the general rule that all suits grounded on negligence must be initiated within two years of the date of the injury.

Section 5524’s two-year limit applies to tort claims, and the discovery rule does not toll it once the plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause.

Melley v. Pioneer Bank, N.A. · filed 2003-10-21

We find Jennifer Melley was aware in December 1993 she had been injured and her injury was caused by the conduct of another. Accordingly, the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations for her. Since this suit was initiated more than two years after Jennifer’s eighteenth birthday, her claims are barred unless they can be characterized as breach of contract claims so that a four year statute of limitations applies.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for tort claims may be tolled under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant caused the injury.

A.L.M. v. Diocese of Allentown · filed 2004-06-24(7)

Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations was tolled until the plaintiffs knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that the defendants were a cause of their harm.

Section 5524’s two-year period begins when a plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause; later disclosure of another potentially responsible party does not invoke the discovery rule.

C.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia · filed 2004-08-13

Therefore, plaintiffs’ cause of action arose at the time of the abuse itself, not when the various disclosures were made in 2002 through 2004.

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period is not tolled by the discovery rule when a plaintiff knew of the injury and had the means to investigate a potential claim against the abuser’s employer.

Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia · filed 2005-03-14

Neither the plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge of the Archdiocese’s conduct, nor the plaintiffs’ reluctance, as members of the Catholic Ghurch, to investigate the possible negligence of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia after having been abused by one of its priests or nuns, tolls the statute of limitations when the plaintiffs had the means of discovery but neglected to use them.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period is tolled when a plaintiff neither knows nor reasonably should know of the injury and its cause when the right to sue arises, even if the injury becomes discoverable before the two years expire.

Fine v. Checcio · filed 2005-03-30(2)

Today, we hold that it is not relevant to the discovery rules application whether or not the prescribed period has expired; the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations in any case where a party neither knows nor reasonably should have known of his injury and its cause at the time his right to institute suit arises.

Section 5524(7)'s two-year limitations period is not extended by the discovery rule when the plaintiff knew or was imputed to know of the injury.

Loranger Manufacturing Corp. v. PNC Bank, National Ass'n (In Re Loranger Manufacturing Corp.) · filed 2005-04-07(7)

The discovery rule does not apply to extend the statutory limitations period where, as here, LMC knew, or was imputed to know, of the injury.

The discovery rule does not toll Section 5524’s two-year period when an injured person knows the abuser and his employer but fails to investigate the employer’s possible liability.

Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc. · filed 2005-07-01

Here, appellant knew he was injured, knew the identity of the primary cause of his injury, and knew his abuser was an employee of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, yet appellant conducted no investigation into any cause of action against Father Newman or into any other aspect of the matter. These facts alone were sufficient to put appellant on notice that there was a possibility that the Archdiocese had been negligent. Neither appellant’s lack of knowledge of the Archdiocese’s conduct, nor appellant’s reluctance, as a member of the Catholic Church, to investigate the possible negligence of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia after having been abused by one of its priests, tolls the statute of limitations when appellant had the means of discovery but neglected to use them. See Meehan. Therefore, we determine, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule is inapplicable and does not toll the statute of limitations in this matter.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limit for wrongful death and survival claims is not extended by the discovery rule.

Pennock v. Lenzi · filed 2005-09-15(2)

Because we hold that the discovery rule is inapplicable to wrongful death and survival claims and, thus, the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs' claims, we need not address the issue of plaintiffs’ failure to substantially state a claim against Rettew Associates, Inc.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a medical malpractice claim, measured from when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Millan v. Laporta · filed 2005-12-30(2)

Although the defendants are correct that there is a two-year statute of limitations to bring a claim for medical malpractice, the tolling date is the date of the injury, more specifically, the date that the injury is discovered, not the date of the operation.

Section 5524 gives fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims a two-year limitations period; the discovery rule delays its running until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its cause.

