Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.225

Section 137.225 permits expungement of qualifying convictions, but it does not extend to a straight felony conviction predating the 1971 criminal code by treating the offense as one that could have been punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor under later law.

State v. Thompson · filed 1975-01-14(1), (3)

Under the criminal code of 1971 burglaries committed in nondwellings, if burglary tools or weapons are not used or present or if injury to a person is not attempted, are treated as Class C felonies (ORS 164.215,164.225) for which discretionary misdemeanor or felony punishments are now possible. (ORS 161.-705.) However, there is no language in the expungement statute, ORS 137.225, quoted supra, which indicates the legislature intended that courts should examine straight felony convictions preceding the 1971 code to see whether they might have fit as either felonies or misdemeanors if committed after the effective date of the new code.

Section 137.225 authorizes expunction for a conviction only when the offense was a Class C felony or was punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.

State v. Young · filed 1976-01-12

The statute allows that form of relief to defendants "convicted of a Class C felony * * * or a crime punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” Respondent’s 1968 grand larceny conviction under former ORS 164.310 is not for a Class C felony, there being no such thing in existence at that time. Nor did former ORS 164.310 authorize punishment as either a felony or a misdemeanor. ORS 137.225 does not authorize expunction in this situation. State v. Thompson, 20 Or App 61, 530 P2d 532 (1975).

Section 137.225 prohibits expungement of multiple crimes committed within 10 years.

Delehant v. Board on Police Standards & Training · filed 1993-01-26

Second, under Oregon law, petitioner could not have obtained expungement of his record if he had committed the crimes in this state. ORS 137.225 prohibits expungement of multiple crimes committed within 10 years.

Section 137.225(1)(a) permits a defendant who has fully performed the sentence to apply to set aside a conviction three years after judgment.

Chavez-Perez v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General · filed 2004-10-27(1)(a)

Under Oregon’s statute, when a defendant is found or pleads guilty the court enters a formal judgment of conviction. At any time after three years from the date of that criminal judgment, a defendant who has fully complied with and performed his sentence may apply to the court for an order setting aside the conviction.

Section 137.225(1) allows the court to deny a motion to set aside a conviction based on the applicant's behavior since conviction, and a probation violation is sufficient grounds for denial.

State v. Green · filed 1977-05-02(1)

It is within the discretion of the court to deny the motion based upon a review of the defendant’s behavior since the date of conviction. Thus, even if we adopt the definition of "sentence” as proposed by defendant the fact he had violated the terms of probation is sufficient to deny the motion. Consequently, we do not decide that issue.

Section 137.225 permits expunction of a conviction even after the conviction has been invalidated, and its eligibility categories apply according to the offense’s timing and classification, including crimes that were punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor in the court’s discretion.

State v. Hammond · filed 1978-06-20(1), (5)(a)-(f), and (7)

This reasoning misses the point of ORS 137.225. That statute is intended to clear the record of those persons convicted of any of the enumerated offenses who have demonstrated their ability to be responsible citizens. ... ORS 137.225 makes no distinction between valid convictions and those that are subsequently declared invalid. Insofar as expunction is concerned, a conviction, whether valid or invalid, comes within the purview of ORS 137.225. ... The provisions of ORS 137.225(5)(a) to (e) apply to all crimes committed before or after September 9, 1971. ORS 137.225(7). Subparagraph (f) applies to those crimes committed before the enactment of the present criminal code, that do not fit within subparagraphs (a) through (e). ... ORS 137.225(5)(c) provides that any conviction of a crime that in the discretion of the trial court could be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor is expungeable.

Section 137.225 limits its expunction and sealing remedies to persons who have been convicted and cannot be extended by implication to unconvicted arrestees.

Springer v. State · filed 1981-01-05(3)

ORS 137.225 is unambiguous in limiting its ex-punction remedies to convicted persons, and the statute therefore cannot be extended by implication.

The statute permits a person whose conviction has been set aside to deny it, but in a civil action where truth matters, the conviction is still treated as existing so the defendant may use its truth as a defense.

