12 Okla. Stat. § 95

Section 95(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to bondholder actions to collect delinquent municipal paving assessments.

Cahill v. Hovenden · filed 1942-12-02(2)

It is contended that the installments in each cause of action' which became due in 1936 and prior years were barred by the second subdivision of 12 O.S.1941 § 95, which provides that any civil action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued and not after-wards. ... But the general three year statute of limitations on which reliance is placed has no application to actions of this kind.

Section 95’s three-year limit does not apply to a special proceeding to foreclose a street improvement assessment lien.

Hann v. City of Clinton, Okl. Ex Rel. Schuetter · filed 1942-11-17(2)

That statute indicates clearly a then legislative understanding or interpretation that the general three-year statute of limitations previously adverted to did not apply to a special proceeding to foreclose an assessment lien, for if it did the enactment of the iater special act fixing the same three-year period was merely a gesture. Of course, that legislative interpretation should be and is strongly persuasive in resolving the doubt, if any existed, whether the general three-year statute applies to a special proceeding of this kind.

Section 95(2) applies to foreclosure of a street improvement assessment lien; the cause of action arises when an installment remains delinquent 12 months after the last annual installment comes due.

Whorton v. City of Hollis Ex Rel. Shannon · filed 1944-11-14(2)

The rule announced in City of Bristow v. Groom, 194 Okla. 384, 151 P. 2d 936, governs. We held (1) that the ... lien is subject to the limitations stated in 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (2), and (2) the cause of action arose when a delinquency as to the annual installments assessed for the payment of the bonds existed for a period of 12 months subsequent to the due date of the last annual installment. ... The cause of action arose September 1, 1937, and the suit being filed July 30, 1940, was filed before the action was barred.

Section 95(2) gives an action to foreclose delinquent street improvement assessments a three-year limitations period beginning twelve months after the last installment is due.

City of Ardmore Ex Rel. Dyer v. Holt · filed 1944-11-14(2)

The three-year period of limitation, 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (2), began to run twelve months after the due date of the last installment, and had run when the action was filed.

Section 95(2)'s general limitation does not apply to refunding street improvement bond liens governed by a special statutory limitation.

Duke v. Town of Okemah ex rel. Clowers · filed 1955-09-27(2)

Inasmuch as these refunding bonds here in question were issued under authority contained in Chapter 33, Article 14, O.S. 1931, and statutes supplementary and amendatory thereto, the limitation quoted above, and not the general statute of limitation, 12 O.S.1951, Sec. 95, subd. 2, applies.

Section 95(1) gives a party five years from the mortgagee’s taking adverse possession to bring an action to declare a deed a mortgage and redeem the property.

Crockett v. Root · filed 1943-07-06(1)

Neither is his right to have the deed declared to be a mortgage and to redeem his share therefrom barred by the provisions of 12 O. S. 1941 § 95 (1). In the cases of Tomlin v. Roberts, above, and Stroud v. Paulk, above, we held that an action to declare a deed a mortgage was not an action for the recovery of real property, but an equitable action seeking relief from the conveyance, and that the right to redeem was barred after five years from the date the mortgagee took adverse possession of the mortgaged premises.

Section 95(3) limits damages for a continuing, abatable wrong to those accruing since the last suit or during the preceding two years.

Hughes v. Harden · filed 1944-05-09(3)

Damages are limited to those accruing since the last suit or during the next preceding two years. 12 O. S. 1941 § 95 (3).

Section 95(First)’s five-year limitation period does not bar a claim for breach of a continuing covenant when breaches occurred within five years before filing.

Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co. · filed 1972-05-09First

On the basis of the foregoing a cause of action is stated by Western against Cities that is not barred by the Oklahoma 5 year statute of limitation 12 O.S.1961, § 95 (First). Western’s petition was filed November 28, 1966. Acts constituting Cities’ alleged bad faith in failing to cooperate with Western in making a full and fair disclosure of relevant facts to the FPC are alleged in Western’s petition as amended to have occurred within 5 years prior to November 28, 1966. This is so because the continuing duty of Cities to make a full and fair disclosure was violated allegedly from day to day by the constant assertion of facts alleged under oath in its petition in intervention.

Section 95(4) gives one year to bring an action for a statutory penalty, and fraudulent concealment does not suspend that period.

Cummings v. Board of Education · filed 1942-04-21(4)

In this instance the statute imposing the penalty did not prescribe a different limitation. The result is the same as if the Legislature had enacted the limitation already fixed into the statute which imposed the penalty. The one-year period so fixed cannot be extended to embrace a case which is not within the letter of the law, since the rule of strict construction is applicable and since concealment does not operate to suspend the statutes. The recovery for the penalty cannot stand.

Section 95’s one-year limit for actions on statutes for penalties or forfeitures does not apply to a remedial action seeking compensation.

Smith Engineering Works v. Custer · filed 1944-05-09(4)

We are driven to the conclusion that the action herein is wholly remedial and not penal, and that the 4th subdivision of 12 O. S. 1941 § 95, fixing a period of limitation for the commencement of an action at one year for a “penalty or forfeiture,” has no application.

Section 95(Fourth)’s one-year limit for actions on statutes for penalty or forfeiture does not apply to private antitrust treble-damages actions under 79 O.S. § 25.

Tulsa Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. McMichael Concrete Co. · filed 1972-04-04(Fourth)

Since the treble damages imposed by 79 O.S.1961 (now 1971) § 25, may not be recovered in an action brought by “the government alone or its designated agent, or the common informer,” but only in an action “for the benefit of private persons, who alone can enforce the remedy,” we hold that § 25 is not a “statute for penalty or forfeiture” within the meaning of 12 O.S.1961 (now 1971) § 95 (Fourth).

Section 95’s limitation for an action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture does not apply when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.

In Re Complaint Against "Judge Anonymous" · filed 1978-10-10(4)

The Judge relies upon 12 O.S.1971, § 95 as grounds for refusal to answer the question concerning his prior relationship with a lawyer. He apparently relies upon the fourth subdivision of § 95, which relates to “an action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.” ... Because there exists a statute imposing a different limitation for penalty or forfeiture we find the limitations argument to be wholly without merit.

Section 95 requires an assault or battery action to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.

McFee v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 1992-05-01Fourth

Under 12 O.S. § 95 (Fourth.), the Plaintiff had to bring an assault or a battery cause of action against the Debtor within one year after the cause of action accrued. The cause of action accrued October 30, 1988 and was barred after October 30, 1989, one year before the Civil Case was filed and two years before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 95 (Fourth) gives the State one year to bring an action under a forfeiture statute unless that statute sets a different limitation period.

State ex rel. Department of Public Safety v. Five Hundred Forty-Eight Dollars & Thirteen Cents ($548.13) In U.S. Currency · filed 1994-05-24(Fourth)

However, under 12 O.S.1991, § 95 (Fourth), the statute of limitations for actions upon a statute of forfeiture is one year, except where the statute imposing the forfeiture prescribes a different limitation. ... Under the plain language of the statutes, DPS had one year within which to bring the forfeiture action.

Section 95(4)'s one-year limit for civil actions upon a statute for penalty does not apply to a request for interest due on an unpaid workers’ compensation award.

Special Indemnity Fund v. Adams · filed 1996-04-02(4)

Section 95(4), a subsection of the general statute of limitations statute, requires that “civil actions” upon a “statute for penalty” be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues. Clearly, the interest sought by Claimants is not a “civil action” or a “penalty.” Claimants were due the interest amounts when the Special Indemnity Fund failed to pay the award within ten days. The statute of limitations is inapplicable in this instance.

Section 95(4)'s one-year limit for actions upon statutory penalties does not apply to interest on unpaid workers' compensation awards because that interest is not a penalty.

Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Dean · filed 2000-11-09(4)

We consequently hold that the one year statute of limitations in 12 O.8.Supp.1995 § 95(4) is inapplicable to an interest award under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 95(4) gives one year to sue for a statutory mortgage-release penalty, but equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from asserting that deadline when its promise caused the plaintiff to delay filing.