Wise v. Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. · filed 2006-03-14

Under Pennsylvania law, tort actions, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, are subject to a two (2) year statute of limitations. ... Plaintiffs have alleged facts that are sufficient to show they did not, and could not, have discovered the fraud and breach until Defendants refused to re-finance their loan two years after the initial closing, in contravention of their initial promise.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for personal injury claims begins when the injury can reasonably be discovered.

Jensen v. Kohl · filed 2006-12-15(2)

We apply the “discovery rule” in this case. That rule states that when the existence of an injury is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the period prescribed in the limitation statute, the limitation period will not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible. ... Since the plaintiffs did not begin this action until June 17, 2004, their claims against defendant KLR are barred and as such KLR’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 5524’s two-year limit on conversion claims is subject to the discovery rule, which delays the start of the limitations period until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an injury caused by another.

Premium Motor Cars, Inc. v. Theisen (In Re Premium Motor Cars, Inc.) · filed 2009-04-17

Because of the foregoing factual record, the applicability of the statute of limitations to bar any claims in this case will necessarily implicate the discovery rule which provides that the statute does not begin running until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been injured by the conduct of another. ... Instead, the Parties in the present matter have posited reasonable but competing versions of the “facts” as to whether the discovery rule should be found to have tolled the running of the statute of limitations. The Court finds this to be a material factual dispute which must be resolved only after trial and not by way of summary judgment.

Section 5524(7) gives tort claims for injury to person or property a two-year filing period, subject to the discovery rule.

Donovan v. Idant Laboratories · filed 2009-06-10(7)

Under Pennsylvania law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to “any ... action or proceeding to recover damages to injury to person or property which is founded on negligent ... or otherwise tortious conduct.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7). ... As this claim was filed in July 2008, the discovery rule does not toll the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims nor the four-year statutes of limitations for contract claims of Donna Donovan.

The discovery rule does not toll the two-year limit for a personal injury action when the plaintiff immediately knows of the injury and that a third party caused it.

Pulli v. Ustin · filed 2011-07-05(2)

Since there is no doubt that Husband was immediately aware of his injury, and that he was injured because of a third party, the trial court did not err in determining that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations in this case.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a fraud claim; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its cause.

Honey Creek Stone Co. v. Telsmith Inc. · filed 2009-12-31(7)

The statute of limitations for a claim of fraud is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(7). ... Honey Creek either knew or should reasonably have known of the cause of the problems with the cone crusher on April 25,2006. As such, the statute of limitations began to run on that date. Honey Creek filed the motion for leave to file amended complaint on April 20, 2007, which is well within the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a professional negligence claim against an attorney; the period may be tolled under the discovery rule until the client could reasonably discover the injury or its cause.

Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti · filed 2007-10-25(3)

Thus, pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for the legal malpractice action against Ferretti was tolled until October 20, 1994. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations in which to commence a professional negligence action against Ferretti expired on October 20, 1996, and the four-year statute of limitations in which to commence a breach of contract action against Ferretti expired on October 20, 1998 (keeping in mind that to avoid waiver of either claim, both causes of action would have to be joined pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1020(d)).

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year deadline for personal injury actions, which the discovery rule does not extend when the injury was serious and known from the outset.

Gilmore v. Logan · filed 2010-07-29(2)

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(2) mandates a two-year statute of limitations for filing actions to recover for personal injuries. On March 2,2010 defendant’s motion was granted because plaintiff failed to bring her action within the required limitations period. ... Plaintiff’s injuries would not have been barred by “verbal threshold” or “limited tort”, they were serious and known by the plaintiff.

Section 5524(7)'s two-year limit for negligent personal injury claims is subject to the discovery rule; knowledge of an injury alone does not trigger a duty to investigate its cause.

Coleman v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2010-08-30(7)

Knowledge of an injury alone is not sufficient to trigger such inquiry. One must have some reason to suspect that the injury was caused by a third party to impose a duty to investigate further.

Section 5524(7) gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period; the discovery rule does not toll it when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury.