Bahr v. Statesman Journal Co. · filed 1981-03-09(3), (4), (8)

While plaintiff was entitled to deny his conviction under ORS 137.225(3) and (4), defendant, in this civil defamation case, was entitled to rely upon the fact that a conviction did occur as a defense under ORS 137.225(8). Because plaintiff admitted in his complaint that he had been convicted, two things follow from the allegations of the complaint and the provisions of ORS 137.225(8). First, that defendant’s statement that plaintiff had been convicted was true and, secondly, that it was true that plaintiff had lied in denying his conviction, despite the fact the lie was authorized by statute.

Under § 137.225(1), a defendant whose costs-and-disbursements judgment was discharged in bankruptcy has fully complied with and performed the sentence and may obtain expunction; requiring payment of the discharged debt would conflict with federal bankruptcy law.

State v. Gwyther · filed 1982-04-26(1)

We find that under these facts defendant has fully complied with and performed the sentence of the court under ORS 137.225(1). To hold otherwise would bring the statute into conflict with the purposes and objectives of the federal Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, USC, and thus make it invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2.

Section 137.225(6)(b) makes a person ineligible for expunction if the person has more than one conviction within the preceding 10 years, even when the convictions arose in the same action.

State v. Adams · filed 1982-06-09(6)(b)

The statute specifically excludes from the benefits of expunction any person with more than one conviction within the previous ten-year period, even if the convictions occurred in the same action. Defendant was convicted of two offenses within the ten-year period immediately preceding his motion and was ineligible for expunction.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars expunction when the person was convicted of another offense within the 10-year period before filing the motion, excluding motor vehicle violations.

Delehant v. Board on Police Standards & Training · filed 1993-08-05(6)(b)

Second, petitioner would not have been entitled to have his convictions expunged in Oregon, because he committed multiple crimes within 10 years. ... In this case, application of ORS 137.225(6)(b) to petitioner’s multiple convictions would have prevented him from qualifying for expunction of any of those convictions, had they occurred in Oregon.

Section 137.225 requires three years to have elapsed and the sentence to have been fully performed, and directs the court to assess the applicant’s lawful conduct; alleged unlawful conduct must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the statutory requirements are satisfied the court must set aside the conviction.

State v. Langan · filed 1986-04-22(1)(a), (3)

ORS 137.225(3) directs the court to determine whether “the circumstances and behavior of the applicant from the date of conviction * * * to the date of the hearing on the motion warrant setting aside the conviction.” ... We think that the statutory reference to the applicant’s “behavior” means that the court is to examine whether the applicant has behaved in conformity with or contrary to public law. Disqualifying behavior must be some form of legal, not merely social, impropriety, and an act incurring ordinary, nonpunitive civil liability (for instance, a contract dispute) is not disqualifying if it does not also contravene some other law. ... Denial on that basis does require identification of every element required to make the conduct unlawful and a determination that each is established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing on the applicant’s motion. ... If the prosecuting attorney asserts that the applicant has committed another offense or otherwise unlawful conduct, he has the burden to show and the court must “determine” each element of that unlawful conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. (5) If the court determines that each statutory requirement is satisfied, the court “shall” enter an order setting aside the conviction.

Section 137.225 permits a qualifying defendant to obtain a conviction set-aside after three years when the statutory eligibility requirements are met, and limits denial to post-conviction behavior that was in some respect contrary to public law.

State v. Bomar · filed 1986-05-21(1), (3), (5)

In deciding whether to set aside a conviction, the trial court may not consider the nature of the offense for which a defendant was convicted, other than to determine that it is listed in ORS 137.225(5). Neither may the court determine that the passage of three years is an insufficient period after which to set aside a conviction, because the legislature has already determined that three years is the appropriate period. In addition, the age of the victims and the facts that defendant received the benefit of a plea bargain and may be eligible for licensing after the conviction is set aside are irrelevant under the statute.

Section 137.225 applies to convictions predating the amendment under subsection (8), and the amended statute bars setting aside child-abuse convictions, including first-degree sexual abuse.