Thaxton v. Beneficial Mortgage Co. · filed 2006-08-01(4)

Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 12 0.8. Supp.2005 § 95(4) is applicable. ... If true, Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the passage of the statute of limitations.

Section 95(4) gives a claimant one year to bring an action for failure to release a mortgage under 46 O.S. § 15.

Melson v. Wachovia Bank, NA of North Carolina · filed 2010-10-22(4)

Causes of action arising under § 15 for the failure to release a mortgage are subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 12 O.S. Supp.2005 § 95(4).

Section 95(A)(4) requires defamation and assault claims to be filed within one year of accrual.

Stepp v. Talihina Public School District · filed 2025-04-29(A)(4)

Plaintiffs' defamation and assault claims, filed April 23, 2024, are thus outside the statute of limitations and must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 95’s limitation period does not run against foreclosure while a mortgagee holds possession that is not adverse to the owner.

Miller v. Wentz · filed 1944-06-13(1)

Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the possession of plaintiff, was similar to that of a mortgagee in possession, and therefore no statute of limitations or estoppel could arise so long as the possession of plaintiff was not adverse to that of defendant.

Section 95(2) supplies the limitations period used to gauge laches in a mandamus proceeding to compel collection of paving assessments.

Hutchman v. Parkinson · filed 1947-12-09(2)

We believe §95(2), supra, is the applicable statute in the case at bar, and using it as a gauge or yardstick for determining whether plaintiff ig guilty of laches, we have concluded that he does not have a clear legal right to the issuance of the discretionary writ and that the trial court did not err in denying it.

Section 95’s limitation periods do not control an equitable creditor’s bill, though a court of equity may apply them by analogy when assessing laches.

Hoehn v. Crews · filed 1944-07-06

The disposition of this question is not controlled by the statute of limitations of Oklahoma. It must be decided upon the principle of laches. A court of equity is not bound by the statute of limitations, although it will ordinarily give effect thereto in many situations by analogy to the statute of limitations.

Section 95(2)'s three-year limitation supplies the analogous period for laches in a mandamus action to enforce street-improvement assessment liens, including liens securing bonds issued under the 1910 law.

Versluis v. Hamilton · filed 1951-11-27(2)

In City of Bristow ex rel. Hedges v. Groom, 194 Okla. 384, 151 P. 2d 936, we held that on bonds issued under the 1923 law, an action to foreclose was barred after the expiration of three years from the accrual of the cause of action, 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (2). ... If, as held in Hutchman v. Parkinson, supra, the failure to bring the mandamus action rendered the bondholders guilty of laches where the bonds were issued, under the 1923 law, we see no reason why the same rule should not apply to bonds issued under the 1910 law, where the only remedy was the sale by the county treasurer to satisfy the delinquent assessments, since under the 1923 law that remedy was also available to-the bondholder. ... Therefore, under the rule announced in Hutchman v. Parkinson, which we consider applicable here, they are barred by laches from maintaining the present action.

Section 95 (Second)’s three-year limit for unwritten contracts does not govern an equitable claim to enforce an oral land contract or quiet title; laches governs.

Pearson v. Hall · filed 1986-05-06(Second)

This legal thesis is not tenable. In the first place plaintiffs’ action — and for that matter the counterclaim — are both of equitable cognizance so that it makes no difference whether plaintiffs’ claim be considered one seeking specific performances of an executed oral contract for deed or to quiet their title. This means, of course, that the doctrine of laches applies and not a statute of limitations.

Section 95’s limitations period guides the application of laches to an equitable restitution claim but does not automatically bar it.

Zilkha Energy Company v. Arthur Leighton, Verna Leighton, George W. Leighton, Susan Kay Stansberry, Ann E. Thompson, and Michael Frank Thompson · filed 1990-12-10

In this case, the district court applied the statute of limitations without consideration either of the doctrine of laches or of the possibility of there being other factors which might control its application. We therefore believe we must remand for that consideration.

Subdivision 2 sets the limitation period for a claim to recover money owed from a partnership or joint venture.

Gilliland v. Snedden · filed 1944-12-19(2)

The court rendered judgment upon the first cause of action alleged by the plaintiff, and the limitation prescribed by Title 12 O. S. 1941 § 95, subd. 2, applies.

Section 95(1) gives five years to bring an action primarily for a partnership accounting based on a written partnership agreement, even when partnership realty is titled in one partner’s name.

Bechler v. Kaye · filed 1955-02-21(1)

Under the law of Oklahoma where an action is primarily for a partnership accounting in which title to realty belonging to the partnership stands in the name of one partner, it is considered an action on the contract of partnership itself, and the five or three-year statute of limitations controls, depending on whether the contract was written or oral.6 In this case the agreement was in writing, thus falling under the five-year bar.

Section 95 gives a partnership accounting claim a five-year limit when the partnership agreement is written and a three-year limit when it is oral; the claim accrues when a partner dies unless it accrued earlier.

Bechler v. Kaye · filed 1955-04-13(1), (2)

Under the law of Oklahoma where an action is primarily for a partnership accounting in which title to realty belonging to the partnership stands in the name of one partner, it is considered an action on the contract of partnership itself, and the five or three-year statute of limitations controls, depending on whether the contract was written or oral.6 In this case the agreement was in writing, thus falling under the five-year bar. The cause of action in such cases accrues upon the death of a partner, absent an earlier date.7 Accordingly, upon the death of Wells the statute commenced to run and the six-year lapse before filing this suit is a complete bar to the action.

Section 95’s limitations period for a joint venture claim begins when the venture is completed or terminated.

Bailey v. Murdock · filed 1966-10-04

However, as is made clear in both of the cited cases, the statute of limitations does not begin to run in such cases until “the completion of the joint venture” or the “termination thereof”.

Section 95 sets a two-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Hug v. James · filed 2008-10-22

The statute of limitations for Hug's negligence claim is two years. 12 O.S. Supp. 2007 § 95 (A)(B). The accident occurred on August 18, 2000. Hug filed the present action on October 4, 2006, a date which is clearly more than two years from the date of the accident.

Section 95’s three-year limitation applies to overtime wage claims and bars portions of a claim outside that period unless saved by another statute.

Smith v. Ogle · filed 1945-11-20(2)

As to the remaining portion of the claim the limitation must be calculated by the three-year period prior to March 4, 1943. It will thus be seen that the portion of the claim from January 4, 1940, to March 4, 1940, is barred by the three-year statute.

Section 95(2) gives a plaintiff three years to sue on a loan agreement not reduced to writing.

Benshoof v. Conn · filed 1951-03-27(2)

Since the agreement in connection with the making of the loan was not reduced to writing, plaintiff Glenn Conn was entitled to bring his action within three years from the execution of the memorandum. 12 O.S. 1941 §95, subd. 2.

Section 95’s three-year period governs a principal’s statutory obligation to reimburse a surety and begins when the surety pays.

Keyes v. Dyer · filed 1952-04-23(2)

It is apparent that defendant’s statutory obligation to reimburse plaintiff is the foundation of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, plaintiff’s cause of action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations, supra. (12 O. S. 1951 §95, par 2). ... The right to reimbursement under the statute, supra (15 O. S. 1951 §381), could not arise until payment is made.

Section 95(2)’s three-year limitation applies when an owner elects to sue in assumpsit for property converted to the converter’s benefit.

Wagner v. Blankenship · filed 1952-11-25(2)

The question of whether a person whose property has been converted may elect to sue either in tort or in assumpsit has been a rather controversial one, but this court has adopted the view that a person whose property has been converted by another to the enhancement or benefit of the tort-fea-sor’s estate may elect not to sue on the tort, but to sue on the implied contract to pay for the property so converted. ... In our opinion the two-year statute does not apply, but the three-year statute does apply.

Section 95’s five-year limitation restricts recovery on a school treasurer’s official bond to the period within five years of suit.

Independent School District No. 93, Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma v. Trinity Universal Insurance Company · filed 1970-12-30

The present suit only involves coverage under Trinity’s bond from September 27, 1961, because of the five year statute of limitations. 12 O.S.1961, § 95.