CCI Communications v. The Richard F Sassa Ins. · filed 2014-10-22(7)

Appellant has not satisfied his burden to establish the inability to learn of the injury despite exercising reasonable diligence. See Brown, 701 A.2d at 167. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims may be tolled until the patient knows or reasonably should know of a compensable injury and its cause; disputed facts about that timing are for a jury.

Gorman, J. v. Aria Health · filed 2015-03-05(2)

Stated differently, questions of fact remain as to whether Dr. Priest’s alleged breach of duty caused Mr. Gorman a compensable injury and when Mr. Gorman learned or should have learned of the existence of such an injury. The answers to these questions will inform a determination of whether the statute of limitations bars Mr. Gorman’s medical malpractice claim. A jury should make such factual determinations.

Claims subject to § 5524(3) and (7) accrue when a plaintiff can first sue; later learning that the defendant is insolvent does not restart the limitations period.

Black v. Gigliotti (In re Gigliotti) · filed 2014-03-26(3),(7)

The statute of limitations on these causes of action range from two to six years. See 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 5109, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(3),(7), § 5527(b). ... Here, the accrual occurred in 2005 because the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit related to this very cause of action against Gigliotti Avignon in state court on December 8, 2005. Plaintiffs may not, once they realize that the pursued defendant is insolvent, seek to cry foul by alleging that the accrual date is other than it was. ... These causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2)'s two-year period for personal-injury negligence claims is subject to the discovery rule; when reasonable minds could differ about the plaintiff's diligence, a jury decides when the injury and its cause were discoverable.

Nicolaou, N. v. Martin, J. · filed 2015-03-24(2)

Because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Mrs. Nicolaou acted with reasonable diligence in choosing to delay her fifth Lyme Disease test, “the question as to when [Mrs. Nicolaou’s] injury and its cause were discovered or discoverable is for the jury.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 859.

Section 5524(7) allows two years to bring an action for tortious injury to person or property; the discovery rule tolls that period until the tort and tortfeasor reasonably should have been discovered.

Glencannon Homes Ass'n v. North Strabane Township · filed 2015-04-22(7)

Here, the Association only became aware of the cause of the sediment problems in 2010, at which time it immediately notified the Township because it was unaware of the School District’s involvement in the matter, and commenced suit within the two-year statute of limitations in June 2011. The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the tort and the existence of the tortfeasor should have reasonably been discovered.

The discovery rule does not toll § 5524(7)’s two-year period after the claimant knew or should have known of the injury and its possible cause.

Watson, G. v. Shipman, R. · filed 2016-07-28(7)

Moreover, “reasonable minds cannot differ” in concluding that Watson knew or should have known that he had a claim against Shipman at the time those charges were filed.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period is not tolled by the discovery rule once a reasonably diligent plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its possible cause, even without confirmatory testing.

Nicolaou, N. v. Martin, J. · filed 2016-12-22(2)

Our review of the record, in the light most favorable to the Nicolaous, the non-moving party, compels our conclusion that Mrs. Nicolaou knew, or reasonably should have known, between July and September, 2009, that her long-standing health problems may have been caused by Appellees’ failure to diagnose and treat her lyme disease and therefore, such failure could have resulted from Appellees’ negligence. Because we find that reasonable minds could not differ in this conclusion, and thus, there are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was proper.

Section 5524(8) sets a two-year period for asbestos injury claims; the discovery rule may delay its start when the link between the injury and asbestos exposure is not immediately apparent.

Conneen v. Amatek, Inc. · filed 2017-03-02(8)

The exception to the statute of limitations created by the “discovery rule” may apply in cases of asbestos-related disease, where there is not an immediate and obvious causal link between a diagnosis (such as lung cancer) and exposure to asbestos.

Section 5524 gives two years to bring fraud, fraud in the inducement, and negligent misrepresentation claims; the discovery rule delays that period until the injury reasonably could be discovered.