State v. Burke · filed 1991-09-25(8), (5)(a), (1)(a)

However, here subsection (8) of the statute unambiguously expresses legislative intent to have ORS 137.225 apply, regardless of the date of conviction. ORS 137.225(8) provides: “The provisions of subsection (1) of this section apply to convictions and arrests which occurred before, as well as those which occurred after, September 9, 1971. There shall be no time limit for making such applications.”

Section 137.225(3) requires the court to consider the applicant’s circumstances and behavior from the conviction date through the hearing when deciding whether to set aside the conviction.

State v. Stanford · filed 1992-02-26(3)

Because ORS 137.225(3) requires a judge hearing a motion to set aside a conviction to consider the “circumstances and behavior of the applicant from the date of conviction * * * to the date of the hearing,” the judge must consider a new aggregate of facts every time that a defendant moves to set aside a conviction.

Section 137.225(3) limits the “official records” that may be sealed to exclude criminal investigation reports.

State v. Smith · filed 1992-12-23(3)

In sum, we conclude that, had the legislature considered the issue, it would have limited the definition of “official records” in ORS 137.225 to exclude investigation reports.

Section 137.225(3) requires sealing official government records related to the conviction or arrest, including police investigative reports that are factually part of the case.

State v. KP · filed 1996-08-01(3)

ORS 137.225 requires that, on granting the motion to set aside records of arrest and conviction, the court shall order sealed those records and "other official records in the case." Thus, other records of an "official" character that are related to the conviction, or an arrest that did not result in a conviction, are to be sealed.

Section 137.225(5)(d) permits a misdemeanor conviction to be set aside unless it is third-degree sexual abuse or endangering the welfare of a child and also constitutes child abuse; attempted sexual abuse is not among the excluded misdemeanors.

State v. Brown · filed 1993-01-06(5)(d)

Attempted sexual abuse, of which defendant was convicted, is not one of the misdemeanors that cannot be set aside under ORS 137.225 (5)(d). Therefore, he can qualify under the statute to have his conviction set aside.

Section 137.225(6)(b) permits setting aside a conviction despite another conviction within the preceding 10 years only when the other conviction is a motor vehicle violation; a felony conviction is not a motor vehicle violation.

State v. Roberts · filed 1993-06-09(6)(b)

By its express language, ORS 137.225(6)(b) permits the court to set aside a conviction when the only additional conviction within the 10-year period immediately preceding the filing of the motion was for a “motor vehicle violation.” ... Because defendant’s prior conviction was for a felony, rather than a violation, defendant was not convicted of a “motor vehicle violation. ’ ’ The court did not err in denying his motion to set aside his conviction.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars expunction when, within the preceding 10 years, the defendant was convicted of any other offense, excluding a motor vehicle violation, including a municipal violation resulting from a no-contest plea.

State v. Roberts · filed 2013-02-06(6)(b)

Nonetheless, pursuant to ORS 137.225(6)(b), the provisions allowing a person to apply for expunction do not apply to “[a]person convicted, within the 10-year period immediately preceding the filing of the motion pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, of any other offense, excluding motor vehicle violations, whether or not the other conviction is for conduct associated with the same criminal episode that caused the arrest or conviction that is sought to be set aside.” ... We conclude that, pursuant to ORS 135.345 and ORS 153.030(1), defendant’s no contest plea to the violation of public urination resulted in a “conviction” of an offense within the 10 years preceding defendant’s motion to expunge his marijuana conviction.

For purposes of ORS 137.225(5)(a), whether a conviction is for a Class C felony depends on the offense's current classification, not its classification when the conviction was entered; a first-degree sexual-abuse conviction elevated to a Class B felony therefore cannot be set aside under the statute.