Section 95(2) imposes a three-year limitation on an action to enforce an oral agreement to repurchase stock.

Smith v. Roederer · filed 1973-10-02(2)

The plaintiffs' action in this case is on the oral agreement by Scott to re-purchase all of the stock on demand. The three year statute of limitation provided in 12 O.S.1971, § 95(2) applies to bar the action.

Section 95’s three-year limitations period bars a statutory claim for unpaid county superintendent salary filed after the period runs.

Christian v. State Board of Education · filed 1975-09-16Second

We conclude that the time of the statute of limitation in, i. e., three years, had run before the filing of this action and that, therefore, the real attack on the order sustaining the Demurrer must be on the Appellant’s position that where there is a “wrongful” refusal to pay a claim, the claim can never be barred by limitations.

Section 95 (Second) provides a three-year limitation period for an action on a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, including a retaliatory discharge claim under the Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Act.

Ingram v. Oneok, Inc. · filed 1989-05-30(Second)

We find and hold the intent of the Legislature, embodied in 85 O.S.1981 §§ 5-7, created a new and separate cause of “action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty.” Since the cause of action is a new one; which did not formerly exist at common law, or under an at-will employment relationship, and is substantive — and not procedural nor remedial in nature, we conclude that § 95 (Second) is controlling.

Section 95 Second’s three-year period for unwritten contracts does not govern recovery of mistaken overpayments sufficiently related to a UCC oil-sale contract; the five-year UCC period applies.

United Crude Marketing & Transportation Co. v. Robert Gordon Oil Co. · filed 1992-05-12Second

Whether the three year or five year statute of limitations applies here turns on whether United’s action to recover money accidentally paid to Gordon is an action under its original contract to buy the oil, or is an unrelated action in assumpsit on a contract implied in law. We hold that this action was sufficiently related to United’s *662original contract to buy Gordon’s oil to apply the five year statute of limitations.

Section 95(Second) gives three years to bring an action over a contract for compensation based on commission sales.

Tillery v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1992-06-23(Second)

The Court of Appeals having so held, the parties’ dispute then necessarily centers on the “interpretation of [a] contract for compensation based upon commission sales,”12 controlled by the three year statute of limitations governing contracts express or implied.13 OFBM terminated the subject contract in 1984, and Agent commenced the present action in 1987, within three years.

Section 95 Fourth sets a one-year limitation period for an assault claim.

Hull v. Rich · filed 1993-06-08Fourth

Hull sued Rich on January 6, 1989, within the one year limitation period in 12 O.S.1981, § 95 Fourth.

Section 95(2) gives a medical services provider three years to claim payment from an employer or insurer for treatment of a work-related injury because that liability is created by statute.

Fortenbacher v. Guardsmark, Inc. · filed 1993-12-21(2)

...must agree the three-year limitation period provided in 12 O.S.1991 § 95(2), which is applicable to actions upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty is the appropriate limitation.

Section 95(2) provides a three-year limitations period for actions upon a liability created by statute.

ACCOSIF v. American States Insurance Co. · filed 2000-03-21(2)

The limitation to be applied is the three-year period prescribed by the terms of 12 O.S.1991 $ 95(2) for one's pursuit of liability created by statute.

Section 95(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence claim, measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Fields · filed 2026-03-23(3)

Because the amendment adding Stubbs does not relate back to the original filing date, and because plaintiffs first asserted their negligence claim against him more than two years after they discovered any injury attributable to Stubbs, the Court finds that the claim is barred under 12 O.S. § 95 as untimely.

Section 95(2) gives three years to bring an action to foreclose a special assessment lien because it is a liability created by statute.

Neff v. Calk · filed 1947-02-18(2)

The three-year statute of limitations prescribed by 12 O.S. 1941 §95(2) on a liability created by statute is the applicable statute, and hence the action is not bafred.

Section 95(2)’s three-year limit for liabilities created by statute does not bar reimbursement for taxes and insurance paid under a mortgage contract.

Van Meter v. Field · filed 1947-11-15(2)

Defendant asserts that it was error to make such allowances upon the theory that same was a liability created by statute, 12 O.S. 1941 §95 (2), and not having been sued for before expiration of three years from date of payment, a claim therefor was barred. The mortgage contract herein sued upon required the mortgagor to pay taxes and insurance. It likewise gave the mortgagee the right to pay same without notice if not paid by the mortgagor, and further provided the mortgage was to stand as security for the amounts so paid. The provisions were a part of the said contract and defendant’s failure to comply therewith necessitated those expenditures.

Section 95(2) gives three years from accrual to bring an action to foreclose a special assessment lien, which is a liability created by statute.

North v. Haning · filed 1950-11-14(2)

In the general statutes of limitations it is provided that an action on a “liability created by statute” is barred after three years from accrual of the cause of action. An action to foreclose a special assessment lien is such an action. See 12 O. S. 1941 §95(2), and City of Bristow ex rel. Hedges v. Groom, 194 Okla. 384, 151 P. 2d 936.

Section 95(Second)’s three-year period for an action on liability incurred begins when the amount is determined and the loss is paid.

Travelers Insurance Co. v. L v. French Truck Service, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28(Second)

The limitation period applicable to an action for damage to electrical facilities is three years from its occurrence. The time to bring suit on a liability incurred runs from the time its amount is determined and the loss paid.

Section 95, Second gives three years to sue on each unpaid monthly charge arising from an implied contract or statutory liability.

Fourth National Bank of Tulsa v. Appleby · filed 1993-11-23Second

Because ANR had a cause of action on each of the operator's bills it submitted to Appleby, each of ANR’s unpaid monthly bills to Appleby was barred by the statute of limitations after three years under § 95, Second.

Section 95(2)’s three-year period for a liability created by statute does not apply when the liability existed before the statute.

Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Neustadt · filed 1996-02-27(2)

According to Ulrick, the Bank’s legal authority, this liability existed prior to, and apart from the statute. If so, and we conclude, the Bank’s cause of action does not qualify as a “liability created by statute” with a three year period of limitations.

Section 95(2) gives three years to bring an action upon a liability created by statute.

Nestle Food Co. v. Crews · filed 2000-07-18(2)

The limitation to be applied is the three-year period pre-seribed by the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (2) for one's pursuit of liability created by statute.

Section 95(A)(2) gives an estate three years to bring an action to apportion estate taxes among non-probate beneficiaries because their liability is created by statute.

Edmonds v. Karas · filed 2013-03-12(A)(2)

The three-year statute of limitations in 12 0.8.2011 § 95(A)(2) governs an action to apportion estate taxes among the non-probate beneficiaries of an estate.

Section 95’s limitation periods do not apply to actions for the recovery of real property.

State ex rel. Remy v. Agar · filed 1977-01-18

In so holding, we note that the provisions of § 95 itself excludes application of that statute in eases for the recovery of property, for the introductory language of that section reads: “Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property, can only be brought within the following periods, * * *.”

Section 95(3)'s two-year limitation applies to actions for taking or detaining personal property; an owner cannot extend the period by unreasonably delaying a required demand for its return.

Cook v. Bingman · filed 1947-04-08(3)

Since the trial court was called upon to determine the application of this statute to the evidence of the plaintiff, excluding every consideration of inferences and conclusions which might be drawn therefrom favorable to demurrant, the conclusion is inescapable that the trial court was correct in holding that this statute was applicable and that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred thereby.

Section 95 sets a two-year limit for an action to recover personal property, unless fraud or concealment prevents the period from running.

Reynolds v. Bagwell · filed 1948-09-28

The applicable statute, Tit. 12 O. S. 1941 §95, prescribes the period of two years. ... The possession of defendant having begun more than two years before the action was instituted, the statute is a bar unless there has been fraud or concealment.

Section 95 Third starts the two-year period for recovering stolen personal property when a good-faith purchaser for value takes possession, absent fraud or concealment, and bars recovery only if the property is held openly and notoriously for two years.

