Statute Annotations › Pennsylvania › 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524

Two year limitation: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania
Case notes
1,102
Cited in passing
238
Citing cases indexed
1,526
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-06-22
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,340 citing cases reviewed of 1,526 in the citation index: 1,102 interpreted the section (annotated below), 238 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-22 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1985-04-17 Wilson v. Garcia held that every § 1983 claim uses the state personal-injury limitations period, replacing claim-by-claim comparisons to particular state torts. Source
  • 1987-05-27 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Pastierik that the discovery rule cannot extend wrongful death or survival claims beyond two years after death. Source
  • 1991 The PHRA was amended to provide its own two-year filing period running from notice that the administrative complaint was closed, so § 5524 no longer supplies that period. Burgh v. Borough Council (2001). Source
  • 2002-03-20 The MCARE Act added a seven-year repose period for medical professional liability claims and a specific two-year period from death for medical liability wrongful death and survival actions. Source
  • 2002-10-22 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Pro Golf and held commercial disparagement claims have a one-year limit under § 5523(1), displacing § 5524(7). Source
  • 2004-05-03 Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. held that § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 amendment use the federal four-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658, while older § 1981 claims continue to borrow state law. Source
  • 2005-03-30 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Fine that the discovery rule can toll § 5524 even when the injury becomes discoverable before the original two years expire. Source
  • 2007-10-11 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Ash that a statutory insurance bad faith action under § 8371 has a two-year limit under § 5524, displacing decisions that applied six years. Source
  • 2017-11-22 Dubose v. Quinlan held that MCARE’s two-year period from death governs medical professional liability survival actions even when the decedent’s injury occurred years earlier. Source
  • 2019-10-31 Yanakos v. UPMC held MCARE’s seven-year statute of repose unconstitutional under Pennsylvania’s remedy clause; the ruling concerned MCARE, not § 5524’s two-year limit. Source
  • 2021-07-21 Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown reversed the Superior Court’s tolling ruling: a child-abuse plaintiff who knew the injury and the abuser’s connection to the diocese was on inquiry notice to investigate the diocese during the limitations period. Source

Employment discrimination claims

Section 5524(2)'s two-year limit for injuries to the person does not apply to employment discrimination suits under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

Webster v. Great American Insurance · filed 1982-08-02(2)

Applying the teaching of Davis to the limitations scheme presently in force in Pennsylvania, leads me to conclude that the two-year limitation for actions to recover damages for injuries to the person, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524(2), does not pertain to employment discrimination suits under the PHRA.
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Section 5524(2)’s two-year personal injury limitation does not apply to employment discrimination claims grounded in duties arising from the employment relationship, even when the claimed damages resemble tort damages.

Hutchings v. ERIE CITY AND COUNTY, ETC. · filed 1981-06-29(2)

The defendants argue that, under Pennsylvania law, the most clearly analogous statute of limitations is the two year limitation governing personal injury actions. See, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Applying this statute, the defendants contend that all claims arising prior to November 12, 1978 must be dismissed. We disagree. ... We do not believe, however, that these unique damage claims change the fundamental nature of the relationship between the parties. The defendants are the employers of the plaintiff. The duties they owe to the plaintiff arise out of this contractual employment relationship. Therefore, their conduct should be considered under the statute of limitations governing contract actions.
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Section 5524(2)’s two-year personal injury limitation does not govern employment discrimination claims arising from an employer’s contractual duties, even when the employee seeks damages for emotional and physical harm.

Hutchings v. Erie City & County Library Board of Directors · filed 1981-06-29(2)

The defendants argue that, under Pennsylvania law, the most clearly analogous statute of limitations is the two year limitation governing personal injury actions. See, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). Applying this statute, the defendants contend that all claims arising prior to November 12, 1978 must be dismissed. We disagree. ... The duties they owe to the plaintiff arise out of this contractual employment relationship. Therefore, their conduct should be considered under the statute of limitations governing contract actions. Accordingly, either Pennsylvania’s four year or six year statutes of limitations would apply in this case.
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Section 5524’s two-year limitation primarily covers injury to person or property and does not provide the analogous limitations period for a discriminatory termination claim.

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College · filed 1981-09-30

The 2-year period of limitations found in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 applies primarily to actions for injury to the person or property. They hardly provide an analogue to a claim for discriminatory termination of a college professor’s employment contract.
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Law changed since The 1991 PHRA amendment supplied its own two-year period from notice that the administrative complaint was closed; Burgh v. Borough Council (May 25, 2001) held § 5524 no longer governs PHRA claims.

Section 5524(7)’s two-year limitation applies to a claim that an employer discharged an employee because of race.

Raleigh v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1988-11-23(7)

Raleigh charged Westinghouse with terminating his employment for the purpose of discriminating against him because of his race. This cause of action charges intentional as well as tortious conduct and is thus within the ambit of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that the two year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524 applies to Raleigh’s action.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 5524(7) applies a two-year limitation to employment discrimination claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act that are analogous to intentional personal injury torts.

Schlegel v. Penn Dairies Inc. · filed 1989-10-06(7)

We find that defendant’s alleged discrimination is analogous to a tort claim for personal injury involving intentional and tortious conduct and that the statutory limitation of two years contained in 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(7), is applicable.
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Section 5524(7)'s two-year personal injury limitations period does not govern PHRA claims after the PHRA's 1991 amendment supplied its own limitations period.

Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough of Montrose Timothy Burgh · filed 2001-05-25(7)

We similarly decline to follow our dictum in Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 90-91 (3d Cir.2000), which cited Raleigh in stating that Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury limitations period applies to PHRA claims.
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Federal civil rights claims

Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which applies to § 1985 civil conspiracy claims.

Mickman v. Philadelphia Professional Collections LLC · filed 2023-10-02

Second, Mickman does not dispute that her civil conspiracy claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 was filed beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that § 1985 claims are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985.

Rollins v. Edrehi · filed 2024-01-19

“The statute of limitations for a §1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524. ... The court will ignore those allegations which occurred outside the two- year statute of limitations period, namely, the issuance of the enforcement notice and Defendant McGlynn’s alleged trespass.
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General two-year period for Section 1983 claims

Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 wrongful-discharge claims against municipal government units.

Kelly v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-10-19(2)

It is also clear that the two-year statute of limitations contained in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5524(2) is applicable to the plaintiff’s claims against the Commission and Philadelphia.
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 and § 1985 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

JOHNSON v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-07-15(2)

The alleged events in this matter occurred in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Johnson’s civil rights claims is two years.
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

FARRELL v. RESTEMAYER · filed 2025-07-22(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Farrell’s Complaint was filed on June 10, 2025, well beyond the two-year period and is thus untimely on its face.
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Section 5524 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which supplies the filing period for Pennsylvania Section 1983 claims.

East Ohio Capital LLC v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment · filed 2025-08-15

Because Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for personal ... injury claims is two years, East Ohio had two years to file suit from the time its cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Bivens.

Omar v. Blackman · filed 2014-10-09

Therefore, in Pennsylvania, actions brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 and Bivens are subject to a two- year limitations period. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights actions originating in Pennsylvania.

Cain v. Dept Pub Welfare Ofc Sec Recon · filed 2011-08-18

For civil rights actions originating in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies.
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Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

Wicks v. Anderson · filed 2015-07-16

For civil rights actions originating in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions originating in Pennsylvania.

Shelley v. Mullen · filed 2011-05-02

For § 1983 actions originating in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies. Id.; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. All of the events complained of in Shelley’s complaint occurred well outside the limitations period.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Shelley v. Patrick · filed 2011-05-05

We do agree, however, that Shelley’s allegation of interference with his legal mail was time-barred. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000) (for § 1983 actions originating in Pennsylvania, Court applies two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524).
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Arneault v. O'Toole · filed 2012-03-28(2)

For § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania, the applicable limitations period is two years.
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Section 5524(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

Reginald Johnson, Sr. v. Mondrosch · filed 2014-10-08(1)

The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in Pennsylvania is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1985) (forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 actions).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Peele v. McLaughlin · filed 2016-02-25(2)

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Section 5524(7) supplies a two-year limitations period for tortious injury claims that applies to Section 1983 civil rights claims.

Anderson v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co. · filed 1990-06-18(7)

Pennsylvania’s residual statute for actions or proceedings “to recover damages for injury to person or property, which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct” is two years, as codified at 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5524(7) (Purdon Supp.1990). For the reasons set forth above, we find that plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that they filed within two years of the accrual of their civil rights claims.
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Section 5524(7) gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period, which also governs an independent declaratory judgment action based on the same fraud claim.

Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. Partnership · filed 1997-09-16(7)

The statute of limitations in Pennsylvania is two years for “[a]ny other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct or any other action sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524(7). ... An independent action clearly would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing fraud actions. Accordingly, the action for declaratory relief here is governed by the applicable statute of limitations on the concurrent legal remedy.
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Section 5524 imposes a two-year limitations period on fraud claims.