State v. Blankenship · filed 1994-07-06(5)(a)

The phrase “a conviction of: A Class C felony” could reasonably mean either: (1) a conviction for an offense that was classified as a class C felony at the time of conviction; or (2) a conviction for an offense that is currently classified as a class C felony. The context of the statute supports the second interpretation. Read together, ORS 137.225(l)(a), ORS 137.225-(5)(a)(D) and ORS 137.225(5)(d)(A) express the legislature’s determination to bar the setting aside of convictions for child-related sexual abuse in the first, second or third degrees. See State v. Burke, 109 Or App 7, 13, 818 P2d 511 (1991).4 Notwithstanding its original “class C” classification, defendant’s conviction, which would currently be classified as a class B felony, is such a conviction. Accordingly, it is not subject to being set aside.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars setting aside a conviction when the person was convicted of another offense within the preceding ten years; combining sentences does not combine the convictions.

State v. Spivak · filed 1994-09-07(6)(b)

If it did not, then ORS 137.225(6)(b) precludes expunction. ... In the light of ORS 161.062(2), we interpret the sentencing court’s statement, “treat it as one matter for sentencing purposes,” to *157mean that the court entered six convictions and merged only the sentences.

Section 137.225(2)(a) excludes a state traffic offense from expunction, including a failure-to-perform-the-duties-of-a-driver conviction classified as a state traffic offense under either version of the traffic law.

State v. Greer · filed 1976-08-30(2)(a)

Thus, under either version of ORS 484.010(9), we reach the same conclusion that a violation of ORS 483.602 is a state traffic offense. Defendant’s conviction, therefore, has been expressly made not expunge-able by ORS 137.225 and the circuit court’s order to set aside defendant’s conviction must be reversed.

Section 137.225(5)(c) does not cover a felony that could be reduced to a misdemeanor only if a separate statutory condition was met; the reduction provision must independently apply to the defendant’s offense.

State v. Johnson · filed 2006-09-13(5)(c)

Second, paragraph (l)(e) was not a “stand-alone” provision. That is, it did not authorize a trial court in 1990 to treat any felony as a misdemeanor based solely on the court’s assessment of the “nature and circumstances of the crime and the history and character of the defendant [.]” ORS 161.705(l)(e) (1989). Rather, that provision was explicitly conjunctive; it was preceded by “and,” linking it to the four preceding disjunctive provisions, paragraphs (l)(a) to (l)(d). Thus, a court could reduce a felony to a Class A misdemeanor only if (1) the defendant’s crime fell within one of the paragraphs, (l)(a) to (l)(d); and (2) the court determined that, in the totality of the circumstances, “it would be unduly harsh to sentence the defendant for a felony.” ORS 161.705(l)(e) (1989).4 Here, the first of those conjunctive requirements was *699not satisfied. Accordingly, the court erred in determining, for purposes of ORS 137.225(5)(c), that defendant’s 1990 conviction could have been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to ORS 161.705(l)(e) (1989).

Former ORS 137.225(5) barred expungement of a first degree sexual abuse conviction when the conduct constituted child abuse under former ORS 418.740.

Long v. State · filed 1994-09-07(5)

In giving this advice, counsel apparently overlooked former ORS 137.225(5), ... which barred expungement of convictions for first ... degree sexual abuse when the conduct would constitute child abuse under former ORS 418.740.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars setting aside an arrest record when the applicant has another conviction within the preceding 10 years, even if that conviction’s record was previously set aside.

State v. Hartford · filed 2007-06-13(6)(b)

The sole issue before us is whether ORS 137.225(6)(b) precludes the trial court from setting aside the record of defendant’s arrest for burglary in the first degree. We hold that it does.

Section 137.225(3) requires the court to assess an applicant’s circumstances and behavior from the date of conviction or arrest through the hearing, without limiting that review to the 10 years preceding the motion, and subsection (6)(b) does not end the inquiry.

State v. Cowling · filed 1996-03-06(3), (6)(b)

The problem with defendant’s argument is that ORS 137.225(6)(b) does not end the trial court’s inquiry. Under ORS 137.225(3), the trial court must also assess the “circumstances and behavior” of the defendant from the date of the conviction or arrest to the date of the hearing on the motion to set aside. Nothing in ORS 137.225(3) limits the trial court to examining a defendant’s “circumstances and behavior” for only the 10 years preceding the motion to set aside. Rather, the statute directs the court to examine a defendant’s “circumstances and behavior” from the date of the conviction or arrest, regardless of how many years have passed since the conviction or arrest.