West Chester University Foundation v. MetLife Insurance Co. · filed 2017-04-13

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524, Plaintiffs fraud, fraud in the inducement, and negligent misrepresentation claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations; pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, Plaintiffs bad faith claim is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations; and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525, Plaintiffs promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. ... This Court finds that a reasonable review of the annual statements would not have alerted Plaintiff to the falsity of Defendant’s alleged statements regarding the vanishing premium scheme, and therefore concludes that only upon receipt of the November 2014 Lapse Notice was Plaintiff alerted to its injury. Because Plaintiff filed- the present action within a year of ascertaining its right to initiate and maintain suit, this Court finds that Plaintiff s claims are not procedurally barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limit bars a property-damage negligence claim when due diligence would have revealed its alleged cause more than two years before suit.

Lee, Dr. K. v. Norris Plumbing & Heating, Inc. · filed 2017-04-13(7)

With the exercise of due diligence, Dr. Lee should have been aware, in December 2011, of Norris’s alleged failure to repair the appropriate sump.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year limitations period is not tolled by the discovery rule when a plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to identify the proper defendants.

Johnson v. Ridley Twp. · filed 2015-11-18(2)

The trial court also determined the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations because Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the proper parties against whom to bring suit. ... Therefore, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion in the matter of Harold Johnson v. Ridley Township and John Doe, Ridley Township Police Officers 1-5 and Donald A. Downes and Rasheena Bradley and Thomas Rafferty and Ridley Park Borough and Officer Robert Quinlan, (No. 12-01911 Civil, filed March 18, 2015) (C.P. Delaware).

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for an undue-influence claim begins when reasonable diligence would reveal the injury.

Claassen, K. v. Claassen, D. · filed 2018-08-21(7)

Reasonable diligence required Kimberly to inquire about those assets, and any interest she may have had in them, on the day George died, May 10, 2014. Thus, Appellants’ May 9, 2016 cause of action was brought within the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims; factual disputes about a plaintiff’s notice and diligence under the discovery rule ordinarily go to the jury.

Nicolaou, N., h/w, Aplts. v. J. Martin M.D. · filed 2018-10-17(2)

As noted, the statute of limitations for filing an action to recover damages for injuries to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or negligence of another is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). ... Applying these principles to the facts presented, we hold that Pennsylvania’s well-established general rule should apply, i.e., that the factual issues pertaining to Plaintiffs’ notice and diligence are for a jury to decide.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims; reasonable diligence under the discovery rule is generally a question for the jury.

Engleman, M. v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2019-09-20

Under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries and corresponding discovery rule, whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in investigating the cause of her injuries generally raises a question of fact for the jury.

For a legal malpractice claim subject to Section 5524(3)’s two-year limit, a jury decides whether the discovery rule tolls the period when reasonable minds could differ about whether the client had notice of the alleged malpractice.

Pitney Road Partners, LLC v. Lazun, S. · filed 2020-01-13(3)

Unlike the trial court, we cannot determine that the record, viewed in a light most favorable to Pitney, is so clear that “reasonable minds could not differ on the subject[,]” Wilson, supra, i.e., as to whether the 2008 Letter should have reasonably put Pitney on notice of Lazun’s alleged malpractice concerning the 2008 Refinance. The trial court thus erred in usurping the province of a jury to make a finding concerning this matter regarding the 2008 Letter.

Section 5524(2) gives a person injured in an automobile accident two years from the date of the accident to sue.

Moyer, E. v. Conroy, M. · filed 2020-01-13(2)

The statute of limitations begins to run for an individual injured in an automobile accident on the day of the accident, and the time period runs for two years.

Section 5524(4) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a trespass claim; for a completed unlawful entry, the period runs from the entry.

Sampathkumar, P. v. Chase Home Finance · filed 2020-10-19(4)

Therefore, the statute of limitations ran in June 2010. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(4).

Section 5524 gives plaintiffs two years to bring personal injury claims, subject to tolling under the discovery rule.

Torres, C. v. Brenntag Northeast, Inc. · filed 2021-04-08

Since Torres was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease on June 25, 2015, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims expired on June 25, 2017 unless the discovery rule tolled the statute. Appellants have the burden of proving that the statute was tolled until July 24, 2016, two years before they filed their original complaint. ... For these reasons, Appellants failed to fulfill their burden of demonstrating that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 5524 gives personal injury and fraud claims a two-year limitations period, which the discovery rule tolls until a reasonably diligent plaintiff can learn of the injury and its cause.

