12 Okla. Stat. § 95

A debtor may be estopped from asserting Section 95’s limitations defense when the creditor justifiably relies on the debtor’s assurances and lets the filing period expire.

Sales Mate, Inc. v. Estate of Elder · filed 1990-01-09

The jury verdict found that Wright and Sales Mates, Inc. were justified in relying on Elder’s assurances, and in fact did so rely. Since the verdict is supported by competent evidence, it must be upheld, and the statute of limitations defense is not available to Estate.

Section 95(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for trespass upon real property, injury to personal property, injury to another’s rights outside contract, and fraud.

Lee v. BP America Production Company · filed 2020-09-10(a)(3)

Oklahoma law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for an action for trespass upon real property, injury to personal property, injury to the rights of another not arising out of contract and fraud. 12 O.S. §95(a)(3).

Section 95(A)(2–3) provides two years to bring negligence or breach of fiduciary duty claims and three years to bring oral or implied contract claims.

FRESH INC. a/k/a All Fresh Corporation v. TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2026-01-27(A)(2–3)

In Oklahoma, the limitation period runs two years for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, and three years for breach of an oral or implied contract. ... Thus, to the extent All Fresh alleges claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and/or breach of an oral or implied contract, CTB’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

Section 95(3) does not bar equitable relief related to a timely action on a contract for payment of money.

Benson v. Benson · filed 1944-05-23(3)

The case of plaintiff is based upon contract for the payment of money and not for alimony as was provided in McRoberts v. McRoberts, supra, and the equitable relief sought was that which may be afforded in cases where right and justice as applied to the relation of parties and circumstances may grant relief. The defendant does not appeal from the money portion of the judgment- and thus, in effect, concedes that it was a valid and subsisting obligation. The right to maintain the action for the legal remedy not being barred by statute of limitations, the right to the equitable relief was likewise not barred for such reasons.

Section 95(1) gives five years for actions on written contracts, and section 95(9) gives five years for tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a contract.

Chickasaw Telephone Co. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-05-27(1), (9)

The parties do not dispute the applicable statutes of limitations. In Oklahoma, a civil action "upon any contract, agreement, or promise in writing," must be brought within five years "after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards." Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(1). A tort action for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a contract falls under the five-year catchall statute of limitations in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(9). Thus, each of Chickasaw's claims is governed by a five-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, Chickasaw could have maintained its action, and the statute of limitations began to run, once Southwestern Bell filed its FCC application on October 19, 1988. Because Chickasaw did not file this action until June 7, 1996, the district court correctly held its breach of contract claim barred by the five-year statute of limitations in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(1). ... Chickasaw could have maintained its tort action when Southwestern Bell filed its public FCC application on October 19, 1988, or at least when Southwestern Bell received the rights to provide service to these RSAs (sometime prior to October 2, 1990). ... Because Chickasaw brought this action more than five years later than either date, the district court properly held this tort claim barred by the statute of limitations in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(9).

Section 95(10), formerly section 95(9), provides a five-year limitations period for fiduciary duties arising from a written contract.

Marshall v. American Federation of Government Employees · filed 1998-01-06(10), previously (9)

that is, arise from a written contract, such as the duties allegedly breached herein, is five years as provided in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(10), previously set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(9).

Section 95 provides a five-year limitations period for breach of contract and allows a fraud action within two years after discovery of the fraud.

Okland Oil Company v. Conoco Inc. · filed 1998-05-19

The former damages were recoverable only under a tort theory because the Oklahoma statute of limitations for recovery of a breach of contract is five years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95, tit. 12A, § 2-725. Actions for fraud, on the other hand, may be brought within two years after the discovery of the fraud. Id.

Section 95(A)(3) applies a two-year limitations period to a breach of fiduciary duty claim premised on fraud, subject to when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In Re Tronox Inc.) · filed 2010-03-31(A)(3)

To the extent Count VI is premised on fraud, a two-year statute of limitations would result in the claim being untimely on any theory, unless Plaintiffs can plead with greater particularity that they could not reasonably have discovered the fraud within two years of the Chapter 11 filing.

A payment toward the balance of an open account tolls or revives the limitations period for earlier items.

Harvey v. Frizzell · filed 1950-07-11(2)

We are of the opinion that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s final payment was simply a payment upon a general balance due was correct. ... Although correct as an abstract proposition, the application of this rule cannot take place where there has been a payment made which tolls or revives the statute.

Section 95 allows five years on the note measured from its last payment and two years on a fraud claim measured from discovery or when the fraud should have been discovered.

Cummings v. Garris · filed 1961-04-11(1), (3)

As to the sixth contention that the statute of limitations had run there is no merit. If these advances to defendant were made for him to use in taking care of the deceased the cause of action would not arise until the time of her death under any circumstances. As to the note, five years had not elapsed since December 6, 1950, the date of the last payment on the note. 12 O.S. 1951 § 95, subd. 1. Mitchell v. Lehmer, Ex’r, 185 Okl. 530, 94 P.2d 916. If the jury considered that the money was fraudulently obtained the statute of limitations would not run until two years had elapsed since the discovery of the fraud, or from the time it should have been discovered. 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 3.

Section 95(2) applies to open accounts; an express written contract defining the parties’ obligations is generally not an open account, even if the resulting debt is treated as one.

Epperson v. Halliburton Company · filed 1967-10-10(2)

Defendant’s second contention is that the action sought to recover upon an open account, and therefore was barred under 12 O.S.1961, § 95(2), the statute applicable to open accounts. ... “ ‘Generally speaking, an open account is one where there are running or concurrent dealings between the parties, which are kept unclosed with the expectation of further transactions. * * An express contract, which defines the duties. and liabilities of the parties, whether it be oral or written, is not, as a rule, an open account.’ ” ... We consider this conclusive of defendant’s argument herein.

Section 95 Second gives three years to bring an action on an unwritten contract, including a quasi contract implied by law.

T & S Investment Co. v. Coury · filed 1979-04-10Second

We hold that 12 O.S.1971 § 95 Second applies to all unwritten contracts whether they be expressed, implied-in-fact, or implied-in-law.

Section 95(A)'s three-year period for statutory liabilities and five-year period for contract claims do not govern a claim against a health care provider arising out of patient care when 76 O.S. § 18 applies.

Britt v. Promise Redeemer, L.L.C. · filed 2011-06-24(A)

Despite the fact that Plaintiff may have cogent arguments favoring a three-year or five-year limitations period under section 95(A), however, neither his allegations of error nor his cited legal authority refute the unambiguous language of 76 O.S. Supp.2010 § 18.

Section 95(A)(1) and (2) provides a five-year limitation period for breach of a written agreement and a three-year period for breach of a verbal agreement.

BLUE SKY TELLURIDE, L.L.C. v. INTERCONTINENTAL JET SERVICE CORP. · filed 2014-01-21(A)(1) and (2)

We agree with IJS that the statute of limitation for breach of an agreement is either three years or five years depending on whether the agreement is verbal or written. 12 O.S. 2011 §95(A)(1) and (2).

Section 95(A)(1) gives a claimant five years to sue for breach of a retirement benefits contract after the right to sue accrues.

Steelman v. Oklahoma Police Pension & Retirement System · filed 2005-12-05(A)(1)

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held a five year statute of limitations applies to breach of contract claims based upon the alleged failure of a state retirement system to pay retirement benefits. Kinzy v. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System, 2001 OK 24, 20 P.3d 818 (public fiduciary status does not alter applicability of contract statute of limitations); 12 O.S. 2004 § 95(A)(1). ... Nonetheless, more than five years past from the dates of retirement before suit was filed in 2003, rendering the claims of Wall and Steelman time-barred.

Section 95(A)(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a breach-of-contract claim based on an oral agreement.

McGinnis · filed 2026-03-30(A)(2)

Because Plaintiff’s claim for breach of their oral agreement was not commenced until July 21, 2023, the claim would be barred by the three-year limitations period of title 12, section 95(A)(2).

Section 95(A)(3)’s two-year period for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is not tolled by administrative proceedings pursued for a separate Burk tort claim.

