Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.135

Under the 1997 version of § 107.135, remarriage supports terminating spousal support when the recipient’s increased income satisfies the purpose of the award, unless termination would be inequitable.

In the Matter of Barron · filed 2011-01-12(2)(a)

We conclude that the version in effect at the time of the dissolution, ORS 107.135(2)(a) (1997), applies. ... If, as a result of remarriage, an obligee's income has increased to the point where, without the spousal support, it is equal to or greater than the income the support was intended to ensure, the support should be terminated, unless it would be inequitable to do so. ... Thus, we conclude that, as a result of wife's increased income following her remarriage, the purpose of the spousal support award has been satisfied and the support should be terminated.

Section 107.135(3)(a) permits termination of spousal support when changed economic circumstances satisfy the purpose of the award and termination is equitable; remarriage alone is insufficient.

In Re the Marriage of Frost · filed 2011-06-29(3)(a)

Whether changes in the economic circumstances of an obligee spouse justify termination of spousal support depends on whether the changes satisfy the purposes of the support.

Section 107.135(3)(a) requires a spouse seeking to terminate spousal support to prove a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances that affects the ability to pay.

In Re Marriage of Spillane · filed 2012-03-28(3)(a)

We emphasize again — and finally — that, as the proponent of modification and termination, husband had the burden of persuasively demonstrating an unanticipated change of circumstances precluding him from meeting his support obligations to wife, whose needs and modest circumstances have remained unchanged.

Section 107.135(4) permits a court to consider modifying spousal support when retirement creates a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances that the original award did not account for.

In re the Marriage of Waid · filed 2013-07-10(4)

Similarly here, and in light of husband’s concession, wife’s ultimate retirement from working will provide a sufficient legal basis for the trial court to consider modification of spousal support.

A remarriage that substantially increases a party’s financial resources or decreases financial needs can justify reconsidering spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Worthington · filed 2006-08-02(3)(a)

Nevertheless, when a remarriage substantially enhances a party’s financial resources or decreases financial needs, it may furnish grounds to reexamine an existing support obligation.

Section 107.135(4)(a) does not treat dissatisfaction with the fairness of a stipulated agreement as a substantial change in economic circumstances.

In the Marriage of Rock · filed 2012-04-04(4)(a)

No matter the equity or inequity of the parties’ original stipulation — which we are in a poor position to assess, given our limited knowledge about the circumstances surrounding that agreement — only “those standards outlined by [ORS 107.135(4)(a)] may be used to determine if there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances.”

Section 107.135(3)(a) permits reconsideration of spousal support when an unanticipated remarriage makes a new spouse’s income available and substantially reduces the recipient’s need for support.

In re the Marriage of Tilson · filed 2013-12-26(3)(a)

That testimony supports the inferences that some portion of Prucha’s income was available to wife, and that the availability of that income reduced her total need for support by one third in a way that had not been contemplated at the time of dissolution. That, in turn, permitted the trial court to conclude — correctly—that there had been a threshold unanticipated “substantial change in economic circumstances” of wife sufficient to authorize reconsideration of spousal support under ORS 107.135(3)(a).

Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal maintenance support after an unanticipated retirement that substantially changes economic circumstances, so long as the retirement decision was made in good faith.

In re the Marriage of Logan · filed 2015-04-01(4)(b)

The statutory scheme authorizes a trial court to modify a spousal maintenance support award in that event, so long as the retirement decision is made in good faith.

Section 107.135(4)(a)(B) requires courts to consider both parties’ retirement benefits when modifying spousal support, but does not require treating those benefits as current income available to pay support.

In re the Marriage of Harless · filed 2016-01-21(4)(a)(B)

And, although such retirement benefits must be considered, it does not necessarily follow that those benefits must be treated as current income from which a spouse can continue to pay a higher level of spousal support.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support on a change of circumstances, but does not permit modification of a property division.

MacWhorter and Skakel · filed 2023-03-08(1)(a)

Spousal support may be modified on a change of circumstances, ORS 107.135(1)(a), but a division of property may not.

Section 107.135(4)(a) requires consideration of all inherited assets, including assets still in probate, when determining a spousal support modification.

In re the Marriage of Vanlaningham · filed 2016-08-31(4)(a)

On remand, the trial court should consider the value of all of wife’s inherited assets, including the assets that were in probate at the time of the modification hearing, to determine whether and how the spousal support award should be modified.

When deciding whether remarriage substantially changes a supported spouse’s economic circumstances, a court must base the amount of a new spouse’s income attributed to that person on evidence of what is actually available, including the new spouse’s independent obligations.

In re the Marriage of Davis · filed 2017-08-23(3)(a)

Rather, the overall record must support the court’s factual findings as to what amount of income is, in fact, available to wife. In this case, because the court did not take into consideration the ways in which Davis’s independent obligations might limit the availability of his income to wife, we cannot conclude that $3,718 is actually available to wife.

In deciding whether to modify spousal support, a court must consider income and benefits from all sources and determine whether a new spouse’s income is actually available to the remarried party.

Trout and Eitzen · filed 2024-01-04(4)(a)

When determining whether a substantial change of circumstances exists to warrant modification or termination of spousal support, the trial court must “consider income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources[.]” ORS 107.135(4)(a). ... Rather, the trial court must consider whether the new spouse’s income is actually available to the remarried party. ... That rigid segregation of property—along with the terms of the premarital agreement—do not support husband’s argument that Trout’s income is “actually or potentially” available to wife.

In modifying spousal support under § 107.135, the court must consider the paying party’s ability to pay when deciding what is just and equitable.

Braun and Braun · filed 2020-03-11

Further, a party’s ability to pay the support is necessarily part of the “just and equitable” determination.

Section 107.135 requires a court considering modification of spousal support after a voluntary early retirement to take the retiree’s earning capacity into account.

Minckler and Minckler · filed 2020-09-10(4)(a)(A)

ORS 107.135(4)(a)(A) states that “[t]he court * * * shall consider income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources, including but not limited to: * * * [t]he reasonable opportunity of each party, the obligor and obligee, respectively, to acquire future income and assets.” True, a court may not be able to order a retired person to return to work. That does not mean, however, that when a person retires early that a court may disregard the person’s earning capacity when evaluating a motion to modify or terminate spousal support.

Section 107.135(4)(a) requires courts deciding whether circumstances have changed to consider both parties’ income opportunities, including reasonable opportunities for future income and assets.

Cargal and Long-Cargal · filed 2020-09-16(4)(a)

In assessing a party’s ability to pay a support award, “we are not restricted to a consideration of what either party is presently receiving but may consider the parties’ earning capacities and potential future income.” Id.; see also ORS 107.135(4)(a) (providing that, in its determination of whether a change of circumstances exists, a court shall consider “income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources,” which includes the “reasonable opportunity of each party * * * to acquire future income and assets”).

Section 107.135(3)(a) permits a substantial change in economic circumstances arising after the dissolution trial but before entry of judgment to be measured from the trial date.