Familienstifung v. Askin · filed 2001-03-01

Pennsylvania has a two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims alleging personal injury.

Wooden v. Eisner · filed 2005-08-18

As the District Court explained, a Bivens claim in which the plaintiff is alleging personal injury has a two-year statute of limitations. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 1993); King v. One Unknown Fed. Correctional Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that same state statute of limitations applies to all Bivens and § 1983 claims); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Lewicki v. Commonwealth of PA · filed 2011-06-21

Accordingly, we apply Pennsylvania’s general statute of limitations for personal injury, which is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524(2) gives Pennsylvania personal injury claims a two-year filing period, which also governs § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Homel v. Centennial School District · filed 2011-12-21(2)

In Pennsylvania, a personal injury claim must be filed within two years. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524(2) (2004). Thus, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania.

Haagensen v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2012-08-02

Section 1983 claims are subject to Pennsylvania‘s two year statute of limitations for personal injuries. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Yarnall v. Philadelphia School District · filed 2014-09-30

The applicable period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524; Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir.1993).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Bennett v. Susquehanna County Children & Youth Services · filed 2014-10-22(2)

Pennsylvania, which is where Bennett’s cause of action arose, has a two-year statute of limitations. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

McLaughlin v. Forty Fort Borough · filed 2014-11-26(2)

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” ... As a result, Plaintiffs had until December 31, 2008, at the latest, to bring a timely § 1983 claim.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims based on conduct in Pennsylvania.

Beckett v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2015-01-07(2)

For § 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Parker v. Lehigh County Domestic Relation Court · filed 2015-07-29

Section 1983 claims must be brought within the state limitations period governing personal-injury torts, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), which is two years in Pennsylvania. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524. ... As both events occurred more than two years before Parker filed suit on October 30, 2013, his complaint established that his claims against Betz are time barred.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Trimble v. County of Beaver · filed 2015-09-14(2)

Trimble’s claims, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, are governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 personal injury claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Bressi v. Gembic · filed 2019-02-08(2)

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

PATTERSON v. QUIGLEY · filed 2019-09-06(2)

Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

CLINKSCALE v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY · filed 2019-10-07(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, limitations period applicable to Clinkscale’s § 1983 claim is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

JONES v. KAMINSKI · filed 2019-10-07

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to Jones’s § 1983 claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

EDWARDS v. BARANOSKI · filed 2019-10-24

Mr. Edwards should note that the statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania is two years, so any claims based on his 2012 incarceration, see supra note 2, have long been time-barred.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania, barring claims filed more than two years after the incident.

CHARLES v. HOPE CAFFAE/COFFEE SHOP · filed 2019-11-06(2)

In addition, a claim under § 1983 is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2) (providing two-year limitations period). Accordingly, any claim based on an incident occurring in the early winter months of 2017 would be time barred because Charles did not file this case until September 2019.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

CHARLES v. GREEN STREET COFFEE CO. · filed 2019-11-06(2)

In addition, a claim under § 1983 is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the timeliness of a § 1983 claim is governed by the limitations period applicable to personal injury actions of the state where the cause of action arose); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2) (providing two-year limitations period). Accordingly, any claim based on an incident occurring in the early winter months of 2017 would be time barred because Charles did not file this case until September 2019.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Adeyinka v. Lomax · filed 2020-01-07

We agree with the District Court that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to Adeyinka’s § 1983 claims, that any claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued in 2008, when Adeyinka was detained pursuant to legal process, and that these claims are time-barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 396 (2007).
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

VIRGO v. GARCIAS · filed 2020-02-07(2)

To the extent that seeks to assert constitutional claims, they are clearly time-barred since his § 1983 claims would be governed by the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations for a personal injury actions.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

BROWN v. PRIMECARE HEALTH · filed 2020-02-24(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Brown’s § 1983 claim is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

MERRITT v. POLINSKY · filed 2020-03-19

Furthermore, Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period applies to Merritt’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

PEARSON v. GRANITZ · filed 2020-04-02

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to Pearson’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

BANKS v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-05-04

Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period applies to Banks’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims based on deprivation of property in Pennsylvania, regardless of the limitations period for petitions seeking return of property.

SPEROW v. BERKS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-05-08

Accordingly, Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies regardless of whatever limitation period applies to petitions for return of property.
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims based on conduct in Pennsylvania.

Whitenight v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2017-01-04(2)

For § 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

BANKS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANA · filed 2020-08-03

Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period applies to Banks’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

HART v. O.F. OBERLANDER · filed 2020-08-19

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to Hart’s § 1983 claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

PICKEL v. LANCASTER COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY · filed 2020-09-30(2)

Their cause of action against Landis and Lauzus accrued on November 5, 2015 and expired on November 5, 2017. Because the instant case was not filed by November 2017, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitation.
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Hamiton v. Gugger · filed 2020-10-13(2)

Mr. Hamilton’s claims arise in the Commonwealth subject to its two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury tort claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims brought under § 1983 in Pennsylvania.

MINOR v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY · filed 2020-10-16

... and some of her claims appear to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Fennell v. Wetzel · filed 2020-11-25(2)

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.”
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

SHERMOT v. BUCCI · filed 2020-12-08

Additionally, Pennsylvania’ s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Since Shermot’s claims against Dr. Champlin are based on events that took place in 2016, and since she did not file her lawsuit until 2020, these claims appear to be time barred.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania.

ROBINSON v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-12-22

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
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Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Lanza v. Moclock · filed 2021-01-08

The two-year state statute of limitations for a personal injury claim applies to Lanza’s § 1983 claim. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

SOMAHKAWAHHO v. COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-02-08

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to Somahkawahho’s claim pursuant to § 1983 for constitutional violations stemming from his March 2014 sentencing.
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

JAGER v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION · filed 2021-03-29(2)

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal-injury claims that also governs the timeliness of § 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania.

MUMIN v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-06-22(2)

Second, the claims would be untimely on their face since Mr. -Mumin asserts the events giving rise to them occurred no later than February 25, 2019. This case was not filed until June 9, 2021. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the timeliness of a § 1983 claim in Pennsylvania is governed by the two-year limitations period applicable to personal injury actions (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2))); see also Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that a “complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.”).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Gartor Brown v. Upper Darby Police De · filed 2021-07-14(2)

As the District Court properly concluded, these claims were filed outside of the statute of limitations for civil rights claims, which is two years in this case. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 personal injury claims arising in Pennsylvania.

ERRINGTON v. CITY OF READING · filed 2021-08-31

In Pennsylvania, the relevant limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania.

REED v. HOULON · filed 2020-08-05

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). ... Here, because Reed did not file his Complaint until February 20, 2020, and as the Complaint does not reflect a basis for tolling, his claims based on the dependency proceedings initiated in 2017 are time-barred.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania.

HOWARD v. EINSTEIN HOSPITAL · filed 2020-08-10

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies in § 1983 actions.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 excessive-force claims arising in Pennsylvania.

YOUST v. LANCASTER CITY BUREAU POLICE DEPT. · filed 2020-11-09

However, Youst’s excessive force claims against Smith and Lopez are time-barred. Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983, § 1985, and Bivens claims arising from investigative searches and seizures.

JONES v. GRILL · filed 2021-05-12

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to these types of claims.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

CUSTIS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS · filed 2021-08-26

Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period applies to Custis’s § 1983 claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The limitations period began to run from the time Custis “knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, it appears that Custis is raising claims based on several state court proceedings and events going back to 1991. Certainly, several of those claims are time-barred.
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Section 5524 imposes a two-year limitations period that bars civil rights claims based on events occurring more than two years before suit.

CUSTIS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS · filed 2021-12-01

Assuming Custis is bringing claims based on events that occurred in this case between 1995 and 1998, the two-year statute of limitations bars her claims.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

HAMMOND v. LANCASTER CITY BUREAU OF POLICE · filed 2021-12-16(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Nguyen, 906 F.3d at 273 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions and for § 1983 damages claims arising in Pennsylvania.

MILLER v. GEORGE W. HILL DELAWARE COUNTY CORRECTIONA FACILITY · filed 2022-07-11(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Miller’s § 1983 claim for money damages against Defendants Simpkins and Young is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

ROYAL v. MACY'S CORPORATION · filed 2022-09-06(2)

Moreover, the claim is also time-barred for the reasons described in this Court’s previous May 11, 2022 decision. See Royal, 2022 WL 15000553, at *2-3. “The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Here, Nakahara arrested Royal on July 11, 2019, which is more than two years before Royal filed his October 8, 2021 complaint.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for a § 1983 due process claim brought in Pennsylvania.

WILLIAMS v. KRASNER · filed 2022-09-19

Therefore, Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to Williams’s claim.
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Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which applies to federal civil rights claims under § 1983 brought in Pennsylvania.

Medina v. Reich · filed 2022-10-31

Federal civil rights claims under § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury claims, including § 1983 due process claims filed there.