Section 137.225(3) does not prevent an agency from considering conduct underlying a set-aside conviction when the information came from the applicant rather than official records sealed under the statute.

Leong's, Inc. v. Oregon State Lottery Commission · filed 1996-07-31(3)

Whatever merits petitioners’ argument might have if the Commission had relied on information obtained from official records sealed pursuant to ORS 137.225(3), that did not occur here. ... The Commission did not surreptitiously obtain information concerning the prior gambling-related conduct from sealed official records. Rather, petitioners themselves provided that information to the Commission. ... Thus, nothing in ORS 137.225 precluded the Commission from considering the prior gambling conduct and denying petitioners’ application because of that conduct.

Section 137.225 permits denial based on a public-safety risk only when clear and convincing evidence supports written findings; a single old probation revocation, without other evidence of post-conviction risk, is insufficient.

State v. Singleton · filed 2025-01-02(3)(a)

evidence of a defendant’s single probation revocation resulting in a conviction more than 10 years ago is insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s behavior or circumstances create a risk to public safety.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars setting aside a conviction based on another offense only if that offense conviction occurred within the 10-year period immediately before the motion was filed; older convictions do not disqualify the defendant.

State v. Bierstock · filed 2004-10-06(6)(b)

On appeal, defendant argues that nothing in ORS 137.225 precludes relief merely on the ground that a defendant had multiple convictions, regardless of when, relative to the motion, those convictions occurred. Rather, defendant points out, ORS 137.225(6)(b) limits the court’s consideration to other convictions occurring “within the 10-year period immediately preceding the filing of the motion.” The state now concurs in that analysis and concedes error. We accept *518that concession of error as well taken, given the plain language of the statute.

Section 137.225(3)(b) gives the prosecuting attorney 120 days to object; an initial notice of no objection does not immediately require the court to grant an otherwise eligible motion.

State v. Kuxhausen · filed 2025-11-26(3)(b)

Thus, the text and context of the statute indicate that the legislature intended to permit the prosecuting attorney 120 days after a defendant files a motion to set aside under ORS 137.225(1)(a) to notify the trial court that they object to the motion. If the prosecuting attorney fails to object within 120 days and the defendant is otherwise eligible under the statute, then the trial court must grant the motion, subject to the other limitations in the statute.

Section 137.225(3)(b) treats “if no objection” as the absence of an objection during the 120-day objection period, so an early notice of no objection does not end that period or require immediate relief.

State v. Kuxhausen · filed 2025-11-26(3)(b)

The text and context of ORS 137.225(3)(b) do not support the proposition that the legislature intended that a communication sent by the prosecuting attorney to the trial court, stating that they do not object to the motion, would end the 120-day period to object and immediately require the trial court to grant the motion. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was not obligated to grant the motion to set aside under ORS 137.225(3)(b) when the state sent the initial letter that it did not object to the motion.

Section 137.225(6)(b) bars setting aside a conviction when the defendant was convicted of any other offense within the 10 years before filing the motion, even if the offenses arose from the same criminal episode, and post-conviction merger cannot avoid that bar.

State v. Jansen · filed 2005-02-02(6)(b)

We have held that ORS 137.225(6)(b) means what it says. ... The trial court’s purported post-conviction “merger” of the convictions was without effect. ORS 137.225(6)(b) applies. It necessarily follows that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion.

Subsection (l)(b) permits a person to seek an order setting aside an arrest record after one year if no accusatory instrument was filed, but subsection (7) bars that relief for an arrest within the three years before the motion, subject to stated exceptions.

State v. Blas-Fernandez · filed 2006-05-03(l)(b), (7)

However, ORS 137.225(7) limits the application of that provision: “The provisions of subsection (l)(b) of this section do not apply to a person arrested within the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the motion for any offense, excluding motor vehicle violations, and excluding arrests for conduct associated with the same criminal episode that caused the arrest that is sought to be set aside.” Here, defendant’s June 4, 2003, arrest occurred within three years preceding the filing of the motion to remove the records of her November 4, 2003, arrest, and her November 4, 2003, arrest occurred within the three years preceding the filing of the motion to remove the records of her June 4, 2003, arrest. Neither motion should have been granted.