Williams and Williams · filed 2021-11-24(3)(a)

We therefore agree with father that the trial court should have assessed whether father experienced a substantial change in economic circumstances since August 3, 2018—the date when the trial ended and the court announced its findings and decision—rather than requiring father to prove a substantial change in circumstances since October 29, 2018, when the dissolution judgment was entered in the register.

A substantial decrease in income can justify modifying spousal support only when the income comparison rests on evidence in the record.

In re the Marriage of Crimmins · filed 2016-09-08(3)(a)

Because the trial court relied on wife’s 2011 USD, it found wife’s income was higher in 2012 than the record establishes. That finding affected the trial court’s finding that there was a substantial decrease between 2012 and 2014. Consequently, we reverse and remand for a redetermi-nation of whether there was a qualifying change in circumstances justifying a modification of spousal support.

A substantial increase in a parent’s time caring for a child may justify modifying child support if it increases reasonable and necessary expenses; a possible future change in residence does not prevent reconsideration.

In re the Marriage of Handley · filed 2016-11-16(3)(a)

The possibility that she might do so at some unspecified point in the future was not a proper basis for declining to reconsider mother’s child support obligation in light of the fact that the child had been living with father on a full-time basis and was continuing to do so.

Section 107.135(3)(a) permits modification of spousal support when a substantial and unanticipated change in the circumstances underlying the original award occurs; significant deterioration in health may qualify.

In re the Marriage of Aaroe · filed 2017-07-26(3)(a)

A modification of spousal support must be based on a substantial and unanticipated change in the circumstances underlying the original award. ... A significant deterioration in health may constitute a qualifying change in circumstances.

A benefit from staying at a partner's home does not warrant modifying spousal support when it does not materially reduce the recipient's living expenses.

In re Patterson · filed 2018-07-25(3)(a)

Whatever benefit wife received from staying with Stone at the Yachats property did not materially reduce her living expenses. In fact, because the town house in Arizona is still solely in her name and she has to maintain the property and pay for her day-to-day expenses even while in Yachats, her living expenses have not substantially changed so as to warrant a modification of her spousal support award.

Section 107.135(3)(a) does not permit modification of spousal support based on employment income that was anticipated when the award was made.

Varro and Varro · filed 2019-11-27(3)(a)

A party’s income from employment is not an “unanticipated” change in economic circumstances where a trial court anticipated such employ- ment and income when making the award of spousal sup- port.

Section 107.135(3)(a) requires a substantial change in economic circumstances before spousal support may be modified; additional time to work does not establish one without sufficient evidence of its economic effect.

Owens and Owens · filed 2020-11-04(3)(a)

The daughter’s increased school attendance, and mother’s concomitant ability to work additional hours, is perhaps a change in economic circumstances but, on this record, we conclude that the trial court in the modification proceeding erred in concluding it is a “substantial” one.

Section 107.135(3) prohibits retroactive modification of a support judgment for the period before a motion for modification is filed.

Starzinger v. Starzinger · filed 1986-10-29(3)

ORS 107.135(3) provides that an original judgment for support cannot be modified for the period between the time of the entry of that judgment and the time of a motion for modification. In other words, retrospective modification is not permitted.

Section 107.135 requires a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances to modify spousal support when the decree does not authorize review without that showing.

In re the Marriage of Barron · filed 1987-05-06(1)(a)

Therefore, even under McDonnal, the duty of wife in this case to show a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances is clear. She has not done so.

Section 107.135(5) bars imposing a retroactive child-support obligation on a parent absent a motion to modify the decree.

State ex rel. Richards v. Richards · filed 1989-02-22(5)

In the absence of a motion to modify, however, it could not impose a retroactive support obligation on mother. It should not have credited father’s arrearage of $5,300 by the amount that it determined that mother should have paid as support.

Section 107.135(2)(a) requires a substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances before a child support obligation may be modified.

In re the Marriage of Richmond · filed 1990-08-08(2)(a)

ORS 107.135(2) (a) provides that a substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances is a prerequisite to modifying a child support obligation.

Section 107.135 permits a child support modification to take effect no earlier than the date the motion to modify was served.

Kim and Kinnersley · filed 2025-01-29(6)

We agree with mother’s second assignment and conclude that the trial court plainly erred in ordering mother to pay for child support and “unreimbursed medical expenses” accrued prior to July 11, 2022, the date mother was served with father’s motion to modify, and we exercise discretion to correct that error.

Section 107.135(7)’s limit on modifying accrued payments applies to support modifications sought through a motion based on changed circumstances, but not to a corrected award entered after an appellate remand.

Skinner and Skinner · filed 2022-12-15(7)

However, ORS 107.135 applies when one party files a motion with the trial court to modify the support award due to a change of circumstances that impacts their needs or ability to pay. ORS 107.135(3). The change in wife’s spousal support award in this case did not occur pursuant to ORS 107.135; therefore, the limitations in ORS 107.135(7) are inap- plicable in this case.

Section 107.135(6) permits a child support modification to take effect no earlier than the date the motion to modify was served.

Kim and Kinnersley · filed 2025-01-29(6)

Finally, ORS 107.135(6) makes clear that “[a]ny modification of child * * * support * * * may be ordered effective retroactive to the date the motion for modification was served or to any date thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) ... On remand, the court may order child support and statutory interest retroactive no earlier than July 11, 2022.

Under subsection (2), a divorce decree requiring future child support installments becomes a final judgment only as each installment accrues and remains unpaid.

Clark v. McCoy · filed 1975-09-05(2)

Specifically, with regard to divorce decrees, this court has held that a decree requiring future monthly installments for child support did not become a “final judgment” under ORS 107.135(2) until an installment accrued and remained unpaid. “As each instalment accrued it became, in effect, a separate judgment upon which execution could issue.”

Section 107.135(2) makes accrued, unpaid child support a judgment for support.

State Ex Rel. Hansen v. McKay · filed 1977-11-15(2)

The accrued but unpaid support obligation had become ... a judgment by operation of ORS 107.135(2), ... a judgment for support.

Section 107.135(2) bars a court from restricting enforcement of accrued support arrears or converting them into an installment obligation.

In re the Marriage of Woodruff · filed 1979-08-20(2)

However, the court had no authority to enjoin enforcement of the $11,460.88 judgment by the procedures to which wife was entitled under ORS ... 24.060 and ORS chapter 23 or to alter the judgment to an installment obligation. ORS 107.135(2).

Section 107.135(2) does not treat post-18 school support as an accrued judgment when the child does not attend or ceases attending school.

Matter of Marriage of Eusterman · filed 1979-08-27(2)

If the contingency which triggers the obligation of extended support — school attendance — does not occur or ceases to occur, the support payments otherwise due thereafter do not accrue and are not a judgment within the meaning of ORS 107.135(2).

Accrued child support payments are final judgments that a court cannot retroactively modify or satisfy under equitable considerations.

In re the Marriage of Alspaugh · filed 1980-02-11(2)

The delinquent child support in the amount of $4,591.32 was therefore a final judgment and the trial court did not have the power to order the mother to satisfy a portion of it.

Section 107.135(2) bars retroactive modification of accrued support payments, but permits a court to declare that payments ceased accruing under the existing decree when a child became emancipated.