WILLIAMS v. KRASNER · filed 2022-11-09

Therefore, Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury clearly applies to Plaintiff’s claim.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for Section 1983 personal injury claims in Pennsylvania, and claims based on injuries known when they occurred are untimely if filed after that period.

CARROLL, JR. v. THE GEO GROUP, INC. · filed 2022-12-08(2)

Because Mr. Carroll knew of any claims at the time they accrued because he personally experienced the allegedly unconstitutional conditions in real time, irrespective of his assertion “it did not register with me,” Mr. Carroll’s allegations concerning events predating the two-year statute of limitations are dismissed with prejudice since they are untimely.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania.

Jahmaes Dates v. Winters · filed 2022-12-27

Claims brought under § 1983 are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

DAVISTON JR v. HOFFNER · filed 2023-01-27(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Daviston’s § 1983 claims is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

PRUITT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2023-01-30(2)

The timeliness of a § 1983 claim is governed by the limitation period applicable to personal injury actions of the state where the cause of action arose. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)).
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

PLUMMER v. WELLPATH · filed 2023-03-13(2)

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189–90 (3d Cir.1993).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year Pennsylvania limitations period for § 1983 claims.

CUNNINGHAM v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT · filed 2023-04-14

In Pennsylvania, the length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. Id.; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

DB Enterprises Developers-Builders, Inc. v. BOROUGH OF NORWOOD · filed 2023-05-31

Counts I and III of the Complaint assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania.

GOLDSTEIN v. ZUCKERBERG · filed 2022-07-07(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is also two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Goldstein’s state law claims in either State is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which applies to federal civil rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985.

ROSE v. CHRISTIAN · filed 2022-06-17

Federal civil rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1989). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations has expired on any claims related to the custody proceedings that took place before Judge Rubenstein, including Rose’s alleged inability to appeal.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1985 civil rights claims arising in Pennsylvania.

MICKMAN v. PHILADELPHIA PROFESSIONAL COLLECTIONS, LLC · filed 2022-12-22

A § 1985 federal civil rights claim is subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the injury occurred. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989)). In Pennsylvania, the limitations period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights claims in Pennsylvania.

Noble v. Wetzel · filed 2022-11-04(2)

Next, Noble’s claims against prison counselors Balestieri, Stella, and Erickson were filed outside of the statue of limitations for civil rights claims, which is two years in this case.
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Section 5524(7) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims brought in Pennsylvania.

English v. City of Wilkes Barre · filed 2023-03-08(7)

In Pennsylvania, that period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7).
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Section 5524 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Herrera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole · filed 2022-12-13

Under Pennsylvania law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524.
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Section 5524(7) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 civil rights suits in Pennsylvania.

Harris v. Stash · filed 2023-02-14(7)

The statute of limitations for civil rights suits under § 1983 in Pennsylvania is two years. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

YOUST v. ROTH · filed 2023-06-05

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal injury claims; a claim filed after that period is time barred.

DEFREYTAS v. PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC. · filed 2023-07-12

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Under the statute of limitations, Plaintiff had until November 15, 2022 to initiate suit but did not do so until December 13, 2022, almost one month later.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

MOSLEY v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2023-08-02(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, limitations period applicable to Mosley’s § 1983 claim is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

OGONTZ FIRE COMPANY v. CHELTENHAM TOWNSHIP · filed 2024-03-14(2)

Therefore, there is a two-year statute of limitations for bringing a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania.
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Section 5524 provides the two-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Justin De La Cruz Martinez v. Casey Long · filed 2024-07-02

We agree with the District Court that Martinez’s claims under § 1983 for the “false police reports” are time-barred on the face of the complaint. See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Those claims are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78–79 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that “all section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 (setting a two-year limitations period).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 tort claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Litman v. Guckin · filed 2024-07-18

All the claims here have a two-year statute of limitations. That is true of § 1983 tort claims brought in Pennsylvania.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury actions, which also governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

CALLOWAY IV v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE · filed 2024-08-05(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)); see also Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Calloway’s § 1983 claims is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania.

Weber v. County of Erie · filed 2025-03-13

A two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania. See Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

STOKES v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-05-30

Section 1983 claims, such as those brought by Stokes, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 sets a two-year limitations period for Pennsylvania personal injury claims, including tort claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Wright v. United States · filed 2023-07-14

Wright’s claims seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and alleging tortious action must comply with the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury claims; the claims alleged in Pennsylvania before August 30, 2018, are barred under the two-year statute for personal injury claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds when that defense is apparent on the face of the complaint).
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Section 5524(7) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

SIMMONS v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. · filed 2023-10-25(7)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations governing personal injury claims is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7).
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

ROTAR v. UPPER POTTSGROVE POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2023-11-20(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, limitations period applicable to Rotar’s § 1983 claims is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies the two-year Pennsylvania limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Justin De La Cruz Martinez v. Derry Area School District · filed 2024-06-18

Martinez’s claims brought under § 1983 are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78–79 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that “all section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 (setting a two-year limitations period).
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

NEWTON v. ABINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL · filed 2025-04-02(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, for Newton’s claims to be timely, he would have had to file them no later than August 9, 2022. Because Newton filed this action on February 18, 2025, his § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

LEWIS v. FORST · filed 2025-04-11(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Lewis’s claims is two years.
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Section 5524 imposes a two-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims based on breach of fiduciary duty, fraud claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

KARDOSH v. MCCALLIN · filed 2025-05-05

The legal malpractice claim premised on a breach of fiduciary duty, as well as the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims asserted by Kardosh are subject to a two- year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

HALL v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-03-21

Nonetheless, to the extent Hall intended to reassert the claims in his Amended Complaint, they are still not plausible because if the claims were not covered by the deferred accrual rule of Heck, they accrued at the time the acts occurred over thirty years ago and would be time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two- year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions.
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

MANSARAY v. DALY · filed 2025-06-06(2)

Thus, the two-year limitations period for his § 1983 claims arising out of those events has long since expired.
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Section 5524 supplies Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.

SHAW v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-06-13

Shaw’s § 1983 claims are, as before, time-barred. Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
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Section 5524 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania.

CHASE-KEYES v. SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2025-10-09

Section 1983 claims, such as those brought by Chase-Keyes, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524(2) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

BROWN · filed 2025-11-26(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Brown’s § 1983 claim based on an injury to his leg is two years. As the injury occurred more than two years before he filed his Complaint, that aspect of his claim is untimely.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

CHASE-KEYES · filed 2025-12-17

In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies the two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Robinson · filed 2025-12-23

In Pennsylvania, this limitations 29 , 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting , 398 U.S. 144, 150–52 (1970)). 30 , 901 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 31 , 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009); , 371 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2004). 32 Doc. 1 at 3. 33 , 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). period is two years from the date the cause of action accrued.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

CAMMARANO V. WEAVER · filed 2026-01-05

The timeliness of Cammarano’s § 1983 claims are governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

BROWN · filed 2026-01-15

Section 1983 claims, such as those brought by Brown, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Kerr v. Peifer · filed 2026-01-26

Section 1983 borrows Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. As Kerr concedes, he got notice of all but one of the challenged reimbursements more than two years before filing his complaint in late 2023.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

WEBER · filed 2026-03-02(2)

The length of the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose, which in Pennsylvania is two years.
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

MCCARY v. SIMCOX · filed 2025-07-07(2)

The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Id. at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)); see also Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, the limitations period applicable to McCary’s § 1983 claims is two years.
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Section 5524(2) gives personal injury claims based on another person’s negligence a two-year limitations period.

Beemac, Inc. v. Glass America LLC · filed 2025-11-05(2)

Accordingly, under either Pennsylvania or Alabama law, Johnson’s claims against Beemac are subject to a two-year limitations period that commenced on February 2, 2022, the date on which Johnson was allegedly injured in the subject motor vehicle accident. Thus, Johnson’s claims against Beemac expired nearly a year before Johnson initially filed them on January 23, 2025, unless the limitations period is tolled.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for excessive-force claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania.

VALENTI v. FRANK · filed 2025-07-10

Valenti’s excessive force claims are time-barred. Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
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Section 5524(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Hill v. PA Dept. of Corrections · filed 2025-10-02(2)

In Pennsylvania, a Section 1983 claim must be brought within two years of the date of accrual. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)).
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

CLEMENS · filed 2025-11-24(2)

Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Thus, the limitations period applicable to Clemens’s civil rights claims is two years.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

BEY v. HEDIGER · filed 2025-09-12

A § 1983 action, arising in Pennsylvania, is subject to a two- year statute of limitations period pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524 provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania.

TYCIAK · filed 2025-12-15

Her lawsuit filed on August 27, 2025 appears to be timely under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions.
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Section 5524(2) supplies Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

GALLAWAY · filed 2026-04-02(2)

The length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose, which in Pennsylvania is two years. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, (2007)); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

FRONIUS · filed 2026-05-26

A section 1983 action, arising in Pennsylvania, is subject to a two-year statute of limitations period pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

JAGER v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION · filed 2021-12-29(2)

The statute of limitations for a ... § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years. ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations defense is not apparent on the face of the complaint and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for the claims being barred by the statute of limitations is denied.
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Section 5524’s two-year period does not revive claims that were already barred before it took effect.

