12 Okla. Stat. § 2004

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by state and federal due process.

Vernon and Bonnie Rambo v. American Southern Insurance Company, Mid South Claim Services, Inc., and W.T.R., Inc. · filed 1988-02-26(F)

Because Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 2004 F is all-encompassing, extending jurisdiction in Oklahoma to the limits of due process, there is no need for a separate analysis under the insurance statute. Any contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the broader provision would also be sufficient under this provision.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the state and federal Constitutions, making the statute coextensive with due-process limits.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 12,752 Melvin Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Company · filed 1991-03-12(F)

Oklahoma’s long arm statute is coextensive with the constitutional limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause. ... Therefore, if jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause, Oklahoma’s long arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only on a basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.

Frieling v. Malowest, Inc. · filed 1993-02-22(F)

The applicable Oklahoma long-arm statute provides, “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 2004 F. Thus, a federal court in Oklahoma is required to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process.

Section 2004(F) makes Oklahoma's long-arm jurisdiction coextensive with the Due Process Clause.

United States v. Bigford · filed 2004-04-13(F)

Because Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction coextensive with the Due Process Clause, Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F), any attack based on Oklahoma’s jurisdictional requirements would appear to be encompassed by Defendant’s challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction only to the extent consistent with the United States Constitution, so the statutory inquiry collapses into the constitutional due-process analysis.

Mandeville v. Crowley · filed 2017-06-07(F)

In this case, “Oklahoma’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction that is consistent with the United States Constitution.” Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F)). Consequently, “the first, statutory, inquiry effectively collapses into the second, constitutional, analysis.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070.

Subsection (F) extends Oklahoma personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the federal Constitution.

Quill Ink Books Ltd. v. Abcd Graphics & Design, Inc. · filed 2019-02-13(F)

Oklahoma has enacted a "long-arm" statute that authorizes its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the federal Constitution.

Oklahoma's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.

Bethea v. Bethea · filed 2021-06-07(F)

“In Oklahoma, this two-part inquiry collapses into a single due process analysis,” because Oklahoma permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution. Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1416 (10th Cir.1998) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004 F).

Section 2004(F) authorizes Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.

Shook v. Gleue Harvesting, LLC · filed 2023-02-08(F)

Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes service of process and provides that an Oklahoma court “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F).

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, so jurisdiction consistent with federal due process is authorized under the statute.

Marsha Lee Kennedy and Stephen Michael Kennedy v. Robert G. Freeman, M.D. And Robert G. Freeman, P.A., a Texas Corporati · filed 1990-11-14(F)

Oklahoma’s long-arm statute jurisdiction is coextensive with the constitutional limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause. ... Therefore, if jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause, Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. ... “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States."

Section 2004(F) permits an Oklahoma court to exercise personal jurisdiction only on a basis consistent with the state and federal Constitutions; a foreign garnishee with no purposeful minimum contacts with Oklahoma is not subject to that jurisdiction.

Revels v. Morgan and Associates, P.C. · filed 2025-01-30(F)

Oklahoma's long-arm statute provides that an Oklahoma court “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F). ... TBPA has “never been in” and “has had no contacts” with Oklahoma, let alone “purposeful[],” “minimum contacts.” Dkt. 29 at 10 (emphasis omitted); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. It is a Florida corporation with its principal office, and only office, in Tampa. Dkt. 29-5 ¶ 4. Plaintiff represents that TBPA has had absolutely zero interactions in or with Oklahoma. Dkt. 29 at 10. The Oklahoma court thus lacks any basis for jurisdiction over TBPA. ... As such, the Oklahoma court’s garnishment of any of Plaintiff’s funds in TBPA’s possession would be invalid. See, e.g., Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Street, 60 P. 221, 222–23 (Okla. 1900). Defendants plainly pursued garnishment in a court that lacked jurisdiction over TBPA under Oklahoma law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 1171(A), 2004(F).

Section 2004(F) authorizes Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.

Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Pay.com US · filed 2026-03-24(F)

Oklahoma has enacted a “long-arm” statute that authorizes its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Oklahoma Constitution. See Dental Dynamics, 946 F.3d at 1228-29 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F)). Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry is reduced to a single question: whether the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with constitutional due process.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the state and federal constitutions.

Campbell v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 1999-02-16(F)

Furthermore, Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, 12 O.S.1991 § 2004(F), provides that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” ... Under this record, exercise of in personam jurisdiction over either of the defendants by an Oklahoma court would not “offend the traditional notions of substantial justice and fair play.”

Section 2004(F) permits jurisdiction over nonresidents within constitutional limits; for internet sales, courts must consider the defendant’s contacts or orders originating in Oklahoma.

Lively v. Ijam, Inc. · filed 2005-04-19(F)

Section 2004(F) provides the authority for service of process outside the state: “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” ... In keeping with this principle, we hold that the amount of contacts or orders originating from persons within Oklahoma must be taken into consideration when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the state and federal constitutions.

Clark v. Tabin · filed 2005-08-26(F)

In Oklahoma, this inquiry collapses into a single due process analysis because Oklahoma’s long-arm statute provides that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” 12 O.S.2001, § 2004(F).

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents within constitutional limits, even when they have not physically entered the state.

Hough v. Leonard · filed 1993-09-29(F)

The current Oklahoma long-arm statute 12 O.S.1991 § 2004(F) provides that “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” ... Jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the non-resident did not physically enter the forum state.

Section 2004(F) permits personal jurisdiction on any constitutionally valid basis, including a divorce court’s continuing jurisdiction over a party in a child-support modification proceeding.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 1994-01-18(F)

When the motion to modify support was filed on October 27, 1989, 12 O.S.Supp. 1988 § 2004(F) was also in effect, which states: ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION. A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. The in personam jurisdiction of the modification proceeding is based upon the continuing jurisdiction of the District Court over the mother, a proper party to the divorce proceeding, and is consistent with the Constitution in this case.

Section 2004(F) allows Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose Oklahoma-related activities establish sufficient minimum contacts.

First Texas Savings Ass'n v. Bernsen · filed 1996-03-26(F)

Jurisdiction under the long-arm statute [12 O.S.1991 § 2004(F)] is predicated on foreign state activity which results in forum state harm. ... We therefore hold that the Oklahoma district court has jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants who are parties to this appeal.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the defendant’s contacts with Oklahoma satisfy constitutional due process.