Riebold v. FleetPride Inc · filed 2023-06-01(A)(3)

Initially, the court rejects Riebold’s argument that the two-year statute of limitations in § 95(A)(3) was tolled while he pursued the administrative remedies before the OCRE for the Burk tort claim.

Section 95(3) gives two years to bring a fraud-based creditor’s bill and excludes time during which an injunction suit restrains enforcement.

Rucks-Brandt Construction Corp. v. Silver · filed 1944-05-16(3)

As hereinbefore indicated, this is a civil action in the nature of a creditor’s bill. It is unquestionably founded upon fraud. This being true, such action comes within the purview of 12 O. S. 1941 § 95, subd. 3, and must have been brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued or such fraud was discovered, or could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, unless for some reason the statute was tolled. ... We conclude that the time from date of filing of the injunction suit to date of its final determination should be excluded from the period of limitation.

Section 95’s third clause imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions for property damage caused by blasting.

Stowell v. Engelson · filed 1948-12-21(3)

This question is unimportant here except in so far as it shows that the issue is in tort and the action therefore barred by the two year statute of limitation.

Section 95 supplies a two-year limitations period for the state-law claims at issue, and equitable tolling is unavailable absent extraordinary circumstances preventing timely filing.

Griffin v. Dillon Family & Youth Services, Doing Business as Shadow Mountain Institute, a Corporation · filed 1997-12-16

Finally, we address plaintiff's claim that the state statute of limitations on her state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be equitably tolled. She does not dispute the two-year limitations period dictated by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95. She asserts, rather, that the limitations period should have been tolled during the time her Title VII claims were pending with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. Generally, equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstances preventing a plaintiff from asserting his or her rights. Cf. Million v. Frank, 47 F.3d 385, 389 (10th Cir.1995) (holding compliance with Title VII's filing requirements not equitably tolled where plaintiff failed to show he was prevented in some extraordinary way from filing his claim); Fleck v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Corrections, 888 P.2d 532, 535 (Okla.Ct.App.1994) (holding compliance with FLSA's filing requirements not equitably tolled where plaintiff failed to show employer's extraordinary conduct made him unaware of his cause of action). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from filing her state law claims within the limitations period. Therefore, she is not entitled to equitable tolling, and the district court properly dismissed those claims.

Section 95 bars a legal malpractice claim when the petition shows the limitations period has run and alleges no facts raising a tolling issue.

Edwards v. Andrews, Davis, Legg, Bixler, Milsten & Murrah, Inc. · filed 1982-06-013rd

The petition discloses upon its face the statute of limitations bars the prosecution of this action and does not contain aver-ments raising a factual question of the tolling of the statute.

Section 95 Third provides a two-year limit for fraud actions; factual disputes about discovery and fraudulent concealment can prevent summary judgment on a limitations defense.

Locke v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1998-04-22Third

Mrs. Locke filed this action in 1996, well past the two-year limitation period provided by Oklahoma law for fraud actions. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 Third (1991). ... In sum, we conclude that fact issues exist on this record as to the applicability of the discovery doctrine and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to the running of statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(4) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period.

Gregory v. United States of America · filed 2021-11-23(A)(4)

Under Oklahoma law, defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 12 Okla. Stat. § 95(A)(4).

Section 95(Fourth) bars libel or slander claims brought more than one year after the defamatory statements.

Marshall v. American Federation of Government Employees · filed 1998-01-09(Fourth)

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting by-these allegations to assert a claim for libel or slander (Plaintiff, even in response to Defendants’ motion, never specifies the legal basis for this claim), the Court agrees with Defendants that any libel or slander claim of Plaintiff is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (Fourth).

Section 95(4) sets a one-year limitations period for libel claims.

McCain v. KTVY, INC. · filed 1987-03-03(4)

We also hold the petition should have been dismissed against Plaintiff Uncle Amos Foods, Inc. for additional reasons. The alleged libelous broadcast occurred in July of 1983. The present suit was brought on July 19, 1985 well after the one-year statute of limitations of 12 O.S. 1981 § 95(4) expired.

Section 95(A)(3) requires fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence injury actions to be brought within two years of accrual.

CFP Acquisitions, Inc. v. Rhoades · filed 2020-06-17(A)(3)

Under Oklahoma law, a cause of action for an injury based on fraud, misrepresentation or negligence must be brought within two years of its accrual. 12 O.S. §95(A)(3); Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Inc. v. Vick, 840 P.2d 619, 624 (Okla. 1992).

Under subdivision 3, when fraud was or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered is a question of fact determined from the parties’ relationship, the acts involved, and the circumstances.

McNeal v. Steinberger · filed 1943-03-16(3)

The question as to when fraud is discovered or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered under the 3rd subdivision of 12 O. S. 1941 § 95 is one of fact to be determined from the relationship of the parties, the nature of the acts involved and all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period for fraud claims begins when the defrauded party receives the means to discover fraud that has not been concealed.

Smith v. Kimsey · filed 1943-03-30(3)

We are of the opinion that the rule announced in Bankers Mtg. Co. v. Leisure, 172 Okla. 170, 42 P.2d 863, as follows: "Where the means of discovering fraud are in the hands of the party defrauded and the defrauding party has not covered up his fraud to the extent that it would be difficult or impossible to discover, the party defrauded will be deemed to have had notice of the fraud from the date the means of discovering such fraud came into his hands, and the fraud will be deemed to have been discovered upon that date" — applies here.

Section 95(3) permits a fraud claim to proceed against a limitations demurrer when the pleading sufficiently alleges that the fraud was discovered within two years before suit.

Pigeon v. Hill · filed 1944-04-04(3)

When the points of the plaintiff’s petition as amended, as outlined above, are considered in the light of the defendants’ admission that they as well as the logical inference they support are true, we are of the opinion that they are sufficient to charge fraud discovered within two years of the filing of action.

Section 95(3)'s fraud provision does not toll a statutory claim merely because the claim was undiscovered.

Oklahoma Ex Rel. Phillips v. American Book Co. · filed 1944-08-15(3)

The running of the statute was not tolled by the nondiscovery of the claim. The claim was not one for fraud within the meaning of 12 O.S.1941 § 95(3).4 We accordingly conclude that the claim in behalf of private persons was barred by limitations.

Section 95(3) gives two years from discovery to bring a fraud action; time during which a supersedeas prevents collection is excluded when calculating the period for postjudgment garnishment.

Whipps, Inc. v. Kling Bros. Co. · filed 1942-05-12(3)

By this statute an action based on fraud must be brought within two years after the discovery of the fraud. ... We are of the opinion that no statute of limitations could apply after the judgment with respect to the remedy of garnishment after judgment. It must be noted that less than two years elapsed between the timé the judgment was rendered and the commencement of these proceedings, after the period the supersedeas was in effect is deducted.

Section 95(3)'s two-year limit for fraud claims does not apply to an action to establish and foreclose an equitable mortgage securing the purchase price.

Douglass v. Douglass · filed 1947-12-23(3)

In view of our conclusion that the second cause of action is to establish and foreclose an equitable mortgage to secure the purchase price, there is no merit in the defendants’ contention that the action is one for relief on the ground of fraud and is barred by the two year statute of limitations, 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (3).

Section 95 Third imposes a two-year limitation period on fraud actions, subject to tolling when the discovery rule or fraudulent-concealment doctrine applies.

Locke v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 1998-04-22Third

Mrs. Locke filed this action in 1996, well past the two-year limitation period provided by Oklahoma law for fraud actions. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 Third (1991). However, Oklahoma recognizes two exceptions to the running of the statute of limitation in tort cases, the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. ... In sum, we conclude that fact issues exist on this record as to the applicability of the discovery doctrine and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to the running of statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions under Oklahoma law.

Hershey v. Turner · filed 2020-04-21(A)(3)

The limitations period for personal injury actions under Oklahoma law is two years, see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3), making Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims subject to the same two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95 requires a fraud action to be brought within two years after discovery of the fraud and places the burden of alleging and proving timely discovery on a plaintiff who sues more than two years after the fraud occurred.

