Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110

Section 12.110(4) gives a medical-treatment claimant two years after discovering, or reasonably being expected to discover, harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Varner v. Eves · filed 1999-11-03(4)

An action to recover damages arising from medical treatment must be commenced within two years from the date when the plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered a claim. ... Under that rule, the plaintiff “must have a reasonable opportunity to become aware of * * *: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct” before the statute of limitations will begin to run. ... Thus, the relevant inquiry is determining when plaintiff knew or should have known that her eye problems were caused by O’Dell’s negligence. That determination is one of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment, unless, as a matter of law, plaintiff should have discovered the claim by a date that preceded the filing of the action by more than two years. ... Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, an objectively reasonable juror might conclude that plaintiff could not have reasonably “discovered” that she was harmed by O’Dell’s alleged negligence until she was told by the Center staff, in May 1994, that she could not be helped further. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense.

Section 12.110(4) begins the two-year medical-malpractice limitations period when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, without requiring expert confirmation of malpractice.

Greene v. Legacy Emanuel Hospital & Health Care Center · filed 2000-08-01(4)

The fact that plaintiff did not have confirmation that Nesler’s conduct was outside the standard of care required of physicians until her attorney had occasion to have the medical information reviewed by other physicians does not create a question of fact as to when plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that Nesler’s conduct was tortious. As the court held in Gaston, actual knowledge of malpractice is not required; only a “substantial possibility” of tortious conduct must exist. 318 Or at 256. Nor is the statute of limitations not triggered until plaintiff procures expert testimony to support her claim or because her attorney is dilatory in filing an action. Duncan v. Augter, 62 Or App 250, 256, 661 P2d 83, rev den 295 Or 122 (1983). ORS 12.110(4) protects “only those who, in exercising the diligence expected of a reasonable person, are unaware that they have suffered legally cognizable harm.”

Section 12.110(4) requires medical-malpractice injury actions to be commenced within two years after the injury is discovered or, with reasonable care, should have been discovered, subject to the statute's outer-limit provisions.

Giulietti v. Oncology Associates of Oregon, P.C. · filed 2001-12-05(4)

ORS 12.110 is phrased in mandatory language, providing that an action “shall be commenced” within two years. The beginning of the time period under ORS 12.110 is either the discovery of the injury or the date it should have been discovered. Had Joyce lived, ORS 12.110 would have controlled, and her action, brought more than two years after she was told that the treatment had burned her, would have been barred by the statute.

Section 12.110(4)'s two-year medical-malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff actually discovers, or reasonably should discover, legally cognizable harm including tortious conduct; a later expert confirmation is not required.

Greene v. Legacy Emanuel Hospital & Health Care Center · filed 2002-12-27(4)

From the foregoing, we conclude that, on the present record, plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that she had suffered an “injury,” that is, legally cognizable harm resulting from Nesler’s actions, when she learned of the injury in the hospital and certainly no later than her lawyer’s receipt of her medical records on November 10, 1995. Plaintiff did not file her action until more than two years had elapsed from that date. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding those events, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Nesler.

Under § 12.110(4), discovering a distinct injury caused by medical treatment, including its tortious character, starts the two-year limitations period; the plaintiff need not know whether the conduct was intentional or negligent.

Laird v. Stroot · filed 2003-06-12(4)

That knowledge constitutes knowledge of a distinct injury, much like the knowledge of the perforated uterus and colon in Greene and of the needle in Berry. In the absence of some reason for plaintiff to believe that leaving gauze in his foot was a part of the course of treatment, plaintiffs knowledge of that fact constituted knowledge that he had suffered harm as a consequence of defendants’ tortious conduct and triggered the running of the statute. It follows that his cause of action accrued as a matter of law on May 4,1994, before his arrest.

For personal-injury claims, § 12.110(1) incorporates a discovery rule, so the two-year period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant’s possible responsibility.

Cole v. Sunnyside Marketplace, LLC · filed 2007-05-09(1)

Thus framed, the parties’ arguments on appeal raise two related issues with respect to the discovery rule and its application to this case: (1) whether the applicable statute of limitations, ORS 12.110(1) is ever properly subject to the discovery rule; and (2) if so, whether, as a matter of law, the rule did not toll the statute of limitations under the facts of this case. We consider each of those issues in turn, concluding that the statute of limitations that governs plaintiffs claims in this case is subject to the discovery rule and that, under that rule, the dispositive inquiry — whether her claims were brought within two years of the time that she knew or reasonably should have known of the substantial possibility of Harbor’s liability — is a question of fact properly reserved for the jury.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitations period for a personal-injury action accrues against a particular defendant when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know there is enough chance that the defendant caused the injury to require investigation, and that investigation would reveal the defendant's role.

T. R. v. Boy Scouts of America · filed 2008-03-13(1)

To restate, then, the discovery accrual rule provides that a plaintiffs claim against a particular defendant accrues when (1) the plaintiff knows, or a reasonable person should know, that there is enough chance that the defendant had a role in causing the plaintiffs injury to require further investigation; and (2) an investigation would have revealed the defendant’s role.

For legal-malpractice claims under subsection (1), the limitations period begins when the client suffers damage and knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer’s acts or omissions caused it.

Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP · filed 2011-11-10(1)

The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the client knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know "'every fact which it would be necessary for the [client] to prove * * * in order to support his right to judgment.'" Stevens, 316 Or at 227; Davies, 274 Or at 666-67 (both quoting Franks, Limitations of Actions 11 (1959)). The three elements of a claim for professional negligence are (1) harm, (2) causation, and (3) tortious conduct. Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 256, 864 P2d 1319 (1994). Thus, a claim for legal negligence accrues "when the client both suffers damage and knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that 'the substantial damage actually suffered was caused by' the lawyer's acts or omissions." Stevens, 316 Or at 227 (quoting Davies, 274 Or at 670 (emphasis in original)).

Section 12.110(4) requires a medical-malpractice damages action to be filed within two years after the injury is first discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, and the injury includes harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Kastle v. Salem Hospital · filed 2017-03-15(4)

We start where everyone agrees. A medical malpractice action must be filed within two years of the date on which the claim accrues. ORS 12.010; ORS 12.110(4). By statute, a medical malpractice action accrues “when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” ORS 12.110(4); Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 254, 864 P2d 1319 (1994) (noting that ORS 12.110(4) was intended to codify the court’s discovery rule). An “injury,” within the meaning of ORS 12.110(4), consists of harm, causation, and tortious conduct. Gaston, 318 Or at 255. Therefore, a medical malpractice claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware *348of a substantial possibility that (1) plaintiff suffered harm, (2) the harm was caused by the defendant’s acts and, (3) the defendant’s acts were tortious. Id. ... In sum, the complaint does not establish, on its face, that plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered his injury, its tortious cause, and those persons who may be responsible, more than two years before commencing this action. Because the complaint does not show that the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff was not required to have pleaded delayed discovery to avoid an assumption that it had run. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 12.110(4) makes a medical-malpractice claim accrue when the injury is first discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered, with injury consisting of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Concienne v. Asante · filed 2019-09-18(4)

In Oregon, “a medical malpractice action accrues ‘when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.’ ” Kastle v. Salem Hospital, 284 Or App 342, 347, 392 P3d 374 (2017) (quoting ORS 12.110(4)). Under ORS 12.110(4), an “injury” “consists of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.” Id. (citing Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 255, 864 P2d 1219 (1994)). Therefore, “a medical malpractice claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that (1) plaintiff suffered harm, (2) the harm was caused by the defendant’s acts, and (3) the defendant’s acts were tortious.”

Section 12.110(1)'s discovery rule starts the limitation period when a plaintiff knows or should know that the defendant was negligent and caused some harm, unless later litigation could establish that the defendant was not negligent.

Cockey v. Mead · filed 2023-03-08(1)

Where the outcome in litigation subsequent to the negligent act could establish that the defendant was not negligent in the first instance, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of that litigation. But where the plaintiff knows or should know that the defendant was negligent, and the litigation subsequent to the negligent act serves only to determine to what extent the plaintiff has been harmed, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the plaintiff learns or should have learned that the defendant’s act was negligent and that it caused some harm.

Under ORS 12.110(4), a medical-malpractice plaintiff need not know the exact nature or full extent of the harm; knowledge of some harm, together with facts creating a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, starts the limitations period, while physician assurances delay discovery only when reasonably relied upon.

Tureck v. Taksali · filed 2025-10-08(4)

As an initial matter, there is no requirement for purposes of ORS 12.110(4) that a plaintiff know the exact nature or full extent of the harm. Rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to know that some harm has occurred. ... Importantly, any assurance must be one on which “a plaintiff reasonably relies” to have the delaying effect. ... Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff’s own deposition testimony—that he had concluded by the fall of 2017 that the first surgery had been unnecessary and that there was a “distinct possibility” that he had a claim—met the “quantum of awareness” standard, because they were facts that would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that the person had suffered cognizable harm.

Section 12.110(1) requires tort actions not otherwise enumerated to be filed within two years, with accrual when the wrongful act causes damage rather than when a later payment fixes the full amount.

CITIZENS INSURANCE CO. OF NJ v. Signal Ins. Co. · filed 1972-01-26(1)

It is our conclusion that the statute of limitations ran upon plaintiff’s claim two years from the time defendant denied coverage and that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 12.110(1) gives a two-year limitations period for specified noncontract injury claims, and the period begins when the claim is actionable; its express discovery rule applies to fraud or deceit.

Cramer v. Stonebridge Inn, Inc. · filed 1986-01-29(1)

The issue is not whether a “discovery” date should be made applicable to the tort of interference with contractual relationships but, rather, when the cause of action accrued. The Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until a claim is actionable. Dortch v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 59 Or App 310, 320, 650 P2d 1046 (1982). Intentional interference with economic relationships that in fact causes injury to a plaintiffs business may give rise to a tort claim. Straube v. Larson, 287 Or 357, 360, 600 P2d 371 (1979). The plaintiff must be damaged beyond the fact of the interference itself. Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or 201, 582 P2d 1365 (1978); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo v. Wakehouse Motors, 46 Or App 199, 208, 611 P2d 658, rev den 289 Or 373 (1980). The trial court was correct that, even though the subordination of plaintiffs’ lien occurred more than two years before they brought this action, they had no actionable claim until that subordination made their lien valueless, i.e., when the foreclosure sale failed to provide funds to pay off their note. Damages and plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued at that time. Plaintiffs’ action was timely.