Riesinger's Jewelers, Inc. v. Roberson · filed 1978-06-20Third

The statute of limitations on an action to recover stolen personal property in the hands of one who in good faith purchased the personalty for value, begins to run from the time the latter acquired th'e possession and not from the time the owner first had knowledge of the whereabouts of the property, provided there was no fraud or attempt at concealment. ... However, the action is barred only when the property is held openly and notoriously for two years, so that the owner may have a reasonable opportunity of knowing its whereabouts and of asserting his title.

Section 95 Third’s two-year period for recovering stolen property begins when the owner knows or, with due diligence, should know where the property is.

In Re 1973 John Deere 4030 Tractor · filed 1991-07-30Third

We hold that, for purposes of determining the two-year limitation period in 12 O.S.1981, § 95 Third, a claim for recovery of stolen property by the owner from whom the property was stolen accrues when the owner first knows or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known the whereabouts of the stolen property.

Section 95(6) gives a party five years from the maturity of a secured debt to satisfy it and redeem an interest in the property.

Allen v. Garman · filed 1949-02-15(6)

Under 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (6), the plaintiff had five years from the date of maturity to satisfy the debt and redeem his interest in the property, the maturity date of the note having been extended one year. This plaintiff failed to do. His action was filed December 3, 1943, more than five' years after the note matured. His claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations and the trial court was correct in so holding.

Section 95’s five-year period for actions on official bonds does not preserve a negligence claim against a sheriff’s surety when the claim against the sheriff is time-barred.

Tipton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. · filed 1950-09-19Fifth

It has long been a sound principle of law that if the action is barred against the principal, it is also barred against his surety, and there could be no doubt here except for subdivision five. ... Thus when the cases pertaining to the subject in the Oklahoma courts have been analyzed and distinguished, it is clear that in the instant case the action is barred by the statute of limitations and judgment should be for the defendant for its costs.

Section 95(5) allows five years to sue on an administrator’s bond, beginning when the action can be brought.

Howard v. Jeffrey · filed 1953-12-22(5)

We therefore hold that an action could have been brought against the estate of Mirtie Howard, deceased, and, therefore, the sureties on the bond immediately after the death of Mirtie Howard, in 1925; since the cause of action arose, and could have been brought, in 1925, it has been barred since 1930 by the five year statute of limitations found in 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 5.

Section 95(Fourth)’s one-year limitation does not bar the State’s action on a forfeited criminal appearance bond because the State enforces a public right in its sovereign capacity.

Sumpter v. State ex rel. Hall · filed 1966-10-11(Fourth)

This civil action upon the forfeited bond was not begun until more than one year had elapsed after the entry of the order forfeiting the bond, and defendant’s first proposition on appeal is that the action was barred by the one year statute of limitation, 12 O.S.1961, § 95 (Fourth). ... In passing, we note that it appears that in enforcing civil liability ttpon an appearance bond forfeited in a criminal case, the State acts in a sovereign capacity, and enforces a public right which has for its ultimate object the aid of the enforcement of the criminal laws of this state. We hold that the instant action was not barred by any statute of limitation.

For an action on a bond, the limitations period begins when a condition of the bond is breached and the cause of action accrues.

City of Norman v. Liddell · filed 1979-06-19(First)

Ordinarily an action will not lie on a bond until a breach of the condition of the bond occurs. ... The cause of action does not accrue until that time, and the statute of limitation begins to run at that time.

Section 95(1)’s five-year limit does not bar a land purchaser’s quiet-title action when the purchaser remains in possession and claims equitable title under the purchase contract.

Alfrey v. Richardson · filed 1951-05-08(1)

Since we hold that plaintiffs action was one to quiet title rather than an action for specific performance, the action is not controlled by the five-year period of limitation relied upon by defendant. The evidence shows that immediately after the execution of the contract, plaintiff went into possession of the land and remained in continuous possession thereof claiming an equitable interest or title therein. She therefore had a right to maintain an action to quiet her title against the adverse claim of defendant, and so long as she remained in the possession thereof, no statute of limitation ran against that right.

Section 95’s two-year limitation period for fraud claims does not apply to an action to quiet title rather than recover a money judgment based on fraud.

Strickland v. Reeburgh · filed 1961-04-25

This is an action to quiet title and not one to recover a money judgment based upon fraud, thus Sec. 95, supra, is not appli *1114 cable.

Under § 95(4), an amendment correcting the newspaper in which an alleged libel appeared relates back when it does not state a new cause of action, defeating a limitations defense.

Doyle v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. · filed 1951-12-04(4)

We are of the opinion the amended petition did not state a new or different cause of action, but, related back to the beginning of the action, so as to defeat defendant’s plea of the bar of the statute of limitations.

Section 95(3)’s two-year limit bars a new claim for cattle damage from a different source of salt water when it is first pleaded more than two years after the injury.

Hamon v. Gardner · filed 1957-06-25(3)

We are of the opinion that this new source of damages in drinking salt water on the Ballew land, alleged to have occurred more than two years prior to the filing of plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3).

Section 95’s two-year limit does not bar an amended petition filed after the period when it merely puts in writing issues raised during the first trial.

City of McAlester v. King · filed 1960-08-02

Its first proposition in substance is that the original petition wholly failed to state a cause of action and that the present suit tried on an amended petition filed in the case more than two years after the *779cause of action accrued is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, 12 O.S. Supp.1953, § 95. This proposition is without merit. This question was settled in our decision in City of McAlester v. King, supra, wherein we held that the cause of action, as amended during the trial, stated a case of physical invasion, and thereby rendered the City of McAlester amenable to the action for damages. The amended petition filed in the case after remand for a new trial was merely a written pleading reiterating the issues raised during the first trial of the case and approved by this court in the City’s first appeal, City of McAlester v. King, supra.

Section 95(3) does not bar issues raised by an amended petition that elaborates on the original cause of action without substantially changing it.

Morris v. Leverett · filed 1967-11-20(3)

The amended petition elaborated upon matters plaintiffs relied upon as showing the inducements by which defendant procured plaintiffs’ loyalty to his cause, in return for his promise to take the estate in trust. The cause of action to establish existence of a trust remained the same, in that a judgment upon the original pleadings would have been as conclusive of the rights of the parties as the judgment entered upon the amended petition. No error resulted from granting leave to amend the petition, and the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiffs’ action as to the issues raised by the amendment.

An amended petition alleging the same cause of action relates back to the original filing, so the limitations period does not bar it.

Minick v. Rhoades Oil Company · filed 1975-03-11(3)

Unless the amended petition sets out a new cause of action, the amendment relates back to the filing of the original petition and the statute of limitations cannot be invoked.

Section 95(3) requires a conversion action to be brought within two years; a spouse’s priority to serve as estate administrator does not postpone the limitation period.

Gentry v. Mitchell · filed 1952-12-02(3)

The parties agree that the apphcable statute is 12 O.S. 1951 §95, subd. 3, providing that an action in conversion must be brought within two years after the date of the alleged conversion oi it will be barred unless the statute is tolled or suspended. ... In so far as the question of right of the husband to be appointed administrator is concerned, we see no reason why that should postpone the operation of the statute of limitation.

Section 95(3) bars a malpractice claim based on treatment administered more than two years before the action was filed.

McElroy v. Frost · filed 1954-02-02(3)

The court explicitly told the jury that any treatment administered by defendant over two years prior to the date the action was filed would be barred and they should find for defendant. The argument that the instructions given were insufficient and the jury was confused by the instructions given, as well as by the refusal to give defendant’s requested instructions, is without substantial merit. The court’s instructions adequately presented the issue of the statute of limitations for the jury to consider.

Section 95 bars a conversion claim when the plaintiff knew of the wrongful appropriation and shows no concealment, false representation, or trust that would delay the limitations bar.

Murray v. Teape · filed 1953-06-23

In the case at bar it is neither alleged, nor is there proof, that defendants made any false or fraudulent representations, or were guilty of any concealment, or that defendants held the property in trust. To the contrary, it is alleged and proven that defendants obtained the equipment from plaintiff’s lease without his knowledge or consent, and as plaintiff pleaded, wrongfully appropriated the same. These facts were known to plaintiff as early as January 4, 1944 (Exhibit 3) therefore, his cause of action is barred by the statute.