H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Diffie H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Carpenter H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. McInnis · filed 1950-12-20

Under the applicable statute of limitations, 12 O.S.1941 § 95, the action was barred unless brought within two years after the discovery by Mclnnis of the fraudulent misrepresentation. Since the instant action was commenced more than two years after the alleged fraud occurred, the burden rested on Mclnnis to allege and prove that he had not discovered the fraud until within the statutory period before the commencement of the action.

Section 95(3) gives a party two years to bring an affirmative fraud claim, beginning when reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud.

Widger v. Union Oil Co. of Oklahoma · filed 1952-01-08(3)

The applicable statute of limitation, 12 O. S. §95, subd. 3, provides that the action must be commenced within two years from the discovery of the fraud, and in ... we held that fraud was deemed to be discovered within the meaning of the statute, when, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered. ... Measured by the rule announced in these cases it clearly appears that the statute of limitation had run at the time the suit was filed by the plaintiff to quiet its title to the oil and gas lease, and under our decisions in ... the plaintiff and the defendants, Charles Weidler, Asa C. McNaught and May Belle McNaught, may invoke the operation of the statute of limitation to defeat the claim asserted by plaintiffs in error.

Section 95(3) gives two years to bring a fraud claim, and the period can begin when public records provide constructive notice of the fraud.

Eaves v. Busby · filed 1954-03-18(3)

The separate demurrers were properly sustained as the petition in the instant case shows upon its face that Eaves cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95(3) requires an action for relief on the ground of fraud to be brought within two years of when reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud.

Walker v. Walker · filed 1957-04-30(3)

Under 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 3, an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within two years, but the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud. The phrase “Until the discovery of the fraud,” does not necessarily mean until the party has actual notice of the fraud. Fraud is deemed to be discovered, within the statute of limitation, when in the exercise of reasonable diligence it could have been discovered.

Section 95(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring an action for relief on the ground of fraud, beginning when reasonable diligence would have uncovered the fraud.

Seigle v. Richardson · filed 1957-07-09(3)

Under 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3), an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within two years, but the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud. ... Fraud is deemed to be discovered, within the statute of limitation, when in the exercise of reasonable diligence it could have been discovered.

Section 95 allows two years after discovery of fraud to bring an action, with earlier discoverability determined as a question of fact.

Shrier v. Morrison · filed 1960-04-05

On the other hand, plaintiff, besides contending that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to this kind of action, cites authorities to the effect that such actions are regarded as timely, if brought within the two-year statutory period, after discovery of the fraud (12 O.S.1951 § 95). With the latter we agree. There is no question but that the action was brought well within two years from the time plaintiff first discovered that Riteway had paid Norman Wholesale for cigarettes and merchandise that had not been left with it for resale there. Whether or not plaintiff should have made this discovery before he did, was, under the circumstances, a question of fact, which, like the question of his claimed negligence, herein-before dealt with, has been resolved in his favor by the trial court’s judgment.

Section 95(3) requires an action based on fraud to begin within two years of discovery, and constructive notice of the fraud can start that period.

Harjo's Heirs v. Standley · filed 1956-10-23(3)

The cited statute provides that the action must be commenced within two years from the discovery of the fraud. We have consistently held as stated in Eaves v. Busby, supra, that the statute does not require that the complaining party must necessarily have had actual notice of the fraud alleged to have been committed, for constructive notice of the fraud is sufficient to set the statute in motion.

Section 95 gives a fraud claimant two years from discovery of the fraud to sue; discovery occurs when reasonable diligence could and should have revealed it.

Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Company · filed 1973-08-14

It is agreed that the instant case is governed by 12 O.S. § 95, as amended, which provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within two years after the cause of action has accrued, and that the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until discovery of the fraud. The phrase “until the discovery of the fraud” does not necessarily mean until the party has actual notice of the fraud, and fraud is deemed to have been discovered when, on the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could, and should have been, discovered.

Under § 95(3), a fraud claim accrues when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered through ordinary diligence; a recorded deed can provide constructive notice.

Matter of Woodward · filed 1976-04-27(3)

Under 12 O.S.1971 § 95(3), cause of action on ground of fraud does not accrue until discovery of fraud. ... It is clear that means of discovering fraud and undue influence came into the hands of Ross sisters when deed was filed of record in 1958. It is also clear Ross sisters failed to exercise ordinary diligence in discovering fraud and undue influence. ... We therefore hold statute of limitations has expired on issues of fraud and undue influence.

Section 95’s two-year limitation for fraud actions does not apply to proceedings to vacate or set aside a judgment based on fraud.

Bette J. W. v. Kitty Louise S. · filed 1978-10-24(third)

When 12 O.S.1971, § 95, is considered in connection with 12 O.S.1971, Chapter 16, relating to “Vacation and Modification of Judgments by Trial Court” and in particular 12 O.S.1971, §§ 1031 and 1038, it is apparent that 12 O.S.1971, § 95 (third) is not applicable in these proceedings or in any other proceedings which are commenced to vacate or set aside a judgment based upon fraud.

Section 95(3)'s limitations period for fraud begins when the claimant discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud.

Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. · filed 1985-02-28(3)

In this regard, the Court finds that the statute as it pertains to both causes of action “begins to run when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 95 (third) gives a fraud claim two years from discovery of the fraud; a claim filed within that period is timely.

Resler v. Financial Group, Inc. · filed 1985-04-17(third)

Within two (2) years ... an action for relief on the ground of fraud — the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have occurred until the discovery of the fraud. ... If cross-claimants did not discover the fraud more than two years before the filing of this cross-complaint, as alleged, then the limitations period will not act as a bar. The motion to dismiss on this theory will be denied.

Section 95(Third) bars a fraud-based challenge brought more than two years after a judgment was entered of record when the challenger is charged with constructive notice of it.

Panhandle Royalty Co. v. Farni · filed 1987-10-06(Third)

Appellants’ action was not timely brought under either § 1088 or § 95. Appellants were charged with constructive notice of the judgment when judgment was rendered in 1948 and filed of public record in the Office of the County Clerk of Roger Mills County in 1975. Matthewson v. Hilton, 321 P.2d 396, 397 (Okla.1958). Therefore, appellants’ action was barred from being brought more than two years after the judgment was entered of record.

Section 95 Third gives a plaintiff two years to bring a fraud claim from when the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts constituting the fraud.

Roberts v. McCrory · filed 1987-12-14Third

Action based on fraud: two years from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts constituting the alleged fraud.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period for fraud begins when public records give the claimant constructive notice, even without actual notice.

Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Grayfox Operating Co. · filed 1992-04-14(3)

Assuming Plaintiff’s claim concerning lack of notice to be true, we find Plaintiff had constructive notice of the Journal Entry filed March 4, 1985, and the two year limitation period of .§ 95(3) for fraud began to run.

Section 95 Third gives a creditor two years to bring a fraudulent conveyance action concerning a pre-1986 transfer; the claim does not accrue before the creditor obtains a judgment.

Eskridge v. Nalls · filed 1993-04-06Third

Prior to that date an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance was within the purview of the two year statute of limitations (12 O.S.1981 § 95 Third) founded on fraud. ... However, we agree with Appellant that his cause of action had not accrued and he had no standing to bring an action to cancel them at that time. ... We do find the trial court erred in holding Appellant’s action to be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95(3) requires a claim to vacate a judgment for extrinsic fraud to be brought within two years after the fraud is discovered.

FDIC v. Jernigan · filed 1995-05-24(3)

The latter must be brought within two years from the date fraud was discovered.

Section 95 gives fraud claims two years and undue-influence claims five years; in a suit to cancel a deed, those periods begin when the deed is filed of record.

Burkes v. Estate of Marie Burkes · filed 1997-06-17Third; Sixth

Under 12 O.S. 1991 § 95, Third, the statute of limitations for fraud is two years. The applicable statute of limitations for undue influence is five years under 12 O.S. 1991 § 95, Sixth. In Matter of Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Okla.1976), we held that in a suit for cancellation of a deed the statutes of limitations on claims of fraud and undue influence start to run when the deed is filed of record because the filing gives the plaintiff the means of discovering any wrongdoing at that time.