Ellis v. Ellis · filed 1982-02-10(2)

ORS 107.135(2) is not applicable here because this case does not involve setting aside, alteration or modification of a decree. Despite the wording of the father's motion, it sought only for the court to declare the extent of the father's obligation under the decree as issued, not to modify the decree or the obligation.

Accrued child support payments are final judgments under ORS 107.135(2) and remain payable when a decree is modified.

In re the Marriage of Riback · filed 1982-10-13(2)

The trial court should have ordered husband to make the accrued payments, because they were final judgments under ORS 107.135(2).

Section 107.135(2) prevents retroactive modification of accrued payment obligations, but payments do not accrue after a support obligation ends under the decree’s terms.

In re the Marriage of Conca · filed 1983-02-16(2)

The statute says only that until a motion to modify, alter or set aside a money judgment is made, obligations under the judgment continue to accrue, and a trial court cannot retroactively modify them. No payments were due after wife’s remarriage, because husband’s support obligation ceased by the terms of the decree. There was no support obligation left to modify.

A support payment due on the first of the month accrues as a judgment on that date; remarriage the next day does not reduce that payment.

In re the Marriage of Cady · filed 1983-05-11(2)

The support payment at issue was due and payable on July 1, and a judgment accrued as of that date.

Section 107.135(3) bars a court from offsetting accrued child support with an unliquidated claim against the custodial parent.

In re the Marriage of Bryant · filed 1984-10-24(3)

Accordingly, the trial court, by virtue of ORS 107.135(3), was without authority to set aside, alter or modify the decree as to the accrued and unpaid installments. Although husband may have a cause of action against wife for conversion, his remedy is to prosecute that claim, and the court may not offset an unliquidated claim against a final judgment.

Section 107.135(3) makes spousal support installments accrued before a motion to modify final judgments that the court cannot alter.

Matter of Marriage of Edwards · filed 1985-04-17(3)

Under the plain language of that statute, installments of spousal support that have accrued before a motion to modify is made become final judgments beyond the power of the court to alter.

Accrued child support installments become final judgments when a motion to modify is filed and cannot be modified, except that the court may allow a credit for time the obligated parent had physical custody of the child.

State ex rel. Sheldon v. Sheldon · filed 1986-12-04

The statute clearly provides that installments of child support that have accrued before a motion to modify is made become final judgments and are beyond the power of the court to modify. The only exception is that a court may allow a credit for any time when the parent who is obligated to pay support had actual custody of the child.

Section 107.135(2) permits credit against accrued child support when the obligated parent supported the child directly, because recognizing payment does not modify the decree.

In re the Marriage of Eagen · filed 1981-05-18(2)

We agree with this approach, which we hold is not foreclosed by the ... language of ORS 107.135(2) because recognition of payment is not, in our opinion, an act which sets aside, alters or modifies a decree.

Section 107.135(1)(a) allows a court to determine arrearages for a child’s health insurance when the decree’s insurance requirement was intended as child support.

In re the Marriage of Ramberg · filed 1993-09-22(1)(a)

Likewise, here we conclude that the provision in the original judgment for health insurance for the child was intended to be child support. Accordingly, the trial court had authority to determine the arrearages between the parties, including the arrearage for health insurance, in this proceeding.

Section 107.135(6) makes child support accrued before a motion to modify a final judgment that the court cannot reduce or set aside on equitable grounds.

State ex rel. Pedroza v. Pedroza · filed 1994-05-25(6)

In short, the parties’ dissolution decree is a final judgment as to the child support that was due and unpaid before father filed his motion to modify. ... Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to modify or set aside father’s accrued and unpaid child support.

Section 107.135(5) does not permit previously accrued child support arrearages that have become final judgments to be set aside, altered, or modified.

State ex rel. O'connor v. O'connor · filed 1995-09-06(5)

Those amounts are the result of final judgments and we have no power to set aside, alter or modify them.

Section 107.135(6) prevents a court from crediting payments made under a private agreement against child support installments that accrued under an unmodified dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of Forrester · filed 1997-03-26(6)

As in each of those cases, father in this case asserts that the parties agreed to substitute something other than what is called for in the dissolution to satisfy his obligation to pay child support in accordance with the terms of that judgment. And, as in each of those cases, we reject father’s contention in this case. ORS 107.135(6) simply does not authorize a court to modify the terms of a dissolution judgment in that fashion.

Section 107.135 permits modification of child support when an obligor’s financial circumstances improve and does not preclude forecasting potential income to calculate support.

In re the Marriage of LaFavor · filed 1997-11-19

Under OAR 137-050-0360, a court may consider potential income, and ORS 107.135, which permits modification of child support if an obligor’s financial circumstances improve, does not preclude a court from forecasting a person’s potential income as a basis for calculating an appropriate child support obligation.

Section 107.135(6) permits a property distribution that offsets a spousal support arrearage while leaving the prior support judgment intact.

In re the Marriage of Ritzinger · filed 1998-12-09(6)

By awarding wife the $13,500 judgment and awarding husband an additional $13,500 from the proceeds of the sale of the parties’ residence, no prior judgment has been set aside, altered, or modified in violation of ORS 107.135(6), and husband is not unfairly penalized for failing to pay spousal support when the parties actually were living together and sharing expenses.

Section 107.135 permits spousal support to continue after remarriage when the original award’s purpose remains unfulfilled and continued support is needed to avoid an overly disproportionate standard of living.

In re the Marriage of Mason · filed 2000-02-09

On de novo review, ORS 19.415(3), we agree with the trial court’s ruling that the purpose of the original award has not been fulfilled. The continuation of spousal support in the amount of $400 is necessary to afford wife a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the parties’ marriage despite wife’s remarriage.

Section 107.135(5) permits a spousal support modification to take effect retroactively, but the court may decline retroactivity when no compelling circumstances warrant it.

In re the Marriage of Jones · filed 2001-05-02(5)

We decline to do so here, where there are no compelling circumstances warranting such an action, and we note that in the absence of a directive from this court as to the effective date of an award, a trial court’s judgment effectuating our decisions takes effect at the time the judgment is entered by the trial court.

Section 107.135(3)(a)(B) requires a court to consider retirement benefits when modifying spousal support, even if those benefits were awarded as marital property.

Matter of Marriage of Wilson · filed 2003-02-19(3)(a)(B)

First, ORS 107.135(3)(a)(B) requires the court to consider retirement benefits, even though they originally were awarded to a party as a form of marital property.

A response requesting increased child support if spousal support is modified qualifies as a motion to modify the decree under section 107.135(6), allowing child support to be recalculated from the date spousal support ends.

In re the Marriage of Rubey · filed 2002-10-16(6)

However, when husband filed a motion to terminate spousal support on March 19, 1998, wife responded on May 18, 1998, that, “[i]f spousal support is modified, child support should be increased.” That response served as a motion “to set aside, alter, or modify the decree” for the purposes of ORS 107.135(6).

Section 107.135(6) prevents a court from making a support modification effective before the motion to modify was filed, even if the parties agreed to an earlier date.