Klassen v. Lazik · filed 2004-04-13(F)

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” 12 O.S. Supp. 2003 § 2004(F); ... Defendant came to Oklahoma and, while here, negotiated and entered into the agreement that gave rise to this litigation. ... The trial court’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction is fair and offers the parties substantial justice.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.

Conoco Inc. v. Agrico Chemical Company · filed 2004-11-09(F)

Section 2004(F) provides that a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” The intent of our long-arm statute is to extend the jurisdiction of the OHahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the Oklahoma Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Subsection F limits Oklahoma courts’ jurisdiction over a nonresident to constitutionally permissible grounds; incidental followup discussions after treatment in another state do not establish sufficient minimum contacts.

Vance v. Molina · filed 2001-07-03(F)

Subsection F. of § 2004 states the test for determining whether jurisdiction has been attained: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States." ... We hold that these incidental discussions should not subject Dr. Molina to jurisdiction in Oklahoma courts.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents through out-of-state service of process, subject to constitutional limits.

GUFFEY v. OSTONAKULOV · filed 2014-02-11(F)

Title 12 O.S. Supp. 2012 §2004(F), known as the long-arm statute, allows jurisdiction over non-residents in Oklahoma court's by providing for service of process outside of the state.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits allowed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.

Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc. · filed 2018-03-06(F)

Oklahoma's long arm statute for establishing specific jurisdiction is 12 O.S. 2011 § 2004(F).17 It sets the limits of the state's jurisdiction over a nonresident to the outer limits permitted of the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.18 Consequently, the outer limits as defined by the United States Supreme Court are relevant to our inquiry.

Section 2004(F) permits personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the United States Constitution.

Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. KCHM, Inc. · filed 2020-03-09(F)

Oklahoma’s long-arm statute [12 O.S. §2004(F)] permits the exercise of any jurisdiction that is consistent with the United States Constitution.

Section 2004(F) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when the defendant’s Oklahoma contacts satisfy constitutional due process.

Kennedy v. Freeman · filed 1989-04-20(F)

Oklahoma’s law, 12 O.S. § 2004(F) provides: “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of the United States.” ... The Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over these Defendants would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Section 2004(F) authorizes Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.

McClelland v. Watling Ladder Co. · filed 1990-02-09(F)

In Oklahoma, the 2-step inquiry “collapses into a single due process analysis” because the relevant ... state statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with the state satisfy due process.

Beverly Enterprises-Texas, Inc. v. Devine Convalescent Care Center · filed 2012-01-26(F)

Jewell's contacts with the state are sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction over him and consistent with the parameters of 12 O.S. § 2004(F).

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the state and federal constitutions.

Satterfield v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. · filed 2018-01-26(F)

Because the applicable Oklahoma statute provides that [a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution[s] of this state and ... the United States, 12 O.S. § 2004(F), that two-part test has "collapse[d] into a single due process analysis[.]" Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1416 ; e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (long established that personal jurisdiction *1292subject to fourteenth amendment due process clause).

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by constitutional due process.

Watts v. Freeman Health System · filed 2023-10-30(F)

The long-arm statute is coextensive with the constitutional limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause.

Section 2004(F) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed by constitutional due process.

Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Group, Inc. · filed 2011-08-19(F)

“Because Oklahoma’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction that is consistent with the United States Constitution, the personal jurisdiction inquiry under Oklahoma law ... collapses into the single due process inquiry.”

Section 2004(C)(1)(A) permits service of process in a civil case by a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a licensed civil process server, or a person specifically appointed to serve process.

Harrel v. Preston · filed 1992-09-29(C)(1)(A)

Under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1)(A) (1988), “a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a person licensed to make service of process in civil cases, or a person specifically appointed for that purpose’ ’ may serve process in a civil case. ... The record does not contain any evidence that Cox was a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, a person licensed to make service of process in a civil case, or specially appointed to serve process. ... In the absence of evidence in the record stating Cox’s qualifications, the trial judge had no basis upon which to conclude that Cox was authorized to make service of process in Oklahoma. Accordingly, we hold that the record does not prove that ... proof of service was made in Oklahoma by a person authorized to serve process by Oklahoma’s statutory scheme.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever jurisdiction complies with state and federal constitutional due-process limits.

Cudd Pressure v. Cornelius · filed 1996-03-20(F)

Thus, Oklahoma’s long-arm statute jurisdiction is coextensive with the constitutional limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1990). If jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause, Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.

Section 2004(I) makes service timely within 180 days after filing; after 180 days, service remains timely if the plaintiff shows good cause, and dismissal for untimely service is discretionary.

Fischer v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma · filed 2000-11-14(I)

Under section 2004(I), service is always timely if made within 180 days after the petition is filed. After 180 days, service is timely if the plaintiff shows good cause for the delay. The use of the word "may" in section 2004(I) indicates dismissal is discretionary. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(I) cmt. (1991); see Mott v. Carlson, 1990 OK 10, ¶ 6, 786 P.2d 1247, 1249. Unlike rule 4(J) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on which section 2004 is based, dismissal under the Oklahoma rule is discretionary after the 180 days time period. The trial court will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Mott, 1990 OK 10 at ¶ 6, 786 P.2d at 1249.

Section 2004(I) places the burden on the plaintiff to show good cause for failing to serve the correct defendant within 180 days.

Clark v. Ralston · filed 2007-08-10(I)

As to the issue of "good cause," this is a correct statement of the law under § 2004(I) and the holding in Mott, 1990 OK 10 at ¶11, 786 P.2d at 1250; Clark as the plaintiff has the burden of showing good cause for not obtaining service on the correct "Carolyn Ralston" within the statutory 180 days.

Section 2004(I) requires a plaintiff opposing dismissal for delayed service to show good cause with probative evidence; unsworn statements in a brief do not suffice.

Willis v. Sequoyah House, Inc. · filed 2008-09-23(I)

To overcome the dismissal's presumptive correctness a plaintiff must sustain the burden to show good cause for its delay in securing timely service. Plaintiffs failed here to meet that burden. They have relied solely upon non-probative material consisting of unsworn conclusory references in a nisi prius brief which utterly lack explanatory content of probative character. Their good-cause proof should have been supplied by testimony, affidavits or by some other form of an acceptable evidentiary substitute.

Section 2004(1) gives a plaintiff who has not served a defendant within 180 days an opportunity to show good cause before the court exercises its discretion to dismiss.

Jones v. INTEGRIS BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2008-01-10(1)

Second, upon failure to obtain service within 180 days, § 2004(1) affords an ordinary plaintiff an opportunity to avoid the trial court’s discretionary power to dismiss by showing “good cause why such service was not made within that period.”