Section 137.225(6) treats convictions arising from the same criminal episode as prior convictions when determining whether a conviction may be set aside.

State v. Trujillo · filed 2006-08-16(6)

ORS 137.225(6) expressly includes convictions that arise out of the same criminal episode.

Pre-2003 convictions for criminally negligent homicide remain eligible to be set aside under ORS 137.225, including under the Class C felony provision, assuming the other eligibility requirements are met.

State v. Soreng · filed 2006-09-27(5)(a), (11)(j)

As relevant here, ORS 137.225 provides that “a conviction of * * * [a] class C felony” may be set aside. In addition, the statute provides that, in general, the court “shall” grant a motion to set aside a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. ORS 137.225(ll)(j). Nothing in the text of ORS 137.225 suggests that the legislature intended to make a conviction for criminally negligent homicide ineligible to be set aside. Indeed, the explicit statement in subsection (11) that a conviction for criminally negligent homicide “shall” be set aside indicates that the legislature intended that at least some convictions for that crime would be “otherwise eligible” to be set aside. In short, nothing in the text of ORS 137.225 supports the state’s argument that defendant’s conviction is not eligible to be set aside; in fact, the text points in the opposite direction.

Section 137.225(5)(b) excludes a Class C felony conviction that is a sex crime from being set aside; whether public indecency is a sex crime is determined by whether the defendant had the qualifying prior conviction at the time of the offense.

State v. Tucker · filed 2015-02-04(5)(b)

Instead, viewed in context, we conclude that public indecency is a sex crime under ORS 181.805(5)(t) if the defendant “has a prior conviction” for public or private indecency or another sex crime at the time of the offense. Thus, because defendant’s conviction was for a sex crime, he was ineligible to have that conviction set aside under ORS 137.225(5)(b), and the trial court did not err in so concluding.

For the three-year set-aside eligibility requirement, when probation is revoked and replaced by incarceration, the relevant sentence is the later incarceration term; completing it satisfies the requirement to fully comply with and perform the sentence.

State v. Branam · filed 2008-05-28(1)(a)

Given that purpose, we conclude that the better reading of ORS 137.225(l)(a) is that, where a defendant initially is sentenced to probation but probation later is revoked and the defendant is sentenced to an incarceration term (and accompanying term of post-prison supervision), the relevant “sentence of the court” for the purpose of ORS 137.225(l)(a) is the incarceration term; where the defendant successfully completes the latter, he or she has met the requirement of that provision that he or she had “fully complied with and performed the sentence of the court.”

Subsection (7) bars setting aside convictions under former ORS 163.091 because that offense is encompassed by ORS 163.145.

State v. Beck · filed 2013-01-16(7)

Because the legislature clearly intended to prohibit the setting aside of all convictions for criminally negligent homicide and because the legislature intended ORS 163.145 to encompass all conduct criminalized by former ORS 163.091, we conclude that the reference to convictions under ORS 163.145 in ORS 137.225(7) also includes convictions under former ORS 163.091. Thus, ORS 137.225(7) prohibits convictions for negligent homicide, such as defendant’s, from being set aside.

Section 137.225(6)(b) does not make a person ineligible to set aside an earlier conviction merely because the person was found in contempt during the preceding 10 years.

State v. Coughlin · filed 2013-10-09(6)(b)

A person who has been found in contempt has not been “convicted * * * of any offense” for purposes of ORS 137.225(6)(b). Such a contempt finding does not, therefore, render a person ineligible to have a criminal conviction set aside under ORS 137.225(1).

Under ORS 137.225(3), the court may consider only the applicant’s circumstances and behavior from the date of the conviction sought to be set aside; the 10-year lookback in subsection (6)(b) applies only to determining eligibility based on a prior conviction.