Chappelle v. Chase · filed 1980-02-04

Rather, plaintiff points to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, Pennsylvania’s newly enacted limitations provision, which allows two years for actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. ... Plaintiff concedes that (1) the new act specifically provides that “[n]o cause of action fully barred prior to the effective date of this act shall be revived by reason of the enactment of this act,” and (2) accordingly, under state law, his claims — which were fully barred as of April 12 and June 3, 1978 — were not revived by the new two-year provision. ... Thus, since application of the non-revival provision is not inconsistent with federal law, this court is obliged to give the provision effect in determining the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims.
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Section 5524(4)’s two-year period for waste or trespass to real property does not apply to a civil-rights suit whose alleged conduct is not analogous to either tort.

Riccobono v. Whitpain Township · filed 1980-09-30(4)

We do not believe that this suit is most analogous to a state court action for waste or trespass to real property. ... The actions complained of in this case cannot be analogized reasonably to waste or trespass to real property.
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Section 5524(4) allows two years to commence an action for trespass to real property; the Judicial Code’s one-year transitional grace period does not shorten that time.

Wilson v. Central Penn Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-10-29(4)

Section 25(a) created a one year grace period terminating June 27, 1979. It did not preclude the bringing of later actions not barred by the two year statute of limitations contained in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524; it did not sooner bar actions otherwise permitted within the time constraints of the general statute of limitations.
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Law changed since Wilson v. Garcia (Apr. 17, 1985) replaced claim-by-claim analogies with the forum state’s personal-injury period for all § 1983 claims; Pennsylvania’s period remains two years.

Section 5524(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims analogous to false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery.

Buskirk v. Seiple · filed 1983-02-16(1)

The operative facts underlying the federal claim are analogous to the state tort of false arrest and imprisonment and assault and battery. Pennsylvania requires that such claims be brought within two years.
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Section 5524(2)'s two-year period applies to a nonresident's motor vehicle tort suit filed in Pennsylvania and begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of a serious injury as defined by the law of the plaintiff's domicile.

Bell v. Santiago · filed 1986-03-10(2)

In summary, we hold that under a Pennsylvania interpretation of our statute of limitations, the non-resident plaintiff (appellants herein) had two years to file suit in Pennsylvania from the date that plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that he had sustained a “serious injury” as the New York statute defines that phrase.
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Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania.

Sockman v. CITY OF ERIE, PA. · filed 1986-08-26

A two year statute of limitations period would be applied under Pennsylvania law. ... For these reasons, we would apply the two-year limitations period to plaintiffs § 1983 claim. ... Since it is this refusal to grant a hearing which plaintiff claims has violated his right to due process, and since this appears to be the first formal notification that the City was refusing such a hearing, we accept plaintiff’s argument that his complaint was timely filed and we will not dismiss on that basis.
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Section 5524(2) gives an injured plaintiff two years from the injury to bring this claim.

Thomas v. Duquesne Light Co. · filed 1988-06-13(2)

The statute of limitations had run on June 25, 1984, two years after the juvenile had been injured. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).
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Law changed since Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) made the federal four-year period govern § 1981 claims first made possible by the 1991 amendment; earlier § 1981 claims still borrow state law.

Section 5524 supplies a two-year limitations period for a Section 1981 claim arising from employment in Pennsylvania.

Carter v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1988-12-05

The statute of limitations for the plaintiffs Section 1981 claim is given by the substantive law of the place of employment, in this case 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524, which sets a limit of two years.
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Section 5524 supplies Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Drum v. Nasuti · filed 1986-11-25

Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations for personal injuries, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524, is applicable to § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania.

Sowers v. Bradford Area School District · filed 1988-08-29(2)

Since this § 1983 action arose within the Commonwealth, we must apply the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524 provides the two-year personal injury limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, Wesley W. Posvar and Trevor Melia, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Mary-Ann Bishop Coffey · filed 1989-10-26

Here, the appropriate limitations period for section 1983 claim is Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5524 (Purdon Supp.1989).
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Section 5524(7) gives a party two years to bring a negligence claim, and that period binds a subrogee.

School District v. Maryland Casualty Co. · filed 1991-03-13(7)

The statute of limitations for a negligence cause of action is found in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, which provides in pertinent part: ... Appellants had two years therefore from October of 1984 to determine whether Hosack, Specht were negligent in their auditing duties. We find therefore that the statute of limitations expired as of October of 1986.
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Section 5524(2) provides the two-year limitations period applied to § 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Long v. Board of Educ. of City of Philadelphia · filed 1993-01-20(2)

For § 1983 cases arising in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit has used Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). ... Therefore, this court finds that the allegations (1) — (11) must be dismissed with prejudice as these incidents are time-barred.
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Section 5524 provides a two-year limitations period for trespass claims, including criminal legal malpractice claims brought in trespass.

Harner v. McCormick · filed 1993-06-29

Then the applicable period for trespass is two years, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524; assumpsit for oral contract is four years, 42 Pa.C.S. §5525; and assumpsit for written contract is six years, 42 Pa.C.S. *377§5527.
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Section 5524(1) provides a two-year limitations period for false arrest and false imprisonment claims, including claims brought under Section 1983 in Pennsylvania.

Hamidian v. Occulto · filed 1994-05-10(1)

It is well-established that claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 are governed by the limitations period applicable to state personal injury claims, which in Pennsylvania is two years. ... Since Hamidian filed the present suit on April 15, 1993, almost three years after the date of her alleged deprivations, her claims for false arrest and false imprisonment must be dismissed as time-barred.
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Section 5524(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for tortious interference with a potential contract and conversion of personal property.

Bednar v. Marino · filed 1994-08-15(3)

The statute of limitations applicable to a claim for tortious interference with a potential contract is found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3), which provides that “[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property ...” must be commenced within two years. ... Conversion actions are subject to the two year period of limitation set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3), supra.
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Section 5524(7) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Frazier v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1996-06-06(7)

Pennsylvania has a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7). ... In this case, plaintiff knew of his injury on October 20, 1992, and, thus, he had two years from that time to commence this action.
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Section 5524(2) provides the two-year limitations period applied to § 1983 and Title IX claims arising in Pennsylvania.

Seneway v. Canon McMillan School District · filed 1997-06-10(2)

Because the instant case arose within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Court must apply the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
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Section 5524’s two-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania.

Estate of Fortunato Ex Rel. Fortunato v. Handler · filed 1996-08-21

Thus Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, applies.
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Section 5524 imposes a two-year limitations period on misrepresentation claims.

Fasig v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. · filed 1999-03-08

The court finds the misrepresentation claims barred by the two-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. §5524.
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Section 5524(2) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Epps v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1998-12-07(2)

Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for personal injuries is two years, and that statute is applied to § 1983 claims.
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Section 5524 requires an action for assault, battery, or intentional tortious conduct to be commenced within two years.

Sylk v. Rosenberg · filed 2000-04-05

The cause of action has also run in Pennsylvania for that phase of the molestation that occurred while Sylk was still a minor. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5524, 5533 (1984), which provides *838that an action for assault, battery, or intentional tortious conduct must be commenced within two years; the period of minority is not deemed part of the time within which action must be commenced, but the action must be commenced within two years of attaining majority. Hence, when Sylk attained her majority she had two years within which to commence an action in Pennsylvania. She did not, and is barred from retroactively asserting such a claim otherwise barred by the statute in effect at the time of the injury.
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Law changed since Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) made the federal four-year period govern § 1981 claims first made possible by the 1991 amendment; the Pennsylvania two-year period still governs § 1983 and pre-1991 § 1981 claims.

Section 5524 supplies Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury limitations period for federal §§ 1981 and 1983 actions.

Williams v. Pennsylvania State Police-Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement · filed 2000-08-14

In actions under both §§ 1981 and 1983, federal courts apply the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury, which, in Pennsylvania, is two years. ... As this action was filed on April 27, 1999, any cause of action based on an injury of which plaintiff knew or should have known prior to April 27, 1997 is time-barred.
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Section 5524(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Deily v. Waste Management of Allentown · filed 2000-10-23(2)

The limitations period for personal injuries in Pennsylvania is two years.
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Notes 1–150 of 1,102, oldest cases first.