The two-year limitations period begins when the negligence cause of action accrues, including when the insured incurs attorney fees as resulting harm from the insurer’s negligence.

Bollam v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 1986-12-16(1)

We hold that the cause accrues when they incur attorney fees as a result of the insurer’s negligence. ... Under ORS 12.010 and 12.110(1) the two-year period for commencement of an action begins when the cause of action accrues. ... Their cause accrued no later than March 31,1978, and the statute of limitations ran more than two years before action was commenced.

Section 12.110(1) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable care, should have discovered the injury; objective or constructive knowledge suffices.

Windmill Inns of America, Inc. v. Cauvin · filed 2019-10-02(1)

On that record, where Windmill claims ignorance of its own agreement, we agree with the trial court that Windmill failed to offer evidence to permit a reasonable inference that it did not know the contract price. ... The trial court did not err in granting the Cauvins’ motions for summary judgment to dismiss Windmill’s tort claims. ... And, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing Windmill’s tort claims as barred by ORS 12.110.

Section 12.110’s two-year discovery-based limitations period does not govern survival or wrongful-death claims when a more specific statute supplies the applicable limitations period.

Calhoon v. Thierolf · filed 2021-03-26

Plaintiff contends that the appropriate limitations period is found in ORS 12.110, which runs for two years from “either the discovery of the injury or the date it should have been discovered.” Guiletti v. Oncology Assoc. of Oregon, P.C., 178 Or. App. 260, 264 (2001). Plaintiff contends that he did not discover the injury until 2018 and initiated this action within two years of that discovery. ... This argument is unavailing. ORS 12.010 provides that actions “shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, “where there is a different limitation prescribed by a statute outside of the confines of ORS chapter 12, then that statute will control.” Giulietti, 178 Or. App. at 265. The limitations period in ORS 30.075 applies “to all personal injury action where the decedent dies before the action is brought” and “ORS 12.190 applies to all other actions where the decedent dies before the action is brought.” Giulietti, 178 Or. App. at 266.

Section 12.110(1) applies a discovery rule to personal-injury claims: the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause, without needing to know the full extent of the injury.

Clark v. Gilstrap · filed 2024-05-30(1)

The statute of limitations for a personal injury claim under ORS 12.110(1) is subject to the “discovery rule,” such that the statute of limitations does not begin until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known that they were injured, and that the defendant caused the injury. ... However, there is no requirement that a plaintiff discover the full extent of their injuries. ... Rather, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to know that “some harm has been incurred and that a claim exists.”

Section 12.110(1) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period that, in this case, ran from the date of injury, treated as the insurer’s coverage-denial date.

Oregon Aero Inc. v. Navigators Insurance Company · filed 2025-03-31(1)

As the negligence per se claim is a tort claim based on an alleged negligent investigation and delay in issuing a decision, it is reasonable to consider that date to be the date of injury for purposes of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, neither the Policy's time limit provision nor the applicable Oregon statute of limitations bar this action.

Section 12.110(1) gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period that starts when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the facts showing harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Hill v. Fairfield Columbia Ridge, LLC · filed 2026-03-25(1)

Negligence claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under ORS 12.110(1). A negligence claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known facts establishing harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations defense, but a factual dispute about when a claim accrued can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

Mears v. Marshall · filed 1995-10-25

Finally, we address Marshall’s contention that even if summary judgment was not appropriately granted on preemption, plaintiffs claims are time barred by the two-year statute of limitations under ORS 12.110. Plaintiff responds that the statute of limitations defense was not raised below and that, therefore, it cannot be raised on appeal as a ground for affirming summary judgment. We disagree. Marshall made a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court did not address that motion, because it granted summary judgment on the ground of preemption. There is a factual dispute about when each of plaintiffs claims against Marshall accrued.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation for injuries not arising on contract does not govern a common-law indemnity action because indemnity is treated as an implied-contract claim covered by the six-year limitation period.

Owings v. Rose · filed 1972-06-01(1)

This court has classified a common-law action for indemnity as an action on an implied contract. ... Although it may be incongruous to require a tort action to be brought within two years and permit an indemnity action based on essentially the same facts to be brought at any time within six years after payment on the tort claim, the theory that indemnity is based on an implied contract is well established. As the legislature, in the statute of limitations, specifically provided for implied contracts, we think the statute should be held to cover indemnity actions. ... We hold that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action.

Section 12.110(1) governs actions for tortious injury, but not a reformation action seeking relief for mutual mistake because such a mistake does not involve tortious conduct.

Woodriff v. Ashcraft · filed 1972-11-24(1)

OES 12.110(1) governs actions for relief from tortious conduct. ... A suit for reformation for mutual mistake seeks relief from a mistake, and a mistake, when proved, does not involve tortious conduct within the contemplation of OBS 12.110(1). The term “mistake” does not imply dishonesty. ... This mistake implies some degree of carelessness hut it was merely an unintentional error.

The two-year tort limitations period applies based on the gravamen or predominant characteristic of the action, rather than the plaintiff’s chosen form of pleading.

Lindemeier v. Walker · filed 1975-08-07

We see no reason to depart from our decisions in Dowell and Bales, and we find that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was controlled by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions, OES 12.110, and therefore the trial court acted properly in sustaining defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitation on negligence actions for injury to another's rights when no more specific Chapter 12 provision applies.

Port of Portland v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. · filed 1983-03-02(1)

If defendant’s injury is an injury to personal property, then it had six years in which to file under ORS 12.080(4). Otherwise, it had two years under ORS 12.110(1), and its claim is time barred. Defendant’s claim is clearly one for economic loss caused by the unavailability of the crane. Its action resulted from an injury to personal property, but defendant’s is not an “action for * * * [injury to] personal property.” Plaintiff, which owns the property, has suffered an injury to the property itself. Whatever a party’s right might be to sue for injury to property in which it has a leasehold interest when the alleged tortfeasor is a third party, it has no right of action for injury to the property when the alleged tortfeasor owns the property. It follows that defendant’s counterclaim for negligence was governed by ORS 12.110(1) and was therefore time barred.

Section 12.110(1) supplies the two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 actions, and a period ending on Sunday extends to the following Monday under § 174.120.

Michael Sain Ryan White Lori J. Sain, Personally and as Next Friend for Crystal Sain v. City of Bend Buck Church Tom Pine Al Campbell · filed 2002-10-29(1)

Under our precedent, as well as that of the Oregon state courts, the district court should have applied Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110 to plaintiffs’ complaint. ... Plaintiffs complaint is timely under Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110, even without resort to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 6(a). Although both Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.275(8) and Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1) provide for a two-year limitations period, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that Or.Rev.Stat. § 174.120 applies to the computation of the statute of limitations in Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1).

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions that do not arise on contract and are not otherwise enumerated in the chapter.

Bowers · filed 2026-05-06(1)

The six-year limitations period set forth in ORS 12.080(3) does not apply because the action is not one for interference with or injury to a property interest. Plaintiff’s negligence claim is subject to the two-year limitations period set out in ORS 12.110(1) because it does not arise on contract and is not subject to any other enumerated limitations period.

ORS 12.110(1)'s two-year period does not govern a personal-injury action pleaded as a Uniform Commercial Code breach-of-warranty claim when the Code supplies a specific four-year limitation.

Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Company · filed 1973-07-19(1)

ORS 12.110 (1) is not so specific in its terms. ... We agree with these courts, for the reasons we have stated, and hold that an action for personal injuries caused by a breach of the warranties implied in a contract for the sale of goods, by virtue of our Commercial Code, may be brought within four years after the accrual of the cause of action.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation period does not govern nuisance actions; nuisance actions are subject to the six-year period in ORS 12.080(3).

Ward v. Jarnport · filed 1992-11-04(1)

Defendants, perhaps relying on cases that were decided under an older version of that statute, e.g., Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or 86, 88, 342 P2d 790 (1960), erroneously assert that the limitation period for nuisance is governed by the two-year limit in ORS 12.110(1).

Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period for nontrespassory injuries to land.

MARTIN ET UX v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 1959-07-29

If the defendant’s conduct created a nuisance and not a trespass the defendant would be liable only for such damage as resulted from its conduct during a period of ... two years immediately preceding the date upon which plaintiffs’ action was instituted.

The two-year limitations period applies to injuries to another's rights that do not arise from contract, while the six-year period applies to breaches of contract.

Ashley v. Fletcher · filed 1976-06-24

The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant breached his contract to perform architectural services by failing to supervise construction, failing to make inspections, etc. Plaintiff contends the six-year statute of limitations applicable to breaches of contract (ORS 12.080) should apply. The trial court held the two-year statute (ORS 12.110), applicable to injuries to the rights of another not arising on contract, applied. Its decision was in accord with our decision in Bales for Food v. Poole, 246 Or 253, 424 P2d 892 (1967), in which we . examined and rejected a contention similar to that now advanced by plaintiff. Affirmed.

Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitation for injuries to a person or another’s rights not otherwise specifically enumerated in the chapter, subject to its stated fraud-discovery proviso.

Coe v. STATESMAN-JOURNAL COMPANY · filed 1977-02-03(1)

Plaintiff is mistaken. There is no statute of limitations which covers actions of negligence specifically. ORS 12.110(1) provides: ... This statute is a catchall, covering all injuries to persons or the rights of another not specifically enumerated in the chapter. Defamation is specifically enumerated in the chapter by ORS 12.120(2).

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for injury to another's person or rights not arising on contract to be commenced within two years, while an action based on fraud or deceit accrues for limitations purposes only upon discovery of the fraud or deceit.

Compton v. Oregon State Highway Commission · filed 1977-12-05(1)

Assuming, arguendo, that "conspiracy to commit fraud” was the cause of action plaintiffs sought to allege, there are two different effective times when the statute of limitations commences to run. An action for conspiracy must be commenced within two years from the last overt act4 whereas the statute of limitations for fraud commences only upon "discovery” of the fraud.5 Thus the question of law is, when does the statute of limitations for "conspiracy to commit fraud” commence to run? The answer becomes apparent upon analyzing the nature of fraud. Since fraud requires that plaintiffs justifiably rely upon defendant’s representations, any further acts by defendants after discovery of the fraud by plaintiffs would not be actionable. Therefore, for purposes of the statute of limitations the last overt act in furtherance of the alleged fraud must have occurred prior to discovery of that fraud.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year fraud limitation runs from discovery of the fraud; the court rejected a claim that the action was untimely because the fraud was discovered more than two years earlier.