Section 95(Third) gives a fraud claim a two-year limitation period that begins when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered through ordinary diligence.

Oklahoma Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Classic Fire & Marine Insurance Co. · filed 1998-05-05(Third)

Appellants also contend Guaranty Association’s claim for fraud was barred by the two year limitation period found at 12 O.S.1981 § 95(Third). That subsection provides that in an action for fraud the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud. Discovery, within the meaning of § 95, includes not only actual notice, but “such time as the defrauded party, by exercise of ordinary diligence, might have discovered such fraud.” ... The jury, upon proper instruction, decided Guaranty Association’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination. We may not disturb that decision.

Section 95’s two-year period for fraud claims begins no later than termination when termination is the basis of the claim, even if wages continue afterward.

McCain v. Combined Communications Corp. of Oklahoma · filed 1998-10-06

As a result, it is the termination itself and not simply the realization of all the by-products of termination which form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim and at the latest, the statute of limitations must run from the date of termination.

Section 95’s limitation period for fraud claims depends on when reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud; a factual dispute about that timing precludes summary judgment.

Roberson v. PaineWebber, Inc. · filed 1999-10-15

Fraud is deemed to have been discovered when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have or should have been discovered. ... Based on the evidence provided, the facts are disputed regarding when a reasonable person with due diligence would have discovered the alleged fraud and injury to their investments. It was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the issue of the statute of limitations.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period for an action based on fraud begins when the fraud is discovered; an owner in possession need not check public records each year for a forged deed.

Brown v. W.M. Acree Trust · filed 2000-02-14(3)

In the present case, reasonable diligencé does not require Plaintiffs to check the public records each year to ascertain whether anyone has filed a forged deed. It would be difficult for Plaintiffs to discover the fraud prior to the statutory limitation for filing their action for fraud. Plaintiffs were in possession of the property and had legal title to the property before the' allegedly forged deed was filed. Therefore, the two year statute of limitations for commencing their action based on fraud did not begin to run until their discovery of the fraudulent deed.

Section 95(A)(12) provides a five-year limitations period for undue influence claims.

Edwards v. Urice · filed 2008-07-17(A)(12)

The statute of limitations for undue influence is five years under § 95(A)(12).

Section 95(A)(3) gives two years to bring a fraud claim, with accrual delayed until discovery of the fraud.

Hitch Enterprises, Inc. v. Cimarex Energy Co. · filed 2012-03-20(A)(3)

Title 12, section 95 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that any action seeking relief on the ground of fraud must be brought “[w]ithin two (2) years,” id., “after the cause of action shall have accrued,” id. § 95(A), but that “the cause of action ... shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the ffaud[.]” Id. § 95(A)(3).

Subsection 95(11) gives an inmate or a person suing over facts occurring while the person was an inmate one year after accrual to bring the action.

JOHNSON v. GEO GROUP, INC. · filed 2018-06-15(11)

Therefore, as to Johnson's claim against the GEO parties, section 95(11) is not "inconsistent" with the limitation provision of the Tort Claims Act. ... If Johnson's cause of action accrued in late 2013, when he contends that he discovered the permanent nature of his injury, then his suit was filed within the one-year limitation period of section 95(11), the limitation period that the GEO parties argue is applicable. Summary judgment in favor of the GEO parties was not available on this basis.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered.

Petco Petroleum Corporation v. West · filed 2020-12-22(A)(3)

At this stage, assuming all well-pleaded facts in the proposed amended complaint to be true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Petco, the court cannot determine that Petco discovered the fraud in February 2017 (or should have discovered it then through ordinary diligence) as U.S. Oil argues because Petco has alleged a plausible explanation for why it did not discover the fraud until August 2020.

Section 95(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

Stevenson v. Grace · filed 2009-10-26(3)

A § 1983 claim arising in Oklahoma is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3).

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

Miller v. Ford · filed 2017-09-25(A)(3)

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint was clearly not filed within the two-year statute of limitations. See McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim is dictated by the personal injury statute of limitations in the state in which the claim arose . . . and in Oklahoma, that period is two years. 12 Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).” (internal citation omitted)).

Section 95(3) supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims by borrowing Oklahoma’s personal-injury statute of limitations.

Ray v. Quisenberry · filed 2023-03-10(3)

Plaintiff’s argument that the magistrate judge improperly applied the statute of limitations set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3) is similarly flawed. Although his claims arise under federal law, it is well settled that the applicable statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008); see Burkley v. Correctional Healthcare Mgmt. of Okla., Inc., 141 F. App’x 714, 715 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3) to a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims).3 For these reasons, the Court finds that these objections should be overruled.

Section 95(A)(3)'s two-year period bars § 1983 retaliation claims accruing before the two-year filing cutoff, while later acts remain timely.

Taylor v. Thomas · filed 2019-07-31(A)(3)

The parties agree that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to the extent they accrued prior to April 27, 2016.

Section 95(3) supplies Oklahoma’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims, running from when the supporting facts are or should be apparent.

Reed · filed 2025-12-12(3)

does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts “must adopt the most analogous limitations period provided by state law.” ... In Oklahoma, the applicable statute of limitations is two (2) years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3); ... Thus, a plaintiff in Oklahoma ordinarily must file a § 1983 action within two (2) years of the date when the facts supporting the plaintiff’s cause of action are or should be apparent to the plaintiff.

Section 95 “third” gives negligence and manufacturers’ products liability claims a two-year limitations period running from the date of injury, except when the Uniform Commercial Code applies.

O'NEAL v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Company · filed 1974-04-23third

As noted before, the statute of limitations to be applied is 12 O.S. 1971 § 95 “third”—two years from the date of injury, except for UCC application.

Section 95(3) gives a fraud claim two years from discovery; after that period, fraud may still be raised as a defense but cannot support affirmative relief.

Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Johnston · filed 1976-02-24(3)

Under 12 O.S.1971, § 95(3), the limitation period for bringing an action in fraud is two years. The statute further provides that the cause of action for relief based upon fraud shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud. ... It is well settled in Oklahoma that while the statute of limitations will not bar a fraud from being asserted as a defense to the enforcement of a transaction asserted as fraudulent, the statute will run and bar affirmative relief sought on the ground of fraud when the cause of action accrued more than two years previously.

Section 95’s two-year tort limitations period applies to an insured’s claim that its insurer failed in bad faith to settle within policy limits.

Tyson v. Casualty Corp. of America, Inc. · filed 1977-03-03

We have been directed to no Oklahoma cases deciding whether the plaintiff-insured should be allowed to waive the tort and sue in contract, thereby coming within the five year statute of limitations. Although it is difficult to determine how the instant action would more likely grow “stale” or be less capable of explanation than the ordinary action based on a written contract, the Oklahoma authorities would permit but one characterization of this type of action, that being in tort.

Section 95 bars claims on individual checks added after the limitations period expires when those checks were omitted from the original petition.

Cooper v. STOCK YARDS BANK OF OKL. CITY, OKL. · filed 1982-04-02(Second)

Second, statute of limitations expired on all checks written in April, 1975, which were not included in the original pleadings.

Section 95(1)’s five-year limit for written contracts governs uninsured motorist coverage claims; failing to sue the tortfeasor within § 95(3)’s two-year tort limit does not itself discharge the insurer.

Uptegraft v. Home Insurance Co. · filed 1983-04-20(1), (3)

While an action in tort for personal injury must be brought within two years after the cause of action arises, 12 O.S.1981 § 95(3), by § 95(1) a five-year statute of limitations is provided for actions on written contracts.

Section 95 (Second) provides a three-year limitation period for claims under the Production Revenue Standards Act involving production before September 1, 1992.