238 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Maria Cardwell Tomlin, and Christine Williams Harrell v. The Boeing Company, the court decides which state’s limitation period Washington would apply; it mentions § 5524(2) only as background to Pennsylvania’s policy and does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the reference to § 5524 appears only in Judge Garth’s dissent, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., the § 5524(7) ruling is attributed to the District Court, while this Court decides the limitations period for federal RICO claims without construing § 5524. opinion →
Santos v. Sacks, the court mentions § 5524(2) as background in a footnote, but its limitations discussion turns on the borrowing statute and Louisiana’s period rather than deciding a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Boley v. Kaymark, the court mentioned § 5524(2) as the background limitations period but decided how the federal service rule, Rule 4(m), treats an expired limitations period. opinion →
Deisenroth v. Numonics Corp., the court applied Massachusetts limitations and mentioned § 5524 only in a footnote as a hypothetical alternative; it did not decide the section’s operation. opinion →
Burkhart v. Widener University, Inc., the court borrows the two-year Pennsylvania limitations period to decide the deadline for ADA claims; it does not decide § 5524(2)’s own coverage or operation. opinion →
Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Corp., Ltd. v. 898 Belmont, Inc., D/B/A El Toro Bar Berhanu Degife, the court decides under federal law which limitations period to borrow for FCA claims; § 5524(7) only supplies the two-year period, and the court does not decide that section’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
In Re Cases Filed by DIRECTV, Inc., the court cites § 5524(7) only as a comparison while choosing a limitations period for federal § 605 claims; it does not decide § 5524’s own rules. opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, § 5524(7) appears only in a footnote listing possible analogous state limitations statutes, and the Court expressly leaves the choice of state statute for remand. opinion →
Norton v. Sperling Law Office, P.C., the court decided malpractice causation and expressly left unresolved whether the Pennsylvania limitations period had lapsed; it did not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Introcaso v. Curry, the opinion reports the District Court’s application of § 5524, while this court identifies no challenge to that ruling and does not itself decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Digital Encoding Factory, LLC v. Iron Mountain Information Management, Inc., the only reference to § 5524(7) reports a citation in a party’s memorandum, without adopting a rule or deciding the section. opinion →
Ilori v. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, the court mentions § 5524 only as background to § 1981 limitations law; the parties agreed that the federal four-year period governed these claims. opinion →
Klatch-Maynard v. ENT Surgical Associates Hazleton Health & Wellness Center, the court cites § 5524(2) as the state limitations period borrowed for an ADA claim, without deciding any rule of § 5524 itself. opinion →
Mincy v. Chmielsewski, the court expressly bypassed the statute-of-limitations defense and decided the retaliation claims on their merits, so it did not decide Section 5524’s rules. opinion →
Travelers Indemnity Co. Ex Rel. De Luca v. Stengel, the court cites § 5524(c)(7) as an analogy while deciding the UCATA’s joint-tortfeasor definition, without deciding any rule of § 5524. opinion →
McHale v. Kelly, the court decided which state’s limitations law applied under New Jersey’s choice-of-law test; the claims’ untimeliness under § 5524 was undisputed, and the court did not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Washington v. Philadelphia Police Department, the opinion reports the District Court’s § 5524 time-bar ruling, but the appellate court’s own sentence only adopts the dismissal generally and states no rule about this section. opinion →
United States Ex Rel. Sefen v. Animas Corp., the court cites § 5524(7) as one possible borrowed limitations period, but decides the FCA claim is late under either possible period and resolves the retroactivity of the federal amendment; it does not decide § 5524’s own rules. opinion →
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, the court cites § 5524(2) for the undisputed two-year period but decides accrual under federal § 1983 law, not a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Arora v. Buckhead Family Dentistry, Inc., the court cites § 5524(7) only as an example of a possible limitations bar when deciding whether to extend time for service; it does not decide whether the section governs the claims or apply its rules. opinion →
McNulty v. Casero, the court mentions the two-year nuisance period in a footnote but decides whether the prior opinion established nuisance liability, not a rule or application of § 5524. opinion →
Waleski v. Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, the only discussion of § 5524(7) reports the parties’ agreement about the limitations periods; the opinion does not contain this court’s own decision on the section. opinion →
D. S.-W. v. United States, the court mentions § 5524(2) as background but decides equitable tolling of the FTCA limitations period, not a rule of § 5524. opinion →
LEVIEN v. HIBU PLC, No. The § 5524(7) limitations issue is a defendant’s argument that the court expressly declines to reach. opinion →
HARRIS v. LAMAS, the court expressly declines to decide whether the two-year limitations period has expired and cites § 5524 only while assessing the effect of dismissal for failure to prosecute. opinion →
SIMMONS v. BRANCA, the court mentions the two-year period as background but dismisses the § 1983 claim under Heck because it has not accrued; it does not decide any application of § 5524(2). opinion →
DATES v. CITY OF EASTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, the court mentions the two-year period in a cautionary footnote but does not decide a limitations issue under § 5524; it says the accrual dates are unclear. opinion →
SZILAGYI v. MCCLURE, the court mentions the two-year period as guidance in a footnote but expressly makes no determination whether the false-arrest claim is time barred under § 5524. opinion →
CORRITORE v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., the court uses § 5524(2) as the borrowed two-year limitations period, but decides relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and equitable tolling under federal law rather than a rule of § 5524 itself. opinion →
CORTEZ v. BERKS COUNTY JAIL SYSTEM, the court assumes the alleged event falls within the two-year period for screening and does not decide a timeliness issue under § 5524(2). opinion →
BESS v. ALBERT EINSTEIN HOSPITAL, the court cited § 5524(2) for the general limitations period but expressly declined to decide whether the complaint was timely. opinion →
VARTELOV v. ACURA, the court cited § 5524(7) in passing while dismissing the state claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction, without deciding or applying its limitations rule. opinion →
H and H Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Paul Bucco, Esquire, the court decided New Jersey choice-of-law procedure and vacated the limitations dismissal, leaving application of Pennsylvania limitations law to a Pennsylvania court; it did not decide § 5524's own rules. opinion →
Troy Moore, Sr. v. Walton, No. The court treats the two-year limitations period as undisputed background and decides relation back under Federal Rules 15(c) and 4(m), rather than a rule of § 5524. opinion →
H and H Manufacturing Company Inc. v. Tomei, the application of § 5524 was the trial court’s ruling; this court vacated the order and expressly declined to decide the limitations merits. opinion →
HARRIS v. BASCO, the court notes the two-year period for fraud but expressly reserves any limitations ruling on that claim. opinion →
JOHNSON v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION, the § 5524 reference reports Defendants’ limitations argument in the background; this opinion decides counsel withdrawal and sanctions, not the limitations issue. opinion →
Erie Indemnity Co v. Stephenson, the opinion reports the district court’s limitations ruling in Beltz; this court describes its own Beltz affirmance as resting on forfeiture. opinion →
ALLEN-MURPHY, the court dismissed the state claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and expressly reserved its merits; the footnote only suggests that some injury claims may be time-barred if refiled. opinion →
Shi v. Forbes Health Foundation, the court cites § 5524 only to establish that dismissal without prejudice is final and appealable; it does not decide a disputed rule of § 5524. opinion →
HAND, No. The court only observes in a footnote that a claim based on events outside the pleaded due process challenge would appear time-barred; it does not decide a § 5524 issue. opinion →
Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, the court mentions § 5524(1) as part of the new limitations scheme but expressly says that scheme does not govern this action. opinion →
Cataldo v. Rick, the court’s application of the two-year limit to Travelers’ claim is conditional on a subrogation right the court found did not exist. opinion →
Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court allowed the declaratory judgment action to proceed but expressly left the §5524 accrual question undecided. opinion →
Fretts v. Pavetti, the court decided an amendment issue under the former limitations statute; it mentioned § 5524 only as the later statute imposing a two year period. opinion →
Bittner v. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., the court deemed the § 5524 objection abandoned and did not decide the section’s limitation rule. opinion →
Taylor v. Tukanowicz, the court decided the limitations issue under 12 P.S. § 34 and mentioned § 5524(2) only to identify its successor. opinion →
Coyne v. Porter-Hayden Co., the court mentions § 5524(2) only in a footnote describing the law after these actions were filed; it decides their timeliness under the earlier statutes. opinion →
Henry v. Control Products Co., the court decides whether the predecessor statute, 12 P.S. § 34, was tolled; it does not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court decided which limitations rule governed the claim under former 12 P.S. § 34. It cited § 5524(2) only as that statute’s current version. opinion →
Wallace v. Horvath, the court applied the former limitation statute, 12 P.S. § 34. It did not decide a rule under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; the reference to § 5524(2) identifies the current version. opinion →
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, the court suggested § 5524 as a possible limitations period but expressly declined to decide whether it applied. opinion →