State v. J. N. L. · filed 2015-02-04(3), (6)(b)

As defendant points out, the 10-year period applies only in determining under ORS 137.225(6)(b) whether a prior conviction renders a person ineligible to have a conviction set aside. In determining whether the person’s circumstances and behavior warrant setting aside a prior conviction under ORS 137.225(3), the court may consider only “the circumstances and behavior of the applicant from the date of conviction.” (Emphasis added.) That is, the court must consider whether, since the date of the conviction at issue, the person “has behaved in conformity with or contrary to public law.” Langan, 301 Or at 9. The conduct for which defendant was convicted in Washington state occurred, at the latest, in June 2006, five months before the Oregon conviction that defendant seeks to set aside. It follows that that conduct is not part of the circumstances and behavior that the trial court could consider. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. Accordingly, we remand for the court to reconsider defendant’s motion under the correct standard.

Section 137.225(13) requires the court to grant an otherwise eligible motion to set aside a conviction unless it makes written findings, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that granting the motion would not be in the best interests of justice.

State v. Carcamo-Tellez · filed 2015-10-28(13)

The most obvious flaw in the court’s order is simple: the state presented no evidence to support a finding that setting aside defendant’s conviction would not be in the best interests of justice as required under ORS 137.225(13). Indeed, the state offered no evidence at all. ... Thus, the record is insufficient to allow the court to make the finding that it did — that there was evidence that granting defendant’s motion would not be in the best interests of justice. Accordingly, the court was required to grant defendant’s motion. ORS 137.225(13) (unless such finding is made, court “shall” grant defendant’s motion if defendant is otherwise eligible to have conviction set aside under statute).

A person seeking expunction of an eligible sex crime under subsection (8)(b) must satisfy subsection (6)(b)'s requirement of having no other conviction in the 10 years preceding the expunction motion.

State v. Jensen · filed 2016-06-29(6)(b), (8)(b)

Because the relief that defendant is seeking under ORS 137.225(8)(b) is provided for under ORS 137.225(l)(a), and the exceptions outlined in ORS 137.225(6) also expressly apply to expunction as provided under ORS 137.225(l)(a), the exception that a person seeking expunction cannot have a second conviction for a criminal offense in the 10 years preceding a motion to set aside a conviction is a general requirement that any person seeking expunction under ORS 137.225(l)(a) and (8)(b) must meet.

Subsection (12) applies only when the defendant has been convicted of one of the crimes it lists, so it does not govern an application to set aside and seal an arrest record after dismissal.

State v. Malm · filed 2017-08-02(12)

We agree with the parties that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion based on ORS 137.225(12).

Section 137.225(1)(a) permits a defendant to seek expungement when public records indicate a criminal conviction and impose the same stigma as a conviction, even if the record is legally inaccurate.

State v. McVein · filed 2020-07-15(1)(a)

Even if erroneous because contempt is not legally a crime, those records still subject defendant to the same stigma as any other defendant convicted of a crime. That allows him to apply for expungement under ORS 137.225(1)(a).

Under ORS 137.225(3), unpaid fines in unrelated cases, without conduct contrary to public law, do not justify denying an otherwise eligible set-aside motion; under ORS 137.225(7)(b), convictions vacated before the hearing do not categorically disqualify the applicant.

State v. Kindred · filed 2021-09-09(3), (7)(b)

In sum, under Langan, the trial court erred in relying on defendant’s failure to pay his fines in unrelated cases as behavior allowing for the denial of his motion, and defendant’s vacated fare violations did not preclude granting his motion to set aside his conviction.

Section 137.225(6)(b) authorizes a trial court to examine information it deems proper when deciding whether a first-degree criminal-mistreatment conviction involving child abuse is eligible to be set aside.

State v. Sylva · filed 2021-09-22(6)(b)

We disagree with defendant’s contention, and we conclude that, under ORS 137.225(6)(b), a trial court is authorized to examine the information it deems proper in order to determine whether a conviction is eligible for set aside.

Section 137.225(2) and (3) requires a hearing when an eligible applicant's motion to set aside a conviction may be denied based on the applicant's circumstances and behavior, allowing relevant evidence and an opportunity to challenge, rebut, explain, or submit contrary evidence.