Tulsa Energy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Oil & Gas Management, Inc. (In re Tulsa Energy, Inc.) · filed 1995-03-24(Second)

Prior to September 1, 1992, the statute of limitations applicable to the Production Revenue Standards Act was determined by 12 O.S. § 95 (Second) which provides a three-year limitation for actions created by statutes.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

Sun v. Banner · filed 2019-09-27(A)(3)

The limitations period for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is dictated by the personal injury statute of limitations in the state in which the claim arose, and in Oklahoma, that period is two years.” McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3)).

Section 95(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a contribution claim based on a statutory right to contribution.

Sun Co., Inc. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. · filed 1996-03-20(2)

Nevertheless, section 95(2) of title 12 establishes a three-year statute of limitations for “an action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty.”

Section 95(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims; the period began when the plaintiffs had notice of the facts surrounding the tax sale.

Grimsley v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-06-06(3)

Even accepting plaintiffs’ assertions of fraud and deceit as true, it is clear that plaintiffs were on notice of the facts surrounding the tax sale on May 20, 1996, when the Gabbarts initiated the quiet title action. It is at this time that the statute of limitations began to run against plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Defendants’ alleged fraudulent or deceitful conduct occurring before that time, even if true, cannot serve to toll the running of the limitations period.

Section 95 gives a plaintiff two years to bring an insurance bad faith claim.

Blue v. Universal Underwriters Life Insurance · filed 2009-03-18

Both parties agree the applicable statute of limitations for a bad faith cause of action is two years. The Court finds this is a correct interpretation of Oklahoma law.

Section 95(A)(3) provides the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Oklahoma.

Rogne v. City of Catoosa · filed 2025-02-21(A)(3)

Because Rogne did not bring his claim until 2024—roughly five years after accrual—it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights actions in Oklahoma.

Castleman v. Marler · filed 2023-07-07(A)(3)

The statute of limitations for a civil rights cause of action in Oklahoma is two years. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... After careful review, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that his action accrued on September 29, 2020, when he received his medical records concerning the stabbing. Therefore, Defendants Christenson and McManus’ allegation that Plaintiff’s action is time barred is denied.

Section 95 (Third) gives a client two years to bring a legal malpractice action, running from the negligent act or when the client should have known of it, rather than from when the client sustains damage.

Boehler v. Shumake · filed 1993-02-23(Third)

The limitations period applicable to actions for legal negligence is the two-year period provided under 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Third). ... If Boeh-ler’s contentions are upheld, an attorney who gave legal advice in 1950 or 1960, but the client was not “injured” by that advice until 1993, could be successfully sued for that thirty or forty year old advice. The rule applicable to malpractice, either legal or medical, as set out in Funnell, does not allow such a scenario.

Section 95(Third) gives legal malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that may be tolled through an appeal until the client becomes aware of the injury caused by the attorney’s negligence.

Ranier v. Stuart and Freida, PC · filed 1994-11-08(Third)

Appellant’s action for legal malpractice, though based upon a contract of employment, was an action in tort governed by the two-year statute of limitations in 12 O.S.1991 § 95(Third). ... We caution, however, that the resolution of the appeal is not necessarily always the critical event triggering ripeness of a legal malpractice claim, but rather it is knowledge of the injury, its cause and the wrongdoing. We emphasize that proper application of the discovery rule demands that the determinative factor be the client’s knowledge of the injury, and each case must be decided under its own particular facts. If it appears that the client knew of the harm before the case is finally determined on appeal, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the underlying injury occurs or upon the client’s awareness of the alleged negligence.

Section 95 gives legal malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the claim accrues; when the alleged injury remains speculative during an underlying appeal, the period begins after that appeal is resolved.

Stephens v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1995-10-24Third

According to 12 O.S.Supp.1993, § 95, an action must be commenced within the relevant period “after the cause of action shall have accrued” or it is barred. ... We find the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the appeal was decided in the underlying ease.

Section 95(A)(11) requires actions brought by an inmate or based on facts occurring while a person was in state custody to be commenced within one year after accrual; a representative plaintiff is subject to the limitations period applicable to the inmate’s claim.

Lawson v. Okmulgee County Criminal · filed 2018-02-28(A)(11)

The estate’s Bosh claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §95(A)(11). Section 95(A)(11) provides that “[a]ll actions filed by an inmate or by a person based upon facts that occurred while the person was an inmate in the custody of . . . the State of Oklahoma . . . shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action shall have accrued.” ... The estate’s argument is unpersuasive for a reason that it identifies itself—Ms. Lawson brought the claims “in a purely representative capacity for the estate of . . . Mr. Perry.” ... As the personal representative of Mr. Perry’s estate bringing constitutional claims on his behalf, Ms. Lawson cannot escape the limitations period that would otherwise apply to Mr. Perry’s claims if he were able to bring them himself. ... The district court properly determined that the estate’s Bosh claims are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Section 95(A)(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on malicious prosecution actions.

Morgan v. City of Pryor · filed 2021-03-09(A)(4)

In Oklahoma, the limitations period for a malicious prosecution action is one year. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(4). Therefore, he had one year from September 27, 2018 in which to bring this claim. His Complaint was filed on September 24, 2020, outside of the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, this claim is barred.

Section 95’s two- and three-year limitation periods do not bar an indemnity action filed within those periods after the underlying judgment is paid.

Central National Bank of Poteau v. McDaniel · filed 1986-12-09Second and Third

Therefore, because the action did not accrue until October 17, 1983, applying either 12 O.S. 1981 § 95 Second or Third to this action, Plaintiff was not barred from bringing suit when he filed his action on June 22, 1984.

Section 95 Third sets a two-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Bray v. Thomas Energy Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-12-05Third

The statutory limitations period for negligence actions is two years. 12 O.S.1991, § 95 Third.

Section 95(A)(11) requires inmates to file actions within one year of accrual, but the GTCA’s limitations provisions govern claims brought under the GTCA.

Brown v. Creek County Ex Rel. Creek County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2007-07-03(A)(11)

The terms of § 157 of the GTCA provide that no action brought under that act may be filed more than 180 days after notice of claim to the appropriate political subdivision has been denied or is deemed denied. The terms of 12 0.8. Supp.2005 § 95 (A)(11) require all actions filed by an inmate to be commenced within one year of accrual. Inasmuch as we hold that a cause of action does not accrue until the claim may be maintained, the provisions of the GTCA must govern here.

Section 95(A)(3) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bryson v. MacY · filed 2009-04-30(A)(3)

In Oklahoma, the limitations period for a personal injury action is two years. 12 O.S. § 95(A)(3).

Section 95(A)(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and unjust-enrichment claims.

Scott v. Coast Professional Inc · filed 2021-08-02(A)(2)

OCPA and unjust enrichment claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.14 Plaintiff filed this suit on July 29, 2019, long after the defaulted student loans were purchased in November 13, 2009 and long after Plaintiff allegedly first learned of the defaulted school loans in 2011.

Section 95(2)'s three-year period applies to private claims seeking only damages under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, even though the Act also provides civil penalties.

Brashears v. Sight 'N Sound Appliance Centers, Inc. · filed 1999-02-12(2)

Because Consumers, in their individual capacities, are seeking only damages, we agree with Consumers that the three-year period applies to their claims.

Section 95(2) gives three years to bring an unjust enrichment claim, beginning when the claimant can first maintain the action.

Lapkin v. Garland Bloodworth, Inc. · filed 2000-11-03(2)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations in the instant case was three years, citing 12 O.S.1991 § 95(2); Sholer v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1995 OK 150, 945 P.2d 469, 475. ... Until the Supreme Court declared the first settlement agreement void on October 28, 1996, Lapkin could not have maintained a cause of action for unjust enrichment. ... Lapkin filed his third-party petition against Attorneys August 25, 1998, well within the applicable limitations period.

Section 95 requires an action on each separately maturing promissory note to be filed within five years after that note’s cause of action accrues.

Harris v. Heron · filed 1944-05-23

The action of plaintiff, therefore, was one upon eleven separate causes of action and each based upon a contract, agreement or promise in writing, and an action thereon had to be commenced vithin five years after the accrual thereof and not afterward. 12 O. S. 1941 § 95.