2-D's Logging, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1981-08-31(1)

We reject defendant’s statute of limitations argument for the same reasons we rejected the time of discovery proposition in its waiver argument.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation applies to separately actionable discrete acts, and labeling them elements of a continuing tort does not revive otherwise time-barred claims.

Davis v. Bostick · filed 1978-06-20(1)

Separately considered, the 1973 and early 1974 acts were then beyond legal reach. We hold that she was not entitled to revive their actionability by designating them merely as elements of a single tort. The trial court erred in striking the statute of limitations defense.

The two-year limitations period for an occupational-disease injury begins when a reasonably prudent person associates the symptoms with a serious or permanent condition and perceives the defendant's role in causing it.

Schiele v. Hobart Corp. · filed 1978-12-05(1)

These cases stand for the proposition that the statute of limitations on claims involving negligent infliction of an occupational disease does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or as a reasonably prudent person should know, that he has the condition for which his action is brought and that defendant has caused it. Plaintiff’s actionable condition in this case is alleged to be her permanent injuries. However, it still remains to be determined exactly what type of knowledge plaintiff must have before it should be said that she knew or should have known of her condition. ... The statute of limitations begins to run when a reasonably prudent person associates his symptoms with a serious or permanent condition and at the same time perceives the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condition.

Section 12.110(4)'s two-year medical-malpractice limitation applies to actions for injuries to the person, but not to this wrongful-death action, which is governed by ORS 30.020(1).

Baxter v. Zeller · filed 1979-10-29(4)

We note first that ORS 12.110(4) speaks of "[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person." (Emphasis added.) By contrast, ORS 30.020(1) applies "[w]hen the death of a person is caused by [a] wrongful act." (Emphasis added.) This is a death case, but the applicability of ORS 30.020(1) derives from more than a label.

Section 12.110(2) applies only to actions upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state or county, not to an action to recover unlawfully obtained public assistance that is in the nature of money had and received.

Adult & Family Services Division v. Scoggins · filed 1980-12-15(2)

The court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Plaintiff’s action to recover public assistance unlawfully obtained was not an action "for a forfeiture or penalty.” It was in the nature of a claim for money had and received. Therefore ORS 12.110(2) was not applicable.

Section 12.110(2) requires an action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state or county to be commenced within two years, but that limitation does not apply to a habitual traffic offender proceeding because the proceeding is neither a forfeiture nor a penalty.

State v. Renteria · filed 1982-10-13(2)

After the trial of this case, this court held in State v. Norton, 57 Or App 679, 646 P2d 53 (1982), with one judge dissenting, that the two-year limitation in ORS 12.110(2) was applicable, because the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act imposed either a “penalty” or a “forfeiture.” A majority of the court, sitting in banc, now concludes that Norton was decided wrongly; it is overruled. ... Although the status of habitual offender imposes severe restrictions on the offender’s right to drive an automobile, those restrictions do not amount to a forfeiture. ... It is equally difficult to characterize this proceeding as an action for a penalty. The Act does not provide a fine or imprisonment as a result of a determination that the driver is a habitual offender: “* * * Act is not intended to punish habitual offenders; there is no such crime as being a habitual offender. The purpose of the Act is to protect the public. * * *”

Section 12.110(2)'s two-year limitation does not govern a habitual-traffic-offender proceeding; loss of driving privileges is a penalty or forfeiture subject to ORS 12.210 instead.

State v. Norton · filed 1982-06-09(2)

Whether loss of driving privileges under the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act is analyzed as a penalty or a forfeiture, ORS 12.210 is the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for injury to a person's rights not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated to be commenced within two years, except that fraud or deceit claims run from discovery of the fraud or deceit.

Guyot v. Multnomah County · filed 1981-03-30(1)

The relevant events occurred and were known to plaintiff more than two years before he brought this action.

Section 12.110(1) governs tort actions for injury to a person or another’s rights that do not arise on contract, rather than a straightforward action for breach of a contract for the sale of improved real property.

Beveridge v. King · filed 1981-05-05(1)

It seems clear enough that the two statutes referred to make that classic distinction, and although life has become more sophisticated justifying some inroads on the clear delineation [ORS 12.135(1) and malpractice cases are examples], we see no purpose or justification in muddying the water further. ... We perceive no reason why any decision should have addressed it because it is clear that this action is a straight forward one for breach of contract for the sale of improved real property, and, as such, is governed by ORS 12.080(1).

ORS 12.110(4)'s limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or should know through diligent inquiry facts from which a reasonable factfinder could find injury, causation, and some negligence; knowledge of the full extent or precise nature of the negligence is unnecessary.

Duncan v. Augter · filed 1983-03-16(4)

To start the running of the statute of limitations, a plaintiff need not have knowledge of facts that, if proved, would convince every reasonable factfinder that plaintiff should win. It is sufficient that a plaintiff have knowledge, actual or implied, of facts that, if proved, will at least raise an issue of fact on each element of the claim. Therefore, a plaintiff has discovered a cause of action and ORS 12.110(4) begins to run when he knows, or should know through diligent inquiry, facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the plaintiffs injury was caused by an act of the defendant that was somehow negligent.

In a legal-malpractice action, § 12.110(1)'s two-year period runs when the malpractice is discovered (or should have been discovered) and harm has occurred; actionable harm exists upon entry of judgment even if the ultimate damages are not yet certain.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Speerstra · filed 1983-06-22(1)

The chronology of events relevant to the issue of whether plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed within the two-year statute of limitations provided by ORS 12.110(1) follows: ... The statute of limitations begins to run at the time the cause of action accrues. ORS 12.010. In a legal malpractice case, the statute starts running when the malpractice is discovered (or should have been discovered) and harm has occurred. ... Even if the appeal had been successful and a more favorable verdict had been rendered in plaintiffs’ behalf (as defendants or insurers in the medical malpractice case) on retrial, plaintiffs nevertheless suffered harm at the time of the entry of the judgment. At that time, they were required to pay the $800,000 judgment or the cost of an appeal (and the cost of a new trial if the appeal were successful). We conclude that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs had incurred actionable harm by the time of the entry of the judgment.

The discovery rule can toll the two-year limitation period until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known facts indicating the existence of a cause of action, and whether that point was reached is a fact question when supported by evidence.

Peterson v. Multnomah County School District No. 1 · filed 1983-08-03(1), (4)

It is settled law that, if the time of discovery rule is legally applicable and if there is supporting evidence, it is a fact question whether or not the plaintiff did discover or reasonably should have discovered the existence of his cause of action against the defendant within two years before bringing an action subject to ORS 12.110(1).

The limitations period for a beneficiary’s negligence claim against a trustee begins when the beneficiary knows or reasonably should know that the trustee’s alleged negligence caused damage.

Condon v. Bank of California, N.A. · filed 1988-08-24

The trial court apparently agreed with defendant’s contention that the two year limitation period, ORS 12.110, began to run on the occurrence of the alleged negligence. ... We hold that the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the beneficiary knows, or reasonably should know, that he was damaged by the trustee’s alleged negligence.

Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence and fraud claims, accruing when harm occurs, its probable cause is apparent, and the negligence is or should have been discovered.

Jaquith v. Ferris · filed 1983-09-21(1)

The limitation period for the negligence of the real estate brokers and for fraud is two years. ORS 12.110(1). ... The period of limitation for a negligence action begins to run when harm occurs, it appears reasonably probable that the harm was caused by the negligence of defendants and the negligence was or should have been discovered. U. S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 548 P2d 966 (1976); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Speerstra, 63 Or App 533, 666 P2d 255 (1983). ... All of these requirements were met, and plaintiffs causes of action accrued at the latest by May 19, 1978.

Section 12.110 imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, beginning when the fraud is discovered.

Ogan v. Ellison · filed 1984-05-01

As to the claims based on fraud, the statute of limitations of two years commences from the date of the discovery of the fraud. ORS 12.110; Carey v. Hays, 248 Or 444, 450, 434 P2d 331, (1967). The date of the discovery of the fraud is a disputed fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for injuries to a person or another's rights that do not arise from contract and are not otherwise enumerated to be filed within two years, with fraud or deceit measured from discovery.

Medo-Bel Creamery v. State of Oregon · filed 1983-11-23(1)

ORS 12.110(1) provides: ... "An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit." (Emphasis supplied.) ... Under either statute, plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action, which are not based on contract, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation does not apply when the alleged injuries are to another's interest in real property and the action is specifically enumerated under § 12.080(3).

Taylor v. Settecase · filed 1984-07-18(1)

Therefore, they are “especially enumerated in * * * chapter [12]” and are outside the ambit of ORS 12.110(1).

Section 12.110(1) applies only when an action neither arises on a contract nor is specifically covered by another limitations provision; an action covered by § 12.080(3) is governed by that six-year limitation instead.

Sutter v. Bingham Construction, Inc. · filed 1986-08-27(1)

In order for ORS 12.110(1) to apply, the action must not arise on a contract and must not be an action specifically covered by another limitation.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation for injury to a person's rights applies to § 1983 claims, with the period beginning when the discriminatory act occurs.

Sanok v. Grimes · filed 1988-07-26(1)

For this reason, plaintiffs’ claim under section 1983 is governed by the two-year limit of ORS 12.110, rather than the similar limit of ORS 30.275(8). The Wilson court specifically held that state limitations periods for statutory claims would not apply in section 1983 actions. Id. at 278-79.

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for injury to a person's rights not arising on contract to be brought within two years, and provides that fraud or deceit claims accrue on discovery of the fraud or deceit.

Jaquith v. Ferris · filed 1984-09-18(1)

Plaintiffs contractual obligation itself constituted harm. ... Her discovery of this harm in May, 1978, commenced the running of the limitation period.

For malpractice claims against attorneys and accountants, the two-year period begins when the claimant is damaged and knows or should know that the defendants’ negligence caused the damage.

Godfrey v. Bick & Monte, P.C. · filed 1986-01-29(1)

The Statute of Limitations in malpractice actions against attorneys and accountants is two years. ORS 12.110(1). A cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a potential plaintiff has been damaged and becomes aware, or should have become aware, that defendants’ negligence was the cause of the damage.