MCDONNELL v. FLOWONIX MEDICAL INC. · filed 2022-01-25(7)

In Pennsylvania, the applicable statutes of limitations for personal injury and fraud claims are two years. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 5524 and 5524(7). ... Thus, Plaintiff became aware of the cause of her injury on March 11, 2019 and, by extension, the two-year statute of limitations began to run on that day. ... Thus, this Court finds that Count Five and Six are not time-barred.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limit for tort-based legal malpractice claims; a factual dispute about when the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the injury can prevent dismissal as untimely.

SIMONS v. ROYER COOPER COHEN BRAUNFELD, L.L.C. · filed 2022-02-28

Whether Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence that would have allowed him to discover his potential legal claims before March 2020 is a fact-intensive inquiry, and the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred at this juncture.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a tort-based criminal legal malpractice claim; the period begins no later than the end of the attorney-client relationship.

Rollins, D. v. Tinari, N. · filed 2021-05-20(7)

Thus, the attorney-client relationship had been terminated at that time, and the statute of limitations had begun to run. ... Rollins did not initiate the instant legal malpractice action until December 18, 2018, well beyond the statutory period.

Section 5524(7)'s two-year period for a misdiagnosis claim may depend on a jury's determination of when the patient reasonably should have discovered the injury and its cause.

DiDomizio, G. v. Jefferson Pulmonary Assoc. · filed 2022-08-02(7)

However, under the circumstances, whether this decision not to undergo this diagnostic testing in 2013 or to investigate whether her lung masses had been misdiagnosed as sarcoidosis in 2015 after her cancer diagnosis is a question better left to a jury.

Section 5524’s two-year limit for negligence claims is subject to the discovery rule; disputed facts about when a claimant reasonably should have known the cause of an injury are for a jury.

Swart, J. v. UPMC Pinnacle · filed 2024-04-22(2)

In sum, we conclude that the factual issues pertaining to Appellants’ notice and diligence must be decided by a jury.

Section 5524 gives a loss of consortium claim a two-year limitations period, subject to the discovery rule when the injury or its cause was not reasonably knowable.

Thomas v. Orozco-Pineda · filed 2025-09-30

While filing a consortium claim more than two years after the incident giving rise to that claim—as Plaintiffs did in this case—does not automatically render it time-barred in light of the discovery rule, Plaintiffs’ assertion that Diane Thomas was unaware of her claim until November of 2022, roughly eight months after the accident, is unreasonable.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year period for criminal legal malpractice claims begins when the attorney-client relationship ends.

Traumann v. Funt · filed 2025-06-24(7)

However, his filing of a pro se motion indicates that by that date, Appellees’ representation of him had ceased, and thus created “the appropriate starting point” for the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2)’s two-year period for personal-injury claims is not tolled when a fall and immediate pain put the plaintiff on inquiry notice of injury, even if its precise cause is unknown.

Ellsworth · filed 2026-02-26(2)

Moreover, even if neither Plaintiffs nor medical staff were aware of the precise cause of the injury, the fall and subsequent immediate pain still put Mr. Ellsworth on inquiry notice rendering the discovery rule inapplicable here.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a medical malpractice claim for personal injury; inquiry notice starts the period when the plaintiff has enough information to investigate the injury and its cause.

Werner, S. v. Beetel, T. · filed 2025-12-03(2)

Like the trial court, we hold that Mr. Werner had sufficient information and knowledge to begin some type of investigation into the status of his gallbladder remaining in his body as early as December of 2013. At that point, inquiry notice existed, and his two-year statute of limitations began to run.

Section 5524(7) gives these tort claims a two-year filing period; the discovery rule does not toll that period once plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injuries and their cause.