Section 95 requires an action on a note to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Janeway v. Artusse · filed 1947-01-07

Under 12 O.S.1941 § 95, an action on a note must be brought within five years after the cause of action accrued. ... Without Janeway’s testimony, there was no proof of payment.

Section 95(A)(1) provides a five-year limitations period for claims based on a written contract, agreement, or promise.

Kristina Consulting Group v. Decision One Debt Relief · filed 2022-03-25(A)(1)

But in either case, the statute of limitations is five years. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(1) (providing five-year limitations period for claims based on a written contract, agreement, or promise); id. § 95(A)(12) (providing five-year catchall limitations period for claims “not hereinbefore provided for”); Belcher v. Kaye, 222 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying Oklahoma’s five-year catchall provision to a claim for breach of fiduciary relationship arising out of a partnership agreement).

Section 95(A)(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on oral contracts.

HiTex, LLC v. Vorel · filed 2022-10-14(A)(2)

Under Oklahoma law, oral contracts are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(2).

Section 95(A)(1) requires actions on written contracts to be filed within five years, with accrual at breach rather than when damages result.

Emrich Aerial Spraying LLC v. The City of Pawhuska · filed 2025-10-23(A)(1)

Under Oklahoma law, an action on a written contract must be brought within five years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(1). The action accrues when the contract is breached (and not when damages result). Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2021 OK 27, ¶ 25, 488 P.3d 743, 750.

When an injured party waives a claim for taking property and sues on an implied contract for its value, § 95(2)’s three-year limit for oral contracts applies instead of § 95(3)’s two-year limit for taking personal property.

Vogel v. Cobb · filed 1943-09-21(2), (3)

As we have seen, however, the injured party may waive the tort and sue on an implied contract to pay the value of the property taken, as was done here, and in such case the three-year statute of limitations governing oral contracts [12 O. S. 1941 § 95 (2)] is applicable.

Section 95(1) gives an action on a written contract a five-year limitations period.

Butterick Co., Inc. v. Molen · filed 1946-12-23(1)

This action, being one upon written contract, is governed by 12 O.S. 1941 § 95 (1). Having been filed within the allowable period of five years, it is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95 requires an action on a written contract to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues, unless the right to sue is revived.

Tankersley v. Cooke · filed 1952-02-05

12 O. S. 1941 §95 provides that an action upon any contract, agreement or promise in writing can only be brought within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued. Beyond question plaintiffs suit on the notes was barred, unless the right to sue was revived and saved under the following provisions of the statute.

An action on a written surety bond is subject to a five-year limitations period measured from each loss.

Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1959-07-14(1)

In the instant case, there was a written contract whereby the defendant as surety agreed to indemnify the State of Oklahoma for the use and benefit of Court Clerk for the failure of the employees to faithfully perform their duties. This is an action on a contract (surety bond), and the trial court was correct in limiting the liability for the misappropriations made prior to December 28, 1951, which is five years prior to the date this action was instituted.

Section 95 gives a suit founded on a written contract five years to be brought, rather than the two years applicable to recovery of personal property.

Edwards v. Petross · filed 1963-05-14First; Third

Plaintiff’s suit being founded upon a contract in writing, the five years statute referred to above and not the two years, statute relied on by the defendant and trial court, governs and determines the issue of limitation against defendants.

Section 95, paragraph First, provides a five-year limitation period for actions on written contracts.

Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Elmar Tank Line Co. · filed 1962-02-20First

Plaintiff’s action was predicated upon a written contract and for said reason the five-year limitation period provided in 12 O.S.1951 § 95, paragraph “First” is applicable.

Section 95 requires an action on a note to be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Willis v. Kuhn · filed 1964-11-04

Under 12 O.S.1961, § 95, an action on a note must be brought within five years after the cause of action accrued.

Section 95(1) limits the time to bring an action to collect a debt secured by a mortgage.

Mills v. Reneau · filed 1965-12-28(1)

The right to attempt to assert a cause of action upon the indebtedness would have been barred under 12 O.S.1961, § 95 (1), by June 24, 1949, at the latest possible date.

Section 95(1) requires an action on a written agreement to be commenced within five years.

Rucker v. Republic Supply Company · filed 1966-06-21(1)

A cause of action on the Guaranty accrued when the above judgment became final, Wood v. Chapman, 87 Okl. 49, 211 P. 396. An action upon an agreement in writing must be commenced within five years, 12 O.S.1961, § 95(1).

Section 95’s limitations period for written instruments applies to an action to collect an unpaid settlement draft.

Farmers & Merchants Mutual Fire Insurance v. Pulliam · filed 1973-07-13(1)

Moreover, the action was commenced within the applicable period governing .written instruments. 12 O.S. § 95.

Section 95 (First) gives a creditor five years from the accrual of each installment-note claim to sue for that installment.

Oklahoma Brick Corporation v. McCall · filed 1972-05-09(First)

The five year limitation period provided in 12 O.S.1971, § 95 (First) is applicable in this case. Plaintiff commenced this action within five years after its cause of action accrued on the fourth and final installment, but not within five years of the accrual of its cause of action on the first three installments. Therefore, plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the first three installments, but is entitled to recover only the final installment.

Section 95, First, provides a five-year limitations period for an obligation in writing signed by the debtor.

Polin v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas · filed 1979-01-18First

The amount owed was evidenced by written receipts signed by one or the other of the Polins. Thus, the obligation was in writing signed by the Polins. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is 12 O.S.1971, § 95, First, which is five years.

Section 95 (First) gives a party five years to bring an action on a written contract, measured from when the cause of action accrues.

Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman · filed 1980-12-23(First)

The district court correctly determined that appellee’s cause of action first accrued on April 5, 1973, the expiration date of the bond. This being an action on a contract in writing, we hold the trial court correctly determined that the five (5) year period of limitations ... was applicable, and the action being commenced on April 5, 1978, was timely.

Section 95(1) allows five years after accrual to bring an implied warranty action arising from a written contract for the sale of a home.

Elden v. Simmons · filed 1981-07-07(1)

Such an action is maintainable for five years after the cause of action shall have accrued, as such actions would come within the purview of the First Subsection of 12 O.S.1971, § 95, which brovides that actions upon any contract or agreement or promise in writing may be maintained within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued.

Section 95 (first) allows five years from the breach to sue on an express warranty in a written contract, even when the warranty covers only one year.

Mounts v. Parker · filed 1986-10-21(first)

As such, the limitations period for breach of the express warranty would be governed by the provisions of 12 O.S.1981 § 95 (first), allowing five years for an action on a contract in writing. Contrary to the arguments presented by appellees to the trial court, although the warranty itself only covered a one year period, an action based on a breach of warranty occurring within that one year could properly be brought within five years of the breach.

Section 95 requires an action on an unwritten contract to be brought within three years.

Wiley Electric, Inc. v. Brantley · filed 1988-07-12Second

The contract between Bench and the contractor for illumination of the softball fields was not in writing; therefore, the action had to be brought within three years.

Section 95 (First) gives each monthly payment under a written installment contract its own accrual date and bars payments due more than five years before suit.

Kiamichi Electric Cooperative v. Underwood · filed 1992-06-02(First)

Each monthly due date constitutes a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations begins to run with each new due date.

Section 95 First sets a five-year limitations period for an action to recover on a promissory note, subject to a qualifying payment under § 101.

McDannold v. McCoy · filed 1992-11-03First

Inasmuch as this action was not filed until June 2,1989, the five year statute of limitations, T. 12 O.S.1981 § 95 First, would bar the bringing of this action unless, as alleged by Appellees, a $5,000.00 payment dated June 7, 1984, satisfies the provisions of T. 12 O.S.1981 § 101, which reads: In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same shall have been made, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.

Section 95(1) gives a claimant five years after accrual to sue on a written guaranty; a later judgment on the underlying note does not start a new limitations period against the guarantors.

Cadle Co. v. Bianco · filed 1992-12-22(1)

An action upon an agreement in writing must be commenced within five years after it accrues. 12 O.S.1991 § 95(1). ... Plaintiff’s cause of action on the guaranty is time-barred. ... The judgment against Bianco did not create a new cause of action with a new statute of limitations against Cable and Johnston.