In re the Marriage of Hutchinson · filed 2003-05-22(6)

Moreover, subsection (6) cannot mean other than what it plainly says: courts do not have the power to make a modification retroactive to a date before the filing date of the motion to modify. The parties’ agreement cannot trump the statute in that regard.

Section 107.135(3)(a) permits reconsideration of child support when a party’s economic circumstances have substantially changed.

In re the Marriage of Sauver · filed 2004-11-10(3)(a)

The court did not err in concluding that wife’s changed circumstances were substantial and unanticipated.

Section 107.135(7)(a) permits, but does not require, a court to credit child support arrears for periods when the obligor had physical custody of the child with the obligee’s knowledge and consent.

Matter of Marriage of Crook · filed 2005-04-20(7)(a)

As noted, husband concedes that nothing in that statute requires a court to grant a credit against child support arrearages. Rather, the statute provides that the court “may” allow a credit against arreages under certain circumstances.

ORS 107.135(5) and (6) do not authorize modification when a spousal support obligation was paid or satisfied before it became a judgment.

In re the Marriage of Harkins · filed 2005-07-06(5), (6)

Similarly, if the support obligation established by the dissolution judgment is paid or satisfied before it ripens into a judgment, ORS 107.135(5) and (6) are inapplicable, because a judgment reflecting that underlying obligation cannot arise.

Section 107.135(7)(a) permits a credit against child support arrears when the obligor has physical custody of the child with the obligee’s knowledge and consent; the court must give a reasoned explanation if it denies a supported request for credit.

In Re the Marriage of Hunt · filed 2010-10-27(7)(a)

However, ORS 107.135(7)(a) provides that the court “may” allow a credit against child support arrearages under certain circumstances. ... We conclude that, in the absence of any countervailing evidence or a reasoned explanation why it would be unjust to give father credit for the period during which the daughter lived with him, the court should have exercised its discretion to reduce the period of arrears by four months, that is, by $1,568.

Section 107.135(7)(a) excludes reasonable parenting time from a credit against child support arrearages; equal overnight parenting time does not by itself qualify as physical custody beyond that exclusion.

State ex rel. Department of Justice v. Akins · filed 2017-05-03(7)(a)

It does not matter that his parenting time includes periods of overnight physical custody, because it is the nature of most parenting-time agreements that each parent has periods of overnight physical custody of the child. If having a child overnight were the metric to trigger the “physical custody” credit in ORS 107.135(7)(a), then the text excluding “reasonable parenting time” would largely be meaningless.

Section 107.135(1) requires personal service on the other spouse of a motion to modify child support when the state initiated the contempt proceeding.

Whallon v. Whallon · filed 1975-11-10(1)

Under those statutes the Attorney General represents the state and not the wife. It is our conclusion, therefore, that under the facts involved here the ex-husband’s motion to modify should have been served personally on the wife.

Section 107.135(1)(a)'s motion and notice requirements are met when both parties submit a written custody stipulation requesting an order and voluntarily appear before the court.

Wolff v. Wolff · filed 1976-06-21(1)(a)

The parties' written stipulation to the change of custody was presented to the court as a request for an order and constituted a motion within the intendment of the statute. ORS 15.030 provides that "[a] voluntary appearance of the defendant shall be equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him." Both parties joined in the motion and both voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. The requirements of ORS 107.135(1)(a) were met and the stipulated order was valid.

A proposed decree modification becomes pending when a party initiates the proceeding with an order to show cause.

In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Smith · filed 1983-10-18(1)(a)

Under this statute, the proposed modification became a pending matter before the court when the accused, on behalf of Mrs. Brown, initiated the proceeding with the show cause order.

Section 107.135(1) governs the manner of serving notice of a custody modification motion, not the time allowed before the hearing.

Killam · filed 1991-09-25(1)

However, ORS 107.135(1) speaks only about the manner, not the time, of service.

Section 107.135(2)(a) permits a party to initiate a child support modification proceeding at any time based on a substantial change in circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Longcor · filed 1992-07-08(2)(a)

Because mother’s motion to modify was based on a substantial change in circumstances, ORS 107.135(2)(a), she was entitled to initiate the modification proceeding at any time.

Section 107.135(1) requires a party seeking modification to give notice in the manner required for service of summons.

State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Bail · filed 1996-04-17(1)

However, ORS 107.135(1) ( since amended by Or.Laws 1995, ch. 22, § 2) specifies that a party seeking modification must provide notification in the manner required for service of summons (ORCP 7D).

Section 107.135(1) requires notice to the other party before a court modifies a dissolution judgment, including during a remedial contempt proceeding.

In Re the Marriage of Becker · filed 1996-10-23(1)

Nothing in ORS 33.105 suggests that a court in imposing sanctions for remedial contempt, can modify the terms of a dissolution judgment without the alleged contemnor-spouse first receiving the notice prescribed in ORS 107.135.

Section 107.135(6) requires a party to move for modification of child support and notify the other parties; a trial court cannot modify support on its own motion.

Sorenson v. Baker · filed 1999-09-15(6)

The state objected to such modification, arguing that respondent had not filed a motion to modify the order as required under ORS 416.425, ORS 107.135(6), or ORS 107.431. ... it is clear that all of the statutory provisions relevant to this case prohibit the trial court from modifying support on its own motion. Each of those statutes explicitly requires a party to file a motion for modification and notify the other parties.

Relevant evidence in a modification proceeding under ORS 107.135 need not be pleaded to be admissible.

In re the Marriage of Jones · filed 2001-01-31

We disagree with the proposition that relevant evidence, to be admissible, must also be pleaded in the pleadings under ORS 107.135.

Section 107.135(1) does not require dissolution court approval of a settlement that does not modify the dissolution judgment.

Bidwell v. Baker · filed 2004-06-09(1)

Thus, it is possible to infer from the allegations of the complaint that the settlement agreement would not have required a modification of the judgment itself and that, accordingly, it did not require court approval in the dissolution action under ORS 107.135(1) (2001).

Section 107.135 allows a court to modify spousal support only on a party’s motion; parties may waive their right to seek modification, but cannot eliminate the court’s authority to modify.

MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF McINNIS · filed 2005-04-20(1)

In this case, one provision of the marital settlement agreement expressly states the parties' intention "to divest the Court of the jurisdiction conferred upon it pursuant to the provisions of ORS 107.135 pertaining to modification of spousal support." That the parties cannot do. ... ORS 107.135 provides that the court has authority to modify a dissolution judgment only "upon motion of either party." Thus, the authority of the court to modify a dissolution judgment always has been dependent on a decision of one of the parties to invoke its authority by filing an appropriate motion.

Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support only on a party’s motion; parties may waive their right to seek modification without removing the court’s authority to modify.

In re the Marriage of McInnis · filed 2005-04-20(1)

The waiver provision in this case has nothing to do with the authority of the court; rather, it involves only whether the parties may invoke it. ORS 107.135 provides that the court has authority to modify a dissolution judgment only “upon motion of either party.” Thus, the authority of the court to modify a dissolution judgment always has been dependent on a decision of one of the parties to invoke its authority by filing an appropriate motion.