Section 2004(I) allows 180 days to serve process before dismissal for failure to serve.

Burk v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections · filed 2013-10-01(I)

However, if the trial court had dismissed this action because of failure to serve process it would have been premature. Burk filed his Motion to Override on October 19, 2009. The Journal Entry of Judgment was filed on January 13, 2010. This is much less than the one hundred and eighty (180) days allowed by 12 O.S. Supp.2009, § 2004(I), to serve process prior to dismissal.

Under § 2004(I), the 180-day service period's expiration ripens grounds for dismissal, but a final appealable order is required before the dismissal starts the savings statute's refiling period.

COLE v. JOSEY · filed 2019-05-29(I)

The best interpretation of the "deemed dismissed" language is that after the expiration of the 180 days under § 2004 (I), grounds for dismissal have ripened.4 However, the dismissal will not be final for purposes of 12 O.S. 2011, § 100 until, at the earliest, a final appealable order is filed.

Section 2004(I)'s deemed dismissal after 180 days without service does not itself start the one-year savings period when no appealable dismissal order was entered; a later voluntary dismissal starts that period.

PEREZ v. VANDERSEE · filed 2019-10-14(I)

The sole issue on appeal is whether the re-filing of a petition after the first petition is voluntarily dismissed without effecting service of summons within 180 days must take place within one year of the date of the voluntary dismissal or within one year from the date the petition was "deemed dismissed" under § 2004(I) for failure to make service. ... Despite this slightly different factual scenario, however, we find the reasoning of Cole v. Josey applies to the current case, and the savings period of 12 O.S.2011 § 100 did not start to run until June 16, 2017, when Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action.

Section 2004(I) requires a court order and an opportunity to show good cause before an action is deemed dismissed for failure to serve process; a plaintiff cannot declare an earlier dismissal date.

STATE ex rel. DOAK v. BMSI HOLDINGS · filed 2023-02-10(I)

The statute does not authorize Receiver to unilaterally determine or confess the action was "deemed dismiss" or to orchestrate when an action will be deemed dismissed. It clearly contemplates an action will be deemed dismissed by order of the trial court after opportunity to show good cause.

The 2017 amendment to § 2004(I) does not retroactively eliminate the opportunity under the 2013 version to show good cause for service after the 180-day period.

THACKER v. COWLING · filed 2020-06-09(I)

We decline to apply the 2017 amendment of section 2004(I) to the extent that doing so would preclude Thacker from an opportunity to show good cause why he failed to serve the defendants within one hundred and eighty days after filing this case.

Section 2004(I)'s 180-day service period was tolled from March 16 through May 15, 2020, by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's emergency orders.

MCBEE v. SHANAHAN HOME DESIGN · filed 2021-11-16(I)

This Court's emergency orders acted to suspend or toll the period under § 2004(I); therefore, plaintiff timely accomplished service of process when the period between March 16, 2020, and May 15, 2020, is excluded from computing the deadline.

Section 2004(I)'s 180-day service period runs from the filing of the original petition when an amended petition corrects an omitted party in the caption.

KPIELE-PODA v. PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY · filed 2023-02-14(I)

The omission of a party from the caption is not fatal where the party is sufficiently named in the body of the petition; § 2010(A) is satisfied by an amended petition filed pursuant to § 2015(A); and the amended petition is served within 180 days from the filing date of the original petition pursuant to § 2004(I).

Section 2004(I) deems an action or unserved defendant dismissed on the 181st day after filing if the plaintiff fails to serve summons within 180 days and cannot show good cause.

THIBAULT v. GARCIA · filed 2017-06-14(I)

If a plaintiff cannot show good cause for failing to serve summons within 180 days, the case or defendant not served “shall be deemed dismissed” as of the 181st day.

Section 2004(I) deems an action dismissed when service is not made within 180 days after the petition is filed and the plaintiff shows no good cause for the delay.

POPPINGA v. WALLACE · filed 2025-03-04(I)

Even if the parties and nature of the suit had been correctly identified, Father's proof of publication appears untimely. Section 2004 (I) provides that service not made within one hundred eighty (180) days after the filing of the petition "shall be deemed dismissed" where the plaintiff has not shown good cause for the delay.

Section 2004(I) makes an action subject to dismissal after the 180-day service deadline expires, but does not automatically dismiss it on the 181st day.

Nosak v. National Liability & Fire Insurance Company · filed 2025-06-09(I)

The “shall be deemed dismissed” language in 12 O.S. § 2004(I), however, does not mean the action is automatically dismissed by operation of law on the 181st day.

Section 2004(1) requires service of the petition within its prescribed time limit.

Bluejacket v. City of Tulsa · filed 2005-03-11(1)

Upon notice of the misnomer of the proper party defendant, Plaintiff promptly amended her petition to correct the misnomer, and obtained service of her amended petition, properly naming City as defendant, on the City Clerk, the proper service agent for City under 11 O.S. § 22-103,3 within the time prescribed by § 2004(1).

Section 2004(E)(5) requires service outside Oklahoma to be made on the designated individual or individuals, but does not require compliance with the foreign state's service-of-process law when the service satisfies due process.

Strong v. Laubauch · filed 2004-06-16(E)(5)

There is no reference to foreign law in the requirement that “service outside this state . . . must be made upon the designated individual or individuals.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(E)(5). We conclude that the process employed here provided SBTC with actual notice and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Section 2004(c)(5) permits service on the State through the officer designated by statute, its chief executive officer, or an official responsible for maintaining its records; § 2004(C)(2)(c) makes service by mail effective when an authorized or regular certified-mail recipient in the specified official's office accepts or refuses the papers.

Krause v. Oklahoma State of · filed 2025-04-29(c)(5), (C)(2)(c)

Oklahoma law provides that service upon a state is accomplished by “delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition to the officer or individual designated by specific statute” or to “the chief executive officer or a clerk, secretary or other official whose duty it is to maintain the official records of the organization.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(c)(5). In addition, service by mail is effective when a copy of the summons and petition is “accept[ed] or refus[ed] by an employee of the office of the officials specified in [(C)(1)(c)(5)] who is authorized to or who regularly receives certified mail.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(c). No Oklahoma statute provides specifically for service upon the State of Oklahoma as an entity. Therefore, Plaintiff was required to serve a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on the chief executive officer of the State.

Section 2004(C)(2) requires certified-mail service to be restricted to the addressee, or accepted by a person authorized under subsection (c); actual notice does not cure acceptance by an unauthorized person.