Section 95.First’s five-year period for written contracts does not prevent the legislature from setting a different limitations period for fire insurance contracts.

Walton v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co. · filed 1993-09-28First

It is within the legislature’s exclusive province to enact statutes of limitations applicable to particular classes of insurance contracts. A contrary holding would inappropriately deprive the legislature of discretion to pass any statute different from those enumerated in § 95, despite the policy considerations involved.

Section 95 First gives a homeowner five years from completion of construction to sue for breach of an implied warranty.

Jaworsky v. Frolich · filed 1992-11-24First

Builder’s potential liability in contract for breach of implied warranty was extinguished on the fifth anniversary of the completion of the house. ... Owners’ cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 12 O.S. 1981 § 95 First.

Section 95 (First) bars an action on a promissory note filed more than five years after the cause of action accrues upon default.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Moore · filed 1995-06-06(First)

Under our construction of the cases, therefore, FDIC reaps no benefit from § 101, and we hold FDIC’s claim on the notes, commenced over five years after FDIC’s cause of action thereon accrued upon the Moores’ default, barred by the five year statute of limitations. 12 O.S. § 95 (First).

Section 95, First allows five years after a written medical services contract ends to bring an action on it.

Balfour v. Nelson · filed 1994-12-20First

Under the provisions of civil procedure — namely 12 O.S.1991 § 95, First4 — appellant could have maintained an action against her patients for five years after the contract ended.

Section 95(1)'s five-year period for written contracts yields to the more specific six-year period in 12A O.S. § 3-118(a) for suits on promissory notes.

Lenders Collection Corp. v. Harris · filed 1995-06-27(1)

The trial court erred in applying the five year statute of limitations found in 12 O.S. § 95(1) rather than the six year period set forth in 12A O.S. § 3-118(a).

Section 95(1) provides a five-year limitations period for a claim to recover sales tax owed under a written purchase agreement.

Superior Welding, Inc. v. Lamamco Drilling Co. · filed 1996-12-13(1)

While the statute is the general source of the tax, this particular tax only arose as a result of a purchase agreement which was in writing, and according to § 1361(B) is part of the *44price for that purchase. The applicable limitations period is the five years provided by 12 O.S.1991 § 95 First [now 12 O.S.Supp. 1996 § 95(1) ]. Superior’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95(First)'s five-year period applies to claims for unpaid royalties under a written oil and gas lease and to the related statutory interest.

Purcell v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. · filed 1998-06-15(First)

The limitations period is five years for an action brought upon a contract, agreement, or promise in writing. 12 O.S. 1991 § 95 (First). This provision applies to breach of an oil and gas lease. ... Thus, § 540 did not change the substantive liability of Santa Fe, and for the purpose of applying a statute of limitations § 540 is not a statutory liability independent of a contract or agreement between the parties. We affirm the District Court's use of a five-year statute of limitations for Purcell's claim as to interest as well as royalty payments.

Section 95(1) gives a claimant five years from accrual to bring an action for breach of a written contract.

Kinzy v. FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT · filed 2001-03-13(1)

The class' claim is contractual in nature and is governed by the five-year statute of limitations governing claims based upon breach of a written contract.

Section 95(Fifth) limits recovery of a life tenant’s continuing right to royalty distributions to the five years before the trustee’s petition for distribution.

Rush v. Appointment of a Trustee for the Purpose of Securing an Oil & Gas Lease · filed 1995-05-09(Fifth)

This right shall be a continuing right retrospectively beginning five years from September 22, 1993, the date the trustee filed his petition for distribution. 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Fifth); Howard v. Jeffrey, 268 P.2d 897 (Okla.1953).

Section 95(first) gives a party five years from accrual to bring an action on a written contract, agreement or promise.

Abboud v. Abboud · filed 2000-05-09(first)

Thomas' cause of action accrued when the debt was not paid by the due date, December 2, 1988. The limitations period for this case, being an action upon a contract, agreement or promise in writing, would be five years after the cause of action accrued. 12 O.S.1991 § 95(first).

Section 95(1)’s five-year period does not govern an action to enforce a note payable at a definite time; the six-year period in 12A O.S. § 3-118 applies.

State Ex Rel. Board of Regents v. Livingston · filed 2005-03-17(1)

We hold the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in applying the five year limitation period pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp.1994 § 95(1). The six year limitation period under § 3-118 should have been applied.

Section 95(A)(1) generally gives five years for written-contract actions, but the specific two-year limit for claims against health care providers arising from patient care controls when it applies.

Whitaker v. Hill Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 2009-03-20(A)(1)

We note, however, that the five-year statute of limitations in 12 O.S8. § 95(A)(1) is generally applicable to breach of contract actions, whereas the two-year statute of limitations in 76 0.8. § 18 specifically applies to breach of contract actions brought against a health care provider for injury or death arising out of patient care. Where two statutes may be construed to apply to the same subject matter, one specific and one general, the specific statute controls.

Section 95(3) provides a five-year limitations period for claims based on written contracts, including a contractual subrogation claim for defense costs.

Yousuf v. Cohlmia · filed 2010-06-03(3)

PLI-CO’s filed its Complaint in Intervention on October 15, 2009, well within the applicable five-year statute of limitations period.

Section 95(3) sets a two year limit for personal injury actions, tolled for minors until one year after they reach adulthood.

Hamilton by and Through Hamilton v. Vaden · filed 1986-06-24(3)

We conclude that the Legislature intended § 96 to toll the two year statute of limitations provided by § 95(3) and that a minor is entitled to institute an action for personal injuries anytime before he/she reaches majority plus one year.

Section 95(sixth)’s general five-year limitation is tolled during a child’s minority under § 96.

State ex rel. Department of Human Services ex rel. Bowens v. Poor · filed 1990-12-18(sixth)

Trendon was born March 23, 1980, and, based upon 12 O.S.1981 § 95(sixth) alone, his claim was barred after March 23, 1985. However, 12 O.S.1981 § 96 tolls a general statute of limitations for claims of minors, giving them one year after majority in which to file. For purposes of statute of limitations, Callison treated paternity claims as claims of the child born out of wedlock. Similar treatment here leads us to conclude the general five-year limitation urged by Poor was tolled during Trendon's minority, and the limitation had not expired prior to October 1, 1985.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for Title IX claims.

Rudman v. Oklahoma State of · filed 2022-11-18(A)(3)

As with § 1983 actions, Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 12 O.S. 2021 § 95(A)(3), applies to the Title IX claim.

Section 95(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 injury-to-rights claims in Oklahoma, while § 95(4) supplies a one-year period for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution and, under Oklahoma law, false arrest.

Ferrick v. City of Tulsa · filed 2025-05-28(3), (4)

“Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, and the Tenth Circuit has held that a § 1983 claim arising in Oklahoma is governed by the two-year statute of limitations for ‘injury to the rights of another, not arising out of contract’ under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3). ... The common law tort of false arrest does not have a specified statute of limitations. Oklahoma courts have found a one-year statute of limitations, which is applicable to false imprisonment claims under § 95(4), also applies to false arrest. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(4) (mandating one-year limitations period for actions “for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment”); ... Like the false arrest claim, the common law tort of malicious prosecution holds a one-year limitations period. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(4) (mandating one-year limitations period for actions “for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment”).”

Section 95 (Third) applies a two-year limitations period to civil rights claims as actions for injury to personal rights.

Jackson v. Grider · filed 1984-11-29(Third)

Accordingly, we conclude that a civil rights claim is in essence an action for injury to personal rights. Under this holding, the appropriate Oklahoma statute is the two-year limitation period for an injury to the rights of another found in 12 O.S.1981 § 95 (Third).

Section 95(A)(7) does not extend its special limitations period to claims against a public school district because the district is not a covered “person.”

Doe · filed 2026-03-06(A)(7)

Even assuming the Court was permitted to apply a statute of limitations other than that for “personal injury,” Plaintiff has not shown that section 95(A)(7) could properly be invoked here. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mustang are not brought against a “person,” as contemplated by section 95(A)(7), but against a public school district. Expanding the reach of this statute falls within the province of the Oklahoma Legislature, which “is primarily vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of” the State of Oklahoma.