Section 95’s two-year limitation bars a conversion claim for stolen personal property held openly and notoriously by good-faith purchasers for more than two years.

Williams v. Harper Brothers Automobile Dealers · filed 1954-09-14(3)

As the evidence reasonably tends to show that they were such purchasers and that the Buick was sold and resold, used and handled, openly and notoriously, for a period of more than the two years specified in Title 12 O.S.1951 § 95, supra, we find no error in the application to the facts in this case of the rule in the Burroughs Adding Machine case, supra.

Section 95’s two-year limitation bars an action for property damage filed more than two years after the collision when the period was not tolled.

Spurgin v. Fred Mixon, Jr. · filed 1957-06-12

Accordingly, we conclude that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Mixon’s temporary absences from the state and that the action was barred by limitation.

Section 95(3) imposes a two-year limit on a damages claim for a constant, visible diversion caused by a permanent improvement.

City of Henryetta v. Runyan · filed 1962-04-03(3)

The two-year statute, 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subdiv. 3, therefore bars any recovery for item 1.

Section 95 provides a two-year limitation period for actions seeking recovery for loss or damage to personal property.

Great American Insurance Company v. Watts · filed 1964-06-09

Plaintiff’s action is for loss and damage to personal property and falls within the two year limitation period prescribed by 12 O.S.1961 § 95.

Section 95 allows two years for conversion of personal property and three years for an implied contract; a plaintiff may use the implied contract period after a conversion only if the defendant benefited from it.

Bidleman v. National Feeders Service, Inc. · filed 1967-05-22(2), (3)

Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes, Sec. 95 (3) prescribes a two year limitation period for conversion of personal property. A three year limitation period is prescribed for an action upon an implied contract, 12 O.S. § 95(2). This case was commenced about 2% years after it accrued so is barred unless plaintiff be permitted to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit. In some situations the above may be allowed but such procedure is available to a plaintiff only where the defendant tortfeasor derived a benefit from the conversion. ... Since there is no contention here that National Feeders Service, Inc., or Oklahoma National Stockyards Co., derived any benefit from the alleged conversion the action must be and hereby is dismissed as to them.

Section 95 imposes a two-year limitation on damages for trespass, including a request to restore damaged property.

Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, U. S. A. of Oklahoma City · filed 1972-04-25

While we agree the church should be enjoined from continuing the dirt fill on Cemetery’s property and should be required to remove the encroaching dirt between the wall and Cemetery’s south property line, we find the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations in seeking to require the church to re-establish vertical alignment of the west 540 feet of its concrete fence. The restoration of the wall to its former condition is in the nature of damages for trespass which is subject to a limitation period of two years. 12 O.S. § 95.

Section 95 requires a tort action to be brought within two years of injury.

Cochran v. Buddy Spencer Mobile Homes, Inc. · filed 1980-10-23(Third)

Title 12 O.S.1971, § 95 is the applicable statute of limitation and requires the party to bring a tort action within two years from the date of injury.

Section 95 imposes a two-year limitations period on an action sounding in tort, even when the plaintiff claims contractual rights.

Equilease Corporation v. State Federal Savings and Loan Association, a Federal Savings and Loan Association · filed 1981-05-08

However, even should we assume that Equilease succeeded to the contractual rights of Henry Oil as against State Federal following the pledge, we conclude, as did the District Court, that for the reasons above stated, the action is one sounding in tort. Hence, the two-year statute of limitations, 12 Okla.St.Ann. § 95 (1971) applies.

Section 95(Third) gives a worker two years to bring a retaliatory discharge claim because the claim is an action for injury to the rights of another.

Mullins v. John Zink Co. · filed 1986-10-28(Third)

While Webb did not reach the exact issue which we face here, we are persuaded by its reasoning and characterization of the action as a “civil tort.” Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is “an action for injury to the rights of another” and is barred by the two-year limitation period of 12 O.S.1981 § 95(Third).

Section 95(3) gives a plaintiff two years after a negligence claim accrues to bring an action for damages.

Stone v. Estate of Sigman · filed 1998-09-15(3)

A civil action for damages from negligence “can only be brought ” within two years after the cause of action accrued. 12 O.S.1991, § 95(3).

Section 95 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

Snowton v. Presbyterian Hospital, Inc. · filed 2003-07-07

In Oklahoma, the applicable period of limitation is two years. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (2003).

Section 95 limits damages for a temporary nuisance to the two years before suit when the limitation is pleaded; the period begins when the damage is or should have been discovered.

City of Bethany v. MUNICIPAL SECURITIES COMPANY · filed 1953-07-14

A nuisance abatable by the expenditure of money and labor is a temporary nuisance, Ponca Refining Company v. Smith, 73 Okl. 6, 174 P. 268, and damages suffered therefrom are limited to the two years next preceding the filing of the suit, 12 O.S.1951 § 95, if the statute of limitations, as here, was plead. The statute does not begin to run until the damage from the maintenance of such a nuisance is or should have been discovered.

Section 95 (Third) bars claims for temporary nuisance damages sustained more than two years before suit.

Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1991-12-10(Third)

Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant ARCO for temporary damages resulting from the alleged public nuisance which occurred prior to May 20, 1989 are barred by Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (Third).

Section 95(A)(3)'s two-year limitations period applies to a public nuisance claim when the plaintiff offers no evidence that abatement is available.

Bristow First Assembly of God v. BP p.l.c. · filed 2023-03-02(A)(3)

Because plaintiffs have offered no evidence from which the court could conclude that they would be entitled to abatement, the two-year limitations period applies to plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim.

Section 95(6) imposes a five-year limit on an action to reform a deed for mistake; the limit runs against a claimant who is out of possession.

Mundy v. Dependent School Dist. No. 32 · filed 1954-07-07(6)

An action for the reformation of a deed on grounds of mistake falls within the 6th subdivision of 12 O.S.1951 § 95, which provides : ... “An action for relief, not hereinbe-fore provided for, can only be brought within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” ... In Hoskins v. Stites, 182 Okl. 455, 78 P.2d 413, we held that this five-year statute of limitations does not run against a grantee who has been in continuous, peaceable, and uninterrupted' possession of the premises since the date of the execution of the instrument sought to be reformed but does run against one out of possession. ... Plaintiff’s action to have the deed reformed is therefore barred.

Section 95(6) gives a party five years to seek reformation of a deed based on mutual mistake.

Maloy v. Smith · filed 1959-04-14(6)

If the right to recover is based upon mutual mistake it falls within the sixth subdivision of 12 O.S. 1951 § 95, which provides: “An action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for, can only be brought within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”

Section 95(A)(12) gives a plaintiff five years to seek deed reformation when the plaintiff knew of the filed deed and has no tenable basis for tolling.

KAIL v. KNUDESON · filed 2014-02-21(A)(12)

The deed at issue was executed and filed of record on May 4, 2001. It is undisputed Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the deed, as she accompanied her mother to the Clerk's Office, witnessed her execute and file the deed, and obtained a copy thereof for herself. Plaintiff has advanced no tenable theory for tolling the five-year statute of limitations, which expired on May 4, 2006. Plaintiff's petition, filed on May 20, 2010, was untimely.

Section 95(3) requires a personal injury action within two years; a defendant’s denial of being the driver does not toll that period when the plaintiff knows of the accident and can bring the action.

Morris v. Wise · filed 1955-10-18(3)

Although such denial was immediate there was no concealment of the cause of action. There was nothing necessary to establish a cause of action that could have been discovered later except who was the driver of the vehicle involved. Plaintiff should have brought his action, containing the same allegations, within the required two year period. The trial court correctly held that the conduct of defendant Wise did not prevent the running of the statute of limitations, 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3).

Section 95’s limitations periods for statutory liability and fraud claims can be tolled by fraudulent concealment until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the fraud.