Hukill v. Oklahoma Native American Domestic Violence Coalition · filed 2008-09-17(C)(2)(b), (C)(2)(c)

Thus, because Ms. Hukill’s attempted service by mail was accepted by an unauthorized person, it did not substantially comply with the statute and was invalid. See Ferguson Enter., 13 P.3d at 484; Graff, 814 P.2d at 490. Moreover, although we concur with the district court’s conclusion that defendants had actual notice of the lawsuit in this case, the holdings in Graff and Ferguson Enterprises preclude us from finding, based upon that conclusion, that Ms. Hukill substantially complied with the requirements for service by mail under § 2004(C)(2). See 13 P.3d at 482, 484; 814 P.2d at 492.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.

Kendall v. Turn-Key Specialists, Inc. · filed 2012-11-28(F)

“In Oklahoma, this two-part inquiry collapses into a single due process analysis,” because Oklahoma permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, so the statutory and due-process inquiries collapse into one.

Monge v. RG Petro-Machinery (Group) Co. · filed 2012-12-07(F)

Oklahoma courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F). As “Oklahoma’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of any jurisdiction that is consistent with the United States Constitution, the personal jurisdiction inquiry under Oklahoma law collapses into the single due process inquiry.”

Section 2004(F) authorizes Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, so the inquiry is reduced to federal due process when no separate state-constitutional objection is made.

White Buffalo Environmental, Inc. v. Hungry Horse, LLC · filed 2021-02-25(F)

“Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes courts to ‘exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.’” Id. at 1229 (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F)). As neither party raises any objection based on the Oklahoma constitution, “the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 903 (10th Cir. 2017); Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013)).

Section 2004(F) authorizes Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, so courts may not impose a fiduciary-shield limit narrower than due process allows.

Low v. Omni Life Science Inc · filed 2019-07-17(F)

The Court must therefore apply state law, by which “[t]he Oklahoma legislature has authorized Oklahoma courts to ‘exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the [Oklahoma] Constitution . . . and the Constitution of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F)). ... A determination that the fiduciary shield doctrine applied would be inconsistent with § 2004(F) because the doctrine is not required by due process. ... Applying the fiduciary shield doctrine would limit the reach of personal jurisdiction to some distance shorter than that allowed by § 2004(F). Judicially imposing such a limitation, absent any indication that the legislature intended as much, is not within the Court’s purview.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the state and federal Constitutions.

Brifen USA Inc v. Briggs Brothers Enterprises Corporation · filed 2024-03-29(F)

Oklahoma has enacted a “long-arm” statute that authorizes its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution. See id. at 1228-29; see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F). As relevant here, the Court’s inquiry is reduced to a single question: whether the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant Briggs is consistent with constitutional due process. See id. at 1229; Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1239.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(3) permits service on a domestic or foreign corporation by delivering the summons and petition to an officer, managing or general agent, or another agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service, without requiring service at the corporation's operating address.

WILLIAMS v. MEEKER NORTH DAWSON NURSING LLC · filed 2019-12-17(C)(1)(c)(3)

Proper service of process can be made to an authorized registered agent of a foreign or domestic corporation or partnership. ... By making the Corporation Company the registered agent, Meeker authorized the Corporation Company to act as an agent of the company for the specific purpose of receiving service of process. ... Any claim made by Meeker that Williams should have sent service of process directly to Meeker's operating address is flawed for two reasons: first, because Oklahoma doesn't require this type of service under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004, and second, because Meeker was made aware of imminent litigation at Meeker's operating address when Decedent's former attorney sent the September 2014 letter directly to Meeker's operating address. ... Further, there is no question that knowledge of the agent is imputed onto the principal.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) requires certified-mail service to be delivery-restricted to the addressee, but substantial compliance may suffice; under § 2004(C)(2)(c), default cannot be entered without a return receipt showing acceptance, and the presumption of authorized acceptance applies at a corporation’s registered office or principal place of business, not its registered agent’s address.

Stillwater Medical Center Authority v. Winchester Global Trust Company Limited · filed 2020-09-30(C)(2)(b), (C)(2)(c)

Plaintiff, however, failed to elect that delivery be restricted to the addressee, as required under the statute. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(b) (“Service by mail shall be accomplished by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.”); ... This oversight is not automatically fatal to otherwise valid service, as substantial compliance is sufficient under Oklahoma law. ... Section 2004(C)(2)(c) of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that, “[s]ervice by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant.” ... Applying the substantial compliance standard, courts have found that an attempt to serve by mail may be effective even in the absence of restricted delivery, if it can be shown that “service [was] delivered to or refused by the addressee, or by an authorized person.” ... In this case, however, the signature of the individual who accepted service is illegible, which prevents the Court from making this determination. ... Further, while § 2004(C)(2)(c) allows a court to presume, for purposes of the entry of a default, that a return receipt signed at a corporation’s registered office or principal place of business was “signed by an employee authorized to receive certified mail,” which in turn would “constitute acceptance . . . by the party addressed,”1 the statute provides for no such presumption when process is mailed to the registered agent’s address.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) requires certified-mail service to be delivery-restricted to the addressee, and § 2004(C)(2)(c) bars default or default judgment unless the record contains a return receipt showing the defendant’s acceptance or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process.

Carlisle v. First Financial Asset Management Inc · filed 2024-09-13(C)(2)(b), (C)(2)(c)

First, Oklahoma law requires service by certified mail to be restricted to the addressee. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(b) (“Service by mail shall be accomplished by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.”). ... Under Oklahoma law, “[s]ervice by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(c). Here, Plaintiff’s proof of delivery does not allow the Court to determine whether the served individual or entity had authority to accept service on behalf of Defendant.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) requires certified-mail service to be delivery-restricted to the addressee, and subsection (C)(2)(c) bars default or default judgment without a return receipt showing the defendant's acceptance or a returned envelope showing refusal.

Nautilus Insurance Company v. Horn · filed 2024-12-20(C)(2)(b) (C)(2)(c)

Oklahoma law requires service by certified mail to be restricted to the addressee. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(b) (“Service by mail shall be accomplished by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.”). Further, “[s]ervice by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(c).

Section 2004 permits service on a foreign corporation by certified mail, return receipt requested, with delivery restricted to the addressee.

Phi Technologies v. New England Sound & Communications, Inc. · filed 1986-01-29(C)(2), (D)(3)

The applicable Oklahoma statute, 12 O.S. Supp.1984, § 2004(C), (E), (F), the “new” Oklahoma Pleading Code, effective November 1, 1984 and dispositive of the issue for the instant action, authorizes service of process upon a foreign corporation by certified mail, return receipt requested, with delivery restricted to the addressee.