State v. Singleton · filed 2022-01-12(2) and (3)

Defendant met the initial criteria to have his conviction set aside, and the state did not object or otherwise contest defendant’s motion. If, nonetheless, the trial court was inclined to deny the motion, it was required to provide defendant with the opportunity to engage in a hearing where relevant evidence could be admitted and defendant could challenge, rebut, or explain that evidence and submit contrary evidence.

Section 137.225(7)(a) excludes convictions for state or municipal traffic offenses from set-aside relief, but third-degree assault and recklessly endangering another person are not traffic offenses merely because they resulted from operating a motor vehicle.

State v. Pohle · filed 2022-01-20(7)(a)

In sum, we conclude that third-degree assault and recklessly endangering another person are not “traffic offenses” as that term is used in ORS 137.225(7)(a), and are not ineligible for set aside under ORS 137.225(1), even when such offenses result “from the operation of a motor vehicle.”

Section 137.225 lets a person who has completed the sentence and waited the required period seek a set-aside that seals the conviction record and generally treats the conviction as if it never occurred.

Mohiadeen v. Washington County Sheriff's Office · filed 2025-02-20(1)(a), (3)(a), (4), (5), (10), (11)(a)

Thus, the essential features of record expungement under Oregon law are that the record of conviction and related official records in the case are sealed and unavailable to the public, the conviction is no longer considered part of the person’s criminal history, it no longer affects the person’s legal rights or disabilities, and the person is privileged to represent that they have never been convicted of the offense.

When a court holds a hearing on a set-aside motion under ORS 137.225, the hearing procedures in subsection (3)(a) apply; any error in holding a hearing on an unopposed motion is invited when the defendant requested that hearing.

State v. Long-Ellis · filed 2024-01-31(3)(a)

Once the trial court agreed to hold the requested hearing, it did not err by applying the hearing procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a), or, if it did, the error was invited by defendant when defendant requested the type of hearing required by Singleton. To the extent that defendant intended to ask for some other kind of hearing—one not subject to the hearing procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a)—he failed to do so, even assuming arguendo that the court would be allowed to hold a hearing on a motion under ORS 137.225(1)(a) without following the hearing procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a).

Under ORS 137.225, unpaid restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence means the defendant has not fully complied with and performed the sentence and is ineligible to seek a set-aside, while the no-objection rule and the prohibition on considering monetary obligations apply only when the defendant is otherwise eligible.

State v. Grant · filed 2025-04-09(1)(a), (3)(b), (3)(a)

Thus, the plain text and legislative history of the set-aside and restitution statutes lead us to conclude that a judgment ordering a criminal defendant to pay restitution based on the underlying conviction is part of the defendant’s sentence within the meaning of ORS 137.225(1)(a). Accordingly, because defendant owed outstanding restitution, he had not “fully complied with and performed the sentence of the court” and was not eligible to file a motion to set aside under ORS 137.225(1)(a). ... Only when a defendant meets the threshold eligibility requirements of ORS 137.225(1)(a) does paragraph (3)(b) require a court to grant the motion in the absence of an objection. ... Therefore, paragraph (3)(a)’s prohibition on the consideration of “monetary obligations” was not relevant to the court’s analysis below.

For set-aside eligibility, a conviction is assessed under the offense and classification existing when the conviction occurred; later reclassification or addition of the offense to the sex-crime list does not retroactively make it ineligible, subject to the court's authority to deny relief for a public-safety risk.

State v. Seay · filed 2026-02-19(5)(a), (6)(f), (13)(c), (3)(a)

We therefore conclude that defendant’s motion to set aside should be assessed based on his conviction under ORS 166.085, a Class C felony that is not a sex crime, and the only abuse of corpse statute that existed at the time of his conviction. Our conclusion does not require the trial court on remand to grant defendant’s motion. When a person is otherwise eligible for relief, the court shall grant the motion “unless the court makes written findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that the circumstances and behavior of the person * * * do not warrant granting the motion due to the circumstances and behavior creating a risk to public safety.” ORS 137.225(3)(a).