Amoco Oil v. Penn State Aluminum Co., the court leaves open whether § 5524(3) or the UCC supplies the period; the affirmative counterclaim is barred under either, and recoupment survives regardless of the period. opinion →
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, the court described § 5524 as a possible limitations period but expressly declined to decide whether it applies. opinion →
Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., the court applied the former limitation statutes; it mentioned § 5524(2) only as successor law and did not decide its rules. opinion →
Rabecs v. Northeastern Bank, the court expressly says it is unnecessary to rule on whether § 5524(1) governs the intentional-distress claim. opinion →
Del Quadro v. City of Philadelphia, the court decided whether judgment on the pleadings was proper. It cited § 5524(2) only as the successor to the limitations law applicable to the claim. opinion →
Curry v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court assumes the asserted limitations date and decides relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), without deciding a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Bond v. Gallen, the indexed opinion contains no citation to § 5524; it decides when a No-fault Act claim accrues. opinion →
Sachritz v. PA. NAT. MUT. CAS. INS. CO., the court decides the No-fault Insurance Act’s limitation periods; it mentions § 5524 as later statutory context. opinion →
Sachritz v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance, the court mentions Section 5524 as historical context while deciding the limitation period under the No-fault Insurance Act; it does not decide Section 5524’s own rules. opinion →
Tonkin v. Palmer, the court decides that §5525(4) governs the claim; §5524 appears as the defendant’s argument, without a decision about that section’s own rules. opinion →
Davis v. Travelers Insurance, the § 5524(2) citation states the plaintiff’s position, which the court did not adopt; the court applied the No-Fault Act’s limitations period. opinion →
Watts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the court reports a ruling from its earlier opinions; this opinion decides only whether it has jurisdiction to allow amendment while the appeals are pending. opinion →
Smith v. Private Industry Council of Westmoreland & Fayette Counties, Inc., the court found the complaint timely under either possible limitations period but did not decide whether § 5524(2) governs the claim. opinion →
Zerr v. Scott, the court did not decide whether §5524 applies; it found the claim untimely even under a six-year limitation. opinion →
Maycock v. Gravely Corp., the court decides whether § 5533(b) revives barred claims; it cites § 5524 only as an applicable limitation statute and does not decide any rule of § 5524. opinion →
Heinsdorf v. Johns-Manville Corp., the limitations ruling was the trial court’s; this court decided that the challenge to it was waived on appeal. opinion →
Trice v. Mozenter, the court held the claim untimely under either a two-year or four-year period without deciding which statute governs. opinion →
Patton v. MacK Trucks, Inc., the court decides the limitations rule for warranty claims under 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725; it does not decide a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Lewis v. City of Philadelphia, the court decides whether § 5533(b) revives an expired claim; it does not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, the section-specific proposition is the defendants’ argument, which the court does not adopt. The court’s own ruling addresses the discovery rule generally. opinion →
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Sykes, the court decides accrual under federal law; § 5524 appears only in a footnote identifying the applicable two-year period. opinion →
Simmons v. Cohen, the cited ruling about §5524(6) was made in the earlier Simmons decision; this opinion recounts it while deciding the validity of DPW’s cutoff date. opinion →
Jones v. Philpott, the opinion only reports an earlier order citing § 5524(2); it does not decide the section in this opinion. opinion →
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, the court said the state claims were probably time-barred, a tentative observation rather than a ruling under § 5524. opinion →
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, § 5524(7) appears in appellants’ argument; the court held that the limitations issue was not preserved, without deciding the section’s application. opinion →
In Re Milbourne, the § 5524 ruling was a preliminary order that expressly deferred final resolution; the limitations defense was later abandoned. opinion →
Melbourne v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. (In re Melbourne), the court resolves timeliness by applying § 5527(6); its earlier discussion of § 5524(5) expressly deferred final resolution. opinion →
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Swisher, the court recounts the issue in Boyle; it does not decide a question under § 5524. opinion →
Williams v. Office of the Public Defender, the court called § 5524(2) only the apparent period and dismissed for failed service and an independent immunity ground. opinion →
Oviatt v. Automated Entrance System Co., the court decides the effect of the expired tort claim on contribution rights under the UCATA, rather than a rule of § 5524(2) itself. opinion →
Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, the citation to § 5524 appears in the plaintiffs’ argument, not in this court’s own decision about that section. opinion →
Maryland National Bank v. Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. (In Re Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc.), the court declined to decide which limitation period applies, so it did not decide any rule of § 5524. opinion →
Boettger v. Miklich, the court mentions § 5524(5) only to describe the current limitations period; it decides that the six-year period under § 5527 applies to this action. opinion →
Gates v. Servicemaster Commercial Service, the reference to § 5524 appears in the plaintiff’s quoted argument, not in the court’s own decision about that section. opinion →
Schwartz v. Kursman (In Re Harry Levin, Inc.), the two-year § 5524 period appears in defendants’ argument; the court denied dismissal because Pennsylvania adverse-domination tolling might apply, without deciding which subsection governs. opinion →
Pollard v. Lord Corp., the court cites § 5524(2) but decides whether workers’ compensation law bars the action; it does not decide any rule of § 5524. opinion →
Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., the court affirmed by an equally divided vote without adopting either separate opinion’s reasoning about § 5524. opinion →
United National Insurance v. J.H. France Refractories Co., the court construed § 5501(c)’s rule for equitable actions. It reported the lower courts’ application of § 5524(7) and did not decide that subsection’s own rules. opinion →
Rosci v. AcroMed, Inc., the opinion reports the trial court’s limitations ruling; this court decides the remaining warranty claims. opinion →
Joshua Hill, Inc. v. Whitemarsh Township Authority (In Re Joshua Hill, Inc.), the opinion recommends summary judgment; the opinion does not show the district court adopting that recommendation. opinion →
Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, Inc., the court leaves the limitations issue for the district court to decide on remand; the statement about § 5524(7) comes from a cited case. opinion →
Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, this court leaves the limitations issue for the district court to decide; the statement about § 5524(7) is quoted from another court. opinion →
United National Insurance v. J.H. France Refractories Co., the discussion of §5524 reports the Supreme Court’s decision and reproduces an earlier ruling; this court does not decide the section’s application in this opinion. opinion →
Lord Corp. v. Pollard, the court addresses whether workers’ compensation exclusivity bars the action; it does not decide any rule of § 5524. opinion →
Tohan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the court quashed the appeal as untimely; its discussion of § 5524(2) was expressly conditional. opinion →
Despot v. Allstate Insurance, the court decided the timeliness of the bankruptcy appeal, not a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the court decides when insurance coverage is triggered; it does not decide a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Mantia v. Northern Insurance, the court found the alleged continuing bad faith timely even under a two-year period and expressly left open whether § 5524(7) applies to section 8371 claims. opinion →
In re Anonymous No. 6 D.B. 94, this is the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation, and the citation recounts the petitioner’s argument in a separate lawsuit; it is not a court decision construing § 5524. opinion →
Smith v. Allstate Insurance, the court expressly declined to decide whether §5524(7) governs the bad faith claim. opinion →
Adamski v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. The § 5524 citation reports another court’s ruling; this court expressly leaves the applicable limitations period unresolved. opinion →
Foodarama Supermarkets Inc. v. American Insurance, the statement about §5524 appears in defendants’ quoted argument, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
Murphy v. Diogenes A. Saavedra, M.D., P.C., the evenly divided court affirmed the judgment but adopted no interpretation of § 5524; the limitations analysis appears only in an Opinion in Support of Affirmance. opinion →
Gallant v. Trustees of Columbia University in New York, the court mentions § 5524 as a possible reason to transfer the case, but expressly leaves applicable law unresolved and does not decide the statute’s application. opinion →
Fancsali v. University Health Center, the court decides when minority tolling under § 5533(b) ends; it does not decide a rule of § 5524(2), which appears only as a footnote citation identifying the two-year period. opinion →
Brickman Group Ltd. v. CGU Insurance, the court expressly declined to decide the limitations issue and denied amendment on other grounds. opinion →
Buchleitner v. Perer, the court acknowledges an undisputed limitations period but decides the favorable-termination issue under § 8351, not a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Teamann v. Zafris, the supplied opinion only quotes § 5524(2) in a footnote; it does not decide a question about that section. opinion →
Diament v. Diament, the court decided whether the settlement was marital property; it did not decide the limitation period under § 5524. opinion →
Lundy v. Hochberg, the court only notes that possible malpractice claims have probably expired; it does not decide a limitations issue. opinion →
Gustine Uniontown Associates, Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., the opinion reports the lower courts’ rulings concerning the two-year period; this Court’s own decision addresses the limitations period for written construction contracts. opinion →