ORS 12.110(4)'s discovery rule begins the limitation period when the plaintiff knows or should know that they have a claim, even before they know the full extent or nature of the harm.

Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation District · filed 1986-08-13(4)

We conclude that here, as in Duncan, plaintiffs knew more than two years before bringing the action that they had a claim and the statute did not remain tolled until they learned the full extent or nature of their harm or all of the facts which they might ultimately be able to advance to support their claim. The negligence claim was time-barred as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitations period applies to tort claims, but it does not govern a contract-breach action merely because the defendant's conduct could also constitute fraud or another tort.

Erickson Hardwood Co. v. North Pacific Lumber Co. · filed 1984-10-31(1)

«* * * ORS 12.110 certainly does not contemplate that a defendant can defeat an action for breach of his contract by asserting that, independent of the contract, his own conduct constituted a tort, whether negligence or, for instance, fraud.” ... Thus, the complaint alleged specific breaches of the contract. ... Even though the claimed breach sounds in fraud or deceit, i.e., in tort, we agree with the trial court that the action was in contract. It was timely filed. ORS 12.080.

Section 12.110(1) requires a legal-malpractice action to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Korgan v. Gantenbein · filed 1985-06-26(1)

An action for legal malpractice must be commenced within two years of its accrual. ... The emphasized provision of ORCP 7D(2)(b) applies to time periods provided in ORCP and does not apply to time periods provided elsewhere. In particular, it has no application to the time periods found in ORS 12.110.

Section 12.110(1) requires a legal-malpractice action to be filed within two years after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff reasonably knows of the harm and that the attorney's negligence probably caused it.

Magnuson v. Lake · filed 1986-04-16(1)

An action for legal malpractice must be commenced within two years of its accrual. ORS 12.110(1); ... A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is or should reasonably be aware of the occurrence of harm and that the negligence of the attorney was the probable cause of the harm. ... Plaintiffs’ cause of action had accrued in June, 1979, and their claim, filed on July 27, 1983, was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period, and whether a plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered a legal-malpractice claim more than two years before filing can be a fact question for the trier of fact.

Werschky v. Moore · filed 1985-09-18(1)

This is a legal malpractice action, in which the trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendant on all but one of plaintiffs claims on the ground that they were barred by the two-year Statute of Limitations. ORS 12.110(1). ... Plaintiff argues that the granting of the partial summary judgment was error, because there was a question of fact as to whether he did discover or reasonably should have discovered his claim against defendant more than two years before the time he instituted this action. ... However, such inferences are for the trier of fact to draw, and such a finding is for the trier of fact to make. ... The trial court erred by granting the partial summary judgment.

Section 12.110(4) permits a misleading representation about postoperative results to toll the five-year medical-malpractice limitation period when it prevents discovery of negligent treatment, even if innocent; a representation concerning the very act whose negligent performance is alleged does not toll the period, and standalone fraud claims fall outside subsection (4).

Skuffeeda v. St. Vincent Hospital & Medical Center · filed 1986-01-29(4)

Plaintiff, therefore, alleged a “misleading representation” within the meaning of ORS 12.110(4). ... Accordingly, it does not toll the five-year period as to these two specifications. ... It is an independent breach of a doctor’s duty to the patient and, if it prevents the patient from discovering the doctor’s careless performance of the surgery, it tolls the statute, even if it is “innocent.” ORS 12.110(4), therefore, does not bar three of plaintiffs specifications, and the court erred in dismissing count III. ... Although ORS 12.110(4) applies to any “action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation,” we hold that an action for fraud is not one that arises out of medical treatment and that it falls outside the ambit of ORS 12.110(4).

For a legal-malpractice claim, the two-year period starts only when harm occurs and the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both of the harm and that the defendant caused it.

Knight v. Rew · filed 1986-06-04(1)

The Statute of Limitations in a legal malpractice claim is two years. ORS 12.110(1). The period of limitations does not begin to run until (1) the harm occurs; (2) the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the harm; and (3) the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the harm was caused by the defendant.

Section 12.110(1) gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that does not begin until the plaintiff is damaged and knows or reasonably should know that the defendant's negligence caused the damage.

Smith v. Mensing · filed 1987-07-08(1)

The Statute of Limitations in legal malpractice actions is two years. ORS 12.110(1); Godfrey v. Bick & Monte, 77 Or App 429, 432, 713 P2d 655, rev den 301 Or 165 (1986). That period does not begin to run until the plaintiff has been damaged and becomes aware, or reasonably should have become aware, that the defendant’s negligence has caused the damage. U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 667-69, 548 P2d 966 (1976).

For medical-treatment injury claims, subsection (4) gives two years from when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

O'Gara v. Kaufman · filed 1986-10-08(4)

“An action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” ... “Alleging that the injury “did not manifest itself’ until December 23, 1982, can be understood to mean that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury was not discoverable until that time. On the basis of the allegations in the amended complaint, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the Statute of Limitations has run.”

Section 12.110(1) starts the limitations period when the plaintiff discovers the injury, although pleaded waiver and estoppel may prevent dismissal on limitations grounds as a matter of law.

Hale v. Groce · filed 1986-12-17(1)

Plaintiff brought the action more than two years after she discovered that she had not been named a beneficiary. See ORS 12.110(1). Defendant argues that, contrary to plaintiffs allegation, her right of action accrued by that discovery rather than after her reformation action proved unavailing. Defendant is correct. See Jaquith v. Ferris, 297 Or 783, 687 P2d 1083 (1984). However, plaintiffs estoppel and waiver allegations preclude the dismissal of the action on the theory that it is barred by the Statute of Limitations as a matter of law.

Section 12.110(4) requires a medical malpractice action to be commenced within five years after the treatment on which it is based, even if the injury was discovered later.

Cornell v. Merck & Co. · filed 1987-09-09(4)

Thus, although plaintiff has alleged that he did not discover that the drug caused side effects until 1984 and he filed his complaint in December, 1985, because ORS 12.110(4) provides that a medical malpractice action must be commenced within five years from the date of the treatment, the action is time-barred.

A misleading representation tolls § 12.110(4)’s medical-malpractice repose period only as to a defendant responsible for the misinformation and sufficiently related to the claimed negligence; contemporaneousness ends when the maker learns facts indicating that the procedure went wrong.

Jones v. Salem Hospital · filed 1988-10-05(4)

Neither Duncan nor Skuffeeda answers whether ORS 12.110(4) can be tolled as to a physician’s own negligent acts or omissions by misleading representations which he makes regarding the unrelated negligence of another doctor. Logically, the answer must be no, because misrepresentations which have no bearing on any negligence in which the speaker was involved cannot mislead a plaintiff into delaying an action based on that negligence. At the same time, both Duncan and Skuffeeda make it clear that an innocent or careless misrepresentation can toll the statute only as to a defendant who is “responsible for the misinformation.” ... We conclude that contemporaneousness ends when the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know information which he did not have at the time of the negligently performed procedure or its immediate aftermath and which reasonably indicates that something in the performance of or related to the procedure went wrong.

Section 12.110(4)'s two-year medical-malpractice period runs from discovery of the injury or when it reasonably should have been discovered, and whether misleading representations delayed reasonable discovery can be a fact question.

Asher v. Hald · filed 1990-03-07(4)

In a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time a plaintiff discovers, or ought *634to have discovered, a claim.

Section 12.110(4)'s discovery rule is objective: facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry can start the period even without the plaintiff's subjective knowledge.

Dew v. DeJong · filed 1991-01-23(4)

The fact that she lacked “subjective knowledge” of *259her claim cannot assist her, because that knowledge was discoverable through the inquiry that she was required, but failed, to conduct.

Section 12.110(1)'s legal-malpractice period is tolled until the client discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the attorney's negligence caused damages, and whether that occurred can be a fact question.

Robertson v. Jessup · filed 1992-12-30(1)

That question is one of fact, and we cannot say as a matter of law that the Statute of Limitations had run.

The two-year limitations period for a professional negligence claim begins when the plaintiff knows or should know, through diligent inquiry, facts indicating that the injury was caused by a possibly negligent act.

O'Gara v. Ptacek · filed 1989-04-05(4)

The test is whether plaintiff knew or should have known “through diligent inquiry, facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiffs injury was caused by an act of defendant that was somehow negligent.” ... On this record, the first time plaintiff knew or had a reason to know that she had a cause of action against Ptacek was in December, 1982, when she learned of the damage to her internal organs. Her December 6,1984, complaint was timely filed.

Section 12.110(1)’s two-year limitations period applies to negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims that accrued before suit, but a claim based on specific contractual obligations is not necessarily governed by that period.

R.A. Hatch Co. v. American Insurance · filed 1990-01-16(1)

The court finds that as a matter of law, the claims of Hatch and Hatch Co. accrued before September, 1987. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are barred by O.R.S. 12.110. Accordingly, American’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for claims based on a non-contractual relationship.

Association of Unit Owners of the Inn at Otter Crest v. Far West Federal Bank · filed 1993-05-12(1)

If the basis of the claim is non-contractual, then the two-year statute of limitations applies. ORS 12.110(1). If, however, the claim is contractual, then the six-year statute of limitations applies. ORS 12.080(1). The pleadings allege a “joint venture” in the operation of the Inn, but they do not allege any specific contract or other relationship with defendants that gives rise to the fiduciary duties that were allegedly breached. Because we cannot determine from the face of the pleadings whether the relationships and duties were of a contractual or non-contractual nature, we cannot determine which statute of limitations applies or whether dismissal was proper. We remand for findings on that issue.

Section 12.110(1)'s catch-all limitation does not apply to a false-light claim based on facts that also constitute defamation; the specific defamation limitation controls.

Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1990-10-10(1)

That being the case, we conclude that the specific defamation Statute of Limitations controls. To hold otherwise would permit a plaintiff to elect the longer limitation period of ORS 12.110(1) simply by characterizing a defamation claim as one for false light. We conclude that, when a claim characterized as false light alleges facts that also constitute a claim for defamation, the claim must be filed within the period for bringing a defamation claim.

Section 12.110(4)’s five-year medical-malpractice repose period does not apply to claims under the Oregon Tort Claims Act because ORS 30.275(8)’s notwithstanding clause supersedes it.

O'BRIEN v. State · filed 1990-10-17(4)

We agree with plaintiff that the “notwithstanding” clause of ORS 30.275(8) makes ORS 12.110(4) inapplicable to this action. ... Similarly, ORS 12.110(4) is a provision of ORS chapter 12, and ORS 30.275(8) precludes its application to OTCA claims.