Section 2004(C)(2)(a) permits an attorney’s clerical staff to mail process at the attorney’s direction; the attorney need not mail it personally.

Foye v. Eastover Bank for Savings · filed 1991-03-12(C)(2)(a)

The Trial Court determined that “the attorney is not personally required to mail certified mail for service to be validly obtained,” and ruled that such service accomplished by an attorney’s clerical staff, at the attorney’s direction, is sufficient. We go no farther than to agree with the Trial Court’s conclusion, and further find such service by mail and receipt thereof by and employee of Bank normally charged with such receipt to be in substantial compliance with § 2004 so as to obtain jurisdiction and *111commence response times under the Oklahoma Pleading Code.

Section 2004(C)(2)(a) makes service by mail effective upon receipt or, if refused, upon refusal.

Dawson v. Douglas · filed 1993-02-16(C)(2)(a)

Section 2004C.2.a. provides that service by mail shall be effective on the date of receipt, or, if refused, on the date of refusal of the summons and petition by the defendant.

Section 2004(C)(2)(c) requires a default judgment to be set aside if the defendant shows that an unauthorized person refused delivery of service.

Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. v. H. Webb Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2000-10-10(C)(2)(c)

Title 12 0.8. § 2004(C)(2)(c) provides that any default judgment shall be set aside upon motion of the defendant if the defendant demonstrates to the court that delivery was refused by an unauthorized person.

Section 2004(C)(2)(c) allows a defendant to challenge defective mail service when seeking to vacate a default judgment, even if the motion also raises nonjurisdictional grounds.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Crutchfield · filed 2006-07-20(C)(2)(c)

We believe that § 2004(C)(2)(c) provides ample authority that joining non-jurisdictional with jurisdictional grounds in a petition to vacate a default judgment does not waive all defects in service.

Section 2004(C)(2)(c) does not permit a default judgment based on certified mail returned as unclaimed rather than refused.

Genoff Farms, Inc. v. Seven Oaks South, LLC · filed 2011-01-31(C)(2)(c)

These returned envelopes marked "unclaimed" do not meet the service of process requirements specified in 12 O.S. Supp.2008 § 2004.

Section 2004 permits service of a garnishment summons by certified mail without restricted delivery; a return receipt signed at the garnishee's principal place of business is presumed signed by an employee authorized to receive certified mail.

Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Collins · filed 2013-02-15(C)(2)(b)-(c)

In the present case, Creditor served the garnishment summons by certified mail at Garnishee's principal place of business and received a return receipt presumed to have been signed by an employee authorized to receive certified mail. Creditor was not required to use restricted delivery. We hold Creditor obtained proper service on Garnish ee.

Section 2004(C)(2) does not permit a default judgment based on certified mail returned unclaimed rather than refused.

SIT v. Tulsa Turbine Engines & Aircraft, LLC · filed 2013-10-10(C)(2)

The certified mail envelopes to the Sherrills show they were not refused-they were returned by the U.S. Postal Service marked "unclaimed unable to forward." Failing the statutory test mandated by § 2004(C)(2), any judgment based on this purported service is clearly invalid.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) requires certified-mail service to be restricted to the addressee; acceptance by an unauthorized person does not substantially comply with the statute.

Bailey's Welding & Machine LLC v. Del Corporation · filed 2020-04-09(C)(2)(b)

Although plaintiff argues that it substantially complied with the requirements for service by mail under § 2004(C)(2)(b), the court finds otherwise. Plaintiff’s attempted service by mail was accepted by an unauthorized person. Thus, it did not substantially comply with the statute and the service was invalid.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) permits substantial compliance with certified-mail service despite omitted restricted delivery, but requires proof that an authorized person received the documents.

Rudman v. Oklahoma State of · filed 2022-11-18(C)(2)(b)

While the failure to specify restricted delivery does not prevent substantial compliance with the statute, see, Hukill v. Oklahoma Native American Domestic Violence Coalition, 542 F.3d 794, 802 (10th Cir. 2008), the court concludes that plaintiffs’ failure to show that an authorized person received the service documents via certified mail precludes a finding that plaintiffs substantially complied with the statute.

Section 2004’s service requirements are satisfied by substantial compliance when the method used has a reasonable probability of giving the recipient notice.

Bristow First Assembly of God v. BP p.l.c. · filed 2016-09-28(C)(1)(c)(3)

Strict compliance with the Oklahoma statutory scheme is not required for service to be proper; instead, “substantial compliance” is sufficient. ... However, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ attempted service to be in substantial compliance with the statutory scheme. Given that BP designated BP America, Inc. as its agent for inquiries regarding the Annual Report, the method employed by Plaintiffs was imperfect but had a reasonable probability of affording BP with notice.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b) permits service by certified mail with restricted delivery; unrestricted delivery can substantially comply when the defendant receives actual notice and suffers no prejudice.

Pendleton v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2019-09-30(C)(2)(b)

As in Niwei and Coulsen, the record in this case reflects that the Commissioners received actual notice of Plaintiff’s lawsuit and are otherwise unprejudiced by Plaintiff’s technical deficiency. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff substantially complied with Oklahoma’s service statute, the requested relief of dismissal or quashing of service is unwarranted, and the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Commissioners.

Section 2004 authorizes service by specified methods, including personal delivery and certified mail, but does not authorize service by posting notice on a defendant’s door.

Harvey v. Filart · filed 2021-10-06(C)(1), (C)(2)

The applicable Oklahoma law is found in title 12, section 2004 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which allows for service of process to be made by six different methods. Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2004(C)(1)–(6). Two such methods that are relevant here are service by personal delivery and service by mail. Id. § 2004(C)(1), (2). Importantly, service by posting notice on a defendant’s door is not included.

Section 2004(1) makes dismissal for service more than 180 days after filing mandatory unless the plaintiff shows good cause, and it does not permit a discretionary extension without that showing.

Brown v. K-MAC Enterprises · filed 2012-09-19(1)

The language of § 2004(1), as amended in 2009, is mandatory rather than permissive.

Section 2004 places the issuance of summons at the plaintiff’s election.

Gugello v. Select Specialty Hospital-Tulsa, Inc. · filed 2006-07-11(C)(1)(a), (C)(2)(a)

Title 12 O.S.2001 §§ 2004(C)(1)(a) and (C)(2)(a) provide that the issuance of summons is within the sole discretion and “(a)t the election of the plaintiff.”