Section 107.135(14) requires a written response to a motion to modify a dissolution judgment; a motion asking Oregon to decline jurisdiction can satisfy that requirement.

In Re the Marriage of Nolan · filed 2010-03-03(14)

ORS 107.135(14) also requires a “written response” to a motion to modify a dissolution judgment. Mother provided such a written response when she filed her motion for the State of Oregon to decline jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in refusing to set aside the order of default, and we reverse the supplemental judgment for that reason.

Section 107.135(1)(a) requires a motion and service of notice before a court has authority to modify spousal support.

In re Stansell · filed 2018-12-05(1)(a)

Thus, the plain language of the statute provides that a court may modify spousal support "at any time" after a party's motion and "after service" of notice on the other party. It follows that a trial court lacks authority to modify spousal support unless and until service occurs.

Section 107.135(3) gives the court discretion to award attorney fees against an unsuccessful party who moves to modify a decree.

Copenhaver v. Copenhaver · filed 1973-10-29(3)

Under OES 107.135 (3), the court has the discretion to award attorneys’ fees against an unsuccessful moving party who files a motion to modify a decree. ... Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award the' attorneys’ fees ..to plaintiff at the trial level.

Under the pre-1973 version of § 107.135(3), the court could assess attorney fees only against an unsuccessful moving party.

Wells v. Wells · filed 1973-12-03(3)

“The court may assess a reasonable attorney fee against an unsuccessful moving party who files a motion to set aside, alter or modify a decree as in this section provided.” ... This provision was formerly in OES 107.130, which was constrned in a similar situation as that at bar in Fox v. Fox, 254 Or 444, 460 P2d 1013 (1969). There the court reversed the part of the decree which awarded attorney fees. We must do the same here.

Section 107.135(3) requires evidence that an attorney fee is reasonable, or a stipulation allowing the court to set the fee without evidence.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Barrong · filed 1976-05-03(3)

Wife’s counsel contends that ... inasmuch as ORS 107.135(3) provides that "the court may assess” a reasonable fee, nothing else is necessary. Neither argument meets the often-expressed need for evidence of reasonableness or a stipulation that the court may set the fee without evidence.

Section 107.135(3) leaves the amount of attorney fees awarded in a child-support modification proceeding to the trial court's sound discretion.

Harder v. Harder · filed 1976-08-02(3)

The amount of the fees granted was, however, a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court; we find no abuse of that discretion in this case.

Section 107.135(3) permits a court to deny attorney fees when both parties can pay their own expenses.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Buss · filed 1978-10-02(3)

Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the failure of the trial court to award attorney’s fees to mother.... Both parties were capable of paying their own expenses.

Section 107.135(3) authorizes reasonable attorney fees, but an award needs a basis in the pleadings or a stipulation and evidence supporting the fee amount.

In re the Marriage of Lundgren · filed 1979-03-05(3)

Under ORS 107.135(3), the court was authorized to "assess against either party a reasonable attorney’s fee for the benefit of the other party.” ... There was nothing in the "certificate” or in the evidence concerning the reasonable value of those services or the fee that the mother would be charged for them. There was therefore no basis for the award.

Section 107.135(3) does not require a party to prevail to receive attorney fees in a modification proceeding.

Matter of Marriage of Desler · filed 1982-04-12(3)

Husband also argues that the order awarding attorney fees was in error, because wife could not reasonably be said to be the prevailing party. This contention is wrong. See ORS 107.135(3).

Section 107.135(3) permits a court to assess a reasonable attorney fee against either party in a proceeding to modify a dissolution decree.

In re the Marriage of Truax · filed 1983-03-02(3)

The statutory authority for award of attorney fees in a proceeding to modify a decree of dissolution is ORS 107.135(3). That statute gives discretionary authority to assess against either party “a reasonable fee for the benefit of the other party.”

Section 107.135(3) permits an attorney fee award only when a stipulation or evidence establishes that the fee is reasonable.

In re the Marriage of Wilson · filed 1983-03-16(3)

However, attorney fees are improper without a stipulation ... or evidence as to reasonableness of the fees.

Section 107.135(3) allows an attorney-fee motion in a modification proceeding; the motion cannot be denied on the stated grounds that fee proof was not offered at the modification hearing and ORCP 68 does not apply.

In re the Marriage of Burch · filed 1983-12-21(3)

She contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for attorney fees on the grounds that she had failed to offer proof on that issue at the modification hearing and that ORCP 68 is not applicable to a modification hearing. ... On cross-appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying mother’s motion for attorney fees on the grounds stated by the court. ORS 107.135(3); ORCP 68C; Truax and Truax, 62 Or App 130, 137, 659 P2d 983 (1983).

Section 107.135(4) permits attorney fees only in a proceeding under subsection (1) to modify a support obligation.

In re the Marriage of Fletcher · filed 1985-03-20(4)

Husband appeals also from the court’s award to wife of attorney fees incurred in this action, under ORS 107.135 (4). Because this was not properly a proceeding under ORS 107.135(1) to modify a support obligation, the court was without authority to award attorney fees.

ORS 107.135 does not authorize an order requiring one spouse to pay the other spouse’s travel and lodging expenses to defend a motion to modify a decree.

In re the Marriage of Scholze · filed 1984-06-13

There is no similar provision, however, in ORS 107.135, governing orders for modification of a decree. Although ORS 107.405 gives the court in this proceeding “full equity powers,” the court could not award travel and lodging expenses in the absence of statutory authority.

Section 107.135(4) authorizes attorney fees in a proceeding to modify a dissolution decree.

State ex rel. Moreau v. Moreau · filed 1987-09-02(4)

ORS 107.135(4) provides the statutory authority for awarding attorney fees in a proceeding to modify a decree of dissolution.

Section 107.135(4) permits an attorney-fee award in a proceeding to terminate child support under subsection (1)(d).

In re the Marriage of Yokum · filed 1987-09-09(4)

Father’s motion seeks to terminate his duty of support pursuant to ORS 107.135(1)(d). Therefore, the attorney fees provision of ORS 107.135(4) is applicable.

Attorney fee awards under subsection (4) are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

State ex rel. Moreau v. Moreau · filed 1988-02-10(4)

We review an award of attorney fees under ORS 107.135(4) only for abuse of discretion.

Section 107.135(6) makes an attorney fee award discretionary, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Porter · filed 1990-02-14(6)

An award of attorney fees under ORS 107.135(6) is discretionary. We review only for abuse of discretion.

ORS 107.135(6) permits attorney fees in a modification proceeding when a party is found to have acted in bad faith; the award needs supporting findings and a factual basis.

In re Schwartz · filed 1990-07-18(6)

Although the court did not explain the award or cite any particular authority, mother had sought attorney fees under ORS 107.135(6), which authorizes the court to award attorney fees in a modification proceeding, “[i]f a party is found to have acted in bad faith.” The court made no findings to support an award under that provision, and the record does not disclose a factual basis for the award.

Section 107.135(6) makes an attorney fee award discretionary and subject to review for abuse of discretion.