In Re: Risperdal Litigation, Appeal of: Saksek, J. · filed 2017-11-13(7)

As such, the discovery rule is not applicable to toll the relevant statutes of limitations. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7), Appellants should have commenced their actions no ... later than October 31, 20087—over five and a half years prior to their February 4, 2014 and March 10, 2014 filing dates.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to sue for injuries caused by negligence; the discovery rule does not toll that period when the plaintiff knew of the injury and failed to investigate its cause diligently.

Greer v. Elwyn Industries · filed 2011-03-04(2)

Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2) proceedings in an action to recover damages for injuries caused by the wrongful or negligent act of another must be commenced within two years, and, failing that, the complainant is barred from bringing suit. ... As the actions were not appropriately diligent, the statute of limitations will not be tolled due to the lack of knowledge resulting from the complacency of the “investigation.”

Section 5524(7) sets a two-year period for medical malpractice claims; the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

Glenn v. Mataloni · filed 2020-11-30(7)

Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is also two (2) years. See id., § 5524(7). ... In sum, the Court concludes that, construing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his claims accrued as of February 15, 2018, when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. ... Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint was filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 5524’s two-year limit for wrongful death and survival claims is not extended by a later decision clarifying the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision.

Riley, S. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 2018-11-16

Appellant failed to do so, and our Supreme Court’s Tooey decision did not extend the statute of limitations for her survival and wrongful death claims.

Section 5524(2)’s general limitation for personal injury actions yields to MCARE’s specific limitation for medical professional liability wrongful death and survival actions.

Dubose, R. v. Quinlan, M. Appeal of: Willowcrest · filed 2017-11-22(2)

Section 513(d) establishes a specific statute of limitations for survival and wrongful death actions in medical professional liability cases that prevails over the general statute of limitations for personal injuries actions contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year period for personal injury and death actions, but MCARE’s period running from death governs medical liability survival actions, including claims for injuries short of death.

Bradley, D. v. Thomas Jefferson Health System · filed 2018-07-17(2)

Section 5524(2) provides that “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another” must be commenced within two years. ... Therefore, although Dubose involved a survival claim resulting in death, the plain language of section 1303.513(d) compels the conclusion that the same statute of limitation be applied to all survival actions, including actions involving injuries short of death.

Section 5524(2) gives wrongful death and survival actions a two-year limitation period that is not tolled by filing an individual action in federal court.

Conyers-Carson, J. v. Germantown Homes · filed 2016-01-12(2)

She did not file her complaint until June 13, 2014, well beyond the two-year statute of limitations. Unfortunately for Appellant, her filing of the federal action did not toll the statute of limitations in this state action.

Section 5524(2) gives wrongful death and survival actions two years from the date of death to be filed.

Floyd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 2001-04-02(2)

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for wrongful death and survival actions is two years from the date of death.

Section 5524(2) governs the limitations period for a wrongful death action filed after its effective date, subject to 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1975, and determines whether additional defendants may be joined.

Roche v. Piercy · filed 1979-11-07(2)

The complaint in this matter was filed after the effective date of section 5524. Therefore this section is controlling for purposes of determining whether any additional defendants may be joined. ... Assuming that the cause of action is not barred prior to the effective date of the code, i.e., June 27, 1978, it is the statute at the time of filing and not the statute at the time of death which controls, subject to the hmitations of 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1975. Suffice it to say that in this matter all additional defendants have been timely joined.

Section 5524(2) requires an action arising from a death to be commenced within two years of the death.

Watts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 1986-04-16(2)

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), appellant had to commence her action by May 23, 1983.

Section 5524(2) gives a survival action a two-year limitations period that begins under the discovery rule when the injured person knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its operative cause, and their causal relationship.

Holmes v. Lado · filed 1992-02-13(2)

The applicable statute of limitations for a survival action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). In determining when this period commences, the discovery rule is applied.

Section 5524(2) gives wrongful death and survival actions two years to be filed; the survival period runs from accrual of the decedent’s claim, while the wrongful death period runs from death if the decedent’s claim was still viable then.