Section 2004(C) governs the physical details of service, not the contents of the notice required to initiate a small claims action.

MANGUM OIL & GAS v. MAYABB · filed 2013-11-19(C)

However, § 2004(C) deals with the physical details of service, not the required contents of the notice.

Section 2004 service is not automatically required to notify respondents of an initial mandamus motion; the court must state if it requires that form of service.

RAY v. STITT · filed 2023-03-01

If the court intended to restrict the form of notice to service pursuant to § 2004, due process required the court to have articulated this restriction.

Section 2004 service is not automatically required to give notice of an initial mandamus motion.

RAY v. STITT · filed 2023-03-01

Respondents' interpretation is that such notice necessarily implicates the requirements of 12 O.S. § 2004... The trial court's order, while not specifically embracing this proposition, can only be understood to endorse it. For the following reasons, we find it a misinterpretation of law.

Section 2004(C)(7) bars a prisoner in a jail or prison from being appointed by a court to serve process on a defendant, party, or witness.

Reed v. Crow · filed 2022-01-11(C)(7)

Further, the Oklahoma Pleading Code expressly provides: “No prisoner in any jail, Department of Corrections facility, [or] private prison . . . shall be appointed by any court to serve process on any defendant, party or witness.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(7). Therefore, Plaintiff is not permitted to personally serve the defendants by mail, making his alleged denial of access to certified mail moot.

Section 2004(C)(7) prevents a court from appointing a prisoner to make personal service, but does not prevent a prisoner from using standard methods of service to give notice.

RAY v. STITT · filed 2023-03-01(C)(7)

Section 2004(C)(7), however, prevents a court from appointing a prisoner to make personal service on anyone. We see no indication that it prevents a prisoner from making use of any standard method of service available to a non-prisoner to provide notice to another party.

Section 2004(C)(7) prohibits courts from appointing prisoners to serve process.

WONSCH and VUNCANNON v. BOWMAN · filed 2025-06-06(C)(7)

In fact, section 2004(C)(7) explicitly precludes Wonsch from such a special appointment: "No prisoner in any jail, Department of Corrections facility, private prison, or parolee or probationer under supervision of the Department of Corrections shall be appointed by any court to serve process on any defendant, party or witness."

In an action seeking discretionary federal statutory damages rather than money owed, the notice requirement to state the total amount claimed is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid judgment.

J and J Sports Productions Inc v. Spears · filed 2023-04-24(C)(3)(c)(1)

Similarly, this case was not an action to recover money due, but to remedy a violation of rights that exist only under federal statutes. Plaintiff did not seek to recover damages for Defendant’s alleged nonpayment of money owed (such as a license fee) but to obtain a discretionary award of statutory damages that were judged to be appropriate under the circumstances. Under Read, the notice prescribed by § 2004(C)(3)(c)(1) was not a jurisdictional prerequisite for entry of a valid judgment. Thus, Plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with that provision does not preclude a finding that Plaintiff’s service by publication of Defendant substantially complied with the statute.

Section 2004(C)(3)(a) permits service by publication only when due diligence shows that service cannot be made by another method; an unsupported claim of diligence does not suffice.

Blackgold Exploration Co. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1991-01-09(C)(3)(a)

The burden of affording proper service rests on the plaintiff, First Federal. While First Federal stated in its affidavit that Atkinson could not be located with due diligence, the facts do not support this claim. We also note that Atkinson lived outside the circulation area of the Journal Record, the newspaper in which the notice appeared. Thus, the trial court erred in approving the notice by publication.

Section 2004(C)(3)(a) does not permit service by publication when the defendant’s address is known and the plaintiff has not shown due diligence in attempting other methods of service.

United States v. Sweeney · filed 2000-08-07(C)(3)(a)

The court concludes that service by publication is not permitted in this instance. ... It is undisputed that plaintiff knows the Sweeneys’ home address and Allen Sweeney’s work address. Thus, service by publication is not permitted. Moreover, the court finds that plaintiff has not established that it exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the Sweeneys.

Section 2004’s publication notice requirement for actions seeking money does not make notice of a child support amount a jurisdictional prerequisite in a divorce proceeding.

Read v. Read · filed 2002-02-11(C)(3)(c)(1)

A divorce proceeding in which child support is an issue is not a common-law action for the recovery of money. Hence, the notice requirement of 12 O.S.1991 § 2004(C)(3)(c)(l) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a valid child support order.

Section 2004(C)(3)(a) permits service by publication when diligent efforts to serve the defendant by other methods have failed.

Mare Oil Co. v. Deep Blue Royalties, L.L.C. · filed 2002-12-23(C)(3)(a)

We hold, based upon the record presented, that Mare’s attempts at personal service satisfied the “due diligence” prerequisite for service by publication.

Section 2004 permits service by publication when the plaintiff states that due diligence cannot achieve service by another method; that diligence requires a meaningful search of readily available records.

State Ex Rel. Christian v. McCauley · filed 2008-04-10(C)(3)(a)

However, publication service is authorized when it is either stated in the petition or in a separate affidavit filed by the plaintiff or his attorney "that with due diligence service cannot be made upon the defendant by any other method." 12 O.S. Supp.2007 § 2004(C)(@8)(a). ... Here, in contrast, the State failed to supplement the Treasurer's report by examining readily accessible, relevant public records, such as County Clerk and Corporation Commission records.

Section 2004(C)(3) generally requires a showing of due diligence before service by publication, but the specific notice statute governs drug-related forfeiture actions.

State ex rel. Henry v. Seventeen Thousand Twenty-Three Dollars & Thirty-Six Cents ($17,023.36) in United States Currency · filed 1992-03-24(C)(3)

Thus, while 12 O.S. § 2004(C)(3) deals with “service of summons” generally (and admittedly requires a showing of “due diligence” to ascertain the whereabouts of interested parties as a condition precedent to notice by publication), 63 O.S. § 2-506(C) specifically deals with notice requirements in *451drug related forfeiture actions and makes no requirement for showing of “due diligence” as a condition for notice by publication.

Section 2004(C)(6) permits court-ordered alternative service, including service on a foreign corporation by email, when personal delivery or mail cannot be used, the method is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the plaintiff files a due-diligence affidavit.