In re the Marriage of Pokorny · filed 1991-11-13(6)

An award of attorney fees under ORS 107.135(6) is discretionary, and we review only for an abuse of discretion.

Section 107.135(7) permits an award of attorney fees and costs in a child support modification proceeding even when the parties agree on the modification without a contested hearing.

In re the Marriage of Floeter · filed 1992-05-20(7)

By filing her motion to modify child support, mother initiated a “proceeding under subsection (1)” and triggered the provisions of ORS 107.135(7). That statute contains no requirement that the parties’ dispute be resolved as a result of a contested hearing on the merits and no exception for disputes that are partially resolved by agreement. Accordingly, the court erred in concluding that it lacked authority to award fees and costs.

ORS 107.135(7) authorizes attorney fees only in a proceeding to modify or vacate a dissolution judgment.

Sherman v. Staffel · filed 1993-02-17(7)

ORS 107.135(7)... only authorizes the award of attorney fees in a proceeding to modify or vacate portions of a dissolution ... judgment. The district court did not have the authority to make a modification, and therefore could not award attorney fees under that statute.

Section 107.135(7) permits an attorney fee award for fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in a custody and visitation modification proceeding; an inadequate award may be increased.

In re Weiner · filed 1993-03-03(7)

The trial court concluded that mother should recover attorney fees that are reasonably and necessarily incurred. ORS 107.135(7). However, we are persuaded that the court’s award does not satisfy that objective and should be increased.

Section 107.135(7) does not authorize an attorney-fee award to grandparents who intervene in a modification proceeding.

In re the Marriage of Cerda · filed 1995-08-09(7)

Our reasoning in Holm also controls the interpretation of that statute. The trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees to grandparents.

Section 107.135(7) permits an attorney fee award for a party represented by legal aid even if the party incurred no personal fee expense.

State Ex Rel. Binschus v. Schreiber · filed 1996-05-29(7)

Father also argues that ORS 107.135(7) provides that the court may assess “a reasonable attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the other party,” and because mother incurred no cost for her attorney fees, the award will not benefit her contrary to the intent of the statute. We disagree. ... In this case, mother was represented by a legal aid attorney. The purpose of legal aid is to provide representation to persons in mother’s situation, and she benefited from that representation. Given the nature of the relationship and mother’s need for legal services, the trial court’s order fulfills the intent of the statute.

Section 107.135(7) does not govern attorney fees in a proceeding involving a foreign child support order; ORS 110.378 does.

In re the Marriage of Cooney · filed 1997-10-01(7)

On appeal, father argues that ORS 107.135(7) required the trial court to award attorney fees and costs and that fees must be awarded because mother acted in bad faith by lying about her income and resources on the witness stand. However, as we have already stated, ORS chapter 107 is inapplicable to this proceeding. Rather, when the case involves a foreign child support order, ORS 110.378 provides the authority for an award of attorney fees and costs.

Section 107.135(7) gives courts discretion to award attorney fees in a proceeding to modify a dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of Baker · filed 2001-03-14(7)

By its terms, the statute grants the courts discretion to award attorney fees in a modification proceeding.

Attorney fee requests under ORS 107.135(7) are subject to a findings requirement, but a party who did not raise a specific objection to the award cannot complain on appeal about missing findings.

In re the Marriage of Gillies · filed 2001-07-25(7)

Requests for attorney fees under ORS 107.135(7) are subject to the requirements of McCarthy. ... Husband will not now be heard to complain about a lack of more specific findings concerning the facts and legal criteria supporting the court’s decision to award wife attorney fees.

Section 107.135(8) treats a party’s position as bad faith for attorney-fee purposes when it was entirely devoid of legal or factual support when made.

In re the Marriage of Shelton · filed 2004-11-10(8)

We agree with mother that “bad faith” in ORS 107.135(8) should be interpreted similarly to “bad faith” in ORS 20.105(1) (1993). As the Supreme Court explained in Mattiza, a claim or position is in bad faith under ORS 20.105(1) (1993) when it is meritless, that is, “it was entirely devoid of legal or factual support at the time it was made.” 311 Or at 8 (footnotes omitted). Under that standard, the trial court’s conclusion that mother did not act in bad faith was legally correct.

Section 107.135(8) authorizes trial-court attorney fees in a modification proceeding but is silent on appellate attorney fees.

In Re the Marriage of Polacek · filed 2010-12-02(8)

ORS 107.135(8) authorizes the trial court to award attorney fees in this case. That statute is silent, however, regarding the authority of an appellate court to award attorney fees on appeal or review from a trial court proceeding under ORS 107.135(1).

Section 107.135(8) permits attorney fees for enforcing a dissolution judgment only when the enforcement efforts are reasonably and materially related to a modification dispute; unrelated enforcement efforts do not qualify.

In Re the Marriage of Berry · filed 2012-01-25(8)

To the extent that extraneous matters, including unrelated enforcement efforts, may be raised and decided concurrently with a motion to modify, that coincidence cannot give rise to fee entitlement under subsection (8).

Section 107.135(8) permits an attorney fee award even when the party seeking fees withdraws the motion to modify.

In re the Marriage of Niman · filed 2006-06-14(8)

We reject, without extended discussion, husband’s contention that wife’s ultimate withdrawal of her motion to modify effectively prevented her from recovering fees. ... Here, in contrast, wife’s asserted entitlement to fees rests on ORS 107.135(8) and the application of the “discretionary entitlement” factors prescribed by ORS 20.075(1).

Section 107.135(8) permits the court to award reasonable attorney fees in proceedings concerning modification of child support obligations, including a motion seeking repayment of alleged overpayments.

In re the Marriage of Merritt · filed 2015-12-30(8)

As relevant here, ORS 107.135(8) provides that, in a proceeding described in ORS 107.135(1), “the court may assess against either party a reasonable attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the other party.” The proceedings described in subsection (1) of that statute include motions to “[s]et aside, alter or modify any portion of the judgment that provides * * * for the custody, parenting time, visitation, support and welfare of the minor children and the children attending school.” ORS 107.135(1)(a). The trial court properly awarded fees based on ORS 107.135(8).

Section 107.135(8) authorizes a court entering a custody judgment after dissolution under subsection (1) to assess reasonable attorney fees against either party.

Al-Ani v. Wafeek · filed 2019-11-27(8)

Thus, ORS 107.135(8) provides statutory authorization for an award of attorney fees to father in this case.

ORS 107.135(8) permits attorney fees for enforcement efforts that are materially and reasonably related to a modification proceeding.

Baertlein and Stocks · filed 2020-03-18(8)

Thus, while perhaps not “inextricably intertwined,” mother’s enforcement motion was certainly “materially and reasonably related” to father’s motion to modify. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had discretion to award mother and Brian the full amount of their fees under that statute and therefore did not err in doing so.

When awarding attorney fees under section 107.135(8), a court must consider the parties’ financial resources and make findings sufficient to show that it did so.

Buchanan and Buchanan · filed 2023-09-13(8)

In this case, we conclude that the court’s findings are not adequate for review, because we cannot determine whether the court considered the financial resources of the parties in making its determination.