Section 12.110(1) gives legal-malpractice actions a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff is harmed and knows or should know that the defendant caused the harm.

Stevens v. Bispham · filed 1991-09-04(1)

The trial court granted summary judgment against William on the basis of ORS 12.110(1), which requires an action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued. A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the plaintiff is in fact harmed and knows or should know that the defendant’s conduct has caused the harm.

Section 12.110(1) gives a legal-malpractice claim a two-year filing period, which begins when the plaintiff is harmed and knows or should know that the defendant caused the harm; when the underlying litigation is unresolved, accrual waits until the judgment resolving it.

Barnard v. Lannan · filed 1992-04-22(1)

A legal malpractice action accrues when the plaintiff is in fact harmed and knows, or should know, that defendant’s conduct has caused the harm. ... In this case, the litigation that precipitated the malpractice action against Crist reached the point of resolution when the court entered its judgment of dismissal of plaintiffs action against Adair. ... Until entry of the judgment of dismissal, there existed the possibility that the court still would resolve the claim against Adair in plaintiffs’ favor, obviating a malpractice claim against Crist. ... Plaintiffs’ claim against defendant accrued when a judgment was entered in Crist’s favor on November 11,1983. Defendant timely filed the action against Crist on October 30, 1985.

Section 12.110 supplies the tort limitations period when a contract claim alleges breach of a general duty of care that exists independently of the contract.

Georgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home Insurance · filed 1992-05-01

If the alleged contract merely incorporates by reference or by implication a general standard of skill and care to which the defendant would be bound independent of the contract, and the alleged breach would also be a breach of this noncontractual duty, then ORS 12.110 [the tort statute of limitations] applies.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limit on noncontract injury claims, and these negligence and misrepresentation claims accrued when plaintiff and her attorney knew or had reason to know of the claims.

McNeely v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1992-09-16(1)

Plaintiff brought this action against defendants for negligence and negligent and intentional misrepresentations concerning medical insurance coverage. The trial court concluded that the action was barred by the two-year Statute of Limitations, ORS 12.110(1),1 and granted a summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. ... The court did not err in holding that plaintiffs claims accrued in January, 1986, rather than in May, 1988. The attorney’s letter demonstrates that plaintiff and her attorney had knowledge or reason to know that plaintiff had a claim against defendants by the 1986 date. Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or 151, 742 P2d 1176 (1987).

For medical-malpractice actions, the statute imposes a five-year period of ultimate repose running from the treatment, omission, or operation, regardless of when the claim accrued, treatment ceased, or negligence was discovered.

Lesch v. DeWitt · filed 1993-03-03(4)

We conclude that any claim brought on the continuous tort theory is subject to the five-year period of ultimate repose. Under the express terms of ORS 12.110(4), the ultimate repose period is five years from the act or omission complained of. ... By its terms, it bars plaintiff from seeking recovery for damages due to treatment she received from defendant more than five years before the action was commenced.

For criminal-defense malpractice, § 12.110(1)'s two-year period does not begin until the client is exonerated, because legally cognizable harm occurs only then.

Stevens v. Bispham · filed 1993-05-13(1)

We hold that, in order for one convicted of a criminal offense to bring an action for professional negligence against that person’s criminal defense counsel, the person must, in addition to alleging a duty, its breach, and causation, allege “harm” in that the person has been exonerated of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief proceedings, or otherwise. ... Plaintiff could not have brought this action until he had suffered legally cognizable harm. ... Plaintiff had not suffered such harm at defendant’s hands in this case unless and until he was exonerated of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief proceedings, or otherwise. Here, he legally was exonerated by a means that qualifies as “otherwise.” But the date of that exoneration — the date on which his conviction was set aside and he was released — was well within two years of the date on which the present action was filed. The trial court’s ruling that the harm had occurred more than two years before the complaint was filed therefore was error.

Section 12.110(4)'s tolling provision for misleading representations does not apply when the alleged misleading statements are the same as and contemporaneous with the negligent medical treatment.

McKechnie v. Stanke · filed 1993-08-04(4)

Plaintiffs, however, misread Jones and ignore Duncan. The “additional information” that they argue provides the basis for tolling the statute of limitations is the same information that provides the basis for their allegations of negligence. In essence, they allege that defendants were negligent in failing to correctly diagnose and treat Shawn, in view of his recurring urinary tract infections and other repeated symptoms and complaints. At the same time, they argue that defendants made misleading representations — which should toll the statute of ultimate repose — by failing to correctly diagnose and treat Shawn, in view of his recurring urinary tract infections and other repeated symptoms and complaints. Thus, the misleading statements are, as in Duncan, identical to and contemporaneous with the very negligence that is the basis of plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year tort limitation does not govern claims whose real character is an express or implied contract; those claims are subject to the six-year contract limitation.

Jaqua v. Nike, Inc. · filed 1993-12-15(1)

The issue is whether plaintiffs claim sounds in tort or in contract. If the complaint sounds in tort, the statute of limitations is two years and the complaint was correctly dismissed; if it sounds in contract, the statute of limitations is six years, and the dismissal was incorrect. ... After reviewing the complaint, considering plaintiff s theory as to the source of defendant’s legal liability and the claimed measure of damages, we conclude that his first claim for relief sounds in contract. ... After reviewing the second claim and considering plaintiffs theory of the legal source of defendant’s liability and the claimed measure of damages, we conclude that his second claim for relief also sounds in contract. ... The statute of limitations for actions on express or implied contracts is six years. ORS 12.080. It was error for the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs claims as untimely.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation applies to injury-to-rights claims based on a general, noncontractual standard of care rather than a specific contractual duty.

South Lake Center Partnership v. Waker Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-08-10(1)

As noted, South Lake has pleaded that Waker breached the contract in four particulars: (1) “failure to prepare the design for the storm drainage, sanitary and water systems”; (2) “failure to prepare and record the easement”; (3) “failure to properly place the storm drain offset stakes”; and (4) “failure to provide observation of the work in progress.” Applying the Securities-Intermountain methodology, we have carefully reviewed Waker’s contract to determine whether each of these particulars is derived from a contractually specified duty of performance. We conclude that allegations (1) and (4) sound in contract, and allegations (2) and (3) do not. ... Thus, the alleged breach referred to a general standard of care, and not to a contractually prescribed duty of performance.

The two-year period in ORS 12.110(4) applies to damages claims arising from medical treatment when the claim's real character is tort rather than a contract claim based on specifically promised performance.

Dauven v. St. Vincent Hospital & Medical Center · filed 1994-10-19(4)

If the complaint sounds in tort, the statute of limitations is two years and the complaint was correctly dismissed; if it sounds in contract, the statute of limitations is six years, and the dismissal was incorrect. To decide that issue, we review the complaint and determine its “real” character. ... In an action for damages against one engaged to provide professional services, “[i]f the alleged contract merely incorporates by reference or implication a general standard of skill and care to which the defendant would be bound independent of the contract, and the alleged breach would also be a breach of this contractual duty, then ORS 12.110 applies. * * * Conversely, the parties may have spelled out the performance expected by plaintiff and promised by the defendant in terms that commit the defendant to this performance without reference to and irrespective of any general standard. Such a defendant would be hable on the contract whether he was negligent or not, and regardless of facts that might excuse him from tort liability. ’ ’ 289 Or at 259. (Citation omitted.)

Section 12.110(4) does not apply to claims against a blood supplier for providing prepared blood because that conduct is not medical treatment; the applicable two-year limitations rule is § 12.110(1), whose period is tolled while the plaintiff reasonably fails to discover the injury.

Doe v. American Red Cross · filed 1994-05-11(4), (1)

The analogy between a blood supplier and a supplier of pharmaceuticals is persuasive. ... We hold that a person who provides a prepared product, such as blood, for general use in medical procedures, does not thereby undertake medical treatment. Because plaintiffs claims do not arise from medical treatment within the meaning of ORS 12.110(4), that provision does not apply to this case. ... The applicable statute of limitations is ORS 12.110(1), which provides that an action ‘ ‘for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall he commenced within two years[.]” ... That statute is tolled during a period in which the plaintiff reasonably fails to discover the injury.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation period begins when an actionable injury to the contractual relationship occurs; emotional distress alone is not that injury.

Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. · filed 1994-08-03(1)

Therefore, MBL concluded, when plaintiff filed his complaint on December 12, 1989, it was beyond the applicable two-year limitation period. ORS 12.110(1). ... To maintain a claim for interference with contractual relations, an injury to the contractual relation must be established. ... Conduct that causes a plaintiff to suffer stress in the performance of his or her contract is not sufficient. ... Accordingly, MBL’s argument that it established that plaintiff suffered an injury to his contractual relation with BanCal in early 1987 fails, as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in disposing of the statute of limitations defense.

Section 12.110(1) starts the limitations period for fraudulent misrepresentation when the plaintiff discovers the fraud or learns facts sufficient to require an inquiry.

Allen v. Lawrence · filed 1995-10-11(1)

The statute of limitations begins to run on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim when the plaintiff either discovers the fraud or has knowledge of facts sufficient to call for an inquiry.

Section 12.110(4)'s five-year medical-malpractice repose period runs from the treatment, omission, or operation and is absolute unless fraud, deceit, or misleading representation prevents timely filing; a continuing-treatment theory does not delay it.

Urbick Ex Rel. Urbick v. Suburban Medical Clinic, Inc. · filed 1996-06-19(4)

The triggering event for the five-year period of ultimate repose is “the date of the treatment, omission or operation upon which the action is based.”

For purposes of § 12.110, an injury is legally cognizable harm consisting of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, and the period begins when reasonable care should reveal a substantial possibility of each element.

Gaspar v. Village Missions · filed 1998-06-10(1)

For purposes of ORS 12.110, an injury is a legally cognizable harm consisting of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.

For claims not arising from medical treatment, subsection (1)'s two-year period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts showing a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct; subsection (4)'s medical-treatment repose period does not apply merely because blood is supplied for a medical procedure.

Doe v. American Red Cross · filed 1996-02-01(1), (4)

On plaintiff’s appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that a person who provides a prepared product, such as blood, for general use in medical procedures, does not thereby undertake “medical treatment.” ... We agree. ... The court further concluded that, because plaintiff’s claims did not arise from medical treatment within the meaning of ORS 12.110(4), the applicable statute of limitations is ORS 12.110(1). ... Gaston holds that a defendant in a summary judgment motion must establish that the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts which would have made a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three elements (harm, causation, and tortious conduct) existed.

Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limitations period that begins when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of legally cognizable harm.

Bibeau v. PACIFIC NORTHWEST RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC. · filed 1997-07-28(1)

The parties agree that the statute of limitations on both the state and federal claims in this case is two years, as provided by ORS 12.110(1). ... In Oregon, a claim accrues when a plaintiff is aware, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been aware, that he or she has suffered a "legally cognizable harm." ... Here, Bibeau was not warned of the possibility of recurring radiating testicular pain, and chronic groin rash, which he knowingly experienced as early as the late 1960s, and during the over thirty years since then. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs' state law claims also are barred by the statute of limitations.[6] Defendants' motions for summary judgment, thus, are granted as to plaintiffs' state law claims.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period for professional-malpractice actions, and the discovery rule governs when that period begins: accrual generally occurs when the client suffers damage and knows or reasonably should know that the damage was caused by the lawyer; under subsection (4)'s parallel rule, when that knowledge should have occurred is ordinarily a fact question, though it may be decided as a matter of law in some cases.

Hoeck v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt · filed 1997-09-10(1), (4)

In an action for professional malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations is ORS 12.110(1), which provides that the action must be initiated within two years of a plaintiffs injury. ... Precisely when a person reasonably should have known that the harm suffered was caused by another’s negligence generally presents a question of fact. See Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 256, 864 P2d 1319 (1994) (applying parallel provision of ORS 12.110(4) and holding that “[w]hether a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would be aware of a substantial possibility of tortious conduct is a question of fact”). Still, in some cases, the facts may be such that no triable issue exists as to when a plaintiff knew or should have known that the defendant caused the harm suffered, and, in those cases, the matter may be resolved as a matter of law.

Section 12.110(1) starts the two-year limitations period when a claimant knows or reasonably should know of a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, without waiting for knowledge of the full damages.

Widing v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt · filed 1998-06-10(1)

“[T]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three elements [of legally cognizable harm] (harm, causation, and tortious conduct) exists. ... The discovery rule does not protect those who sleep on their rights, but only those who, in exercising the diligence expected of a reasonable person, are unaware that they have suffered legally cognizable harm.” ... A final aspect of the discovery rule that is significant in this case is that it does not contemplate that a plaintiffs actual or inquiry knowledge must extend to all of the particulars of his or her ultimate injury. Rather, the rule delays the running of the limitation period only until the plaintiff knows or should know that some harm has been incurred and that a claim exists. The statute is not delayed until the plaintiff is or should be aware of the full extent of his or her damage or of all the details relevant to the claim. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge that they had a claim to start the running of the limitation period more than two years before they brought this action.

The two-year limitation period under § 12.110(1) is computed by excluding the first day and extending the deadline when the final day falls on a legal holiday.

Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp. · filed 1998-08-06(1)

From the text and context of ORS 12.010 and ORS 174.120, it is apparent that the legislature intended that ORS 174.120 apply to the computation of limitation periods prescribed in ORS chapter 12 for determining both when the statutory period begins to run and when it ends. Accordingly, we hold that ORS 174.120 applies to the computation of plaintiffs two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1). We previously have concluded that plaintiffs wrongful-discharge claim accrued on October 30, 1992, when her termination became effective. To calculate when the applicable two-year limitation period ran under ORS 174.120, we exclude the first day and count to within two years from October 31,1992, to October 30,1994. October 30,1994, fell on a Sunday. Under ORS 187.010, Sunday is a legal holiday. Because ORS 174.120 excludes a last day that falls on a legal holiday, plaintiffs limitation period ran on Monday, October 31,1994. Plaintiff filed her complaint on that day; thus, her filing was timely.

Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year period for noncontract injury claims, with fraud accruing on discovery and negligence governed by the judicially engrafted discovery rule.

Oregon Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Inter-Regional Financial Group, Inc. · filed 1998-10-14(1)

That statute creates two standards for determining when the limitations period commences: one for fraud and another for negligence. Each standard incorporates the so-called “discovery rule.” For fraud claims, the second sentence of ORS 12.110(1) itself integrates that doctrine into the limitations rule. For negligence claims, the Oregon Supreme Court in Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307, 312, 421 P2d 996 (1966), engrafted that doctrine onto the first sentence of the statute.

Section 12.110(1) supplies the statute of limitations governing a claim for intentional interference with economic relations.

Kraemer v. Harding · filed 1999-03-17(1)

Even though the one-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.120, operates to ban plaintiffs claim for defamation, it has no effect on plaintiffs claim for intentional interference with economic relations, which is governed by ORS 12.110(1).

Section 12.110(1) gives fraud claims a two-year statute of limitations, and a claim based on a misrepresentation discovered in August 1993 was time-barred when filed in May 1997.

Independence Apartments Associates, Missouri Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. · filed 1999-03-31(1)

Assuming that any claim arising out of those allegations was properly assigned, plaintiff's predecessor in interest, The Mansion Apartments, discovered that alleged "misrepresentation" no later than August 1993, when L-P declined warranty coverage because the siding was utility grade. Plaintiff did not commence this action until May 1997, thus any claim arising out of the original sale is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for fraud.

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for injuries to a person or another’s rights, when not arising in contract or otherwise enumerated, to be commenced within two years.

Bradbury v. Teacher Standards & Practices Commission · filed 1999-04-08(1)

In sum, liberally construed, plaintiffs complaint alleges a tort other than defamation. The two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(4) applies to that claim.

Section 12.110(1) governs limitations for negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, and the adverse-domination doctrine delays its running while culpable directors control the corporation.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Smith · filed 1999-04-22(1)

This court has applied the discovery rule to negligence actions subject to the statutes of limitations expressed at ORS 12.110(1) and ORS 12.010. ... By extension, the doctrine of adverse domination also would apply to claims governed by those statutes, i.e., negligence actions. Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are governed, for limitations purposes, by the same limitations provision that applies to negligence actions, viz., ORS 12.110(1). ... Accordingly, we also accept the doctrine of adverse domination in that context.

Section 12.110(1) gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff suffers legally cognizable harm and knows or should know that the lawyer caused it.

Jeffries v. Mills · filed 2000-01-19(1)

A cause of action for legal malpractice must be brought within two years of the date on which the action for the “injury” accrues. ... The cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers a legally cognizable harm and knew or should have known that the damage was caused by the lawyer’s acts or omissions. ... June 29, 1993, was the first date upon which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Mary Ann actually suffered a legally cognizable harm. ... Her complaint was filed exactly two years after the trial court approved the sale. Consequently, her cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

The two-year limitations period for a medical-injury action begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts showing a substantial possibility of tortious conduct; an unusually severe surgical complication can trigger that period before expert confirmation of malpractice.

Greene v. Legacy Emanuel Hospital · filed 2000-02-23(4)

Although not all surgical complications in every circumstance will put a patient on inquiry notice as to medical malpractice, our review of the summary judgment record in this case persuades us that a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have known of a substantial possibility of malpractice when informed of the nature of the complication. The trial court did not err in ruling that the two-year statute of limitations ran before plaintiff commenced her action.

ORS 12.110(4) imposes an absolute five-year outside limit on medical-malpractice actions, regardless of when the injury is discovered, and that limit is not unconstitutional as applied to a claim filed seven years after the alleged negligence.

Barke v. Maeyens · filed 2001-09-12(4)

Thus, even assuming that plaintiff is correct that this wrongful death action is more properly viewed as a survival action and thus is a type of action that the remedies clause protects, and even assuming that the remedies clause goes so far as to protect not only causes of action but the rules governing the accrual of causes of action as they existed at the time of the enactment of the Oregon Constitution, the remedies clause nonetheless would not guarantee plaintiff the right to initiate a personal injury action based on negligent acts that occurred some seven years before the action was initiated. In short, plaintiff’s action would have been time barred under the law as it existed at the time that Article I, section 10 was enacted, just as it is barred under current law.

Section 12.110(1) requires tort claims to be filed within two years after the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered with reasonable care, the wrongful conduct and resulting harm.

McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc. · filed 2003-09-10(1)

It is undisputed that each claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitation and that plaintiff had to file her complaint within two years after discovery of the claims of fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. See ORS 12.110(1); Oregon Life and Health v. Inter-Regional Financial, 156 Or App 485, 491, 967 P2d 880 (1998). ... Thus, there is evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff did not learn that she had been damaged until she learned that her security interest was inadequate to cover the amount due on the loan. Plaintiff filed her complaint within two years of that date.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty claims, subject to a discovery rule.

Spirit Partners, LP v. Stoel Rives LLP · filed 2007-04-25(1)

The limitation period for all three claims — fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty — is two years, subject to a discovery rule. ORS 12.110(1); Oregon Life and Health v. Inter-Regional Financial, 156 Or App 485, 491-92, 967 P2d 880 (1998), rev withdrawn, 329 Or 10 (1999).

Section 12.110(1) requires tort claims to be commenced within two years, but for fraud or deceit the period begins when the fraud or deceit is discovered; the court applied that rule to hold the fiduciary-duty claim time-barred while allowing a jury to find the fraud claim accrued when the alleged omissions were learned in 1997.

Bramel v. Brandt · filed 2003-11-13(1)

Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the two-year limitation period for torts in ORS 12.110(1): ... “An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an action based on fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ... We conclude, accordingly, that a jury could find that the fraud claim based on the nondisclosure of the retainer agreements and the escrow of the agreements did not accrue until 1997, when plaintiffs finally learned of the omissions.

Section 12.110(1) generally requires tort actions to be filed within two years, with the limitations period for fraud or deceit commencing upon discovery; accrual also depends on when the plaintiff knew or should have known of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Kelly v. Lessner · filed 2008-11-19(1)

ORS 12.110(1) provides: “An action for assault * * * or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, * * * shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an action * * * based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ... In general, with respect to claims based on negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three elements [of a claim] (harm, causation, and tortious conduct) exists.” ... We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs allegations, when given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, state a claim that presents a jury question about whether the statute of limitations expired before the complaint was filed.

ORS 12.110(1) gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm caused by the attorney’s tortious conduct, even if the full extent of damages is not yet known.

Cairns v. Dole · filed 2004-10-20(1)

For statute of limitations purposes, a claim accrues when the plaintiff is aware that he or she has suffered some harm as a result of the defendant’s alleged negligence. It is immaterial that the plaintiff may not have known the full extent of the damages.

For a legal malpractice claim arising from criminal defense, the two-year limitations period begins when the former defendant's exoneration becomes certain and the resulting harm is legally cognizable.

Abbott v. DeKalb · filed 2008-07-23(1)

As the court held in Stevens, exoneration can occur not only “through reversal on direct appeal [or] through post-conviction relief proceedings,” but also “otherwise.” Id. at 238. In this case, exoneration occurred “otherwise.” Exoneration occurred, and plaintiffs claim accrued, when the time within which the state could seek further review of the post-conviction court’s judgment elapsed because, at that point, *344his exoneration became certain. The harm attributable to defendant’s negligence was thus legally cognizable 35 days after this court’s decision affirming the grant of post-conviction relief on December 5, 2001, within which time the state could have filed a petition seeking review in the Supreme Court, but did not do so. See ORAP 9.05(2)(a) (specifying that any party seeking to obtain review of a decision of the Court of Appeals must file a petition for review in the Supreme Court within 35 days from the date of that decision). On that date — January 9, 2002 — the statute of limitations under ORS 12.110(1) began to run. Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim, filed more than two years later on May 21, 2004, was filed too late.

Section 12.110(4) requires medical-malpractice actions to be commenced within five years of the treatment, omission, or operation, regardless of when the injury or claim accrues, and bars disability tolling subject to statutory exceptions.

George Fields, personal representative of the Estate of Laura Fields v. Legacy Health System · filed 2005-06-22(4)

We reject this argument because the statutory text does not permit the interpretation urged by George Fields. Oregon Revised Statutes section 30.020(1)(b) expressly incorporates section 12.110(4), the medical malpractice statute of repose, which in turn expressly prohibits the use of the disability tolling statute, section 12.160.10 Moreover, the plain language of the disability tolling statute, section 12.160,11 limits its application to "action[s] mentioned in ORS 12.010 to 12.050, 12.070 to 12.250 and 12.276." See also Stupek v. Wyle Labs. Corp., 327 Or. 433, 963 P.2d 678, 685 (1998) (holding that courts lacked authority to toll statutory discrimination claim for insanity where the claim was not enumerated in section 12.160 and anti-discrimination statute did not otherwise provide for tolling). The actions here appealed fall under Oregon's wrongful death statute, section 30.020, which is clearly not within the statutory ranges listed in section 12.160. Thus, we decline to apply section 12.160 to toll George Fields' wrongful death action.

Section 12.110(4) requires a medical-negligence action to be commenced within five years of the treatment, regardless of when the injury was discovered and notwithstanding ORS 12.160.

Christiansen v. PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM OF OREGON CORPORATION · filed 2006-12-27(4)

As noted, however, under ORS 12.110(4), the statute of ultimate repose, notwithstanding ORS 12.160, every action must be commenced within five years of the date of treatment. In this case, the statute of ultimate repose bars plaintiffs claim because it was not brought within five years of March 14, 1994.

The five-year limitation period for medical-treatment injury actions applies notwithstanding the minor-tolling statute, so a minor's claim is not tolled beyond five years from the treatment.

Christiansen v. Providence Health System of Oregon Corp. · filed 2008-05-08(4)

The second sentence of ORS 12.110(4) presents a different question, however. Under the second sentence of ORS 12.110(4), plaintiff had a maximum of five years from the date of the medical treatment, i.e., until March 1999, in which to bring the child’s claim against defendants. That five-year limitation period applies “notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 12.160,” therefore the fact that plaintiffs son was a minor did not toll that five-year limitation period. Thus, plaintiffs claim is untimely under that statutory five-year limitation period.

Section 12.110(3) requires actions for overtime or premium pay, or related penalties or liquidated damages, to be commenced within two years.

Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp. · filed 2007-01-29(3)

Under Oregon law, actions “for overtime or premium pay or for penalties or liquidated damages for failure to pay overtime or premium pay shall be commenced within two years” (ORS 12.110(3)) and are specifically excluded from Oregon’s six-year statute of limitations for other contractual claims, such as failure to pay regular wages.

Section 12.110(1) gives tort claims a two-year statute of limitations, which accrues when the alleged interference actually causes injury.

Butcher v. McClain · filed 2011-07-13(1)

It is undisputed that plaintiffs’ second claim, which is based on defendants’ alleged interference with plaintiffs’ economic relationship with Betty and with plaintiffs’ inheritance, sounds in tort and is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110(1). ... Here, by analogy, although the alleged interference occurred when defendants caused Betty to execute a will disinheriting Rachelle and the children, plaintiffs were not damaged by that interference until Betty’s death, when they lost their expected inheritance. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim based on the statute of limitations.

Section 12.110(1) supplies the two-year residual limitations period for FCA retaliation claims when Oregon’s specialized whistleblower period does not apply.

United States ex rel. Berglund v. Boeing Co. · filed 2011-12-13(1)

Instead, after a careful review of the parties’ respective arguments regarding the applicable limitations period for Berglund’s § 3730(h) claim, and the Supreme Court’s direction in Graham, the court concludes Oregon’s two-year catch-all limitations period, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1), applicable to state law claims for wrongful discharge, applies to Berglund’s retaliation claim under the FCA.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year negligence period incorporates an objective discovery rule, beginning when reasonable care should reveal a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Doughton v. Morrow · filed 2013-02-27(1)

Under ORS 12.110(1), a negligence claim must be commenced within two years of the date on which the cause of action accrues.

The discovery rule applies to bodily-harm battery claims under § 12.110(1), although an inherently discoverable injury may not toll the two-year period.

Whalen v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. · filed 2013-04-17(1) (4)

We conclude, based on *287Cole and the other cases that we have discussed, that the “discovery rule” applies in all circumstances involving tort claims based on bodily harm; when the injury is “inherently discoverable,” however, the discovery rule’s application does not extend the time within which the plaintiff may bring a claim.

Section 12.110(4) gives a medical-malpractice plaintiff two years from discovering, or reasonably discovering, a legally cognizable injury involving harm, causation, and tortious conduct to file suit.

Zabriskie v. Lowengart · filed 2012-09-26(4)

Under ORS 12.110(4), a discovery rule applies to that kind of claim. Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 254, 864 P2d 1319 (1994). That is, under ORS 12.110(4), a plaintiff has two years in which to file a complaint after he or she first discovered the injury that allegedly arose from a medical treatment or, “in the exercise of reasonable care,” should have discovered it. In determining when the two-year period began to run in a particular case, the specialized meaning of the word “injury” must be kept in mind. As used in ORS 12.110(4), “injury” does not refer simply to ordinary physical harm, but means a “legally cognizable harm” that “consists of three elements: *549(1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.” Gaston, 318 Or at 255 (emphasis added).

Section 12.110(1) gives negligence and intentional-interference claims a two-year limitations period, with accrual governed by when the claim’s legally cognizable damage occurs and, for professional malpractice, when the plaintiff knows or should know the damage was caused by the lawyer.

Frakes v. Nay · filed 2012-12-19(1)

See ORS 12.110(1) (negligence claims must be filed within two years of their accrual). However, negligence claims, although subject to a shorter statute of limitations than “an action upon a contract,” accrue differently from breach of contract claims. In Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 351 Or 270, 277-78, 265 P3d 777 (2011), the Supreme Court explained that the statute of limitations on a claim for professional malpractice does not begin to run until the plaintiff “both suffers damage and knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that the substantial damage actually suffered was caused by the lawyer’s acts or omissions.” ... Next, Nay argues that Frakes’s claim for intentional interference is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1), because the claim accrued upon the death of Carol in 2002. ... We agree with Frakes that his alleged prospective inheritance — substantially all of Velma’s share of the estate — was lost when Velma died in 2004. For purposes of Frakes’s intentional interference claim, that is the point at which the statute of limitations began to run.

Section 12.110(1) gives fraud and deceit claims a two-year limitations period that starts when the fraud is discovered, meaning when the plaintiff knows or should have known of it.

Burgdorf v. Weston · filed 2013-12-11(1)

The word “discovery” in the statute has been interpreted-in an objective manner, meaning that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the alleged fraud or deceit.

Subsection (1)'s two-year limitations period applies when an action's predominant characteristics sound in tort, and its discovery rule starts the period at the earlier of actual discovery of injury or when reasonable care should have revealed it.

Htaike v. Sein · filed 2015-02-25(1)

We conclude that the statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) applies to plaintiffs’ claims. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the predominant characteristics of plaintiffs’ claims sound in tort and that ORS 12.110(1) applies. Of course, our determination that ORS 12.110(1) governs in this case does not end the matter. As noted, the trial court concluded that, even if ORS 12.110(1) applies, plaintiffs’ claims were timely under the discovery rule that is incorporated within that statute. Under that rule, the limitations period begins to run from the earlier of two possible events: “(1) the date of the plaintiffs actual discovery of injury; or (2) the date when a person exercising reasonable care should have discovered the injury, including learning facts that an inquiry would have disclosed.”

Section 12.110(1) requires an action for noncontractual injury to a person or another’s rights, including professional negligence, to be filed within two years after the claim accrues; under the discovery rule, accrual occurs when the client knows or reasonably should know of a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Guirma v. O'Brien · filed 2013-12-11(1)

A professional negligence action must be filed within two years of the date on which the claim accrues. ORS 12.010; ORS 12.110(1); U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 665-66, 548 P2d 966 (1976). With respect to legal negligence claims, Oregon follows the “discovery rule” for determining when a claim accrues. Id. at 666. Under the discovery rule, a legal negligence claim accrues when a client knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that there is a substantial possibility that she has an actionable injury. Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 351 Or 270, 277, 265 P3d 777 (2011); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Or App 316, 321, 284 P3d 528 (2012). An actionable injury in a legal negligence claim consists of harm, causation, and tortious conduct. Kaseberg, 351 Or at 277. Thus, under the discovery rule, a claim for legal negligence accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the client knows or, in *780the exercise of reasonable care, should know that there is a substantial possibility that (1) he or she has suffered harm, (2) the harm was caused by the lawyer’s acts or omissions and, (3) the lawyer’s acts or omissions were tortious. Id. at 278.