Aeronautical Title and Escrow Service LLC v. Shenzhen Zhongtian Hengye International Trade Co LTD · filed 2023-11-01(C)(6)

Section 2004(C)(6), which governs “service by other methods,” to include service on a foreign corporation, provides in relevant part: If service cannot be made by personal delivery or by mail . . . a defendant may be served as provided by court order in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard and upon filing an affidavit by the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney that with due diligence service cannot otherwise be made upon the defendant. ... Shenzhen concedes that “service by personal delivery and mail were not possible methods of service in this instance[.].” Mot. at 4. Moreover, Shenzhen does not argue that service by email was not “reasonably calculated to give [it] actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” Thus, Shenzhen concedes it has received both actual notice and an opportunity to be heard. ... In sum, the Court finds no clear error or manifest injustice as to the state court’s order permitting service by email on Shenzhen.

Section 2004(C)(6) permits court-ordered alternative service reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice and an opportunity to be heard when personal delivery or mail service cannot be made and due diligence is shown.

Parks v. Taylor · filed 2022-03-07(C)(6)

If service cannot be made by personal delivery or by mail, a defendant . . . may be served as provided by court order in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard and upon filing an affidavit by the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney that with due diligence service cannot otherwise be made upon the defendant. ... In this matter, the USMS was unable to locate Defendant Hendershot at OCDC because he no longer worked there. ... Given this apparent dead end in locating Defendant Hendershot, the Court finds it is appropriate to allow service on Gary J. James — who entered an appearance on behalf of Defendant Hendershot in Tenth Circuit Case No. 21-6014 — because service on Mr. James is reasonably calculated to give Defendant Hendershot notice of these proceedings.

Section 2004(C)(2)(b)-(c) permits service by certified mail with specified delivery restrictions and bars entry of default based on mailed service unless the record shows the defendant accepted or refused the process.

Henderson v. Credit World Services Inc · filed 2024-03-01(C)(2)(b)-(c)

Under the applicable Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004, plaintiffs can serve defendants “by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(b). However, it further states that “[s]ervice by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant.” /d. § 2004(C)(2)(c). Here, Plaintiff's proof of service shows neither. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met Plaintiff's burden of showing proper service for purposes of default by following state law.

Section 2004(I) does not automatically dismiss an action against a defendant who was served within 180 days of the original petition, even if the service is later found defective.

Doe v. Lyft Inc · filed 2024-03-04(I)

The statute makes clear that if service was made within 180 days, “the action shall not be dismissed” even if service is later deemed to be defective. So, although Doe should have served Greene with the amended petition, because he was served in the original 180-day window, section 2004(I)’s automatic dismissal provision does not apply.

Section 2004(F) permits Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the state and federal constitutions and applies retroactively to pending actions because it is procedural.

First City Bank, N.A., a National Banking Association v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., a Kansas Corporation, and Gar · filed 1987-06-19(F)

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” ... Since § 2004 F is a jurisdictional statute, Oklahoma courts would apply it retroactively. ... We therefore hold that appellants’ claim is governed by § 2004 F. ... Under § 2004 F, whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over appellants must be determined under federal constitutional law.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) permits service on an individual by personal delivery, delivery at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode to a qualifying resident, or delivery to an agent authorized by appointment or law, and service on an agent for an entity does not substantially comply when the individual is the named defendant.

Cys v. Clark · filed 2024-09-10(C)(1)(c)(1)

Under Oklahoma law, service by personal delivery upon an individual must be accomplished by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition personally or by leaving copies thereof at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person then residing therein who is fifteen (15) years of age or older or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition personally or by leaving copies thereof at an agreed meeting place with some person then residing at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1)(c)(1). Here, the individuals served were purportedly authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for OCCJA, not the individual defendants. Thus, service was not effectuated by any method delineated in Rule 4(e), nor did service substantially comply with the statutory requirements of § 2004(C).

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) requires personal service on an individual by personally delivering the summons and petition, leaving copies at the individual's dwelling with a qualifying resident, or delivering them to an authorized agent, with an agreed-meeting-place alternative.

Lindamood v. Jordan · filed 2025-09-24(C)(1)(c)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds service by U.S. Marshal did not comport with Rule 4(e)(2), nor did it substantially comply with the statutory requirements of § 2004(C)(1)(c)(1).

Section 2004(I) automatically deems a defendant dismissed without prejudice when service is not made within 180 days and the plaintiff fails to show good cause, although post-removal federal law may allow additional time to complete service.

Ware v. Caddo Wind LLC · filed 2025-05-22(I)

If service of process is not made upon a defendant within one hundred eighty (180) days after the filing of the petition and the plaintiff has not shown good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be deemed dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice and Section 100 of this title shall be applicable to any refiling of the action. ... This statute places the burden on plaintiff “to demonstrate good cause why service on the defendant was not made within the prescribed 180—day period.’” ... Accordingly, the remaining Defendants would typically be deemed dismissed pursuant to § 2004(I). ... Plaintiffs suggest that § 2004(I) requires an unserved defendant to obtain a court order stating that the case is dismissed, which Defendants failed to do in this case. Plaintiffs cite no authority to support this argument, which runs counter to the way several federal districts courts have applied § 2004(I).

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) requires personal service to be made in the same manner provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2).

Jaquez · filed 2026-02-23(C)(1)(c)(1)

Here, the USMS11 chose personal service which, under Oklahoma law, must be made in the same manner provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2). Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1)(c)(1). The proofs of service filed by the USMS indicate Defendants Scroggins, Huff and Johnny Dallis were all personally served at 1513 N. Douglas Avenue in Tahlequah, Oklahoma.

Section 2004(P) allows a court to discharge lis pendens notice when compelling equitable considerations justify it, after considering prejudice to the other party.

White v. Wensauer · filed 1985-04-09(P)

Because Oklahoma’s statutory scheme does not expressly provide the legal norms that govern in a proceeding to discharge notice of lis pendens, we hold that the trial court must balance the equities to determine whether, in a particular case, the application of the doctrine is harsh or arbitrary and whether the cancellation of lis pendens would result in prejudice to the nonpetitioning party.

Section 2004 permits service of suit on a corporation through its president.

State ex rel. Moss v. New Day Tabernacle · filed 1990-10-23

New Day denominated its corporate President and co-founder as that person, clearly a permissible person to receive service of suit under 12 O.S.Supp.1988 § 2004.

Section 2004(C) does not authorize service of summons on a party’s counsel.

Morris v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2010-02-09(C)

Section 2004(C) specifies the manner and method of effecting service of summons. Indisputably, Plaintiff did not effect service of summons upon any of Defendants in the manner provided by the statute within 180 days of refiling her petition. The statute does not authorize service of summons upon a parties’ counsel.