Moyer v. Rubright · filed 1994-12-30(2)

The statute of limitations applicable to both wrongful death and survival actions appears at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2) and provides that “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another” must be commenced within two years. ... Since the survival suit was brought more than two years after the accrual of the underlying negligence action, the statute of limitations bars recovery. In contrast, the wrongful death action is not barred by the statute of limitations because Mr. Moyer’s loss occurred at his wife’s death. The wrongful death action was brought within two years of death, and the original tort action still was viable at the time of death.

Section 5524(2) gives both survival and wrongful death actions a two-year filing period; a wrongful death action must be filed within two years of death, while a survival action may be barred earlier.

Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp. · filed 1993-11-01(2)

The statute of limitations governing both wrongful death and survival actions is contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2), which provides that “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another” must be commenced within two (2) years. ... By then, however, the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations enacted by the legislature at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). ... Therefore, the rule is that an action for the wrongful death of another person must be brought no later than two years after the date of death.

Section 5524(2) gives an estate two years from the date of injury to file a survival action when minority tolling does not apply.

Holt v. Lenko · filed 2002-02-06(2)

As we have held, the minority tolling statute does not apply in this case. Thus, Holt had two years from the date of Andrew’s death in which to file a survival action. The Complaint herein was not filed until more than two years after Andrew’s death. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Holt’s Complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years from the decedent’s death to bring a personal-injury claim resulting in death; knowledge of the cause of death generally does not extend that period.

Bartow v. Cambridge Springs SCI · filed 2008-07-10(2)

In Pennsylvania, the limitations period for a personal-injury tort claim resulting in death is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). This period begins to run from the decedent’s date of death, and generally is not tolled based on the degree of knowledge a plaintiff possessed concerning the decedent’s cause of death.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limitation period for personal injury claims.

Meadows v. Goodman · filed 2010-04-08(2), (7)

The statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two years. ... Appellants thus had until May 1, 2009 to initiate suit for injuries suffered in the car accident.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a claim for injuries or death caused by another’s wrongful act or negligence; the limit also applies to survival claims.

Bell v. Willis · filed 2013-11-08(2)

A two-year statute of limitations applies to an action to recover damages for injuries or death to a person resulting from the wrongful act or negligence of another. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Here, Ms. Sewak died on May 2, 2008, and the estate was substituted as the plaintiff approximately two months later. For survival actions, the cause of action accrues and the two-year statute of limitations begins to run, at the latest, at death. Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Company, 514 Pa. 517, 526 A.2d 323 (1987). Appellant did not seek to amend her complaint to add a Survival Act claim until October 14, 2011, well outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death and survival actions.

White v. Pocono Psychiatric Ass'n · filed 2014-02-26(2)

The statute of limitations for wrongful death or survival actions is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Ms. Steele passed away on April 8, 2011. The statute of limitations therefore expired on April 8, 2013, the same day that this action was commenced by writ of summons.

Section 5524 sets a two-year limitations period for a survival action seeking damages for personal injury caused by another’s wrongful act or negligence.

Ippolito v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia · filed 2014-11-14(2), (7)

Where, as here, the decedent’s personal representative seeks to recover damages for injury that resulted from the wrongful act or negligence of another, a two-year limitations period applies.

Section 5524(2)'s general two-year limit yields to the specific limitation period for medical professional liability wrongful death and survival actions, which begins at death.

Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts. · filed 2017-11-22(2)

Section 513(d) establishes a specific statute of limitations for survival and wrongful death actions in medical professional liability cases that prevails over the general statute of limitations for personal injuries actions contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limit for wrongful death and survival actions; the discovery rule does not extend that period.

Estate of Marcella Marsh v. Lizza, C. · filed 2018-02-13(2)

The statute of limitations for survival and wrongful death actions is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. The discovery rule is not applicable to survival and wrongful death actions as recently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court in Dubose.

Section 5524 imposes a two-year limit on wrongful death and survival claims, which the Tooey decision did not extend.

Moeller, J. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 2018-11-16

Appellant failed to do so, and our Supreme Court’s Tooey decision did not extend the statute of limitations for his survival and wrongful death claims.

Section 5524(2) gives a plaintiff two years from the death to bring a wrongful death action.