Section 107.135(8) authorizes attorney fees for the other party’s benefit; an award under it cannot be categorized in the judgment as child support.

Boyd and Boyd · filed 2024-06-05(8)

By contrast, a discretionary award of attorney fees, such as the one at issue here, is for the benefit of the other party. ... Although in some broad or colloquial sense, anything that benefits a parent may also be said to benefit the parent’s minor children, based on the distinct statutory schemes and criteria that apply to awards of reasonable attorney fees and child support, the trial court erred when it included language in the attorney fee judgment suggesting an equivalence between the two.

Section 107.135(8) permits attorney fees in a custody modification proceeding and requires a fee award if a party acts in bad faith.

In re Moser · filed 2015-05-13(8)

Under ORS 107.135(8), the court always may award fees, and must award fees if one party acts in bad faith.

Section 107.135(8) permits a discretionary attorney fee award in a custody modification proceeding but requires an award when a party acted in bad faith.

Dickson v. Abrams, Jr. · filed 2021-09-30(8)

Under ORS 107.135(8) when a party seeks to modify the custody arrangement, as a matter of discretion the court may choose to award “a reasonable attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the other party.” ... Alternatively, if the court finds a party acted in bad faith, under the second part of the statute it must order that party to pay attorney fees and costs. ORS 107.135(8). Such an award becomes mandatory when the court makes a bad faith finding.

Section 107.135(8) gives trial courts discretion to award attorney fees and costs in proceedings to modify a dissolution judgment.

Schroeder v. Maitinnara · filed 2025-12-03(8)

Trial courts have discretion to award attorney fees and costs in a proceeding to modify a judgment of dissolution of marriage. ORS 107.135(8).

Section 107.135 does not permit modification of a decree’s property division provisions.

In re the Marriage of McCormack · filed 1980-04-28

The inability to modify, coupled with the provision requiring payment of the lien upon remarriage, would restrict the wife so that she could remarry only if her husband was able to pay off the lien. The wife would not be able to seek modification if her prospective husband was unable to pay the lien.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of support orders upon a change of circumstances, but property divisions may not be modified.

Schaffer v. Schaffer · filed 1982-04-26(1)(a)

Support orders may be modified on a showing of a change of circumstances, ORS 107.135(l)(a), and may be set aside after 10 years if the spouse has not made a reasonable effort to become financially self-supporting, ORS 107.407, but divisions of property may not.

Section 107.135 authorizes modification of support provisions but does not authorize modification of a final property division.

Matter of Marriage of Vinson · filed 1982-05-12(1)(a)

The trial court had no statutory authority to modify the property division. See ORS 107.135(l)(a) (power to modify support provision).

Section 107.135 permits modification of support orders, but a dissolution decree’s property division cannot be modified.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 1983-10-12(1)(a)

Although support orders are modifiable (ORS 107.135(l)(a)), provisions in a dissolution decree relating to a division of property are invulnerable to change. ... The trial court erred when it ordered a modification of the property division provisions of the dissolution decree, and we reverse that order.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support when circumstances change, but does not permit modification of a property division.

Matter of Marriage of Moak · filed 1983-09-07(1)(a)

We agree with husband that the court had the power to modify spousal support, but we do not agree that it should be modified. Spousal support may be modified on a change of circumstances, ORS 107.135(1) (a), but a division of property may not.

Section 107.135(1)(a) does not authorize a court to alter property rights acquired through a voluntary transfer between former spouses that the decree did not require.

In re the Marriage of McMahan · filed 1983-11-09(1)(a)

We conclude that the transfer of the policy to wife was not made under compulsion of the decree and that the trial court was without authority under ORS 107.135(l)(a) or its general equity powers to affect the rights that wife acquired in a voluntary transfer of property to her by her former spouse.

Section 107.135(1)(a) authorizes modification of spousal and child support provisions, but not a property division incorporated in a dissolution decree.

Spady v. Graves · filed 1989-03-07(1)(a)

ORS 107.135(1)(a), upon which Spady relies, authorizes a circuit court to modify spousal and child support provisions, but it does not authorize modification of a property division incorporated in a dissolution decree.

Section 107.135(1)(a) does not authorize a court to modify the property division in a dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of Dee · filed 1989-04-26(1)(a)

Unlike the modification of spousal or child support provisions, the court does not have authority under ORS 107.135(1)(a) to modify the property division in a dissolution judgment.

Section 107.135(1) generally bars a trial court from modifying the property division in a dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of McDade · filed 1991-06-12(1)

The general rule is that a trial court cannot modify property division provisions of a dissolution judgment.

Section 107.135(1)(a) does not permit modification of a property division.

In re the Marriage of Murray · filed 1993-05-12(1)(a)

Although a property division may not be modified under ORS 107.135(l)(a), ... a dissolution judgment, including the property division, may be set aside under ORCP 71.

Section 107.135 generally prohibits modifying a dissolution judgment’s property division, even when the change is presented as a clarification.

Williams v. Williams · filed 1995-04-26(1)(e)

Generally, however, a court cannot modify property division awards. See ORS 107.135(l)(e); Garnett v. Garnett, 270 Or 102, 526 P2d 549 (1974). ... Accordingly, the amended judgment was not a clarification but was an improper modification of a property division.

Section 107.135 does not authorize a court to modify a property division that was not based on enhanced earning capacity by converting it into spousal support.

In the Matter of Marriage of Dornbusch and Dornbusch · filed 2004-09-01(1)(e)

It follows that the trial court could not modify that part of its property division award under ORS 107.135 after the judgment.

Section 107.135(1)(e) does not permit modification of a retirement-benefit property division unless the property award was based on a party’s enhanced earning capacity.

In re the Marriage of Tough · filed 2013-10-30(1)(e)

The division of retirement benefits at dissolution is a property division that is not subject to modification unless the property award was based on the enhanced earning capacity of one of the parties. ORS 107.135(l)(e); Tiley and Tiley, 147 Or App 262, 266, 936 P2d 367, rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997). Wife did not petition the trial court to modify the dissolution judgment according to ORS 107.135(l)(e). As a result, wife is not entitled to a division of husband’s retirement benefits contrary to the division provided for in the dissolution judgment.

Section 107.135 generally does not authorize modification of a dissolution judgment’s property division, subject to statutory exceptions.

Menten and Deatherage · filed 2020-02-26

We agree with wife that our case law is clear that, barring statutory exceptions, a property division is not subject to modification.

Section 107.135(1)(e) limits modification of property awards to certain awards based on enhanced earning capacity; it does not authorize transferring property awarded in a dissolution judgment as a remedial contempt sanction.

Lamm v. Lamm · filed 2018-02-22(1)(e)

As we have stated, " ORS 107.135(1)(e) limits the authority of the court to modify property awards to certain awards based on enhanced earning capacity." ... We conclude that the court lacked the authority to award respondent's real property to petitioner as a remedial sanction for contempt.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits an Oregon court to modify a registered foreign dissolution decree to award support for children over 18 who are attending school.