Section 2004 requires an agent appointed to receive service of process to have specific authorization from the defendant; general agency is insufficient.

Graff v. Kelly · filed 1991-07-09(C)(1)(c)(1)

An agent authorized by appointment to receive service of process must be one who has received specific authorization by his principal. General agency is not sufficient.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c) requires service on both an incompetent person and the person’s guardian; an unconscious person fits the court’s definition of incompetent.

Porter v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety · filed 1992-08-25(C)(1)(c)

Under 12 O.S.1991 § 2004(C)(1)(c), service upon an incompetent person must be upon both the person and the person’s guardian to be effective. An incompetent person is one who, though not insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or from any other cause, unable or incapable, unassisted to properly take care of himself or manage his property, and by reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons. In re Guardianship of Prince, 379 P.2d 845 (Okla.1963). An unconscious person fits this definition.

Section 2004 requires service on both a person judicially declared mentally incapacitated and that person’s appointed guardian for the court to acquire jurisdiction.

Vance v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1999-09-21(C)(1)(c)(2)

Section 2004(C)(l)(c)(2) means no more than when a person has been declared by a district court to be mentally incapacitated and a guardian appointed, both parties must be served with process for the court to acquire jurisdiction.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) permits service by leaving the summons and petition at a person’s dwelling with a resident age fifteen or older; the rule rests on their shared residence.

Shamblin v. Beasley · filed 1999-01-28(C)(1)(c)(1)

The service in this case is to be treated as within the guidelines prescribed by § 2004(C)(l)(c)(l) and of the general policy expressed in it.

Section 2004 does not permit service at a person's dwelling by delivery to a visiting son who does not reside there.

Garcia v. Ted Parks, L.L.C. · filed 2008-10-07(C)(1)(c)(1)

Here, service was made on the son who merely stopped by his mother's property on the way to visit her in the hospital. Even if applied in the context of a mother/son relationship rather than a spousal relationship, not one Shamblin factor exists. Nor does applying the "totality of the circumstances" test result in a "reasonable probability" that the landowner would have received actual notice by serving the son while his mother was hospitalized. Service was clearly ineffective and contrary to 12 0.S8.2001 § 2004.

Section 2004’s rule for serving an unincorporated association or partnership requires it to use a particular appellation or common name.

Valdez v. Occupants of 3908 SW 24th Street · filed 2011-11-22(C)(1)(c)(8)

She cites to Title 12 O.S. § 187 sic [§ 182] and § 2004(c)(8) sic [§ 2004(C)(1)(c)(8) ] which concern service of process on unincorporated associations and partnerships. However, these statutes require such unincorporated associations and partnerships to be under a particular appellation or common name. The record does not reflect Valdez and Vargas used any particular appellation or common name, nor was service attempted on any appellation or common name.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) permits service at a defendant’s residence by leaving the summons and petition with a resident over age 15.

ASSET ACCEPTANCE v. PHAM · filed 2016-07-07(C)(1)(c)(1)

Defendants were properly served; in compliance with 12 O.S.2011 § 2004(C)(1)(c)(1), the process server left copies of each Defendant's summons and petition at Defendants' residence in Cleveland County, Oklahoma, with their daughter who was over the age of 15 and a resident of the home.

Section 2004 permits service through an agent authorized to receive process for the defendant; service on a police department liaison does not substantially comply when the liaison lacks that authority for officers sued individually.

Logan v. Oklahoma City Police Department · filed 2023-02-10(C)(1)(c)(1)

Oklahoma law permits service by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint upon “an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” 12 O.S. § 2004(C)(1)(c)(1). ... There is no indication that Ms. Grove is authorized by appointment or by law to accept service of process on behalf of defendants, Hodges, Ponder, and Sheets. ... The court concludes that plaintiff did not substantially comply with the service of process requirements in 12 O.S. § 2004.

Section 2004 permits service on an individual through an agent authorized by appointment or law; service on a police department court liaison without that authority does not substantially comply.

Logan v. Oklahoma City Police Department · filed 2023-04-18(C)(1)(c)(1)

The court concludes that plaintiff did not substantially comply with the service of process requirements in 12 O.S. § 2004.

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) requires service left at a person's dwelling to be received by someone who resides there and is at least fifteen years old.

JOSEPH ZALAR, JR. v. JZEE PROPERTIES, LLC · filed 2025-08-01(C)(1)(c)(1)

For example, if the address reflected in the Proof of Service was not Rutherford's "dwelling house or usual place of abode," if Gail Rutherford did not reside at that address, or if Gail Rutherford was not fifteen years of age or older, then the service on Rutherford would not satisfy the requirements of section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1).

Section 2004(C)(1)(c)(1) permits service on an individual through an agent authorized by appointment or law; serving a city clerk does not suffice without that authorization.

Flower · filed 2026-06-05(C)(1)(c)(1)

There is no indication that the City Clerk is authorized by appointment or by law to accept service of process on behalf of Defendant.

Section 2004 permits service of a garnishment summons on a corporation’s authorized service agent outside Oklahoma when service satisfies due process, even if the agent is not designated to receive garnishments under the other state’s law.

Strong v. Laubauch · filed 2003-04-22(C)(1)(c)(3)

The fact that Mr. Lane was not designated to receive service of garnishments under Missouri law does not invalidate the service of process.

Section 2004(B) limits a default judgment to the kind and amount of relief requested in the petition.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sudderth · filed 1993-03-23(B)

That is, the judgment may not be different in kind, or exceed the amount prayed for in the petition. 12 O.S.1991 § 2004(B).

Section 2004(B)(2) makes a default judgment void to the extent it exceeds the relief requested in the petition.

Nelson v. Nelson · filed 1998-02-03(B)(2)

In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we have held that to the extent a default judgment exceeds the relief requested in the petition, the judgment is void.55 Here, nothing in the petition, in Administrative Order CV-95-1, or in the settlement negotiations with the wife,56 put the husband on notice that his visitation rights were in jeopardy. We find that, under these facts, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the default judgment.

Section 2004(C)(3)’s general service provision yields to § 2-506(C) in drug forfeiture proceedings.

State ex rel. Macy v. Four Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Dollars & No/100 · filed 1996-09-17(C)(3)

The above quoted language concerned only whether § 2-506(C) would apply to the forfeiture proceeding rather than the general service of process statute, 12 O.S.1991, § 2004(C)(3). While that decision does recognize the proper application of § 2-506 to forfeiture proceedings over the general provision, it does not hold that manner of service to be exclusive.