M. Osbourne, M.D. & the City of Philadelphia Office of the Medical Examiner v. J.M. Greenberg · filed 2023-09-13(2)

As noted, a wrongful death plaintiff has two years from the time of death to commence such an action, which means that the latest that the Parents could have filed suit was on or about January 26, 2013.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years from the decedent’s death to commence a survival action for personal injuries.

Swatt, A. v. Nottingham Village · filed 2025-07-02(7)

Hence, a survival-action plaintiff has two years from the date of the decedent’s death to commence an action for personal injuries.

Section 5524(7) gives a plaintiff two years from the decedent’s death to commence a survival action for personal injuries.

Hawbaker, J. v. Nottingham Village · filed 2025-07-02(7)

Hence, a survival-action plaintiff has two years from the date of the decedent’s death to commence an action for personal injuries.

Section 5524(2) requires wrongful death and survival actions to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Ogioba, H. v. Gupta, C. · filed 2018-04-23(2)

Instantly, we recognize that a party must commence Wrongful Death and Survival actions within two years of the time the cause of action ... accrued.

Section 5524(7) imposes a two-year limitations period on statutory insurance bad faith actions under section 8371 because those actions sound in tort.

Haugh v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2003-02-28(7)

After considering the germane precedents we conclude that the district court correctly predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that an action under section 8371 sounds in tort and thus is subject to a two-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5224(7).

Section 5524(5) and (7) impose a two-year limit on statutory insurance bad-faith claims because they seek a civil penalty and sound in trespass.

Susich v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1998-04-15(5), (7)

We think this case comes within both subsections 5 and 7. ... Because the bad faith statute authorizes awards of interest at prime rate plus 3 percent, punitive damages, and court costs and attorney’s fees if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, it clearly is a statutory action for a civil penalty. ... While Susich is seeking punitive damages and attorney’s fees in this action and not the damage to his property, and therefore the first part of subsection seven does not apply, the conduct complained of certainly sounds in trespass. ... Since we conclude that the bad faith claim is barred by the two-year period of limitations, we need not discuss the remaining issues relating to that claim.

Section 5524(7) applies a two-year limitations period to statutory insurance bad faith actions because they sound in tort.

Ash v. Continental Insurance · filed 2003-09-15(7)

This court agrees with and adopts the view that a section 8371 bad faith action is a statutorily created tort action and is therefore subject to the two-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(7).

Section 5524’s two-year limitations period applies to statutory insurance bad faith actions under Section 8371.

Ash v. Continental Insurance Co. · filed 2004-11-03

We find the reasoning supporting those decisions to be persuasive and thus hold that a bad faith action under Section 8371 is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5524 imposes a two-year limitations period on statutory insurance bad faith claims under § 8371.

Ash v. Continental Insurance · filed 2007-10-11

Consequently, we conclude the Superior Court properly determined an action under § 8371 is a statutorily-created tort action and we therefore hold such an action is subject to the two-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.

Section 5524 gives an insurer bad faith claim a two-year limitations period.

Feingold, A. v. State Farm Insurance Co. · filed 2019-05-17

Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court declining to allow Feingold to amend his complaint. The trial court noted that the statute of limitations had long expired for both breach of contract, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525 (four years), and bad faith, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524 (two years). Here, Feingold filed his complaint more than 23 years after the Wallaces’ accident and 13 years after all of the Wallaces had turned at least 18 years old. Feingold’s brief does not show how a more specific amended complaint would overcome the statute of limitations.

Section 5524 gives a statutory insurance bad faith claim a two-year limitations period that begins when coverage is denied.

Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2008-04-07

Recently, in Ash v. Continental Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 523, 932 A.2d 877 (2007), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that claims brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for tort actions set forth at 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5524. ... Therefore, Mr. Heathcock’s claim for bad faith, which is now plaintiffs claim by virtue of the assignment, accrued on August 9, 2002. This suit was filed more than two (2) years later. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim for bad faith pursuant to 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8371 is untimely and defendant’s motion for summary judgment of Count III will be granted.