In re the Marriage of Tavares · filed 1981-12-21(1)(a)

The California decree having been registered in Oregon, the court then also had jurisdiction, pursuant to ORS 107.135(l)(a) and Eusterman, to award child support for the children during the time they are over the age of 18 and attending school.

Section 107.135 permits modification of provisions in a dissolution decree, but does not give the court jurisdiction over a trust the decree did not address.

In re the Marriage of Melkonian · filed 1982-01-25(1)(a)

ORS 107.135 authorizes the court to modify particular provisions of a decree of dissolution. In this case the decree addressed the realty portion of the trust, but was entirely silent with respect to the securities and the bank account funds, if any such funds existed at the time. Therefore, in a proceeding for modification of the decree, the securities and bank account trust was not within the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 107.135 preserves personal jurisdiction over a parent for child-support modification when the court obtained personal jurisdiction in the original dissolution proceeding and the support duty continues.

Carlin v. Carlin · filed 1983-03-23(1)(a)

Once having obtained personal jurisdiction over father in 1966, the circuit court never lost that jurisdiction for child support purposes under ORS 107.135.

Section 107.135 does not authorize imposing liability for predissolution expenses that the dissolution judgment did not assign to a party.

State ex rel Connelly v. Connelly · filed 1988-04-20

The dissolution judgment does not obligate father for the payments incurred by mother during the period of separation when she had custody of the children and occupied the residence. ... Imposing that obligation would be a modification of the decree not authorized by ORS 107.135 or any other statutory provision.

Section 107.135 does not authorize a court to require annual medical examinations of a former spouse in the circumstances described.

In Matter of Marriage of Baumgartner and Baumgartner · filed 1989-03-22

We find no authority in the statutes or case law which would permit a trial court to impose a requirement of physical examination of a former spouse in the circumstances in this record. Since the court’s power is limited to that expressly conferred by ORS 107.135 and that implied to carry an express grant into effect, the trial court was without authority to enter the order.

Section 107.135 supplies the court’s authority to modify a dissolution judgment that incorporates a settlement agreement.

In re the Marriage of Edwards · filed 1993-11-17

When a settlement agreement is incorporated into a dissolution judgment, the court’s authority to modify that judgment rests on the statute, not on the agreement.

Section 107.135 governs modification of child support but does not authorize creating a trust out of a child support award.

Stringer v. Brandt · filed 1994-06-22

ORS 107.105 only applies to decrees of annulment, dissolution or separation. ORS 107.135 is the appropriate statutory provision for modification of child support, and it contains no provision for the creation of trusts out of a child support award. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ordering the creation of the trust.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support only while a support obligation remains under the decree; unpaid arrears do not extend that obligation.

In re the Marriage of Goertel · filed 2006-12-06(1)(a)

When the last payment date passed, there was no longer a support obligation under the decree; there was only the right of wife to enforce her judgments for any unpaid support. Since there was no support obligation in effect on the day wife filed her motion to modify the decree, her first argument fails.

Section 107.135(1) allows an Oregon court to modify the child and spousal support components of an award labeled family support.

In Re the Marriage of Daly · filed 2009-04-29(1)

Modifications of child support and spousal support awards are within an Oregon court’s jurisdiction. It follows that a family support award that consists of child support and spousal support is within an Oregon court’s jurisdiction to modify. The parties’ use of the term “family support” did not deprive the trial court of its statutory authority to modify child support and spousal support.

Section 107.135 permits a party to seek modification of a stipulated spousal support award.

In the Matter of Marriage of Beebe · filed 2011-06-29(15)(d)

Stated differently, even where parties have stipulated to an initial spousal support award, nothing limits their ability to file a motion to modify the award under ORS 107.135.

Section 107.135(15)(a)’s presumption favoring enforcement of stipulated dissolution judgments applies to child support agreements; a waiver of the right to seek modification is enforceable unless enforcement would contravene public policy.

Matar and Harake · filed 2011-10-26(15)(a)

Father's policy argument is incorrect. In several recent cases, we have discussed the presumption in favor of enforcement of stipulated dissolution judgments as expressed in the policy statements set forth in ORS 107.104(1) and ORS 107.135(15)(a), and in two recent cases, we have applied that presumption in the context of agreements regarding child support. ... Rather, through their agreement, the parties have waived the right to seek that modification and, absent circumstances that make enforcement of the agreement contrary to public policy, such waiver provisions are enforceable.

Section 107.135(15)(a)’s presumption favoring enforcement of stipulated dissolution judgments extends to child support agreements; a waiver of the right to seek modification is enforceable unless its enforcement would contravene public policy.

In re the Marriage of Matar · filed 2011-10-26(15)(a)

In several recent cases, we have discussed the presumption in favor of enforcement of stipulated dissolution judgments as expressed in the policy statements set forth in ORS 107.104(1) and ORS 107.135(15)(a), and in two recent cases, we have applied that presumption in the context of agreements regarding child support. ... Rather, through their agreement, the parties have waived the right to seek that modification and, absent circumstances that make enforcement of the agreement contrary to public policy, such waiver provisions are enforceable.

Section 107.135(15) permits enforcement of child support nonmodification agreements unless enforcement would violate the law or clearly contravene public policy; courts assess the public policy issue case by case.

Matar and Harake · filed 2013-04-18(15)

We conclude that ORS 107.104 and ORS 107.135(15) recognize that the enforcement of nonmodification agreements may, but does not necessarily, contravene public policy.

Section 107.135(15) permits enforcement of a parent’s agreement not to seek child support modification unless enforcement would violate the law or contravene public policy, which courts assess case by case.

In re the Marriage of Matar · filed 2013-04-18(15)(a)

We conclude that ORS 107.104 and ORS 107.135(15) recognize that the enforcement of nonmodification agreements may, but does not necessarily, contravene public policy. Courts must make that determination on a case-by-case basis.

Section 107.135’s custody modification standards were erroneously applied to this dispute over custody awarded to grandparents, but the parent who invoked those standards could not challenge their use on appeal.

Underwood · filed 2013-02-13(1)(a)

In sum, the trial court was invited—albeit erroneously—to decide the case under the standards set forth in ORS 107.135 pertaining to changes in custody. It did so.

Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support in a stipulated dissolution judgment when its requirements are met.

In re the Marriage of Dow · filed 2013-04-24

Nothing in ORS 107.135 limits courts’ authority to modify stipulated dissolution judgments.

Section 107.135 gives courts authority to modify spousal support, but parties may agree to waive their right to seek modification without depriving the court of that authority.

In re the Marriage of Sheil · filed 2017-06-07

Here, we decline to interpret the agreement as expressing an intention to deprive the trial court of its authority to modify support—something that parties cannot do. Rather, in the absence of an explicit statement like the one we invalidated in McInnis, we conclude that, as in Matar, the parties expressed an intention not to seek modification of spousal support.

The 1997 amendment adding subsection (10) does not apply retroactively to a custody judgment entered before it took effect.

Matter of Marriage of Heuberger · filed 1998-08-05(10)

However, the judgment here was entered December 20,1996, and there is no indication in the legislation or in its history that the legislature intended it to be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the amended version of the statute is not applicable here.