In Re American Paper Mills of Vermont, Inc., the court quoted another court’s discussion of § 5524(7), but decided timeliness under Vermont’s statute of limitations, not this Pennsylvania section. opinion →
Estate of Hollywood v. First National Bank of Palmerton, the court decides the UCC limitations rules. It mentions § 5524 only when discussing another court’s decision. opinion →
In Re: Mushroom, the reference to § 5524(2) is a bare citation in a list; the opinion gives no sentence stating the court’s decision about that section. opinion →
David Smith and Kimberly Smith v. Woosley, the cited two-year limitations ruling was the Pennsylvania District Court’s decision, reported here as background; this court decided the effect of that judgment under the relitigation exception. opinion →
Colonial Assurance v. Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co., the court decides the effect of the insurance-liquidation limitations statute; it does not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia, the court decides the good faith service rule under Lamp and the Rules of Civil Procedure. It cites § 5524(2) only to identify the applicable two-year limitation. opinion →
McNeil v. Jordan, the court decides the rules for pre-complaint discovery and does not decide any rule under § 5524; it cites the section only to identify the two-year limitation. opinion →
Lesoon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the limitations ruling is the trial court’s; the appellate court does not adopt it or decide Section 5524’s rules. opinion →
Toy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the opinion only reports the trial court's ruling under § 5524(7); this court does not decide the section's application. opinion →
Wilson v. El-Daief, the opinion reports the parties’ positions and lower courts’ rulings but does not contain this court’s decision on § 5524. opinion →
Lafayette Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, the court says only that the claims appear time-barred; it does not decide the limitations issue. opinion →
Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Services, Inc., the statement about § 5524 is Appellees’ argument, which the court did not adopt as a ruling on that section. opinion →
Atlantic Pier Assocs., LLC v. Boardakan Rest. Partners, the court expressly declined to decide the statute-of-limitations issue and decided no rule under § 5524. opinion →
Eline v. Estate of Kurtz, the court recites the limitations periods but does not decide a limitations issue; it dismisses the malpractice claim because the certificate of merit is deficient. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., the court treats the undisputed expiration as a factor in deciding whether to extend time for service under Rule 4(m); it does not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Burgos v. Stephen McEwen, Jr., the limitations ruling was the District Court’s; this court affirmed on Rooker-Feldman grounds without deciding § 5524. opinion →
Rabatin v. Allied Glove Corp., the reference to § 5524(8) appears in Rabatin’s argument, which the court held was not preserved for appeal; the court did not adopt or decide it. opinion →
Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., the cited ruling under § 5524(2) was the Superior Court’s decision in Cathcart, which this court recounts as background. opinion →
In Re Canoe Manufacturing Co., the court describes a possible limitations defense to a hypothetical lawsuit; it does not decide a claim under § 5524(7). opinion →
West Penn Allegheny Health System v. Medical Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund, the court cites Section 5524(2) for the general tort filing period, but decides whether the claim qualifies under Section 715 of the MCARE Act; it does not decide a rule of Section 5524. opinion →
Barr v. Public Storage, the citation appears in the court’s account of the defendant’s argument, not in the court’s own decision about § 5524. opinion →
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., the opinion gives only a bare citation to § 5524(7), with no sentence stating a decision about the section. opinion →
Weston v. Northampton Personal Care, Inc., the court presents the limitations point as a tentative observation, not a decision. opinion →
Barren v. Commonwealth, the court only noted that the limitation period may apply; it did not decide that § 5524(3) governed the action. opinion →
Lake v. Hankin Group, this is the trial court’s tentative statement, reported by the appellate court; the appellate court did not decide whether § 5524(7) applies. opinion →
Hunter v. City of Philadelphia, the limitations argument was the City’s; the court did not adopt it or decide a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Commonwealth v. Neiman, the court decides the constitutionality of Act 152, not the rules of § 5524. The opinion cites § 5524.1, a different section. opinion →
Sharp v. Travelers Personal Security Insurance, the § 5524 ruling is attributed to Ash; this court does not decide a limitations issue under that section. opinion →
Kaliner v. Antonoplos (In re DMW Marine, LLC), the court’s application of § 5524(7) is expressly conditional on Pennsylvania law applying and says the provision only ‘seemingly’ covers the claims. opinion →
County of Beaver ex rel. Beaver County Board of Commissioners v. Sainovich, the court applied the nullum tempus doctrine to the County’s claim without deciding a rule specific to Section 5524(6). opinion →
Skinner v. Skinner (In re Skinner), the court observes that the parties did not address § 5524 but makes no decision about its application. opinion →
Markovsky, J. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the court describes Section 5524 as part of Act 101’s legislative history but does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Commonwealth v. Allen, the court decided waiver under Rule 588 and did not decide Section 5524’s own rules. opinion →
Trexler, A. v. McDonald's Corp., the court decided whether service was proper and whether preliminary objections were timely; it did not decide a rule of § 5524(2). opinion →
J.O. Lozado v. WCAB (Dependable Concrete Work and UEGF), the court cites Section 5524 to explain the timing of the claimant’s civil action, but decides whether that action bars his workers’ compensation claim under Section 305(d). opinion →
Reyes, I. v. Hawk, P., the court expressly made its assessment of the limitations issue conditional; its decision resolved the response deadline and oral argument issues. opinion →
Rick v. Profit Management Associates, Inc., the court chose Massachusetts law and dismissed the fraud claim under its limitations period. Its reference to Pennsylvania’s two-year period was not a decision under § 5524. opinion →
S.J., a Minor by J., B. & C. v. Gardner, C., the court expressly says its Section 5524 observation is not at issue; its decision rests on the Minority Tolling Statute. opinion →
Stein, B. v. Toyota, the court described the limitations issue as arguable and affirmed summary judgment on other grounds; it did not decide the issue. opinion →
Romero v. Allstate Insurance, the court deferred the limitations issue; it did not decide how § 5524(7) applies. opinion →
Nicolaou, h/w, Pets v. Martin, J., M.D., the court granted review; the references to § 5524(2) appear only in Petitioners’ stated issues, not in a decision by this court on the statute. opinion →
J.D. Schneller v. Prothonotary of Montgomery County, individually, and in his official capacity, and his employees, in their individual and official capacities, the discussion of Section 5524 reports the holding in Morgalo. This court decides the mandamus claim under Section 5522(b)(1). opinion →
J.D. Schneller v. Prothonotary of Montgomery County, individually, and in his official capacity, and his employees, in their individual and official capacities, the opinion reports an earlier decision about § 5524; its own ruling applies § 5522(b)(1) to this mandamus claim. opinion →
Chin, E. v. Chin, S., the court only suggests a possible time bar under § 5524; it decides the counterclaims on res judicata grounds. opinion →
Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts., this discussion appears in a dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts., the discussion of § 5524(2) appears in Justice Baer’s concurring and dissenting opinion, not the Court’s holding. opinion →
Dubose, R. v. Quinlan, M. Appeal of: Willowcrest, the discussion of Section 5524(2) appears only in a dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Dubose, R. v. Quinlan, M. Appeal of: Willowcrest, this is a concurring and dissenting opinion, so its discussion of § 5524(2) is not the court’s holding. opinion →
In re Speights, the statement appears in a Hearing Committee report attached to a Board recommendation, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
In re Speights, this is a Board recommendation incorporating a Hearing Committee report, not a court decision. opinion →
In re Speights, the citation appears in an attached Hearing Committee report incorporated into the Board’s recommendation, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
In re Speights, the references to § 5524 appear in a hearing committee report incorporated into the Board’s recommendation, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
Woodland v. v. Weigh Scales Mini Storage, Inc., the § 5524 limitations issue appears as a party’s objection and the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the issues were waived and did not decide the limitations issue. opinion →
J. Robins v. M. Ward and General Manager of Delaware County Dept of Public Welfare, the court acknowledged the two-year fraud period but expressly found the statute of limitations immaterial; it decided the case on immunity and notice grounds. opinion →
Hobbie, L. v. CCO Mortgage And Citizens Bank, the § 5524(7) ruling is reported as the trial court's reasoning. The appellate court affirmed on summary judgment procedure without deciding the limitations issue. opinion →
Buchan, J. v. The Milton Hershey School, the court treated Section 5524’s two-year period as undisputed background and decided whether other statutes tolled it. opinion →
McDonald v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the statement about § 5524(3) appears only in a quotation from another court, not in this court's own decision. opinion →
Dunbar v. J.E. Wetzel, Secretary, PA DOC, the court decided a pleading issue under Rule 1030 and expressly declined to address the Section 5524(2) limitations defense. opinion →
Best Courier v. Dept. of L&I, Office of UC Tax Services, the court cites § 5524(1) as an example while deciding the effect of a deadline in Section 304(b); it does not decide a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Com. v. Coon, E., the court decides that the separate forfeiture ruling does not resolve the motion for return of property; it does not decide a rule of § 5524(5). opinion →
Austin James Assoc. v. Musser, the court discusses the deadline only for a hypothetical fraud or misrepresentation claim that was not pleaded; it does not decide such a claim. opinion →