Section 95’s three-year limit for civil actions does not apply to an application to county commissioners to correct an erroneous tax assessment because the application is a special statutory proceeding.

Stevenson v. Friend · filed 1945-12-18

Defendant contends that the three-year statute for civil actions (12 O. S. 1941 § 95) applies, thus treating such an application to this board as a civil action. It is not a civil action, but a special statutory proceeding.

Section 95(2)’s three-year limit applies to civil actions, so it does not bar filing a workers’ compensation award for enforcement as part of a special proceeding.

Hickman v. Gumerson · filed 1942-03-10(2)

Observe that the quoted statute bars only the bringing of a “civil action.” ... He is nowhere required or permitted to bring a “civil action.”

Section 95 does not apply to an action brought by the state in its sovereign capacity.

State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Employment SEC. Com. v. Eddie · filed 1944-12-12

We conclude that the state in respect to this action is acting in the exercise of its sovereign capacity, and that the general statute of limitations of actions, 12 O. S. 1941 § 95, does not apply.

Section 95 does not bar the state from foreclosing a mortgage securing a school fund loan when it acts in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right.

Wooten v. State Ex Rel. Comr's of Land Office · filed 1942-09-29

It is thus apparent that the statute of limitations does not bar an action to foreclosé a real estate mortgage executed to the Commissioners of the Land Office to secure a loan from the school fund, and to enforce the debt which it secures.

Section 95(4)'s one-year limitation does not apply when the State sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right on a liquor-license surety bond.

State Ex Rel. Nesbitt v. Western Surety Company · filed 1972-02-15(4)

However, we are of the opinion that the limitation period prescribed by § 95(4) supra, is not applicable against the State in the case at bar.

Section 95’s limitation period does not run against the State when it sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right.

State Ex Rel. Cartwright v. Tidmore · filed 1983-12-12Fourth

We have long-recognized the general rule that statutes of limitations do not operate against the state when it is acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right.

Section 95 Third does not bar the state’s action when the state acts in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right.

Oklahoma Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc. · filed 1985-01-07Third

The defendants have also argued that the plaintiff’s Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action or at least those allegations contained in said causes of action which describe events occurring prior to 1982 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 12 O.S. § 95 Third. ... The Court has reviewed the plaintiff’s allegations in its amended complaint and finds under the circumstances set forth therein that the plaintiff is acting in its sovereign capacity to recover money allegedly paid by the state due to the tortious conduct of the defendants and that the recovery of such money will benefit the public in general. Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations is no bar to the plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action.

Section 95 Second and Third do not bar actions brought by the United States.

United States v. Children's Shelter, Inc. · filed 1985-01-07Second and Third

The defendants have challenged also Counts 5, 6, and 7 on the grounds that the causes of action alleged therein are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 12 O.S. §§ 95 Second and 95 Third. It is well established however that this plaintiff is not barred by state statutes of limitations and thus the statutory sections upon which the defendants have relied are inapplicable to the instant proceeding.

Section 95’s limitation periods do not bar a state action to enforce a public right, including an action to recover public funds diverted through county corruption.

State ex rel. Board of County Commissioners v. Shelton · filed 1986-06-10

We hold, however, that none of the actions is barred by a statute of limitations and vacate the orders of dismissal. ... This criteria, when applied to the factual situation in the instant case, prevents escape from the conclusion that the attempt to enforce the provisions of 62 O.S.1981 § 372 against defendants is an attempt to attain an objective consistent with the intent and purpose of § 372, namely, protection of the public’s right to be governed by county officials who perform their duties fraudlessly without bribes, kickbacks or payoffs.

Section 95(4)’s one-year limit does not bar a municipality’s suit to recover a statutory penalty when it acts in its sovereign capacity to vindicate public rights.

State Ex Rel. Schones v. Town of Canute · filed 1993-06-29(4)

We therefore find that had suit in the case at bar been brought by the proper city officers, the statute of limitations would not bar the suit because the proper officers of the Town of Canute would be acting in a sovereign capacity for vindication of public rights.

Section 95’s five-year limitation does not bar the state from seeking reimbursement for public assistance when it is enforcing a public right.

Lewandowski v. Lewandowski · filed 1993-09-21(Fifth)

We again hold that 56 O.S. § 238, requiring the state to obtain reimbursement for payment of public assistance for the benefit of a minor child, protects the public at large and as such is enforcement of a public right against which the statute of limitations constitutes no bar.

Subdivision 2 bars an action to foreclose a paving bond lien more than three years after the bonds mature, but does not extinguish the lien or bar other remedies to enforce it.

Williams v. City of Durant · filed 1949-01-25(2)

However, in City of Bristow v. Groom, supra, we expressly held that said subdivision of section 95 barred only the right to bring an action to foreclose the lien of bonds which had matured more than three years prior to the bringing of the action, and did not cancel or nullify the lien of the bonds upon the property, or prevent the bondholder from availing himself of other remedies provided by law for the enforcement of his lien. The foreclosure statute (11 O. S. 1941 §107) did not apply to bonds issued prior to 1923, so that an action to foreclose could not be maintained on the bonds herein involved. It follows that this contention may not be sustained.

Section 95(2) provided a three-year limitations period, but the later, specific section 242 replaced it for street improvement assessment liens.

City of Healdton ex rel. Rewoldt v. Pickens · filed 1948-11-23(2)

It would not have been barred by 12 O. S. 1941 §95(2) until October 1, 1939, or three years after the cause of action accrued. Section 95(2) is a general statute of limitations, while section 242 is a later special statute of limitations applying only to special assessment liens for street improvement purposes. The Legislature is presumed to have intended to substitute section 242 for section 95(2) in so far as it affected the special assessment liens here involved (50 Am. Jur. 564, §563), and while doing so it extended the period of limitations as to these liens until December 1, 1940, by the proviso to section 242.

Section 95(2) gives three years to bring a civil action to foreclose a street improvement assessment lien because the action enforces a liability created by statute.

City of Bristow Ex Rel. Hedges v. Groom · filed 1944-05-29(2)

It follows that since more than three years had elapsed between the accrual of plaintiffs’ cause of action as to the last installment and the commencement of the present action, the cause of action was barred as to all installments by the three-year statute of limitations, 12 O. S. 1941 § 95 (2), and the court correctly sustained the demurrer to the petition.

Section 95(2) gives a bondholder three years after accrual to bring an action to foreclose a special assessment lien; the claim accrues after the last installment has remained delinquent for twelve months.

Town of Medford Ex Rel. Fuss v. Early · filed 1944-11-28(2)

Therefore without further discussion and following the rule above mentioned, we hold that the causes of action here presented accrue under 11 O. S. 1941 § 107 after there occurs a delinquency on the last installment and after such delinquency continues for twelve months; that the limitation provision of 12 O. S. 1941 § 95, subd. 2, is applicable; and that such action would be barred thereby upon the lapse of three years after the accrual of the causes of action.

Section 95(2) gives an action to foreclose a special assessment lien three years from accrual; the cause accrues when a delinquency after the last installment’s due date continues for twelve months.

City of Muskogee ex rel. Savidge v. Mann · filed 1947-10-14(2)

It appears on the face of the amended petition that plaintiff’s action to foreclose against the defendant was barred long before the amended petition was filed. ... “An action to foreclose a special assessment lien under 11 O. S. 1941 §107 is an action on a ‘liability created by *254statute’ and is barred after the expiration of three years from the accrual of the cause of action under 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (2), and such action accrues on the assessment where (1) there is a delinquency after the due date of the last installment, and (2) such delinquency continues for twelve months.”

Section 95(2) bars a civil action to foreclose a special assessment lien after its limitations period has run.

City of Tahlequah ex rel. Johnston v. Franklin · filed 1948-10-12(2)

Therefore, at the time section 242 was enacted, an action to foreclose the special assessment lien under section 132 was barred by 12 O. S. 1941 §95(2), as construed in City of Bristow v. Groom, above.