Richey v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. · filed 1986-12-29

This Court believes that the instant action is governed by 12 O.S. § 95, subdivision three, which provides a two year statute of limitations for relief on the ground of fraud. However, the Court declines to pursue this issue, as it believes the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls either statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, this Court finds Plaintiffs’ Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh causes of action are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, on the ground that the statute is tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, until such time as Plaintiffs discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, Defendant’s fraud.

Section 95’s five-year limitations period for collecting a note is tolled when the maker voluntarily resumes payments after the holder waives a default.

Farris v. C. T. Sturner and Ila Mae Sturner · filed 1959-02-12

By accepting the payments the holder waived the default and by voluntarily making the payments the maker tolled the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95 sets a three-year limitations period for an open-account claim; a qualifying payment on the account tolls that period.

Drakos v. Edwards · filed 1963-09-17Second

In the case at bar there was squarely presented to the trial court the issue of whether the payment on the account in question in the amount of $5.00 was pleaded and proven and the statute of limitation thereby tolled. The claims of the parties and their evidence were contradictory. That court determined the issue against the defendant. ... The rules established by- the above decisions of this Court lead to but one conclusion. The finding of the.trial court •in favor of the plaintiff must be sustained.

Section 95 sets a five-year filing period for actions on written contracts; partial payment can avert the limitations bar.

CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Stettnisch · filed 1987-02-17

Under 12 O.S. § 95 a civil cause of action upon a written contract, agreement or promise must be brought within five (5) years after the cause of action shall have accrued. ... The principle or theory on which part payment removes the bar of the statute is that the payment is án acknowledgment or admission of the existence of the indebtedness which raises an implied promise to pay the balance, or that the payment, by its own vigor, revives the debt, no matter how old the debt may be.

Section 95 gives a person one year to bring an action on a foreign judgment; the limitations period begins when the judgment debtor becomes an Oklahoma resident.

Clester v. Heidt's Estate · filed 1960-05-31(4)

Inasmuch as it was stipulated that defendant’s decedent had been a resident of the State- of Oklahoma since 1932, we conclude that plaintiff’s action became barred by our limitations statute in the year 1933.

Section 95’s three-year limit for actions on foreign judgments does not apply to enforcement proceedings under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act because those proceedings are not civil actions.

Producers Grain Corporation v. Carroll · filed 1976-02-05(Second)

Since an enforcement proceeding under the Act is not a civil action within the meaning of Section 95 and since the express terms and statutory purposes of the Revised Act indicate unequivocally that the statute of limitations has no application to a proceeding under the Act, we hold that the trial court erred by striking Producers’ judgment from the judgment docket.

Section 95, subdivision 2, supplies the filing period for a physician’s ancillary claim for medical services provided to an injured worker.

Speed v. Oklahoma State Industrial Court · filed 1962-01-16(2)

A physician who did not participate as a party-litigant in, and had no notice of, a hearing at which employee’s primary claim against the employer was submitted for disposition by a joint-petition settlement, is not concluded or barred by a final order of the trial tribunal approving such settlement between employer and employee, and may thereafter, within the period of time provided in 12 O.S.Supp. 1953 § 95, subdiv. 2, prosecute in his own name an ancillary proceeding before the State Industrial Court, to obtain an award for medical services rendered to the injured workman at the instance of the latter, or pursuant to an oral agreement with the employer.

Section 95(6) bars an untimely attack on an adoption decree when the adoption proceeding was not void.

Yates v. Johnston · filed 1962-01-23(6)

In the opinion of this court, this is not a void proceeding. We therefore hold that any attack upon the validity of this adoption decree is barred by the limitation provided by Title 12 O.S. 1951 § 95, as amended.

Section 95’s limitations defense must be pleaded; it is waived if first raised on appeal.

Marks v. McCune Construction Company · filed 1962-04-03

However defendant argues in support of the lower court’s action that plaintiffs’ action for breach of a written contract is barred by the five year Statute of Limitations and cites 12 O.S.1961 §§ 95 and 97. ... The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the party asserting or claiming it, and when it' is not pleaded, it is waived, and the Supreme Court will not consider the defense when raised initially on appeal.

A Section 95(3) limitations defense must be pleaded in the underlying action; a garnishee cannot raise it after the judgment becomes final.

Greene v. Circle Insurance Company · filed 1976-11-23(3)

Limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pled if it is to operate to bar recovery. ... Whether appellees’ action against Brown may have been barred by limitations has no bearing whatsoever concerning appellant’s contractual liability to Brown under the insurance policy; it is not material or relevant in the garnishment proceedings; and may not be raised as a defense in these proceedings.

Section 95’s five-year period applies, if any limitation period does, to an equitable action to cancel deeds for failure of consideration.

Taylor v. Clark · filed 1963-03-19Sixth

It has been held — -and we think correctly so — that, if any limitation period .can be used to defeat an equitable action to cancel deeds for failure of consideration, it is the five-year period prescribed by sec. 95 (subdiv.) Sixth of Title 12, supra, and that neither the two, three, or fifteen-year periods apply.

Section 95 (Sixth) supplies a five-year period, if a limitation period applies, for an equitable action to cancel a deed for failure of consideration; the period runs from accrual of the claim.

City of Haileyville v. Smallwood · filed 1968-05-28(Sixth)

In Taylor v. Clark, Okl., 380 P.2d 250, we held that if any limitation period was applicable to bar an equitable action to cancel a deed for failure of consideration, it was the five-year period prescribed by 12 O.S.1961, § 95 (Sixth). ... Thus, for the plaintiff’s action herein to be barred, if it may be barred at all, it must have been commenced after the expiration of five years from the date the cause of action accrued. ... Under these facts, we determine that plaintiff’s cause of action had not accrued prior to the termina*392tion of her possession of the tract.

Section 95(7)’s five-year limit applies to an action to cancel a deed arising wholly or partly from failure or lack of consideration.

Crumley v. Smith · filed 1964-10-06(7)

At p. 253 of that decision we stated that if plaintiff’s cause of action for the cancellation of a deed appears to have arisen wholly, or in part, from failure or lack of consideration, then only the five-year limitation contained in 12 O.S.1961, § 95(7) can be applied to defeat the action. The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding plaintiff’s cause of action barred under the two-year statute, supra.

Section 95 sixth supplies a five-year limitation period for actions to rescind deeds on grounds of undue influence or failure of consideration.

Baker v. Massey · filed 1977-09-27sixth

We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the five year statute, 12 O.S.1971 § 95 sixth, applies and we sustain that part of the trial court order overruling the demurrer.

Section 95’s two-year limitation does not bar an action filed on the next day the courthouse is open when the last day of the period falls during a courthouse closure.

Evans v. Davis · filed 1965-10-12

In the instant action, plaintiff’s-cause of action arose as a result of an accident occurring on November 22, 1960, and by excluding the first day and including the last day, the two year limitation to file the action expired on November 22, 1962. However, the courthouse was officially closed for public business on November 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th, 1962; and the next day it was open for public business was on November 26, 1962, the date plaintiff commenced the present proceedings. Applying our holding herein to such facts, plaintiff’s-cause of action was not barred by limitations and the trial court erred in refusing to-vacate his order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s petition and denying plaintiff’s application to file his amended petition.

Section 95(1) and (3)’s five- and three-year limitations periods do not apply to an action seeking rescission of a usurious loan contract.

Ionic Petroleum, Limited v. Third Finance Corp. · filed 1966-02-15(1), (3)

There is no merit to the argument that, having attempted to seek relief by a purported action for rescission of a contract, the applicable statute of limitations was either five years or three years prescribed under 12 O.S.1961, § 95(1) or (3).

Section 95(7) bars an action to establish a trust by implication of law if it is not brought within five years after the claimant learns of a clear repudiation of the trust.

Catron v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa · filed 1967-04-25(7)

As no action to establish a trust was commenced within five years of the date that the plaintiff was clearly informed by Mr. Catron that she had no rights of ownership, her recovery is barred by 12 O.S.1961, § 95(7).

For an action to recover personal property, defendants bear the burden of proving the claim is barred by limitations after the plaintiff shows permission to leave the property in place.

Finley v. West · filed 1970-03-03(3d par.)