Section 12.110(1) requires a professional negligence action to be filed within two years after the claim accrues, which in legal malpractice occurs when the client knows or reasonably should know there is a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Sternberg v. Lechman-Su · filed 2015-05-28(1)

A professional negligence action must be filed within two years of the date on which the claim accrues.” ... “A legal malpractice claim accrues “when the client knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know ‘every fact which it would be necessary for the [client] to prove * * * in order to support his right to judgment.’”

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year negligence limitations period does not govern construction-defect claims alleging injury to an interest in real property.

Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc. · filed 2014-12-10(1)

In Riverview Condo. Assn. v. Cypress Ventures (A150586), 266 Or App 574, 593, 339 P3d 447 (2014) (Riverview), we were required to determine which statute of limitations applied to the plaintiffs “construction-defect claims — i.e., claims based on [the] defendants’ negligence during construction.” As in this case, the defendants in Riverview asserted that ORS 12.110(1) governed, pointing to the same footnote in Abraham. Id. at 599. We disagreed and, based on another line of cases,2 determined that construction-defect claims alleging injury to an interest in real property are governed by the six-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.080(3). Id. at 600. ... Given our decision there and plaintiffs’ claims here allege an injury to an interest in real property, the trial court was correct in the first part of its conclution that the applicable statute of limitations was ORS 12.080(3).

Section 12.110(4) describes actions for personal injuries arising from medical treatment, including an OTCA medical-negligence action, even when the action's operative deadline comes from ORS 30.275(9).

Smith v. Oregon Health Science University Hospital & Clinic · filed 2015-07-22(4)

Based on the text of the statute, we conclude that plaintiffs action is one that is “mentioned in” ORS 12.110(4), because ORS 12.110(4) “note[s],” “call[s] attention to,” or “refer [s] to” plaintiffs action — that is, “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation.” See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1412 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining the verb “mention” as “: to cite, note, or call attention to esp. in a brief, casual, or incidental manner : make mention of: refer to”). The fact that the particular time limitation applicable to plaintiffs action is set forth in ORS 30.275(9), and not in ORS 12.110(4), does not prevent the application of ORS 12.160 (2005) to plaintiffs claim.

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitations period for specified noncontract injuries does not apply to lawyer disciplinary proceedings.

In re Ramirez · filed 2018-01-19(1)

Furthermore, even if the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure applied, ORS 12.110, which establishes the two-year limitations period upon which the accused relies, does not apply to disciplinary proceedings because they are not actions for injuries “to the person or rights of another”; they are proceedings to enforce professional rules. ORS 9.529 (disciplinary proceedings are “neither civil nor criminal in nature[;]. [t]hey are sui generis”); BR 1.3 (disciplinary proceedings “are designed as the means to determine whether an attorney should be disciplined for misconduct”).

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to a person or another's rights that do not arise on contract, including tort claims; it does not bar a separately pleaded contract claim governed by section 12.080.

Davis v. American Alternative Insurance Corporation · filed 2025-08-08(1)

Pursuant to ORS 12.110(1), a litigant has two years within which to bring “[a]n action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or for an injury to the person or the rights of another, not arising on contract.” ORS 12.110(1) “covers the residual category of those actions which cannot be said to arise from contracts or from other sources of liability covered by different statutory limitations.” ... The fact that Plaintiff is time-barred from alleging a tort claim under ORS 12.110 does not equate to her being time-barred from alleging a contract claim under ORS 12.080.

For legal malpractice claims, the two-year period under ORS 12.110(1) begins when the claimant knows or reasonably should know of a substantial possibility of actionable injury, including harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Merchants Paper Co. v. Newton · filed 2018-06-20(1)

ORS 12.110(1) sets forth the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action. ... In determining when a legal malpractice claim arises, we employ the discovery rule. ... Under the discovery rule, a legal malpractice claim accrues when a person knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know, that there is a substantial possibility that the person has an actionable injury. ... Thus, a legal malpractice claim arises when the person "knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that there is a substantial possibility that (1) he or she has suffered harm, (2) the harm was caused by the lawyer's acts or omissions and, (3) the lawyer's acts or omissions were tortious."

Section 12.110(1) gives accounting-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts showing a substantial possibility of harm caused by the defendant's negligence; when that occurs is a question of fact.

Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP · filed 2021-12-29(1)

The limitations period governing an accounting-malpractice action is two years. ORS 12.110(1); Godfrey v. Bick & Monte, 77 Or App 429, 432, 713 P2d 655, rev den, 301 Or 165 (1986).

Section 12.110(1) gives a two-year statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim.

Nails v. Case & Dusterhoff, LLP · filed 2025-03-04(1)

Under Oregon law, the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is two years. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 665-66, 548 P.2d 966 (1976).

Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limitation period for legal malpractice actions.

Niedermeyer v. Dusenbery · filed 1976-05-20(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is ORS 12.110(1) and provides for a two-year limitation.

Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limit for legal malpractice claims based on lack of due care, despite an implied contractual relationship.

United States National Bank of Oregon v. Davies · filed 1976-04-15(1)

The applicable statute is ORS 12.110(1), which provides: ... This statute has been held applicable to professional malpractice cases which are based upon the lack of due care, despite the existence of an implied contractual relationship. We have construed such actions to be ones of tort rather than of contract.

Section 12.110(4) imposes a five-year statute of ultimate repose, after which the claim is extinguished and no legally cognizable injury exists.

Thompson v. Portland Adventist Medical Center · filed 2021-02-03(4)

Likewise, we conclude that Graham’s NIED claim was extinguished by the running of ORS 12.110(4)’s five-year statute of ultimate repose. See Cannon v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 288 Or App 793, 799, 407 P3d 883 (2017), rev den, 362 Or 860 (2018) (“When the ultimate repose period has expired, the claim is extinguished and no legally cognizable injury exists.”)

Section 12.110(3)'s two-year limitations period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff lacks actual or constructive notice of a possible claim and otherwise pursues the claim diligently.

Denley · filed 2026-03-24(3)

At this stage, Plaintiff has successfully plead that § 12.110(3) was equitably tolled until Defendant notified him on February 14, 2025, that he was entitled to overtime pay. ... Because seven months is within the two-year statute of limitations mandated by § 12.110(3), Plaintiff’s overtime claims for pay periods prior to September 9, 2023, survive dismissal.

Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for general tort claims.

Davis v. Harvey, Police Officer · filed 1986-05-14(1)

Although under Wilson v. Garcia the district court should have applied Oregon’s general tort statute, Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1), rather than the Oregon Tort Claims Act, both statutes provide for a two-year limitations period.

Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for Oregon's general tort actions, which the court applied to bar Pieri's action.

Pieri v. Dammasch State Hospital · filed 1996-02-20(1)

Oregon's general tort statute provides for a two-year limitations period.

Section 12.110 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought against an Oregon public entity.

Wade · filed 2026-05-06

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought against an Oregon public entity is two years. See Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions–outlined in ORS § 12.110–to § 1983 claims).

Section 12.110(1) provides the two-year limitations period that Oregon supplies for § 1983 claims.

Scott v. Jackson County · filed 2008-10-24(1)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims “must be borrowed from state law.” Plumean v. Sch. Dist. # 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997). Here, the applicable period is two years. Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1); see also Plumean, 130 F.3d at 438. Scott’s action was filed on July 22, 2003.4 Any constitutional claims arising prior to July 22, 2001, are time barred.5 See Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir.1994) (“[We] may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).

Section 12.110(4) requires a medical-malpractice action to be commenced within two years after the injury is discovered or, with reasonable care, should have been discovered.

Marjorie Winn, Personal Representative of the Estate of Homer A. Winn, Deceased v. United States · filed 1979-01-31(4)

An action for medical malpractice must be commenced “within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. . . . ” Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(4) (1977). It is undisputed that plaintiff would have no claim under Oregon law.

Section 12.110(4) bars Franklin’s malpractice action based on 1963 back surgery as untimely.

Franklin v. State of Or. · filed 1983-05-25(4)

Franklin brings a malpractice action against the physicians who performed back surgery on him in 1963. Franklin says he served the State Attorney General. But the complaint does not allege that the doctors’ actions were state actions. Nor do I perceive any other basis for federal jurisdiction. Even if I did, this action is plainly barred by the statute of limitations, Or.Rev. Stat. § 12.110(4) (1981).

Section 12.110(1) supplies the two-year limitations period for section 1983 claims based on personal injury; the period does not begin before the claim arises.

Foster Group, Inc. v. City of Elgin · filed 2014-07-30(1)

The parties agree that plaintiffs section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Gambaro v. Dept. of Justice, 247 Or App 609, 617, 270 P3d 377 (2012) (explaining that section 1983 adopts statute of limitations for personal injury torts under state law); ORS 12.110(1) (providing two-year limitations period for personal injury torts). ... Plaintiffs section 1983 claims, based on the city’s actions in 2008, were timely, and that remains true even if plaintiff could have pursued other claims based on other wrongful conduct at an earlier time.

Section 12.110’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions governs § 1983 actions in Oregon.

Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2021-03-31

In this District, § 1983 actions are “governed by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions” under ORS 12.110.

Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period for a professional negligence claim seeking added construction costs.

Carter v. Wolf Creek Highway Water District · filed 1981-11-09

Contrary to the assumption made by the parties at trial and on appeal, we conclude that the applicable statute of limitations is not ORS 12.135(1), but ORS 12.110, although both are two year statutes of limitation.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitation period for battery and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, which runs when the plaintiff recognizes the initial injury rather than when the full extent of harm is discovered.

Peggy Mansfield, M.D. v. Herb Watson, ph.d. · filed 1993-03-17(1)

Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that the two-year statute of limitations on her battery claim had run. ... Accordingly, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time-barred. See Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1) (1991) (two-year limitation period).

Section 12.110(B) provides a two-year statute of limitations for overtime compensation claims.

Doris Rowe,plaintiff-Appellant v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., a Foreigncorporation,defendant-Appellee · filed 2001-04-04(B)

The district court also correctly concluded that the statute of limitations barred Rowe’s state law claims for overtime compensation when she was employed as an hourly employee. Under Oregon law, the statute of limitations for overtime compensation claims is two years. Or.Rev. Stat. § 12.110(B). Because Rowe ceased her hourly employment in 1995, her claims are precluded by the statute of limitations.

Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations, making an action filed after that period time-barred.

Johnson v. Harpercollins Publishers, LLC · filed 2007-08-30(1)

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action as time barred because Johnson failed to file it within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1).