San Diego County Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, the court reports another court’s ruling about § 5524(7); its own decision applies California’s discovery rule. opinion →
Chandler, J. v. Bracey, C., the court mentions the two-year period only as procedural background and does not decide any rule under § 5524. opinion →
Reviello v. Banker Life and Casualty Company, the court’s discussion of the two-year limitation is conditional on a theory it did not decide; it resolved the claim for lack of evidence of a prospective contractual relationship. opinion →
EVERETT v. WOODLAND HILLS, the court made no ruling under § 5524; it treated a possible time bar as one factor in deciding whether to extend time for service. opinion →
M.B. Selig v. North Whitehall ZHB, the court mentions § 5524(7) to explain why Selig’s reference is irrelevant to governmental immunity; it does not decide a limitations issue under that section. opinion →
TAYLOR F. v. LAWRENCE COUNTY, the court mentions § 5524(1) as a possible consideration when declining supplemental jurisdiction, but decides the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), not a rule under § 5524(1). opinion →
Mickman, E. v. White & Williams, the court decided the appeal on waiver; its discussion of § 5524(7) was conditional on considering the merits. opinion →
FREMCO Assoc., LLC - Dept. of Revenue of PA UC Audit Div., the court cites § 5524(1) only as an example while deciding the effect of the deadline in a different statute. opinion →
Schmidt, H. v. Rosin, R., the court mentions § 5524 only while recounting the attorneys’ defense in Steiner; it makes no decision of its own about the section. opinion →
RAVOTTI v. ONEJET, INC., the court mentions the two-year period but decides whether bankruptcy stay relief validated the complaint, not a rule of § 5524. opinion →
K.N.B. v. M.D., Aplt., this is a concurring opinion expressing one justice’s reasoning, not the court’s own decision. opinion →
CRUZ v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY COURTHOUSE, this is a magistrate judge’s unadopted report and recommendation, and its limitations assessment is tentative. opinion →
J.E. Rupert v. Campus Crafts, Inc. and Bradco Supply Co., Inc. v. V. Comly, the opinion reports a party’s limitations argument but contains no decision by this court applying Section 5524. opinion →
Dandridge, D. v. Northeast Medical Center, the court decided whether the complaint could be amended after the limitations period expired. It did not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Lackawanna County v. Correctional Care, Inc. & E.J. Zaloga, D.O., C.P.A., the court used the two-year limitation as background for choosing an insurance term, without deciding a rule of § 5524. opinion →
BERNARD v. BNY MELLON, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, the court left § 5524’s applicability unresolved and discussed its effect only conditionally. opinion →
Wooley v. Wellpath, the court only tentatively observed that the limitations period likely had not expired; it did not decide the issue. opinion →
Neeb, S. v. Robin, T., the court quashed the appeal as interlocutory and did not decide the statute of limitations issue under § 5524. opinion →
KEM Resources, LP v. Ryvamat, Inc., the § 5524(7) citation appears in Ryvamat’s argument, which the court rejects; the court applies § 5527(b) to the accounting claim. opinion →
Mertis, B. v. Dong-Joon, M.D., the court mentions the limitations period in a background observation about a nonparty; it does not decide a limitations issue. opinion →
Nottingham v. Cooley, the opinion recounts the court’s earlier limitations ruling, but decides the current requests for reconsideration and sanctions without deciding a rule under § 5524. opinion →
M.R. Holbrook & D.L. Holbrook, his wife v. PA DOT, the court decided whether service was proper; it expressly said it was not deciding the statute-of-limitations issue. opinion →
Santiago, J. v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, the court mentions the two-year limit as background to its arbitration analysis but does not decide a rule under § 5524. opinion →
Castillos v. Carmelo Arias, the court mentioned a possible time bar while deciding whether to dismiss for untimely service under Rule 4(m); it did not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Harrigan, K. v. Forsythe, K., the court reports a party’s limitations argument; the opinion contains no decision by this court about § 5524. opinion →
D. Crook & S. Crook, h/w v. E. Fallowfield Twp., the court states the applicable two-year period but decides whether the Crooks diligently attempted service, not a rule of § 5524. opinion →
Outerlimits Tech v. Cozen O'Connor, the court's tentative observation that the tort claim appears untimely is not a decision under § 5524. opinion →
Washington, T., Aplt. v. PA Dept. of Corrections, the opinion reports another court’s ruling about Section 5524(6); it does not make its own decision about the section. opinion →
Bedolla-Comacho v. M. Garman, Facility Mgr. of S.C.I. Rockview, the section appears in a footnote addressing a possible mandamus claim conditionally; the court dismissed the pleaded §1983 action on other limitations grounds. opinion →
W. Mayo v. J. Doe, section 5524 appears in a party’s argument, and the court expressly declines to decide the limitations issue. opinion →
Johnson v. J. Wetzel, Sec'y. PA. D.O.C., the opinion recounts an earlier limitations ruling but decides only whether the DOC provided sufficient post-deduction due process. opinion →
Cooper, S. v. Brenntag Northeast Inc., the court cites § 5524(7) to identify the applicable period, but its decision applies collateral estoppel to a prior limitations ruling rather than deciding this section’s rules or applying them anew. opinion →
Com. of PA v. J.A. Baker, the opinion reports the trial court’s conclusion about § 5524(7); this court does not decide that section’s application. opinion →
Ferraro, B. v. Patterson-Erie, Aplt., the court decides whether the plaintiff diligently attempted service; Section 5524 supplies the background two-year period, whose rules are not in dispute. opinion →
Ferraro, B. v. Patterson-Erie, Aplt., the court states Section 5524’s deadline as background; it decides whether the plaintiff made a good faith effort to serve process. opinion →
McNeal, T. v. M & J Auto Repair, the court cites § 5524(2) for the undisputed two-year period, but decides whether the amendment is timely under Pa.R.C.P. 1033. opinion →
McNeal, T. v. M & J Auto Repair, the court uses § 5524(2)’s two-year period as an input to its decision about amending a judgment under Rule 1033; it does not decide a disputed rule of § 5524(2). opinion →
Com. v. Rizor, J., the court offered a tentative assessment of a possible malpractice claim while deciding a hearsay issue; it did not decide a limitations claim under § 5524. opinion →
O'Brien, J. v. Beatty, K., the court expressly declined to decide the statute of limitations issue. opinion →
HARPER v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation on the limitations issue, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
Green, J. v. Farole, A., the court decides whether service was diligent under the procedural rules, while assuming the limitations date and expressly leaving the discovery-rule issue undecided. opinion →
Marchesano v. M.C. Garman, the court discussed the limitations period only in a footnote about a hypothetical amendment; it affirmed dismissal on other grounds. opinion →
T. Lee v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., the discussion of Section 5524(1) reports the federal district court’s ruling. This court decided whether dismissal under Rule 233.1 was proper. opinion →
Richard v. The PA. DOC, the reference to Section 5524 states the DOC’s argument, not the court’s own decision about that section. opinion →
Garcia v. The City of Hazleton, the citation and two-year rule appear in the defendants’ argument. The court resolved timeliness under Rule 15(c) without deciding a rule of § 5524. opinion →
B.J. Leatham v. Mose, this describes Mose’s preliminary objection. The court affirmed dismissal on res judicata grounds and did not decide a Section 5524 issue. opinion →
OCKLEY v. RADNOR TOWNSHIP, the court mentions § 5524(2) only when discussing an unpleaded negligence claim; it does not decide a limitations issue before it. opinion →
Davidson v. United States, the court mentions § 5524 as a possible consequence of dismissal while deciding whether to extend time for service under Rule 4(m); it does not decide a rule of § 5524. opinion →
R. Wheeler v. PA DOC, the limitations ruling was the Trial Court’s decision. This court decided only whether to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc. opinion →
Allegheny Health Network v. Brader, E., the court decides the deadline under the MCARE Act and Whistleblower Law. Section 5524(7) appears in a party’s argument and the trial court’s reasoning, but the court does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Poteat, A. v. Asteak, G., the court mentions § 5524 as background to the trial court’s limitations ruling, but decides that the pleaded claim is contractual without applying § 5524 to it. opinion →
B. Key v. PA DOC, the § 5524 citation appears in Respondent’s argument. The court addressed the two-year period only on an assuming-arguendo basis, not as its own ruling that the section applies. opinion →
R.A. Diroche v. CO. 1. Bollinger & CO. 1. Over, the discussion of Section 5524(2) is the trial court’s reasoning quoted in the opinion; the appellate court does not make its own decision about that section. opinion →
Estate of: Patricia Henninger, Appeal of: Estate, this is a party’s argument, not the appellate court’s decision. The court did not decide whether § 5524 applies. opinion →
Estate of: Patricia Henninger, Appeal of: Com. of PA, this is Dr. Bazylak’s argument, not this court’s decision about § 5524. opinion →
Gidor, M., Aplt. v. Mangus, B., the court mentions § 5524(2) only while recounting an argument made in Dubose; it does not decide a rule under § 5524(2). opinion →
MALLES v. CLARK, the court discusses an unpleaded negligence claim only conditionally and does not decide its timeliness. opinion →
BATTS v. AMERICAN EXPRESS, the court quotes another decision's limitations rule, then says only that a time bar seems unlikely when weighing service time; it does not decide a § 5524 issue. opinion →
Matharu v. Muir, the court cites § 5524 as the existing two-year limit for death claims while interpreting the separate MCARE statute of repose. opinion →
In Re Fellheimer, the court cites § 5524 as background to possible state law claims and leaves their limitations issues for a state court. opinion →
Urbina v. Bureau of Prisons Physician, the court identifies the section’s two-year period as applicable but gives the plaintiff an opportunity to show cause before deciding whether to dismiss the complaint. opinion →
ZHANG v. DORRANCE PUBLISHING CO., the magistrate judge cited the section for the fraud limitations period in a recommendation the district judge had not adopted. opinion →

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