The burden of proof then shifted to the defendants to establish that plaintiff waited so long to sue on his cause of action that it was no longer protected by said exception, but was barred by limitations or laches.

Section 95(3)’s two-year limitations period is not suspended when a creditor can seek administration of a deceased tortfeasor’s estate but fails to do so diligently within a reasonable time.

Chesnut v. McGinnis · filed 1970-04-07(3)

The two-year statute of limitations, § 95, subd. 3, controls this cause of action. The two-year period is not suspended when administration of the estate *502of a deceased tort-feasor is available to a creditor and is not diligently invoked within a reasonable time.

Section 95 Third gives products liability actions a two-year limitations period that begins on the date of injury.

Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1974-04-23Third

We are persuaded that the limitation period to be applied in products liability actions is two (2) -years, 12 O.S.1971 § 95 “Third”, for we recognize the tortious origin and nature of the single cause of action, Williams v. Ford Motor Company, Mo.App., 454 S.W.2d 611 (1970). The essential nature of an action based upon products liability is an action for injury to personal property or for injury to the rights of another. The action thus being primarily tortious in nature must be governed by 12 O.S.1971 § 95 “Third”, and, as other such causes of action in tort, limitations should begin to run from the date of injury.

Section 95 applies the two-year period in Third to a products-liability tort action, even when the claim alleges implied warranty; the three-year contract period in Second does not apply.

Moss v. Polyco, Inc. · filed 1974-05-10Second, Third

Accordingly, neither the five year period of limitations expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code, 12A O.S.1971, § 2-725, ... nor the three year period of limitations expressed in 12 O.S.1971, § 95, Second, is applicable to the plaintiffs’ tort action which is governed by 12 O.S.1971, § 95, Third, and which period is two years.

Section 95(3) sets a two-year limitations period for manufacturers’ products liability actions.

Nichols v. Elililly & Co. · filed 1974-08-15(3)

The Oklahoma decisions control. The action is barred by the two-year statute, 12 O.S. § 95(3).

Section 95(3) requires negligence and manufacturers’ products liability actions to be brought within two years from the date of injury.

Redwine v. Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma · filed 1984-05-17(3)

These actions must be brought within two years from the date of injury, and failing that, they are barred. 12 O.S.1981 § 95(3).

Section 95’s five-year limitation applies to claims for an injured employee’s medical expenses, but the employer or insurer may waive it.

Womack v. Boston Fisheries · filed 1974-10-29

Claim for medical expenses for attending injured employee is governed by general statutes of limitation. 12 O.S.1971 § 95. ... This requirement may be waived by the employer or insurer. ... Hospital’s Form 19 claim filed January 29, 1970 showed, upon its face, inclusion of charges for services rendered more than five (5) years prior to date of the claim. The record does not reflect waiver of requirement for filing claim within statutory period.

Section 95(2)'s three-year limit for unwritten contracts was superseded for sales contracts, including open accounts, by the UCC's five-year limit.

Sesow v. Swearingen · filed 1976-07-20(2)

Although none of the provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 95 were expressly repealed by the adoption of the UCC, all inconsistent acts and parts of acts were repealed. ... We, therefore, hold the adoption of the UCC superseded the pre-existing statute and abrogated the distinctions insofar as the statute of limitations is concerned based on whether the contract was verbal or written on sales contracts.

Section 95’s three-year limit for contracts not in writing does not apply to an open account arising from sales of goods; the five-year limit in 12A O.S.1991 § 2-725 applies.

Simpson Properties, Inc. v. Oexco, Inc. · filed 1996-04-09

However, we do not agree with Oex-co that a three-year statute of limitations applies to Simpson’s claims. According to Sesow v. Swearingen, 552 P.2d 705 (Okla.1976), where the open account results from sales of goods, as here, the five-year statute of limitations contained in 12A O.S.1991 § 2-725 is applicable rather than the three-year statute of limitations for contracts not in writing under 12 O.S.1991 § 95.

Section 95 gives a plaintiff two years after a replevin claim accrues to sue; when a sheriff lawfully holds seized property, the claim does not accrue before the owner demands its return.

Bellows v. Compton · filed 1977-10-11

His possession continued to be lawful at least until the owner demanded return of the guns. Under these circumstances plaintiffs’ causes of action could not have accrued before the November 22, 1974 demands were made. And since these actions were brought within two years from that date they cannot be barred by the two-year limitations statute.

Section 95(Third) gives a two-year limitations period for accountant malpractice; a claim for negligent tax preparation accrues when the resulting interest loss becomes identifiable or ascertainable.

Wynn v. Estate of Holmes · filed 1991-08-20(Third)

Generally, professional malpractice actions in Oklahoma have been held to be governed by the two-year statute of limitation of 12 O.S.1981 § 95 (Third). ... We hold that identifiable or ascertainable detriment occasioned by the negligence of Holmes was not established until December 10, 1984, when the IRS notified the plaintiffs of the interest assessment. The plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued at that time. Consequently, their December 9, 1985, petition was timely.

Section 95(3)’s two-year limit does not bar an action to enforce a Human Rights Commission employment discrimination order after the Commission’s administrative proceedings.

National Cowboy Hall of Fame & Western Heritage Center v. State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Human Rights Commission · filed 1978-05-23(3)

We find these cases supportive of Respondent’s contention that the statute of limitations had not run on this action.

Section 95 sets general limitation periods, and a time bar under it does not deprive a court of jurisdiction.

Kimberly v. DeWitt · filed 1980-02-14

We hold that the bar of an action by a general statute of limitations, such as 12 O.S.1971, § 95, is not jurisdictional.

Section 95, subdivision 2, supplies the three-year limitations period for an equitable subrogation action.

Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Fire Insurance Exchange · filed 1982-05-18Subd. 2

Having determined that 36 O.S.1981 § 4803 does not apply to this equitable sub-rogation action, the appellee is correct in noting the applicable limitation statute in this cause is 12 O.S.1981 § 95, Subd. 2.

Section 95(3) gives a subrogated negligence claim two years from the injured person’s accrual date; the insurer’s later payment does not restart the period.

Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Mosby · filed 1997-07-08(3)

A claim obtained through sub-rogation is simply not subject to the normal rule of accrual of a cause of action. The subrogee steps into the shoes of its claimant and takes the claim subject to defenses based on the date of accrual to the claimant. Insurer’s claim in the present matter is based upon an automobile accident, an action for negligence. Actions for negligence must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued.

Section 95’s two-year period for conversion does not bar an FDIC receiver’s conversion claim based on claims owned by an insolvent national bank; the six-year federal period applies.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Haines Pipeline Construction, Inc. · filed 1985-09-11

Union Bank asserts that the pertinent limitations statute is 12 O.S. § 95, Oklahoma’s two-year limitations period for conversion actions of personal property. ... This Court now finds, in light of FDIC v. Petersen, that 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) and the six year federal limitations period applies to the receiver’s action for conversion based on claims owned by an insolvent national bank.

Section 95 (Third) gives an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim a two-year limitations period as an action for injury to the rights of another.

Chandler v. Denton · filed 1987-05-13(Third)

The claim is governed by a two-year limitations period because it falls within the express terms of § 95 (Third) ("an action for injury to the rights of another...."), and also because of the rationale adopted by the majority in ... (for a tort not specifically enumerated in § 95 (Fourth) which is held governed by § 95 (Third)).

Section 95 gives a false light invasion of privacy claim two years because it is not among the torts subject to the one-year limit.

Colbert v. World Publishing Co. · filed 1987-11-24(Third)

This reasoning is applicable here because the tort theory of false light invasion of privacy is not listed with those specific theories which must be sued upon within one year. The general two-year limitation period was applied correctly.

Section 95(10) sets no limitations period for collecting court-ordered child support, which remains owed until paid in full.

In re Kimball · filed 2016-12-13(10)

Oklahoma clearly provides for the longer statute of limitations in child support actions than does Utah. In fact, in Oklahoma there is no statute of limitations for collection of child support arrearages, 12 O.S. § 95(10) providing, “Court-ordered child support is owed until it is it is paid in full and it is not subject to a statute of limitations.”

Section 95’s three-year limitations period does not bar a contingent third-party reimbursement claim when the underlying federal equitable claim is not subject to state limitations periods.

Koch Industries, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1992-04-07(Second)

Koch’s first objection to the third-party complaint is that Oklahoma’s three-year statute of limitations, 12 O.S. § 95 (Second), bars Mobil’s claim to the severance tax refund Koch received in 1983. ... Since the underlying counterclaim could not be barred by any statute of limitations, and the third-party action was contingent upon the determination in that cause, we hold that Mobil’s third-party complaint is not time barred.

Section 95 (Third) requires a fraud claim to be brought within two years after discovery of the fraudulent acts.

Grider v. USX Corp. · filed 1993-02-23(Third)

A claim based on fraud must be brought within two years of the discovery of the fraudulent acts. 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Third); Richey v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 667 F.Supp. 752 (W.D.Okla.1986).

A UIM insurer’s subrogated tort claim is subject to the two-year limitation period for the insured’s claim, rather than the three-year period for liabilities created by statute.

Farmers Insurance Co. v. Estate of Stark · filed 1996-04-30(Second), (Third)

We also reject the contention that 36 O.S. 1991 § 3636, creates a cause of action so that 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Second), and its three-year limitation period for “an action upon a liability created by statute” would be applicable. ... Skibsted had two years from the date of her accident with Stark to bring suit. Farmers’ action was not brought within the applicable two-year limitation period and was barred.

Section 95(2)'s three-year limitation period applies to consequential property damage from a public improvement if the factfinder determines there was no taking.

Rummage v. State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation · filed 1993-03-02(2)

If the trier of fact determines there has been no taking, the limitation period is the three year period found applicable in City of Oklahoma City v. Daly, 316 P.2d at 132.

Section 95(2)'s three-year limitation period applies to consequential property damage without a taking; an inverse condemnation action involving a taking has a fifteen-year period.

Underwood v. STATE EX REL. DOT · filed 1993-03-09(2)

In Daly, the Supreme Court found the three year limitation *1117 period found at 12 O.S. 1951 § 95(2) applicable to an action under Section 24, Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution. Again, the facts may be distinguished because the Daly court considered only consequential damage to private buildings caused by construction of a city sewer, not a taking as is alleged here. We find if the trier of fact determines there is a taking, even if the taking is the unintended, consequential result of a public improvement, the action is one properly in inverse condemnation and the applicable limitation period is fifteen years. To hold otherwise would be to allow the taking entity to effectively gain title, or at least some property interest, short of the prescriptive period. If the trier of fact determines there has been no taking, the limitation period is the three year period found applicable in City of Oklahoma City v. Daly, 316 P.2d at 132.

Section 95(2)'s three-year period applies to consequential property damage without a taking; a taking is subject to a fifteen-year limitation period.

Corbell v. State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation · filed 1993-03-09(2)

In Daly, the Supreme Court found the three year limitation period found at 12 O.S.1951 § 95(2) applicable to an action under Section 24, Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution. Again, the facts may be distinguished because the Daly court considered only consequential damage to private buildings caused by construction of a city sewer, not a taking as is alleged here. We find if the trier of fact determines there is a taking, even if the taking is the unintended, consequential result of a public improvement, the action is one properly in inverse condemnation and the applicable limitation period is fifteen years.

Section 95(2)’s three-year period applies to consequential property damage without a taking; a taking is subject to a fifteen-year period.

Underwood v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation · filed 1993-03-09(2)

We find if the trier of fact determines there is a taking, even if the taking is the unintended, consequential result of a public improvement, the action is one properly in inverse condemnation and the applicable limitation period is fifteen years. ... If the trier of fact determines there has been no taking, the limitation period is the three year period found applicable in City of Oklahoma City v. Daly, 316 P.2d at 132.

Section 95 governs actions other than recovery of real property and does not supply the limitations period for inverse condemnation based on a taking of real property.

Drabek v. City of Norman · filed 1996-11-26

Section 95 provides for limitations of actions other than for recovery of real property.

Section 95’s five-year limitation for civil proceedings does not bar attorney disciplinary proceedings.

State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Watson · filed 1994-03-22

Respondent suggests that the five year statute of limitation period provided in civil proceedings pursuant to 12 O.S.1991 § 95 is applicable in this case and should have barred the proceedings of the PRT and should bar the enforcement of the PRT’s report in that the events in question occurred in 1981 which was eight years before Wakely requested the OBA investigate the matter. ... Accordingly, we find that the proceeding of the PRT regarding Respondent’s misconduct was not barred by a statute of limitations, nor is our consideration of the matter barred.

Section 95(3) gives abuse-of-process claims a two-year limitations period because they are excluded from the one-year list in subsection (4).

Greenberg v. Wolfberg · filed 1995-01-03(3)

(4) The statutory limitation for an abuse-of-process claim is two years.

Section 95(3)'s limitations period may be tolled by adverse domination for fraudulent conduct while a majority of culpable directors and officers controls the injured corporation.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Grant · filed 1995-06-27(3)

In answer to the second certified question, we find that application of the doctrine of adverse domination to delay accrual or toll the statute of limitations is limited to situations involving fraudulent conduct exercised while the wronged corporation is controlled by a majority of culpable directors and officers.

Section 95(2) sets a three-year limit for actions on liabilities created by statute; a corporate creditor cannot use adverse domination to toll that limit.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greer · filed 1995-11-07(2)

It may not avoid the § 95(2) ... time bar of three years by invoking the adverse domination doctrine.

Section 95(7) permits an action to establish paternity and enforce support obligations any time before the child turns eighteen.

Martin v. Brock · filed 2001-09-18(7)

Oklahoma law is clear that "[aln action to establish paternity and to enforee support obligations can be brought any time before the child reaches the age of eighteen (18)." 12 0.8. Supp.2000 § 95 (7) (emphasis added).

Section 95’s three-year limitations period is suspended for class members when the class action is filed; their recoverable benefits extend back three years from that filing.

Dewey v. State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System · filed 2001-05-08(Second)

It is the action's filing which suspends the running of the statute of limitation, and it is the three-year period antecedent to this temporal marker for which vested, retired firefighters are entitled to enhancement of retirement benefits by consideration of military-service credits.

Section 95(3)’s two-year limit for injury to personal property is not tolled by a notice-of-claim procedure that the plaintiff can complete without delay by another party.

Brown v. Rocky Farmers Co-Op., Inc. · filed 2005-02-18(3)

Oklahoma has not previously addressed the issue of tolling of the statute of limitations where the notice of claim procedure is wholly within the plaintiffs ambit and could not therefore occasion prejudicial delay except that occasioned by the plaintiffs own action. We are convinced by the soundness of this reasoning and adopt it here. The trial court correctly concluded Brown’s suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(7) cannot revive a claim whose limitations period expired before the amendment took effect.

Robinson v. Clark · filed 2009-06-25(A)(7)

Oklahoma Constitution, art 5, § 52 prevents a construction of section 95(A)(7) that would revive Robinson's claim.

Section 95(A)(3) gives a party two years to bring a fraud claim, with the claim accruing upon discovery of the fraud.

HORTON v. HAMILTON · filed 2015-02-10(A)(3)

Section 95 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes states the accrual date for fraud: "[A]n action for relief on the ground of fraud" is limited to two years, but "the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud." 12 O.S.2011, § 95(A)(3). A claim for fraud accrues when a person discovers the fraud.

Section 95(3) provides that fraud claims accrue when the fraud is discovered.

MINERAL ACQUISITIONS v. HAMM · filed 2020-07-28(3)

Fraud claims are deemed to have accrued upon discovery of the fraud. 12 O.S. 2011, § 95(3).

Section 95(A)(3) requires a fraud claim to be brought within two years after the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the fraud.

First v. AGCO Corporation · filed 2023-05-30(A)(3)

Under Oklahoma law, an action for fraud must be brought within two years after the fraud is discovered. 12 O.S. § 95(A)(3). ... Therefore, using the date determined by the jury, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations.